draft-ietf-dnsop-maintain-ds-06.txt		rfc8078.txt
	dnsop O. Gudmundsson		Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) O. Gudmundsson
	Internet-Draft CloudFlare		Request for Comments: 8078 CloudFlare
	Intended status: Standards Track P. Wouters		Updates: 7344 P. Wouters
	Expires: July 14, 2017 Red Hat		Category: Standards Track Red Hat
	January 10, 2017		ISSN: 2070-1721 March 2017
	Managing DS records from parent via CDS/CDNSKEY		Managing DS Records from the Parent via CDS/CDNSKEY
	draft-ietf-dnsop-maintain-ds-06
	Abstract		Abstract
	RFC7344 specifies how DNS trust can be maintained across key		RFC 7344 specifies how DNS trust can be maintained across key
	rollovers in-band between parent and child. This document elevates		rollovers in-band between parent and child. This document elevates
	RFC7344 from informational to standards track and adds a standard		RFC 7344 from Informational to Standards Track. It also adds a
	track method for initial trust setup and removal of secure entry		method for initial trust setup and removal of a secure entry point.
	point.
	Changing a domain's DNSSEC status can be a complicated matter		Changing a domain's DNSSEC status can be a complicated matter
	involving multiple unrelated parties. Some of these parties, such as		involving multiple unrelated parties. Some of these parties, such as
	the DNS operator, might not even be known by all the organizations		the DNS operator, might not even be known by all the organizations
	involved. The inability to disable DNSSEC via in-band signaling is		involved. The inability to disable DNSSEC via in-band signaling is
	seen as a problem or liability that prevents some DNSSEC adoption at		seen as a problem or liability that prevents some DNSSEC adoption at
	large scale. This document adds a method for in-band signaling of		a large scale. This document adds a method for in-band signaling of
	these DNSSEC status changes.		these DNSSEC status changes.
	This document describes reasonable policies to ease deployment of the		This document describes reasonable policies to ease deployment of the
	initial acceptance of new secure entry points (DS records)		initial acceptance of new secure entry points (DS records).
	It is preferable that operators collaborate on the transfer or move		It is preferable that operators collaborate on the transfer or move
	of a domain. The best method is to perform a Key Signing Key ("KSK")		of a domain. The best method is to perform a Key Signing Key (KSK)
	plus Zone Signing Key ("ZSK") rollover. If that is not possible, the		plus Zone Signing Key (ZSK) rollover. If that is not possible, the
	method using an unsigned intermediate state described in this		method using an unsigned intermediate state described in this
	document can be used to move the domain between two parties. This		document can be used to move the domain between two parties. This
	leaves the domain temporarily unsigned and vulnerable to DNS		leaves the domain temporarily unsigned and vulnerable to DNS
	spoofing, but that is preferred over the alternative of validation		spoofing, but that is preferred over the alternative of validation
	failures due to a mismatched DS and DNSKEY record.		failures due to a mismatched DS and DNSKEY record.
	Status of This Memo		Status of This Memo
	This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the		This is an Internet Standards Track document.
	provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		received public review and has been approved for publication by the
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
			Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
	This Internet-Draft will expire on July 14, 2017.		Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
			and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
			http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8078.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect		carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
	to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must		to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
	include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of		include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
	the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as		the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
	described in the Simplified BSD License.		described in the Simplified BSD License.
	Table of Contents		Table of Contents
	1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	1.1. Introducing a DS record . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		1.1. Introducing a DS Record . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	1.2. Removing a DS Record . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		1.2. Removing a DS Record . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	1.3. Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		1.3. Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	1.4. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		1.4. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	2. The Three Uses of CDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		2. The Three Uses of CDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	2.1. The meaning of the CDS RRset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		2.1. The Meaning of the CDS RRset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	3. Enabling DNSSEC via CDS/CDNSKEY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		3. Enabling DNSSEC via CDS/CDNSKEY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	3.1. Accept policy via authenticated channel . . . . . . . . . 6		3.1. Accept Policy via Authenticated Channel . . . . . . . . . 6
	3.2. Accept with extra checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		3.2. Accept with Extra Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	3.3. Accept after delay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		3.3. Accept after Delay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	3.4. Accept with challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		3.4. Accept with Challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	3.5. Accept from inception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		3.5. Accept from Inception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	4. DNSSEC Delete Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		4. DNSSEC Delete Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	5. Security considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	6. IANA considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	6.1. Promoting RFC7344 to standards track . . . . . . . . . . 9		6.1. Promoting RFC 7344 to Standards Track . . . . . . . . . . 9
	7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	Appendix A. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	CDS/CDNSKEY [RFC7344] records are used to signal changes in secure		CDS (Child DS) and CDNSKEY (Child DNSKEY) [RFC7344] records are used
	entry points. This is one method to maintain delegations that can be		to signal changes in secure entry points. This is one method to
	used when the DNS operator has no other way to inform the parent that		maintain delegations that can be used when the DNS operator has no
	changes are needed. This document elevates [RFC7344] from		other way to inform the parent that changes are needed. This
	informational to standards track RFC.		document elevates [RFC7344] from Informational to Standards Track.
	In addition, [RFC7344] is lacking two different options for full		In addition, [RFC7344] lacks two different options for full automated
	automated operation to be possible. It did not define a method for		operation to be possible. It does not define a method for the
	the Initial Trust establishment, leaving it open to each parent to		initial trust establishment, leaving it open to each parent to come
	come up with an acceptance policy. Additionally, [RFC7344] did not		up with an acceptance policy. Additionally, [RFC7344] does not
	provide a "delete" signal for the child to inform the parent that the		provide a "delete" signal for the child to inform the parent that the
	DNSSEC security for its domain must be removed.		DNSSEC security for its domain must be removed.
	1.1. Introducing a DS record		1.1. Introducing a DS Record
	Automated insertion of DS records has been limited for many zones by		Automated insertion of DS records has been limited for many zones by
	the requirement that all changes pass through a "registry" of the		the requirement that all changes pass through a "Registry" of the
	child zone's parent. This has significantly hindered deployment of		child zone's parent. This has significantly hindered deployment of
	DNSSEC at large scale for DNS hosters, as the child zone owner is		DNSSEC at a large scale for DNS hosters, as the child zone owner is
	often not aware or able to update DNS records such as the DS record.		often not aware or able to update DNS records such as the DS record.
	This document describes a few possible methods for the parent to		This document describes a few possible methods for the parent to
	accept a request by the child to add a DS record to its zone. These		accept a request by the child to add a DS record to its zone. These
	methods have different security properties that addresses different		methods have different security properties that address different
	deployment scenarios, all resulting in an automated method of trust		deployment scenarios, all resulting in an automated method of trust
	introduction.		introduction.
	1.2. Removing a DS Record		1.2. Removing a DS Record
	This document introduces the delete option for both CDS and CDNSKEY,		This document introduces the delete option for both CDS and CDNSKEY,
	allowing a child to signal to the parent to turn off DNSSEC. When a		allowing a child to signal to the parent to turn off DNSSEC. When a
	domain is moved from one DNS operator to another, sometimes it is		domain is moved from one DNS operator to another, sometimes it is
	necessary to turn off DNSSEC to facilitate the change of DNS		necessary to turn off DNSSEC to facilitate the change of DNS
	operator. Common scenarios include:		operator. Common scenarios include:
	1 Alternative to doing a proper DNSSEC algorithm rollover due to		1. Alternative to doing a proper DNSSEC algorithm rollover due to
	operational limitations such as software limitations.		operational limitations such as software limitations.
	2 Moving from a DNSSEC operator to a non-DNSSEC capable operator.		2. Moving from a DNSSEC operator to a non-DNSSEC-capable operator.
	3 Moving to an operator that cannot/does-not-want to do a proper		3. Moving to an operator that cannot or does not want to do a proper
	DNSSEC rollover.		DNSSEC rollover.
	4 When moving between two DNS operators that use disjoint sets of		4. When moving between two DNS operators that use disjoint sets of
	algorithms to sign the zone, thus an algorithm rollover can not be		algorithms to sign the zone, an algorithm rollover cannot be
	performed.		performed.
	5 The domain holder no longer wants DNSSEC enabled.		5. The domain holder no longer wants DNSSEC enabled.
	The lack of a "remove my DNSSEC" option is cited as a reason why some		The lack of a "remove my DNSSEC" option is cited as a reason why some
	operators cannot deploy DNSSEC, as this is seen as an operational		operators cannot deploy DNSSEC, as this is seen as an operational
	risk.		risk.
	Turning off DNSSEC reduces the security of the domain and thus should		Turning off DNSSEC reduces the security of the domain and thus should
	only be done carefully, and that decision should be fully under the		only be done carefully, and that decision should be fully under the
	child domain's control.		child domain's control.
	1.3. Notation		1.3. Notation
	Signaling can happen via CDS or CDNSKEY records. The only		Signaling can happen via CDS or CDNSKEY records. The only
	differences between the two records is how information is		differences between the two records are how information is
	represented, and who calculates the DS digest. For clarity, this		represented and who calculates the DS digest. For clarity, this
	document uses the term "CDS" throughout the document to mean "either		document uses the term "CDS" to mean "either CDS or CDNSKEY".
	CDS or CDNSKEY".
	When the document uses the word "parent" it implies an entity that is		When this document uses the word "parent", it implies an entity that
	authorized to insert DS records into the parent zone on behalf of the		is authorized to insert DS records into the parent zone on behalf of
	child domain. Which entity this exactly is does not matter. It		the child domain. Which entity this exactly is does not matter. It
	could be the Registrar or Reseller that the child domain was		could be the Registrar or Reseller that the child domain was
	purchased from. It could be the Registry that the domain is		purchased from. It could be the Registry that the domain is
	registered in when allowed. Or it could be some other entity.		registered in when allowed. Or it could be some other entity.
	1.4. Terminology		1.4. Terminology
	The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",		The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
	"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this		"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
	document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].		document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
	2. The Three Uses of CDS		2. The Three Uses of CDS
	In general there are three operations that a domain wants to instruct		In general, there are three operations that a domain wants to
	their parent to perform:		instruct its parent to perform:
	1 Enable DNSSEC validation, i.e. place an initial DS RRset in the		1. Enable DNSSEC validation, i.e., place an initial DS Resource
	parent.		Record Set (RRset) in the parent.
	2 Roll over the Key Signing Key ("KSK"), this means updating the DS		2. Roll over the KSK. This means updating the DS records in the
	records in the parent to reflect the new set of KSK's at the		parent to reflect the new set of KSKs at the child. This could
	child. This could be an ADD operation, a DELETE operation on one		be an ADD operation, a DELETE operation on one or more records
	or more records while keeping at least one DS RR, or a full		while keeping at least one DS RR, or a full REPLACE operation.
	REPLACE operation.
	3 Turn off DNSSEC validation, i.e. delete all the DS records.		3. Turn off DNSSEC validation, i.e., delete all the DS records.
	Rolling the KSK is covered in [RFC7344]. It is considered the safest		KSK rollover is covered in [RFC7344]. It is considered the safest
	use case of a CDS/CDNSKEY record as it makes no change to the trust		use case of a CDS/CDNSKEY record as it makes no change to the trust
	relationship between parent and child. Introduction and removal of		relationship between parent and child. Introduction and removal of
	DS records are defined in this document. As these CDS/CDNSKEY use		DS records are defined in this document. As these CDS/CDNSKEY use
	cases create or end the trust relationship between the parent and		cases create or end the trust relationship between the parent and
	child, these use cases should be carefully implemented and monitored.		child, these use cases should be carefully implemented and monitored.
	2.1. The meaning of the CDS RRset		2.1. The Meaning of the CDS RRset
	The semantic meaning of publishing a CDS RRset is interpreted to		The semantic meaning of publishing a CDS RRset is interpreted to
	mean:		mean:
	"Publishing a CDS or CDNSKEY record signals to the parent that the		Publishing a CDS or CDNSKEY record signals to the parent that the
	child desires that the corresponding DS records be synchronized.		child desires that the corresponding DS records be synchronized.
	Every parent or parental agent should have an acceptance policy of		Every parent or parental agent should have an acceptance policy of
	these records for the three different use cases involved: Initial DS		these records for the three different use cases involved: Initial
	publication, Key rollover, and Returning to Insecure."		DS publication, Key rollover, and Returning to Insecure.
	In short, the CDS RRset is an instruction to the parent to modify the		In short, the CDS RRset is an instruction to the parent to modify the
	DS RRset if the CDS and DS Reset's differ.		DS RRset if the CDS and DS Resets differ.
	The acceptance policy for CDS in the rollover case is "seeing"		The acceptance policy for CDS in the rollover case is "seeing"
	according to [RFC7344]. The acceptance policy in the Delete case is		according to [RFC7344]. The acceptance policy in the Delete case is
	seeing a (validly signed) CDS RRset with the delete operation		seeing a (validly signed) CDS RRset with the delete operation
	specified in this document.		specified in this document.
	3. Enabling DNSSEC via CDS/CDNSKEY		3. Enabling DNSSEC via CDS/CDNSKEY
	There are number of different models for managing initial trust, but		There are number of different models for managing initial trust, but
	in the general case, the child wants to enable global validation. As		in the general case, the child wants to enable global validation. As
	long as the child is insecure, DNS answers can be forged. The goal		long as the child is insecure, DNS answers can be forged. The goal
	is to promote the child from insecure to secure as soon as reasonably		is to promote the child from insecure to secure as soon as reasonably
	possible by the parent. This means that the period from the child's		possible by the parent. This means that the period from the child's
	publication of CDS/CDNSKEY RRset to the parent publishing the		publication of CDS/CDNSKEY RRset to the parent publishing the
	synchronized DS RRset should be as short as possible.		synchronized DS RRset should be as short as possible.
	One important use case is how a third party DNS operator can upload		One important use case is how a third-party DNS operator can upload
	its DNSSEC information to the parent, so the parent can publish a DS		its DNSSEC information to the parent, so the parent can publish a DS
	record for the child. In this case there is a possibility of setting		record for the child. In this case, there is a possibility of
	up some kind of authentication mechanism and submission mechanism		setting up some kind of authentication mechanism and submission
	that is outside the scope of this document.		mechanism that is outside the scope of this document.
	Below are some policies that parents can use. These policies assume		Below are some policies that parents can use. These policies assume
	that the notifications can be verified or authenticated.		that the notifications can be verified or authenticated.
	3.1. Accept policy via authenticated channel		3.1. Accept Policy via Authenticated Channel
	In this case the parent is notified via authenticated channel UI/API		In this case, the parent is notified via authenticated channel UI/API
	that a CDS/CDNSKEY RRset exists. In the case of a CDS RRset the		that a CDS/CDNSKEY RRset exists. In the case of a CDS RRset, the
	parent retrieves the CDS RRset and inserts the corresponding DS RRset		parent retrieves the CDS RRset and inserts the corresponding DS RRset
	as requested. In the case of CDNSKEY the parent retrieves the		as requested. In the case of CDNSKEY, the parent retrieves the
	CDNSKEY RRset and calculates the DS record(s). Parents may limit the		CDNSKEY RRset and calculates the DS record(s). Parents may limit the
	DS record type based on local policy. Parents SHOULD NOT refuse CDS/		DS record type based on local policy. Parents SHOULD NOT refuse CDS/
	CDNSKEY updates that do not (yet) have a matching DNSKEY in the child		CDNSKEY updates that do not (yet) have a matching DNSKEY in the child
	zone. This will allow the child to prepublish a spare (and		zone. This will allow the child to pre-publish a spare (and
	potentially offline) DNSKEY.		potentially offline) DNSKEY.
	3.2. Accept with extra checks		3.2. Accept with Extra Checks
	In this case the parent checks that the source of the notification is		In this case, the parent checks that the source of the notification
	allowed to request the DS insertion. The checks could include		is allowed to request the DS insertion. The checks could include
	whether this is a trusted entity, whether the nameservers correspond		whether this is a trusted entity, whether the nameservers correspond
	to the requester, whether there have been any changes in registration		to the requester, whether there have been any changes in registration
	in the last few days, etc. The parent can also send a notification		in the last few days, etc. The parent can also send a notification
	requesting a confirmation, for example by sending email to the		requesting a confirmation, for example, by sending email to the
	registrant requesting a confirmation. The end result is that the CDS		registrant requesting a confirmation. The end result is that the CDS
	RRset is accepted at the end of the checks or when the out-of-band		RRset is accepted at the end of the checks or when the out-of-band
	confirmation is received. Any extra checks should have proper rate		confirmation is received. Any extra checks should have proper rate
	limiting in place to prevent abuse.		limiting in place to prevent abuse.
	3.3. Accept after delay		3.3. Accept after Delay
	In this case, if the parent deems the request valid, it starts		In this case, if the parent deems the request valid, it starts
	monitoring the CDS RRset at the child nameservers over period of time		monitoring the CDS RRset at the child nameservers over a period of
	to make sure nothing changes. After some time or after a number of		time to make sure nothing changes. After some time or after a number
	checks, preferably from different vantage points in the network, the		of checks, preferably from different vantage points in the network,
	parent accepts the CDS RRset as a valid signal to update its DS RRset		the parent accepts the CDS RRset as a valid signal to update its DS
	for this child.		RRset for this child.
	3.4. Accept with challenge		3.4. Accept with Challenge
	In this case the parent instructs the requester to insert some record		In this case, the parent instructs the requester to insert some
	into the child domain to prove it has the ability to do so (i.e., it		record into the child domain to prove it has the ability to do so
	is the operator of the zone). This method imposes a new task on the		(i.e., it is the operator of the zone). This method imposes a new
	parent to monitor the child zone to see if the challenge has been		task on the parent to monitor the child zone to see if the challenge
	added to the zone. The parent should verify the challenge is		has been added to the zone. The parent should verify that the
	published by all the child's nameservers and should test for this		challenge is published by all the child's nameservers and should test
	challenge from various diverse network locations to increase the		for this challenge from various diverse network locations to increase
	security of this method as much as possible.		the security of this method as much as possible.
	3.5. Accept from inception		3.5. Accept from Inception
	If a parent is adding a new child domain that is not currently		If a parent is adding a new child domain that is not currently
	delegated at all, it could use the child CDS/CDNSKEY RRset to		delegated at all, it could use the child CDS/CDNSKEY RRset to
	immediately publish a DS RRset along with the new NS RRset. This		immediately publish a DS RRset along with the new NS RRset. This
	would ensure that the new child domain is never active in an insecure		would ensure that the new child domain is never active in an insecure
	state.		state.
	4. DNSSEC Delete Algorithm		4. DNSSEC Delete Algorithm
	This document defines the previously reserved DNS Security Algorithm		This document defines the previously reserved DNS Security Algorithm
	Number of value 0 in the context of CDS and CDNSKEY records to mean		Number of value 0 in the context of CDS and CDNSKEY records to mean
	that the entire DS RRset at the parent must be removed. The value 0		that the entire DS RRset at the parent must be removed. The value 0
	remains reserved for the DS and DNSKEY records.		remains reserved for the DS and DNSKEY records.
	No DNSSEC validator can treat algorithm 0 as a valid signature		No DNSSEC validator can treat algorithm 0 as a valid signature
	algorithm. If a validator sees a DNSKEY or DS record with this		algorithm. If a validator sees a DNSKEY or DS record with this
	algorithm value, it must treat it as unknown. Accordingly, the zone		algorithm value, it must treat it as unknown. Accordingly, the zone
	is treated as unsigned unless there are other algorithms present. In		is treated as unsigned unless there are other algorithms present. In
	general the value 0 should never be used in the context of DNSKEY and		general, the value 0 should never be used in the context of DNSKEY
	DS records.		and DS records.
	The CERT record [RFC4398] defines the value 0 similarly to mean the		The CERT record [RFC4398] defines the value 0 similarly to mean the
	algorithm in the CERT record is not defined in DNSSEC.		algorithm in the CERT record is not defined in DNSSEC.
	The contents of the CDS or CDNSKEY RRset MUST contain one RR and only		The contents of the CDS or CDNSKEY RRset MUST contain one RR and only
	contain the exactly the fields as shown below.		contain the exact fields as shown below.
	1 CDS 0 0 0 0		CDS 0 0 0 0
	2 CDNSKEY 0 3 0 0		CDNSKEY 0 3 0 0
	The keying material payload is represented by a single 0. This		The keying material payload is represented by a single 0. This
	record is signed in the same way as regular CDS/CDNSKEY RRsets are		record is signed in the same way as regular CDS/CDNSKEY RRsets are
	signed. This is a change in format from strict interpretation of		signed.
	[RFC7344] and may cause problems with some deployed software.
	Strictly speaking the CDS record could be "CDS X 0 X 0" as only the		Strictly speaking, the CDS record could be "CDS X 0 X 0" as only the
	DNSKEY algorithm is what signals the DELETE operation, but for		DNSKEY algorithm is what signals the DELETE operation, but for
	clarity the "0 0 0 0" notation is mandated - this is not a definition		clarity, the "0 0 0 0" notation is mandated -- this is not a
	of DS Digest algorithm 0. The same argument applies to "CDNSKEY 0 3		definition of DS digest algorithm 0. The same argument applies to
	0 0", the value 3 in second field is mandated by [RFC4034] section		"CDNSKEY 0 3 0 0"; the value 3 in the second field is mandated by
	2.1.2.		[RFC4034], Section 2.1.2.
	Once the parent has verified the CDS/CDNSKEY RRset and it has passed		Once the parent has verified the CDS/CDNSKEY RRset and it has passed
	other acceptance tests, the parent MUST remove the DS RRset. After		other acceptance tests, the parent MUST remove the DS RRset. After
	waiting a sufficient amount of time - depending on the parental TTL's		waiting a sufficient amount of time -- depending on the parental TTLs
	- the child can start the process of turning off DNSSEC.		-- the child can start the process of turning off DNSSEC.
	5. Security considerations		5. Security Considerations
	Turning off DNSSEC reduces the security of the domain and thus should		Turning off DNSSEC reduces the security of the domain and thus should
	only be done as a last resort in preventing DNSSEC validation errors		only be done as a last resort in preventing DNSSEC validation errors
	due to mismatched DS and DNSKEY records.		due to mismatched DS and DNSKEY records.
	Users should keep in mind that re-establishing trust in delegation		Users should keep in mind that re-establishing trust in delegation
	can be hard and takes time. Before deciding to complete the rollover		can be hard and takes time. Before deciding to complete the rollover
	via an unsigned state, all other options should be considered first.		via an unsigned state, all other options should be considered first.
	A parent SHOULD ensure that when it is allowing a child to become		A parent SHOULD ensure that when it is allowing a child to become
	securely delegated, that it has a reasonable assurance that the CDS/		securely delegated, it has a reasonable assurance that the CDS/
	CDNSKEY RRset that is used to bootstrap the security is visible from		CDNSKEY RRset used to bootstrap the security is visible from a
	a geographically and topologically diverse view. It SHOULD also		geographically and topologically diverse view. It SHOULD also ensure
	ensure that the zone validates correctly if the parent publishes the		that the zone validates correctly if the parent publishes the DS
	DS record. A parent zone might also consider sending an email to its		record. A parent zone might also consider sending an email to its
	contact addresses to give the child zone a warning that security will		contact addresses to give the child zone a warning that security will
	be enabled after a certain amount of wait time - thus allowing a		be enabled after a certain amount of wait time -- thus allowing a
	child administrator to cancel the request.		child administrator to cancel the request.
	This document describes a few possible acceptance criteria for the		This document describes a few possible acceptance criteria for the
	Initial Trust establishment. Due to a large variety of legal		initial trust establishment. Due to a large variety of legal
	frameworks surrounding parent domains (TLDs in particular) this		frameworks surrounding parent domains (Top-Level Domain (TLDs) in
	document cannot give a definitive list of valid acceptance criteria.		particular), this document cannot give a definitive list of valid
	Parental zones should look at the listed methods and pick the most		acceptance criteria. Parental zones should look at the listed
	secure method possible within their legal and technical scenario,		methods and pick the most secure method possible within their legal
	possibly further securing the acceptance criteria, as long as the		and technical scenario, possibly further securing the acceptance
	deployed method still enables a fully automated method for non-direct		criteria, as long as the deployed method still enables a fully
	parties such as third party DNS hosters.		automated method for non-direct parties such as third-party DNS
			hosters.
	6. IANA considerations		6. IANA Considerations
	This document updates entry number 0 of the "DNS Security Algorithm		IANA has assigned entry number 0 in the "DNS Security Algorithm
	Numbers" IANA Registry as follows:		Numbers" registry as follows:
	+------+---------+-------+-------+-------+--------------------------+		+--------+--------------+----------+----------+---------+-----------+
	| Numb | Descrip | Mnemo | Zone | Trans | Reference |		| Number | Description | Mnemonic | Zone | Trans. | Reference |
	| er | tion | nic | Signi | . | |		| | | | Signing | Sec. | |
	| | | | ng | Sec. | |		+--------+--------------+----------+----------+---------+-----------+
	+------+---------+-------+-------+-------+--------------------------+		| 0 | Delete DS | DELETE | N | N | [RFC4034] |
	| 0 | Delete | DELET | N | N | [RFC4034][RFC4398]RFC- |		| | | | | | [RFC4398] |
	| | DS | E | | | THIS-DOCUMENT] |		| | | | | | [RFC8078] |
	+------+---------+-------+-------+-------+--------------------------+		+--------+--------------+----------+----------+---------+-----------+
	6.1. Promoting RFC7344 to standards track		6.1. Promoting RFC 7344 to Standards Track
	Experience has shown that CDS/CDNSKEY are useful in the deployment of		Experience has shown that CDS and CDNSKEY are useful in the
	DNSSEC. [RFC7344] was published as Informational, this document		deployment of DNSSEC. [RFC7344] was published as Informational; this
	elevates RFC7344 to standards track.		document elevates RFC 7344 to Standards Track.
	7. References		7. References
	7.1. Normative References		7.1. Normative References
			[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
			Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
			DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
			<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
	[RFC4034] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.		[RFC4034] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
	Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",		Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",
	RFC 4034, DOI 10.17487/RFC4034, March 2005,		RFC 4034, DOI 10.17487/RFC4034, March 2005,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4034>.		<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4034>.
	[RFC7344] Kumari, W., Gudmundsson, O., and G. Barwood, "Automating		[RFC7344] Kumari, W., Gudmundsson, O., and G. Barwood, "Automating
	DNSSEC Delegation Trust Maintenance", RFC 7344,		DNSSEC Delegation Trust Maintenance", RFC 7344,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC7344, September 2014,		DOI 10.17487/RFC7344, September 2014,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7344>.		<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7344>.
	7.2. Informative References		7.2. Informative References
	[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
	Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
	[RFC4398] Josefsson, S., "Storing Certificates in the Domain Name		[RFC4398] Josefsson, S., "Storing Certificates in the Domain Name
	System (DNS)", RFC 4398, DOI 10.17487/RFC4398, March 2006,		System (DNS)", RFC 4398, DOI 10.17487/RFC4398, March 2006,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4398>.		<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4398>.
	Appendix A. Acknowledgments		Acknowledgments
	This document is generated using the mmark tool that Miek Gieben has		We thank a number of people that have provided feedback and useful
	developed. We thank number of people that have provided feedback and		comments including Bob Harold, John Levine, Dan York, Shane Kerr,
	useful comments including Bob Harold, John Levine, Matthijs		Jacques Latour, and especially Matthijs Mekking.
	Mekking(!), Dan York, Shane Kerr, Jacques Latour.
	Authors' Addresses		Authors' Addresses
	Olafur Gudmundsson		Olafur Gudmundsson
	CloudFlare		CloudFlare
	Email: olafur+ietf@cloudflare.com		Email: olafur+ietf@cloudflare.com
	Paul Wouters		Paul Wouters
	Red Hat		Red Hat
	Email: pwouters@redhat.com		Email: pwouters@redhat.com
End of changes. 71 change blocks.
	174 lines changed or deleted		167 lines changed or added
This html diff was produced by rfcdiff 1.45. The latest version is available from http://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcdiff/