--- 1/draft-ietf-dprive-phase2-requirements-00.txt	2020-06-16 15:13:18.444716480 -0700
+++ 2/draft-ietf-dprive-phase2-requirements-01.txt	2020-06-16 15:13:18.504717252 -0700
@@ -1,22 +1,22 @@
 
 DPRIVE                                                      J. Livingood
 Internet-Draft                                                   Comcast
 Intended status: Informational                              A. Mayrhofer
-Expires: June 16, 2020                                       nic.at GmbH
+Expires: December 18, 2020                                   nic.at GmbH
                                                            B. Overeinder
                                                               NLnet Labs
-                                                       December 14, 2019
+                                                           June 16, 2020
 
  DNS Privacy Requirements for Exchanges between Recursive Resolvers and
                          Authoritative Servers
-                draft-ietf-dprive-phase2-requirements-00
+                draft-ietf-dprive-phase2-requirements-01
 
 Abstract
 
    This document provides requirements for adding confidentiality to DNS
    exchanges between recursive resolvers and authoritative servers.
 
 Status of This Memo
 
    This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
    provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
@@ -24,25 +24,25 @@
    Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
    Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
    working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
    Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
 
    Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
    and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
    time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
    material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
 
-   This Internet-Draft will expire on June 16, 2020.
+   This Internet-Draft will expire on December 18, 2020.
 
 Copyright Notice
 
-   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
+   Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
    document authors.  All rights reserved.
 
    This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
    Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
    (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
    publication of this document.  Please review these documents
    carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
    to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
    include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
    the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
@@ -246,32 +246,32 @@
 
 9.1.  The User Perspective and Use Cases
 
    The privacy and confidentiality of Users (that is, users as in
    clients of recursive resolvers, which in turn forward/resolve the
    user's DNS requests by contacting authoritative servers) can be
    improved in several ways.  We call this "minimisation of exposure",
    and there are currently three ways to reduce that exposure:
 
    o  Qname minimisation [RFC7816], reducing the amount of information
-      which is absolutely necessary to resolve a query
+      to what is absolutely necessary to resolve a query
 
    o  Aggressive NSEC/local auth cache [RFC8198], reducing the amount of
       outgoing queries in the first place
 
    o  Encryption, removing exposure of information while in transit
 
    As recursors typically forwards queries received from the user to
    authoritative servers.  This creates a transitive trust between the
    user and the recursor, as well as the authoritative server, since
    information created by the user is exposed to the authoritative
-   server.  However, the user has never a chance to identify which data
+   server.  However, the user never has a chance to identify what data
    was exposed to which authoritative party (via which path).
 
    Also, Users would want to be informed about the status of the
    connections which were made on their behalf, which adds a fourth
    point
 
    Encryption/privacy status signaling
 
    *TODO*: Actual requirements - what do users "want"?  Start below: