draft-ietf-dnsext-restrict-key-for-dnssec-03.txt   draft-ietf-dnsext-restrict-key-for-dnssec-04.txt 
DNS Extensions D. Massey DNS Extensions D. Massey
Internet-Draft USC/ISI Internet-Draft USC/ISI
Expires: December 27, 2002 S. Rose Expires: March 11, 2003 S. Rose
NIST NIST
June 28, 2002 September 10, 2002
Limiting the Scope of the KEY Resource Record Limiting the Scope of the KEY Resource Record
draft-ietf-dnsext-restrict-key-for-dnssec-03 out
draft-ietf-dnsext-restrict-key-for-dnssec-04.txt
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026. all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
Drafts. Drafts.
skipping to change at page 1, line 33 skipping to change at page 1, line 35
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
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This Internet-Draft will expire on December 27, 2002. This Internet-Draft will expire on March 11, 2003.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2002). All Rights Reserved. Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2002). All Rights Reserved.
Abstract Abstract
This document limits the Domain Name System KEY resource record to This document limits the Domain Name System KEY resource record to
only keys used by the Domain Name System Security Extensions only keys used by the Domain Name System Security Extensions
(DNSSEC). The original KEY resource record used sub-typing to store (DNSSEC). The original KEY resource record used sub-typing to store
both DNSSEC keys and arbitrary application keys. Storing both DNSSEC both DNSSEC keys and arbitrary application keys. Storing both DNSSEC
and application keys in one record was a mistake. This document and application keys with the same record type is a mistake. This
removes application keys from the KEY record by redefining the document removes application keys from the KEY record by redefining
Protocol Octet field in the KEY Resource Record Data. As a result of the Protocol Octet field in the KEY Resource Record Data. As a
removing application keys, all but one of the flags in the KEY record result of removing application keys, all but one of the flags in the
become unnecessary and are removed. Three existing application key KEY record become unnecessary and are redefined. Three existing
sub-types are changed to reserved, but the format of the KEY record application key sub-types are changed to reserved, but the format of
is not changed. This document updates RFC 2535. the KEY record is not changed. This document updates RFC 2535.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119. document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [1].
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Motivation for Restricting the KEY Record . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Motivation for Restricting the KEY RR . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1 Differences Between DNSSEC and Application Keys . . . . . . . 4 2.1 Differences Between DNSSEC and Application Keys . . . . . . . 4
3. Definition of the KEY Resource Record . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3. Definition of the KEY Resource Record . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. Changes from RFC 2535 KEY Record . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4. Changes from RFC 2535 KEY RR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. Backward Compatibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 5. Backward Compatibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6. Storing Application Keys in the DNS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 6. Storing Application Keys in the DNS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Full Copyright Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Full Copyright Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document limits the scope the KEY resource record. The KEY This document limits the scope of the KEY resource record. The KEY
resource record was defined in [2] and used resource record sub- resource record was defined in [3] and used resource record sub-
typing to hold arbitrary public keys such as Email, IPSEC, DNSSEC, typing to hold arbitrary public keys such as Email, IPSEC, DNSSEC,
and TLS keys. This document eliminates the existing Email, IPSEC, and TLS keys. This document eliminates the existing Email, IPSEC,
and TLS sub-types and prohibits the introduction of new sub-types. and TLS sub-types and prohibits the introduction of new sub-types.
DNSSEC will be the only allowable sub-type for the KEY record (hence DNSSEC will be the only allowable sub-type for the KEY RR (hence sub-
sub-typing is essentially eliminated) and all but one of the KEY typing is essentially eliminated) and all but one of the KEY RR flags
record flags are also eliminated. are also eliminated.
Section 2 presents the motivation for restricting the KEY record and Section 2 presents the motivation for restricting the KEY record and
Section 3 defines the revised KEY record. Sections 4 and 5 summarize Section 3 defines the revised KEY RR. Sections 4 and 5 summarize the
the changes from RFC 2535 and discuss backwards compatibility. It is changes from RFC 2535 and discuss backwards compatibility. It is
important to note that this document restricts the use of the KEY important to note that this document restricts the use of the KEY RR
record and simplifies the flags, but does not change the definition and simplifies the flags, but does not change the definition or use
or use of DNSSEC keys. of DNSSEC keys.
2. Motivation for Restricting the KEY Record 2. Motivation for Restricting the KEY RR
The KEY record RDATA [2] consists of Flags, a Protocol Octet, an The KEY RR RDATA [3] consists of Flags, a Protocol Octet, an
Algorithm type, and a Public Key. The Protocol Octet identifies the Algorithm type, and a Public Key. The Protocol Octet identifies the
KEY record sub-type. DNSSEC public keys are stored in the KEY record KEY RR sub-type. DNSSEC public keys are stored in the KEY RR using a
using a Protocol Octet value of 3. Email, IPSEC, and TLS keys were Protocol Octet value of 3. Email, IPSEC, and TLS keys were also
also stored in the KEY record and used Protocol Octet values of 1,2, stored in the KEY RR and used Protocol Octet values of 1,2, and 4
and 4 (respectively). Protocol Octet values 5-254 were available for (respectively). Protocol Octet values 5-254 were available for
assignment by IANA and values were requested (but not assigned) for assignment by IANA and values were requested (but not assigned) for
applications such as SSH. applications such as SSH.
Any use of sub-typing has inherent limitations. A resolver can not Any use of sub-typing has inherent limitations. A resolver can not
specify the desired sub-type in a DNS query and most DNS operations specify the desired sub-type in a DNS query and most DNS operations
apply only to resource records sets. For example, a resolver can not apply only to resource records sets. For example, a resolver can not
directly request the DNSSEC subtype KEY records. Instead, the directly request the DNSSEC subtype KEY RRs. Instead, the resolver
resolver has to request all KEY records associated with a DNS name has to request all KEY RRs associated with a DNS name and then search
and then search the set for the desired DNSSEC sub-type. DNSSEC the set for the desired DNSSEC sub-type. DNSSEC signatures also
signatures also apply to the set of all KEY resource records apply to the set of all KEY resource records associated with the DNS
associated with the DNS name, regardless of sub-type. name, regardless of sub-type.
In the case of the KEY record, the inherent sub-type limitations are In the case of the KEY RR, the inherent sub-type limitations are
exacerbated since the sub-type is used to distinguish between DNSSEC exacerbated since the sub-type is used to distinguish between DNSSEC
keys and application keys. DNSSEC keys and application keys differ keys and application keys. DNSSEC keys and application keys differ
in virtually every respect and Section 2.1 discusses these in virtually every respect and Section 2.1 discusses these
differences in more detail. Combining these very different types of differences in more detail. Combining these very different types of
keys into a single sub-typed resource record adds unnecessary keys into a single sub-typed resource record adds unnecessary
complexity and increases the potential for implementation and complexity and increases the potential for implementation and
deployment errors. Limited experimental deployment has shown that deployment errors. Limited experimental deployment has shown that
application keys stored in KEY records are problematic. application keys stored in KEY RRs are problematic.
This document addresses these issues by removing all application keys This document addresses these issues by removing all application keys
from the KEY resource record. Note that the scope of this document from the KEY resource record. Note that the scope of this document
is strictly limited to the KEY record and this document does not is strictly limited to the KEY RR and this document does not endorse
endorse or restrict the storage of application keys in other resource or restrict the storage of application keys in other, yet undefined,
records. resource records.
2.1 Differences Between DNSSEC and Application Keys 2.1 Differences Between DNSSEC and Application Keys
DNSSEC keys are an essential part of the DNSSEC protocol and are used DNSSEC keys are an essential part of the DNSSEC protocol and are used
by both name servers and resolvers in order to perform DNS tasks. A by both name servers and resolvers in order to perform DNS tasks. A
DNS zone key, used to sign and authenticate RR sets, is the most DNS zone key, used to sign and authenticate RR sets, is the most
common example of a DNSSEC key. SIG(0) [3] and TKEY [2] also use common example of a DNSSEC key. SIG(0) [4] and TKEY [3] also use
DNSSEC keys. DNSSEC keys.
Application keys such as Email keys, IPSEC keys, and TLS keys are Application keys such as Email keys, IPSEC keys, and TLS keys are
simply another type data. These keys have no special meaning to a simply another type data. These keys have no special meaning to a
name server or resolver. name server or resolver.
The following table summarizes some of the differences between DNSSEC The following table summarizes some of the differences between DNSSEC
keys and Application keys: keys and application keys:
1. They serve different purposes. 1. They serve different purposes.
2. They are managed by different administrators. 2. They are managed by different administrators.
3. They are authenticated according to different rules. 3. They are authenticated according to different rules.
4. Nameservers use different rules when including them in responses. 4. Nameservers use different rules when including them in responses.
5. Resolvers process them in different ways. 5. Resolvers process them in different ways.
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keys are managed by application administrators. The DNS zone keys are managed by application administrators. The DNS zone
administrator determines the key lifetime, handles any suspected key administrator determines the key lifetime, handles any suspected key
compromises, and manages any DNSSEC key changes. Likewise, the compromises, and manages any DNSSEC key changes. Likewise, the
application administrator is responsible for the same functions for application administrator is responsible for the same functions for
the application keys related to the application. For example, a user the application keys related to the application. For example, a user
typically manages her own PGP key and a server manages its own TLS typically manages her own PGP key and a server manages its own TLS
key. Application key management tasks are outside the scope of DNS key. Application key management tasks are outside the scope of DNS
administration. administration.
3. DNSSEC zone keys are used to authenticate application keys, but 3. DNSSEC zone keys are used to authenticate application keys, but
application keys MUST NOT be used to authenticate DNS zone keys. A by definition application keys are not allowed to authenticate DNS
DNS zone key is either configured as trusted key or authenticated by zone keys. A DNS zone key is either configured as trusted key or
constructing a chain of trust in the DNS hierarchy. To participate authenticated by constructing a chain of trust in the DNS hierarchy.
in the chain of trust, a DNS zone needs to exchange zone key To participate in the chain of trust, a DNS zone needs to exchange
information with its parent zone [2]. Application keys are not zone key information with its parent zone [3]. Application keys are
configured as trusted keys in the DNS and are never part of any DNS not configured as trusted keys in the DNS and are never part of any
chain of trust. Application key data SHOULD not be exchanged with DNS chain of trust. Application key data is not needed by the parent
the parent zone. A resolver considers an application key and does not need to be exchanged with the parent zone for secure DNS
authenticated if it has a valid signature from the local DNS zone resolution to work. A resolver considers an application key RRset as
keys, but applications could impose additional requirements before authenticated DNS information if it has a valid signature from the
the application key is accepted as authentic. local DNS zone keys, but applications could impose additional
security requirements before the application key is accepted as
authentic for use with the application.
4. It MAY be useful for nameservers to include DNS zone keys in the 4. It may be useful for nameservers to include DNS zone keys in the
additional section of a response, but application keys are typically additional section of a response, but application keys are typically
not useful unless they have been specifically requested. For not useful unless they have been specifically requested. For
example, it could be useful to include the isi.edu zone key along example, it could be useful to include the example.com zone key along
with a response that contain the www.isi.edu A record and SIG record. with a response that contains the www.example.com A record and SIG
A secure resolver will need the isi.edu zone key in order to check record. A secure resolver will need the example.com zone key in
the SIG and authenticate the www.isi.edu A record. It is typical not order to check the SIG and authenticate the www.example.com A record.
useful to include the IPSEC, email, and TLS keys along with the A It is typically not useful to include the IPSEC, email, and TLS keys
record. Note that by placing application keys in the KEY record, a along with the A record. Note that by placing application keys in
resolver will need the IPSEC, email, TLS, and other key associated the KEY record, a resolver would need the IPSEC, email, TLS, and
with isi.edu if the resolver intends to authenticate the isi.edu zone other key associated with example.com if the resolver intends to
key (since signatures only apply to the entire KEY RR set). authenticate the example.com zone key (since signatures only apply to
the entire KEY RR set). Depending on the number of protocols
involved, the KEY RR set could grow unwieldy for resolvers, and DNS
administrators to manage.
5. DNS zone keys require special handling by resolvers, but 5. DNS zone keys require special handling by resolvers, but
application keys are treated the same as any other type of DNS data. application keys are treated the same as any other type of DNS data.
The DNSSEC keys are of no value to end applications, unless the The DNSSEC keys are of no value to end applications, unless the
applications plan to do their own DNS authentication. Secure applications plan to do their own DNS authentication. By definition,
resolvers MUST NOT use application keys as part of the authentication secure resolvers are not allowed to use application keys as part of
process. Application keys have no unique value to resolvers and are the authentication process. Application keys have no unique meaning
only useful to the application requesting the key. Note that if sub- to resolvers and are only useful to the application requesting the
types are used to identify the application key, then either the key. Note that if sub-types are used to identify the application
interface to the resolver needs to specify the sub-type or the key, then either the interface to the resolver needs to specify the
application needs to be able to accept all KEY records and pick out sub-type or the application needs to be able to accept all KEY RRs
the desired the sub-type. and pick out the desired the sub-type.
6. A fault or compromise of a DNS zone key can lead to invalid or 6. A fault or compromise of a DNS zone key can lead to invalid or
forged DNS data, but a fault or compromise of an application key forged DNS data, but a fault or compromise of an application key
SHOULD have no impact on other DNS data. Incorrectly adding or should have no impact on other DNS data. Incorrectly adding or
changing a DNS zone key can invalidate all of the DNS data in zone changing a DNS zone key can invalidate all of the DNS data in zone
and in all of its subzones. By using a compromised key, an attacker and in all of its subzones. By using a compromised key, an attacker
can forge data from the effected zone and any for any of its sub- can forge data from the effected zone and any for any of its sub-
zones. A fault or compromise of an application key has implications zones. A fault or compromise of an application key has implications
for that application, but it SHOULD not have an impact on the DNS. for that application, but it should not have an impact on the DNS.
Note that application key faults and key compromises can have an Note that application key faults and key compromises can have an
impact on the entire DNS if the application key and DNS zone keys are impact on the entire DNS if the application key and DNS zone keys are
both stored in the KEY record. both stored in the KEY RR.
In summary, DNSSEC keys and application keys differ in most every In summary, DNSSEC keys and application keys differ in most every
respect. DNSSEC keys are an essential part of the DNS infrastructure respect. DNSSEC keys are an essential part of the DNS infrastructure
and require special handling by DNS administrators and DNS resolvers. and require special handling by DNS administrators and DNS resolvers.
Application keys are simply another type of data and have no special Application keys are simply another type of data and have no special
meaning to DNS administrators or resolvers. These two different meaning to DNS administrators or resolvers. These two different
types of data do not belong in the same resource record. types of data do not belong in the same resource record.
3. Definition of the KEY Resource Record 3. Definition of the KEY Resource Record
The KEY record uses type 25 and is used as resource record for The KEY RR uses type 25 and is used as resource record for storing
storing DNSSEC keys. The RDATA for a KEY RR consists of flags, a DNSSEC keys. The RDATA for a KEY RR consists of flags, a protocol
protocol octet, the algorithm number octet, and the public key octet, the algorithm number octet, and the public key itself. The
itself. The format is as follows: format is as follows:
--------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| flags | protocol | algorithm | | flags | protocol | algorithm |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| / | /
/ public key / / public key /
/ / / /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
KEY RR Format KEY RR Format
--------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------
In the flags field, all bits except bit 7 are reserved and SHOULD be In the flags field, all bits except bit 7 are reserved and MUST be
zero. If Bit 7 (Zone bit) is set to 1, then the KEY is a DNS Zone zero. If Bit 7 (Zone bit) is set to 1, then the KEY is a DNS Zone
key. If Bit 7 is set to 0, the KEY is not a zone key. SIG(0)/TKEY key. If Bit 7 is set to 0, the KEY is not a zone key. SIG(0)/TKEY
are examples of DNSSEC keys that are not zone keys. are examples of DNSSEC keys that are not zone keys.
The protocol field MUST be set to 3. The protocol field MUST be set to 3.
The algorithm and public key fields are not changed. The algorithm and public key fields are not changed.
4. Changes from RFC 2535 KEY Record 4. Changes from RFC 2535 KEY RR
The KEY RDATA format is not changed. The KEY RDATA format is not changed.
