draft-ietf-drip-arch-02.txt   draft-ietf-drip-arch-03.txt 
DRIP S. Card, Ed. DRIP S. Card, Ed.
Internet-Draft A. Wiethuechter Internet-Draft A. Wiethuechter
Intended status: Informational AX Enterprize Intended status: Informational AX Enterprize
Expires: 26 December 2020 R. Moskowitz Expires: 14 January 2021 R. Moskowitz
HTT Consulting HTT Consulting
S. Zhao S. Zhao
Tencent Tencent
A. Gurtov A. Gurtov
Linköping University Linköping University
24 June 2020 13 July 2020
Drone Remote Identification Protocol (DRIP) Architecture Drone Remote Identification Protocol (DRIP) Architecture
draft-ietf-drip-arch-02 draft-ietf-drip-arch-03
Abstract Abstract
This document defines an architecture for protocols and services to This document defines an architecture for protocols and services to
support Unmanned Aircraft System Remote Identification and tracking support Unmanned Aircraft System Remote Identification and tracking
(UAS RID), plus RID-related communications, including required (UAS RID), plus RID-related communications, including required
architectural building blocks and their interfaces. architectural building blocks and their interfaces.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 26 December 2020. This Internet-Draft will expire on 14 January 2021.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text
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provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terms and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2. Terms and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1. Requirements Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.1. Requirements Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2. Additional Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.2. Additional Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. Entities and their Interfaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3. Entities and their Interfaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1. Private Information Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.1. Private Information Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1.1. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.1.1. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1.2. Proposed Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.1.2. Proposed Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2. Public Information Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.2. Public Information Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2.1. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.2.1. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2.2. Proposed Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.2.2. Proposed Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.3. CS-RID concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.3. CS-RID concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.3.1. Proposed optional CS-RID SDSP . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.3.1. Proposed optional CS-RID SDSP . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.3.2. Proposed optional CS-RID Finder . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.3.2. Proposed optional CS-RID Finder . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4. Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.1. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4.1. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.2. Proposed Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4.2. Proposed Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5. DRIP Transactions enabling Trustworthy UAS RID . . . . . . . 9 5. DRIP Transactions enabling Trustworthy UAS RID . . . . . . . 10
6. Privacy for Broadcast PII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 6. Privacy for Broadcast PII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7. Architectural implications of EASA requirements . . . . . . . 11 7. Architectural implications of EASA requirements . . . . . . . 11
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Appendix A. Overview of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Traffic Appendix A. Overview of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Traffic
Management (UTM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Management (UTM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
A.1. Operation Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 A.1. Operation Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
A.2. UAS Service Supplier (USS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 A.2. UAS Service Supplier (USS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
A.3. UTM Use Cases for UAS Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 A.3. UTM Use Cases for UAS Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
A.4. Overview UAS Remote ID (RID) and RID Standardization . . 16 A.4. Overview UAS Remote ID (RID) and RID Standardization . . 17
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document describes a natural Internet based architecture for This document describes a natural Internet based architecture for
Unmanned Aircraft System Remote Identification and tracking (UAS Unmanned Aircraft System Remote Identification and tracking (UAS
RID), conforming to proposed regulations and external technical RID), conforming to proposed regulations and external technical
standards, satisfying the requirements listed in the companion standards, satisfying the requirements listed in the companion
requirements document [I-D.ietf-drip-reqs]. The requirements requirements document [drip-requirements]. The requirements document
document also provides an extended introduction to the problem space, also provides an extended introduction to the problem space, use
use cases, etc. Only a brief summary of that introduction will be cases, etc. Only a brief summary of that introduction will be
restated here as context, with reference to the general architecture restated here as context, with reference to the general architecture
shown in Figure 1 below. shown in Figure 1 below.
General x x Public General x x Public
Public xxxxx xxxxx Safety Public xxxxx xxxxx Safety
Observer x x Observer Observer x x Observer
x x x x
x x ---------+ +---------- x x x x ---------+ +---------- x x
x x | | x x x x | | x x
| | | |
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locally directly received UAS ID as a key. Broadcast RID should locally directly received UAS ID as a key. Broadcast RID should
be functionally usable in situations with no Internet be functionally usable in situations with no Internet
connectivity. connectivity.
The less constrained but more complex case of Network RID is The less constrained but more complex case of Network RID is
illustrated in Figure 2 below. illustrated in Figure 2 below.
x x UA x x UA
xxxxx ******************** xxxxx ********************
| * ------*---+------------+ | * ------*---+------------+
| * / * | NET_Rid_DP | | * / * | NET_Rid_SP |
| * ------------/ +---*--+------------+ | * ------------/ +---*--+------------+
| RF */ | * | RF */ | *
| * INTERNET | * +------------+ | * INTERNET | * +------------+
| /* +---*--| NET_Rid_SP | | /* +---*--| NET_Rid_DP |
| / * +----*--+------------+ | / * +----*--+------------+
+ / * | * + / * | *
x / ****************|*** x x / ****************|*** x
xxxxx | xxxxx xxxxx | xxxxx
x +------- x x +------- x
x x x x
x x Operator (GCS) Observer x x x x Operator (GCS) Observer x x
x x x x x x x x
Figure 2 Figure 2
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2.1. Requirements Terminology 2.1. Requirements Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here. capitals, as shown here.
2.2. Additional Definitions 2.2. Additional Definitions
This document uses terms defined in [I-D.ietf-drip-reqs]. This document uses terms defined in [drip-requirements].
3. Entities and their Interfaces 3. Entities and their Interfaces
Any DRIP solutions for UAS RID must fit into the UTM (or U-space) Any DRIP solutions for UAS RID must fit into the UTM (or U-space)
system. This implies interaction with entities including UA, GCS, system. This implies interaction with entities including UA, GCS,
USS, Net-RID SP, Net-RID DP, Observers, Operators, Pilots In Command, USS, Net-RID SP, Net-RID DP, Observers, Operators, Pilots In Command,
Remote Pilots, possibly SDSP, etc. The only additional entities Remote Pilots, possibly SDSP, etc. The only additional entities
introduced in this document are registries, required but not introduced in this document are registries, required but not
specified by the regulations and [RFC7401], and optionally CS-RID specified by the regulations and [RFC7401], and optionally CS-RID
SDSP and Finder nodes. SDSP and Finder nodes.
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protocols, infrastructure and business models, by fitting into an ID protocols, infrastructure and business models, by fitting into an ID
structure compatible with DNS names. This implies some sort of structure compatible with DNS names. This implies some sort of
hierarchy, for scalability, and management of this hierarchy. It is hierarchy, for scalability, and management of this hierarchy. It is
expected that the private registry function will be provided by the expected that the private registry function will be provided by the
same organizations that run USS, and likely integrated with USS. same organizations that run USS, and likely integrated with USS.
3.1.2. Proposed Approach 3.1.2. Proposed Approach
A DRIP UAS ID MUST be amenable to handling as an Internet domain name A DRIP UAS ID MUST be amenable to handling as an Internet domain name
(at an arbitrary level in the hierarchy), MUST be registered in at (at an arbitrary level in the hierarchy), MUST be registered in at
least a pseudo-domain (e.g. .ip6 for reverse lookup), and MAY be least a pseudo-domain (e.g. .ip6.arpa for reverse lookup), and MAY be
registered as a sub-domain (for forward lookup). registered as a sub-domain (for forward lookup).
A DRIP private information registry MUST support essential Internet A DRIP private information registry MUST support essential Internet
domain name registry operations (e.g. add, delete, update, query) domain name registry operations (e.g. add, delete, update, query)
using interoperable open standard protocols. It SHOULD support the using interoperable open standard protocols. It SHOULD support the
Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) and the Registry Data Access Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) and the Registry Data Access
Protocol (RDAP) with access controls. It MAY use XACML to specify Protocol (RDAP) with access controls. It MAY use XACML to specify
those access controls. It MUST be listed in a DNS: that DNS MAY be those access controls. It MUST be listed in a DNS: that DNS MAY be
private; but absent any compelling reasons for use of private DNS, private; but absent any compelling reasons for use of private DNS,
SHOULD be the definitive public Internet DNS hierarchy. The DRIP SHOULD be the definitive public Internet DNS hierarchy. The DRIP
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NPRM requires both for Standard RID and specifies Broadcast RID only NPRM requires both for Standard RID and specifies Broadcast RID only
for Limited RID. One obvious opportunity is to enhance the for Limited RID. One obvious opportunity is to enhance the
architecture with gateways from Broadcast RID to Network RID. This architecture with gateways from Broadcast RID to Network RID. This
provides the best of both and gives regulators and operators provides the best of both and gives regulators and operators
flexibility. Such gateways could be pre-positioned (e.g. around flexibility. Such gateways could be pre-positioned (e.g. around
airports and other sensitive areas) and/or crowdsourced (as nothing airports and other sensitive areas) and/or crowdsourced (as nothing
more than a smartphone with a suitable app is needed). Gateways can more than a smartphone with a suitable app is needed). Gateways can
also perform multilateration to provide independent measurements of also perform multilateration to provide independent measurements of
UA position, which is otherwise entirely operator self-reported in UA position, which is otherwise entirely operator self-reported in
UAS RID and UTM. CS-RID would be an option, beyond baseline DRIP UAS RID and UTM. CS-RID would be an option, beyond baseline DRIP
functionality; if implemented, it adds 2 more entity types. functionality; if implemented, it adds two more entity types.
3.3.1. Proposed optional CS-RID SDSP 3.3.1. Proposed optional CS-RID SDSP
A CS-RID SDSP MUST appear (i.e. present the same interface) to a Net- A CS-RID SDSP MUST appear (i.e. present the same interface) to a Net-
RID SP as a Net-RID DP. A CS-RID SDSP MUST appear to a Net-RID DP as RID SP as a Net-RID DP. A CS-RID SDSP MUST appear to a Net-RID DP as
a Net-RID SP. A CS-RID SDSP MUST NOT present a standard GCS-facing a Net-RID SP. A CS-RID SDSP MUST NOT present a standard GCS-facing
interface as if it were a Net-RID SP. A CS-RID SDSP MUST NOT present interface as if it were a Net-RID SP. A CS-RID SDSP MUST NOT present
a standard client-facing interface as if it were a Net-RID DP. A CS- a standard client-facing interface as if it were a Net-RID DP. A CS-
RID SDSP MUST present a TBD interface to a CS-RID Finder; this RID SDSP MUST present a TBD interface to a CS-RID Finder; this
interface SHOULD be based upon but readily distinguishable from that interface SHOULD be based upon but readily distinguishable from that
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* The ASTM Basic RID message (the message containing the RID) is 25 * The ASTM Basic RID message (the message containing the RID) is 25
characters; only 3 characters are currently unused characters; only 3 characters are currently unused
* The ASTM Authentication message, with some changes from [F3411-19] * The ASTM Authentication message, with some changes from [F3411-19]
can carry 224 bytes of payload. can carry 224 bytes of payload.
Standard approaches like X.509 and PKI will not fit these Standard approaches like X.509 and PKI will not fit these
constraints, even using the new EdDSA algorithm. An example of a constraints, even using the new EdDSA algorithm. An example of a
technology that will fit within these limitations is an enhancement technology that will fit within these limitations is an enhancement
of the Host Identity Tag (HIT) of HIPv2 [RFC7401] introducing of the Host Identity Tag (HIT) of HIPv2 [RFC7401] introducing
hierarchy as defined in HHIT [I-D.moskowitz-hip-hierarchical-hit]; hierarchy as defined in HHIT [hierarchical-hit]; using Hierarchical
using Hierarchical HITs for UAS RID is outlined in HHIT based UAS RID HITs for UAS RID is outlined in HHIT based UAS RID [drip-uas-rid].
[I-D.moskowitz-drip-uas-rid]. As PKI with X.509 is being used in
other systems with which UAS RID must interoperate (e.g. the UTM As PKI with X.509 is being used in other systems with which UAS RID
Discovery and Synchronization Service and the UTM InterUSS protocol) must interoperate (e.g. the UTM Discovery and Synchronization Service
mappings between the more flexible but larger X.509 certificates and and the UTM InterUSS protocol) mappings between the more flexible but
the HHIT based structures must be devised. larger X.509 certificates and the HHIT based structures must be
devised.
By using the EdDSA HHIT suite, self-assertions of the RID can be done By using the EdDSA HHIT suite, self-assertions of the RID can be done
in as little as 84 bytes. Third-party assertions can be done in 200 in as little as 84 bytes. Third-party assertions can be done in 200
bytes. An observer would need Internet access to validate a self- bytes. An observer would need Internet access to validate a self-
assertion claim. A third-party assertion can be validated via a assertion claim. A third-party assertion can be validated via a
small credential cache in a disconnected environment. This third- small credential cache in a disconnected environment. This third-
party assertion is possible when the third-party also uses HHITs for party assertion is possible when the third-party also uses HHITs for
its identity and the UA has the public key for that HHIT. its identity and the UA has the public key for that HHIT.
4.2. Proposed Approach 4.2. Proposed Approach
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registries and MAY be provisioned with public keys or certificates registries and MAY be provisioned with public keys or certificates
for subordinate registries. for subordinate registries.
Operators and Private Information Registries MUST possess and other Operators and Private Information Registries MUST possess and other
UTM entities MAY possess UAS ID style HHITs. When present, such UTM entities MAY possess UAS ID style HHITs. When present, such
HHITs SHOULD be used with HIP to strongly mutually authenticate and HHITs SHOULD be used with HIP to strongly mutually authenticate and
optionally encrypt communications. optionally encrypt communications.
5. DRIP Transactions enabling Trustworthy UAS RID 5. DRIP Transactions enabling Trustworthy UAS RID
Each Operator MUST generate a "HIo" and derived "HHITo", register Each Operator MUST generate a Host Identity of the Operator (HIo) and
them with a Private Information Registry along with whatever Operator derived Hierarchical HIT of the Operator (HHITo), register them with
data (inc. PII) is required by the cognizant CAA and the registry, a Private Information Registry along with whatever Operator data
and obtain a certificate "Cro" signed with "HIr(priv)" proving such (inc. PII) is required by the cognizant CAA and the registry, and
registration. obtain a Certificate from the Registry on the Operator (Cro) signed
with the Host Identity of the Registry private key (HIr(priv))
proving such registration.
To add an UA, an Operator MUST generate a "HIa" and derived "HHITa", To add an UA, an Operator MUST generate a Host Identity of the
create a certificate "Coa" signed with "HIo(priv)" to associate the Aircraft (HIa) and derived Hierarchical HIT of the Aircraft (HHITa),
UA with its Operator, register them with a Private Information create a Certificate from the Operator on the Aircraft (Coa) signed
Registry along with whatever UAS data is required by the cognizant with the Host Identity of the Operator private key (HIo(priv)) to
CAA and the registry, obtain a certificate "Croa" signed with associate the UA with its Operator, register them with a Private
"HIr(priv)" proving such registration, and obtain a certificate "Cra" Information Registry along with whatever UAS data is required by the
signed with "HIr(priv)" proving UA registration in that specific cognizant CAA and the registry, obtain a Certificate from the
registry while preserving Operator privacy. The operator then MUST Registry on the Operator and Aircraft ("Croa") signed with the
provision the UA with "HIa", "HIa(priv)", "HHITa" and "Cra". HIr(priv) proving such registration, and obtain a Certificate from
the Registry on the Aircraft (Cra) signed with HIr(priv) proving UA
registration in that specific registry while preserving Operator
privacy. The operator then MUST provision the UA with HIa,
HIa(priv), HHITa and Cra.
UA engaging in Broadcast RID MUST use "HIa(priv)" to sign Auth UA engaging in Broadcast RID MUST use HIa(priv) to sign Auth Messages
Messages and MUST periodically broadcast "Cra". UAS engaging in and MUST periodically broadcast Cra. UAS engaging in Network RID MUST
Network RID MUST use "HIa(priv)" to sign Auth Messages. Observers use HIa(priv) to sign Auth Messages. Observers MUST use HIa from
MUST use "HIa" from received "Cra" to verify received Broadcast RID received Cra to verify received Broadcast RID Auth messages.
Auth messages. Observers without Internet connectivity MAY use "Cra" Observers without Internet connectivity MAY use Cra to identify the
to identify the trust class of the UAS based on known registry trust class of the UAS based on known registry vetting. Observers
vetting. Observers with Internet connectivity MAY use "HHITa" to with Internet connectivity MAY use HHITa to perform lookups in the
perform lookups in the Public Information Registry and MAY then query Public Information Registry and MAY then query the Private
the Private Information Registry, which MUST enforce AAA policy on Information Registry, which MUST enforce AAA policy on Operator PII
Operator PII and other sensitive information. and other sensitive information.
6. Privacy for Broadcast PII 6. Privacy for Broadcast PII
Broadcast RID messages may contain PII. This may be information Broadcast RID messages may contain PII. This may be information
about the UA such as its destination or Operator information such as about the UA such as its destination or Operator information such as
GCS location. There is no absolute "right" in hiding PII, as there GCS location. There is no absolute "right" in hiding PII, as there
will be times (e.g., disasters) and places (buffer zones around will be times (e.g., disasters) and places (buffer zones around
airports and sensitive facilities) where policy may mandate all airports and sensitive facilities) where policy may mandate all
information be sent as cleartext. Otherwise, the modern general information be sent as cleartext. Otherwise, the modern general
position (consistent with, e.g., the EU General Data Protection position (consistent with, e.g., the EU General Data Protection
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A viable architecture for PII protection would be symmetric A viable architecture for PII protection would be symmetric
encryption of the PII using a key known to the UAS and a USS service. encryption of the PII using a key known to the UAS and a USS service.
An authorized Observer may send the encrypted PII along with the An authorized Observer may send the encrypted PII along with the
Remote ID (to their UAS display service) to get the plaintext. The Remote ID (to their UAS display service) to get the plaintext. The
authorized Observer may send the Remote ID (to their UAS display authorized Observer may send the Remote ID (to their UAS display
service) and receive the key to directly decrypt all PII content from service) and receive the key to directly decrypt all PII content from
the UA. the UA.
PII is protected unless the UAS is informed otherwise. This may come PII is protected unless the UAS is informed otherwise. This may come
from operational instructions to even permit flying in a space/time. from operational instructions to even permit flying in a space/time.
It may be special instructions at the start or during a mission. PII It may be special instructions at the start or during an operation.
protection should not be used if the UAS loses connectivity to the PII protection should not be used if the UAS loses connectivity to
USS. The USS always has the option to abort the mission if PII the USS. The USS always has the option to abort the operation if PII
protection is disallowed. protection is disallowed.
An authorized Observer may instruct a UAS via the USS that conditions An authorized Observer may instruct a UAS via the USS that conditions
have changed mandating no PII protection or land the UA. have changed mandating no PII protection or land the UA.
7. Architectural implications of EASA requirements 7. Architectural implications of EASA requirements
According to EASA, in EU broadcasting drone identification will be According to EASA, in EU broadcasting drone identification will be
mandatory from July 2020. Following info should be sent in plaintext mandatory from July 2020. Following info should be sent in cleartext
over Wifi or Bluetooth. In real time during the whole duration of over Wifi or Bluetooth. In real time during the whole duration of
the flight, the direct periodic broadcast from the UA using an open the flight, the direct periodic broadcast from the UA using an open
and documented transmission protocol, of the following data, in a way and documented transmission protocol, of the following data, in a way
that they can be received directly by existing mobile devices within that they can be received directly by existing mobile devices within
the broadcasting range: the broadcasting range:
i) the UAS operator registration number; i) the UAS operator registration number;
ii) the unique physical serial number of the UA compliant with ii) the unique physical serial number of the UA compliant with
standard ANSI/CTA2063; standard ANSI/CTA2063;
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factory may be sending a copy of a UA or GCS self-generated key back factory may be sending a copy of a UA or GCS self-generated key back
to the factory. Compromise of a registry private key could do to the factory. Compromise of a registry private key could do
widespread harm. Key revocation procedures are as yet to be widespread harm. Key revocation procedures are as yet to be
determined. These risks are in addition to those involving Operator determined. These risks are in addition to those involving Operator
key management practices. key management practices.
10. References 10. References
10.1. Normative References 10.1. Normative References
[drip-requirements]
Card, S., Wiethuechter, A., Moskowitz, R., and A. Gurtov,
"Drone Remote Identification Protocol (DRIP)
Requirements", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-drip-reqs-01, 25 May 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-drip-reqs-01>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
10.2. Informative References 10.2. Informative References
[ATIS-I-0000074] [ATIS-I-0000074]
ATIS, "Report on UAS in 3GPP", ATIS, "Report on UAS in 3GPP",
<https://access.atis.org/apps/group_public/ <https://access.atis.org/apps/group_public/
download.php/48760/ATIS-I-0000074.pdf>. download.php/48760/ATIS-I-0000074.pdf>.
[crowd-sourced-rid]
Moskowitz, R., Card, S., Wiethuechter, A., Zhao, S., and
H. Birkholz, "Crowd Sourced Remote ID", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-moskowitz-drip-crowd-sourced-rid-04,
20 May 2020, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-moskowitz-
drip-crowd-sourced-rid-04>.
[CTA2063A] ANSI, "Small Unmanned Aerial Systems Serial Numbers", [CTA2063A] ANSI, "Small Unmanned Aerial Systems Serial Numbers",
September 2019. September 2019.
[Delegated] [Delegated]
European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), "EU European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), "EU
Commission Delegated Regulation 2019/945 of 12 March 2019 Commission Delegated Regulation 2019/945 of 12 March 2019
on unmanned aircraft systems and on third-country on unmanned aircraft systems and on third-country
operators of unmanned aircraft systems", March 2019. operators of unmanned aircraft systems", March 2019.
[F3411-19] ASTM, "Standard Specification for Remote ID and Tracking", [drip-auth]
December 2019. Wiethuechter, A., Card, S., and R. Moskowitz, "DRIP
Authentication Formats", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-wiethuechter-drip-auth-01, 10 July 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-wiethuechter-drip-auth-
01>.
[I-D.ietf-drip-reqs] [drip-identity-claims]
Card, S., Wiethuechter, A., Moskowitz, R., and A. Gurtov, Wiethuechter, A., Card, S., and R. Moskowitz, "DRIP
"Drone Remote Identification Protocol (DRIP) Identity Claims", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
Requirements", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft- wiethuechter-drip-identity-claims-00, 23 March 2020,
ietf-drip-reqs-01, 25 May 2020, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-wiethuechter-drip-
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-drip-reqs-01>. identity-claims-00>.
[I-D.moskowitz-drip-uas-rid] [drip-secure-nrid-c2]
Moskowitz, R., Card, S., Wiethuechter, A., and A. Gurtov,
"Secure UAS Network RID and C2 Transport", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-moskowitz-drip-secure-
nrid-c2-00, 6 April 2020, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/
draft-moskowitz-drip-secure-nrid-c2-00>.
[drip-uas-rid]
Moskowitz, R., Card, S., Wiethuechter, A., and A. Gurtov, Moskowitz, R., Card, S., Wiethuechter, A., and A. Gurtov,
"UAS Remote ID", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft- "UAS Remote ID", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
moskowitz-drip-uas-rid-02, 28 May 2020, moskowitz-drip-uas-rid-02, 28 May 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-moskowitz-drip-uas-rid- <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-moskowitz-drip-uas-rid-
02>. 02>.
[I-D.moskowitz-hip-hierarchical-hit] [F3411-19] ASTM, "Standard Specification for Remote ID and Tracking",
December 2019.
[hhit-registries]
Moskowitz, R., Card, S., and A. Wiethuechter,
"Hierarchical HIT Registries", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-moskowitz-hip-hhit-registries-02, 9 March
2020, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-moskowitz-hip-
hhit-registries-02>.
[hierarchical-hit]
Moskowitz, R., Card, S., and A. Wiethuechter, Moskowitz, R., Card, S., and A. Wiethuechter,
"Hierarchical HITs for HIPv2", Work in Progress, Internet- "Hierarchical HITs for HIPv2", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-moskowitz-hip-hierarchical-hit-05, 13 May Draft, draft-moskowitz-hip-hierarchical-hit-05, 13 May
2020, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-moskowitz-hip- 2020, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-moskowitz-hip-
hierarchical-hit-05>. hierarchical-hit-05>.
[Implementing] [Implementing]
European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), "EU European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), "EU
Commission Implementing Regulation 2019/947 of 24 May 2019 Commission Implementing Regulation 2019/947 of 24 May 2019
on the rules and procedures for the operation of unmanned on the rules and procedures for the operation of unmanned
aircraft", May 2019. aircraft", May 2019.
[LANNC] United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), "Low [LAANC] United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), "Low
Altitude Authorization and Notification Capability", Altitude Authorization and Notification Capability",
<https://www.faa.gov/uas/programs_partnerships/ <https://www.faa.gov/uas/programs_partnerships/
data_exchange/>. data_exchange/>.
[new-hip-crypto]
Moskowitz, R., Card, S., and A. Wiethuechter, "New
Cryptographic Algorithms for HIP", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-moskowitz-hip-new-crypto-04, 23
January 2020, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-
moskowitz-hip-new-crypto-04>.
[new-orchid]
Moskowitz, R., Card, S., and A. Wiethuechter, "Using
cSHAKE in ORCHIDs", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-moskowitz-orchid-cshake-01, 21 May 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-moskowitz-orchid-
cshake-01>.
[NPRM] United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), [NPRM] United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),
"Notice of Proposed Rule Making on Remote Identification "Notice of Proposed Rule Making on Remote Identification
of Unmanned Aircraft Systems", December 2019. of Unmanned Aircraft Systems", December 2019.
[RFC4122] Leach, P., Mealling, M., and R. Salz, "A Universally
Unique IDentifier (UUID) URN Namespace", RFC 4122,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4122, July 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4122>.
[RFC6280] Barnes, R., Lepinski, M., Cooper, A., Morris, J., [RFC6280] Barnes, R., Lepinski, M., Cooper, A., Morris, J.,
Tschofenig, H., and H. Schulzrinne, "An Architecture for Tschofenig, H., and H. Schulzrinne, "An Architecture for
Location and Location Privacy in Internet Applications", Location and Location Privacy in Internet Applications",
BCP 160, RFC 6280, DOI 10.17487/RFC6280, July 2011, BCP 160, RFC 6280, DOI 10.17487/RFC6280, July 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6280>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6280>.
[RFC7401] Moskowitz, R., Ed., Heer, T., Jokela, P., and T. [RFC7401] Moskowitz, R., Ed., Heer, T., Jokela, P., and T.
Henderson, "Host Identity Protocol Version 2 (HIPv2)", Henderson, "Host Identity Protocol Version 2 (HIPv2)",
RFC 7401, DOI 10.17487/RFC7401, April 2015, RFC 7401, DOI 10.17487/RFC7401, April 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7401>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7401>.
skipping to change at page 15, line 17 skipping to change at page 16, line 42
A USS plays an important role to fulfill the key performance A USS plays an important role to fulfill the key performance
indicators (KPIs) that a UTM has to offer. Such Entity acts as a indicators (KPIs) that a UTM has to offer. Such Entity acts as a
proxy between UAS operators and UTM service providers. It provides proxy between UAS operators and UTM service providers. It provides
services like real-time UAS traffic monitor and planning, services like real-time UAS traffic monitor and planning,
aeronautical data archiving, airspace and violation control, aeronautical data archiving, airspace and violation control,
interacting with other third-party control entities, etc. A USS can interacting with other third-party control entities, etc. A USS can
coexist with other USS(s) to build a large service coverage map which coexist with other USS(s) to build a large service coverage map which
can load-balance, relay and share UAS traffic information. can load-balance, relay and share UAS traffic information.
The FAA works with UAS industry shareholders and promotes the Low The FAA works with UAS industry shareholders and promotes the Low
Altitude Authorization and Notification Capability [LANNC] program Altitude Authorization and Notification Capability [LAANC] program
which is the first implementation to realize UTM's functionality. which is the first implementation to realize UTM's functionality.
The LAANC program can automate the UAS's fly plan application and The LAANC program can automate the UAS's fly plan application and
approval process for airspace authorization in real-time by checking approval process for airspace authorization in real-time by checking
against multiple aeronautical databases such as airspace against multiple aeronautical databases such as airspace
classification and fly rules associated with it, FAA UAS facility classification and fly rules associated with it, FAA UAS facility
map, special use airspace, Notice to airman (NOTAM) and Temporary map, special use airspace, Notice to airman (NOTAM) and Temporary
flight rule (TFR). flight rule (TFR).
A.3. UTM Use Cases for UAS Operations A.3. UTM Use Cases for UAS Operations
skipping to change at page 17, line 22 skipping to change at page 19, line 4
United States of America United States of America
Email: rgm@labs.htt-consult.com Email: rgm@labs.htt-consult.com
Shuai Zhao Shuai Zhao
Tencent Tencent
CA CA
United States of America United States of America
Email: shuaiizhao@tencent.com Email: shuaiizhao@tencent.com
Andrei Gurtov Andrei Gurtov
Link&#246;ping University Linköping University
IDA IDA
SE-58183 Link&#246;ping SE-58183 Linköping
Sweden Sweden
Email: gurtov@acm.org Email: gurtov@acm.org
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