--- 1/draft-ietf-dnssec-secext-03.txt 2008-04-11 10:43:17.000000000 +0200 +++ 2/draft-ietf-dnssec-secext-04.txt 2008-04-11 10:43:17.000000000 +0200 @@ -1,22 +1,25 @@ +Donald E. Eastlake 3rd +1 508-287-4877(tel) dee@cybercash.com + 318 Acton Street +1 508-371-7148(fax) dee@world.std.com +Carlisle, MA 01741 USA +1 703-620-4200(main office, Reston, VA) DNS Security Working Group Donald E. Eastlake, 3rd -INTERNET-DRAFT DEC +INTERNET-DRAFT CyberCash Charles W. Kaufman Iris - Domain Name System Protocol Security Extensions - ------ ---- ------ -------- -------- ---------- + Domain Name System Security Extensions + ------ ---- ------ -------- ---------- Status of This Document - This draft, file name draft-ietf-dnssec-secext-03.txt, is intended to - be become a proposed standard RFC. Distribution of this document is + This draft, file name draft-ietf-dnssec-secext-04.txt, is intended to + be become a Proposed Standard RFC. Distribution of this document is unlimited. Comments should be sent to the DNS Security Working Group mailing list or to the authors. This document is an Internet-Draft. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months. Internet-Drafts may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by @@ -31,523 +34,681 @@ Abstract The Domain Name System (DNS) has become a critical operational part of the Internet infrastructure yet it has no strong security mechanisms to assure data integrity or authentication. Extensions to the DNS are described that provide these services to security aware resolvers or applications through the use of cryptographic digital signatures. These digital signatures are included in secured zones as resource records. Security can still be provided even through - non-security aware DNS servers. + non-security aware DNS servers in many cases. The extensions also provide for the storage of authenticated public - keys in the DNS. This storage of keys can support a general public - key distribution service as well as DNS security. The stored keys - enable security aware resolvers to learn the authenticating key of - zones in addition to keys for which they are initially configured. - Keys associated with DNS names can be retrieved to support other + keys in the DNS. This storage of keys can support general public key + distribution service as well as DNS security. The stored keys enable + security aware resolvers to learn the authenticating key of zones in + addition to keys for which they are initially configured. Keys + associated with DNS names can be retrieved to support other protocols. Provision is made for a variety of key types and algorithms. In addition, the security extensions provide for the optional authentication of DNS protocol transactions. Acknowledgements The significant contributions of the following persons (in alphabetic - order) to this draft are gratefully acknowledged: Madelyn Badger, - Matt Crawford, James M. Galvin, Olafur Gudmundsson, Sandy Murphy, - Masataka Ohta, Michael A. Patton, Jeffrey I. Schiller. + order) to this draft are gratefully acknowledged: + + Madelyn Badger, Matt Crawford, James M. Galvin, Olafur + Gudmundsson, Sandy Murphy, Masataka Ohta, Michael A. Patton, + Jeffrey I. Schiller. Table of Contents Status of This Document....................................1 Abstract...................................................2 Acknowledgements...........................................2 Table of Contents..........................................3 - 1. Introduction............................................5 + 1. Overview of Contents....................................5 - 2. Brief Overview of the Extensions.......................6 + 2. Overview of the Extensions.............................6 2.1 Services Not Provided..................................6 2.2 Key Distribution.......................................6 2.3 Data Origin Authentication and Integrity...............7 - 2.3.2 The SIG Resource Record..............................7 - 2.3.3 Authenticating Name Non-existence....................8 - 2.3.5 Special Problems With Time-to-Live...................8 - 2.3.5 Signers Other Than The Zone..........................9 - 2.4 DNS Transaction Authentication.........................9 + 2.3.1 The SIG Resource Record..............................7 + 2.3.2 Authenticating Name and Type Non-existence...........8 + 2.3.3 Special Considerations With Time-to-Live.............8 + 2.3.4 Special Considerations at Delegation Points..........9 + 2.3.5 Special Considerations with CNAME RRs................9 + 2.3.6 Signers Other Than The Zone..........................9 + 2.4 DNS Transaction Authentication........................10 - 3. The KEY Resource Record................................10 - 3.1 KEY RDATA format......................................10 - 3.2 Object Types and DNS Names and Keys...................10 - 3.3 The KEY RR Flag Octet.................................11 - 3.4 The KEY Algorithm Version and MD5/RSA Algorithm.......12 - 3.5 KEY RRs in the Construction of Responses..............13 - 3.6 File Representation of KEY RRs........................14 + 3. The KEY Resource Record................................11 + 3.1 KEY RDATA format......................................11 + 3.2 Object Types, DNS Names, and Keys.....................11 + 3.3 The KEY RR Flag Field.................................12 + 3.4 The Protocol Octet....................................14 + 3.5 The KEY Algorithm Number and the MD5/RSA Algorithm....14 + 3.6 Interaction of Flags, Algorithm, and Protocol Bytes...15 + 3.7 KEY RRs in the Construction of Responses..............16 + 3.8 File Representation of KEY RRs........................16 - 4. The SIG Resource Record................................15 - 4.1 SIG RDATA Format......................................15 - 4.1.1 Signature Format....................................17 - 4.1.2 SIG RRs Covering Type ANY...........................18 - 4.1.3 Zone Transfer (AXFR) SIG............................18 - 4.1.4 Transaction SIGs....................................19 - 4.2 SIG RRs in the Construction of Responses..............19 - 4.3 Processing Responses with SIG RRs.....................20 - 4.4 File Representation of SIG RRs........................21 + 4. The SIG Resource Record................................18 + 4.1 SIG RDATA Format......................................18 + 4.1.1 Signature Data......................................20 + 4.1.2 MD5/RSA Algorithm Signature Calculation.............21 + 4.1.3 Zone Transfer (AXFR) SIG............................22 + 4.1.4 Transaction SIGs....................................22 + 4.2 SIG RRs in the Construction of Responses..............23 + 4.3 Processing Responses and SIG RRs......................23 + 4.4 Signature Expiration, TTLs, and Validity..............24 + 4.5 File Representation of SIG RRs........................25 - 5. Non-existent Names.....................................22 - 5.1 The NXD Resource Record...............................22 - 5.2 NXD RDATA Format......................................23 - 5.3 Example...............................................23 - 5.4 Interaction of NXD RRs and Wildcard RRs...............23 - 5.5 Blocking NXD Pseudo-Zone Transfers....................24 + 5. Non-existent Names and Types...........................26 + 5.1 The NXT Resource Record...............................26 + 5.2 NXT RDATA Format......................................27 + 5.3 Example...............................................27 + 5.4 Interaction of NXT RRs and Wildcard RRs...............28 + 5.5 Blocking NXT Pseudo-Zone Transfers....................28 + 5.6 Special Considerations at Delegation Points...........29 - 6. How to Resolve Securely................................25 - 6.1 Boot File Format......................................25 - 6.2 Chaining Through Zones................................25 - 6.3 Secure Time...........................................27 - 7. Operational Considerations.............................28 - 7.1 Key Size Considerations...............................28 - 7.2 Key Storage...........................................28 - 7.3 Key Generation........................................29 - 7.4 Key Lifetimes.........................................29 - 7.5 Signature Lifetime....................................30 - 7.6 Root..................................................30 + 6. The AD and CD Bits and How to Resolve Securely.........30 + 6.1 The AD and CD Header Bits.............................30 + 6.2 Boot File Format......................................31 + 6.3 Chaining Through Zones................................32 + 6.4 Secure Time...........................................33 - 8. Conformance............................................31 - 8.1 Server Conformance....................................31 - 8.2 Resolver Conformance..................................31 + 7. Operational Considerations.............................34 + 7.1 Key Size Considerations...............................34 + 7.2 Key Storage...........................................35 + 7.3 Key Generation........................................35 + 7.4 Key Lifetimes.........................................35 + 7.5 Signature Lifetime....................................36 + 7.6 Root..................................................36 - 9. Security Considerations................................32 - References................................................32 + 8. Conformance............................................37 + 8.1 Server Conformance....................................37 + 8.2 Resolver Conformance..................................37 - Authors Addresses.........................................33 - Expiration and File Name..................................33 + 9. Security Considerations................................38 + References................................................38 - Appendix: Base 64 Encoding................................34 + Authors Addresses.........................................39 + Expiration and File Name..................................39 -1. Introduction + Appendix: Base 64 Encoding................................40 - This draft describes extensions of the DNS protocol to support DNS - security and public key distribution. +1. Overview of Contents - This draft assumes that the reader is familiar with the Domain Name - System, particularly as described in RFCs 1034 and 1035. + This draft describes extensions of the Domain Name System (DNS) + protocol to support DNS security and public key distribution. It + assumes that the reader is familiar with the Domain Name System, + particularly as described in RFCs 1034 and 1035. -2. Brief Overview of the Extensions + Section 2 provides an overview of the extensions and the key + distribution, data origin authentication, and transaction security + they provide. - The DNS protocol extensions provide three distinct services: key - distribution as described in section 2.2 below, data origin - authentication as described in section 2.3 below, and transaction - authentication, described in section 2.4 below. + Section 3 discusses the KEY resource record, its structure, use in + DNS responses, and file representation. These resource records + represent the pubic keys of entities named in the DNS and are used + for key distribution. + + Section 4 discusses the SIG digital signature resource record, its + structure, use in DNS responses, and file representation. These + resource records are used to authenticate other resource records in + the DNS and optionally to authenticate DNS transactions. + + Section 5 discusses the NXT resource record and its use in DNS + responses. The NXT RR permits authenticated denial in the DNS of the + existence of a name or of a particular type for an existing name. + + Section 6 discusses how a resolver can be configured with a starting + key or keys and proceed to securely resolve DNS requests. + Interactions between resolvers and servers are discussed for all + combinations of security aware and security non-aware. Two + additional query header bits are defined for signaling between + resolvers and servers. + + Section 7 reviews a variety of operational considerations including + key generation, lifetime, and storage. + + Section 8 defines levels of conformance for resolvers and servers. + + Section 9 provides a few paragraphs on overall security + considerations. + + An Appendix is provided that gives some details of base64 encoding + which is used in the file representation of some RR's defined in this + draft. + +2. Overview of the Extensions + + The Domain Name System (DNS) protocol security extensions provide + three distinct services: key distribution as described in Section 2.2 + below, data origin authentication as described in Section 2.3 below, + and transaction authentication, described in Section 2.4 below. + + Special considerations related to time to live, CNAMEs, and + delegation points are also discussed in Section 2.3. 2.1 Services Not Provided It is part of the design philosophy of the DNS that the data in it is public and that the DNS gives the same answers to all inquirers. Following this philosophy, no attempt has been made to include any sort of access control lists or other means to differentiate inquirers. In addition, no effort has been made to provide for any confidentiality for queries or responses. (This service may be - available via an IP network level security protocol for which there - is current an IETF working group.) + available via other protocols such as a network level security + protocol providing confidentiality.) 2.2 Key Distribution - The resource records are defined to associate keys with DNS names. + Resource records (RRs) are defined to associate keys with DNS names. This permits the DNS to be used as a general public key distribution mechanism in support of the data origin authentication and transaction authentication DNS services as well as other security - services such as IP level security. + services. - The syntax of a KEY resource record is described in Section 3. It - includes the name of the entity the key is associated with - (frequently but not always the KEY resource record owner name), an - algorithm identifier, flags indicating the type of entity the key is - associated with and/or asserting that there is no key associated with - that entity, and the actual public key parameters. + The syntax of a KEY resource record (RR) is described in Section 3. + It includes an algorithm identifier, flags indicating the type of + entity the key is associated with and/or asserting that there is no + key associated with that entity, and the actual public key + parameters. Under conditions described in Section 3, security aware DNS servers - will automatically attempt to return KEY resources as additional - information, along with those actually requested, to minimize query - traffic. + may automatically attempt to return KEY resources as additional + information, along with those resource records actually requested, to + minimize the number of queries needed. 2.3 Data Origin Authentication and Integrity Security is provided by associating with resource records in the DNS cryptographically generated digital signatures. Commonly, there will be a single private key that signs for an entire zone. If a security aware resolver reliably learns the public key of the zone, it can - verify that all the data read was properly authorized and is - reasonably current. The expected implementation is for the zone - private key to be kept off-line and used to re-sign all of the - records in the zone periodically. + verify, for any data read from that zone, that it was properly + authorized and is reasonably current. The expected implementation is + for the zone private key to be kept off-line and used to re-sign all + of the records in the zone periodically. The data origin authentication key belongs to the zone and not to the servers that store copies of the data. That means compromise of a - server or even all servers for a zone will not affect the degree of - assurance that a resolver has that the data is genuine. + server or even all servers for a zone will not necessarily affect the + degree of assurance that a resolver has that the data is genuine. A resolver can learn the public key of a zone either by reading it from DNS or by having it staticly configured. To reliably learn the public key by reading it from DNS, the key itself must be signed. Thus, to provide a reasonable degree of security, the resolver must - be configured with at least the public key of one zone. From that, - it can securely read the public keys of other zones if the - intervening zones in the DNS tree are secure. It is in principle - more secure to have the resolver manually configured with the public - keys of multiple zones, since then the compromise of a single zone - would not permit the faking of information from other zones. It is - also more administratively cumbersome, however, particularly when - public keys change. + be configured with at least the public key of one zone that it can + use to authenticate signatures. From that, it can securely read the + public keys of other zones if the intervening zones in the DNS tree + are secure. (It is in principle more secure to have the resolver + manually configured with the public keys of multiple zones, since + then the compromise of a single zone would not permit the faking of + information from other zones. It is also more administratively + cumbersome, however, particularly when public keys change.) Adding origin authentication and integrity requires no change to the "on-the-wire" DNS protocol beyond the addition of the signature resource types (and, as a practical matter, the key resource type needed for key distribution). This service can be supported by - existing resolver and server implementations so long as they could - support the additional resource types. + existing resolver and server implementations so long as they can + support the additional resource types (see Section 8) with the one + exception that CNAME referals can not be authenticated if they are + from non-security aware servers (see Section 2.3.5). If signatures are always separately retrieved and verified when retrieving the information they authenticate, there will be more trips to the server and performance will suffer. To avoid this, - security aware servers mitigate that degradation by automatically - sending exactly the signature(s) needed. + security aware servers mitigate that degradation by always sending + the signature(s) needed. -2.3.2 The SIG Resource Record +2.3.1 The SIG Resource Record The syntax of a SIG resource record (signature) is described in Section 4. It includes the type of the RR(s) being signed, the name of the signer, the time at which the signature was created, the time it expires (when it is no longer to be believed), its original time to live (which may be longer than its current time to live but cannot be shorter), the cryptographic algorithm in use, and the actual signature. Every name in a zone supporting signed data will have associated with it at least one SIG resource record for each resource type under that name. A security aware server supporting the performance enhanced version of the DNS protocol security extensions will attempt to return, with all records retrieved, the corresponding SIGs. If a server does not support the protocol, the resolver must retrieve all the SIG records for a name and select the one or ones that sign the resource record(s) that resolver is interested in. -2.3.3 Authenticating Name Non-existence +2.3.2 Authenticating Name and Type Non-existence The above security mechanism provides only a way to sign existing RRs - in a zone. Data origin authentication is not obviously provided for - the non-existence of a domain name in a zone. This gap is filled by - the NXD RR which authenticatably asserts a range of non-existent - names in a zone. The owner of the NXD RR is the start of such a - ranger and its RDATA is the end of the range; however, there are - additional complexities due to wildcards. + in a zone. "Data origin" authentication is not obviously provided + for the non-existence of a domain name in a zone or the non-existence + of a type for an existing name. This gap is filled by the NXT RR + which authenticatably asserts a range of non-existent names in a zone + and the non-existence types for the initial name in that range. - Section 6 below covers the NXD RR. + Section 5 below covers the NXT RR. -2.3.5 Special Problems With Time-to-Live +2.3.3 Special Considerations With Time-to-Live A digital signature will fail to verify if any change has occurred to the data between the time it was originally signed and the time the signature is verified. This conflicts with our desire to have the time-to-live field tick down when resource records are cached. This could be avoided by leaving the time-to-live out of the digital - signature, but that would allow unscrupulous secondaries to set + signature, but that would allow unscrupulous servers to set arbitrarily long time to live values undetected. Instead, we include the "original" time-to-live in the signature and communicate that data in addition to the current time-to-live. Unscrupulous servers under this scheme can manipulate the time to live but a security aware resolver will bound the TTL value it uses at the original signed value. Separately, signatures include a time signed and an - expiration time. A resolver that knows an absolute time can + expiration time. A resolver that knows the absolute time can determine securely whether a signature has expired. It is not possible to rely solely on the signature expiration as a substitute - for the TTL, however, singe non-security aware servers must still be + for the TTL, however, since non-security aware servers must still be supported. -2.3.5 Signers Other Than The Zone +2.3.4 Special Considerations at Delegation Points - There are two general cases where a SIG resource record is signed by - other than the zone private key. One is for future support of - dynamic update where an entity is permitted to authenticate/update - its own records. The public key of the entity must be present in the - DNS and be appropriately signed but the other RR(s) may be signed - with the entity's key. The other is for support of transaction - authentication as described in Section 2.3 below. + DNS security would like to view each zone as a unit of data + completely under the control of the zone owner and signed by the + zone's key. But the operational DNS views the leaf nodes in a zone + which are also the apex nodes of a subzone (i.e., delegation points) + as "really" belonging to the subzone. These nodes occur in two + master files and will have RRs signed by both the upper and lower + zone's keys. A retrieval could get a mixture of these RRs and SIGs, + especially since one server could be serving both the zone above and + below a delegation point. + + In general, the KEY RR from the superzone is authoritative while for + all other RRs, the data from the subzone is more authoritative. To + avoid conflicts, only the KEY RR in the superzone should be signed + and the NS and any A (glue) RRs should only be signed in the subzone + along with the SOA and any other RRs that have the zone name as + owner. The only exception is the NXT RR type that will always appear + differently and authoritatively in both the superzone and subzone, if + both are secure, as described in Section 5. + +2.3.5 Special Considerations with CNAME RRs + + There is a significant problem with security related RRs with the + same owner name as a CNAME RR when retrieved from a non-security- + aware server. In particular, an initial retrieval for the CNAME or + any other type will not retrieve an associated signature, key, or NXT + RR. For types other than CNAME it will retrieve that type at the + target name of the CNAME (or chain of CNAMEs) and will return the + CNAME as additional info. In particular, a specific retrieval for + type SIG will not get the SIG, if any, at the original domain name + but rather an SIG at the target name. + + In general, security aware servers must be used to securely CNAME in + DNS. Security aware servers must (1) allow KEY, SIG, and NXT RRs + along with CNAME RRs, (2) suppress CNAME processing on retrieval of + these types as well as on retrieval of the type CNAME, and (3) + automatically return SIG RRs authenticating the CNAME or CNAMEs + encountered in resolving a query. + +2.3.6 Signers Other Than The Zone + + There are two cases where a SIG resource record is signed by other + than the zone private key. One is for future support of dynamic + update where an entity is permitted to authenticate/update its own + records. The public key of the entity must be present in the DNS and + be appropriately signed but the other RR(s) may be signed with the + entity's key. The other is for support of transaction authentication + as described in Section 2.4 below. 2.4 DNS Transaction Authentication The data origin authentication service described above protects resource records but provides no protection for DNS message headers. If header bits are falsely set by a server, there is little that can be done. However, it is possible to add transaction authentication. - Such authentication means that a resolver can be sure it is getting - messages from the server it thinks it queried and that the response - is from the query it sent and that these messages have not been - diddled in transit. + Such authentication means that a resolver can be sure it is at least + getting messages from the server it thinks it queried, that the + response is from the query it sent, and that these messages have not + been diddled in transit. This is accomplished by optionally adding a special SIG resource record to the end of the reply which digitally signs the concatenation of the server's response and the resolver's query. The private key used belongs to the host composing the reply, not to the zone being queried. The corresponding public key is stored in and retrieved from the DNS. Because replies are highly variable, message authentication SIGs can not be pre-calculated. Thus it will be necessary to keep the private key on-line, for example in software or in a directly connected piece of hardware. DNS level transaction authentication would be unnecessary if a lower level (i.e., IP level) end-to-end security protocol were available. However, such a protocol is not yet standardized and when it is, - there will be a considerable time during which there will be systems - on which it will be hard to add IPSEC but relatively easy to replace - the DNS components. + there will be a significant time during which there will be systems + on which it will be hard to add such a protocol but relatively easy + to replace the DNS components. 3. The KEY Resource Record - The KEY RR is used to document a key that is associated with a DNS - name. It will be a public key as only public keys are stored in the - DNS. This can be the public key of a zone owner, of a host or other - end entity, or a user. A KEY RR is, like any other RR, authenticated - by a SIG RR. Security aware DNS implementations should be designed - to handle at least two simultaneously valid keys of the same type - associated with a name. + The KEY resource record (RR) is used to document a key that is + associated with a Domain Name System (DNS) name. It will be a public + key as only public keys are stored in the DNS. This can be the + public key of a zone, of a host or other end entity, or a user. A + KEY RR is, like any other RR, authenticated by a SIG RR. Security + aware DNS implementations MUST be designed to handle at least two + simultaneously valid keys of the same type associated with a name. The type number for the KEY RR is 25. 3.1 KEY RDATA format - The RDATA for a KEY RR consists of an object name, flags, the - algorithm version, and the public key itself. The format is as + The RDATA for a KEY RR consists of flags, a protocol octet, the + algorithm number, and the public key itself. The format is as follows: 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ - | / - +- object name +---------------+---------------+ - / | flags | algorithm | + | flags | protocol | algorithm | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | / - + - public key / + / public key / / / - +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-/ + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-| - The object name, and the flags octets are described in Sections 3.2 - and 3.3 below respectively. The flags must be examined before any - following data as they control the format and even whether there is - any following data. The algorithm and public key fields are - described in Section 3.4. The format of the public key is algorithm - dependent. + The meaning of the KEY RR owner name, flags, and protocol octet are + described in Sections 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 below respectively. The flags + and protocol must be examined before any following data as they + control the format and even whether there is any following data. The + algorithm and public key fields are described in Section 3.5. The + format of the public key is algorithm dependent. -3.2 Object Types and DNS Names and Keys +3.2 Object Types, DNS Names, and Keys - The public key in a KEY RR belongs to the object named in the object - name field. Frequently this will also be the owner name of the KEY - RR. But they will be different in the case of the key or keys stored - under a zone's name for the zone's superzone or keys that are stored - for cross certification of other zones. + The public key in a KEY RR belongs to the object named in the owner + name. - The DNS object name may refer to up to three different things. For - example, dee.lkg.dec.com could be (1) a zone, (2) a host or other end - entity , and (3) the mapping into a DNS name of the user or account - dee@lkg.dec.com . Thus, there are flags in the KEY RR to indicate - with which of these roles the object name and public key are + This DNS name may refer to up to three different things. For + example, dee.cybercash.com could be (1) a zone, (2) a host or other + end entity , and (3) the mapping into a DNS name of the user or + account dee@cybercash.com . Thus, there are flags in the KEY RR to + indicate with which of these roles the owner name and public key are associated as described below. Although the same name can be used for up to all three of these contexts, such overloading of a name is discouraged. It is also possible to use the same key for different things with the same name or even different names, but this is strongly discouraged. In particular, the use of a zone key as a non-zone key will usually require that the private key be kept on line and thereby become much more vulnerable. It would be desirable for the growth of DNS to be managed so that additional possible simultaneous uses for names are NOT added. New uses should be distinguished by exclusive domains. For example, all IP autonomous system numbers have been mapped into the in-as.arpa domain [draft-ietf-dnssec-as-map-*.txt] and all telephone numbers in the world have been mapped into the tpc.int domain [RFC 1530]. This is much preferable to having the same name possibly be an autonomous system number, telephone number, and/or host as well as a zone and a user. - In addition to the name type bits, there are three control bits, the - "no key" bit, the "experimental" bit, and the "signatory" bit, as - described below. + In addition to the name type bits, there are additional control bits, + the "no key" bit, the "experimental" bit, the "signatory" field, + etc., as described below. -3.3 The KEY RR Flag Octet +3.3 The KEY RR Flag Field In the "flags" field: Bit 0 is the "no key" bit. If this bit is on, there is no key - information and the RR stops with the flags octet. By the use of - this bit, a signed KEY RR can authenticatably assert that, for + information and the RR stops after the algorithm octet. By the use + of this bit, a signed KEY RR can authenticatably assert that, for example, a zone is not secured. - Bits 1 is the "experimental" bit. Keys may be associated with - zones, entities, or users for experimental, trial, or optional use, - in which case this bit will be one. If this bit is a zero, it means - that the use or availability of security based on the key is - "mandatory". Thus, if this bit is off for a zone, the zone should be - assumed secured by SIG RRs and any responses indicating the zone is - not secured should be considered bogus. Similarly, if this bit were - off for a host key and attempts to negotiate IP-security with the - host produced indications that IP-security was not supported, it - should be assumed that the host has been compromised or - communications with it are being spoofed. On the other hand, if this - bit were a one, the host might very well sometimes operate in a - secure mode and at other times operate without the availability of - IP-security. The experimental bit, like all other aspects of the KEY + Bit 1 is the "experimental" bit. It is ignored if the "no key" + bit is on and the following description assumes the "no key" bit to + be off. Keys may be associated with zones, entities, or users for + experimental, trial, or optional use, in which case this bit will be + one. If this bit is a zero, it means that the use or availability of + security based on the key is "mandatory". Thus, if this bit is off + for a zone key, the zone should be assumed secured by SIG RRs and any + responses indicating the zone is not secured should be considered + bogus. If this bit is a one for a host or end entity, it might + sometimes operate in a secure mode and at other times operate without + security. The experimental bit, like all other aspects of the KEY RR, is only effective if the KEY RR is appropriately signed by a SIG RR. The experimental bit must be zero for safe secure operation and should only be a one for a minimal transition period. - Bit 2 is the "signatory" bit. It indicates that the key can - validly sign RRs of the same name. If the owner name is a wildcard, - then RRs with any name which is in the wildcard's scope can be signed - including NS and corresponding zone KEY RRs to carve out a subzone. - This bit is meaningless for zone keys which always have authority to - sign any RRs in the zone. The signatory bit, like all other aspects - of the KEY RR, is only effective if the KEY RR is appropriately - signed by a SIG RR. - - Bits 3-4 are reserved and must be zero. If they are found non- - zero, they should be ignored and the KEY RR used as indicated by the - other flags. + Bits 2-4 are reserved and must be zero. Bit 5 on indicates that this is a key associated with a "user" or "account" at an end entity, usually a host. The coding of the owner name is that used for the responsible individual mailbox in the SOA record: The owner name is the user name as the name of a node under the entity name. For example, "j.random_user" on host.subdomain.domain could have a public key associated through a KEY RR with name j\.random_user.host.subdomain.domain. It could be - used in an IP-security protocol where authentication of a user was + used in an security protocol where authentication of a user was desired. This key would be useful in IP or other security for a user level service such a telnet, ftp, rlogin, etc. Bit 6 on indicates that this is a key associated with the non- - zone entity whose name is the RR owner name. This will commonly be a - host but could, in some parts of the DNS tree, be some other type of - entity such as an Autonomous System [draft-ietf-dnssec-as-map-*.txt]. - This is the public key used in connection with the optional DNS - transaction authentication service that can be used if the owner name - is a DNS server host. It could also be used in an IP-security - protocol where authentication of a host was desired. + zone "entity" whose name is the RR owner name. This will commonly be + a host but could, in some parts of the DNS tree, be some other type + of entity such as an Autonomous System [draft-ietf-dnssec-as-map- + *.txt]. This is the public key used in connection with the optional + DNS transaction authentication service that can be used if the owner + name is a DNS server host. It could also be used in an IP-security + protocol where authentication of a host was desired such as routing, + NTP, etc. - Bit 7 on indicates that this is a zone key for the zone whose - name is the KEY RR owner name. This is the fundamental type of DNS - data origin authentication public key. + Bit 7 is the "zone" bit and indicates that this is a zone key + for the zone whose name is the KEY RR owner name. This is the + fundamental type of DNS data origin authentication public key. -3.4 The KEY Algorithm Version and MD5/RSA Algorithm + Bits 8 is reserved to be the "IPSEC" bit and indicate that this + key is valid for use in a future IP level security protocol. This + key could be used in connection with secured communication on behalf + of an end entity or user whose name is the owner name of the KEY RR + if the entity or user bits are on. The presence of a KEY resource + with the IPSEC and entity bits on and experimental and no-key bits + off is a guarantee that the host speaks IPSEC. - This octet is the key algorithm version parallel to the same field - for the SIG resource. The MD5/RSA algorithm described in this draft - is number 1. Version numbers 2 through 253 are available for - assignment should sufficient reason arise. However, the designation - of a new version could have a major impact on interoperability and - requires an IETF standards action. Version 254 is reserved for - private use and will never be assigned a specific algorithm. For - version 254, the public key area shown in the packet diagram above - will actually begin with an Object Identifier (OID) indicating the - private algorithm in use and the remainder of the combined area is - whatever is required by that algorithm. Algorithm versions 0 and 255 - are reserved. + Bits 9-11 are reserved and must be zero. + + Bits 12-15 are the "signatory" field. If non-zero, it indicates + that the key can validly sign RRs of the same name. If the owner + name is a wildcard, then RRs with any name which is in the wildcard's + scope can be signed. Fifteen different non-zero values are possible + for this field and any differences in their meaning are reserved for + definition in connection with possible future DNS dynamic update or + other new DNS commands. This field is meaningless for zone keys + which always have authority to sign any RRs in the zone. The + signatory field, like all other aspects of the KEY RR, is only + effective if the KEY RR is appropriately signed by a SIG RR. + +3.4 The Protocol Octet + + It is anticipated that keys stored in DNS will be used in conjunction + with Internet protocols other than DNS (keys with zone bit or + signatory field non-zero) and IPSEC (keys with IPSEC bit set). The + protocol octet is provided to indicate that a key is valid for such + use and, for end entity keys or the host part of user keys, that the + secure version of that protocol is implemented on that entity or + host. + + Values between 1 and 191 decimal inclusive are available for + assignment by IANA for such protocols. The 63 values between 192 and + 254 inclusive will not be assigned to a specific protocol and are + available for experimental use under bilateral agreement. Value 0 + indicates, for a particular key, that it is not valid for any + particular additional protocol beyond those indicated in the flag + field. And value 255 indicates that the key is valid for all assigned + protocols (those in the 1 to 191 range). + + It is intended that new uses of DNS stored keys would initially be + implemented, and operational experience gained, using the + experimental range of the protocol octet. If demand for widespread + deployment for the indefinite future warrants, a value in the + assigned range would then be designated for the protocol. Finally, + (1) should the protocol become so widespread in conjunction with + other protocols which are indicated via the protocol octet and with + which it shares key values that duplicate RRs are a serious burden + and (2) should the protocol provide substantial facilities not + available in any protocol for which a flags field bit has been + allocated, then a flag field bit may be allocated to the protocol. + Then a key can be simultaneously indicated as valid for that protocol + and the entity or host can be simultaneously flagged as implementing + the secure version of that protocol, along with other protocols for + which flag field bits have been assigned. + + Note that the IPSEC protocol being developed may provide facilities + adequate for all point to point IP communication meaning that + additional flag field bits would only be assigned, when appropriate + as indicated above, to protocols with a store-and-forward nature + (other than DNS) or otherwise not subsumed into a point-to-point + paradigm. + +3.5 The KEY Algorithm Number and the MD5/RSA Algorithm + + This octet is the key algorithm parallel to the same field for the + SIG resource. The MD5/RSA algorithm described in this draft is + number 1. Numbers 2 through 253 are available for assignment should + sufficient reason arise. However, the designation of a new algorithm + could have a major impact on interoperability and requires an IETF + standards action. Number 254 is reserved for private use and will + never be assigned a specific algorithm. For number 254, the public + key area shown in the packet diagram above will actually begin with + an Object Identifier (OID) indicating the private algorithm in use + and the remainder of the area is whatever is required by that + algorithm. Values 0 and 255 are reserved. If the no key bit is zero and the algorithm field is 1, indicating - the MD5/RSA algorithm, the public key filed is structured as follows: + the MD5/RSA algorithm, the public key field is structured as follows: 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ - | public key exponent |modulus length | + | pub exp length| public key exponent / +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | / +- modulus / | / - +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-/ - The public key modulus field is a multiprecision unsigned integer. - The "modulus length" is an unsigned octet which is the actual modulus - length minus 64. This limits keys to a maximum of 255+64 or 319 - octets and a minimum of 64 octets. Although moduluses of less than - 512 significant bits are not permitted, due to the weak security they - provide, they can be represented by using leading zeros. + To promote interoperability, the exponent and modulus are limited to + 2552 bits in length. The public key exponent is a variable length + unsigned integer. Its length in octets is represented as one octet + if it is in the range of 1 to 255 and by a zero octet followed by a + two octet unsigned length if it is longer than 255 bytes. The public + key modulus field is a multiprecision unsigned integer. The length + of the modulus can be determined from the RDLENGTH and the preceding + RDATA fields including the exponent. Leading zero bytes are + prohibited in the exponent and modulus. -3.5 KEY RRs in the Construction of Responses +3.6 Interaction of Flags, Algorithm, and Protocol Bytes + + Various combinations of the no-key bit, algorithm byte, protocol + byte, and any protocol indicating flags (such as the reserved IPSEC + flag) are possible. (Not that the zone flag bit being on or the + signatory field being non-zero is effectively a DNS protocol flag + on.) The meaning of these combinations is indicated below: + + NK = no key flag + AL = alogrithm byte + PR = protocols indicated by protocol byte or protocol flags + + x represents any valid non-zero value. + + AL PR NK Meaning + 0 0 0 Illegal, claims key but has bad algorithm field. + 0 0 1 Authenticates total lack of security for owner. + + 0 x 0 Illegal, claims key but has bad algorithm field. + 0 x 1 Specified protocols insecure, others may be secure. + x 0 0 Useless. Gives key but no protocols to use it. + x 0 1 Useless. Denies key but for no protocols. + x x 0 Authenticates key for protocols and certifies + that those protocols are implemented with + security. + x x 1 Algorithm not understood for protocol. + + (remember, in reference to the above table, that a protocol + byte of 255 means all protocols with protocol bytes assigned) + +3.7 KEY RRs in the Construction of Responses An explicit request for KEY RRs does not cause any special additional information processing except, of course, for the corresponding SIG RR from a security aware server. Security aware DNS servers will include KEY RRs as additional information in responses where appropriate including the following: - On the retrieval of NS RRs, the zone key KEY RR(s) for the zone - served by these name servers will be included. If not all additional - info will fit, the KEY RR(s) have lower priority than type A or AAAA - glue RRs. + (1) On the retrieval of NS RRs, the zone key KEY RR(s) for the zone + served by these name servers will be included as additional + information. If not all additional info will fit, the KEY RR(s) have + higher priority than type A (or AAAA) glue RRs. - On retrieval of type A or AAAA RRs, the end entity KEY RR(s) - will be included. On inclusion of A or AAAA RRs as additional + (2) On retrieval of type A (or AAAA) RRs, the end entity KEY RR(s) + will be included. On inclusion of A (or AAAA) RRs as additional information, their KEY RRs will also be included but with lower - priority than the relevant A or AAAA RRs. + priority than the relevant A (or AAAA) RRs. -3.6 File Representation of KEY RRs +3.8 File Representation of KEY RRs KEY RRs may appear as lines in a zone data file. - In the RDATA portion, the object name appears first. - - The flag octet and algorithm version octets are then represented as - unsigned integers; however, if the "no key" flag is on in the flags, - nothing appears after the flag octet. + The flag field, protocol, and algorithm number octets are then + represented as unsigned integers. Note that if the "no key" flag is + on in the flags, nothing appears after the algorithm octet. - If the algorithm specified is the MD5/RSA algorithm, then the - exponent and modulus appear. The public key exponent is an unsigned - integer from 3 to 16777215. The public key modulus can be quite - large, up to 319 octets. It is the last data field and is - represented in base 64 (see Appendix) and may be divided up into any - number of white space separated substrings, down to single base 64 - digits, which are concatenated to obtain the full signature. These - substrings can span lines using the standard parenthesis. + The remaining public key portion is represented in base 64 (see + Appendix) and may be divided up into any number of white space + separated substrings, down to single base 64 digits, which are + concatenated to obtain the full signature. These substrings can span + lines using the standard parenthesis. - If an algorithm from 2 through 253 is specified, the public key - parameters required by that algorithm are given. If the algorithm - specified is number 254, then an OID appears followed by whatever is - required for the private algorithm. An implementation that does not - understand a particular standard or private algorithm should attempt - to parse the rest of the line as one or more base 64 substrings to be - concatenated to yield the key parameters. Algorithm versions 0 and - 255 are reserved. + Note that the public key may have internal sub-fields but these do + not appear in the master file representation. For example, with + algorithm 1 there is a public exponent and then a modulus and with + algorithm 254, there will be an OID followed by algorithm dependent + information. 4. The SIG Resource Record The SIG or "signature" resource record (RR) is the fundamental way - that data is authenticated in the secure DNS. As such it is the - heart of the security provided. + that data is authenticated in the secure Domain Name System (DNS). As + such it is the heart of the security provided. The SIG RR unforgably authenticates other RRs of a particular type, class, and name and binds them to a time interval and the signer's - fully qualified domain name. This is done using cryptographic - techniques and the signer's private key. The signer is frequently - the owner of the zone from which the RR originated. + domain name. This is done using cryptographic techniques and the + signer's private key. The signer is frequently the owner of the zone + from which the RR originated. 4.1 SIG RDATA Format The RDATA portion of a SIG RR is as shown below. The integrity of the RDATA information is protected by the signature field. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | type covered | algorithm | labels | @@ -564,696 +725,848 @@ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | / +- signature / / / +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ The value of the SIG RR type is 24. The "type covered" is the type of the other RRs covered by this SIG. - The algorithm version number is an octet specifying the digital - signature algorithm used. The MD5/RSA algorithm described in this - draft is version 1. Version numbers 2 through 253 are available for - assignment should sufficient reason arise to allocate them. However, - the designation of a new version could have a major impact on the - interoperability of the global DNS systems and requires an IETF - standards action. Version 254 is reserved for private use and will - never be assigned a specific algorithm. For version 254, the - "signature" area shown above will actually begin with an Object - Identified (OID) indicating the private algorithm in use and the - remainder of the signature area is whatever is required by that - algorithm. Version numbers 0 and 255 are reserved. + The algorithm number is an octet specifying the digital signature + algorithm used parallel to the algorithm octet for the KEY RR. The + MD5/RSA algorithm described in this draft is number 1. Numbers 2 + through 253 are available for assignment should sufficient reason + arise to allocate them. However, the designation of a new algorithm + could have a major impact on the interoperability of the global DNS + systems and requires an IETF standards action. Number 254 is + reserved for private use and will not be assigned a specific + algorithm. For number 254, the "signature" area shown above will + actually begin with an Object Identifier (OID) indicating the private + algorithm in use and the remainder of the signature area is whatever + is required by that algorithm. Values 0 and 255 are reserved. The "labels" octet is an unsigned count of how many labels there are in the original SIG RR owner name not counting the null label for - root and not counting any initial "*" for a wildcard. If, on - retrieval, the RR appears to have a longer name, the resolver can - tell it is the result of wildcard substitution. If the RR owner name - appears to be shorter than the labels count, the SIG RR should be - considered corrupt and ignored. The maximum number of labels - possible in the current DNS is 127 but the entire octet is reserved - and would be required should DNS names ever be expanded to 255 - labels. If a secured retrieval is the result of wild card - substitution, it is necessary for the resolver to use the original - form of the name in verifying the digital signature. The field helps - optimize the determination of the original form reducing the effort - in authentication signed data. The following table give some + root and not counting any initial "*" for a wildcard. If a secured + retrieval is the result of wild card substitution, it is necessary + for the resolver to use the original form of the name in verifying + the digital signature. This field helps optimize the determination + of the original form reducing the effort in authenticating signed + data. + + If, on retrieval, the RR appears to have a longer name than indicated + by "labels", the resolver can tell it is the result of wildcard + substitution. If the RR owner name appears to be shorter than the + labels count, the SIG RR should be considered corrupt and ignored. + The maximum number of labels possible in the current DNS is 127 but + the entire octet is reserved and would be required should DNS names + ever be expanded to 255 labels. The following table give some examples. The value of "labels" is at the top, the retrieved owner name on the left, and the table entry is the name to use in signature verification except that "bad" means the RR is corrupt. labels= | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | --------+-----+------+--------+----------+----------+ .| . | bad | bad | bad | bad | d.| *. | d. | bad | bad | bad | c.d.| *. | *.d. | c.d. | bad | bad | b.c.d.| *. | *.d. | *.c.d. | b.c.d. | bad | a.b.c.d.| *. | *.d. | *.c.d. | *.b.c.d. | a.b.c.d. | The "original TTL" field is included in the RDATA portion to avoid - authentication problems that caching servers would otherwise cause by - decrementing the real TTL field and security problems that - unscrupulous servers could otherwise cause by manipulating the real - TTL field. This original TTL is protected by the signature while the - current TTL field is not. + (1) authentication problems that caching servers would otherwise + cause by decrementing the real TTL field and (2) security problems + that unscrupulous servers could otherwise cause by manipulating the + real TTL field. This original TTL is protected by the signature + while the current TTL field is not. NOTE: The "original TTL" must be restored into the covered RRs when - the signature is verified. This implies that the RRs need to all - have the same TTL to start with. + the signature is verified. This implies that the RRs for a + particular type need to all have the same TTL to start with. The SIG is valid until the "signature expiration" time which is an - unsigned number of seconds since the start of 1 January 1970, GMT. + unsigned number of seconds since the start of 1 January 1970, GMT, + ignoring leap seconds. (See also Section 4.4.) The "time signed" field is an unsigned number of seconds since the - start of 1 January 1970, GMT. + start of 1 January 1970, GMT, ignoring leap seconds. The "key footprint" is a 16 bit quantity that is used to help efficiently select between multiple keys which may be applicable and as a quick check that a public key about to be used for the computationally expensive effort to check the signature is possibly valid. Its exact meaning is algorithm dependent. For the MD5/RSA algorithm, it is the next to the bottom two octets of the public key modulus needed to decode the signature field. That is to say, the most significant 16 of the lest significant 24 bits of this quantity in network order. - The "signer's name" field is the fully qualified domain name of the - signer generating the SIG RR. This is frequently the zone which - contained the RR(s) being authenticated. + The "signer's name" field is the domain name of the signer generating + the SIG RR. This is frequently the zone which contained the RR(s) + being authenticated. The signer's name may be compressed with + standard DNS name compression when being transmitted over the + network. - The structured of the "signature" field depends on the algorithm - chosen and is described below for the MD5/RSA algorithm. + The structure of the "signature" field is described below. -4.1.1 Signature Format +4.1.1 Signature Data - The actual signature portion of the SIG RR binds RDATA to all of the - "type covered" RRs with that owner name. These covered RRs are - thereby authenticated. To accomplish this, a data sequence is - constructed as follows: + The actual signature portion of the SIG RR binds the other RDATA + fields to all of the "type covered" RRs with that owner name. These + covered RRs are thereby authenticated. To accomplish this, a data + sequence is constructed as follows: data = RDATA | RR(s)... - where | is concatenation and RR(s) are all the expanded (no name - abbreviation) RR(s) of the type covered with the same owner name and - class as the SIG RR in canonical order. The canonical order for RRs - is to sort them in ascending order as left justified unsigned octet - sequences where a missing octet sorts before a zero octet. + where | is concatenation, RDATA is all the RDATA fields in the SIG RR + itself before the signature, and RR(s) are all the RR(s) of the type + covered with the same owner name and class as the SIG RR in canonical + form and order. + + For purposes of DNS security, the canonical form for an RR is the RR + with domain names (1) fully expanded (no name compression via + pointers) and (2) all domain name letters set to lower case. For + purposes of DNS security, the canonical order for RRs is to sort them + in ascending order by name, then by type, as left justified unsigned + octet sequences in network (transmission) order where a missing octet + sorts before a zero octet. (See also ordering discussion in Section + 5.1.) Within any particular name and type they are similarly sorted + by RDATA as a left justified unsigned octet sequence. EXCEPT that the + type SIG RR(s) covering any particular type appear immediately after + the other RRs of that type. Thus if at name a.b there is one A RR + and one KEY RR, their order with SIGs for concatenating the "data" to + be signed would be as follows: + + a.b. A .... + a.b. SIG A ... + a.b. KEY ... + a.b. SIG KEY ... + + (SIGs on type ANY should not be included in a zone.) How this data sequence is processed into the signature is algorithm dependent. +4.1.2 MD5/RSA Algorithm Signature Calculation + For the MD5/RSA algorithm, the signature is as follows hash = MD5 ( data ) signature = ( 01 | FF* | 00 | hash ) ** e (mod n) - where "|" is concatenation, "e" is the secret key exponent of the - signer, and "n" is the public modulus that is the signer's public - key. 01, FF, and 00 are fixed octets of the corresponding - hexadecimal value. The FF octet is repeated the maximum number of - times such that the value of the quantity being exponentiated is one - octet shorter than the value of n. + where MD5 is the message digest algorithm documented in RFC 1321, "|" + is concatenation, "e" is the secret key exponent of the signer, and + "n" is the public modulus of the signer's public key. 01, FF, and 00 + are fixed octets of the corresponding hexadecimal value. The FF + octet is repeated the maximum number of times such that the value of + the quantity being exponentiated is one octet shorter than the value + of n. The size of n, including most and least significant bits (which will be 1) SHALL be not less than 512 bits and not more than 2552 bits. n - and e MUST be chosen such that the public exponent is less than or - equal to 2**24 - 1 and SHOULD be chosen such that the public exponent - is small. + and e SHOULD be chosen such that the public exponent is small. + + Leading zeros bytes are not permitted in the MD5/RSA algorithm + signature. The above specifications are similar to Public Key Cryptographic Standard #1 [PKCS1]. - (A public exponent of 3 minimizes the effort needed to decode a + A public exponent of 3 minimizes the effort needed to decode a signature. Use of 3 as the public exponent may be weak for confidentiality uses since, if the same data can be collected encrypted under three different keys with an exponent of 3 then, using the Chinese Remainder Theorem, the original plain text can be easily recovered. This weakness is not significant for DNS because - we seek only authentication, not confidentiality.) - -4.1.2 SIG RRs Covering Type ANY - - The SIG RR described above protects all the RRs with a particular - owner name, class, and type. Thus a server must supply them all to - convince a security aware resolver. However, an unscrupulous server - could claim there were no RRs of a particular type and class under an - owner name while presenting signed RRs of other types. To provide a - means of protection against this, one or more SIG RR is added for - each owner name that covers the type ANY. It is calculated as - indicated above except that all RRs for that owner name and SIG key, - except the SIG RR covering type ANY itself, are included in the data - string which is processed into the signature. - - To allow for dynamic update, the zone key signed ANY SIG RR covers - only zone signed RRs. If RRs are added to a zone authenticated by an - entity or user key, then an ANY SIG RR signed by that key covering - the RRs signed by that key should be added. + we seek only authentication, not confidentiality. 4.1.3 Zone Transfer (AXFR) SIG - The above SIG mechanisms assure the authentication of all the RRs of - a particular name, class and type and all the RRs of a particular - name, class and any type. However, to secure complete zone - transfers, a SIG RR owned by the zone name must be created with a - type covered of AXFR that covers all other zone signed RRs. It will - be calculated by hashing together all other static zone RRs, - including SIGs. The RRs are ordered and concatenated for hashing as - described in Section 4.1.1. This SIG, other than having to be - calculated last of all zone key signed SIGs in the zone, is the same - as any other SIG. + The above SIG mechanisms assure the authentication of all zone signed + RRs of a particular name, class and type. However, to efficiently + secure complete zone transfers, a SIG RR owned by the zone name must + be created with a type covered of AXFR that covers all zone signed + RRs other than the SIG AXFR itself. It will be calculated by hashing + together all other static zone RRs, including SIGs. The RRs are + ordered and concatenated for hashing as described in Section 4.1.1. + (See also ordering discussion in Section 5.1.) + + The AXFR SIG must be calculated last of all zone key signed SIGs in + the zone. It really belongs to the zone as a whole, not to the zone + name. The AXFR SIG is only retrieved as part of a zone transfer. + After validation of the AXFR SIG, the zone may be considered valid + without verification of all the internal zone SIGs in the zone; + however, any SIGs signed by entity keys or the like must still be + validated. The AXFR SIG is transmitted first in a zone transfer so + the receiver can tell immediately that they may be able to avoid + verifying other zone signed SIGs. Dynamic zone RRs which might be added by some future dynamic zone update protocol and signed by an end entity or user key rather than a zone key (see Section 3.2) are not included. They originate in the network and will not, in general, be migrated to the recommended off line zone signing procedure (see Section 8.2). Thus such dynamic RRs - are not directly signed by the zone and are not generally protected - against omission during zone transfers. + are not directly signed by the zone, are not included in the AXFR + SIG, and are not generally protected against omission during zone + transfers. 4.1.4 Transaction SIGs A response message from a security aware server may optionally contain a special SIG as the last item in the additional information section to authenticate the transaction. This SIG has a "type covered" field of zero, which is not a valid RR - type. It is calculated by using a "data" (see section 4.1.1) of the + type. It is calculated by using a "data" (see Section 4.1.2) of the entire preceding DNS reply message, including DNS header, concatenated with the entire DNS query message that produced this response, including the query's DNS header. That is data = full response (less trailing message SIG) | full query - Verification of the message SIG (which is signed by the server host - key, not the zone key) by the requesting resolver shows that the - query and response were not tampered with in transit and that the - response corresponds to the intended query. + Verification of the transaction SIG (which is signed by the server + host key, not the zone key) by the requesting resolver shows that the + query and response were not tampered with in transit, that the + response corresponds to the intended query, and that the response + comes from the queried server. 4.2 SIG RRs in the Construction of Responses Security aware servers MUST, for every authoritative RR the query will return, attempt to send the available SIG RRs which authenticate - the requested RR. If multiple such SIGs are available, there may be - insufficient space in the response to include them all. In this - case, SIGs whose signer is the zone containing the RR MUST be given - highest priority and retained even if SIGs with other signers must be - dropped. + the requested RR. The following rules apply to the inclusion of SIG + RRs in responses: + + 1. when an RR is placed in a response, its SIG RR has a higher + priority for inclusion than other RRs that may need to be + included. If space does not permit its inclusion, the response + MUST be considered truncated. + + 2. when a SIG RR is present for an RR to be included in the + additional information section, the response MUST not be + considered truncated if space does not permit the inclusion of the + SIG RR. Sending SIGs to authenticate non-authoritative data (glue records and - NS RRs for subzones) is optional and should be avoided if it will - lead to UDP DNS response truncation. + NS RRs for subzones) is unnecessary and must be avoided. Note that + KEYs for subzones are authoritative. If a SIG covers any RR that would be in the answer section of the response, its automatic inclusion MUST be the answer section. If it covers an RR that would appear in the authority section, its automatic inclusion MUST be in the authority section. If it covers an RR that would appear in the additional information section it MUST appear in the additional information section. Optionally, DNS transactions may be authenticated by a SIG RR at the - end of the response in the additional information section (section + end of the response in the additional information section (Section 4.1.4). Such SIG RRs are signed by the DNS server originating the response. Although the signer field must be the name of the originating server host, the owner name, class, TTL, and original - TTL, are meaningless. The class and TTL fields can be zero. To save - space, the name should be root (a single zero octet). + TTL, are meaningless. The class and TTL fields can be zero. To + conserve space, the owner name SHOULD be root (a single zero octet). + If transaction authentication is desired, that SIG RR must be + considered higher priority than any other RR in the answer. - [There may be a problem with SIG and NXD RR's associated with domain - names that are CNAMEs. The DNS RFCs prohibit other types of RRs - appearing with a CNAME RR. This problem is being ignored until it is - clear if DNS servers will really have a problem with this.] +4.3 Processing Responses and SIG RRs -4.3 Processing Responses with SIG RRs + The following rules apply to the processing of SIG RRs included in a + response: - If SIG RRs are received in response to a query explicitly specifying - the SIG type, no special processing is required but a security aware - client MAY wish to authenticate them by checking the signature and - applying consistency checks. + 1. a security aware resolver that receives a response from what it + believes to be a security aware server via a communication path + that it believes to be secure with the AD bit (see Section 6.1) + set, MAY choose to accept the RRs as received + without verifying the SIG RRs. - If SIG RRs are received in any other response, a security aware - client should check them using the public key of the signer. The - result should then be verified against the appropriate other RRs - retrieved. + 2. in other cases, a security aware resolver SHOULD verify the SIG + RRs for the RRs of interest. This may involve initiating + additional queries for SIG or KEY RRs, at least in the case of + getting a response from an insecure server. (As explained in 4.2 + above, it will not be possible to secure CNAMEs being served up by + old resolvers.) + + NOTE: Implementors might expect the SHOULD to be a MUST. However, + local policy or the calling application may not require the + security services. + + 3. If SIG RRs are received in response to a user query explicitly + specifying the SIG type, no special processing is required. If the message does not pass reasonable checks or the SIG does not check against the signed RRs, the SIG RR is invalid and should be - ignored. The time of receipt of the SIG RR must be in the inclusive - range of the time signed and the signature expiration but the SIG can - be retained and remains locally valid until the expiration time plus - the authenticated TTL. + ignored. If all of the SIG RR(s) purporting to authenticate a set of + RRs are invalid, then the set of RR(s) is not authenticated. If the SIG RR is the last RR in a response in the additional information section and has a type covered of zero, it is a - transaction signature of the the response and the query that produced - the response. It may be optionally checked and the message rejected - if the checks fail. But even it the checks succeed, such a - transaction authentication SIG does NOT authenticate any RRs in the - message. Only a proper SIG RR signets signed by the zone can - authenticate RRs. If a resolver does not implement transaction SIGs, - it MUST at least ignore them without error. + transaction signature of the response and the query that produced the + response. It MAY be optionally checked and the message rejected if + the checks fail. But even if the checks succeed, such a transaction + authentication SIG does NOT authenticate any RRs in the message. + Only a proper SIG RR signed by the zone can authenticate RRs. If a + resolver does not implement transaction SIGs, it MUST at least ignore + them without error. If all reasonable checks indicate that the SIG RR is valid then RRs - verified by it should be considered authenticated and all other RRs - in the response should be considered with suspicion. + verified by it should be considered authenticated. -4.4 File Representation of SIG RRs +4.4 Signature Expiration, TTLs, and Validity + + Security aware servers must not consider SIG RRs to be authentic + after their expiration time and not consider any RR to be + authenticated after its signatures have expired. Within that + constraint, servers should continue to follow DNS TTL aging. Thus + authoritative servers should continue to follow the zone refresh and + expire parameters and a non-authoritative server should count down + the TTL and discard RRs when the TTL is zero. In addition, when RRs + are transmitted in a query response, the TTL should be trimmed so + that current time plus the TTL does not extend beyond the signature + expiration time. Thus, in general, the TTL on an transmitted RR + would be + + min(sigExpTim,max(zoneMinTTL,min(originalTTL,currentTTL))) + +4.5 File Representation of SIG RRs A SIG RR can be represented as a single logical line in a zone data file [RFC1033] but there are some special problems as described below. (It does not make sense to include a transaction authenticating SIG RR in a file as it is a transient authentication - that must be calculated in real time by the DNS server.) + that covers data including an ephemeral transaction number so it must + be calculated in real time by the DNS server.) There is no particular problem with the signer, covered type, and times. The time fields appears in the form YYYYMMDDHHMMSS where YYYY is the year, the first MM is the month number (01-12), DD is the day of the month (01-31), HH is the hour in 24 hours notation (00-23), the second MM is the minute (00-59), and SS is the second (00-59). - The original TTL and algorithm fields appears as unsigned integers. + The original TTL and algorithm fields appear as unsigned integers. The "labels" field does not appear in the file representation as it can be calculated from the owner name. - The key footprint appears as an eight digit unsigned hexadecimal - number. + The key footprint appears as an unsigned decimal number. However, the signature itself can be very long. It is the last data field and is represented in base 64 (see Appendix) and may be divided up into any number of white space separated substrings, down to single base 64 digits, which are concatenated to obtain the full signature. These substrings can be split between lines using the standard parenthesis. -5. Non-existent Names +5. Non-existent Names and Types - The SIG RR mechanism described in section 4 above provides strong + The SIG RR mechanism described in Section 4 above provides strong authentication of RRs that exist in a zone. But is it not immediately clear how to authenticatably deny the existence of a name - in a zone. + in a zone or a type for an existent name. - The nonexistence of a name in a zone is indicated by the NXD RR for a - name interval containing the nonexistent name. An NXD RR and its SIG - are returned in the additional information section, along with the - error, if the resolver is security aware. NXD RRs can also be - returned if an explicit query is made for the NXD type. + The nonexistence of a name in a zone is indicated by the NXT ("next") + RR for a name interval containing the nonexistent name. An NXT RR and + its SIG are returned in the authority section, along with the error, + if the server is security aware. The same is true for a non-existent + type under an existing name. NXT RRs will also be returned if an + explicit query is made for the NXT type. - The existence of a complete set of NXD records in a zone means that - any query for any name to a security aware server serving the zone - should result in an reply containing at least one signed RR. + The existence of a complete set of NXT records in a zone means that + any query for any name and type to a security aware server serving + the zone should result in an reply containing at least one signed RR. -5.1 The NXD Resource Record + NXT RRs do not appear in zone master files since they can be derived + from the rest of the zone. - The NXD resource record is used to securely indicate that no RRs with - an owner name in a certain name interval exist in a zone. +5.1 The NXT Resource Record - The owner name of the NXD RR is an existing name in the zone. It's - RDATA is another existing name in the zone. The presence of the NXD - RR means that no name between its owner name and the name in its - RDATA area exists. This implies a canonical ordering of all domain - names in a zone. + The NXT resource record is used to securely indicate that RRs with an + owner name in a certain name interval do not exist in a zone and to + indicate what zone signed type RRs are present for an existing name. + + The owner name of the NXT RR is an existing name in the zone. It's + RDATA is a "next" name and a type bit map. The presence of the NXT RR + means that generally no name between its owner name and the name in + its RDATA area exists and that no other types exist under its owner + name. This implies a canonical ordering of all domain names in a + zone. The ordering is to sort labels as unsigned left justified octet - strings where the absence of a byte sorts before a zero byte. Names - are then sorted by sorting on the highest level label and then, + strings where the absence of a octet sorts before a zero octet. + Names are then sorted by sorting on the highest level label and then, within those names with the same highest level label by the next lower label, etc. Since we are talking about a zone, the zone name itself always exists and all other names are the zone name with some prefix of lower level labels. Thus the zone name itself always sorts first. - There is a slight problem with the last NXD in a zone as it wants to - have an owner name which is the last existing name in sort order, - which is easy, but it is not obvious what name to put in its RDATA to - indicate the entire remainder of the name space. This is handled by - treating the name space as circular and putting the zone name in the - RDATA of the last NXD. + There is a problem with the last NXT in a zone as it wants to have an + owner name which is the last existing name in sort order, which is + easy, but it is not obvious what name to put in its RDATA to indicate + the entire remainder of the name space. This is handled by treating + the name space as circular and putting the zone name in the RDATA of + the last NXT. - There are additional complexities due to interaction with wildcards - as explained below. + There are special considerations due to interaction with wildcards as + explained below. - The NXD RRs for a zone can be automatically calculated and added to - the zone by the same recommended off-line process that signs the - zone. The NXD RR's TTL should not exceed the zone minimum TTL. + The NXT RRs for a zone should be automatically calculated and added + to the zone by the same recommended off-line process that signs the + zone. The NXT RR's TTL should not exceed the zone minimum TTL. - The type number for the NXD RR is xxx. +5.2 NXT RDATA Format -5.2 NXD RDATA Format + The RDATA for an NXT RR consists simply of a domain name followed by + a bit map. - The RDATA for an NXD RR consists simply of a domain name. + The type number for the NXT RR is 30. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | next domain name / +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | type bit map / + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + + The size of the bit map can be inferred from the RDLENGTH and the + length of the next domain name. 5.3 Example - Assume a zone has entries for + Assume zone foo.bar has entries for big.foo.bar, medium.foo.bar. small.foo.bar. tiny.foo.bar. Then a query to a security aware server for huge.foo.bar would - produce an error reply with the additional information section - containing + produce an error reply with the authority section data including the + following: - big.foo.bar. NXD medium.foo.bar. + big.foo.bar. NXT medium.foo.bar. 130 + big.foo.bar. SIG NXT ... - and the corresponding SIG RR. + Note that this response implies that big.foo.bar is an existing name + in the zone and thus has other RR types associated with it than NXT. + However, only the NXT (and its SIG) RR appear in the response to this + query for huge.foo.bar, which is a non-existent name. -5.4 Interaction of NXD RRs and Wildcard RRs +5.4 Interaction of NXT RRs and Wildcard RRs - As a wildcard RR causes all possible names in an interval to exist, - there should not be an NXD record that would cover any part of this - interval. Thus if *.X.ZONE exists you would expect an NXD RR that - ends at X.ZONE and one that starts with the last name covered by - *.X.ZONE. However, this "last name covered" is something very ugly - and long like \255\255\255....X.zone. So the NXD for the interval - following is simply given the owner name *.X.zone. This "*" type - name is not expanded when the NXD is returned as additional - information in connection with a query for a non-existent name and - type. + Since, in some sense, a wildcard RR causes all possible names in an + interval to exist, there should not be an NXT RR that would cover any + part of this interval. Thus if *.X.ZONE exists you would expect an + NXT RR that ends at X.ZONE and one that starts with the last name + covered by *.X.ZONE. However, this "last name covered" is something + very ugly and long like \255\255\255....X.zone. So the NXT for the + interval following is simply given the owner name *.X.ZONE. This "*" + type name is not expanded when the NXT is returned as authority + information in connection with a query for a non-existent name. - If there could be any wildcard RRs in a zone and thus wildcard NXDs, - care must be taken in interpreting the results of explicit NXD + If there could be any wildcard RRs in a zone and thus wildcard NXTs, + care must be taken in interpreting the results of explicit NXT retrievals as the owner name may be a wildcard expansion. The existence of one or more wildcard RRs covering a name interval makes it possible for a malicious server to hide any more specificly named RRs in the internal. The server can just falsely return the - wildcard match NXD instead of the more specificly named RRs. If - there is a zone wide wildcard, there will be only one NXD RR whose - owner name and RDATA are both the zone name. In this case a server - could conceal the existence of any more specific RRs in the zone. - (It would be possible to make a more complex NXD feature, taking into - account the types of RRs that did not exist in a name interval, and - the like, which would eliminate this possibility. But it would be - more complex and would be so constraining as to make any future - dynamic update feature that could create new names very difficult - (see Section 3.2).) + wildcard match NXT instead of the more specificly named RRs. If + there is a zone wide wildcard, there will be an NXT RR whose owner + name is the wild card and whose RDATA is the zone name. In this case + a server could conceal the existence of any more specific RRs in the + zone. (It would be possible to design a more strict NXT feature + which would eliminate this possibility. But it would be more complex + and might be so constraining as to make any future dynamic update + feature that could create new names very difficult (see Section + 3.2).) -5.5 Blocking NXD Pseudo-Zone Transfers + What name should be put into the RDATA of an RR with a name that is + within a wild card scope? Since the "next" existing name will be one + that matches the wild card, the wild card name should be used. - In a secure zone, a resolver can query for the initial NXD associated - with the zone name. Using the RDATA field from that RR, it can query - for the next NXD RR. By repeating this, it can walk through all the - NXDs in the zone. If there are no wildcards, it can use this - technique to find all names in a zone. If it does type ANY queries, - it can incrementally get all information in the zone and perhaps - defeat attempts to administratively block zone transfers. +5.5 Blocking NXT Pseudo-Zone Transfers - If there are any wildcards, this NXD walking technique will not find + In a secure zone, a resolver can query for the initial NXT associated + with the zone name. Using the next domain name RDATA field from that + RR, it can query for the next NXT RR. By repeating this, it can walk + through all the NXTs in the zone. If there are no wildcards, it can + use this technique to find all names in a zone. If it does type ANY + queries, it can incrementally get all information in the zone and + perhaps defeat attempts to administratively block zone transfers. + + If there are any wildcards, this NXT walking technique will not find any more specific RR names in the part of the name space the wildcard covers. By doing explicit retrievals for wildcard names, a resolver could determine what intervals are covered by wildcards but still could not, with these techniques, find any names inside such intervals except by trying every name. - If it is desired to block NXD walking, the recommended method is to + If it is desired to block NXT walking, the recommended method is to add a zone wide wildcard of the KEY type with the no key bit on and with no type (zone, entity, or user) bit on. This will cause there - to be only one NXD RR in the zone for the zone name and leak no - information about what real names exist in the zone. This protection - from pseudo-zone transfers is bought at the expense of eliminating - the data origin authentication of the non-existence of names that NXD - RRs can provide. If an entire zone is covered by a wildcard, a - malicious server can return an RR produced by matching the resulting - wildcard NXD and can thus hide all the real data and delegations with - more specific names in the zone. + to be one zone covering NXT RR and leak no information about what + real names exist in the zone. This protection from pseudo-zone + transfers is bought at the expense of eliminating the data origin + authentication of the non-existence of names that NXT RRs can + provide. If an entire zone is covered by a wildcard, a malicious + server can return an RR produced by matching the resulting wildcard + NXT and can thus hide all the real data and delegations with more + specific names in the zone. -6. How to Resolve Securely +5.6 Special Considerations at Delegation Points - Retrieving or resolving authentic data from the DNS involves starting - with one or more trusted public keys and, in general, progressing - securely from them through the DNS zone structure to the zone of - interest. Such trusted public keys would normally be configured in a - manner similar to that described in section 6.1. However, as a - practical matter, a security aware resolver would still gain some - confidence in the results it returns even if it was not configured - with any keys but trusted what it got from a local well known server - as a starting point. + A name other than root which is the head of a zone also appears as + the leaf in a superzone. If both are secure, there will always be + two different NXT RRs with the same name. They can be distinguished + by their signers and next domain name fields. Security aware servers + should return the correct NXT automatically when required to + authenticate the non-existence of a name and both NXTs, if available, + on explicit query for type NXT. -6.1 Boot File Format + Insecure servers will never automatically return an NXT and may only + return the NXT from the subzone on explicit queries. - The recommended format for a boot file line to configure starting - keys is as follows: +6. The AD and CD Bits and How to Resolve Securely - pubkey name object flags algorithm [exponent modulus] + Retrieving or resolving authentic data from the Domain Name System + (DNS) involves starting with one or more trusted public keys. With + trusted keys, a browser willing to perform cryptography can progress + securely through the secure DNS zone structure to the zone of + interest as described in Section 6.3. Such trusted public keys would + normally be configured in a manner similar to that described in + Section 6.2. However, as a practical matter, a security aware + resolver would still gain some confidence in the results it returns + even if it was not configured with any keys but trusted what it got + from a local well known server as a starting point. - for a public key. "object" is the domain name of the thing the key - is associated with and "name" is the owner name if the line is + Data stored at a server needs security labels of Authenticated, + Pending, or Insecure. There is also a fourth transient state of Bad + which indicates that SIG checks have explicitly failed on the data. + Such data is not retained at a security aware server. Authenticated + means that the data has a valid SIG under a KEY traceable via a chain + of zero or more SIG and KEY RRs to a KEY configured at the resolver + via its boot file. Pending data has no authenticated SIGs and at + least one additional SIG the browser is still trying to authenticate. + Insecure data is data which it is known can never be either + authenticated or found bad because it is in a zone with no key or an + experimental key. Behavior in terms of control of and flagging based + on such data labels is described in Section 6.1. + + The proper validation of signatures requires a reasonably secure + shared opinion of the absolute time between resolvers and servers as + described in Section 6.4. + + In getting to the data of interest to respond to a query, a secure + resolver may encounter genuine non-secure zones. It may proceed + through such zones but should report this as described in Section + 6.5. + +6.1 The AD and CD Header Bits + + Two unused bits are allocated out of the DNS query/response format + header. The AD (authentic data) bit indicates in a response that the + data included has been verified by the server providing it. The CD + (checking disabled) bit indicates in a query that non-verified data + is acceptable to the resolver sending the query. + + These bits are allocated from the must-be-zero Z field as follows: + + 1 1 1 1 1 1 + 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 + +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ + | ID | + +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ + |QR| Opcode |AA|TC|RD|RA| Z|AD|CD| RCODE | + +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ + | QDCOUNT | + +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ + | ANCOUNT | + +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ + | NSCOUNT | + +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ + | ARCOUNT | + +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ + + These bits are zero in old servers and resolvers. Thus the responses + of old servers are not flagged as authenticated to security aware + resolvers and queries from non-security aware resolvers do not assert + the checking disabled bit and thus will be answered by security aware + servers only with authenticated data. Of course security aware + resolvers can not trust the AD bit unless they trust the server they + are talking to and have a secure path to it. + + Any security aware resolver willing to do cryptography should assert + the CD bit on all queries to reduce DNS latency time by allowing + security aware servers to answer before they have resolved the + validity of data. + + Security aware servers never return bad data. For non-security aware + resolvers or security aware resolvers requesting service by having + the CD bit clear, security aware servers return only authenticated or + insecure data with the AD bit set in the response. Security aware + resolvers will know that if data is insecure versus authentic by the + absence of SIG RRs. Security aware servers may return pending data + to security aware resolvers requesting the service by clearing the AD + bit in the response. The AD bit may only be set on a response if the + RRs in the response are either authenticated or insecure. + +6.2 Boot File Format + + The format for a boot file directive to configure a starting zone key + is as follows: + + pubkey name flags protocol algorithm key-data + + for a public key. "name" is the owner name (if the line is translated into a KEY RR). Flags indicates the type of key and is - the same as the flag byte in the KEY RR. In particular, if the "no - key" bit is on in flags, then all fields after flags may be omitted. - Algorithm is the algorithm in use where one is the MD5/RSA algorithm - and 254 indicates a private algorithm. The material after the - algorithm is algorithm dependent and, for private algorithms, starts - with the algorithm's identifying OID. For the RSA algorithm, it is - the public key exponent as a decimal number between 3 and 16777215, - and the modulus in base 64 (see Appendix). + the same as the flag octet in the KEY RR. In particular, if the "no + key" bit is on in flags, then all fields after algorithm may be + omitted. Algorithm is the algorithm in use where one is the MD5/RSA + algorithm and 254 indicates a private algorithm. The material after + the algorithm is algorithm dependent and, for private algorithms, + starts with the algorithm's identifying OID. It is encoded in base + 64 (see Appendix). + + A file of keys for cross certification or other purposes can be + configured though the keyfile directive as follows: + + keyfile filename + + The file looks like a master file except that it can only contain KEY + and SIG RRs with the SIGs signed under a key configured with the + pubkey directive. While it might seem logical for everyone to start with the key for the root zone, this has problems. The logistics of updating every DNS resolver in the world when the root key changes would be excessive. It may be some time before there even is a root key. Furthermore, many organizations will explicitly wish their "interior" DNS implementations to completely trust only their own zone. These interior resolvers can then go through the organization's zone server to access data outsize the organization's domain. -6.2 Chaining Through Zones +6.3 Chaining Through Zones - Starting with one trusted zone key, it is possible to retrieve signed - keys for subzones which have a key. Every secure zone (except root) - should also include the KEY RR for its super-zone signed by the - secure zone and with the owner name of the secure zone and object - name of the super-zone. This makes it possible to climb the tree of - zones if one starts below root. A secure sub-zone is indicated by a - KEY RR appearing with the NS RRs for the sub-zone and with the same - owner and object names. These make it possible to descend within the - tree of zones. + Starting with one or more trusted keys for a zone, it should be + possible to retrieve signed keys for its subzones which have a key + and, if the zone is not root, for some superzone. Every authoritative + secure zone server should also include the KEY RR for a super-zone + signed by the secure zone via a keyfile directive. This makes it + possible to climb the tree of zones if one starts below root. A + secure sub-zone is indicated by a KEY RR appearing with the NS RRs + for the sub-zone. These make it possible to descend within the tree + of zones. A resolver should keep track of the number of successive secure zones traversed from a starting point to any secure zone it can reach. In general, the lower such a distance number is, the greater the - confidence in the data. Data configured via a boot file should be - given a distance number of zero. Should a query encounter different - data with different distance values, that with a larger value should - be ignored. + confidence in the data. Data configured via a boot file directive + should be given a distance number of zero. Should a query encounter + different data for the same query with different distance values, + that with a larger value should be ignored. A security conscious resolver should completely refuse to step from a secure zone into a non-secure zone unless the non-secure zone is certified to be non-secure or only experimentally secure by the presence of an authenticated KEY RR for the non-secure zone with a no key flag or the presence of a KEY RR with the experimental bit set. Otherwise the resolver is probably getting completely bogus or spoofed data. If legitimate non-secure zones are encountered in traversing the DNS tree, then no zone can be trusted as secure that can be reached only via information from such non-secure zones. Since the non-secure zone data could have been spoofed, the "secure" zone reach via it could be counterfeit. The "distance" to data in such zones or zones reached via such zones could be set to 512 or more as this exceeds the largest possible distance through secure zones in the DNS. Nevertheless, continuing to apply secure checks within "secure" zones reached via non-secure zones will, as a practical matter, provide some increase in security. - The syntax of KEY RRs, with an arbitrary object name, provides for - cross-certification. Although the syntax permits the owner name of a - cross-certification KEY RR to be any name, by convention and to avoid - an undue concentration of such KEY RRs under any particular name, - their owner name should be the zone name prefixed with the - destination object name (truncated an integral number of labels from - the front if necessary due to DNS name restrictions). Thus a key for - isoc.org would appear in the mit.edu zone with the owner name - isoc.org.mit.edu and object name isoc.org. - - The existence of cross certifications adds further policy questions. - Assume we have a zone B.A and a zone Y.X. Many possibilities exist - for a secure resolver configured with the B.A key to get to Y.X. If - all the zones along the way are secure, it could climb to root and - then descend the other side, a total of four hops (B.A -> A -> . -> X - -> Y.X). If the B.A administrator had installed a cross certified - key for Y.X in the B.A zone, using that would be a shorter and - presumably more secure way to find Y.X's key which would be immune to - the non-security or even compromise of the servers for A or root or - X. But what if some less trusted subzone of B.A, say flakey.B.A - installed a cross certified key for Y.X? If there is a conflict, - should this be preferred to a hierarhically derived key obtained by - climbing to root and descending? Such questions are entirely a - matter of local resolver policy. - -6.3 Secure Time +6.4 Secure Time Coordinated interpretation of the time fields in SIG RRs requires that reasonably consistent time be available to the hosts implementing the DNS security extensions. A variety of time synchronization protocols exist including the Network Time Protocol (NTP, RFC1305). If such protocols are used, they should be used securely so that time can not be spoofed. Otherwise, for example, a host could get its clock turned back and might then believe old SIG and KEY RRs which were valid but no longer are. 7. Operational Considerations This section discusses a variety of considerations in secure - operation of DNS using these proposed protocol extensions. + operation of the Domain Name System (DNS) using these proposed + protocol extensions. 7.1 Key Size Considerations There are a number of factors that effect public key size choice for use in the DNS security extension. Unfortunately, these factors - usually do not all point in the same direction. Choice of a key size - should generally be made by the zone administrator depending on their - local conditions. + usually do not all point in the same direction. Choice of zone key + size should generally be made by the zone administrator depending on + their local conditions. - For most schemes, larger keys are more secure but slower. - Verification (the most common operation) for the MD5/RSA algorithm - will vary roughly with the square of the modulus length, signing will - vary with the cube of the modulus length, and key generation (the - least common operation) will vary with the fourth power of the - modulus length. The current best algorithms for factoring a modulus - and breaking RSA security vary roughly with the square of the modulus - itself. Thus going from a 640 bit modulus to a 1280 bit modulus only - increases the verification time by a factor of 4 but vastly increases - the work factor of breaking the key. [RSA FAQ] + For most schemes, larger keys are more secure but slower. Given a + small public exponent, verification (the most common operation) for + the MD5/RSA algorithm will vary roughly with the square of the + modulus length, signing will vary with the cube of the modulus + length, and key generation (the least common operation) will vary + with the fourth power of the modulus length. The current best + algorithms for factoring a modulus and breaking RSA security vary + roughly with the square of the modulus itself. Thus going from a 640 + bit modulus to a 1280 bit modulus only increases the verification + time by a factor of 4 but increases the work factor of breaking the + key by over 2^3000. [RSA FAQ] An upper bound of 2552 bit has been + established for the MD4/RSA DNS security algorithm for + interoperability purposes. However, larger keys increase size of the KEY and SIG RRs. This - increases the chance of UDP packet overflow and the possible - necessity for using higher overhead TCP. + increases the chance of DNS UDP packet overflow and the possible + necessity for using higher overhead TCP in responses. The recommended minimum RSA algorithm modulus size, 640 bits, is believed by the authors to be secure at this time and for some years but high level zones in the DNS tree may wish to set a higher minimum, perhaps 1000 bits, for security reasons. (Since the United States National Security Agency generally permits export of encryption systems using an RSA modulus of up to 512 bits, use of that small a modulus, i.e. n, must be considered weak.) For a key used only to secure data and not to secure other keys, 640 bits should be entirely adequate. 7.2 Key Storage It is strongly recommended that zone private keys and the zone file master copy be kept and used in off-line non-network connected physically secure machines only. Periodically an application can be - run to re-sign the RRs in a zone by adding NXD and SIG RRs. Then the + run to re-sign the RRs in a zone by adding NXT and SIG RRs. Then the augmented file can be transferred, perhaps by sneaker-net, to the networked zone primary server machine. The idea is to have a one way information flow to the network to avoid the possibility of tampering from the network. Keeping the zone master file on-line on the network and simply cycling it through an off-line signer does not do this. The on-line version could still - be tampered with if the host it resides on is compromised. The - master copy of the zone file should be off net and should not be - updated based on an unsecured network mediated communication. + be tampered with if the host it resides on is compromised. For + maximum security, the master copy of the zone file should be off net + and should not be updated based on an unsecured network mediated + communication. + + Note, however, that secure resolvers need to be configured with some + trusted on-line public key information (or a secure path to such a + resolver). Non-zone private keys, such as host or user keys, may have to be kept - on line to be used for real-time purposes such a IP secure session - set-up or secure mail. + on line to be used for real-time purposes such a IPSEC session set-up + or secure mail. 7.3 Key Generation Careful key generation is a sometimes over looked but absolutely essential element in any cryptographically secure system. The strongest algorithms used with the longest keys are still of no use if an adversary can guess enough to lower the size of the likely key space so that it can be exhaustively searched. Suggestions will be - found in draft-ietf-security-randomness-*.txt. + found in RFC 1750. It is strongly recommended that key generation also occur off-line, perhaps on the machine used to sign zones (see Section 7.2). 7.4 Key Lifetimes No key should be used forever. The longer a key is in use, the greater the probability that it will have been compromised through - carelessness, accident, espionage, or cryptanalysis. + carelessness, accident, espionage, or cryptanalysis. Furthermore, if + key rollover is a rare event, there is an increased risk that, when + the time does come up change the key, no one at the site will + remember how to do it or other problems will have developed in the + procedures. - No zone key should have a lifetime significantly over five years. - The recommended maximum lifetime for zone keys that are kept off-line - and carefully guarded is 13 months with the intent that they be - replaced every year. The recommended maximum lifetime for end entity - keys that are used for IP-security or the like and are kept on line - is 36 days with the intent that they be replaced monthly or more - often. In some cases, an entity key lifetime of a little over a day + While key lifetime is a matter of local policy, these considerations + suggest that no zone key should have a lifetime significantly over + four years. A reasonable maximum lifetime for zone keys that are + kept off-line and carefully guarded is 13 months with the intent that + they be replaced every year. A reasonable maximum lifetime for end + entity keys that are used for IP-security or the like and are kept on + line is 36 days with the intent that they be replaced monthly or more + often. In some cases, an entity key lifetime of somewhat over a day may be reasonable. - Key lifetimes significantly over a year increase the risk that, when - the time comes up change the key, no one at the site will remember - how to do it. - 7.5 Signature Lifetime - Signature expiration times must be set far enought in the future that + Signature expiration times must be set far enough in the future that it is quite certain that new signatures can be generated before the old ones expire. However, setting expiration too far into the future could, if bad data or signatures were ever generated, mean a long time to flush such badness. It is recommended that signature lifetime be a small multiple of the TTL but not less than a reasonable re-signing interval. 7.6 Root It should be noted that in DNS the root is a zone unto itself. Thus - the root zone key should only be see signing itself or signing RRs + the root zone key should only be seen signing itself or signing RRs with names one level below root, such as .aq, .edu, or .arpa. Implementations MAY reject as bogus any purported root signature of records with a name more than one level below root. 8. Conformance Several levels of server and resolver conformance are defined. 8.1 Server Conformance - Three levels of server conformance are defined as follows: + Two levels of server conformance are defined as follows: - Basic server compliance is the ability to store and retrieve - (including zone transfer) SIG, KEY, and NXD RRs. Secondaries for a - secure zone must be at least basicly compliant. + Minimal server compliance is the ability to store and retrieve + (including zone transfer) SIG, KEY, and NXT RRs. Any secondary, + caching, or other server for a secure zone must be at least minimally + compliant and even then some things, such as secure CNAMEs, will not + work. - Medium server compliance adds the following to basic compliance: - (1) ability to read SIG, KEY, and NXD RRs in zone files and (2) + Full server compliance adds the following to basic compliance: + (1) ability to read SIG, KEY, and NXT RRs in zone files and (2) ability, given a zone file and private key, to add appropriate SIG - and NXD RRs, possibly via a separate application. Primary servers - for secure zones must be at least minimally compliant. - - Full server compliance is ability to automatically include SIG, - KEY, and NXD RRs in responses as appropriate, as well as meeting - medium compliance. + and NXT RRs, possibly via a separate application, (3) proper + automatic inclusion of SIG, KEY, and NXT RRs in responses, (4) + suppression of CNAME following on retrieval of the security type RRs, + (5) recognize the CD query header bit and set the AD query header + bit, as appropriate, and (6) proper handling of the two NXT RRs at + delegation points. Primary servers for secure zones MUST be fully + compliant and for completely successful secure operation, all + secondary, caching, and other servers handling the zone should be + fully compliant as well. 8.2 Resolver Conformance Two levels of resolver compliance are defined: - A basic compliance resolver can handle SIG, KEY, and NXD RRs + A basic compliance resolver can handle SIG, KEY, and NXT RRs when they are explicitly requested. - A fully compliant resolver understands KEY, SIG, and NXD RRs, - maintains appropriate information in its local caches and database to - indicate which RRs have been authenticated and to what extent they - have been authenticated, and performs additional queries as necessary - to obtain KEY, SIG, or NXD RRs from non-security aware servers. + A fully compliant resolver (1) understands KEY, SIG, and NXT + RRs, (2) maintains appropriate information in its local caches and + database to indicate which RRs have been authenticated and to what + extent they have been authenticated, (3) performs additional queries + as necessary to attempt to obtain KEY, SIG, or NXT RRs from non- + security aware servers, (4) normally sets the CD query header bit on + its queries. 9. Security Considerations This document concerns technical details of extensions to the Domain Name System (DNS) protocol to provide data integrity and data origin authentication, public key distribution, and optional transaction security. If should be noted that, at most, these extensions guarantee the validity of resource records, including KEY resource records, @@ -1274,54 +1587,58 @@ [RFC1032] - Domain Administrators Guide, M. Stahl, November 1987 [RFC1033] - Domain Administrators Operations Guide, M. Lottor, November 1987 [RFC1034] - Domain Names - Concepts and Facilities, P. Mockapetris, November 1987 [RFC1035] - Domain Names - Implementation and Specifications + [RFC1305] - Network Time Protocol (v3), D. Mills, April 9 1992. + [RFC1321] - The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm, R. Rivest, April 16 1992. + [RFC1750] - Randomness Requirements for Security, D. Eastlake, S. + Crocker, J. Schiller, December 1994. + [RSA FAQ] - RSADSI Frequently Asked Questions periodic posting. Authors Addresses Donald E. Eastlake, 3rd - Digital Equipment Corporation - 550 King Street, LKG2-1/BB3 - Littleton, MA 01460 + CyberCash, Inc. + 318 Acton Street + Carlisle, MA 01741 USA - Telephone: +1 508 486 6577(w) +1 508 287 4877(h) - EMail: dee@lkg.dec.com + Telephone: +1 508 287 4877 + EMail: dee@cybercash.com Charles W. Kaufman Iris Associates 1 Technology Park Drive - Westford, MA 01886 + Westford, MA 01886 USA Telephone: +1 508-392-5276 EMail: charlie_kaufman@iris.com Expiration and File Name - This draft expires 1 July 1995. + This draft expires 24 December 1995. - Its file name is draft-ietf-dnssec-secext-03.txt. + Its file name is draft-ietf-dnssec-secext-04.txt. Appendix: Base 64 Encoding The following encoding technique is taken from RFC 1521 by Borenstein - and Freed. It is reproduced here in a slightly edited form for - convenience. + and Freed. It is reproduced here in an edited form for convenience. A 65-character subset of US-ASCII is used, enabling 6 bits to be represented per printable character. (The extra 65th character, "=", is used to signify a special processing function.) The encoding process represents 24-bit groups of input bits as output strings of 4 encoded characters. Proceeding from left to right, a 24-bit input group is formed by concatenating 3 8-bit input groups. These 24 bits are then treated as 4 concatenated 6-bit groups, each of which is translated into a single digit in the base64 alphabet.