All flags except for the zone key flag are eliminated: All flags except for the zone key flag are eliminated:
The A/C bits (bits 0 and 1) are eliminated. They MUST be set to 0 The A/C bits (bits 0 and 1) are eliminated. They MUST be set to 0
and MUST be ignored by the receiver. and MUST be ignored by the receiver.
The extended flags bit (bit 3) is eliminated. It MUST be set to 0 The extended flags bit (bit 3) is eliminated. It MUST be set to 0
and MUST be ignored by the receiver. and MUST be ignored by the receiver.
The host/user bit (bit 6) is eliminated. It MUST be set to 0 and The host/user bit (bit 6) is eliminated. It MUST be set to 0 and
MUST be ignored by the receiver. MUST be ignored by the receiver.
The zone bit (bit 7) remains unchanged. The zone bit (bit 7) remains unchanged.
The signatory field (bits 12-15) are eliminated by [4]. They MUST The signatory field (bits 12-15) are eliminated by [5]. They MUST
be set to 0 and MUST be ignored by the receiver. be set to 0 and MUST be ignored by the receiver.
Bits 2,4,5,8,9,10,11 remain unchanged. They are reserved, MUST be Bits 2,4,5,8,9,10,11 remain unchanged. They are reserved, MUST be
set to zero and MUST be ignored by the receiver. set to zero and MUST be ignored by the receiver.
Assignment of any future KEY record Flag values requires a standards Assignment of any future KEY RR Flag values requires a standards
action. action.
All Protocol Octet values except DNSSEC (3) are eliminated: All Protocol Octet values except DNSSEC (3) are eliminated:
Value 1 (Email) is renamed to reserved. Value 1 (Email) is renamed to RESERVED.
Value 2 (IPSEC) is renamed to reserved. Value 2 (IPSEC) is renamed to RESERVED.
Value 3 (DNSSEC) is unchanged. Value 3 (DNSSEC) is unchanged.
Value 4 (TLS) is renamed to reserved. Value 4 (TLS) is renamed to RESERVED.
Value 5-254 remains unchanged (reserved). Value 5-254 remains unchanged (reserved).
Value 255 (ANY) is renamed to reserved. Value 255 (ANY) is renamed to RESERVED.
The authoritative data for a zone MUST NOT include any KEY records The authoritative data for a zone MUST NOT include any KEY records
with a protocol octet other than 3. Any future KEY record Protocol with a protocol octet other than 3. The registry maintained by IANA
Octet values requires a standards action. for protocol values is closed for new assignemnts.
Name servers and resolvers SHOULD accept KEY RR sets that contain KEY Name servers and resolvers SHOULD accept KEY RR sets that contain KEY
records with a value other than 3. If out of date DNS zones contain RRs with a value other than 3. If out of date DNS zones contain
deprecated KEY records with a protocol octet value other than 3, then deprecated KEY RRs with a protocol octet value other than 3, then
simply dropping the deprecated KEY records from the KEY RR set would simply dropping the deprecated KEY RRs from the KEY RR set would
invalidate any associated SIG record(s) and could create caching invalidate any associated SIG record(s) and could create caching
consistency problems. Note that KEY records with a protocol octet consistency problems. Note that KEY RRs with a protocol octet value
value other than 3 MUST NOT be used to authenticate DNS data. other than 3 MUST NOT be used to authenticate DNS data.
The algorithm and public key fields are not changed. The algorithm and public key fields are not changed.
5. Backward Compatibility 5. Backward Compatibility
DNSSEC zone key records are not changed and remain backwards DNSSEC zone KEY RRs are not changed and remain backwards compatible.
compatible. A properly formatted RFC 2535 zone KEY would have all A properly formatted RFC 2535 zone KEY would have all flag bits,
flag bits, other than the Zone Bit (Bit 7), set to 0 and would have other than the Zone Bit (Bit 7), set to 0 and would have the Protocol
the Protocol Octet set to 3. This remains true under the restricted Octet set to 3. This remains true under the restricted KEY.
KEY.
DNSSEC non-zone key records (SIG(0)/TKEY keys) are backwards DNSSEC non-zone KEY RRs (SIG(0)/TKEY keys) are backwards compatible,
compatible, but the distinction between host and user keys (flag bit but the distinction between host and user keys (flag bit 6) is lost.
6) is lost.
No backwards compatibility is provided for application keys. Any No backwards compatibility is provided for application keys. Any
Email, IPSEC, or TLS keys are now deprecated. Storing application Email, IPSEC, or TLS keys are now deprecated. Storing application
keys in the KEY record created problems such as keys at the apex and keys in the KEY RR created problems such as keys at the apex and
large RR sets and some change in the definition and/or usage of the large RR sets and some change in the definition and/or usage of the
KEY record would have been required even if the approach described KEY RR would have been required even if the approach described here
here were not adopted. were not adopted.
Overall, existing nameservers and resolvers will continue to Overall, existing nameservers and resolvers will continue to
correctly process KEY records with a sub-type of DNSSEC keys. correctly process KEY RRs with a sub-type of DNSSEC keys.
6. Storing Application Keys in the DNS 6. Storing Application Keys in the DNS
The scope of this document is strictly limited to the KEY record. The scope of this document is strictly limited to the KEY record.
This document prohibits storing application keys in the KEY record, This document prohibits storing application keys in the KEY record,
but it does not endorse or restrict the storing application keys in but it does not endorse or restrict the storing application keys in
other record types. Other documents can describe how DNS handles other record types. Other documents can describe how DNS handles
application keys. application keys.
7. IANA Considerations 7. IANA Considerations
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Second, new values are no longer available for assignment by IANA and Second, new values are no longer available for assignment by IANA and
this document closes the IANA registry for DNS KEY Resource Record this document closes the IANA registry for DNS KEY Resource Record
Protocol Octet Values. Assignment of any future KEY Resource Record Protocol Octet Values. Assignment of any future KEY Resource Record
Protocol Octet values requires a standards action. Protocol Octet values requires a standards action.
8. Security Considerations 8. Security Considerations
This document eliminates potential security problems that could arise This document eliminates potential security problems that could arise
due to the coupling of DNS zone keys and application keys. Prior to due to the coupling of DNS zone keys and application keys. Prior to
the change described in this document, a correctly authenticated KEY the change described in this document, a correctly authenticated KEY
set could include both application keys and DNSSEC keys. If one of set could include both application keys and DNSSEC keys. This draft
the application keys is compromised, it could be used as a false zone restricts the KEY RR to DNS security usage only. This is an attempt
key to create false DNS signatures (SIG records). Resolvers that do to simplify the security model and make it less user-error prone. If
not carefully check the KEY sub-type could believe these false one of the application keys is compromised, it could be used as a
signatures and incorrectly authenticate DNS data. With this change, false zone key to create false DNS signatures (SIG records).
application keys cannot appear in an authenticated KEY set and this Resolvers that do not carefully check the KEY sub-type could believe
vulnerability is eliminated. these false signatures and incorrectly authenticate DNS data. With
this change, application keys cannot appear in an authenticated KEY
set and this vulnerability is eliminated.
The format and correct usage of DNSSEC keys is not changed by this The format and correct usage of DNSSEC keys is not changed by this
document and no new security considerations are introduced. document and no new security considerations are introduced.
References (Normative) References (Normative)
[1] Eastlake, D., "Domain Name System Security Extensions", RFC [1] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[2] Eastlake, D., "Domain Name System Security Extensions", RFC
2535, March 1999. 2535, March 1999.
[2] Eastlake, D., "Secret Key Establishment for DNS (TKEY RR)", RFC [3] Eastlake, D., "Secret Key Establishment for DNS (TKEY RR)", RFC
2930, September 2000. 2930, September 2000.
[3] Eastlake, D., "DNS Request and Transaction Signatures ( [4] Eastlake, D., "DNS Request and Transaction Signatures (
SIG(0)s)", RFC 2931, September 2000. SIG(0)s)", RFC 2931, September 2000.
[4] Wellington, B., "Secure Domain Name System (DNS) Dynamic [5] Wellington, B., "Secure Domain Name System (DNS) Dynamic
Update", RFC 3007, November 2000. Update", RFC 3007, November 2000.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Dan Massey Dan Massey
USC Information Sciences Institute USC Information Sciences Institute
3811 N. Fairfax Drive 3811 N. Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22203 Arlington, VA 22203
USA USA
 End of changes. 

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