draft-ietf-drip-reqs-02.txt   draft-ietf-drip-reqs-03.txt 
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DRIP S. Card, Ed. DRIP S. Card, Ed.
Internet-Draft A. Wiethuechter Internet-Draft A. Wiethuechter
Intended status: Informational AX Enterprize Intended status: Informational AX Enterprize
Expires: 14 January 2021 R. Moskowitz Expires: 14 January 2021 R. Moskowitz
HTT Consulting HTT Consulting
A. Gurtov A. Gurtov
Linköping University Linköping University
13 July 2020 13 July 2020
Drone Remote Identification Protocol (DRIP) Requirements Drone Remote Identification Protocol (DRIP) Requirements
draft-ietf-drip-reqs-02 draft-ietf-drip-reqs-03
Abstract Abstract
This document defines the requirements for Drone Remote This document defines the requirements for Drone Remote
Identification Protocol (DRIP) Working Group protocols to support Identification Protocol (DRIP) Working Group protocols to support
Unmanned Aircraft System Remote Identification and tracking (UAS RID) Unmanned Aircraft System Remote Identification and tracking (UAS RID)
for security, safety and other purposes. Complementing external for security, safety and other purposes. Complementing external
technical standards as regulator-accepted means of compliance with technical standards as regulator-accepted means of compliance with
UAS RID regulations, DRIP will: UAS RID regulations, DRIP will:
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provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction (Informative) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction (Informative) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Overall Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Overall Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Intended Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.2. Intended Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3. DRIP Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 1.3. DRIP Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2. Terms and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2. Terms and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1. Requirements Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.1. Requirements Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3. UAS RID Problem Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 3. UAS RID Problem Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.1. Network RID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 3.1. Network RID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.2. Broadcast RID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 3.2. Broadcast RID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.3. DRIP Focus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 3.3. DRIP Focus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 4. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.1. General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 4.1. General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.2. Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 4.2. Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.3. Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 4.3. Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.4. Registries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 4.4. Registries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5. Discussion and Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 5. Discussion and Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
8. Privacy and Transparency Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . 23 8. Privacy and Transparency Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . 24
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1. Introduction (Informative) 1. Introduction (Informative)
1.1. Overall Context 1.1. Overall Context
Many considerations (especially safety and security) dictate that UAS Many considerations (especially safety and security) dictate that UAS
be remotely identifiable. Any Observer with responsibilities be remotely identifiable. Any Observer with responsibilities
involving aircraft inherently must classify Unmanned Aircraft (UA) involving aircraft inherently must classify Unmanned Aircraft (UA)
situationally according to basic considerations, as illustrated situationally according to basic considerations, as illustrated
notionally in Figure 1 below. An Observer who classifies an UAS: as notionally in Figure 1 below. An Observer who classifies an UAS: as
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+--------------+ +--------------+ +--------------+ +--------------+ +--------------+ +--------------+
Figure 1: "Notional UAS Classification"> Figure 1: "Notional UAS Classification">
Civil Aviation Authorities (CAAs) worldwide are mandating Unmanned Civil Aviation Authorities (CAAs) worldwide are mandating Unmanned
Aircraft System Remote Identification and tracking (UAS RID). The Aircraft System Remote Identification and tracking (UAS RID). The
European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) has published European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) has published
[Delegated] and [Implementing] Regulations. The United States (US) [Delegated] and [Implementing] Regulations. The United States (US)
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has published a Notice of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has published a Notice of
Proposed Rule Making [NPRM] and has described the key role that UAS Proposed Rule Making [NPRM] and has described the key role that UAS
RID plays in UAS Traffic Management (UTM [CONOPS] especially RID plays in UAS Traffic Management (UTM [FAACONOPS] especially
Section 2.6). CAAs currently (2020) promulgate performance-based Section 2.6). CAAs currently (2020) promulgate performance-based
regulations that do not specify techniques, but rather cite industry regulations that do not specify techniques, but rather cite industry
consensus technical standards as acceptable means of compliance. consensus technical standards as acceptable means of compliance.
ASTM International, Technical Committee F38 (UAS), Subcommittee ASTM International, Technical Committee F38 (UAS), Subcommittee
F38.02 (Aircraft Operations), Work Item WK65041, developed ASTM F38.02 (Aircraft Operations), Work Item WK65041, developed ASTM
F3411-19 [F3411-19] Standard Specification for Remote ID and F3411-19 [F3411-19] Standard Specification for Remote ID and
Tracking. It defines two means of UAS RID: Tracking. It defines two means of UAS RID:
Network RID defines a set of information for UAS to make available Network RID defines a set of information for UAS to make available
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Broadcast RID defines a set of messages for Unmanned Aircraft (UA) Broadcast RID defines a set of messages for Unmanned Aircraft (UA)
to transmit locally directly one-way over Bluetooth or Wi-Fi, to to transmit locally directly one-way over Bluetooth or Wi-Fi, to
be received in real time by local Observers. be received in real time by local Observers.
The same information must be provided via both means. The The same information must be provided via both means. The
presentation may differ, as Network RID defines a data dictionary, presentation may differ, as Network RID defines a data dictionary,
whereas Broadcast RID defines message formats (which carry items from whereas Broadcast RID defines message formats (which carry items from
that same data dictionary). The frequency with which it is sent may that same data dictionary). The frequency with which it is sent may
differ, as Network RID can accomodate Observer queries asynchronous differ, as Network RID can accomodate Observer queries asynchronous
to UAS updates (which generally need be send only when information, to UAS updates (which generally need be sent only when information,
such as position, changes), whereas Broadcast RID depends upon such as GCS location, changes), whereas Broadcast RID depends upon
Observers receiving UA messages at the time they are transmitted. Observers receiving UA messages at the time they are transmitted.
Network RID depends upon Internet connectivity in several segments Network RID depends upon Internet connectivity in several segments
from the UAS to each Observer. Broadcast RID should need Internet from the UAS to each Observer. Broadcast RID should need Internet
(or other Wide Area Network) connectivity only for UAS registry (or other Wide Area Network) connectivity only for UAS registry
information lookup using the directly locally received UAS Identifier information lookup using the directly locally received UAS Identifier
(UAS ID) as a key. (UAS ID) as a key. Broadcast RID does not assume IP connectivity of
UAS; messages are encapsulated by the UA without IP, directly in
Bluetooth or WiFi link layer frames.
[F3411-19] specifies three UAS ID types: [F3411-19] specifies three UAS ID types:
TYPE-1 A static, manufacturer assigned, hardware serial number per TYPE-1 A static, manufacturer assigned, hardware serial number per
ANSI/CTA-2063-A "Small Unmanned Aerial System Serial Numbers" ANSI/CTA-2063-A "Small Unmanned Aerial System Serial Numbers"
[CTA2063A]. [CTA2063A].
TYPE-2 A CAA assigned (presumably static) ID. TYPE-2 A CAA assigned (presumably static) ID.
TYPE-3 A UTM system assigned UUID [RFC4122], which can but need not TYPE-3 A UTM system assigned UUID [RFC4122], which can but need not
be dynamic. be dynamic.
The EU allows only Type 1; the US allows Types 1 and 3, but requires The EU allows only Type 1; the US allows Types 1 and 3, but requires
Type 3 IDs (if used) each to be used only once (for a single UAS Type 3 IDs (if used) each to be used only once (for a single UAS
flight, which in the context of UTM is called an "operation"). flight, which in the context of UTM is called an "operation"). The
EU also requires an operator registration number (an additional
identifier distinct from the UAS ID) that can be carried in an
[F3411-19] optional Operator ID message.
[F3411-19] Broadcast RID transmits all information as cleartext [F3411-19] Broadcast RID transmits all information as cleartext
(ASCII or binary), so static IDs enable trivial correlation of (ASCII or binary), so static IDs enable trivial correlation of
patterns of use, unacceptable in many applications, e.g., package patterns of use, unacceptable in many applications, e.g., package
delivery routes of competitors. delivery routes of competitors.
[WG105] addreses a "different scope than Direct Remote [WG105] addreses a "different scope than Direct Remote
Identification... latter being primarily meant for security Identification... latter being primarily meant for security
purposes... rather than for safety purposes (e.g. hazards purposes... rather than for safety purposes (e.g. hazards
deconfliction..." Aviation community standards set a higher bar for deconfliction..." Aviation community standards set a higher bar for
safety than for security. It "leaves the opportunity for those safety than for security. It "leaves the opportunity for those
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in severely constrained UAS environments, balancing legitimate (e.g., in severely constrained UAS environments, balancing legitimate (e.g.,
public safety) authorities' Need To Know trustworthy information with public safety) authorities' Need To Know trustworthy information with
UAS operators' privacy. By "immediately actionable" is meant UAS operators' privacy. By "immediately actionable" is meant
information of sufficient precision, accuracy, timeliness, etc. for information of sufficient precision, accuracy, timeliness, etc. for
an Observer to use it as the basis for immediate decisive action, an Observer to use it as the basis for immediate decisive action,
whether that be to trigger a defensive counter-UAS system, to attempt whether that be to trigger a defensive counter-UAS system, to attempt
to initiate communications with the UAS operator, to accept the to initiate communications with the UAS operator, to accept the
presence of the UAS in the airspace where/when observed as not presence of the UAS in the airspace where/when observed as not
requiring further action, or whatever, with potentially severe requiring further action, or whatever, with potentially severe
consequences of any action or inaction chosen based on that consequences of any action or inaction chosen based on that
information. Potential follow-on goals may extend beyond providing information. For further explanation of the concept of immediate
timely and trustworthy identification data, to using it to enable actionability, see [ENISACSIRT]. Potential follow-on goals may
identity-oriented networking of UAS. extend beyond providing timely and trustworthy identification data,
to using it to enable identity-oriented networking of UAS.
DRIP (originally Trustworthy Multipurpose Remote Identification, TM- DRIP (originally Trustworthy Multipurpose Remote Identification, TM-
RID) potentially could be applied to verifiably identify other types RID) potentially could be applied to verifiably identify other types
of registered things reported to be in specified physical locations, of registered things reported to be in specified physical locations,
but the urgent motivation and clear initial focus is UAS. Existing but the urgent motivation and clear initial focus is UAS. Existing
Internet resources (protocol standards, services, infrastructure, and Internet resources (protocol standards, services, infrastructure, and
business models) should be leveraged. A natural Internet based business models) should be leveraged. A natural Internet based
architecture for UAS RID conforming to proposed regulations and architecture for UAS RID conforming to proposed regulations and
external technical standards is described in a companion architecture external technical standards is described in a companion architecture
document [drip-architecture] and elaborated in other DRIP documents; document [drip-architecture] and elaborated in other DRIP documents;
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functions." [ICAOATM] functions." [ICAOATM]
Authentication Message Authentication Message
F3411 Message Type 2. Provides framing for authentication data, F3411 Message Type 2. Provides framing for authentication data,
only. only.
Basic ID Message Basic ID Message
F3411 Message Type 0. Provides UA Type, UAS ID Type and UAS ID, F3411 Message Type 0. Provides UA Type, UAS ID Type and UAS ID,
only. only.
BLOS B-LOS
Beyond Line Of Sight (LOS). Term to be avoided due to ambiguity. Beyond Line Of Sight (LOS). Term to be avoided due to ambiguity.
See LOS. See LOS.
BVLOS BV-LOS
Beyond Visual Line Of Sight (V-LOS). See V-LOS. Beyond Visual Line Of Sight (V-LOS). See V-LOS.
CAA CAA
Civil Aviation Authority. Two examples are the United States Civil Aviation Authority. Two examples are the United States
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the European Union Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the European Union
Aviation Safety Agency (EASA). Aviation Safety Agency (EASA).
C2 C2
Command and Control. A set of organizational and technical Command and Control. A set of organizational and technical
attributes and processes that employs human, physical, and attributes and processes that employs human, physical, and
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EU regulatory requirement for Network RID. Requirement could be EU regulatory requirement for Network RID. Requirement could be
met with ASTM Network RID: Basic ID message with UAS ID Type 1; met with ASTM Network RID: Basic ID message with UAS ID Type 1;
Location/Vector message; Operator ID message; System Message. Location/Vector message; Operator ID message; System Message.
Corresponds roughly to the Network RID portion of FAA NPRM Corresponds roughly to the Network RID portion of FAA NPRM
Standard RID. Standard RID.
Observer Observer
An entity (typically but not necessarily an individual human) who An entity (typically but not necessarily an individual human) who
has directly or indirectly observed an UA and wishes to know has directly or indirectly observed an UA and wishes to know
something about it, starting with its ID. An observer typically something about it, starting with its ID. An observer typically
is on the ground and local (within VLOS of an observed UA), but is on the ground and local (within V-LOS of an observed UA), but
could be remote (observing via Network RID or other surveillance), could be remote (observing via Network RID or other surveillance),
operating another UA, aboard another aircraft , etc. operating another UA, aboard another aircraft , etc.
Operation Operation
A flight, or series of flights of the same mission, by the same A flight, or series of flights of the same mission, by the same
UAS, in the same airspace volume, separated by at most brief UAS, in the same airspace volume, separated by at most brief
ground intervals. ground intervals.
Operator Operator
"A person, organization or enterprise engaged in or offering to "A person, organization or enterprise engaged in or offering to
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System component designed to handle the authentication System component designed to handle the authentication
requirements of RID by offloading verification to a web hosted requirements of RID by offloading verification to a web hosted
service. service.
USS USS
UAS Service Supplier. "A USS is an entity that assists UAS UAS Service Supplier. "A USS is an entity that assists UAS
Operators with meeting UTM operational requirements that enable Operators with meeting UTM operational requirements that enable
safe and efficient use of airspace" and "... provide services to safe and efficient use of airspace" and "... provide services to
support the UAS community, to connect Operators and other entities support the UAS community, to connect Operators and other entities
to enable information flow across the USS Network, and to promote to enable information flow across the USS Network, and to promote
shared situational awareness among UTM participants" per [CONOPS]. shared situational awareness among UTM participants" per
[FAACONOPS].
UTM UTM
UAS Traffic Management. Per ICAO, "A specific aspect of air UAS Traffic Management. Per ICAO, "A specific aspect of air
traffic management which manages UAS operations safely, traffic management which manages UAS operations safely,
economically and efficiently through the provision of facilities economically and efficiently through the provision of facilities
and a seamless set of services in collaboration with all parties and a seamless set of services in collaboration with all parties
and involving airborne and ground-based functions." In the US, and involving airborne and ground-based functions." In the US,
per FAA, a "traffic management" ecosystem for "uncontrolled" low per FAA, a "traffic management" ecosystem for "uncontrolled" low
altitude UAS operations, separate from, but complementary to, the altitude UAS operations, separate from, but complementary to, the
FAA's ATC system for "controlled" operations of manned aircraft. FAA's ATC system for "controlled" operations of manned aircraft.
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"remote" pilot who can clearly directly (without video cameras or "remote" pilot who can clearly directly (without video cameras or
any other aids other than glasses or under some rules binoculars) any other aids other than glasses or under some rules binoculars)
see the UA and its immediate flight environment. Potentially see the UA and its immediate flight environment. Potentially
subject to blockage by foliage, structures, terrain or other subject to blockage by foliage, structures, terrain or other
vehicles, more so than RF-LOS. vehicles, more so than RF-LOS.
3. UAS RID Problem Space 3. UAS RID Problem Space
UA may be fixed wing Short Take-Off and Landing (STOL), rotary wing UA may be fixed wing Short Take-Off and Landing (STOL), rotary wing
(e.g., helicopter) Vertical Take-Off and Landing (VTOL), or hybrid. (e.g., helicopter) Vertical Take-Off and Landing (VTOL), or hybrid.
They may be single engine or multi engine. The most common today are They may be single- or multi-engine. The most common today are
multicopters: rotary wing, multi engine. The explosion in UAS was multicopters: rotary wing, multi engine. The explosion in UAS was
enabled by hobbyist development, for multicopters, of advanced flight enabled by hobbyist development, for multicopters, of advanced flight
stability algorithms, enabling even inexperienced pilots to take off, stability algorithms, enabling even inexperienced pilots to take off,
fly to a location of interest, hover, and return to the take-off fly to a location of interest, hover, and return to the take-off
location or land at a distance. UAS can be remotely piloted by a location or land at a distance. UAS can be remotely piloted by a
human (e.g., with a joystick) or programmed to proceed from Global human (e.g., with a joystick) or programmed to proceed from Global
Positioning System (GPS) waypoint to waypoint in a weak form of Positioning System (GPS) waypoint to waypoint in a weak form of
autonomy; stronger autonomy is coming. UA are "low observable": they autonomy; stronger autonomy is coming. UA are "low observable": they
typically have a small radar cross section; they make noise quite typically have a small radar cross section; they make noise quite
noticeable at short range but difficult to detect at distances they noticeable at short range but difficult to detect at distances they
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3.1. Network RID 3.1. Network RID
Network RID has several variants. The UA may have persistent onboard Network RID has several variants. The UA may have persistent onboard
Internet connectivity, in which case it can consistently source RID Internet connectivity, in which case it can consistently source RID
information directly over the Internet. The UA may have intermittent information directly over the Internet. The UA may have intermittent
onboard Internet connectivity, in which case the GCS must source RID onboard Internet connectivity, in which case the GCS must source RID
information whenever the UA itself is offline. The UA may not have information whenever the UA itself is offline. The UA may not have
Internet connectivity of its own, but have instead some other form of Internet connectivity of its own, but have instead some other form of
communications to another node that can relay RID information to the communications to another node that can relay RID information to the
Internet; this would typically be the GCS (which to perform its Internet; this would typically be the GCS (which to perform its
function must know where the UA is). function must know where the UA is, although C2 link outages do
occur).
The UA may have no means of sourcing RID information, in which case The UA may have no means of sourcing RID information, in which case
the GCS must source it; this is typical under FAA NPRM Limited RID the GCS must source it; this is typical under FAA NPRM Limited RID
proposed rules, which require providing the location of the GCS (not proposed rules, which require providing the location of the GCS (not
that of the UA). In the extreme case, this could be the pilot using that of the UA). In the extreme case, this could be the pilot using
a web browser/application to designate, to an UAS Service Supplier a web browser/application to designate, to an UAS Service Supplier
(USS) or other UTM entity, a time-bounded airspace volume in which an (USS) or other UTM entity, a time-bounded airspace volume in which an
operation will be conducted; this may impede disambiguation of ID if operation will be conducted; this may impede disambiguation of ID if
multiple UAS operate in the same or overlapping spatio-temporal multiple UAS operate in the same or overlapping spatio-temporal
volumes. volumes.
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Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
9.2. Informative References 9.2. Informative References
[CONOPS] FAA Office of NextGen, "UTM Concept of Operations v2.0",
March 2020.
[cpdlc] Gurtov, A., Polishchuk, T., and M. Wernberg, "Controller- [cpdlc] Gurtov, A., Polishchuk, T., and M. Wernberg, "Controller-
Pilot Data Link Communication Security", MDPI Pilot Data Link Communication Security", MDPI
Sensors 18(5), 1636, 2018, Sensors 18(5), 1636, 2018,
<https://www.mdpi.com/1424-8220/18/5/1636>. <https://www.mdpi.com/1424-8220/18/5/1636>.
[crowd-sourced-rid] [crowd-sourced-rid]
Moskowitz, R., Card, S., Wiethuechter, A., Zhao, S., and Moskowitz, R., Card, S., Wiethuechter, A., Zhao, S., and
H. Birkholz, "Crowd Sourced Remote ID", Work in Progress, H. Birkholz, "Crowd Sourced Remote ID", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-moskowitz-drip-crowd-sourced-rid-04, Internet-Draft, draft-moskowitz-drip-crowd-sourced-rid-04,
20 May 2020, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-moskowitz- 20 May 2020, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-moskowitz-
skipping to change at page 25, line 40 skipping to change at page 26, line 12
nrid-c2-00, 6 April 2020, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/ nrid-c2-00, 6 April 2020, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/
draft-moskowitz-drip-secure-nrid-c2-00>. draft-moskowitz-drip-secure-nrid-c2-00>.
[drip-uas-rid] [drip-uas-rid]
Moskowitz, R., Card, S., Wiethuechter, A., and A. Gurtov, Moskowitz, R., Card, S., Wiethuechter, A., and A. Gurtov,
"UAS Remote ID", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft- "UAS Remote ID", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
moskowitz-drip-uas-rid-02, 28 May 2020, moskowitz-drip-uas-rid-02, 28 May 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-moskowitz-drip-uas-rid- <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-moskowitz-drip-uas-rid-
02>. 02>.
[ENISACSIRT]
European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA),
"Actionable information for Security Incident Response",
November 2014, <https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/csirt-
cert-services/reactive-services/copy_of_actionable-
information>.
[EU2018] European Parliament and Council, "2015/0277 (COD) PE-CONS [EU2018] European Parliament and Council, "2015/0277 (COD) PE-CONS
2/18", February 2018. 2/18", February 2018.
[F3411-19] ASTM, "Standard Specification for Remote ID and Tracking", [F3411-19] ASTM International, "Standard Specification for Remote ID
December 2019. and Tracking", February 2020,
<http://www.astm.org/cgi-bin/resolver.cgi?F3411>.
[FAACONOPS]
FAA Office of NextGen, "UTM Concept of Operations v2.0",
March 2020.
[hhit-registries] [hhit-registries]
Moskowitz, R., Card, S., and A. Wiethuechter, Moskowitz, R., Card, S., and A. Wiethuechter,
"Hierarchical HIT Registries", Work in Progress, Internet- "Hierarchical HIT Registries", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-moskowitz-hip-hhit-registries-02, 9 March Draft, draft-moskowitz-hip-hhit-registries-02, 9 March
2020, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-moskowitz-hip- 2020, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-moskowitz-hip-
hhit-registries-02>. hhit-registries-02>.
[hierarchical-hit] [hierarchical-hit]
Moskowitz, R., Card, S., and A. Wiethuechter, Moskowitz, R., Card, S., and A. Wiethuechter,
skipping to change at page 27, line 32 skipping to change at page 28, line 18
DOI 10.17487/RFC6973, July 2013, DOI 10.17487/RFC6973, July 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6973>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6973>.
[RFC8280] ten Oever, N. and C. Cath, "Research into Human Rights [RFC8280] ten Oever, N. and C. Cath, "Research into Human Rights
Protocol Considerations", RFC 8280, DOI 10.17487/RFC8280, Protocol Considerations", RFC 8280, DOI 10.17487/RFC8280,
October 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8280>. October 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8280>.
[Roadmap] American National Standards Institute (ANSI) Unmanned [Roadmap] American National Standards Institute (ANSI) Unmanned
Aircraft Systems Standardization Collaborative (UASSC), Aircraft Systems Standardization Collaborative (UASSC),
"Standardization Roadmap for Unmanned Aircraft Systems "Standardization Roadmap for Unmanned Aircraft Systems
draft v2.0", April 2020. draft v2.0", April 2020, <https://share.ansi.org/Shared
Documents/Standards Activities/UASSC/
UASSC_20-001_WORKING_DRAFT_ANSI_UASSC_Roadmap_v2.pdf>.
[Stranger] Heinlein, R.A., "Stranger in a Strange Land", June 1961. [Stranger] Heinlein, R.A., "Stranger in a Strange Land", June 1961.
[WG105] European Parliament and Council, "EUROCAE WG-105 draft [WG105] European Parliament and Council, "EUROCAE WG-105 draft
Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for
Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Electronic Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Electronic
Identification"", June 2020. Identification"", June 2020.
Acknowledgments Acknowledgments
 End of changes. 21 change blocks. 
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