draft-ietf-drip-arch-01.txt   draft-ietf-drip-arch-02.txt 
DRIP S. Card, Ed. DRIP S. Card, Ed.
Internet-Draft A. Wiethuechter Internet-Draft A. Wiethuechter
Intended status: Informational AX Enterprize Intended status: Informational AX Enterprize
Expires: 27 November 2020 R. Moskowitz Expires: 26 December 2020 R. Moskowitz
HTT Consulting HTT Consulting
S. Zhao S. Zhao
Tencent Tencent
26 May 2020 A. Gurtov
Linköping University
24 June 2020
Drone Remote Identification Protocol (DRIP) Architecture Drone Remote Identification Protocol (DRIP) Architecture
draft-ietf-drip-arch-01 draft-ietf-drip-arch-02
Abstract Abstract
This document defines an architecture for protocols and services to This document defines an architecture for protocols and services to
support Unmanned Aircraft System Remote Identification and tracking support Unmanned Aircraft System Remote Identification and tracking
(UAS RID), plus RID-related communications, including required (UAS RID), plus RID-related communications, including required
architectural building blocks and their interfaces. architectural building blocks and their interfaces.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 27 November 2020. This Internet-Draft will expire on 26 December 2020.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terms and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2. Terms and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1. Requirements Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.1. Requirements Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2. Additional Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.2. Additional Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Entities and their Interfaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3. Entities and their Interfaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1. Private Information Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.1. Private Information Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1.1. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.1.1. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1.2. Proposed Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.1.2. Proposed Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2. Public Information Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.2. Public Information Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2.1. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.2.1. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2.2. Proposed Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.2.2. Proposed Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.3. CS-RID concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.3. CS-RID concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.3.1. Proposed optional CS-RID SDSP . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.3.1. Proposed optional CS-RID SDSP . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.3.2. Proposed optional CS-RID Finder . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.3.2. Proposed optional CS-RID Finder . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4. Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.1. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4.1. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.2. Proposed Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4.2. Proposed Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5. DRIP Transactions enabling Trustworthy UAS RID . . . . . . . 10 5. DRIP Transactions enabling Trustworthy UAS RID . . . . . . . 9
6. Privacy for Broadcast PII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 6. Privacy for Broadcast PII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 7. Architectural implications of EASA requirements . . . . . . . 11
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Appendix A. Overview of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Traffic Appendix A. Overview of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Traffic
Management (UTM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Management (UTM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
A.1. Operation Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 A.1. Operation Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
A.2. UAS Service Supplier (USS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 A.2. UAS Service Supplier (USS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
A.3. UTM Use Cases for UAS Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 A.3. UTM Use Cases for UAS Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
A.4. Overview UAS Remote ID (RID) and RID Standardization . . 15 A.4. Overview UAS Remote ID (RID) and RID Standardization . . 16
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document describes a natural Internet based architecture for This document describes a natural Internet based architecture for
Unmanned Aircraft System Remote Identification and tracking (UAS Unmanned Aircraft System Remote Identification and tracking (UAS
RID), conforming to proposed regulations and external technical RID), conforming to proposed regulations and external technical
standards, satisfying the requirements listed in the companion standards, satisfying the requirements listed in the companion
requirements document [I-D.ietf-drip-reqs]. The requirements requirements document [I-D.ietf-drip-reqs]. The requirements
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PII is protected unless the UAS is informed otherwise. This may come PII is protected unless the UAS is informed otherwise. This may come
from operational instructions to even permit flying in a space/time. from operational instructions to even permit flying in a space/time.
It may be special instructions at the start or during a mission. PII It may be special instructions at the start or during a mission. PII
protection should not be used if the UAS loses connectivity to the protection should not be used if the UAS loses connectivity to the
USS. The USS always has the option to abort the mission if PII USS. The USS always has the option to abort the mission if PII
protection is disallowed. protection is disallowed.
An authorized Observer may instruct a UAS via the USS that conditions An authorized Observer may instruct a UAS via the USS that conditions
have changed mandating no PII protection or land the UA. have changed mandating no PII protection or land the UA.
7. IANA Considerations 7. Architectural implications of EASA requirements
According to EASA, in EU broadcasting drone identification will be
mandatory from July 2020. Following info should be sent in plaintext
over Wifi or Bluetooth. In real time during the whole duration of
the flight, the direct periodic broadcast from the UA using an open
and documented transmission protocol, of the following data, in a way
that they can be received directly by existing mobile devices within
the broadcasting range:
i) the UAS operator registration number;
ii) the unique physical serial number of the UA compliant with
standard ANSI/CTA2063;
iii) the geographical position of the UA and its height above the
surface or take-off point;
iv) the route course measured clockwise from true north and ground
speed of the UA; and
v) the geographical position of the remote pilot or, if not
available, the take-off point;
The architecture proposed in this document partially satisfies EASA
requirements. In particular, i) is included to Operator-ID Message
as optional. ii) cannot be directly supported due to its heavy
privacy implications. A cryptographic identifier that needs to be
resolved is proposed instead. iii) and iv) are included into
Location/Vector Message. v) is included into a System Message
(optional).
8. IANA Considerations
This document does not make any request to IANA. This document does not make any request to IANA.
8. Security Considerations 9. Security Considerations
DRIP is all about safety and security, so content pertaining to such DRIP is all about safety and security, so content pertaining to such
is not limited to this section. The security provided by asymmetric is not limited to this section. The security provided by asymmetric
cryptographic techniques depends upon protection of the private keys. cryptographic techniques depends upon protection of the private keys.
A manufacturer that embeds a private key in an UA may have retained a A manufacturer that embeds a private key in an UA may have retained a
copy. A manufacturer whose UA are configured by a closed source copy. A manufacturer whose UA are configured by a closed source
application on the GCS which communicates over the Internet with the application on the GCS which communicates over the Internet with the
factory may be sending a copy of a UA or GCS self-generated key back factory may be sending a copy of a UA or GCS self-generated key back
to the factory. Compromise of a registry private key could do to the factory. Compromise of a registry private key could do
widespread harm. Key revocation procedures are as yet to be widespread harm. Key revocation procedures are as yet to be
determined. These risks are in addition to those involving Operator determined. These risks are in addition to those involving Operator
key management practices. key management practices.
9. References 10. References
9.1. Normative References 10.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
9.2. Informative References 10.2. Informative References
[ATIS-I-0000074] [ATIS-I-0000074]
ATIS, "Report on UAS in 3GPP", ATIS, "Report on UAS in 3GPP",
<https://access.atis.org/apps/group_public/ <https://access.atis.org/apps/group_public/
download.php/48760/ATIS-I-0000074.pdf>. download.php/48760/ATIS-I-0000074.pdf>.
[CTA2063A] ANSI, "Small Unmanned Aerial Systems Serial Numbers", [CTA2063A] ANSI, "Small Unmanned Aerial Systems Serial Numbers",
September 2019. September 2019.
[Delegated] [Delegated]
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[I-D.ietf-drip-reqs] [I-D.ietf-drip-reqs]
Card, S., Wiethuechter, A., Moskowitz, R., and A. Gurtov, Card, S., Wiethuechter, A., Moskowitz, R., and A. Gurtov,
"Drone Remote Identification Protocol (DRIP) "Drone Remote Identification Protocol (DRIP)
Requirements", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft- Requirements", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-drip-reqs-01, 25 May 2020, ietf-drip-reqs-01, 25 May 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-drip-reqs-01>. <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-drip-reqs-01>.
[I-D.moskowitz-drip-uas-rid] [I-D.moskowitz-drip-uas-rid]
Moskowitz, R., Card, S., Wiethuechter, A., and A. Gurtov, Moskowitz, R., Card, S., Wiethuechter, A., and A. Gurtov,
"UAS Remote ID", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft- "UAS Remote ID", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
moskowitz-drip-uas-rid-01, 5 May 2020, moskowitz-drip-uas-rid-02, 28 May 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-moskowitz-drip-uas-rid- <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-moskowitz-drip-uas-rid-
01>. 02>.
[I-D.moskowitz-hip-hierarchical-hit] [I-D.moskowitz-hip-hierarchical-hit]
Moskowitz, R., Card, S., and A. Wiethuechter, Moskowitz, R., Card, S., and A. Wiethuechter,
"Hierarchical HITs for HIPv2", Work in Progress, Internet- "Hierarchical HITs for HIPv2", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-moskowitz-hip-hierarchical-hit-05, 13 May Draft, draft-moskowitz-hip-hierarchical-hit-05, 13 May
2020, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-moskowitz-hip- 2020, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-moskowitz-hip-
hierarchical-hit-05>. hierarchical-hit-05>.
[Implementing] [Implementing]
European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), "EU European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), "EU
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United States of America United States of America
Email: rgm@labs.htt-consult.com Email: rgm@labs.htt-consult.com
Shuai Zhao Shuai Zhao
Tencent Tencent
CA CA
United States of America United States of America
Email: shuaiizhao@tencent.com Email: shuaiizhao@tencent.com
Andrei Gurtov
Link&#246;ping University
IDA
SE-58183 Link&#246;ping
Sweden
Email: gurtov@acm.org
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