draft-ietf-dnsop-refuse-any-04.txt   draft-ietf-dnsop-refuse-any-05.txt 
Network Working Group J. Abley Network Working Group J. Abley
Internet-Draft Dyn, Inc. Internet-Draft Afilias
Updates: 1035 (if approved) O. Gudmundsson Updates: 1035 (if approved) O. Gudmundsson
Intended status: Standards Track M. Majkowski Intended status: Standards Track M. Majkowski
Expires: August 12, 2017 Cloudflare Inc. Expires: September 6, 2018 Cloudflare Inc.
February 08, 2017 March 5, 2018
Providing Minimal-Sized Responses to DNS Queries that have QTYPE=ANY Providing Minimal-Sized Responses to DNS Queries that have QTYPE=ANY
draft-ietf-dnsop-refuse-any-04 draft-ietf-dnsop-refuse-any-05
Abstract Abstract
The Domain Name System (DNS) specifies a query type (QTYPE) "ANY". The Domain Name System (DNS) specifies a query type (QTYPE) "ANY".
The operator of an authoritative DNS server might choose not to The operator of an authoritative DNS server might choose not to
respond to such queries for reasons of local policy, motivated by respond to such queries for reasons of local policy, motivated by
security, performance or other reasons. security, performance or other reasons.
The DNS specification does not include specific guidance for the The DNS specification does not include specific guidance for the
behaviour of DNS servers or clients in this situation. This document behaviour of DNS servers or clients in this situation. This document
aims to provide such guidance. aims to provide such guidance.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on August 12, 2017. This Internet-Draft will expire on September 6, 2018.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Motivations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Motivations for Use of ANY Queries . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. General Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. General Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Behaviour of DNS Responders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4. Behaviour of DNS Responders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.1. Select one RRSet mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4.1. Answer with a Subset of Available RRSets . . . . . . . . 5
4.2. Synthesised HINFO RRset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4.2. Answer with a Synthesised HINFO RRSet . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.3. Guess intention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4.3. Answer with Best Guess as to Intention . . . . . . . . . 5
4.4. Responding to queries over TCP . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4.4. Behaviour with TCP Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Behaviour of DNS Initiators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5. Behaviour of DNS Initiators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. HINFO Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 6. HINFO Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7. Updates to RFC 1035 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 7. Updates to RFC 1035 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8. Implementation Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 8. Implementation Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
11. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 11. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
12.3. URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 12.3. URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Appendix A. Editorial Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Appendix A. Editorial Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
A.1. Change History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 A.1. Change History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
A.1.1. draft-ietf-dnsop-refuse-any-04 . . . . . . . . . . . 8 A.1.1. draft-ietf-dnsop-refuse-any-05 . . . . . . . . . . . 9
A.1.2. draft-ietf-dnsop-refuse-any-03 . . . . . . . . . . . 9 A.1.2. draft-ietf-dnsop-refuse-any-04 . . . . . . . . . . . 9
A.1.3. draft-ietf-dnsop-refuse-any-02 . . . . . . . . . . . 9 A.1.3. draft-ietf-dnsop-refuse-any-03 . . . . . . . . . . . 9
A.1.4. draft-ietf-dnsop-refuse-any-01 . . . . . . . . . . . 9 A.1.4. draft-ietf-dnsop-refuse-any-02 . . . . . . . . . . . 9
A.1.5. draft-ietf-dnsop-refuse-any-00 . . . . . . . . . . . 9 A.1.5. draft-ietf-dnsop-refuse-any-01 . . . . . . . . . . . 10
A.1.6. draft-jabley-dnsop-refuse-any-01 . . . . . . . . . . 9 A.1.6. draft-ietf-dnsop-refuse-any-00 . . . . . . . . . . . 10
A.1.7. draft-jabley-dnsop-refuse-any-00 . . . . . . . . . . 9 A.1.7. draft-jabley-dnsop-refuse-any-01 . . . . . . . . . . 10
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 A.1.8. draft-jabley-dnsop-refuse-any-00 . . . . . . . . . . 10
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The Domain Name System (DNS) specifies a query type (QTYPE) "ANY". The Domain Name System (DNS) specifies a query type (QTYPE) "ANY".
The operator of an authoritative DNS server might choose not to The operator of an authoritative DNS server might choose not to
respond to such queries for reasons of local policy, motivated by respond to such queries for reasons of local policy, motivated by
security, performance or other reasons. security, performance or other reasons.
The DNS specification [RFC1034] [RFC1035] does not include specific The DNS specification [RFC1034] [RFC1035] does not include specific
guidance for the behaviour of DNS servers or clients in this guidance for the behaviour of DNS servers or clients in this
skipping to change at page 3, line 25 skipping to change at page 3, line 25
QTYPE=ANY. An "ANY Response" is a response to such a query. QTYPE=ANY. An "ANY Response" is a response to such a query.
In an exchange of DNS messages between two hosts, this document In an exchange of DNS messages between two hosts, this document
refers to the host sending a DNS request as the initiator, and the refers to the host sending a DNS request as the initiator, and the
host sending a DNS response as the responder. host sending a DNS response as the responder.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY" and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY" and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2. Motivations 2. Motivations for Use of ANY Queries
ANY queries are legitimately used for debugging and checking the ANY queries are legitimately used for debugging and checking the
state of a DNS server for a particular name. ANY queries are state of a DNS server for a particular name.
sometimes used as a attempt to reduce the number of queries needed to
get information, e.g. to obtain MX, A and AAAA RRSets for a mail
domain in a single query. Although there is no documented guidance
available for this use case and some implementations have been
observed that appear not to function as perhaps their developers
expected. For any developer that assumes that ANY query will be sent
to authoritative server to fetch all RRSets, they need to include a
fallback when that does not happen.
ANY queries are also frequently used to exploit the amplification ANY queries are sometimes used as a attempt to reduce the number of
queries needed to get information, e.g. to obtain MX, A and AAAA
RRSets for a mail domain in a single query. There is no documented
guidance available for this use case, however, and some
implementations have been observed not to function as perhaps their
developers expected. Implementers that assume that an ANY query will
ultimately be received by an authoritative server and will fetch all
existing RRSets, should include a fallback mechanism to use when that
does not happen.
ANY queries are frequently used to exploit the amplification
potential of DNS servers/resolvers using spoofed source addresses and potential of DNS servers/resolvers using spoofed source addresses and
UDP transport (see [RFC5358]). Having the ability to return small UDP transport (see [RFC5358]). Having the ability to return small
responses to such queries makes DNS servers less attractive responses to such queries makes DNS servers less attractive
amplifiers. amplifiers.
ANY queries are sometimes used to help mine authoritative-only DNS ANY queries are sometimes used to help mine authoritative-only DNS
servers for zone data, since they are expected to return all RRSets servers for zone data, since they are expected to return all RRSets
for a particular query name. If a DNS operator prefers to reduce the for a particular query name. If a DNS operator prefers to reduce the
potential for information leaks, they MAY choose to not to send large potential for information leaks, they might choose not to send large
ANY responses. ANY responses.
Some authoritative-only DNS server implementations require additional Some authoritative-only DNS server implementations require additional
processing in order to send a conventional ANY response, and avoiding processing in order to send a conventional ANY response, and avoiding
that processing expense might be desirable. that processing expense might be desirable.
3. General Approach 3. General Approach
This proposal provides a mechanism for an authority server to signal This proposal provides a mechanism for an authority server to signal
that conventional ANY queries are not supported for a particular that conventional ANY queries are not supported for a particular
QNAME, and to do so in such a way that is both compatible with and QNAME, and to do so in such a way that is both compatible with and
triggers desirable behaviour by unmodified clients (e.g. DNS triggers desirable behaviour by unmodified clients (e.g. DNS
resolvers). resolvers).
Alternative proposals for dealing with ANY queries have been Alternative proposals for dealing with ANY queries have been
discussed. One approach proposed using a new RCODE to signal that an discussed. One approach proposed using a new RCODE to signal that an
authoritative server did not answer ANY queries in the standard way. authoritative server did not answer ANY queries in the standard way.
This approach was found to have an undesirable effect on both This approach was found to have an undesirable effect on both
resolvers and authoritative-only servers; resolvers receiving an resolvers and authoritative-only servers; resolvers receiving an
unknown RCODE caused them to re-send the same query to all available unknown RCODE would re-send the same query to all available
authoritative servers, rather than suppress future such ANY queries authoritative servers, rather than suppress future such ANY queries
for the same QNAME. for the same QNAME.
This proposal avoids that outcome by returning a non-empty RRSet in This proposal avoids that outcome by returning a non-empty RRSet in
the ANY response, providing resolvers with something to cache and the ANY response, providing resolvers with something to cache and
effectively suppressing repeat queries to the same or different effectively suppressing repeat queries to the same or different
authority servers. authority servers.
4. Behaviour of DNS Responders 4. Behaviour of DNS Responders
Below are the three different modes of behaviour by DNS responders Below are the three different modes of behaviour by DNS responders
for names that exists that are used, listed in the order of when processing queries with QNAMEs that exist, QCLASS=IN and
preference. Operators/Implementers are free to choose whichever QTYPE=ANY. Operators/Implementers are free to choose whichever
mechanism best suits their environment. mechanism best suits their environment.
1. A DNS responder can choose to select one or subset of RRSets at 1. A DNS responder can choose to select one or a larger subset of
the QNAME. the available RRSets at the QNAME.
2. A DNS responder can return a synthesised HINFO resource record. 2. A DNS responder can return a synthesised HINFO resource record.
See Section 6 for discussion of the use of HINFO. See Section 6 for discussion of the use of HINFO.
3. Resolver can try to give out the most likely records the 3. Resolver can try to give out the most likely records the
requester wants. This is not always possible and the likely requester wants. This is not always possible and the result
RRsets may add up to a large answer. might well be a large response.
Except as described below in this section, the DNS responder MUST Except as described below in this section, the DNS responder MUST
follow the standard algorithms when constructing a response. follow the standard algorithms when constructing a response.
4.1. Select one RRSet mode 4.1. Answer with a Subset of Available RRSets
A DNS responder which receives an ANY query MAY decline to provide a A DNS responder which receives an ANY query MAY decline to provide a
conventional response, or MAY instead send a response with a single conventional response, or MAY instead send a response with a single
RRSet in the answer section. RRSet (or a larger subset of available RRSets) in the answer section.
The RRSet returned in the answer section of the response MAY be a The RRSets returned in the answer section of the response MAY consist
single RRSet owned by the name specified in the QNAME. Where of a single RRSet owned by the name specified in the QNAME. Where
multiple RRSets exist, the responder SHOULD choose a small one(s) to multiple RRSets exist, the responder SHOULD choose a small subset of
reduce its amplification potential. those avialable to reduce the amplification potential of the
response.
If the zone is signed RRSIG records MUST be included in the answer If the zone is signed, appropriate RRSIG records MUST be included in
the answer.
4.2. Synthesised HINFO RRset 4.2. Answer with a Synthesised HINFO RRSet
If there is no CNAME present at the owner name matching the QNAME, If there is no CNAME present at the owner name matching the QNAME,
the resource record returned in the response MAY instead be the resource record returned in the response MAY instead be
synthesised, in which case a single HINFO resource record SHOULD be synthesised, in which case a single HINFO resource record SHOULD be
returned. The CPU field of the HINFO RDATA SHOULD be set to RFCXXXX returned. The CPU field of the HINFO RDATA SHOULD be set to RFCXXXX
[note to RFC Editor, replace with RFC number assigned to this [note to RFC Editor, replace with RFC number assigned to this
document]. The OS field of the HINFO RDATA SHOULD be set to the null document]. The OS field of the HINFO RDATA SHOULD be set to the null
string to minimize the size of the response. string to minimize the size of the response.
The TTL encoded for a synthesised RR SHOULD be chosen by the operator The TTL encoded for the synthesised HINFO RR SHOULD be chosen by the
of the DNS responder to be large enough to suppress frequent operator of the DNS responder to be large enough to suppress frequent
subsequent ANY queries from the same initiator with the same QNAME, subsequent ANY queries from the same initiator with the same QNAME,
understanding that a TTL that is too long might make policy changes understanding that a TTL that is too long might make policy changes
relating to ANY queries difficult to change in the future. The relating to ANY queries difficult to change in the future. The
specific value used is hence a familiar balance when choosing TTL for specific value used is hence a familiar balance when choosing TTL for
any RR in any zone, and be specified according to local policy. any RR in any zone, and be specified according to local policy.
If the DNS query includes DO=1 and the QNAME corresponds to a zone If the DNS query includes DO=1 and the QNAME corresponds to a zone
that is known by the responder to be signed, a valid RRSIG for the that is known by the responder to be signed, a valid RRSIG for the
RRSets in the answer (or authority if answer is empty) section MUST RRSets in the answer (or authority if answer is empty) section MUST
be returned. In the case of DO=0, the RRSIG SHOULD be omitted. be returned. In the case of DO=0, the RRSIG SHOULD be omitted.
4.3. Guess intention 4.3. Answer with Best Guess as to Intention
In some cases it is possible to guess what the initiator wants in the In some cases it is possible to guess what the initiator wants in the
answer but not always. Some implementations have implemented the answer but not always. Some implementations have implemented the
spirit of this document by returning all of CNAME or (MX A and AAAA) spirit of this document by returning all of CNAME or (MX A and AAAA)
RRsets that are present. This is not a guess but a heuristic that RRsets that are present. This is not a guess but a heuristic that
seems to work well in practice. The main drawback is the size of the seems to work well in practice. The main drawback is the size of the
answer. answer.
As in the first one if the zone is signed RRSIG MUST be returned if As in the first one if the zone is signed RRSIG MUST be returned if
there the DO bit is set on query. there the DO bit is set on query.
4.4. Responding to queries over TCP 4.4. Behaviour with TCP Transport
There has been a desire to specify that a ANY query over TCP get full A DNS responder MAY behave differently when processing ANY queries
response. This document does not specify that as that is best left received over different transport, e.g. by providing a conventional,
to the operator to decide. Implementers SHOULD provide an option for full response over TCP whilst using one of the other mechanisms
operators to specify behavior over TCP. specified in this document in the case where a query was received
using UDP.
Implementers SHOULD provide configuration options to allow operators
to specify different behaviour over UDP and TCP.
5. Behaviour of DNS Initiators 5. Behaviour of DNS Initiators
A DNS initiator which sends a query with QTYPE=ANY and receives a A DNS initiator which sends a query with QTYPE=ANY and receives a
response containing an HINFO resource record or a single RRset, as response containing an HINFO resource record or a single RRset, as
described in Section 4, MAY cache the response in the normal way. described in Section 4, MAY cache the response in the normal way.
Such cached resource records SHOULD be retained in the cache Such cached resource records SHOULD be retained in the cache
following normal caching semantics, as it would with any other following normal caching semantics, as it would with any other
response received from a DNS responder. response received from a DNS responder.
A DNS initiator MAY suppress queries with QTYPE=ANY in the event that A DNS initiator MAY suppress queries with QTYPE=ANY in the event that
the local cache contains a matching HINFO resource record with the local cache contains a matching HINFO resource record with
RDATA.CPU field, as described in Section 4. Similarly it is fine to RDATA.CPU field, as described in Section 4. A DNS initiator MAY
replay back exactly what Authoritative server returned to ANY query. instead respond to such queries with the contents of the local cache
in the usual way.
6. HINFO Considerations 6. HINFO Considerations
It is possible that the synthesised HINFO RRSet in an ANY response, It is possible that the synthesised HINFO RRSet in an ANY response,
once cached by the initiator, might suppress subsequent queries from once cached by the initiator, might suppress subsequent queries from
the same initiator with QTYPE=HINFO. Thus the use of HINFO in this the same initiator with QTYPE=HINFO. Thus the use of HINFO in this
proposal would hence have effectively mask the HINFO RRSet present in proposal would hence have effectively mask the HINFO RRSet present in
the zone. the zone.
Authority-server operators who serve zones that rely upon Authority-server operators who serve zones that rely upon
skipping to change at page 6, line 48 skipping to change at page 7, line 17
It is important to note that returning a subset of available RRSets It is important to note that returning a subset of available RRSets
when processing an ANY query is legitimate and consistent with when processing an ANY query is legitimate and consistent with
[RFC1035]; ANY does not mean ALL. The main difference here is that [RFC1035]; ANY does not mean ALL. The main difference here is that
the TC bit SHOULD not be set on the response indicating that this is the TC bit SHOULD not be set on the response indicating that this is
not a complete answer. not a complete answer.
This document describes optional behaviour for both DNS initiators This document describes optional behaviour for both DNS initiators
and responders, and implementation of the guidance provided by this and responders, and implementation of the guidance provided by this
document is OPTIONAL. document is OPTIONAL.
RRSIG queries have the same potential as ANY queries of generating RRSIG queries (i.e. queries with QTYPE=RRSIG) are similar to ANY
large answers as well as extra work. DNS implementations are free to queries in the sense that they have the potential to generate large
not return all RRSIG records. In the wild there are implementations responses as well as extra work for the responders that process them,
that return REFUSE, others return single RRSIG, etc. This document e.g. in the case where signatures are generated on-the-fly. RRSIG
recommends returning a single RRSIG in this case. RRSets are not usually obtained using such explicit queries, but are
rather included in the responses for other RRSets that the RRSIGs
cover. This document does not specify appropriate behaviour for
RRSIG queries, but note that future such advice might well benefit
from consistency with and experience of the approaches for ANY
queries described here.
8. Implementation Experience 8. Implementation Experience
In October 2015 Cloudflare Authoritative Name server implementation In October 2015 Cloudflare Authoritative Name server implementation
implemented the HINFO response. Few minor problems have been implemented the HINFO response. A few minor problems were reported
reported and worked out. NSD has for a while implemented a sub-set and have since been resolved.
response. A Bind user implemented this draft suggestion of returning
only single RRset during an attack, his code is now in the current An implementation of the subset-mode response to ANY queries was
release. implemented in NSD 4.1 in 2016.
An implementation of a single RRSet response to an ANY query was made
for BIND9 by Tony Finch, and that functionality was subsequently made
available in production releases starting in BIND 9.11.
9. Security Considerations 9. Security Considerations
Queries with QTYPE=ANY are frequently observed as part of reflection Queries with QTYPE=ANY are frequently observed as part of reflection
attacks, since a relatively small query can be used to elicit a large attacks, since a relatively small query can be used to elicit a large
response; this is a desirable characteristic if the goal is to response; this is a desirable characteristic if the goal is to
maximize the amplification potential of a DNS server as part of a maximize the amplification potential of a DNS server as part of a
volumetric attack. The ability of a DNS operator to suppress such volumetric attack. The ability of a DNS operator to suppress such
responses on a particular server makes that server a less useful responses on a particular server makes that server a less useful
amplifier. amplifier.
skipping to change at page 8, line 11 skipping to change at page 8, line 36
better. Tony Finch realized that this document was valuable and better. Tony Finch realized that this document was valuable and
implemented it while under attack. A large number of people have implemented it while under attack. A large number of people have
provided comments and suggestions we thank them all for the feedback. provided comments and suggestions we thank them all for the feedback.
12. References 12. References
12.1. Normative References 12.1. Normative References
[RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities", [RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
STD 13, RFC 1034, DOI 10.17487/RFC1034, November 1987, STD 13, RFC 1034, DOI 10.17487/RFC1034, November 1987,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1034>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1034>.
[RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and [RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, DOI 10.17487/RFC1035, specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, DOI 10.17487/RFC1035,
November 1987, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1035>. November 1987, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1035>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/ Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
12.2. Informative References 12.2. Informative References
[RFC5358] Damas, J. and F. Neves, "Preventing Use of Recursive [RFC5358] Damas, J. and F. Neves, "Preventing Use of Recursive
Nameservers in Reflector Attacks", BCP 140, RFC 5358, DOI Nameservers in Reflector Attacks", BCP 140, RFC 5358,
10.17487/RFC5358, October 2008, DOI 10.17487/RFC5358, October 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5358>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5358>.
[RFC6895] Eastlake 3rd, D., "Domain Name System (DNS) IANA [RFC6895] Eastlake 3rd, D., "Domain Name System (DNS) IANA
Considerations", BCP 42, RFC 6895, DOI 10.17487/RFC6895, Considerations", BCP 42, RFC 6895, DOI 10.17487/RFC6895,
April 2013, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6895>. April 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6895>.
[RFC7719] Hoffman, P., Sullivan, A., and K. Fujiwara, "DNS [RFC7719] Hoffman, P., Sullivan, A., and K. Fujiwara, "DNS
Terminology", RFC 7719, DOI 10.17487/RFC7719, December Terminology", RFC 7719, DOI 10.17487/RFC7719, December
2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7719>. 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7719>.
12.3. URIs 12.3. URIs
[1] http://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-parameters/dns- [1] http://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-parameters/dns-
parameters.xhtml#dns-parameters-4 parameters.xhtml#dns-parameters-4
Appendix A. Editorial Notes Appendix A. Editorial Notes
This section (and sub-sections) to be removed prior to publication. This section (and sub-sections) to be removed prior to publication.
A.1. Change History A.1. Change History
A.1.1. draft-ietf-dnsop-refuse-any-04 A.1.1. draft-ietf-dnsop-refuse-any-05
Minor editorial changes. Soften advice on RRSIG queries. Version
bump.
A.1.2. draft-ietf-dnsop-refuse-any-04
These are the changes requested during WGLC. The title has been These are the changes requested during WGLC. The title has been
updated for readability The behavior section now contains description updated for readability The behavior section now contains description
of three different approaches in order of preference. Text added on of three different approaches in order of preference. Text added on
behavior over TCP. The document is clear in how it updates from behavior over TCP. The document is clear in how it updates from
RFC1035. Minor adjustments for readability and remove redundancy. RFC1035. Minor adjustments for readability and remove redundancy.
A.1.2. draft-ietf-dnsop-refuse-any-03 A.1.3. draft-ietf-dnsop-refuse-any-03
Change section name to "Updates to RFC1034", few minor grammar Change section name to "Updates to RFC1034", few minor grammar
changes suggested by Matthew Pounsett and Tony Finch. changes suggested by Matthew Pounsett and Tony Finch.
Text clarifications, reflecting experience, added implementation Text clarifications, reflecting experience, added implementation
experience. experience.
A.1.3. draft-ietf-dnsop-refuse-any-02 A.1.4. draft-ietf-dnsop-refuse-any-02
Added suggestion to call out RRSIG is optional when DO=0. Added suggestion to call out RRSIG is optional when DO=0.
Number of text suggestions from Jeremy Laidman Number of text suggestions from Jeremy Laidman.
A.1.4. draft-ietf-dnsop-refuse-any-01 A.1.5. draft-ietf-dnsop-refuse-any-01
Add IANA Considerations Add IANA Considerations
A.1.5. draft-ietf-dnsop-refuse-any-00 A.1.6. draft-ietf-dnsop-refuse-any-00
Re-submitted with a different name following adoption at the dnsop WG Re-submitted with a different name following adoption at the dnsop WG
meeting convened at IETF 94. meeting convened at IETF 94.
A.1.6. draft-jabley-dnsop-refuse-any-01 A.1.7. draft-jabley-dnsop-refuse-any-01
Make signing of RRSets in answers from signed zones mandatory. Make signing of RRSets in answers from signed zones mandatory.
Document the option of returning an existing RRSet in place of a Document the option of returning an existing RRSet in place of a
synthesised one. synthesised one.
A.1.7. draft-jabley-dnsop-refuse-any-00 A.1.8. draft-jabley-dnsop-refuse-any-00
Initial draft circulated for comment. Initial draft circulated for comment.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Joe Abley Joe Abley
Dyn, Inc. Afilias
103-186 Albert Street 300-184 York Street
London, ON N6A 1M1 London, ON N6A 1B5
Canada Canada
Phone: +1 519 670 9327 Phone: +1 519 670 9327
Email: jabley@dyn.com Email: jabley@afilias.info
Olafur Gudmundsson Olafur Gudmundsson
Cloudflare Inc. Cloudflare Inc.
Email: olafur+ietf@cloudflare.com Email: olafur+ietf@cloudflare.com
Marek Majkowski Marek Majkowski
Cloudflare Inc. Cloudflare Inc.
Email: marek@cloudflare.com Email: marek@cloudflare.com
 End of changes. 48 change blocks. 
96 lines changed or deleted 121 lines changed or added

This html diff was produced by rfcdiff 1.46. The latest version is available from http://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcdiff/