draft-ietf-drip-reqs-03.txt   draft-ietf-drip-reqs-04.txt 
DRIP S. Card, Ed. DRIP S. Card, Ed.
Internet-Draft A. Wiethuechter Internet-Draft A. Wiethuechter
Intended status: Informational AX Enterprize Intended status: Informational AX Enterprize
Expires: 14 January 2021 R. Moskowitz Expires: 26 February 2021 R. Moskowitz
HTT Consulting HTT Consulting
A. Gurtov A. Gurtov
Linköping University Linköping University
13 July 2020 25 August 2020
Drone Remote Identification Protocol (DRIP) Requirements Drone Remote Identification Protocol (DRIP) Requirements
draft-ietf-drip-reqs-03 draft-ietf-drip-reqs-04
Abstract Abstract
This document defines the requirements for Drone Remote This document defines the requirements for Drone Remote
Identification Protocol (DRIP) Working Group protocols to support Identification Protocol (DRIP) Working Group protocols to support
Unmanned Aircraft System Remote Identification and tracking (UAS RID) Unmanned Aircraft System Remote Identification and tracking (UAS RID)
for security, safety and other purposes. Complementing external for security, safety and other purposes. Complementing external
technical standards as regulator-accepted means of compliance with technical standards as regulator-accepted means of compliance with
UAS RID regulations, DRIP will: UAS RID regulations, DRIP will:
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 14 January 2021. This Internet-Draft will expire on 26 February 2021.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
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as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction (Informative) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction (Informative) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Overall Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Overall Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Intended Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.2. Intended Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3. DRIP Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 1.3. DRIP Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2. Terms and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2. Terms and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1. Requirements Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.1. Requirements Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2.2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3. UAS RID Problem Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 3. UAS RID Problem Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.1. Network RID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 3.1. Network RID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.2. Broadcast RID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 3.2. Broadcast RID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.3. DRIP Focus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 3.3. DRIP Focus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 4. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.1. General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 4.1. General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.2. Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 4.2. Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.3. Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 4.3. Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.4. Registries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 4.4. Registries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5. Discussion and Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 7. Privacy and Transparency Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . 24
8. Privacy and Transparency Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . 24 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Appendix A. Discussion and Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1. Introduction (Informative) 1. Introduction (Informative)
1.1. Overall Context 1.1. Overall Context
Many considerations (especially safety and security) dictate that UAS Many considerations (especially safety and security) dictate that UAS
be remotely identifiable. Any Observer with responsibilities be remotely identifiable. Any Observer with responsibilities
involving aircraft inherently must classify Unmanned Aircraft (UA) involving aircraft inherently must classify Unmanned Aircraft (UA)
situationally according to basic considerations, as illustrated situationally according to basic considerations, as illustrated
notionally in Figure 1 below. An Observer who classifies an UAS: as notionally in Figure 1 below. An Observer who classifies an UAS: as
Taskable, can ask it to do something useful; as Low Concern, can Taskable, can ask it to do something useful; as Low Concern, can
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| x x | | x x |
| xxxxxxx | | xxxxxxx |
| + | | + |
v v v v v v
+--------------+ +--------------+ +--------------+ +--------------+ +--------------+ +--------------+
| | | | | | | | | | | |
| TASKABLE | | LOW CONCERN | | HIGH CONCERN | | TASKABLE | | LOW CONCERN | | HIGH CONCERN |
| | | | | | | | | | | |
+--------------+ +--------------+ +--------------+ +--------------+ +--------------+ +--------------+
Figure 1: "Notional UAS Classification"> Figure 1: "Notional UAS Classification"
Civil Aviation Authorities (CAAs) worldwide are mandating Unmanned Civil Aviation Authorities (CAAs) worldwide are mandating Unmanned
Aircraft System Remote Identification and tracking (UAS RID). The Aircraft System Remote Identification and tracking (UAS RID). The
European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) has published European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) has published
[Delegated] and [Implementing] Regulations. The United States (US) [Delegated] and [Implementing] Regulations. The United States (US)
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has published a Notice of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has published a Notice of
Proposed Rule Making [NPRM] and has described the key role that UAS Proposed Rule Making [NPRM] and has described the key role that UAS
RID plays in UAS Traffic Management (UTM [FAACONOPS] especially RID plays in UAS Traffic Management (UTM) in [FAACONOPS] (especially
Section 2.6). CAAs currently (2020) promulgate performance-based Section 2.6). CAAs currently (2020) promulgate performance-based
regulations that do not specify techniques, but rather cite industry regulations that do not specify techniques, but rather cite industry
consensus technical standards as acceptable means of compliance. consensus technical standards as acceptable means of compliance.
ASTM International, Technical Committee F38 (UAS), Subcommittee ASTM International, Technical Committee F38 (UAS), Subcommittee
F38.02 (Aircraft Operations), Work Item WK65041, developed ASTM F38.02 (Aircraft Operations), Work Item WK65041, developed ASTM
F3411-19 [F3411-19] Standard Specification for Remote ID and F3411-19 [F3411-19] Standard Specification for Remote ID and Tracking
Tracking. It defines two means of UAS RID: (early drafts are freely available as [OpenDroneID] specifications).
It defines two means of UAS RID:
Network RID defines a set of information for UAS to make available Network RID defines a set of information for UAS to make available
globally indirectly via the Internet, through servers that can be globally indirectly via the Internet, through servers that can be
queried by Observers. queried by Observers.
Broadcast RID defines a set of messages for Unmanned Aircraft (UA) Broadcast RID defines a set of messages for UA to transmit locally
to transmit locally directly one-way over Bluetooth or Wi-Fi, to directly one-way over Bluetooth or Wi-Fi, to be received in real
be received in real time by local Observers. time by local Observers.
The same information must be provided via both means. The The same information must be provided via both means. The
presentation may differ, as Network RID defines a data dictionary, presentation may differ, as Network RID defines a data dictionary,
whereas Broadcast RID defines message formats (which carry items from whereas Broadcast RID defines message formats (which carry items from
that same data dictionary). The frequency with which it is sent may that same data dictionary). The frequency with which it is sent may
differ, as Network RID can accomodate Observer queries asynchronous differ, as Network RID can accommodate Observer queries asynchronous
to UAS updates (which generally need be sent only when information, to UAS updates (which generally need be sent only when information,
such as GCS location, changes), whereas Broadcast RID depends upon such as GCS location, changes), whereas Broadcast RID depends upon
Observers receiving UA messages at the time they are transmitted. Observers receiving UA messages at the time they are transmitted.
Network RID depends upon Internet connectivity in several segments Network RID depends upon Internet connectivity in several segments
from the UAS to each Observer. Broadcast RID should need Internet from the UAS to each Observer. Broadcast RID should need Internet
(or other Wide Area Network) connectivity only for UAS registry (or other Wide Area Network) connectivity only for UAS registry
information lookup using the directly locally received UAS Identifier information lookup using the directly locally received UAS Identifier
(UAS ID) as a key. Broadcast RID does not assume IP connectivity of (UAS ID) as a key. Broadcast RID does not assume IP connectivity of
UAS; messages are encapsulated by the UA without IP, directly in UAS; messages are encapsulated by the UA without IP, directly in
Bluetooth or WiFi link layer frames. Bluetooth or WiFi link layer frames.
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TYPE-1 A static, manufacturer assigned, hardware serial number per TYPE-1 A static, manufacturer assigned, hardware serial number per
ANSI/CTA-2063-A "Small Unmanned Aerial System Serial Numbers" ANSI/CTA-2063-A "Small Unmanned Aerial System Serial Numbers"
[CTA2063A]. [CTA2063A].
TYPE-2 A CAA assigned (presumably static) ID. TYPE-2 A CAA assigned (presumably static) ID.
TYPE-3 A UTM system assigned UUID [RFC4122], which can but need not TYPE-3 A UTM system assigned UUID [RFC4122], which can but need not
be dynamic. be dynamic.
The EU allows only Type 1; the US allows Types 1 and 3, but requires The EU allows only Type 1. The US allows Types 1 and 3, but requires
Type 3 IDs (if used) each to be used only once (for a single UAS Type 3 IDs (if used) each to be used only once (for a single UAS
flight, which in the context of UTM is called an "operation"). The flight, which in the context of UTM is called an "operation"). The
EU also requires an operator registration number (an additional EU also requires an operator registration number (an additional
identifier distinct from the UAS ID) that can be carried in an identifier distinct from the UAS ID) that can be carried in an
[F3411-19] optional Operator ID message. [F3411-19] optional Operator ID message. As yet apparently there are
no CAA proposals to use Type 2.
[F3411-19] Broadcast RID transmits all information as cleartext [F3411-19] Broadcast RID transmits all information as cleartext
(ASCII or binary), so static IDs enable trivial correlation of (ASCII or binary), so static IDs enable trivial correlation of
patterns of use, unacceptable in many applications, e.g., package patterns of use, unacceptable in many applications, e.g., package
delivery routes of competitors. delivery routes of competitors.
[WG105] addreses a "different scope than Direct Remote [Opinion1] and [WG105] cite the Direct Remote Identification
Identification... latter being primarily meant for security previously required and specified, explicitly stating that whereas
purposes... rather than for safety purposes (e.g. hazards Direct RID is primarily for security purposes, "Electronic
deconfliction..." Aviation community standards set a higher bar for Identification" (or the "Network Identification Service" in the
safety than for security. It "leaves the opportunity for those context of U-Space) is primarily for safety purposes (e.g. air
manufacturers who would prefer to merge both functions to do so... traffic management, especially hazards deconfliction) and also is
The purpose of the e-Identification function is to transmit, towards allowed to be used for other purposes such as support of efficient
the U-space infrastructure and/or other UA, a set of information for operations. These emerging standards allow the security and safety
safety (traffic management) purposes..." In addition to RID's oriented systems to be separate or merged. In addition to mandating
Broadcast and Network one-way to Observers), it will use V2V to other both Broadcast and Network one-way to Observers, they will use V2V to
UA (also perhaps to and/or from some manned aircraft). other UAS (also likely to and/or from some manned aircraft).
Security oriented UAS RID regulations essentially have two goals:
enable the general public to obtain and record an opaque ID for any
observed UA, which they can then report to authorities; enable
authorities, from such an ID, to look up information about the UAS
and its operator, especially location. Safety oriented UAS RID has
stronger requirements. Aviation community SDOs set a higher bar for
safety than for security, especially with respect to reliability.
1.2. Intended Use 1.2. Intended Use
An ID is not an end in itself; it exists to enable lookups and An ID is not an end in itself; it exists to enable lookups and
provision of services complementing mere identification. provision of services complementing mere identification.
Minimal specified information must be made available to the public; Minimal specified information must be made available to the public;
access to other data, e.g., UAS operator Personally Identifiable access to other data, e.g., UAS operator Personally Identifiable
Information (PII), must be limited to strongly authenticated Information (PII), must be limited to strongly authenticated
personnel, properly authorized per policy. The balance between personnel, properly authorized per policy. The balance between
privacy and transparency remains a subject for public debate and privacy and transparency remains a subject for public debate and
regulatory action; DRIP can only offer tools to expand the achievable regulatory action; DRIP can only offer tools to expand the achievable
trade space and enable trade-offs within that space. [F3411-19] trade space and enable trade-offs within that space. [F3411-19]
specifies only how to get the UAS ID to the Observer; how the specifies only how to get the UAS ID to the Observer; how the
Observer can perform these lookups, and how the registries first can Observer can perform these lookups, and how the registries first can
be populated with information, is unspecified. be populated with information, is unspecified.
Using UAS RID to facilitate vehicular (V2X) communications and Using UAS RID to facilitate vehicular (V2X) communications and
applications such as Detect And Avoid (DAA, which would impose applications such as Detect And Avoid (DAA), which would impose
tighter latency bounds than RID itself) is an obvious possibility, tighter latency bounds than RID itself, is an obvious possibility,
explicitly contemplated in the FAA NPRM. However, applications of explicitly contemplated in the FAA NPRM. However, applications of
RID beyond RID itself have been omitted from [F3411-19]; DAA has been RID beyond RID itself have been omitted from [F3411-19]; DAA has been
explicitly declared out of scope in ASTM working group discussions, explicitly declared out of scope in ASTM working group discussions,
based on a distinction between RID as a security standard vs DAA as a based on a distinction between RID as a security standard vs DAA as a
safety application. Although dynamic establishment of secure safety application. Although dynamic establishment of secure
communications between the Observer and the UAS pilot seems to have communications between the Observer and the UAS pilot seems to have
been contemplated by the FAA UAS ID and Tracking Aviation Rulemaking been contemplated by the FAA UAS ID and Tracking Aviation Rulemaking
Committee (ARC) in their [Recommendations], it is not addressed in Committee (ARC) in their [Recommendations], it is not addressed in
any of the subsequent proposed regulations or technical any of the subsequent proposed regulations or technical
specifications. specifications.
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The need for near-universal deployment of UAS RID is pressing. This The need for near-universal deployment of UAS RID is pressing. This
implies the need to support use by Observers of already ubiquitous implies the need to support use by Observers of already ubiquitous
mobile devices (typically smartphones and tablets). Anticipating mobile devices (typically smartphones and tablets). Anticipating
likely CAA requirements to support legacy devices, especially in likely CAA requirements to support legacy devices, especially in
light of [Recommendations], [F3411-19] specifies that any UAS sending light of [Recommendations], [F3411-19] specifies that any UAS sending
Broadcast RID over Bluetooth must do so over Bluetooth 4, regardless Broadcast RID over Bluetooth must do so over Bluetooth 4, regardless
of whether it also does so over newer versions; as UAS sender devices of whether it also does so over newer versions; as UAS sender devices
and Observer receiver devices are unpaired, this implies extremely and Observer receiver devices are unpaired, this implies extremely
short "advertisement" (beacon) frames. short "advertisement" (beacon) frames.
UA onboard RID devices are severely constrained in Cost, Size, Weight UA onboard RID devices are severely constrained in Cost ($), Size,
and Power ($SWaP). Cost is a significant impediment to the necessary Weight and Power ($SWaP). Cost is a significant impediment to the
near-universal adoption of UAS send and Observer receive RID necessary near-universal adoption of UAS send and Observer receive
capabilities. $SWaP is a burden not only on the designers of new UA RID capabilities. $SWaP is a burden not only on the designers of new
for production and sale, but also on owners of existing UA that must UA for production and sale, but also on owners of existing UA that
be retrofit. Radio Controlled (RC) aircraft modelers, "hams" who use must be retrofit. Radio Controlled (RC) aircraft modelers, "hams"
licensed amateur radio frequencies to control UAS, drone hobbyists who use licensed amateur radio frequencies to control UAS, drone
and others who custom build UAS all need means of participating in hobbyists and others who custom build UAS all need means of
UAS RID sensitive to both generic $SWaP and application-specific participating in UAS RID, sensitive to both generic $SWaP and
considerations. application-specific considerations.
To accommodate the most severely constrained cases, all these To accommodate the most severely constrained cases, all these
conspire to motivate system design decisions, especially for the conspire to motivate system design decisions, especially for the
Broadcast RID data link, which complicate the protocol design Broadcast RID data link, which complicate the protocol design
problem: one-way links; extremely short packets; and Internet- problem: one-way links; extremely short packets; and Internet-
disconnected operation of UA onboard devices. Internet-disconnected disconnected operation of UA onboard devices. Internet-disconnected
operation of Observer devices has been deemed by ASTM F38.02 too operation of Observer devices has been deemed by ASTM F38.02 too
infrequent to address, but for some users is important and presents infrequent to address, but for some users is important and presents
further challenges. further challenges.
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public safety) authorities' Need To Know trustworthy information with public safety) authorities' Need To Know trustworthy information with
UAS operators' privacy. By "immediately actionable" is meant UAS operators' privacy. By "immediately actionable" is meant
information of sufficient precision, accuracy, timeliness, etc. for information of sufficient precision, accuracy, timeliness, etc. for
an Observer to use it as the basis for immediate decisive action, an Observer to use it as the basis for immediate decisive action,
whether that be to trigger a defensive counter-UAS system, to attempt whether that be to trigger a defensive counter-UAS system, to attempt
to initiate communications with the UAS operator, to accept the to initiate communications with the UAS operator, to accept the
presence of the UAS in the airspace where/when observed as not presence of the UAS in the airspace where/when observed as not
requiring further action, or whatever, with potentially severe requiring further action, or whatever, with potentially severe
consequences of any action or inaction chosen based on that consequences of any action or inaction chosen based on that
information. For further explanation of the concept of immediate information. For further explanation of the concept of immediate
actionability, see [ENISACSIRT]. Potential follow-on goals may actionability, see [ENISACSIRT]. Note that UAS RID must achieve near
extend beyond providing timely and trustworthy identification data, universal adoption, but DRIP can add value even if only selectively
to using it to enable identity-oriented networking of UAS. deployed, as those with jurisdiction over more sensitive airspace
volumes may set a higher than generally mandated RID bar for flight
in those volumes. Potential follow-on goals may extend beyond
providing timely and trustworthy identification data, to using it to
enable identity-oriented networking of UAS.
DRIP (originally Trustworthy Multipurpose Remote Identification, TM- DRIP (originally Trustworthy Multipurpose Remote Identification, TM-
RID) potentially could be applied to verifiably identify other types RID) potentially could be applied to verifiably identify other types
of registered things reported to be in specified physical locations, of registered things reported to be in specified physical locations,
but the urgent motivation and clear initial focus is UAS. Existing but the urgent motivation and clear initial focus is UAS. Existing
Internet resources (protocol standards, services, infrastructure, and Internet resources (protocol standards, services, infrastructure, and
business models) should be leveraged. A natural Internet based business models) should be leveraged. A natural Internet based
architecture for UAS RID conforming to proposed regulations and architecture for UAS RID conforming to proposed regulations and
external technical standards is described in a companion architecture external technical standards is described in a companion architecture
document [drip-architecture] and elaborated in other DRIP documents; document [drip-architecture] and elaborated in other DRIP documents;
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documents. This list is meant to be the DRIP terminology reference. documents. This list is meant to be the DRIP terminology reference.
Some of the terms listed below are not used in this document. Some of the terms listed below are not used in this document.
[RFC4949] provides a glossary of Internet security terms that should [RFC4949] provides a glossary of Internet security terms that should
be used where applicable. In the UAS community, the plural form of be used where applicable. In the UAS community, the plural form of
acronyms generally is the same as the singular form, e.g. Unmanned acronyms generally is the same as the singular form, e.g. Unmanned
Aircraft System (singular) and Unmanned Aircraft Systems (plural) are Aircraft System (singular) and Unmanned Aircraft Systems (plural) are
both represented as UAS. On this and other terminological issues, to both represented as UAS. On this and other terminological issues, to
encourage comprehension necessary for adoption of DRIP by the encourage comprehension necessary for adoption of DRIP by the
intended user community, that community's norms are respected herein, intended user community, that community's norms are respected herein,
and definitions are quoted in cases where they have been found in and definitions are quoted in cases where they have been found in
that community's documents. that community's documents. Most of the listed terms are from that
community (even if specific source documents are not cited); any that
are DRIP-specific or invented by the authors of this document are
marked "(DRIP)".
$SWaP $SWaP
Cost, Size, Weight and Power. Cost, Size, Weight and Power. (DRIP)
AAA AAA
Attestation, Authentication, Authorization, Access Control, Attestation, Authentication, Authorization, Access Control,
Accounting, Attribution, Audit, or any subset thereof (uses differ Accounting, Attribution, Audit, or any subset thereof (uses differ
by application, author and context). by application, author and context). (DRIP)
ABDAA ABDAA
AirBorne DAA. Accomplished using systems onboard the aircraft AirBorne DAA. Accomplished using systems onboard the aircraft
involved. Also known as "self-separation". involved. Also known as "self-separation".
ADS-B ADS-B
Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast. "ADS-B Out" Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast. "ADS-B Out"
equipment obtains aircraft position from other on-board systems equipment obtains aircraft position from other on-board systems
(typically GNSS) and periodically broadcasts it to "ADS-B In" (typically GNSS) and periodically broadcasts it to "ADS-B In"
equipped entities, including other aircraft, ground stations and equipped entities, including other aircraft, ground stations and
satellite based monitoring systems. satellite based monitoring systems.
AGL AGL
Above Ground Level. Relative altitude, above the variously Above Ground Level. Relative altitude, above the variously
defined local ground level, typically of an UA, measured in feet defined local ground level, typically of an UA, measured in feet
or meters. or meters. Should be explicitly specified as either barometric
(pressure) or geodetic (GNSS).
ATC ATC
Air Traffic Control. Explicit flight direction to pilots from Air Traffic Control. Explicit flight direction to pilots from
ground controllers. Contrast with ATM. ground controllers. Contrast with ATM.
ATM ATM
Air Traffic Management. A broader functional and geographic scope Air Traffic Management. A broader functional and geographic scope
and/or a higher layer of abstraction than ATC. "The dynamic, and/or a higher layer of abstraction than ATC. "The dynamic,
integrated management of air traffic and airspace including air integrated management of air traffic and airspace including air
traffic services, airspace management and air traffic flow traffic services, airspace management and air traffic flow
management - safely, economically and efficiently - through the management - safely, economically and efficiently - through the
provision of facilities and seamless services in collaboration provision of facilities and seamless services in collaboration
with all parties and involving airborne and ground-based with all parties and involving airborne and ground-based
functions." [ICAOATM] functions." [ICAOATM]
Authentication Message Authentication Message
F3411 Message Type 2. Provides framing for authentication data, [F3411-19] Message Type 2. Provides framing for authentication
only. data, only. Optional per [F3411-19] but may be required by
regulations.
Basic ID Message Basic ID Message
F3411 Message Type 0. Provides UA Type, UAS ID Type and UAS ID, [F3411-19] Message Type 0. Provides UA Type, UAS ID Type and UAS
only. ID, only. Mandatory per [F3411-19].
B-LOS B-LOS
Beyond Line Of Sight (LOS). Term to be avoided due to ambiguity. Beyond Line Of Sight (LOS). Term to be avoided due to ambiguity.
See LOS. See LOS.
BV-LOS BV-LOS
Beyond Visual Line Of Sight (V-LOS). See V-LOS. Beyond Visual Line Of Sight (V-LOS). See V-LOS.
CAA CAA
Civil Aviation Authority. Two examples are the United States Civil Aviation Authority. Two examples are the United States
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Direct RID Direct RID
Direct Remote Identification. Per [Delegated], "a system that Direct Remote Identification. Per [Delegated], "a system that
ensures the local broadcast of information about a UA in ensures the local broadcast of information about a UA in
operation, including the marking of the UA, so that this operation, including the marking of the UA, so that this
information can be obtained without physical access to the UA". information can be obtained without physical access to the UA".
Requirement could be met with ASTM Broadcast RID: Basic ID message Requirement could be met with ASTM Broadcast RID: Basic ID message
with UAS ID Type 1; Location/Vector message; Operator ID message; with UAS ID Type 1; Location/Vector message; Operator ID message;
System Message. Corresponds roughly to the Broadcast RID portion System Message. Corresponds roughly to the Broadcast RID portion
of FAA NPRM Standard RID. of FAA NPRM Standard RID.
DSS
Discovery and Synchronization Service. Formerly Inter-USS. The
UTM system overlay network backbone. Most importantly, it enables
one USS to learn which other USS have UAS operating in a given 4-D
airspace volume, for deconfliction and surveillance; but it also
supports other functions.
E2E E2E
End to End. End to End.
EUROCAE EUROCAE
European Organisation for Civil Aviation Equipment. Aviation SDO, European Organisation for Civil Aviation Equipment. Aviation SDO,
originally European, now with broader membership. Cooperates originally European, now with broader membership. Cooperates
extensively with RTCA. extensively with RTCA.
GBDAA GBDAA
Ground Based DAA. Accomplished with the aid of ground based Ground Based DAA. Accomplished with the aid of ground based
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Global Navigation Satellite System. Satellite based timing and/or Global Navigation Satellite System. Satellite based timing and/or
positioning with global coverage, often used to support positioning with global coverage, often used to support
navigation. navigation.
GPS GPS
Global Positioning System. A specific GNSS, but in this context, Global Positioning System. A specific GNSS, but in this context,
the term is typically misused in place of the more generic term the term is typically misused in place of the more generic term
GNSS. GNSS.
GRAIN GRAIN
Global Resilient Aviation Interoperable Network. Putative ICAO Global Resilient Aviation Interoperable Network. ICAO managed
managed IPv6 overlay internetwork per IATF. IPv6 overlay internetwork per IATF, dedicated to aviation (but not
just aircraft). Currently in design.
IATF IATF
International Aviation Trust Framework. ICAO effort to develop a International Aviation Trust Framework. ICAO effort to develop a
resilient and secure by design framework for networking in support resilient and secure by design framework for networking in support
of all aspects of aviation. of all aspects of aviation.
ICAO ICAO
International Civil Aviation Organization. A United Nations International Civil Aviation Organization. A United Nations
specialized agency that develops and harmonizes international specialized agency that develops and harmonizes international
standards relating to aviation. standards relating to aviation.
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Limited RID Limited RID
Per the FAA NPRM, a mode of operation that must use Network RID, Per the FAA NPRM, a mode of operation that must use Network RID,
must not use Broadcast RID, and must provide pilot/GCS location must not use Broadcast RID, and must provide pilot/GCS location
only (not UA location). This mode is only allowed for UA that only (not UA location). This mode is only allowed for UA that
neither require (due to e.g. size) nor are equipped for Standard neither require (due to e.g. size) nor are equipped for Standard
RID, operated within V-LOS and within 400 feet of the pilot, below RID, operated within V-LOS and within 400 feet of the pilot, below
400 feet AGL, etc. 400 feet AGL, etc.
Location/Vector Message Location/Vector Message
F3411 Message Type 1. Provides UA location, altitude, heading and [F3411-19] Message Type 1. Provides UA location, altitude,
speed, only. heading and speed, only. Mandatory per [F3411-19].
LOS LOS
Line Of Sight. An adjectival phrase describing any information Line Of Sight. An adjectival phrase describing any information
transfer that travels in a nearly straight line (e.g. transfer that travels in a nearly straight line (e.g.
electromagnetic energy, whether in the visual light, RF or other electromagnetic energy, whether in the visual light, RF or other
frequency range) and is subject to blockage. A term to be avoided frequency range) and is subject to blockage. A term to be avoided
due to ambiguity, in this context, between RF-LOS and V-LOS. due to ambiguity, in this context, between RF-LOS and V-LOS.
MSL MSL
Mean Sea Level. Relative altitude, above the variously defined Mean Sea Level. Relative altitude, above the variously defined
mean sea level, typically of an UA (but in FAA NPRM also for a mean sea level, typically of an UA (but in FAA NPRM also for a
GCS), measured in or meters. GCS), measured in or meters. Should be explicitly specified as
either barometric (pressure) or geodetic (GNSS).
Net-RID DP Net-RID DP
Network RID Display Provider. Logical entity that aggregates data Network RID Display Provider. Logical entity that aggregates data
from Net-RID SPs as needed in response to user queries regarding from Net-RID SPs as needed in response to user queries regarding
UAS operating within specified airspace volumes, to enable display UAS operating within specified airspace volumes, to enable display
by a user application on a user device. Potentially could provide by a user application on a user device. Potentially could provide
not only information sent via UAS RID but also information not only information sent via UAS RID but also information
retrieved from UAS RID registries, or information beyond UAS RID, retrieved from UAS RID registries, or information beyond UAS RID,
regarding subscribed USS. Under the FAA NPRM, not recognized as a regarding subscribed USS. Under the FAA NPRM, not recognized as a
distinct entity, but a service provided by USS, including Public distinct entity, but a service provided by USS, including Public
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Location/Vector message; Operator ID message; System Message. Location/Vector message; Operator ID message; System Message.
Corresponds roughly to the Network RID portion of FAA NPRM Corresponds roughly to the Network RID portion of FAA NPRM
Standard RID. Standard RID.
Observer Observer
An entity (typically but not necessarily an individual human) who An entity (typically but not necessarily an individual human) who
has directly or indirectly observed an UA and wishes to know has directly or indirectly observed an UA and wishes to know
something about it, starting with its ID. An observer typically something about it, starting with its ID. An observer typically
is on the ground and local (within V-LOS of an observed UA), but is on the ground and local (within V-LOS of an observed UA), but
could be remote (observing via Network RID or other surveillance), could be remote (observing via Network RID or other surveillance),
operating another UA, aboard another aircraft , etc. operating another UA, aboard another aircraft, etc. (DRIP)
Operation Operation
A flight, or series of flights of the same mission, by the same A flight, or series of flights of the same mission, by the same
UAS, in the same airspace volume, separated by at most brief UAS, in the same airspace volume, separated by at most brief
ground intervals. ground intervals.
Operator Operator
"A person, organization or enterprise engaged in or offering to "A person, organization or enterprise engaged in or offering to
engage in an aircraft operation." [ICAOUTM] engage in an aircraft operation." [ICAOUTM]
Operator ID Message Operator ID Message
F3411 Message Type 5. Provides CAA issued Operator ID, only. [F3411-19] Message Type 5. Provides CAA issued Operator ID, only.
Operator ID is distinct from UAS ID. Operator ID is distinct from UAS ID. Optional per [F3411-19] but
may be required by regulations.
PIC PIC
Pilot In Command. "The pilot designated by the operator, or in Pilot In Command. "The pilot designated by the operator, or in
the case of general aviation, the owner, as being in command and the case of general aviation, the owner, as being in command and
charged with the safe conduct of a flight." [ICAOATM] charged with the safe conduct of a flight." [ICAOATM]
PII PII
Personally Identifiable Information. In this context, typically Personally Identifiable Information. In this context, typically
of the UAS operator, Pilot In Command (PIC) or remote pilot, but of the UAS Operator, Pilot In Command (PIC) or Remote Pilot, but
possibly of an observer or other party. possibly of an Observer or other party.
Remote Pilot Remote Pilot
A pilot using a GCS to exercise proximate control of an UA. A pilot using a GCS to exercise proximate control of an UA.
Either the PIC or under the supervision of the PIC. Either the PIC or under the supervision of the PIC.
RF-LOS RF-LOS
RF LOS. Typically used in describing operation of a direct radio RF LOS. Typically used in describing operation of a direct radio
link between a GCS and the UA under its control, potentially link between a GCS and the UA under its control, potentially
subject to blockage by foliage, structures, terrain or other subject to blockage by foliage, structures, terrain or other
vehicles, but less so than V-LOS. vehicles, but less so than V-LOS.
RTCA RTCA
Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics. US aviation SDO. Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics. US aviation SDO.
Cooperates extensively with EUROCAE. Cooperates extensively with EUROCAE.
Self-ID Message Self-ID Message
F3411 Message Type 3. Provides a 1 byte descriptor and 23 byte [F3411-19] Message Type 3. Provides a 1 byte descriptor and 23
ASCII free text field, only. Expected to be used to provide byte ASCII free text field, only. Expected to be used to provide
context on the operation, e.g. mission intent. context on the operation, e.g. mission intent. Optional unless
required by the cognizant CAA. Optional per [F3411-19] but may be
required by regulations.
Standard RID Standard RID
Per the FAA NPRM, a mode of operation that must use both Network Per the FAA NPRM, a mode of operation that must use both Network
RID (if Internet connectivity is available at the time in the RID (if Internet connectivity is available at the time in the
operating area) and Broadcast RID (always and everywhere), and operating area) and Broadcast RID (always and everywhere), and
must provide both pilot/GCS location and UA location. This mode must provide both pilot/GCS location and UA location. This mode
is required for UAS that exceed the allowed envelope (e.g. size, is required for UAS that exceed the allowed envelope (e.g. size,
range) of Limited RID and for all UAS equipped for Standard RID range) of Limited RID and for all UAS equipped for Standard RID
(even if operated within parameters that would otherwise permit (even if operated within parameters that would otherwise permit
Limited RID). The Broadcast RID portion corresponds roughly to EU Limited RID). The Broadcast RID portion corresponds roughly to EU
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SDO SDO
Standards Development Organization. ASTM, IETF, et al. Standards Development Organization. ASTM, IETF, et al.
SDSP SDSP
Supplemental Data Service Provider. An entity that participates Supplemental Data Service Provider. An entity that participates
in the UTM system, but provides services beyond those specified as in the UTM system, but provides services beyond those specified as
basic UTM system functions. E.g., provides weather data. basic UTM system functions. E.g., provides weather data.
System Message System Message
F3411 Message Type 4. Provides general UAS information, including [F3411-19] Message Type 4. Provides general UAS information,
remote pilot location, multiple UA group operational area, etc. including remote pilot location, multiple UA group operational
area, etc. Optional per [F3411-19] but may be required by
regulations.
U-space U-space
EU concept and emerging framework for integration of UAS into all EU concept and emerging framework for integration of UAS into all
classes of airspace, specifically including high density urban classes of airspace, specifically including high density urban
areas, sharing airspace with manned aircraft. areas, sharing airspace with manned aircraft.
UA UA
Unmanned Aircraft. An aircraft which is intended to operate with Unmanned Aircraft. An aircraft which is intended to operate with
no pilot on board. In popular parlance, "drone". no pilot on board. In popular parlance, "drone".
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UTM UTM
UAS Traffic Management. Per ICAO, "A specific aspect of air UAS Traffic Management. Per ICAO, "A specific aspect of air
traffic management which manages UAS operations safely, traffic management which manages UAS operations safely,
economically and efficiently through the provision of facilities economically and efficiently through the provision of facilities
and a seamless set of services in collaboration with all parties and a seamless set of services in collaboration with all parties
and involving airborne and ground-based functions." In the US, and involving airborne and ground-based functions." In the US,
per FAA, a "traffic management" ecosystem for "uncontrolled" low per FAA, a "traffic management" ecosystem for "uncontrolled" low
altitude UAS operations, separate from, but complementary to, the altitude UAS operations, separate from, but complementary to, the
FAA's ATC system for "controlled" operations of manned aircraft. FAA's ATC system for "controlled" operations of manned aircraft.
V2V
Vehicle-to-Vehicle. Originally communications between
automobiles, now extended to apply to communications between
vehicles generally. Often, together with Vehicle-to-
Infrastructure (V2I) etc., generalized to V2X.
V-LOS V-LOS
Visual LOS. Typically used in describing operation of an UA by a Visual LOS. Typically used in describing operation of an UA by a
"remote" pilot who can clearly directly (without video cameras or "remote" pilot who can clearly directly (without video cameras or
any other aids other than glasses or under some rules binoculars) any other aids other than glasses or under some rules binoculars)
see the UA and its immediate flight environment. Potentially see the UA and its immediate flight environment. Potentially
subject to blockage by foliage, structures, terrain or other subject to blockage by foliage, structures, terrain or other
vehicles, more so than RF-LOS. vehicles, more so than RF-LOS.
3. UAS RID Problem Space 3. UAS RID Problem Space
UA may be fixed wing Short Take-Off and Landing (STOL), rotary wing UA may be fixed wing Short Take-Off and Landing (STOL), rotary wing
(e.g., helicopter) Vertical Take-Off and Landing (VTOL), or hybrid. (e.g., helicopter) Vertical Take-Off and Landing (VTOL), or hybrid.
They may be single- or multi-engine. The most common today are They may be single- or multi-engine. The most common today are
multicopters: rotary wing, multi engine. The explosion in UAS was multicopters: rotary wing, multi engine. The explosion in UAS was
enabled by hobbyist development, for multicopters, of advanced flight enabled by hobbyist development, for multicopters, of advanced flight
stability algorithms, enabling even inexperienced pilots to take off, stability algorithms, enabling even inexperienced pilots to take off,
fly to a location of interest, hover, and return to the take-off fly to a location of interest, hover, and return to the take-off
location or land at a distance. UAS can be remotely piloted by a location or land at a distance. UAS can be remotely piloted by a
human (e.g., with a joystick) or programmed to proceed from Global human (e.g., with a joystick) or programmed to proceed from GNSS
Positioning System (GPS) waypoint to waypoint in a weak form of waypoint to waypoint in a weak form of autonomy; stronger autonomy is
autonomy; stronger autonomy is coming. UA are "low observable": they coming. UA are "low observable": they typically have small radar
typically have a small radar cross section; they make noise quite cross sections; they make noise quite noticeable at short range but
noticeable at short range but difficult to detect at distances they difficult to detect at distances they can quickly close (500 meters
can quickly close (500 meters in under 17 seconds at 60 knots); they in under 17 seconds at 60 knots); they typically fly at low altitudes
typically fly at low altitudes (for the small UAS to which RID (for the small UAS to which RID applies in the US, under 400 feet
applies in the US, under 400 feet AGL); they are highly maneuverable AGL); they are highly maneuverable so can fly under trees and between
so can fly under trees and between buildings. buildings.
UA can carry payloads including sensors, cyber and kinetic weapons, UA can carry payloads including sensors, cyber and kinetic weapons,
or can be used themselves as weapons by flying them into targets. or can be used themselves as weapons by flying them into targets.
They can be flown by clueless, careless or criminal operators. Thus They can be flown by clueless, careless or criminal operators. Thus
the most basic function of UAS RID is "Identification Friend or Foe" the most basic function of UAS RID is "Identification Friend or Foe"
(IFF) to mitigate the significant threat they present. Numerous (IFF) to mitigate the significant threat they present. Numerous
other applications can be enabled or facilitated by RID: consider the other applications can be enabled or facilitated by RID: consider the
importance of identifiers in many Internet protocols and services. importance of identifiers in many Internet protocols and services.
Network RID from the UA itself (rather than from its GCS) and Network RID from the UA itself (rather than from its GCS) and
Broadcast RID require one or more wireless data links from the UA, Broadcast RID require one or more wireless data links from the UA,
but such communications are challenging due to $SWaP constraints and but such communications are challenging due to $SWaP constraints and
low altitude flight amidst structures and foliage over terrain. low altitude flight amidst structures and foliage over terrain.
Disambiguation of multiple UA flying in close proximity may be very Disambiguation of multiple UA flying in close proximity may be very
challenging, even if each is reporting its identity, position and challenging, even if each is reporting its identity, position and
velocity as accurately as it can. velocity as accurately as it can.
3.1. Network RID 3.1. Network RID
Network RID is essentially publish-subscribe-query. First the UAS
operator pushes an operation plan to the USS that will serve that UAS
for that operation, for deconfliction with other operations; assuming
the plan receives approval and the operation commences, that UAS
periodically pushes location/status updates to that USS (call it
USS#1), which serves as the Network RID Service Provider (Net-RID SP)
for that operation. If users of any other USS (whether they be other
UAS operators or Observers) develop an interest in any 4-D airspace
volume containing that UAS operation, their USS learns, via the UTM
Discovery and Synchronization Service (DSS), that USS#1 has such
operations. Observers or other interested parties can then
subscribe, via their USS, which serves as a Network RID Display
Provider (Net-RID DP) for that surveillance session. The Net-RID SP
(USS#1) will then publish updates of the UAS position/status to all
subscribed Net-RID DP, which in turn will deliver the surveillance
information to their users via unspecified (but expected to be web
browser based) means.
Network RID has several variants. The UA may have persistent onboard Network RID has several variants. The UA may have persistent onboard
Internet connectivity, in which case it can consistently source RID Internet connectivity, in which case it can consistently source RID
information directly over the Internet. The UA may have intermittent information directly over the Internet. The UA may have intermittent
onboard Internet connectivity, in which case the GCS must source RID onboard Internet connectivity, in which case the GCS must source RID
information whenever the UA itself is offline. The UA may not have information whenever the UA itself is offline. The UA may not have
Internet connectivity of its own, but have instead some other form of Internet connectivity of its own, but have instead some other form of
communications to another node that can relay RID information to the communications to another node that can relay RID information to the
Internet; this would typically be the GCS (which to perform its Internet; this would typically be the GCS (which to perform its
function must know where the UA is, although C2 link outages do function must know where the UA is, although C2 link outages do
occur). occur).
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GEN-1 Provable Ownership: DRIP MUST enable verification that the GEN-1 Provable Ownership: DRIP MUST enable verification that the
UAS ID asserted in the Basic ID message is that of the actual UAS ID asserted in the Basic ID message is that of the actual
current sender of the message (i.e. the message is not a current sender of the message (i.e. the message is not a
replay attack or other spoof, authenticating e.g. by replay attack or other spoof, authenticating e.g. by
verifying an asymmetric cryptographic signature using a verifying an asymmetric cryptographic signature using a
sender provided public key from which the asserted ID can be sender provided public key from which the asserted ID can be
at least partially derived), even on an observer device at least partially derived), even on an observer device
lacking Internet connectivity at the time of observation. lacking Internet connectivity at the time of observation.
GEN-2 Provable Binding: DRIP MUST enable binding all other F3411 GEN-2 Provable Binding: DRIP MUST enable binding all other
messages from the same actual current sender to the UAS ID [F3411-19] messages from the same actual current sender to
asserted in the Basic ID message. the UAS ID asserted in the Basic ID message.
GEN-3 Provable Registration: DRIP MUST enable verification that the GEN-3 Provable Registration: DRIP MUST enable verification that the
UAS ID is in a registry and identification of which one, even UAS ID is in a registry and identification of which one, even
on an observer device lacking Internet connectivity at the on an observer device lacking Internet connectivity at the
time of observation; with UAS ID Type 3, the same sender may time of observation; with UAS ID Type 3, the same sender may
have multiple IDs, potentially in different registries, but have multiple IDs, potentially in different registries, but
each ID must clearly indicate in which registry it can be each ID must clearly indicate in which registry it can be
found. found.
GEN-4 Readability: DRIP MUST enable information (regulation GEN-4 Readability: DRIP MUST enable information (regulation
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registries) to be read and utilized by both humans and registries) to be read and utilized by both humans and
software. software.
GEN-5 Gateway: DRIP MUST enable Broadcast RID -> Network RID GEN-5 Gateway: DRIP MUST enable Broadcast RID -> Network RID
application layer gateways to stamp messages with precise application layer gateways to stamp messages with precise
date/time received and receiver location, then relay them to date/time received and receiver location, then relay them to
a network service (e.g. SDSP or distributed ledger), to a network service (e.g. SDSP or distributed ledger), to
support three objectives: mark up a RID message with where support three objectives: mark up a RID message with where
and when it was actually received (which may agree or and when it was actually received (which may agree or
disagree with the self-report in the set of messages); defend disagree with the self-report in the set of messages); defend
against reply attacks; and support optional SDSP services against replay attacks; and support optional SDSP services
such as multilateration (to complement UAS position self- such as multilateration (to complement UAS position self-
reports with independent measurements). reports with independent measurements).
GEN-6 Finger (placeholder name): DRIP MUST enable dynamically GEN-6 Finger: DRIP MUST enable dynamically establishing, with AAA,
establishing, with AAA, per policy, E2E strongly encrypted per policy, E2E strongly encrypted communications with the
communications with the UAS RID sender and entities looked up UAS RID sender and entities looked up from the UAS ID,
from the UAS ID, including at least the remote pilot and USS. including at least the remote pilot and USS.
GEN-7 QoS: DRIP MUST enable policy based specification of GEN-7 QoS: DRIP MUST enable policy based specification of
performance and reliability parameters, such as maximum performance and reliability parameters, such as maximum
message transmission intervals and delivery latencies. message transmission intervals and delivery latencies.
GEN-8 Mobility: DRIP MUST support physical and logical mobility of GEN-8 Mobility: DRIP MUST support physical and logical mobility of
UA, GCS and Observers. DRIP SHOULD support mobility of UA, GCS and Observers. DRIP SHOULD support mobility of
essentially all participating nodes (UA, GCS, Observers, Net- essentially all participating nodes (UA, GCS, Observers, Net-
RID SP, Net-RID DP, Private Registry, SDSP). RID SP, Net-RID DP, Private Registry, SDSP).
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link failure. DRIP SHOULD support multihoming of essentially link failure. DRIP SHOULD support multihoming of essentially
all participating nodes. all participating nodes.
GEN-10 Multicast: DRIP SHOULD support multicast for efficient and GEN-10 Multicast: DRIP SHOULD support multicast for efficient and
flexible publish-subscribe notifications, e.g., of UAS flexible publish-subscribe notifications, e.g., of UAS
reporting positions in designated sensitive airspace volumes. reporting positions in designated sensitive airspace volumes.
GEN-11 Management: DRIP SHOULD support monitoring of the health and GEN-11 Management: DRIP SHOULD support monitoring of the health and
coverage of Broadcast and Network RID services. coverage of Broadcast and Network RID services.
Requirements imposed either by regulation or in [F3411-19] are not
reiterated here, but drive many of the numbered requirements listed
here. E.g. the QoS requirement currently would be satisfied
generally by ensuring information refresh rates of at least 1 Hertz,
with latencies no greater than 1 second, at least 80% of the time;
but these numbers may change, so instead the DRIP requirement is that
they be user policy specifiable. Note that the "provable binding"
requirement addresses the MAC address correlation problem of
[F3411-19] noted above. Note that the "gateway" requirement is the
only instance in which DRIP transports [F3411-19] messages; most of
DRIP pertains to the authentication of such messages and the
identifier carried within them.
4.2. Identifier 4.2. Identifier
ID-1 Length: The DRIP (UAS) entity [remote] identifier must be no ID-1 Length: The DRIP (UAS) entity (remote) identifier must be no
longer than 20 bytes (per [F3411-19] to fit in a Bluetooth 4 longer than 20 bytes (per [F3411-19] to fit in a Bluetooth 4
advertisement payload). advertisement payload).
ID-2 Registry ID: The DRIP identifier MUST be sufficient to identify ID-2 Registry ID: The DRIP identifier MUST be sufficient to identify
a registry in which the (UAS) entity identified therewith is a registry in which the (UAS) entity identified therewith is
listed. listed.
ID-3 Entity ID: The DRIP identifier MUST be sufficient to enable ID-3 Entity ID: The DRIP identifier MUST be sufficient to enable
lookup of other data associated with the (UAS) entity lookup of other data associated with the (UAS) entity
identified therewith in that registry. identified therewith in that registry.
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PRIV-1 Confidential Handling: DRIP MUST enable confidential handling PRIV-1 Confidential Handling: DRIP MUST enable confidential handling
of private information (i.e., any and all information of private information (i.e., any and all information
designated by neither cognizant authority nor the information designated by neither cognizant authority nor the information
owner as public, e.g., personal data). owner as public, e.g., personal data).
PRIV-2 Encrypted Transport: DRIP MUST enable selective strong PRIV-2 Encrypted Transport: DRIP MUST enable selective strong
encryption of private data in motion in such a manner that encryption of private data in motion in such a manner that
only authorized actors can recover it. If transport is via only authorized actors can recover it. If transport is via
IP, then encryption MUST be end-to-end, at or above the IP IP, then encryption MUST be end-to-end, at or above the IP
layer. DRIP MUST NOT encrypt safety critical data to be layer. DRIP MUST NOT encrypt safety critical data to be
transmitted over Broadcast RID unless also concurrently transmitted over Broadcast RID in any situation where it is
sending that data via Network RID and obtaining frequent unlikely that local observers authorized to access the
confirmations of receipt. plaintext will be able to decrypt it or obtain it from a
service able to decrypt it. DRIP MUST NOT encrypt data when/
where doing so would conflict with applicable regulations or
CAA policies/procedures, i.e. DRIP MUST support configurable
disabling of encryption.
PRIV-3 Encrypted Storage: DRIP SHOULD facilitate selective strong PRIV-3 Encrypted Storage: DRIP SHOULD facilitate selective strong
encryption of private data at rest in such a manner that only encryption of private data at rest in such a manner that only
authorized actors can recover it. authorized actors can recover it.
PRIV-4 Public/Private Designation: DRIP SHOULD facilitate
designation, by cognizant authorities and information owners,
which information is public and which private. By default,
all information required to be transmitted via Broadcast RID,
even when actually sent via Network RID, is assumed to be
public; all other information contained in registries for
lookup using the UAS ID is assumed to be private.
PRIV-5 Pseudonymous Rendezvous: DRIP MAY enable mutual discovery of
and communications among participating UAS operators whose UA
are in 4-D proximity, using the UAS ID without revealing
pilot/operator identity or physical location.
How information is stored on end systems is out of scope for DRIP. How information is stored on end systems is out of scope for DRIP.
Encouraging privacy best practices, including end system storage Encouraging privacy best practices, including end system storage
encryption, by facilitating it with protocol design reflecting such encryption, by facilitating it with protocol design reflecting such
considerations, is in scope. considerations, is in scope. Similar logic applies to methods for
designating information as public or private.
The privacy requirements above are for DRIP, neither for [F3411-19]
(which requires obfuscation of location to any Network RID subscriber
engaging in wide area surveillance, limits data retention periods,
etc. in the interests of privacy), nor for UAS RID in any specific
jurisdiction (which may have its own regulatory requirements). The
requirements above are also in a sense parameterized: who are the
"authorized actors", how are they designated, how are they
authenticated, etc.?
4.4. Registries 4.4. Registries
REG-1 Public Lookup: DRIP MUST enable lookup, from the UAS ID, of REG-1 Public Lookup: DRIP MUST enable lookup, from the UAS ID, of
information designated by cognizant authority as public, and information designated by cognizant authority as public, and
MUST NOT restrict access to this information based on identity MUST NOT restrict access to this information based on identity
of the party submitting the query. of the party submitting the query.
REG-2 Private Lookup: DRIP MUST enable lookup of private information REG-2 Private Lookup: DRIP MUST enable lookup of private information
(i.e., any and all information in a registry, associated with (i.e., any and all information in a registry, associated with
skipping to change at page 22, line 9 skipping to change at page 23, line 41
information on its current operation within the UTM (including information on its current operation within the UTM (including
means by which the USS under which the UAS is operating may be means by which the USS under which the UAS is operating may be
contacted for further, typically even more dynamic, contacted for further, typically even more dynamic,
information), and Internet direct contact information for information), and Internet direct contact information for
services related to the foregoing. services related to the foregoing.
REG-4 AAA Policy: DRIP MUST enable closing the AAA-policy registry REG-4 AAA Policy: DRIP MUST enable closing the AAA-policy registry
loop by governing AAA per registered policies and loop by governing AAA per registered policies and
administering policies only via AAA. administering policies only via AAA.
5. Discussion and Limitations 5. IANA Considerations
This document is largely based on the process of one SDO, ASTM.
Therefore, it is tailored to specific needs and data formats of this
standard. Other organizations, for example in EU, do not necessary
follow the same architecture. IETF traditionally operates assuming
the source material for the standardization process is publicly
available. However, ASTM standards require a fee for download.
Therefore a double-liaison program at IETF might need to be
activated, providing free access to ASTM specifications for
contributors to IETF documents.
The need for drone ID and operator privacy is an open discussion
topic. For instance, in the ground vehicular domain each car carries
a publicly visible plate number. In some countries, for nominal cost
or even for free, anyone can resolve the identity and contact
information of the owner. Civil commercial aviation and maritime
industries also have a tradition of broadcasting plane or ship ID,
coordinates and even flight plans in plain text. Community networks
such as OpenSky and Flightradar use this open information through
ADS-B to deploy public services of flight tracking. Many researchers
also use these data to perform optimization of routes and airport
operations. Such ID information should be integrity protected, but
not necessarily confidential.
In civil aviation, aircraft identity is broadcast by a device known
as transponder. It transmits a four-digit squawk code, which is
assigned by a traffic controller to an airplane after approving a
flight plan. There are several reserved codes such as 7600 which
indicate radio communication failure. The codes are unique in each
traffic area and can be re-assigned when entering another control
area. The code is transmitted in plain text by the transponder and
also used for collision avoidance by a system known as Traffic alert
and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS). The system could be used for
UAS as well initially, but the code space is quite limited and likely
to be exhausted soon. The number of UAS far exceeds the number of
civil airplanes in operation.
The ADS-B system is utilized in civil aviation for each "ADS-B Out"
equipped airplane to broadcast its ID, coordinates and altitude for
other airplanes and ground control stations. If this system is
adopted for drone IDs, it has additional benefit with backward
compatibility with civil aviation infrastructure; then, pilots and
dispatchers will be able to see UA on their control screens and take
those into account. If not, a gateway translation system between the
proposed drone ID and civil aviation system should be implemented.
Again, system saturation due to large numbers of UAS is a concern.
Wi-Fi and Bluetooth are two wireless technologies currently
recommended by ASTM specifications due to their widespread use and
broadcast nature. However, those have limited range (max 100s of
meters) and may not reliably deliver UAS ID at high altitude or
distance. Therefore, a study should be made of alternative
technologies from the telecom domain (WiMax, 5G) or sensor networks
(Sigfox, LORA). Such transmission technologies can impose additional
restrictions on packet sizes and frequency of transmissions, but
could provide better energy efficiency and range. In civil aviation,
Controller-Pilot Data Link Communications (CPDLC) is used to transmit
command and control between the pilots and ATC. It could be
considered for UAS as well due to long range and proven use despite
its lack of security [cpdlc].
L-band Digital Aeronautical Communications System (LDACS) is being
standardized by ICAO and IETF for use in future civil aviation
[I-D.maeurer-raw-ldacs]. It provides secure communication,
positioning and control for aircraft using a dedicated radio band.
It should be analyzed as a potential provider for UAS RID as well.
This will bring the benefit of a global integrated system creating a
global airspace use awareness.
6. IANA Considerations
This document does not make any IANA request. This document does not make any IANA request.
7. Security Considerations 6. Security Considerations
DRIP is all about safety and security, so content pertaining to such DRIP is all about safety and security, so content pertaining to such
is not limited to this section. Potential vulnerabilities of DRIP is not limited to this section. Potential vulnerabilities of DRIP
include but are not limited to: include but are not limited to:
* Sybil attacks * Sybil attacks
* Confusion created by many spoofed unsigned messages * Confusion created by many spoofed unsigned messages
* Processing overload induced by attempting to verify many spoofed * Processing overload induced by attempting to verify many spoofed
signed messages (where verification will fail but still consume signed messages (where verification will fail but still consume
cycles) cycles)
* Malicious or malfunctioning registries * Malicious or malfunctioning registries
* Interception of (e.g. Man In The Middle attacks on) registration * Interception of (e.g. Man In The Middle attacks on) registration
messages messages
skipping to change at page 24, line 5 skipping to change at page 24, line 15
* Processing overload induced by attempting to verify many spoofed * Processing overload induced by attempting to verify many spoofed
signed messages (where verification will fail but still consume signed messages (where verification will fail but still consume
cycles) cycles)
* Malicious or malfunctioning registries * Malicious or malfunctioning registries
* Interception of (e.g. Man In The Middle attacks on) registration * Interception of (e.g. Man In The Middle attacks on) registration
messages messages
8. Privacy and Transparency Considerations * UA impersonation through private key extraction, improper key
sharing or carriage of a small (presumably harmless) UA, e.g. as a
"false flag", by a larger (malicious) UA
Privacy is closely related to but not synonomous with security, and 7. Privacy and Transparency Considerations
Privacy is closely related to but not synonymous with security, and
conflicts with transparency. Privacy and transparency are important conflicts with transparency. Privacy and transparency are important
for legal reasons including regulatory consistency. [EU2018] for legal reasons including regulatory consistency. [EU2018]
[EU2018]states "harmonised and interoperable national registration [EU2018] states "harmonised and interoperable national registration
systems... should comply with the applicable Union and national law systems... should comply with the applicable Union and national law
on privacy and processing of personal data, and the information on privacy and processing of personal data, and the information
stored in those registration systems should be easily accessible." stored in those registration systems should be easily accessible."
Privacy and transparency (where essential to security or safety) are Privacy and transparency (where essential to security or safety) are
also ethical and moral imperatives. Even in cases where old also ethical and moral imperatives. Even in cases where old
practices (e.g. automobile registration plates) could be imitated, practices (e.g. automobile registration plates) could be imitated,
when new applications involving PII (such as UAS RID) are addressed when new applications involving PII (such as UAS RID) are addressed
and newer technologies could enable improving privacy, such and newer technologies could enable improving privacy, such
opportunities should not be squandered. Thus is is recommended that opportunities should not be squandered. Thus it is recommended that
all DRIP documents give due regard to [RFC6973] and more broadly all DRIP documents give due regard to [RFC6973] and more broadly
[RFC8280]. [RFC8280].
DRIP information falls into two classes: that which, to achieve the DRIP information falls into two classes: that which, to achieve the
purpose, must be published openly as cleartext, for the benefit of purpose, must be published openly as cleartext, for the benefit of
any Observer (e.g. the basic UAS ID itself); and that which must be any Observer (e.g., the basic UAS ID itself); and that which must be
protected (e.g., PII of pilots) but made available to properly protected (e.g., PII of pilots) but made available to properly
authorized parties (e.g., public safety personnel who urgently need authorized parties (e.g., public safety personnel who urgently need
to contact pilots in emergencies). This classification must be made to contact pilots in emergencies). How properly authorized parties
explicit and reflected with markings, design, etc. Classifying the are authorized, authenticated, etc. are questions that extend beyond
information will be addressed primarily in external standards; herein the scope of DRIP, but DRIP may be able to provide support for such
it will be regarded as a matter for CAA, registry and operator processes. Classification of information as public or private must
policies, for which enforcement mechanisms will be defined within the be made explicit and reflected with markings, design, etc.
scope of DRIP WG and offered. Details of the protection mechanisms Classifying the information will be addressed primarily in external
will be provided in other DRIP documents. Mitigation of adversarial standards; herein it will be regarded as a matter for CAA, registry
correlation will also be addressed. and operator policies, for which enforcement mechanisms will be
defined within the scope of DRIP WG and offered. Details of the
protection mechanisms will be provided in other DRIP documents.
Mitigation of adversarial correlation will also be addressed.
9. References 8. References
9.1. Normative References 8.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
9.2. Informative References 8.2. Informative References
[cpdlc] Gurtov, A., Polishchuk, T., and M. Wernberg, "Controller- [cpdlc] Gurtov, A., Polishchuk, T., and M. Wernberg, "Controller-
Pilot Data Link Communication Security", MDPI Pilot Data Link Communication Security", MDPI
Sensors 18(5), 1636, 2018, Sensors 18(5), 1636, 2018,
<https://www.mdpi.com/1424-8220/18/5/1636>. <https://www.mdpi.com/1424-8220/18/5/1636>.
[crowd-sourced-rid]
Moskowitz, R., Card, S., Wiethuechter, A., Zhao, S., and
H. Birkholz, "Crowd Sourced Remote ID", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-moskowitz-drip-crowd-sourced-rid-04,
20 May 2020, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-moskowitz-
drip-crowd-sourced-rid-04>.
[CTA2063A] ANSI, "Small Unmanned Aerial Systems Serial Numbers", [CTA2063A] ANSI, "Small Unmanned Aerial Systems Serial Numbers",
September 2019. September 2019.
[Delegated] [Delegated]
European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), "Commission European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), "Commission
Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/945 of 12 March 2019 on Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/945 of 12 March 2019 on
unmanned aircraft systems and on third-country operators unmanned aircraft systems and on third-country operators
of unmanned aircraft systems", March 2019. of unmanned aircraft systems", March 2019.
[drip-architecture] [drip-architecture]
Card, S., Wiethuechter, A., Moskowitz, R., Zhao, S., and Card, S., Wiethuechter, A., Moskowitz, R., Zhao, S., and
A. Gurtov, "Drone Remote Identification Protocol (DRIP) A. Gurtov, "Drone Remote Identification Protocol (DRIP)
Architecture", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft- Architecture", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-drip-arch-02, 23 June 2020, ietf-drip-arch-03, 13 July 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-drip-arch-02>. <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-drip-arch-03>.
[drip-auth]
Wiethuechter, A., Card, S., and R. Moskowitz, "DRIP
Authentication Formats", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-wiethuechter-drip-auth-01, 10 July 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-wiethuechter-drip-auth-
01>.
[drip-identity-claims]
Wiethuechter, A., Card, S., and R. Moskowitz, "DRIP
Identity Claims", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
wiethuechter-drip-identity-claims-00, 23 March 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-wiethuechter-drip-
identity-claims-00>.
[drip-secure-nrid-c2]
Moskowitz, R., Card, S., Wiethuechter, A., and A. Gurtov,
"Secure UAS Network RID and C2 Transport", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-moskowitz-drip-secure-
nrid-c2-00, 6 April 2020, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/
draft-moskowitz-drip-secure-nrid-c2-00>.
[drip-uas-rid]
Moskowitz, R., Card, S., Wiethuechter, A., and A. Gurtov,
"UAS Remote ID", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
moskowitz-drip-uas-rid-02, 28 May 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-moskowitz-drip-uas-rid-
02>.
[ENISACSIRT] [ENISACSIRT]
European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA), European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA),
"Actionable information for Security Incident Response", "Actionable information for Security Incident Response",
November 2014, <https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/csirt- November 2014, <https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/csirt-
cert-services/reactive-services/copy_of_actionable- cert-services/reactive-services/copy_of_actionable-
information>. information>.
[EU2018] European Parliament and Council, "2015/0277 (COD) PE-CONS [EU2018] European Parliament and Council, "2015/0277 (COD) PE-CONS
2/18", February 2018. 2/18", February 2018.
[F3411-19] ASTM International, "Standard Specification for Remote ID [F3411-19] ASTM International, "Standard Specification for Remote ID
and Tracking", February 2020, and Tracking", February 2020,
<http://www.astm.org/cgi-bin/resolver.cgi?F3411>. <http://www.astm.org/cgi-bin/resolver.cgi?F3411>.
[FAACONOPS] [FAACONOPS]
FAA Office of NextGen, "UTM Concept of Operations v2.0", FAA Office of NextGen, "UTM Concept of Operations v2.0",
March 2020. March 2020.
[hhit-registries]
Moskowitz, R., Card, S., and A. Wiethuechter,
"Hierarchical HIT Registries", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-moskowitz-hip-hhit-registries-02, 9 March
2020, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-moskowitz-hip-
hhit-registries-02>.
[hierarchical-hit]
Moskowitz, R., Card, S., and A. Wiethuechter,
"Hierarchical HITs for HIPv2", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-moskowitz-hip-hierarchical-hit-05, 13 May
2020, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-moskowitz-hip-
hierarchical-hit-05>.
[I-D.maeurer-raw-ldacs] [I-D.maeurer-raw-ldacs]
Maeurer, N., Graeupl, T., and C. Schmitt, "L-band Digital Maeurer, N., Graeupl, T., and C. Schmitt, "L-band Digital
Aeronautical Communications System (LDACS)", Work in Aeronautical Communications System (LDACS)", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-maeurer-raw-ldacs-04, 2 Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-maeurer-raw-ldacs-05, 14
July 2020, August 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-maeurer-raw-ldacs-04>. <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-maeurer-raw-ldacs-05>.
[ICAOATM] International Civil Aviation Organization, "Doc 4444: [ICAOATM] International Civil Aviation Organization, "Doc 4444:
Procedures for Air Navigation Services: Air Traffic Procedures for Air Navigation Services: Air Traffic
Management", November 2016. Management", November 2016.
[ICAOUTM] International Civil Aviation Organization, "Unmanned [ICAOUTM] International Civil Aviation Organization, "Unmanned
Aircraft Systems Traffic Management (UTM) - A Common Aircraft Systems Traffic Management (UTM) - A Common
Framework with Core Principles for Global Harmonization, Framework with Core Principles for Global Harmonization,
Edition 2", November 2019. Edition 2", November 2019.
[Implementing] [Implementing]
European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), "Commission European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), "Commission
Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947 of 24 May 2019 on Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947 of 24 May 2019 on
the rules and procedures for the operation of unmanned the rules and procedures for the operation of unmanned
aircraft", May 2019. aircraft", May 2019.
[new-hip-crypto]
Moskowitz, R., Card, S., and A. Wiethuechter, "New
Cryptographic Algorithms for HIP", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-moskowitz-hip-new-crypto-04, 23
January 2020, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-
moskowitz-hip-new-crypto-04>.
[new-orchid]
Moskowitz, R., Card, S., and A. Wiethuechter, "Using
cSHAKE in ORCHIDs", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-moskowitz-orchid-cshake-01, 21 May 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-moskowitz-orchid-
cshake-01>.
[NPRM] United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), [NPRM] United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),
"Notice of Proposed Rule Making on Remote Identification "Notice of Proposed Rule Making on Remote Identification
of Unmanned Aircraft Systems", December 2019. of Unmanned Aircraft Systems", December 2019.
[OpenDroneID]
Intel Corp., "Open Drone ID", March 2019,
<https://github.com/opendroneid/specs>.
[Opinion1] European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), "Opinion No
01/2020: High-level regulatory framework for the U-space",
March 2020.
[Recommendations] [Recommendations]
FAA UAS Identification and Tracking Aviation Rulemaking FAA UAS Identification and Tracking Aviation Rulemaking
Committee, "UAS ID and Tracking ARC Recommendations Final Committee, "UAS ID and Tracking ARC Recommendations Final
Report", September 2017. Report", September 2017.
[RFC4122] Leach, P., Mealling, M., and R. Salz, "A Universally [RFC4122] Leach, P., Mealling, M., and R. Salz, "A Universally
Unique IDentifier (UUID) URN Namespace", RFC 4122, Unique IDentifier (UUID) URN Namespace", RFC 4122,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4122, July 2005, DOI 10.17487/RFC4122, July 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4122>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4122>.
skipping to change at page 28, line 24 skipping to change at page 27, line 50
[Roadmap] American National Standards Institute (ANSI) Unmanned [Roadmap] American National Standards Institute (ANSI) Unmanned
Aircraft Systems Standardization Collaborative (UASSC), Aircraft Systems Standardization Collaborative (UASSC),
"Standardization Roadmap for Unmanned Aircraft Systems "Standardization Roadmap for Unmanned Aircraft Systems
draft v2.0", April 2020, <https://share.ansi.org/Shared draft v2.0", April 2020, <https://share.ansi.org/Shared
Documents/Standards Activities/UASSC/ Documents/Standards Activities/UASSC/
UASSC_20-001_WORKING_DRAFT_ANSI_UASSC_Roadmap_v2.pdf>. UASSC_20-001_WORKING_DRAFT_ANSI_UASSC_Roadmap_v2.pdf>.
[Stranger] Heinlein, R.A., "Stranger in a Strange Land", June 1961. [Stranger] Heinlein, R.A., "Stranger in a Strange Land", June 1961.
[WG105] European Parliament and Council, "EUROCAE WG-105 draft [WG105] EUROCAE, "WG-105 draft Minimum Operational Performance
Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for Standards (MOPS) for Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS)
Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Electronic Electronic Identification", June 2020.
Identification"", June 2020.
Appendix A. Discussion and Limitations
This document is largely based on the process of one SDO, ASTM.
Therefore, it is tailored to specific needs and data formats of this
standard. Other organizations, for example in EU, do not necessary
follow the same architecture.
The need for drone ID and operator privacy is an open discussion
topic. For instance, in the ground vehicular domain each car carries
a publicly visible plate number. In some countries, for nominal cost
or even for free, anyone can resolve the identity and contact
information of the owner. Civil commercial aviation and maritime
industries also have a tradition of broadcasting plane or ship ID,
coordinates and even flight plans in plain text. Community networks
such as OpenSky and Flightradar use this open information through
ADS-B to deploy public services of flight tracking. Many researchers
also use these data to perform optimization of routes and airport
operations. Such ID information should be integrity protected, but
not necessarily confidential.
In civil aviation, aircraft identity is broadcast by a device known
as transponder. It transmits a four-digit squawk code, which is
assigned by a traffic controller to an airplane after approving a
flight plan. There are several reserved codes such as 7600 which
indicate radio communication failure. The codes are unique in each
traffic area and can be re-assigned when entering another control
area. The code is transmitted in plain text by the transponder and
also used for collision avoidance by a system known as Traffic alert
and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS). The system could be used for
UAS as well initially, but the code space is quite limited and likely
to be exhausted soon. The number of UAS far exceeds the number of
civil airplanes in operation.
The ADS-B system is utilized in civil aviation for each "ADS-B Out"
equipped airplane to broadcast its ID, coordinates and altitude for
other airplanes and ground control stations. If this system is
adopted for drone IDs, it has additional benefit with backward
compatibility with civil aviation infrastructure; then, pilots and
dispatchers will be able to see UA on their control screens and take
those into account. If not, a gateway translation system between the
proposed drone ID and civil aviation system should be implemented.
Again, system saturation due to large numbers of UAS is a concern.
Wi-Fi and Bluetooth are two wireless technologies currently
recommended by ASTM specifications due to their widespread use and
broadcast nature. However, those have limited range (max 100s of
meters) and may not reliably deliver UAS ID at high altitude or
distance. Therefore, a study should be made of alternative
technologies from the telecom domain (WiMax, 5G) or sensor networks
(Sigfox, LORA). Such transmission technologies can impose additional
restrictions on packet sizes and frequency of transmissions, but
could provide better energy efficiency and range. In civil aviation,
Controller-Pilot Data Link Communications (CPDLC) is used to transmit
command and control between the pilots and ATC. It could be
considered for UAS as well due to long range and proven use despite
its lack of security [cpdlc].
L-band Digital Aeronautical Communications System (LDACS) is being
standardized by ICAO and IETF for use in future civil aviation
[I-D.maeurer-raw-ldacs]. It provides secure communication,
positioning and control for aircraft using a dedicated radio band.
It should be analyzed as a potential provider for UAS RID as well.
This will bring the benefit of a global integrated system creating a
global airspace use awareness.
Acknowledgments Acknowledgments
The work of the FAA's UAS Identification and Tracking (UAS ID) The work of the FAA's UAS Identification and Tracking (UAS ID)
Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) is the foundation of later ASTM Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) is the foundation of later ASTM
[F3411-19] and IETF DRIP efforts. The work of ASTM F38.02 in [F3411-19] and IETF DRIP efforts. The work of Gabriel Cox, Intel
balancing the interests of diverse stakeholders is essential to the Corp. and their Open Drone ID collaborators opened UAS RID to a wider
necessary rapid and widespread deployment of UAS RID. IETF community. The work of ASTM F38.02 in balancing the interests of
volunteers who have contributed to this draft include Amelia diverse stakeholders is essential to the necessary rapid and
Andersdotter, Mohamed Boucadair, Toerless Eckert, Susan Hares, Mika widespread deployment of UAS RID. IETF volunteers who have
J&#228;rvenp&#228;&#228;, Daniel Migault, Saulo Da Silva and Shuai extensively reviewed or otherwise contributed to this document
Zhao. include Amelia Andersdotter, Carsten Bormann, Mohamed Boucadair,
Toerless Eckert, Susan Hares, Mika Jarvenpaa, Daniel Migault,
Alexandre Petrescu, Saulo Da Silva and Shuai Zhao.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Stuart W. Card (editor) Stuart W. Card (editor)
AX Enterprize AX Enterprize
4947 Commercial Drive 4947 Commercial Drive
Yorkville, NY 13495 Yorkville, NY 13495
United States of America United States of America
Email: stu.card@axenterprize.com Email: stu.card@axenterprize.com
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