draft-ietf-drip-reqs-01.txt   draft-ietf-drip-reqs-02.txt 
DRIP S. Card, Ed. DRIP S. Card, Ed.
Internet-Draft A. Wiethuechter Internet-Draft A. Wiethuechter
Intended status: Informational AX Enterprize Intended status: Informational AX Enterprize
Expires: 26 November 2020 R. Moskowitz Expires: 14 January 2021 R. Moskowitz
HTT Consulting HTT Consulting
A. Gurtov A. Gurtov
Linköping University Linköping University
25 May 2020 13 July 2020
Drone Remote Identification Protocol (DRIP) Requirements Drone Remote Identification Protocol (DRIP) Requirements
draft-ietf-drip-reqs-01 draft-ietf-drip-reqs-02
Abstract Abstract
This document defines the requirements for Drone Remote This document defines the requirements for Drone Remote
Identification Protocol (DRIP) Working Group protocols to support Identification Protocol (DRIP) Working Group protocols to support
Unmanned Aircraft System Remote Identification and tracking (UAS RID) Unmanned Aircraft System Remote Identification and tracking (UAS RID)
for safety, regulatory compliance and other purposes. for security, safety and other purposes. Complementing external
technical standards as regulator-accepted means of compliance with
Complementing external technical standards as regulator-accepted UAS RID regulations, DRIP will:
means of compliance with UAS RID regulations, DRIP will:
facilitate use of existing Internet resources to support UAS RID facilitate use of existing Internet resources to support UAS RID
and to enable enhanced related services; and to enable enhanced related services;
enable on-line and off-line verification that UAS RID information enable online and offline verification that UAS RID information is
is trustworthy. trustworthy.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 26 November 2020. This Internet-Draft will expire on 14 January 2021.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text
as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction (Informative) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terms and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 1.1. Overall Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Requirements Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 1.2. Intended Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 1.3. DRIP Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3. UAS RID Problem Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 2. Terms and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1. Network RID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 2.1. Requirements Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2. Broadcast RID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 2.2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.3. DRIP Focus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 3. UAS RID Problem Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 3.1. Network RID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.1. General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 3.2. Broadcast RID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.2. Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 3.3. DRIP Focus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.3. Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 4. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.4. Registries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 4.1. General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5. Discussion and Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 4.2. Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 4.3. Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 4.4. Registries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 5. Discussion and Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 8. Privacy and Transparency Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1. Introduction 1. Introduction (Informative)
1.1. Overall Context
Many considerations (especially safety) dictate that UAS be remotely Many considerations (especially safety and security) dictate that UAS
identifiable. Any observer with responsibilities involving aircraft be remotely identifiable. Any Observer with responsibilities
inherently must classify them situationally according to basic involving aircraft inherently must classify Unmanned Aircraft (UA)
considerations, as illustrated notionally in Figure 1 below. situationally according to basic considerations, as illustrated
notionally in Figure 1 below. An Observer who classifies an UAS: as
Taskable, can ask it to do something useful; as Low Concern, can
reasonably assume it is not malicious, and would cooperate with
requests to modify its flight plans for safety reasons; as High
Concern or Unidentified, is worth focused surveillance.
xxxxxxx +--------------+ xxxxxxx +--------------+
x x No | | x x No | |
x ID? x+---->| UNIDENTIFIED | x ID? x+---->| UNIDENTIFIED |
x x | | x x | |
xxxxxxx +--------------+ xxxxxxx +--------------+
+ +
| Yes | Yes
v v
xxxxxxx xxxxxxx
skipping to change at page 3, line 26 skipping to change at page 3, line 37
| x x | | x x |
| xxxxxxx | | xxxxxxx |
| + | | + |
v v v v v v
+--------------+ +--------------+ +--------------+ +--------------+ +--------------+ +--------------+
| | | | | | | | | | | |
| TASKABLE | | LOW CONCERN | | HIGH CONCERN | | TASKABLE | | LOW CONCERN | | HIGH CONCERN |
| | | | | | | | | | | |
+--------------+ +--------------+ +--------------+ +--------------+ +--------------+ +--------------+
Figure 1 Figure 1: "Notional UAS Classification">
Civil Aviation Authorities (CAAs) worldwide are mandating Unmanned Civil Aviation Authorities (CAAs) worldwide are mandating Unmanned
Aircraft System Remote Identification and tracking (UAS RID). The Aircraft System Remote Identification and tracking (UAS RID). The
European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) has published European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) has published
[Delegated] and [Implementing] Regulations. The United States (US) [Delegated] and [Implementing] Regulations. The United States (US)
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has published a Notice of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has published a Notice of
Proposed Rule Making ([NPRM]) and has described the key role that UAS Proposed Rule Making [NPRM] and has described the key role that UAS
RID plays in UAS Traffic Management (UTM [CONOPS] especially RID plays in UAS Traffic Management (UTM [CONOPS] especially
Section 2.6). CAAs currently (2020) promulgate performance-based Section 2.6). CAAs currently (2020) promulgate performance-based
regulations that do not specify techniques, but rather cite industry regulations that do not specify techniques, but rather cite industry
consensus technical standards as acceptable means of compliance. consensus technical standards as acceptable means of compliance.
ASTM International, Technical Committee F38 (UAS), Subcommittee ASTM International, Technical Committee F38 (UAS), Subcommittee
F38.02 (Aircraft Operations), Work Item WK65041, developed ASTM F38.02 (Aircraft Operations), Work Item WK65041, developed ASTM
F3411-19 [F3411-19] Standard Specification for Remote ID and F3411-19 [F3411-19] Standard Specification for Remote ID and
Tracking. It defines two means of UAS RID: Tracking. It defines two means of UAS RID:
Network RID defines a set of information for UAS to make available Network RID defines a set of information for UAS to make available
globally indirectly via the Internet. globally indirectly via the Internet, through servers that can be
queried by Observers.
Broadcast RID defines a set of messages for Unmanned Aircraft (UA) Broadcast RID defines a set of messages for Unmanned Aircraft (UA)
to transmit locally directly one-way over Bluetooth or Wi-Fi. to transmit locally directly one-way over Bluetooth or Wi-Fi, to
be received in real time by local Observers.
Generally the same information must provided via both means. Network The same information must be provided via both means. The
RID depends upon Internet connectivity in several segments from the presentation may differ, as Network RID defines a data dictionary,
UAS to the observer. Broadcast RID should need Internet (or other whereas Broadcast RID defines message formats (which carry items from
Wide Area Network) connectivity only for UAS registry information that same data dictionary). The frequency with which it is sent may
lookup using the directly locally received UAS ID as a key. differ, as Network RID can accomodate Observer queries asynchronous
to UAS updates (which generally need be send only when information,
such as position, changes), whereas Broadcast RID depends upon
Observers receiving UA messages at the time they are transmitted.
Network RID depends upon Internet connectivity in several segments
from the UAS to each Observer. Broadcast RID should need Internet
(or other Wide Area Network) connectivity only for UAS registry
information lookup using the directly locally received UAS Identifier
(UAS ID) as a key.
[F3411-19] specifies 3 UAS ID types: [F3411-19] specifies three UAS ID types:
TYPE-1 A static, manufacturer assigned, hardware serial number per TYPE-1 A static, manufacturer assigned, hardware serial number per
ANSI/CTA-2063-A "Small Unmanned Aerial System Serial Numbers" ANSI/CTA-2063-A "Small Unmanned Aerial System Serial Numbers"
[CTA2063A]. [CTA2063A].
TYPE-2 A CAA assigned (presumably static) ID. TYPE-2 A CAA assigned (presumably static) ID.
TYPE-3 A UTM system assigned UUID [RFC4122], which can but need not TYPE-3 A UTM system assigned UUID [RFC4122], which can but need not
be dynamic. be dynamic.
The EU allows only Type 1; the US allows Types 1 and 3, but requires The EU allows only Type 1; the US allows Types 1 and 3, but requires
Type 3 IDs (if used) each to be used only once (for a single UAS Type 3 IDs (if used) each to be used only once (for a single UAS
flight, which in the context of UTM is called an "operation"). flight, which in the context of UTM is called an "operation").
[F3411-19] Broadcast RID transmits all information in the clear as [F3411-19] Broadcast RID transmits all information as cleartext
plaintext (ASCII or binary), so static IDs enable trivial correlation (ASCII or binary), so static IDs enable trivial correlation of
of patterns of use, unacceptable in many applications, e.g., package patterns of use, unacceptable in many applications, e.g., package
delivery routes of competitors. delivery routes of competitors.
[WG105] addreses a "different scope than Direct Remote
Identification... latter being primarily meant for security
purposes... rather than for safety purposes (e.g. hazards
deconfliction..." Aviation community standards set a higher bar for
safety than for security. It "leaves the opportunity for those
manufacturers who would prefer to merge both functions to do so...
The purpose of the e-Identification function is to transmit, towards
the U-space infrastructure and/or other UA, a set of information for
safety (traffic management) purposes..." In addition to RID's
Broadcast and Network one-way to Observers), it will use V2V to other
UA (also perhaps to and/or from some manned aircraft).
1.2. Intended Use
An ID is not an end in itself; it exists to enable lookups and An ID is not an end in itself; it exists to enable lookups and
provision of services complementing mere identification. provision of services complementing mere identification.
Minimal specified information must be made available to the public; Minimal specified information must be made available to the public;
access to other data, e.g., UAS operator Personally Identifiable access to other data, e.g., UAS operator Personally Identifiable
Information (PII), must be limited to strongly authenticated Information (PII), must be limited to strongly authenticated
personnel, properly authorized per policy. The balance between personnel, properly authorized per policy. The balance between
privacy and transparency remains a subject for public debate and privacy and transparency remains a subject for public debate and
regulatory action; DRIP can only offer tools to expand the achievable regulatory action; DRIP can only offer tools to expand the achievable
trade space and enable trade-offs within that space. [F3411-19] trade space and enable trade-offs within that space. [F3411-19]
specifies only how to get the UAS ID to the observer; how the specifies only how to get the UAS ID to the Observer; how the
observer can perform these lookups, and how the registries first can Observer can perform these lookups, and how the registries first can
be populated with information, is unspecified. be populated with information, is unspecified.
Using UAS RID to facilitate vehicular (V2X) communications and Using UAS RID to facilitate vehicular (V2X) communications and
applications such as Detect And Avoid (DAA, which would impose applications such as Detect And Avoid (DAA, which would impose
tighter latency bounds than RID itself) is an obvious possibility, tighter latency bounds than RID itself) is an obvious possibility,
explicitly contemplated in the FAA NPRM. However, applications of explicitly contemplated in the FAA NPRM. However, applications of
RID beyond RID itself have been omitted from [F3411-19]; DAA has been RID beyond RID itself have been omitted from [F3411-19]; DAA has been
explicitly declared out of scope in ASTM working group discussions, explicitly declared out of scope in ASTM working group discussions,
based on a distinction between RID as a security standard vs DAA as a based on a distinction between RID as a security standard vs DAA as a
safety application. Although dynamic establishment of secure safety application. Although dynamic establishment of secure
communications between the observer and the UAS pilot seems to have communications between the Observer and the UAS pilot seems to have
been contemplated by the FAA UAS ID and Tracking Aviation Rulemaking been contemplated by the FAA UAS ID and Tracking Aviation Rulemaking
Committee (ARC) in their [Recommendations], it is not addressed in Committee (ARC) in their [Recommendations], it is not addressed in
any of the subsequent proposed regulations or technical any of the subsequent proposed regulations or technical
specifications. specifications.
The need for near-universal deployment of UAS RID is pressing. This The need for near-universal deployment of UAS RID is pressing. This
implies the need to support use by observers of already ubiquitous implies the need to support use by Observers of already ubiquitous
mobile devices (typically smartphones and tablets). Anticipating mobile devices (typically smartphones and tablets). Anticipating
likely CAA requirements to support legacy devices, especially in likely CAA requirements to support legacy devices, especially in
light of [Recommendations], [F3411-19] specifies that any UAS sending light of [Recommendations], [F3411-19] specifies that any UAS sending
Broadcast RID over Bluetooth must do so over Bluetooth 4, regardless Broadcast RID over Bluetooth must do so over Bluetooth 4, regardless
of whether it also does so over newer versions; as UAS sender devices of whether it also does so over newer versions; as UAS sender devices
and observer receiver devices are unpaired, this implies extremely and Observer receiver devices are unpaired, this implies extremely
short "advertisement" (beacon) frames. short "advertisement" (beacon) frames.
UA onboard RID devices are severely constrained in Cost, Size, Weight UA onboard RID devices are severely constrained in Cost, Size, Weight
and Power ($SWaP). Cost is a significant impediment to the necessary and Power ($SWaP). Cost is a significant impediment to the necessary
near-universal adoption of UAS send and observer receive RID near-universal adoption of UAS send and Observer receive RID
capabilities. $SWaP is a burden not only on the designers of new UA capabilities. $SWaP is a burden not only on the designers of new UA
for production and sale, but also on owners of existing UA that must for production and sale, but also on owners of existing UA that must
be retrofit. Radio Controlled (RC) aircraft modelers, "hams" who use be retrofit. Radio Controlled (RC) aircraft modelers, "hams" who use
licensed amateur radio frequencies to control UAS, drone hobbyists licensed amateur radio frequencies to control UAS, drone hobbyists
and others who custom build UAS all need means of participating in and others who custom build UAS all need means of participating in
UAS RID sensitive to both generic $SWaP and application-specific UAS RID sensitive to both generic $SWaP and application-specific
considerations. considerations.
To accommodate the most severely constrained cases, all these To accommodate the most severely constrained cases, all these
conspire to motivate system design decisions, especially for the conspire to motivate system design decisions, especially for the
Broadcast RID data link, which complicate the protocol design Broadcast RID data link, which complicate the protocol design
problem: one-way links; extremely short packets; and Internet- problem: one-way links; extremely short packets; and Internet-
disconnected operation of UA onboard devices. Internet-disconnected disconnected operation of UA onboard devices. Internet-disconnected
operation of observer devices has been deemed by ASTM F38.02 too operation of Observer devices has been deemed by ASTM F38.02 too
infrequent to address, but for some users is important and presents infrequent to address, but for some users is important and presents
further challenges. further challenges.
Despite work by regulators and Standards Development Organizations Despite work by regulators and Standards Development Organizations
(SDOs), there are substantial gaps in UAS standards generally and UAS (SDOs), there are substantial gaps in UAS standards generally and UAS
RID specifically. [Roadmap] especially Section 7.8 catalogs UAS RID RID specifically. [Roadmap] catalogs UAS related standards, ongoing
standards, ongoing standardization activities and gaps. standardization activities and gaps (as of early 2020); Section 7.8
catalogs those related specifically to UAS RID.
Given not only packet payload length and bandwidth, but also Given not only packet payload length and bandwidth, but also
processing and storage within the $SWaP constraints of very small processing and storage within the $SWaP constraints of very small
(e.g. consumer toy) UA, heavyweight cryptographic security protocols (e.g. consumer toy) UA, heavyweight cryptographic security protocols
are infeasible, yet trustworthiness of UAS RID information is are infeasible, yet trustworthiness of UAS RID information is
essential. Under [F3411-19], even the most basic datum, the UAS ID essential. Under [F3411-19], even the most basic datum, the UAS ID
string (typically number) itself can be merely an unsubstantiated string (typically number) itself can be merely an unsubstantiated
claim. Observer devices being ubiquitous, thus popular targets for claim. Observer devices being ubiquitous, thus popular targets for
malware or other compromise, cannot be generally trusted (although malware or other compromise, cannot be generally trusted (although
the user of each device is compelled to trust that device, to some the user of each device is compelled to trust that device, to some
extent); a "fair witness" functionality (inspired by [Stranger]) may extent); a "fair witness" functionality (inspired by [Stranger]) is
be desirable. desirable.
1.3. DRIP Scope
DRIP's initial goal is to make RID immediately actionable, in both DRIP's initial goal is to make RID immediately actionable, in both
Internet and local-only connected scenarios (especially emergencies), Internet and local-only connected scenarios (especially emergencies),
in severely constrained UAS environments, balancing legitimate (e.g., in severely constrained UAS environments, balancing legitimate (e.g.,
public safety) authorities' Need To Know trustworthy information with public safety) authorities' Need To Know trustworthy information with
UAS operators' privacy. By "immediately actionable" is meant UAS operators' privacy. By "immediately actionable" is meant
information of sufficient precision, accuracy, timeliness, etc. for information of sufficient precision, accuracy, timeliness, etc. for
an observer to use it as the basis for immediate decisive action, an Observer to use it as the basis for immediate decisive action,
whether that be to trigger a defensive counter-UAS system, to attempt whether that be to trigger a defensive counter-UAS system, to attempt
to initiate communications with the UAS operator, to accept the to initiate communications with the UAS operator, to accept the
presence of the UAS in the airspace where/when observed as not presence of the UAS in the airspace where/when observed as not
requiring further action, or whatever, with potentially severe requiring further action, or whatever, with potentially severe
consequences of any action or inaction chosen based on that consequences of any action or inaction chosen based on that
information. Potential follow-on goals may extend beyond providing information. Potential follow-on goals may extend beyond providing
timely and trustworthy identification data, to using it to enable timely and trustworthy identification data, to using it to enable
identity-oriented networking of UAS. identity-oriented networking of UAS.
DRIP (originally Trustworthy Multipurpose Remote Identification, TM- DRIP (originally Trustworthy Multipurpose Remote Identification, TM-
RID) potentially could be applied to verifiably identify other types RID) potentially could be applied to verifiably identify other types
of registered things reported to be in specified physical locations, of registered things reported to be in specified physical locations,
but the urgent motivation and clear initial focus is UAS. Existing but the urgent motivation and clear initial focus is UAS. Existing
Internet resources (protocol standards, services, infrastructure, and Internet resources (protocol standards, services, infrastructure, and
business models) should be leveraged. A natural Internet based business models) should be leveraged. A natural Internet based
architecture for UAS RID conforming to proposed regulations and architecture for UAS RID conforming to proposed regulations and
external technical standards is described in a companion architecture external technical standards is described in a companion architecture
document [I-D.ietf-drip-arch]; this document describes only relevant document [drip-architecture] and elaborated in other DRIP documents;
requirements. this document describes only relevant requirements and defines
terminology for the set of DRIP documents.
2. Terms and Definitions 2. Terms and Definitions
2.1. Requirements Terminology 2.1. Requirements Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here. capitals, as shown here.
2.2. Definitions 2.2. Definitions
This section defines a set of terms that are used in DRIP documents. This section defines a set of terms expected to be used in DRIP
This list is meant to be the DRIP terminology reference. Some of the documents. This list is meant to be the DRIP terminology reference.
terms listed below are not used in this document. Some of the terms listed below are not used in this document.
[RFC4949] provides a glossary of Internet security terms that should
be used where applicable. In the UAS community, the plural form of
acronyms generally is the same as the singular form, e.g. Unmanned
Aircraft System (singular) and Unmanned Aircraft Systems (plural) are
both represented as UAS. On this and other terminological issues, to
encourage comprehension necessary for adoption of DRIP by the
intended user community, that community's norms are respected herein,
and definitions are quoted in cases where they have been found in
that community's documents.
$SWaP $SWaP
Cost, Size, Weight and Power. Cost, Size, Weight and Power.
AAA AAA
Attestation, Authentication, Authorization, Access Control, Attestation, Authentication, Authorization, Access Control,
Accounting, Attribution, Audit. Accounting, Attribution, Audit, or any subset thereof (uses differ
by application, author and context).
ABDAA ABDAA
AirBorne DAA. Also known as "self-separation". AirBorne DAA. Accomplished using systems onboard the aircraft
involved. Also known as "self-separation".
ADS-B ADS-B
Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast. "ADS-B Out" Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast. "ADS-B Out"
equipment obtains aircraft position from other on-board systems equipment obtains aircraft position from other on-board systems
(typically GPS) and periodically broadcasts it to "ADS-B In" (typically GNSS) and periodically broadcasts it to "ADS-B In"
equipped entities, including other aircraft, ground stations and equipped entities, including other aircraft, ground stations and
satellite based monitoring systems. satellite based monitoring systems.
AGL AGL
Above Ground Level. Relative altitude, above the variously Above Ground Level. Relative altitude, above the variously
defined local ground level, typically of an UA, typically measured defined local ground level, typically of an UA, measured in feet
in feet. or meters.
ATC ATC
Air Traffic Control. Explicit flight direction to pilots from Air Traffic Control. Explicit flight direction to pilots from
ground controllers. Contrast with ATM. ground controllers. Contrast with ATM.
ATM ATM
Air Traffic Management. All systems that assist aircraft from Air Traffic Management. A broader functional and geographic scope
departure to landing. A broader functional and geographic scope and/or a higher layer of abstraction than ATC. "The dynamic,
and/or a higher layer of abstraction than ATC. integrated management of air traffic and airspace including air
traffic services, airspace management and air traffic flow
management - safely, economically and efficiently - through the
provision of facilities and seamless services in collaboration
with all parties and involving airborne and ground-based
functions." [ICAOATM]
Authentication Message Authentication Message
F3411 Message Type 2. Provides framing for authentication data, F3411 Message Type 2. Provides framing for authentication data,
only. only.
Basic ID Message Basic ID Message
F3411 Message Type 0. Provides UA Type, UAS ID Type and UAS ID, F3411 Message Type 0. Provides UA Type, UAS ID Type and UAS ID,
only. only.
BLOS BLOS
skipping to change at page 8, line 30 skipping to change at page 9, line 46
operation, including the marking of the UA, so that this operation, including the marking of the UA, so that this
information can be obtained without physical access to the UA". information can be obtained without physical access to the UA".
Requirement could be met with ASTM Broadcast RID: Basic ID message Requirement could be met with ASTM Broadcast RID: Basic ID message
with UAS ID Type 1; Location/Vector message; Operator ID message; with UAS ID Type 1; Location/Vector message; Operator ID message;
System Message. Corresponds roughly to the Broadcast RID portion System Message. Corresponds roughly to the Broadcast RID portion
of FAA NPRM Standard RID. of FAA NPRM Standard RID.
E2E E2E
End to End. End to End.
EUROCAE
European Organisation for Civil Aviation Equipment. Aviation SDO,
originally European, now with broader membership. Cooperates
extensively with RTCA.
GBDAA GBDAA
Ground Based DAA. Ground Based DAA. Accomplished with the aid of ground based
functions.
GCS GCS
Ground Control Station. The part of the UAS that the remote pilot Ground Control Station. The part of the UAS that the remote pilot
uses to exercise C2 over the UA, whether by remotely exercising UA uses to exercise C2 over the UA, whether by remotely exercising UA
flight controls to fly the UA, by setting GPS waypoints, or flight controls to fly the UA, by setting GPS waypoints, or
otherwise directing its flight. otherwise directing its flight.
GNSS
Global Navigation Satellite System. Satellite based timing and/or
positioning with global coverage, often used to support
navigation.
GPS GPS
Global Positioning System. In this context, misused in place of Global Positioning System. A specific GNSS, but in this context,
Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) or more generally SATNAV the term is typically misused in place of the more generic term
to refer generically to satellite based timing and/or positioning. GNSS.
GRAIN GRAIN
Global Resilient Aviation Information Network. An effort to Global Resilient Aviation Interoperable Network. Putative ICAO
develop an international IPv6 overlay network with end-to-end managed IPv6 overlay internetwork per IATF.
security supporting all aspects of aviation.
IATF IATF
International Aviation Trust Framework. ICAO effort to develop a International Aviation Trust Framework. ICAO effort to develop a
resilient and secure by design framework for networking in support resilient and secure by design framework for networking in support
of all aspects of aviation. of all aspects of aviation.
ICAO ICAO
International Civil Aviation Organization. A United Nations International Civil Aviation Organization. A United Nations
specialized agency that develops and harmonizes international specialized agency that develops and harmonizes international
standards relating to aviation. standards relating to aviation.
skipping to change at page 9, line 38 skipping to change at page 11, line 18
LOS LOS
Line Of Sight. An adjectival phrase describing any information Line Of Sight. An adjectival phrase describing any information
transfer that travels in a nearly straight line (e.g. transfer that travels in a nearly straight line (e.g.
electromagnetic energy, whether in the visual light, RF or other electromagnetic energy, whether in the visual light, RF or other
frequency range) and is subject to blockage. A term to be avoided frequency range) and is subject to blockage. A term to be avoided
due to ambiguity, in this context, between RF-LOS and V-LOS. due to ambiguity, in this context, between RF-LOS and V-LOS.
MSL MSL
Mean Sea Level. Relative altitude, above the variously defined Mean Sea Level. Relative altitude, above the variously defined
mean sea level, typically of an UA (but in FAA NPRM for a GCS), mean sea level, typically of an UA (but in FAA NPRM also for a
typically measured in feet. GCS), measured in or meters.
Net-RID DP Net-RID DP
Network RID Display Provider. Logical entity that aggregates data Network RID Display Provider. Logical entity that aggregates data
from Net-RID SPs as needed in response to user queries regarding from Net-RID SPs as needed in response to user queries regarding
UAS operating within specified airspace volumes, to enable display UAS operating within specified airspace volumes, to enable display
by a user application on a user device. Under the FAA NPRM, not by a user application on a user device. Potentially could provide
recognized as a distinct entity, but a service provided by USS, not only information sent via UAS RID but also information
including Public Safety USS that may exist primarily for this retrieved from UAS RID registries, or information beyond UAS RID,
purpose rather than to manage any subscribed UAS. regarding subscribed USS. Under the FAA NPRM, not recognized as a
distinct entity, but a service provided by USS, including Public
Safety USS that may exist primarily for this purpose rather than
to manage any subscribed UAS.
Net-RID SP Net-RID SP
Network RID Service Provider. Logical entity that participates in Network RID Service Provider. Logical entity that collects RID
Network RID and provides to NetRID-DPs information on UAS it messages from UAS and responds to NetRID-DP queries for
manages. Under the FAA NPRM, the USS to which the UAS is information on UAS of which it is aware. Under the FAA NPRM, the
subscribed ("Remote ID USS"). USS to which the UAS is subscribed ("Remote ID USS").
Network Identification Service Network Identification Service
EU regulatory requirement for Network RID. Requirement could be EU regulatory requirement for Network RID. Requirement could be
met with ASTM Network RID: Basic ID message with UAS ID Type 1; met with ASTM Network RID: Basic ID message with UAS ID Type 1;
Location/Vector message; Operator ID message; System Message. Location/Vector message; Operator ID message; System Message.
Corresponds roughly to the Network RID portion of FAA NPRM Corresponds roughly to the Network RID portion of FAA NPRM
Standard RID. Standard RID.
Observer Observer
Referred to in other UAS RID documents as a "user", but there are An entity (typically but not necessarily an individual human) who
also other classes of UAS RID users, so here "observer" is has directly or indirectly observed an UA and wishes to know
preferred to denote specifically an individual who has observed an something about it, starting with its ID. An observer typically
UA and wishes to know something about it, starting with its ID. is on the ground and local (within VLOS of an observed UA), but
could be remote (observing via Network RID or other surveillance),
operating another UA, aboard another aircraft , etc.
Operation
A flight, or series of flights of the same mission, by the same
UAS, in the same airspace volume, separated by at most brief
ground intervals.
Operator Operator
UAS operator. Typically an organization that owns or leases the "A person, organization or enterprise engaged in or offering to
UAS. engage in an aircraft operation." [ICAOUTM]
Operator ID Message Operator ID Message
F3411 Message Type 5. Provides CAA issued Operator ID, only. F3411 Message Type 5. Provides CAA issued Operator ID, only.
Operator ID is distinct from UAS ID.
PIC
Pilot In Command. "The pilot designated by the operator, or in
the case of general aviation, the owner, as being in command and
charged with the safe conduct of a flight." [ICAOATM]
PII PII
Personally Identifiable Information. In this context, typically Personally Identifiable Information. In this context, typically
of the UAS operator, Pilot In Command (PIC) or remote pilot, but of the UAS operator, Pilot In Command (PIC) or remote pilot, but
possibly of an observer or other party. possibly of an observer or other party.
RF Remote Pilot
Radio Frequency. May be used as an adjective or as a noun; in the A pilot using a GCS to exercise proximate control of an UA.
latter case, typically means Radio Frequency energy. Either the PIC or under the supervision of the PIC.
RF-LOS RF-LOS
RF LOS. Typically used in describing operation of a direct radio RF LOS. Typically used in describing operation of a direct radio
link between a GCS and the UA under its control, potentially link between a GCS and the UA under its control, potentially
subject to blockage by foliage, structures, terrain or other subject to blockage by foliage, structures, terrain or other
vehicles, but less so than V-LOS. vehicles, but less so than V-LOS.
RTCA
Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics. US aviation SDO.
Cooperates extensively with EUROCAE.
Self-ID Message Self-ID Message
F3411 Message Type 3. Provides a 1 byte descriptor and 23 byte F3411 Message Type 3. Provides a 1 byte descriptor and 23 byte
ASCII free text field, only. ASCII free text field, only. Expected to be used to provide
context on the operation, e.g. mission intent.
Standard RID Standard RID
Per the FAA NPRM, a mode of operation that must use both Network Per the FAA NPRM, a mode of operation that must use both Network
RID (if Internet connectivity is available at the time in the RID (if Internet connectivity is available at the time in the
operating area) and Broadcast RID (always and everywhere), and operating area) and Broadcast RID (always and everywhere), and
must provide both pilot/GCS location and UA location. This mode must provide both pilot/GCS location and UA location. This mode
is required for UAS that exceed the allowed envelope (e.g. size, is required for UAS that exceed the allowed envelope (e.g. size,
range) of Limited RID and for all UAS equipped for Standard RID range) of Limited RID and for all UAS equipped for Standard RID
(even if operated within parameters that would otherwise permit (even if operated within parameters that would otherwise permit
Limited RID). The Broadcast RID portion corresponds roughly to EU Limited RID). The Broadcast RID portion corresponds roughly to EU
Direct RID; the Network RID portion corresponds roughly to EU Direct RID; the Network RID portion corresponds roughly to EU
Network Identification Service. Network Identification Service.
SDO SDO
Standards Development Organization. ASTM, IETF, et al. Standards Development Organization. ASTM, IETF, et al.
SDSP SDSP
Supplemental Data Service Provider. An entity that participates Supplemental Data Service Provider. An entity that participates
in the UTM system, but provides services beyond those specified as in the UTM system, but provides services beyond those specified as
basic UTM system functions. basic UTM system functions. E.g., provides weather data.
System Message System Message
F3411 Message Type 4. Provides general UAS information, including F3411 Message Type 4. Provides general UAS information, including
remote pilot location, multiple UA group operational area, etc. remote pilot location, multiple UA group operational area, etc.
U-space U-space
EU concept and emerging framework for integration of UAS into all EU concept and emerging framework for integration of UAS into all
classes of airspace, specifically including high density urban classes of airspace, specifically including high density urban
areas, sharing airspace with manned aircraft. areas, sharing airspace with manned aircraft.
UA UA
Unmanned Aircraft. An aircraft which is intended to operate with Unmanned Aircraft. An aircraft which is intended to operate with
no pilot on board. In popular parlance, "drone". Plural form of no pilot on board. In popular parlance, "drone".
UA is UA.
UAS UAS
Unmanned Aircraft System. Composed of UA, all required on-board Unmanned Aircraft System. Composed of UA, all required on-board
subsystems, payload, control station, other required off-board subsystems, payload, control station, other required off-board
subsystems, any required launch and recovery equipment, all subsystems, any required launch and recovery equipment, all
required crew members, and C2 links between UA and control required crew members, and C2 links between UA and control
station. Plural form of UAS is UAS. station.
UAS ID UAS ID
UAS identifier. Although called "UAS ID", unique to the UA: UAS identifier. Although called "UAS ID", unique to the UA:
neither to the operator (as previous registration numbers have neither to the operator (as previous registration numbers have
been assigned), nor to the combination of GCS and UA that comprise been assigned), nor to the combination of GCS and UA that comprise
the UAS. Per [F3411-19], maximum length of 20 bytes. the UAS. Per [F3411-19]: maximum length of 20 bytes; see
Section 1.1, Paragraph 7 for currently defined values.
UAS ID Type UAS ID Type
Identifier type index. Per [F3411-19], 4 bits, values 0-3 already Identifier type index. Per [F3411-19], 4 bits, values 0-3 already
specified. specified.
UAS RID UAS RID
UAS Remote Identification. System for identifying UA during UAS Remote Identification. System for identifying UA during
flight by other parties. flight by other parties.
UAS RID Verification Service UAS RID Verification Service
System component designed to handle the authentication System component designed to handle the authentication
requirements of RID by offloading verification to a web hosted requirements of RID by offloading verification to a web hosted
service. service.
USS USS
UAS Service Supplier. "A USS is an entity that assists UAS UAS Service Supplier. "A USS is an entity that assists UAS
Operators with meeting UTM operational requirements that enable Operators with meeting UTM operational requirements that enable
safe and efficient use of airspace" and "... provide services to safe and efficient use of airspace" and "... provide services to
support the UAS community, to connect Operators and other entities support the UAS community, to connect Operators and other entities
to enable information flow across the USS Network,and to promote to enable information flow across the USS Network, and to promote
shared situational awareness among UTM participants." per shared situational awareness among UTM participants" per [CONOPS].
[CONOPS].
UTM UTM
UAS Traffic Management. Per ICAO, "A specific aspect of air UAS Traffic Management. Per ICAO, "A specific aspect of air
traffic management which manages UAS operations safely, traffic management which manages UAS operations safely,
economically and efficiently through the provision of facilities economically and efficiently through the provision of facilities
and a seamless set of services in collaboration with all parties and a seamless set of services in collaboration with all parties
and involving airborne and ground-based functions." In the US, and involving airborne and ground-based functions." In the US,
per FAA, a "traffic management" ecosystem for "uncontrolled" low per FAA, a "traffic management" ecosystem for "uncontrolled" low
altitude UAS operations, separate from, but complementary to, the altitude UAS operations, separate from, but complementary to, the
FAA's ATC system for "controlled" operations of manned aircraft. FAA's ATC system for "controlled" operations of manned aircraft.
skipping to change at page 13, line 41 skipping to change at page 15, line 40
information whenever the UA itself is offline. The UA may not have information whenever the UA itself is offline. The UA may not have
Internet connectivity of its own, but have instead some other form of Internet connectivity of its own, but have instead some other form of
communications to another node that can relay RID information to the communications to another node that can relay RID information to the
Internet; this would typically be the GCS (which to perform its Internet; this would typically be the GCS (which to perform its
function must know where the UA is). function must know where the UA is).
The UA may have no means of sourcing RID information, in which case The UA may have no means of sourcing RID information, in which case
the GCS must source it; this is typical under FAA NPRM Limited RID the GCS must source it; this is typical under FAA NPRM Limited RID
proposed rules, which require providing the location of the GCS (not proposed rules, which require providing the location of the GCS (not
that of the UA). In the extreme case, this could be the pilot using that of the UA). In the extreme case, this could be the pilot using
a web browser to designate, to an UAS Service Supplier (USS) or other a web browser/application to designate, to an UAS Service Supplier
UTM entity, a time-bounded airspace volume in which an operation will (USS) or other UTM entity, a time-bounded airspace volume in which an
be conducted; this may impede disambiguation of ID if multiple UAS operation will be conducted; this may impede disambiguation of ID if
operate in the same or overlapping spatio-temporal volumes. multiple UAS operate in the same or overlapping spatio-temporal
volumes.
In most cases in the near term, if the RID information is fed to the In most cases in the near term, if the RID information is fed to the
Internet directly by the UA or GCS, the first hop data links will be Internet directly by the UA or GCS, the first hop data links will be
cellular Long Term Evolution (LTE) or Wi-Fi, but provided the data cellular Long Term Evolution (LTE) or Wi-Fi, but provided the data
link can support at least UDP/IP and ideally also TCP/IP, its type is link can support at least UDP/IP and ideally also TCP/IP, its type is
generally immaterial to the higher layer protocols. An UAS as the generally immaterial to the higher layer protocols. An UAS as the
ultimate source of Network RID information feeds an USS acting as a ultimate source of Network RID information feeds an USS acting as a
Network RID Service Provider (Net-RID SP), which essentially proxies Network RID Service Provider (Net-RID SP), which essentially proxies
for that and other sources; an observer or other ultimate consumer of for that and other sources; an observer or other ultimate consumer of
Network RID information obtains it from a Network RID Display Network RID information obtains it from a Network RID Display
skipping to change at page 14, line 22 skipping to change at page 16, line 22
Network RID is the more flexible and less constrained of the defined Network RID is the more flexible and less constrained of the defined
UAS RID means, but is only partially specified in [F3411-19]. It is UAS RID means, but is only partially specified in [F3411-19]. It is
presumed that IETF efforts supporting Broadcast RID (see next presumed that IETF efforts supporting Broadcast RID (see next
section) can be easily generalized for Network RID. section) can be easily generalized for Network RID.
3.2. Broadcast RID 3.2. Broadcast RID
[F3411-19] specifies three Broadcast RID data links: Bluetooth 4.X; [F3411-19] specifies three Broadcast RID data links: Bluetooth 4.X;
Bluetooth 5.X Long Range; and Wi-Fi with Neighbor Awareness Bluetooth 5.X Long Range; and Wi-Fi with Neighbor Awareness
Networking (NAN). For compliance with this standard, an UA must Networking (NAN). For compliance with [F3411-19], an UA must
broadcast (using advertisement mechanisms where no other option broadcast (using advertisement mechanisms where no other option
supports broadcast) on at least one of these; if broadcasting on supports broadcast) on at least one of these; if broadcasting on
Bluetooth 5.x, it is also required concurrently to do so on 4.x Bluetooth 5.x, it is also required concurrently to do so on 4.x
(referred to in [F3411-19] as Bluetooth Legacy). (referred to in [F3411-19] as Bluetooth Legacy).
The selection of the Broadcast media was driven by research into what The selection of the Broadcast media was driven by research into what
is commonly available on 'ground' units (smartphones and tablets) and is commonly available on 'ground' units (smartphones and tablets) and
what was found as prevalent or 'affordable' in UA. Further, there what was found as prevalent or 'affordable' in UA. Further, there
must be an Application Programming Interface (API) for the observer's must be an Application Programming Interface (API) for the observer's
receiving application to have access to these messages. As yet only receiving application to have access to these messages. As yet only
skipping to change at page 15, line 10 skipping to change at page 17, line 10
immediately usable: immediately usable:
1. by making it trustworthy (despite the severe constraints of 1. by making it trustworthy (despite the severe constraints of
Broadcast RID); Broadcast RID);
2. by enabling verification that an UAS is registered, and if so, in 2. by enabling verification that an UAS is registered, and if so, in
which registry (for classification of trusted operators on the which registry (for classification of trusted operators on the
basis of known registry vetting, even by observers lacking basis of known registry vetting, even by observers lacking
Internet connectivity at observation time); Internet connectivity at observation time);
3. by facilitating independent reports of UA location to confirm or 3. by facilitating independent reports of UA's aeronautical data
refute the operator self-reports upon which UAS RID and UTM (location, velocity, etc.) to confirm or refute the operator
tracking are based; self-reports upon which UAS RID and UTM tracking are based;
4. by enabling instant establishment, by authorized parties, of 4. by enabling instant establishment, by authorized parties, of
secure communications with the remote pilot. secure communications with the remote pilot.
Any UA can assert any ID using the [F3411-19] required Basic ID Any UA can assert any ID using the [F3411-19] required Basic ID
message, which lacks any provisions for verification. The Position/ message, which lacks any provisions for verification. The Position/
Vector message likewise lacks provisions for verification, and does Vector message likewise lacks provisions for verification, and does
not contain the ID, so must be correlated somehow with a Basic ID not contain the ID, so must be correlated somehow with a Basic ID
message: the developers of [F3411-19] have suggested using the MAC message: the developers of [F3411-19] have suggested using the MAC
addresses, but these may be randomized by the operating system stack addresses, but these may be randomized by the operating system stack
skipping to change at page 16, line 33 skipping to change at page 18, line 33
have multiple IDs, potentially in different registries, but have multiple IDs, potentially in different registries, but
each ID must clearly indicate in which registry it can be each ID must clearly indicate in which registry it can be
found. found.
GEN-4 Readability: DRIP MUST enable information (regulation GEN-4 Readability: DRIP MUST enable information (regulation
required elements, whether sent via UAS RID or looked up in required elements, whether sent via UAS RID or looked up in
registries) to be read and utilized by both humans and registries) to be read and utilized by both humans and
software. software.
GEN-5 Gateway: DRIP MUST enable Broadcast RID -> Network RID GEN-5 Gateway: DRIP MUST enable Broadcast RID -> Network RID
gateways to stamp messages with precise date/time received application layer gateways to stamp messages with precise
and receiver location, then relay them to a network service date/time received and receiver location, then relay them to
(e.g. SDSP or distributed ledger), to support three a network service (e.g. SDSP or distributed ledger), to
objectives: mark up a RID message with where and when it was support three objectives: mark up a RID message with where
actually received (which may agree or disagree with the self- and when it was actually received (which may agree or
report in the set of messages); defend against reply attacks; disagree with the self-report in the set of messages); defend
and support optional SDSP services such as multilateration against reply attacks; and support optional SDSP services
(to complement UAS position self-reports with independent such as multilateration (to complement UAS position self-
measurements). reports with independent measurements).
GEN-6 Finger (placeholder name): DRIP MUST enable dynamically GEN-6 Finger (placeholder name): DRIP MUST enable dynamically
establishing, with AAA, per policy, E2E strongly encrypted establishing, with AAA, per policy, E2E strongly encrypted
communications with the UAS RID sender and entities looked up communications with the UAS RID sender and entities looked up
from the UAS ID, including at least the remote pilot and USS. from the UAS ID, including at least the remote pilot and USS.
GEN-7 QoS: DRIP MUST enable policy based specification of GEN-7 QoS: DRIP MUST enable policy based specification of
performance and reliability parameters, such as maximum performance and reliability parameters, such as maximum
message transmission intervals and delivery latencies. message transmission intervals and delivery latencies.
skipping to change at page 17, line 24 skipping to change at page 19, line 24
GEN-10 Multicast: DRIP SHOULD support multicast for efficient and GEN-10 Multicast: DRIP SHOULD support multicast for efficient and
flexible publish-subscribe notifications, e.g., of UAS flexible publish-subscribe notifications, e.g., of UAS
reporting positions in designated sensitive airspace volumes. reporting positions in designated sensitive airspace volumes.
GEN-11 Management: DRIP SHOULD support monitoring of the health and GEN-11 Management: DRIP SHOULD support monitoring of the health and
coverage of Broadcast and Network RID services. coverage of Broadcast and Network RID services.
4.2. Identifier 4.2. Identifier
ID-1 Length: The DRIP [UAS] entity [remote] identifier must be no ID-1 Length: The DRIP (UAS) entity [remote] identifier must be no
longer than 20 bytes (per [F3411-19] to fit in a Bluetooth 4 longer than 20 bytes (per [F3411-19] to fit in a Bluetooth 4
advertisement payload). advertisement payload).
ID-2 Registry ID: The DRIP identifier MUST be sufficient to identify ID-2 Registry ID: The DRIP identifier MUST be sufficient to identify
a registry in which the [UAS] entity identified therewith is a registry in which the (UAS) entity identified therewith is
listed. listed.
ID-3 Entity ID: The DRIP identifier MUST be sufficient to enable ID-3 Entity ID: The DRIP identifier MUST be sufficient to enable
lookup of other data associated with the [UAS] entity lookup of other data associated with the (UAS) entity
identified therewith in that registry. identified therewith in that registry.
ID-4 Uniqueness: The DRIP identifier MUST be unique within a to-be- ID-4 Uniqueness: The DRIP identifier MUST be unique within a to-be-
defined scope. defined scope.
ID-5 Non-spoofability: The DRIP identifier MUST be non-spoofable ID-5 Non-spoofability: The DRIP identifier MUST be non-spoofable
within the context of Remote ID broadcast messages (some within the context of Remote ID broadcast messages (some
collection of messages provides proof of UA ownership of ID). collection of messages provides proof of UA ownership of ID).
ID-6 Unlinkability: A DRIP UAS ID MUST NOT facilitate adversarial ID-6 Unlinkability: A DRIP UAS ID MUST NOT facilitate adversarial
correlation over multiple UAS operations; this may be correlation over multiple UAS operations; this may be
accomplished e.g. by limiting each identifier to a single use, accomplished e.g. by limiting each identifier to a single use,
but if so, the UAS ID MUST support well-defined scalable timely but if so, the UAS ID MUST support well-defined scalable timely
registration methods. registration methods.
Note that Registry ID and Entity ID are requirements on a single DRIP
entity Identifier, not separate (types of) ID. In the most common
use case, the Entity will be the UA, and the DRIP Identifier will be
the UAS ID; however, other entities may also benefit from having DRIP
identifiers, so the Entity type is not prescribed here.
Whether a UAS ID is generated by the operator, GCS, UA, USS or Whether a UAS ID is generated by the operator, GCS, UA, USS or
registry, or some collaboration thereamong, is unspecified; however, registry, or some collaboration thereamong, is unspecified; however,
there must be agreement on the UAS ID among these entities. there must be agreement on the UAS ID among these entities.
4.3. Privacy 4.3. Privacy
PRIV-1 Confidential Handling: DRIP MUST enable confidential handling PRIV-1 Confidential Handling: DRIP MUST enable confidential handling
of private information (i.e., any and all information of private information (i.e., any and all information
designated by neither cognizant authority nor the information designated by neither cognizant authority nor the information
owner as public, e.g., personal data). owner as public, e.g., personal data).
PRIV-2 Encrypted Transport: DRIP MUST enable selective strong PRIV-2 Encrypted Transport: DRIP MUST enable selective strong
encryption of private data in motion in such a manner that encryption of private data in motion in such a manner that
only authorized actors can recover it. If transport is via only authorized actors can recover it. If transport is via
IP, then encryption MUST be end-to-end, at or above the IP IP, then encryption MUST be end-to-end, at or above the IP
layer. layer. DRIP MUST NOT encrypt safety critical data to be
transmitted over Broadcast RID unless also concurrently
sending that data via Network RID and obtaining frequent
confirmations of receipt.
PRIV-3 Encrypted Storage: DRIP SHOULD enable selective strong PRIV-3 Encrypted Storage: DRIP SHOULD facilitate selective strong
encryption of private data at rest in such a manner that only encryption of private data at rest in such a manner that only
authorized actors can recover it. authorized actors can recover it.
As satisfying these requirements may require that authorized actors How information is stored on end systems is out of scope for DRIP.
have connectivity to third parties, e.g., Internet to a Remote ID Encouraging privacy best practices, including end system storage
USS, to enable decryption, and such connectivity cannot be assured, encryption, by facilitating it with protocol design reflecting such
DRIP SHOULD provide automatic fallback to plaintext transmission of considerations, is in scope.
safety-critical information when necessary.
4.4. Registries 4.4. Registries
REG-1 Public Lookup: DRIP MUST enable lookup, from the UAS ID, of REG-1 Public Lookup: DRIP MUST enable lookup, from the UAS ID, of
information designated by cognizant authority as public. information designated by cognizant authority as public, and
MUST NOT restrict access to this information based on identity
of the party submitting the query.
REG-2 Private Lookup: DRIP MUST enable lookup, with AAA, per policy, REG-2 Private Lookup: DRIP MUST enable lookup of private information
of private information (i.e., any and all information in a (i.e., any and all information in a registry, associated with
registry, associated with the UAS ID, that is designated by the UAS ID, that is designated by neither cognizant authority
neither cognizant authority nor the information owner as nor the information owner as public), and MUST, per policy,
public). enforce AAA, including restriction of access to this
information based on identity of the party submitting the
query.
REG-3 Provisioning: DRIP MUST enable provisioning registries with REG-3 Provisioning: DRIP MUST enable provisioning registries with
static information on the UAS and its operator, dynamic static information on the UAS and its operator, dynamic
information on its current operation within the UTM (including information on its current operation within the UTM (including
means by which the USS under which the UAS is operating may be means by which the USS under which the UAS is operating may be
contacted for further, typically even more dynamic, contacted for further, typically even more dynamic,
information), and Internet direct contact information for information), and Internet direct contact information for
services related to the foregoing. services related to the foregoing.
REG-4 AAA Policy: DRIP MUST enable closing the AAA-policy registry REG-4 AAA Policy: DRIP MUST enable closing the AAA-policy registry
skipping to change at page 20, line 34 skipping to change at page 23, line 8
This will bring the benefit of a global integrated system creating a This will bring the benefit of a global integrated system creating a
global airspace use awareness. global airspace use awareness.
6. IANA Considerations 6. IANA Considerations
This document does not make any IANA request. This document does not make any IANA request.
7. Security Considerations 7. Security Considerations
DRIP is all about safety and security, so content pertaining to such DRIP is all about safety and security, so content pertaining to such
is not limited to this section. DRIP information falls into two is not limited to this section. Potential vulnerabilities of DRIP
classes: that which, to achieve the purpose, must be published openly include but are not limited to:
in clear plaintext, for the benefit of any observer; and that which
must be protected (e.g., PII of pilots) but made available to
properly authorized parties (e.g., public safety personnel who
urgently need to contact pilots in emergencies). This classification
must be made explicit and reflected with markings, design, etc.
Classifying the information will be addressed primarily in external
standards; herein it will be regarded as a matter for CAA, registry
and operator policies, for which enforcement mechanisms will be
defined within the scope of DRIP WG and offered. Details of the
protection mechanisms will be provided in other DRIP documents.
Mitigation of adversarial correlation will also be addressed.
Acknowledgments * Sybil attacks
The work of the FAA's UAS Identification and Tracking (UAS ID) * Confusion created by many spoofed unsigned messages
Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) is the foundation of later ASTM
[F3411-19] and IETF DRIP WG efforts. The work of ASTM F38.02 in
balancing the interests of diverse stakeholders is essential to the
necessary rapid and widespread deployment of UAS RID.
References * Processing overload induced by attempting to verify many spoofed
signed messages (where verification will fail but still consume
cycles)
Normative References * Malicious or malfunctioning registries
* Interception of (e.g. Man In The Middle attacks on) registration
messages
8. Privacy and Transparency Considerations
Privacy is closely related to but not synonomous with security, and
conflicts with transparency. Privacy and transparency are important
for legal reasons including regulatory consistency. [EU2018]
[EU2018]states "harmonised and interoperable national registration
systems... should comply with the applicable Union and national law
on privacy and processing of personal data, and the information
stored in those registration systems should be easily accessible."
Privacy and transparency (where essential to security or safety) are
also ethical and moral imperatives. Even in cases where old
practices (e.g. automobile registration plates) could be imitated,
when new applications involving PII (such as UAS RID) are addressed
and newer technologies could enable improving privacy, such
opportunities should not be squandered. Thus is is recommended that
all DRIP documents give due regard to [RFC6973] and more broadly
[RFC8280].
DRIP information falls into two classes: that which, to achieve the
purpose, must be published openly as cleartext, for the benefit of
any Observer (e.g. the basic UAS ID itself); and that which must be
protected (e.g., PII of pilots) but made available to properly
authorized parties (e.g., public safety personnel who urgently need
to contact pilots in emergencies). This classification must be made
explicit and reflected with markings, design, etc. Classifying the
information will be addressed primarily in external standards; herein
it will be regarded as a matter for CAA, registry and operator
policies, for which enforcement mechanisms will be defined within the
scope of DRIP WG and offered. Details of the protection mechanisms
will be provided in other DRIP documents. Mitigation of adversarial
correlation will also be addressed.
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
Informative References 9.2. Informative References
[CONOPS] FAA Office of NextGen, "UTM Concept of Operations v2.0", [CONOPS] FAA Office of NextGen, "UTM Concept of Operations v2.0",
March 2020. March 2020.
[cpdlc] Gurtov, A., Polishchuk, T., and M. Wernberg, "Controller- [cpdlc] Gurtov, A., Polishchuk, T., and M. Wernberg, "Controller-
Pilot Data Link Communication Security", MDPI Pilot Data Link Communication Security", MDPI
Sensors 18(5), 1636, 2018, Sensors 18(5), 1636, 2018,
<https://www.mdpi.com/1424-8220/18/5/1636>. <https://www.mdpi.com/1424-8220/18/5/1636>.
[crowd-sourced-rid]
Moskowitz, R., Card, S., Wiethuechter, A., Zhao, S., and
H. Birkholz, "Crowd Sourced Remote ID", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-moskowitz-drip-crowd-sourced-rid-04,
20 May 2020, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-moskowitz-
drip-crowd-sourced-rid-04>.
[CTA2063A] ANSI, "Small Unmanned Aerial Systems Serial Numbers", [CTA2063A] ANSI, "Small Unmanned Aerial Systems Serial Numbers",
September 2019. September 2019.
[Delegated] [Delegated]
European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), "Commission European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), "Commission
Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/945 of 12 March 2019 on Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/945 of 12 March 2019 on
unmanned aircraft systems and on third-country operators unmanned aircraft systems and on third-country operators
of unmanned aircraft systems", March 2019. of unmanned aircraft systems", March 2019.
[drip-architecture]
Card, S., Wiethuechter, A., Moskowitz, R., Zhao, S., and
A. Gurtov, "Drone Remote Identification Protocol (DRIP)
Architecture", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-drip-arch-02, 23 June 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-drip-arch-02>.
