draft-ietf-drip-arch-14.txt   draft-ietf-drip-arch-15.txt 
drip S. Card drip S. Card
Internet-Draft A. Wiethuechter Internet-Draft A. Wiethuechter
Intended status: Informational AX Enterprize Intended status: Informational AX Enterprize
Expires: 10 January 2022 R. Moskowitz Expires: 26 January 2022 R. Moskowitz
HTT Consulting HTT Consulting
S. Zhao (Editor) S. Zhao (Editor)
Tencent Tencent
A. Gurtov A. Gurtov
Linköping University Linköping University
9 July 2021 25 July 2021
Drone Remote Identification Protocol (DRIP) Architecture Drone Remote Identification Protocol (DRIP) Architecture
draft-ietf-drip-arch-14 draft-ietf-drip-arch-15
Abstract Abstract
This document describes an architecture for protocols and services to This document describes an architecture for protocols and services to
support Unmanned Aircraft System Remote Identification and tracking support Unmanned Aircraft System Remote Identification and tracking
(UAS RID), plus RID-related communications. This architecture (UAS RID), plus RID-related communications. This architecture
adheres to the requirements listed in the DRIP Requirements document. adheres to the requirements listed in the DRIP Requirements document.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 10 January 2022. This Internet-Draft will expire on 26 January 2022.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Overview of Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Remote ID (RID) 1.1. Overview of Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Remote ID (RID)
and Standardization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 and Standardization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Overview of Types of UAS Remote ID . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.2. Overview of Types of UAS Remote ID . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2.1. Broadcast RID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.2.1. Broadcast RID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2.2. Network RID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.2.2. Network RID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3. Overview of USS Interoperability . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 1.3. Overview of USS Interoperability . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.4. Overview of DRIP Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 1.4. Overview of DRIP Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2. Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2. Terms and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3. Definitions and Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2.1. Architecture Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.1. Additional Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2.2. Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.2. Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2.3. Additional Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.3. Claims, Assertions, Attestations, and Certificates . . . 10 3. Claims, Assertions, Attestations, and Certificates . . . . . 10
4. HHIT as the Primary DRIP Entity Identifier . . . . . . . . . 11 4. HHIT as the DRIP Entity Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.1. UAS Remote Identifiers Problem Space . . . . . . . . . . 11 4.1. UAS Remote Identifiers Problem Space . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.2. HIT as A Trustworthy DRIP Entity Identifier . . . . . . . 12 4.2. HIT as A Trustworthy DRIP Entity Identifier . . . . . . . 11
4.3. HHIT for DRIP Identifier Registration and Lookup . . . . 14 4.3. HHIT for DRIP Identifier Registration and Lookup . . . . 13
4.4. HHIT for DRIP Identifier Cryptographic . . . . . . . . . 14 4.4. HHIT for DRIP Identifier Cryptographic . . . . . . . . . 13
5. DRIP Identifier Registration and Registries . . . . . . . . . 14 5. DRIP Identifier Registration and Registries . . . . . . . . . 13
5.1. Public Information Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 5.1. Public Information Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.1.1. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 5.1.1. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.1.2. Proposed Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 5.1.2. DNS as the Public DRIP Identifier Registry . . . . . 14
5.2. Private Information Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 5.2. Private Information Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.2.1. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 5.2.1. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.2.2. Proposed Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 5.2.2. EPP and RDAP as the Private DRIP Identifier
6. Harvesting Broadcast Remote ID messages for UTM Inclusion . . 16 Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6.1. The CS-RID Finder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 5.2.3. Alternative Private DRIP Registry methods . . . . . . 15
6.2. The CS-RID SDSP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 6. Harvesting Broadcast Remote ID messages for UTM Inclusion . . 15
7. IANA Consideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 6.1. The CS-RID Finder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 6.2. The CS-RID SDSP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
9. Privacy & Transparency Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 7. IANA Consideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 9. Privacy & Transparency Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Appendix A. Overview of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Traffic Appendix A. Overview of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Traffic
Management (UTM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Management (UTM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
A.1. Operation Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 A.1. Operation Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
A.2. UAS Service Supplier (USS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 A.2. UAS Service Supplier (USS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
A.3. UTM Use Cases for UAS Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 A.3. UTM Use Cases for UAS Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Appendix B. Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast
(ADS-B) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Appendix B. Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 (ADS-B) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document describes an architecture for protocols and services to This document describes an architecture for protocols and services to
support Unmanned Aircraft System Remote Identification and tracking support Unmanned Aircraft System Remote Identification and tracking
(UAS RID), plus RID-related communications. The architecture takes (UAS RID), plus RID-related communications. The architecture takes
into account both current (including proposed) regulations and non- into account both current (including proposed) regulations and non-
IETF technical standards. IETF technical standards.
The architecture adheres to the requirements listed in the DRIP The architecture adheres to the requirements listed in the DRIP
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1.2.2. Network RID 1.2.2. Network RID
A RID data dictionary and data flow for Network RID are defined in A RID data dictionary and data flow for Network RID are defined in
[F3411-19]. This data flow is emitted from an UAS via unspecified [F3411-19]. This data flow is emitted from an UAS via unspecified
means (but at least in part over the Internet) to a Network Remote ID means (but at least in part over the Internet) to a Network Remote ID
Service Provider (Net-RID SP). A Net-RID SP provides the RID data to Service Provider (Net-RID SP). A Net-RID SP provides the RID data to
Network Remote ID Display Providers (Net-RID DP). It is the Net-RID Network Remote ID Display Providers (Net-RID DP). It is the Net-RID
DP that responds to queries from Network Remote ID Observers DP that responds to queries from Network Remote ID Observers
(expected typically, but not specified exclusively, to be web-based) (expected typically, but not specified exclusively, to be web-based)
specifying airspace volumes of interest. Network RID depends upon specifying airspace volumes of interest. Network RID depends upon
connectivity, in several segments, via the Internet, from the UAS to internet connectivity to fulfill Observers the RID data query to the
the Observer. NET-RID DP. The summary of network RID data flows work as follows:
Editor-note 1: + list all the segments mentioned above + specify * The UA's RID data is generated from a UAS which consists of UAs
how DRIP provide solutions for each segment and GCSs.
* The RID data is transferred from the UA to the GCS via a RF (Radio
Frequency) link.
* The GCS or UA (e.g. BVLOS and autonomous operation) provides the
UA's RID data to a NET_RID_SP via a secure internet connection.
* NET_RID_DP as a NET_RID_SP subscriber and satisfies the Observer's
query request also via a secure internet connection.
The mimunum Network RID data flow is illustrated in Figure 2: The mimunum Network RID data flow is illustrated in Figure 2:
x x UA x x UA
xxxxx ******************** xxxxx ********************
| \ * ------*---+------------+ | \ * ------*---+------------+
| \ * / * | NET_RID_SP | | \ * / * | NET_RID_SP |
| \ * ------------/ +---*--+------------+ | \ * ------------/ +---*--+------------+
| RF \ */ | * | RF \ */ | *
| * INTERNET | * +------------+ | * INTERNET | * +------------+
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x x x x x x x x
Figure 2 Figure 2
Command and Control (C2) must flow from the GCS to the UA via some Command and Control (C2) must flow from the GCS to the UA via some
path, currently (in the year of 2021) typically a direct RF link, but path, currently (in the year of 2021) typically a direct RF link, but
with increasing beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS) operations with increasing beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS) operations
expected often to be wireless links at either end with the Internet expected often to be wireless links at either end with the Internet
between. between.
Editor-note 2: Explain the difference with wireless and RF link Telemetry (at least UA's position and heading) flows from the UA to
includes what are the end entities, usages for each transport the GCS via some path, typically the reverse of the C2 path. Thus,
media. RID information pertaining to both the GCS and the UA can be sent, by
whichever has Internet connectivity, to the Net-RID SP, typically the
For all but the simplest hobby aircraft, telemetry (at least position USS managing the UAS operation.
and heading) flows from the UA to the GCS via some path, typically
the reverse of the C2 path. Thus, RID information pertaining to both
the GCS and the UA can be sent, by whichever has Internet
connectivity, to the Net-RID SP, typically the USS managing the UAS
operation.
Editor-note 3: Does all UAS support telemetry? explain what are
simplsest hobby aircraft vs UAS in general. Is it necessary to
keep "For all but the simplest hobby aircraft"?
The Net-RID SP forwards RID information via the Internet to The Net-RID SP forwards RID information via the Internet to
subscribed Net-RID DP, typically USS. Subscribed Net-RID DP forward subscribed Net-RID DP, typically USS. Subscribed Net-RID DP forward
RID information via the Internet to subscribed Observer devices. RID information via the Internet to subscribed Observer devices.
Regulations require and [F3411-19] describes RID data elements that Regulations require and [F3411-19] describes RID data elements that
must be transported end-to-end from the UAS to the subscribed must be transported end-to-end from the UAS to the subscribed
Observer devices. Observer devices.
[F3411-19] prescribes the protocols only between the Net-RID SP, Net- [F3411-19] prescribes the protocols only between the Net-RID SP, Net-
RID DP, and the Discovery and Synchronization Service (DSS). DRIP RID DP, and the Discovery and Synchronization Service (DSS). DRIP
may also address standardization of protocols between the UA and GCS, can address standardization of protocols between the UA and GCS,
between the UAS and the Net-RID SP, and/or between the Net-RID DP and between the UAS and the Net-RID SP, and/or between the Net-RID DP and
Observer devices. Observer devices.
Editor-note 4: "DRIP may also..." Specify what protocol DRIP can [F3411-19] prescribes the protocols between the Net-RID SP, Net-RID
or will standardize. DP, and the Discovery and Synchronization Service (DSS). It also
prescribes data elements (in JSON) between Observer and DSS. DRIP
addresses standardization of secure protocols between the UA and GCS
(over direct wireless and Internet connection), between the UAS and
the Net-RID SP, and/or between the Net-RID DP and Observer devices.
Informative note: Neither link layer protocols nor the use of Informative note: Neither link layer protocols nor the use of
links (e.g., the link often existing between the GCS and the links (e.g., the link often existing between the GCS and the
UA) for any purpose other than carriage of RID information is UA) for any purpose other than carriage of RID information is
in the scope of [F3411-19] Network RID. in the scope of [F3411-19] Network RID.
1.3. Overview of USS Interoperability 1.3. Overview of USS Interoperability
With Net-RID, there is direct communication between the UAS and its With Net-RID, there is direct communication between the UAS and its
USS. With Broadcast-RID, the UAS Operator has either pre-filed a 4D USS. With Broadcast-RID, the UAS Operator has either pre-filed a 4D
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[RFC1034]), Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP [RFC5731]) [RFC1034]), Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP [RFC5731])
and Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) ([RFC7482]) for and Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) ([RFC7482]) for
publishing public and private information (see Section 5.1 and publishing public and private information (see Section 5.1 and
Section 5.2). Section 5.2).
- Harvesting broadcast RID messages for UTM inclusion - Harvesting broadcast RID messages for UTM inclusion
(Section 6). (Section 6).
- Privacy in RID messages (PII protection) (Section 9). - Privacy in RID messages (PII protection) (Section 9).
2. Conventions 2. Terms and Definitions
2.1. Architecture Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown above. capitals, as shown above.
3. Definitions and Abbreviations 2.2. Abbreviations
Editor-note 13: 1) should we merge Section 2 and Section 3 2) how
should we list abbr in the Arch? Previous WG agreement is that
all the DRIP terms shall be defined in -reqs, which may or may not
be used in -reqs itself, but other documents such as Arch-. And
arch- can list terms when they are used in the arch- only. So
which is which ?
3.1. Additional Definitions
This document uses terms defined in [I-D.ietf-drip-reqs].
3.2. Abbreviations
ADS-B: Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast ADS-B: Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast
DSS: Discovery & Synchronization Service DSS: Discovery & Synchronization Service
EdDSA: Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm EdDSA: Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
GCS: Ground Control Station GCS: Ground Control Station
HHIT: Hierarchical HIT Registries HHIT: Hierarchical HIT Registries
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SDSP: Supplemental Data Service Provider SDSP: Supplemental Data Service Provider
UA: Unmanned Aircraft UA: Unmanned Aircraft
UAS: Unmanned Aircraft System UAS: Unmanned Aircraft System
USS: UAS Service Supplier USS: UAS Service Supplier
UTM: UAS Traffic Management UTM: UAS Traffic Management
3.3. Claims, Assertions, Attestations, and Certificates 2.3. Additional Definitions
This document uses terms defined in [I-D.ietf-drip-reqs].
3. Claims, Assertions, Attestations, and Certificates
This section introduces the terms "Claims", "Assertions", This section introduces the terms "Claims", "Assertions",
"Attestations", and "Certificates" as used in DRIP. DRIP certificate "Attestations", and "Certificates" as used in DRIP. DRIP certificate
has a different context compared with security certificates and has a different context compared with security certificates and
Public Key Infrastructure used in X.509. Public Key Infrastructure used in X.509.
Editor-note 5: To be confirmed
Claims: Claims:
A claim in DRIP is a predicate (e.g., "X is Y", "X has property A claim in DRIP is a predicate (e.g., "X is Y", "X has property
Y", and most importantly "X owns Y" or "X is owned by Y"). Y", and most importantly "X owns Y" or "X is owned by Y").
Assertions: Assertions:
An assertion in DRIP is a set of claims. This definition is An assertion in DRIP is a set of claims. This definition is
borrowed from JWT [RFC7519] and CWT [RFC8392]. borrowed from JWT [RFC7519] and CWT [RFC8392].
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claimant or a third party. Under DRIP this is normally used when claimant or a third party. Under DRIP this is normally used when
an entity asserts a relationship with another entity, along with an entity asserts a relationship with another entity, along with
other information, and the asserting entity signs the assertion, other information, and the asserting entity signs the assertion,
thereby making it an attestation. thereby making it an attestation.
Certificates: Certificates:
A certificate in DRIP is an attestation, strictly over identity A certificate in DRIP is an attestation, strictly over identity
information, signed by a third party. information, signed by a third party.
4. HHIT as the Primary DRIP Entity Identifier 4. HHIT as the DRIP Entity Identifier
This section describes the DRIP architectural approach to meeting the This section describes the DRIP architectural approach to meeting the
basic requirements of a DRIP entity identifier within external basic requirements of a DRIP entity identifier within external
technical standard ASTM [F3411-19] and regulatory constraints. It technical standard ASTM [F3411-19] and regulatory constraints. It
justifies and explains the use of Hierarchical Host Identity Tags justifies and explains the use of Hierarchical Host Identity Tags
(HHITs) as self-asserting IPv6 addresses suitable as a UAS ID type (HHITs) as self-asserting IPv6 addresses suitable as a UAS ID type
and more generally as trustworthy multipurpose remote identifiers. and more generally as trustworthy multipurpose remote identifiers.
A HHIT, together with the Host Identity (HI) from which it is partly Self-asserting in this usage is given the Host Identity (HI), the
derived, self-attests to its included explicit registration HHIT ORCHID construction and a signature of the HHIT by the HI can
hierarchy, providing Registrar discovery for a 3rd-party who is both be validated. The explicit registration hierarchy within the
looking for ID attestation retrieves the necessary information to the HHIT provides registry discovery (managed by a Registrar) to either
registrar via a DNS request HHIT. yield the HI for 3rd-party (who is looking for ID attestation)
validation or prove the HHIT and HI have uniquely been registered.
Editor-note 6: Is there a need to specify how self-attest works?
if yes then where? possible a new section under Section 4}
4.1. UAS Remote Identifiers Problem Space 4.1. UAS Remote Identifiers Problem Space
Editor-note 14: Good to have: adding match requirment numbering A DRIP entity identifier needs to be "Trustworthy" (See DRIP
from requirement document Requirement about GEN-1, ID-4 and ID-5 in [I-D.ietf-drip-reqs]).
This means that within the framework of the RID messages, an Observer
A DRIP entity identifier needs to be "Trustworthy". This means that can establish that the DRIP identifier uniquely belong to the UAS.
within the framework of the RID messages, an Observer can establish That the only way for any other UAS to assert this DRIP identifier
that the DRIP identifier uniquely belong to the UAS. That the only would be to steal something from within the UAS. The DRIP identifier
way for any other UAS to assert this DRIP identifier would be to is self-generated by the UAS (either UA or GCS) and registered with
steal something from within the UAS. The DRIP identifier is self- the USS.
generated by the UAS (either UA or GCS) and registered with the USS.
The Broadcast RID data exchange faces extreme challenges due to the The Broadcast RID data exchange faces extreme challenges due to the
limitation of the demanding support for Bluetooth. The ASTM limitation of the demanding support for Bluetooth. The ASTM
[F3411-19] defines the basic RID message which is expected to contain [F3411-19] defines the basic RID message which is expected to contain
certain RID data and the Authentication message. The Basic RID certain RID data and the Authentication message. The Basic RID
message has a maximum payload of 25 bytes and the maximum size message has a maximum payload of 25 bytes and the maximum size
allocated by ASTM for the RID is 20 bytes and only 3 bytes are left allocated by ASTM for the RID is 20 bytes. currently, the
unused. currently, the authentication maximum payload is defined to authentication maximum payload is defined to be 201 bytes (9 paged
be 201 bytes. Bluetooth 4 messages).
Editor-note 7: To be more specific about the RID message header
and payload structure, such as 1) list different type of BRID
messages defined in ASTM F3411, 2) how many bytes for each filed.
Standard approaches like X.509 and PKI will not fit these
constraints, even using the new EdDSA [RFC8032] algorithm cannot fit
within the maximum 201 byte limit, due in large measure to ASN.1
encoding format overhead.
An example of a technology that will fit within these limitations is
an enhancement of the Host Identity Tag (HIT) of HIPv2 [RFC7401]
using Hierarchical HITs (HHITs) for UAS RID [I-D.ietf-drip-rid]. As
PKI with X.509 is being used in other systems with which UAS RID must
interoperate (e.g. Discovery and Synchronization Service and any
other communications involving USS) mappings between the more
flexible but larger X.509 certificates and the HHIT-based structures
can must be devised. This could be as in [RFC8002] or simply the
HHIT as Subject Alternative Name (SAN) and no Distinguished Name
(DN).
Editor-note 8: is there a need to explain the how binding/proxy/
translation between the HHIT and X509? Should this be addressed
in Arch- or solution?
A self-attestation of the HHIT RID can be done in as little as 84
bytes, by avoiding an explicit encoding technology like ASN.1 or
Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR [RFC8949]). This
compressed attestation consists of only the HHIT, a timestamp, and
the EdDSA signature on them.
Editor-note 9: to be more specific regarding how HHIT can only use
as little as 84 bytes to address the crypto concern.
The HHIT prefix and suiteID provide crypto agility and implicit
encoding rules. Similarly, a self-attestation of the Hierarchical
registration of the RID (an attestation of a RID third-party
registration "certificate") can be done in 200 bytes. Both these are
detailed in UAS RID [I-D.ietf-drip-rid].
Editor-note 10: to be more specific why 200 bytes is sufficient.
An Observer would need Internet access to validate a self-
attestations claim. A third-party Certificate can be validated via a
small credential cache in a disconnected environment. This third-
party Certificate is possible when the third-party also uses HHITs
for its identity and the UA has the public key and the Certificate
for that HHIT.
4.2. HIT as A Trustworthy DRIP Entity Identifier 4.2. HIT as A Trustworthy DRIP Entity Identifier
Editor-note 15: general comments about rewrite of this section due
to lack of coherence.
A Remote ID that can be trustworthily used in the RID Broadcast mode A Remote ID that can be trustworthily used in the RID Broadcast mode
can be built from an asymmetric keypair. Rather than using a key can be built from an asymmetric keypair. Rather than using a key
signing operation to claim ownership of an ID that does not guarantee signing operation to claim ownership of an ID that does not guarantee
name uniqueness, in this method the ID is cryptographically derived name uniqueness, in this method the ID is cryptographically derived
directly from the public key. The proof of ID ownership (verifiable directly from the public key. The proof of ID ownership (verifiable
attestation, versus mere claim) is guaranteed by signing this attestation, versus mere claim) is guaranteed by signing this
cryptographic ID with the associated private key. The association cryptographic ID with the associated private key. The association
between the ID and the private key is ensured by cryptographically between the ID and the private key is ensured by cryptographically
binding the public key with the ID, more specifically the ID results binding the public key with the ID, more specifically the ID results
from the hash of the public key. It is statistically hard for from the hash of the public key. It is statistically hard for
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The HITs is designed statistically unique through the cryptographic The HITs is designed statistically unique through the cryptographic
hash feature of second-preimage resistance. The cryptographically- hash feature of second-preimage resistance. The cryptographically-
bound addition of the Hierarchy and an HHIT registration process bound addition of the Hierarchy and an HHIT registration process
(e.g. based on Extensible Provisioning Protocol, [RFC5730]) provide (e.g. based on Extensible Provisioning Protocol, [RFC5730]) provide
complete, global HHIT uniqueness. This registration forces the complete, global HHIT uniqueness. This registration forces the
attacker to generate the same public key rather than a public key attacker to generate the same public key rather than a public key
that generates the same HHIT. This is in contrast to general IDs that generates the same HHIT. This is in contrast to general IDs
(e.g. a UUID or device serial number) as the subject in an X.509 (e.g. a UUID or device serial number) as the subject in an X.509
certificate. certificate.
Editor-note 11: Explain how HIT itself and HHIT registry address
naming collision.
A DRIP identifier can be assigned to a UAS as a static HHIT by its A DRIP identifier can be assigned to a UAS as a static HHIT by its
manufacturer, such as a single HI and derived HHIT encoded as a manufacturer, such as a single HI and derived HHIT encoded as a
hardware serial number per [CTA2063A]. Such a static HHIT can only hardware serial number per [CTA2063A]. Such a static HHIT can only
be used to bind one-time use DRIP identifiers to the unique UA. be used to bind one-time use DRIP identifiers to the unique UA.
Depending upon implementation, this may leave a HI private key in the Depending upon implementation, this may leave a HI private key in the
possession of the manufacturer (more details in Section 8). possession of the manufacturer (more details in Section 8).
In another case, a UAS equipped for Broadcast RID can be provisioned In another case, a UAS equipped for Broadcast RID can be provisioned
not only with its HHIT but also with the HI public key from which the not only with its HHIT but also with the HI public key from which the
HHIT was derived and the corresponding private key, to enable message HHIT was derived and the corresponding private key, to enable message
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device can be provisioned either with public keys of the DRIP device can be provisioned either with public keys of the DRIP
identifier root registries or certificates for subordinate identifier root registries or certificates for subordinate
registries. registries.
HHITs can also be used throughout the USS/UTM system. The Operators, HHITs can also be used throughout the USS/UTM system. The Operators,
Private Information Registries, as well as other UTM entities, can Private Information Registries, as well as other UTM entities, can
use HHITs for their IDs. Such HHITs can facilitate DRIP security use HHITs for their IDs. Such HHITs can facilitate DRIP security
functions such as used with HIP to strongly mutually authenticate and functions such as used with HIP to strongly mutually authenticate and
encrypt communications. encrypt communications.
A self-attestation of the HHIT RID can be done in as little as 84
bytes, by avoiding an explicit encoding technology like ASN.1 or
Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR [RFC8949]). This
attestation consists of only the HHIT, a timestamp, and the EdDSA
signature on them.
An Observer would need Internet access to validate a self-
attestations claim. A third-party Certificate can be validated via a
small credential cache in a disconnected environment. This third-
party Certificate is possible when the third-party also uses HHITs
for its identity and the UA has the public key and the Certificate
for that HHIT.
4.3. HHIT for DRIP Identifier Registration and Lookup 4.3. HHIT for DRIP Identifier Registration and Lookup
Remote ID needs a deterministic lookup mechanism that rapidly Remote ID needs a deterministic lookup mechanism that rapidly
provides actionable information about the identified UA. Given the provides actionable information about the identified UA. Given the
size constraints imposed by the Bluetooth 4 broadcast media, the size constraints imposed by the Bluetooth 4 broadcast media, the
Remote ID itself needs to be the inquiry input into the lookup. An Remote ID itself needs to be a non-spoofable inquiry input into the
HHIT DRIP identifier contains cryptographically embedded registration lookup.
information. This HHIT registration hierarchy, along with the IPv6
prefix, is trustable and sufficient information that can be used to
perform such a lookup. Additionally, the IPv6 prefix can enhance the
HHITs use beyond the basic Remote ID function (e.g use in HIP,
[RFC7401]).
Editor-note 12: more description regarding 1) Is that something we
should address in the Arch- 2) if yes, then adding more text about
how a trustable lookup is performed
Therefore, a DRIP identifier can be represented as a HHIT. It can be A DRIP registration process based on the explicit hierarchy within a
self-generated by a UAS (either UA or GCS) and registered with the HHIT provides manageable uniqueness of the HI for the HHIT (defense
Private Information Registry (More details in Section 5.2) identified against a cryptographic hash second pre-image attack on the HHIT;
in its hierarchy fields. Each DRIP identifier represented as an HHIT e.g. multiple HIs yielding the same HHIT). A lookup of the HHIT into
can not be used more than once. this registration data provides the registered HI for HHIT proof. A
first-come-first-serve registration for a HHIT provides deterministic
access to any other needed actionable information based on inquiry
access authority (more details in Section 5.2).
4.4. HHIT for DRIP Identifier Cryptographic 4.4. HHIT for DRIP Identifier Cryptographic
The only (known to the authors of this document at the time of its The only (known to the authors of this document at the time of its
writing) extant fixed-length ID cryptographically derived from a writing) extant fixed-length ID cryptographically derived from a
public key are the Host Identity Tag [RFC7401], HITs, and public key are the Host Identity Tag [RFC7401], HITs, and
Cryptographically Generated Addresses [RFC3972], CGAs. However, both Cryptographically Generated Addresses [RFC3972], CGAs. However, both
HITs and CGAs lack registration/retrieval capability. HHIT, on the HITs and CGAs lack registration/retrieval capability. HHIT, on the
other hand, is capable of providing a cryptographic hashing function, other hand, is capable of providing a cryptographic hashing function,
along with a registration process to mitigate the probability of a along with a registration process to mitigate the probability of a
hash collision (first registered, first allowed). hash collision (first registered, first allowed).
5. DRIP Identifier Registration and Registries 5. DRIP Identifier Registration and Registries
Editor-note 16: Fundamentally disagree with not actually DRIP registries hold both public and private UAS information
specifying an architecture in the DRIP Architecture document (From
Stuart Card)
UAS registries can hold both public and private UAS information
resulting from the DRIP identifier registration process. Given these resulting from the DRIP identifier registration process. Given these
different uses, and to improve scalability, security, and simplicity different uses, and to improve scalability, security, and simplicity
of administration, the public and private information can be stored of administration, the public and private information can be stored
in different registries. A DRIP identifier is amenable to handling in different registries. This section introduces the public and
as an Internet domain name (at an arbitrary level in the hierarchy). private information registries for DRIP identifiers.
It also can be registered in at least a pseudo-domain (e.g. .ip6.arpa
for reverse lookup), or as a sub-domain (for forward lookup). This
section introduces the public and private information registries for
DRIP identifiers.
5.1. Public Information Registry 5.1. Public Information Registry
5.1.1. Background 5.1.1. Background
The public registry provides trustable information such as The public registry provides trustable information such as
attestations of RID ownership and HDA registration. Optionally, attestations of RID ownership and registration with the HDA
pointers to the repositories for the HDA and RAA implicit in the RID (Hierarchical HIT Domain Authority). Optionally, pointers to the
can be included (e.g. for HDA and RAA HHIT|HI used in attestation repositories for the HDA and RAA (Registered Assigning
signing operations). This public information will be principally Authority)implicit in the RID can be included (e.g., for HDA and RAA
used by Observers of Broadcast RID messages. Data on UAS that only HHIT|HI used in attestation signing operations). This public
use Network RID, is only available via an Observer's Net-RID DP that information will be principally used by Observers of Broadcast RID
would tend to provide all public registry information directly. The messages. Data on UAS that only use Network RID, is available via an
Observer can visually "see" these UAS, but they are silent to the Observer's Net-RID DP that would tend to directly provide all public
Observer; the Net-RID DP is the only source of information based on a registry information. The Observer may visually "see" these Net-RID
query for an airspace volume. UAS, but they may be silent to the Observer. The Net-RID DP is the
only source of information based on a query for an airspace volume.
5.1.2. Proposed Approach 5.1.2. DNS as the Public DRIP Identifier Registry
A DRIP public information registry can respond to standard DNS A DRIP identifier is amenable to handling as an Internet domain name
queries, in the definitive public Internet DNS hierarchy. If a DRIP (at an arbitrary level in the hierarchy, e.g. in .ip6.arpa). Thus
public information registry lists, in a HIP RR, any HIP RVS servers DNS can provide all the needed public DRIP information. A
for a given DRIP identifier, those RVS servers can restrict relay standardized HHIT FQDN (Fully Qualified Domain Name) can deliver the
services per AAA policy; this requires extensions to [RFC8004]. HI via a HIP RR (Resource Record) [RFC8005] and other public
These public information registries can use secure DNS transport information (e.g., RRA and HDA ptrs, and HIP RVS (Rendezvous Servers)
(e.g. DNS over TLS) to deliver public information that is not [RFC8004]). These public information registries can use secure DNS
inherently trustable (e.g. everything other than attestations). transport (e.g. DNS over TLS) to deliver public information that is
not inherently trustable (e.g. everything other than attestations).
5.2. Private Information Registry 5.2. Private Information Registry
5.2.1. Background 5.2.1. Background
The private information required for DRIP identifiers is similar to The private information required for DRIP identifiers is similar to
that required for Internet domain name registration. A DRIP that required for Internet domain name registration. A DRIP
identifier solution can leverage existing Internet resources: identifier solution can leverage existing Internet resources:
registration protocols, infrastructure and business models, by registration protocols, infrastructure, and business models, by
fitting into an ID structure compatible with DNS names. This implies fitting into an ID structure compatible with DNS names. The HHIT
some sort of hierarchy, for scalability, and management of this hierarchy can provide the needed scalability and management
hierarchy. It is expected that the private registry function will be structure. It is expected that the private registry function will be
provided by the same organizations that run a USS, and likely provided by the same organizations that run a USS, and likely
integrated with a USS. integrated with a USS. The lookup function may be implemented by the
Net-RID DPs.
5.2.2. Proposed Approach 5.2.2. EPP and RDAP as the Private DRIP Identifier Registry
A DRIP private information registry can support essential Internet A DRIP private information registry supports essential registry
domain name registry operations (e.g. add, delete, update, query) operations (e.g. add, delete, update, query) using interoperable open
using interoperable open standard protocols. It can also support the standard protocols. It can accomplish this by using the Extensible
Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) and the Registry Data Access Provisioning Protocol (EPP [RFC5730]) and the Registry Data Access
Protocol (RDAP) with access controls. It might be listed in a DNS: Protocol (RDAP RFC7480] [RFC7482] [RFC7483]). The DRIP private
that DNS could be private; but absent any compelling reasons for use information registry in which a given UAS is registered needs to be
of private DNS, a public DNS hierarchy needs to be in place. The findable, starting from the UAS ID, using the methods specified in
DRIP private information registry in which a given UAS is registered [RFC7484].
needs to be findable, starting from the UAS ID, using the methods
specified in [RFC7484]. A DRIP private information registry can also 5.2.3. Alternative Private DRIP Registry methods
support WebFinger as specified in [RFC7033].
A DRIP private information registry might be an access controlled DNS
(e.g. via DNS over TLS). Additionally, WebFinger [RFC7033] can be
deployed. These alternative methods may be used by Net-RID DP with
specific customers.
6. Harvesting Broadcast Remote ID messages for UTM Inclusion 6. Harvesting Broadcast Remote ID messages for UTM Inclusion
ASTM anticipated that regulators would require both Broadcast RID and ASTM anticipated that regulators would require both Broadcast RID and
Network RID for large UAS, but allow RID requirements for small UAS Network RID for large UAS, but allow RID requirements for small UAS
to be satisfied with the operator's choice of either Broadcast RID or to be satisfied with the operator's choice of either Broadcast RID or
Network RID. The EASA initially specified Broadcast RID for UAS of Network RID. The EASA initially specified Broadcast RID for UAS of
essentially all UAS and is now also considering Network RID. The FAA essentially all UAS and is now also considering Network RID. The FAA
RID Final Rules [FAA_RID] only specify Broadcast RID for UAS, RID Final Rules [FAA_RID] only specify Broadcast RID for UAS,
however, still encourages Network RID for complementary however, still encourages Network RID for complementary
skipping to change at page 19, line 29 skipping to change at page 18, line 29
<https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-01-15/ <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-01-15/
pdf/2020-28948.pdf>. pdf/2020-28948.pdf>.
[FAA_UAS_Concept_Of_Ops] [FAA_UAS_Concept_Of_Ops]
United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),
"Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Traffic Management (UTM) "Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Traffic Management (UTM)
Concept of Operations (V2.0)", 2020, Concept of Operations (V2.0)", 2020,
<https://www.faa.gov/uas/research_development/ <https://www.faa.gov/uas/research_development/
traffic_management/media/UTM_ConOps_v2.pdf>. traffic_management/media/UTM_ConOps_v2.pdf>.
[I-D.ietf-drip-rid]
Moskowitz, R., Card, S. W., Wiethuechter, A., and A.
Gurtov, "UAS Remote ID", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-ietf-drip-rid-07, 28 January 2021,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-drip-rid-
07.txt>.
[Implementing] [Implementing]
European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), "EU European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), "EU
Commission Implementing Regulation 2019/947 of 24 May 2019 Commission Implementing Regulation 2019/947 of 24 May 2019
on the rules and procedures for the operation of unmanned on the rules and procedures for the operation of unmanned
aircraft", 2019. aircraft", 2019.
[LAANC] United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), "Low [LAANC] United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), "Low
Altitude Authorization and Notification Capability", n.d., Altitude Authorization and Notification Capability", n.d.,
<https://www.faa.gov/uas/programs_partnerships/ <https://www.faa.gov/uas/programs_partnerships/
data_exchange/>. data_exchange/>.
skipping to change at page 20, line 36 skipping to change at page 19, line 28
[RFC7401] Moskowitz, R., Ed., Heer, T., Jokela, P., and T. [RFC7401] Moskowitz, R., Ed., Heer, T., Jokela, P., and T.
Henderson, "Host Identity Protocol Version 2 (HIPv2)", Henderson, "Host Identity Protocol Version 2 (HIPv2)",
RFC 7401, DOI 10.17487/RFC7401, April 2015, RFC 7401, DOI 10.17487/RFC7401, April 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7401>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7401>.
[RFC7482] Newton, A. and S. Hollenbeck, "Registration Data Access [RFC7482] Newton, A. and S. Hollenbeck, "Registration Data Access
Protocol (RDAP) Query Format", RFC 7482, Protocol (RDAP) Query Format", RFC 7482,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7482, March 2015, DOI 10.17487/RFC7482, March 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7482>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7482>.
[RFC7483] Newton, A. and S. Hollenbeck, "JSON Responses for the
Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)", RFC 7483,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7483, March 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7483>.
[RFC7484] Blanchet, M., "Finding the Authoritative Registration Data [RFC7484] Blanchet, M., "Finding the Authoritative Registration Data
(RDAP) Service", RFC 7484, DOI 10.17487/RFC7484, March (RDAP) Service", RFC 7484, DOI 10.17487/RFC7484, March
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7484>. 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7484>.
[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token [RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015, (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
[RFC8002] Heer, T. and S. Varjonen, "Host Identity Protocol
Certificates", RFC 8002, DOI 10.17487/RFC8002, October
2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8002>.
[RFC8004] Laganier, J. and L. Eggert, "Host Identity Protocol (HIP) [RFC8004] Laganier, J. and L. Eggert, "Host Identity Protocol (HIP)
Rendezvous Extension", RFC 8004, DOI 10.17487/RFC8004, Rendezvous Extension", RFC 8004, DOI 10.17487/RFC8004,
October 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8004>. October 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8004>.
[RFC8032] Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-Curve Digital [RFC8005] Laganier, J., "Host Identity Protocol (HIP) Domain Name
Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", RFC 8032, System (DNS) Extension", RFC 8005, DOI 10.17487/RFC8005,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8032, January 2017, October 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8005>.
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8032>.
[RFC8392] Jones, M., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., and H. Tschofenig, [RFC8392] Jones, M., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., and H. Tschofenig,
"CBOR Web Token (CWT)", RFC 8392, DOI 10.17487/RFC8392, "CBOR Web Token (CWT)", RFC 8392, DOI 10.17487/RFC8392,
May 2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8392>. May 2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8392>.
[RFC8949] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object [RFC8949] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
Representation (CBOR)", STD 94, RFC 8949, Representation (CBOR)", STD 94, RFC 8949,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8949, December 2020, DOI 10.17487/RFC8949, December 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8949>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8949>.
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