[drip-auth]
Wiethuechter, A., Card, S., and R. Moskowitz, "DRIP
Authentication Formats", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-wiethuechter-drip-auth-01, 10 July 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-wiethuechter-drip-auth-
01>.
[drip-identity-claims]
Wiethuechter, A., Card, S., and R. Moskowitz, "DRIP
Identity Claims", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
wiethuechter-drip-identity-claims-00, 23 March 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-wiethuechter-drip-
identity-claims-00>.
[drip-secure-nrid-c2]
Moskowitz, R., Card, S., Wiethuechter, A., and A. Gurtov,
"Secure UAS Network RID and C2 Transport", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-moskowitz-drip-secure-
nrid-c2-00, 6 April 2020, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/
draft-moskowitz-drip-secure-nrid-c2-00>.
[drip-uas-rid]
Moskowitz, R., Card, S., Wiethuechter, A., and A. Gurtov,
"UAS Remote ID", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
moskowitz-drip-uas-rid-02, 28 May 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-moskowitz-drip-uas-rid-
02>.
[EU2018] European Parliament and Council, "2015/0277 (COD) PE-CONS
2/18", February 2018.
[F3411-19] ASTM, "Standard Specification for Remote ID and Tracking", [F3411-19] ASTM, "Standard Specification for Remote ID and Tracking",
December 2019. December 2019.
[I-D.ietf-drip-arch] [hhit-registries]
Card, S., Wiethuechter, A., Moskowitz, R., and S. Zhao, Moskowitz, R., Card, S., and A. Wiethuechter,
"Drone Remote Identification Protocol (DRIP) "Hierarchical HIT Registries", Work in Progress, Internet-
Architecture", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft- Draft, draft-moskowitz-hip-hhit-registries-02, 9 March
ietf-drip-arch-00, 18 May 2020, 2020, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-moskowitz-hip-
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-drip-arch-00>. hhit-registries-02>.
[hierarchical-hit]
Moskowitz, R., Card, S., and A. Wiethuechter,
"Hierarchical HITs for HIPv2", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-moskowitz-hip-hierarchical-hit-05, 13 May
2020, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-moskowitz-hip-
hierarchical-hit-05>.
[I-D.maeurer-raw-ldacs] [I-D.maeurer-raw-ldacs]
Maeurer, N., Graeupl, T., and C. Schmitt, "L-band Digital Maeurer, N., Graeupl, T., and C. Schmitt, "L-band Digital
Aeronautical Communications System (LDACS)", Work in Aeronautical Communications System (LDACS)", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-maeurer-raw-ldacs-02, 1 Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-maeurer-raw-ldacs-04, 2
April 2020, July 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-maeurer-raw-ldacs-02>. <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-maeurer-raw-ldacs-04>.
[ICAOATM] International Civil Aviation Organization, "Doc 4444:
Procedures for Air Navigation Services: Air Traffic
Management", November 2016.
[ICAOUTM] International Civil Aviation Organization, "Unmanned
Aircraft Systems Traffic Management (UTM) - A Common
Framework with Core Principles for Global Harmonization,
Edition 2", November 2019.
[Implementing] [Implementing]
European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), "Commission European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), "Commission
Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947 of 24 May 2019 on Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947 of 24 May 2019 on
the rules and procedures for the operation of unmanned the rules and procedures for the operation of unmanned
aircraft", May 2019. aircraft", May 2019.
[new-hip-crypto]
Moskowitz, R., Card, S., and A. Wiethuechter, "New
Cryptographic Algorithms for HIP", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-moskowitz-hip-new-crypto-04, 23
January 2020, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-
moskowitz-hip-new-crypto-04>.
[new-orchid]
Moskowitz, R., Card, S., and A. Wiethuechter, "Using
cSHAKE in ORCHIDs", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-moskowitz-orchid-cshake-01, 21 May 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-moskowitz-orchid-
cshake-01>.
[NPRM] United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), [NPRM] United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),
"Notice of Proposed Rule Making on Remote Identification "Notice of Proposed Rule Making on Remote Identification
of Unmanned Aircraft Systems", December 2019. of Unmanned Aircraft Systems", December 2019.
[Recommendations] [Recommendations]
FAA UAS Identification and Tracking Aviation Rulemaking FAA UAS Identification and Tracking Aviation Rulemaking
Committee, "UAS ID and Tracking ARC Recommendations Final Committee, "UAS ID and Tracking ARC Recommendations Final
Report", September 2017. Report", September 2017.
[RFC4122] Leach, P., Mealling, M., and R. Salz, "A Universally [RFC4122] Leach, P., Mealling, M., and R. Salz, "A Universally
Unique IDentifier (UUID) URN Namespace", RFC 4122, Unique IDentifier (UUID) URN Namespace", RFC 4122,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4122, July 2005, DOI 10.17487/RFC4122, July 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4122>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4122>.
[RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2",
FYI 36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4949>.
[RFC6973] Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J.,
Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, "Privacy
Considerations for Internet Protocols", RFC 6973,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6973, July 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6973>.
[RFC8280] ten Oever, N. and C. Cath, "Research into Human Rights
Protocol Considerations", RFC 8280, DOI 10.17487/RFC8280,
October 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8280>.
[Roadmap] American National Standards Institute (ANSI) Unmanned [Roadmap] American National Standards Institute (ANSI) Unmanned
Aircraft Systems Standardization Collaborative (UASSC), Aircraft Systems Standardization Collaborative (UASSC),
"Standardization Roadmap for Unmanned Aircraft Systems "Standardization Roadmap for Unmanned Aircraft Systems
draft v2.0", April 2020. draft v2.0", April 2020.
[Stranger] Heinlein, R.A., "Stranger in a Strange Land", June 1961. [Stranger] Heinlein, R.A., "Stranger in a Strange Land", June 1961.
[WG105] European Parliament and Council, "EUROCAE WG-105 draft
Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for
Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Electronic
Identification"", June 2020.
Acknowledgments Acknowledgments
The work of the FAA's UAS Identification and Tracking (UAS ID) The work of the FAA's UAS Identification and Tracking (UAS ID)
Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) is the foundation of later ASTM Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) is the foundation of later ASTM
[F3411-19] and IETF DRIP efforts. The work of ASTM F38.02 in [F3411-19] and IETF DRIP efforts. The work of ASTM F38.02 in
balancing the interests of diverse stakeholders is essential to the balancing the interests of diverse stakeholders is essential to the
necessary rapid and widespread deployment of UAS RID. IETF necessary rapid and widespread deployment of UAS RID. IETF
volunteers who have contributed to this draft include Amelia volunteers who have contributed to this draft include Amelia
Andersdotter, Mohamed Boucadair, Toerless Eckert, Susan Hares, Mika Andersdotter, Mohamed Boucadair, Toerless Eckert, Susan Hares, Mika
J&#228;rvenp&#228;&#228;, Daniel Migault, Saulo Da Silva and Shuai J&#228;rvenp&#228;&#228;, Daniel Migault, Saulo Da Silva and Shuai
skipping to change at page 23, line 31 skipping to change at page 28, line 31
Email: adam.wiethuechter@axenterprize.com Email: adam.wiethuechter@axenterprize.com
Robert Moskowitz Robert Moskowitz
HTT Consulting HTT Consulting
Oak Park, MI 48237 Oak Park, MI 48237
United States of America United States of America
Email: rgm@labs.htt-consult.com Email: rgm@labs.htt-consult.com
Andrei Gurtov Andrei Gurtov
Link&#246;ping University Linköping University
IDA IDA
SE-58183 Link&#246;ping SE-58183 Linköping
Sweden Sweden
Email: gurtov@acm.org Email: gurtov@acm.org
 End of changes. 80 change blocks. 
177 lines changed or deleted 393 lines changed or added

This html diff was produced by rfcdiff 1.47. The latest version is available from http://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcdiff/