draft-ietf-drip-reqs-13.txt   draft-ietf-drip-reqs-14.txt 
DRIP S. Card, Ed. DRIP S. Card, Ed.
Internet-Draft A. Wiethuechter Internet-Draft A. Wiethuechter
Intended status: Informational AX Enterprize Intended status: Informational AX Enterprize
Expires: 16 December 2021 R. Moskowitz Expires: 27 December 2021 R. Moskowitz
HTT Consulting HTT Consulting
A. Gurtov A. Gurtov
Linköping University Linköping University
14 June 2021 25 June 2021
Drone Remote Identification Protocol (DRIP) Requirements Drone Remote Identification Protocol (DRIP) Requirements
draft-ietf-drip-reqs-13 draft-ietf-drip-reqs-14
Abstract Abstract
This document defines terminology and requirements for Drone Remote This document defines terminology and requirements for Drone Remote
Identification Protocol (DRIP) Working Group solutions to support Identification Protocol (DRIP) Working Group solutions to support
Unmanned Aircraft System Remote Identification and tracking (UAS RID) Unmanned Aircraft System Remote Identification and tracking (UAS RID)
for security, safety, and other purposes (e.g., initiation of for security, safety, and other purposes (e.g., initiation of
identity based network sessions supporting UAS applications). identity based network sessions supporting UAS applications).
Complementing external technical standards as regulator-accepted Complementing external technical standards as regulator-accepted
means of compliance with UAS RID regulations, DRIP will facilitate means of compliance with UAS RID regulations, DRIP will facilitate
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 16 December 2021. This Internet-Draft will expire on 27 December 2021.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
skipping to change at page 2, line 23 skipping to change at page 2, line 23
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Motivation and External Influences . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Motivation and External Influences . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Concerns and Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 1.2. Concerns and Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.3. DRIP Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 1.3. DRIP Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.4. Document Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 1.4. Document Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2. Terms and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 2. Terms and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.1. Requirements Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 2.1. Requirements Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 2.2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3. UAS RID Problem Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 3. UAS RID Problem Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.1. Network RID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 3.1. Network RID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.2. Broadcast RID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 3.2. Broadcast RID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.3. USS in UTM and RID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 3.3. USS in UTM and RID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.4. DRIP Focus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 3.4. DRIP Focus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 4. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.1. General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 4.1. General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.1.1. Normative Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 4.1.1. Normative Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.1.2. Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 4.1.2. Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.2. Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 4.2. Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4.2.1. Normative Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 4.2.1. Normative Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4.2.2. Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 4.2.2. Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4.3. Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 4.3. Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4.3.1. Normative Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 4.3.1. Normative Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4.3.2. Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 4.3.2. Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4.4. Registries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 4.4. Registries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.4.1. Normative Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 4.4.1. Normative Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.4.2. Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 4.4.2. Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
7. Privacy and Transparency Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . 39 7. Privacy and Transparency Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . 38
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Appendix A. Discussion and Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 Appendix A. Discussion and Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
For any unfamiliar or _a priori_ ambiguous terminology herein, see For any unfamiliar or _a priori_ ambiguous terminology herein, see
Section 2. Section 2.
1.1. Motivation and External Influences 1.1. Motivation and External Influences
Many considerations (especially safety and security) necessitate Many considerations (especially safety and security) necessitate
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Remote Identification and tracking Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Remote Identification and tracking
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(e.g., UAS or Observer device) encountering an _a priori_ unknown UA (e.g., UAS or Observer device) encountering an _a priori_ unknown UA
in physical space has no identifier or logical space locator for that in physical space has no identifier or logical space locator for that
UA, unless and until one is provided somehow. RID provides an UA, unless and until one is provided somehow. RID provides an
identifier, which, if well chosen, can facilitate use of a variety of identifier, which, if well chosen, can facilitate use of a variety of
Internet family protocols and services to support arbitrary Internet family protocols and services to support arbitrary
applications, beyond the basic security functions of RID. For most applications, beyond the basic security functions of RID. For most
of these, some type of identifier is essential, e.g., Network Access of these, some type of identifier is essential, e.g., Network Access
Identifier (NAI), Digital Object Identifier (DOI), Uniform Resource Identifier (NAI), Digital Object Identifier (DOI), Uniform Resource
Identifier (URI), domain name, or public key. DRIP motivations Identifier (URI), domain name, or public key. DRIP motivations
include both the basic security and the broader application support include both the basic security and the broader application support
functions of RID. functions of RID. The general scenario is illustrated in Figure 1.
The general UAS RID usage scenario is illustrated in Figure 1.
+-----+ +-----+ *************** ***************
| UA1 | | UA2 | * UAS1 * * UAS2 *
+-----+ +-----+ * * * *
* +--------+ * DAA/V2V * +--------+ *
* | UA o--*----------------------------------------*--o UA | *
* +--o--o--+ * * +--o--o--+ *
* | | * +------+ Lookups +------+ * | | *
* | | * | GPOD o------. .------o PSOD | * | | *
* | | * +------+ | | +------+ * | | *
* | | * | | * | | *
* C2 | | * V2I ************ V2I * | | C2 *
* | '-----*--------------* *--------------*-----' | *
* | * * * * | *
* | o====NetRID====* *====NetRID====o | *
* +--o--+ * * Internet * * +--o--+ *
* | GCS o-----*--------------* *--------------*-----o GCS | *
* +-----+ * Registration * * Registration * +-----+ *
* * (and UTM) * * (and UTM) * *
*************** ************ ***************
| | |
+----------+ | | | +----------+
| Public o---' | '---o Private |
| Registry | | | Registry |
+----------+ | +----------+
+--o--+
| DNS |
+-----+
+----------+ +----------+ GPOD: General Public Observer Device (used only to fit this figure)
| General | | Public | PSOD: Public Safety Observer Device (used only to fit this figure)
| Public | | Safety |
| Observer o------\ /------o Observer |
+----------+ | | +----------+
| |
*************
+----------+ * * +----------+
| UA1 | * * | UA2 |
| Pilot/ o------* Internet *------o Pilot/ |
| Operator | * * | Operator |
+----------+ * * +----------+
*************
| | |
+----------+ | | | +----------+
| Public o---/ | \---o Private |
| Registry | | | Registry |
+----------+ | +----------+
+--o--+
| DNS |
+-----+
Figure 1: "General UAS RID Usage Scenario" Figure 1: "General UAS RID Usage Scenario"
Figure 1 illustrates a typical case where there may be: multiple Figure 1 illustrates a typical case where there may be: multiple
Observers, some of them members of the general public, others Observers, some of them members of the general public, others
government officers with public safety/security responsibilities; government officers with public safety/security responsibilities;
multiple UA in flight within observation range, each with its own multiple UA in flight within observation range, each with its own
pilot/operator; at least one registry each for lookup of public and pilot/operator; at least one registry each for lookup of public and
(by authorized parties only) private information regarding the UAS (by authorized parties only) private information regarding the UAS
and their pilots/operators; and in the DRIP vision, DNS resolving and their pilots/operators; and in the DRIP vision, DNS resolving
various identifiers and locators of the entities involved. Note the various identifiers and locators of the entities involved. Note that
absence of any links to/from the UA in the figure; this is because Broadcast RID direct RF links are not shown, as they are indeed
UAS RID and other connectivity involving the UA varies as described broadcast, so reach anywhere within range; they do not connect
below. specific entity pairings, as edges do vertices in a graph. Further,
RID and other connectivity involving the UA varies, as described
subsequently herein under Figure 3. Not all the links shown in
Figure 1 above necessarily exist in all scenarios (e.g., UA support
for direct connectivity to the Internet is very rare as of 2021), and
even those links that exist sometimes in a given scenario are not
necessarily up at all times in that same scenario (e.g., remote
Observer connectivity to the Internet may be very intermittent).
An Observer of UA may need to classify them, as illustrated An Observer of UA may need to classify them, as illustrated
notionally in Figure 2, for basic airspace Situational Awareness notionally in Figure 2, for basic airspace Situational Awareness
(SA). An Observer who classifies a UAS: as Taskable, can ask it to (SA). An Observer who classifies a UAS: as Taskable, can ask it to
do something useful; as Low Concern, can reasonably assume it is not do something useful; as Low Concern, can reasonably assume it is not
malicious and would cooperate with requests to modify its flight malicious and would cooperate with requests to modify its flight
plans for safety concerns that arise; as High Concern or plans for safety concerns that arise; as High Concern or
Unidentified, can focus surveillance on it. Unidentified, can focus surveillance on it.
xxxxxxx +--------------+ xxxxxxx
x x No | | x x No +--------------+
x ID? x+---->| Unidentified | x ID? x+---->| Unidentified |
x x | | x x +--------------+
xxxxxxx +--------------+ xxxxxxx
+ +
| Yes | Yes
v v
xxxxxxx xxxxxxx
x x x x
/---------+x Type? x+----------\ .---------+x Type? x+----------.
| x x | | x x |
| xxxxxxx | | xxxxxxx |
| + | | + |
v v v v v v
+--------------+ +--------------+ +--------------+ +--------------+ +--------------+ +--------------+
| | | | | |
| Taskable | | Low Concern | | High Concern | | Taskable | | Low Concern | | High Concern |
| | | | | |
+--------------+ +--------------+ +--------------+ +--------------+ +--------------+ +--------------+
Figure 2: "Notional UAS Classification" Figure 2: "Notional UAS Classification"
ASTM International, Technical Committee F38 (UAS), Subcommittee ASTM International, Technical Committee F38 (UAS), Subcommittee
F38.02 (Aircraft Operations), Work Item WK65041, developed the widely F38.02 (Aircraft Operations), Work Item WK65041, developed the widely
cited Standard Specification for Remote ID and Tracking [F3411-19]: cited Standard Specification for Remote ID and Tracking [F3411-19]:
the published standard is available for purchase from ASTM and as an the published standard is available for purchase from ASTM and as an
ASTM membership premium; early drafts are freely available as ASTM membership premium; early drafts are freely available as
[OpenDroneID] specifications. [F3411-19] is frequently referenced in [OpenDroneID] specifications. [F3411-19] is frequently referenced in
skipping to change at page 6, line 14 skipping to change at page 6, line 23
In many applications, including UAS RID, identification and In many applications, including UAS RID, identification and
identifiers are not ends in themselves; they exist to enable lookups identifiers are not ends in themselves; they exist to enable lookups
and provision of other services. and provision of other services.
Using UAS RID to facilitate vehicular (V2X) communications and Using UAS RID to facilitate vehicular (V2X) communications and
applications such as Detect And Avoid (DAA), which would impose applications such as Detect And Avoid (DAA), which would impose
tighter latency bounds than RID itself, is an obvious possibility, tighter latency bounds than RID itself, is an obvious possibility,
explicitly contemplated in the United States (US) Federal Aviation explicitly contemplated in the United States (US) Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) Remote Identification of Unmanned Aircraft rule Administration (FAA) Remote Identification of Unmanned Aircraft rule
[FRUR]. However, applications of RID beyond RID itself, including [FRUR]. However, usage of RID systems and information beyond mere
DAA, have been declared out of scope in ASTM F38.02 WK65041, based on identification (primarily to hold operators accountable after the
a distinction between RID as a security standard vs DAA as a safety fact), including DAA, have been declared out of scope in ASTM F38.02
application. Each Standards Development Organization (SDO) has its WK65041, based on a distinction between RID as a security standard vs
own cultural set of connotations of safety vs security; the DAA as a safety application. Aviation community Standards
denotative definitions of the International Civil Aviation Development Organizations (SDOs) generally set a higher bar for
Organization (ICAO) are cited in Section 2. safety than for security, especially with respect to reliability.
Each SDO has its own cultural set of connotations of safety vs
security; the denotative definitions of the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) are cited in Section 2.
[Opinion1] and [WG105] cite the Direct Remote Identification (DRI) [Opinion1] and [WG105] cite the Direct Remote Identification (DRI)
previously required and specified, explicitly stating that whereas previously required and specified, explicitly stating that whereas
DRI is primarily for security purposes, the "Network Identification DRI is primarily for security purposes, the "Network Identification
Service" [Opinion1] (in the context of U-space [InitialView]) or Service" [Opinion1] (in the context of U-space [InitialView]) or
"Electronic Identification" [WG105] is primarily for safety purposes "Electronic Identification" [WG105] is primarily for safety purposes
(e.g., Air Traffic Management, especially hazards deconfliction) and (e.g., Air Traffic Management, especially hazards deconfliction) and
also is allowed to be used for other purposes such as support of also is allowed to be used for other purposes such as support of
efficient operations. These emerging standards allow the security efficient operations. These emerging standards allow the security
and safety oriented systems to be separate or merged. In addition to and safety oriented systems to be separate or merged. In addition to
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ASD-STAN also contemplates corresponding Network Remote ASD-STAN also contemplates corresponding Network Remote
Identification (NRI) functionality. The ASD-STAN RID target is to Identification (NRI) functionality. The ASD-STAN RID target is to
revise their current standard with additional functionality (e.g., revise their current standard with additional functionality (e.g.,
DRIP) to be published before 2022 [ASDRI]. DRIP) to be published before 2022 [ASDRI].
Security oriented UAS RID essentially has two goals: enable the Security oriented UAS RID essentially has two goals: enable the
general public to obtain and record an opaque ID for any observed UA, general public to obtain and record an opaque ID for any observed UA,
which they can then report to authorities; enable authorities, from which they can then report to authorities; enable authorities, from
such an ID, to look up information about the UAS and its operator. such an ID, to look up information about the UAS and its operator.
Safety oriented UAS RID has stronger requirements. Aviation Safety oriented UAS RID has stronger requirements.
community SDOs set a higher bar for safety than for security,
especially with respect to reliability.
Although dynamic establishment of secure communications between the Although dynamic establishment of secure communications between the
Observer and the UAS pilot seems to have been contemplated by the FAA Observer and the UAS pilot seems to have been contemplated by the FAA
UAS ID and Tracking Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) in their UAS ID and Tracking Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) in their
[Recommendations], it is not addressed in any of the [Recommendations], it is not addressed in any of the
subsequent regulations or international SDO technical specifications, subsequent regulations or international SDO technical specifications,
other than DRIP, known to the authors as of early 2021. other than DRIP, known to the authors as of early 2021.
1.2. Concerns and Constraints 1.2. Concerns and Constraints
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clubs and other eligible organizations can apply to the FAA for such clubs and other eligible organizations can apply to the FAA for such
recognition of their operating areas. recognition of their operating areas.
3.1. Network RID 3.1. Network RID
+-------------+ ****************** +-------------+ ******************
| UA | * Internet * | UA | * Internet *
+--o-------o--+ * * +--o-------o--+ * *
| | * * | | * *
| | * * +------------+ | | * * +------------+
| \--------*--(+)-----------*-----o | | '--------*--(+)-----------*-----o |
| * | * | | | * | * | |
| /--------*--(+)-----------*-----o NET-Rid SP | | .--------*--(+)-----------*-----o NET-Rid SP |
| | * * | | | | * * | |
| | * /------*-----o | | | * .------*-----o |
| | * | * +------------+ | | * | * +------------+
| | * | * | | * | *
| | * | * +------------+ | | * | * +------------+
| | * \------*-----o | | | * '------*-----o |
| | * * | NET-Rid DP | | | * * | NET-Rid DP |
| | * /------*-----o | | | * .------*-----o |
| | * | * +------------+ | | * | * +------------+
| | * | * | | * | *
| | * | * +------------+ | | * | * +------------+
+--o-------o--+ * \------*-----o Observer’s | +--o-------o--+ * '------*-----o Observer's |
| GCS | * * | Device | | GCS | * * | Device |
+-------------+ ****************** +------------+ +-------------+ ****************** +------------+
Figure 3: "Network RID Information Flow" Figure 3: "Network RID Information Flow"
Figure 3 illustrates Network RID information flows. Only two of the Figure 3 illustrates Network RID information flows. Only two of the
three typically wireless links shown involving the UAS (UA-GCS, UA- three typically wireless links shown involving the UAS (UA-GCS, UA-
Internet, and GCS-Internet) need exist. All three may exist, at the Internet, and GCS-Internet) need exist. All three may exist, at the
same or different times, especially in Beyond Visual Line Of Sight same or different times, especially in Beyond Visual Line Of Sight
(BVLOS) operations. There must be some information flow path (direct (BVLOS) operations. There must be some information flow path (direct
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(APIs) and browsers. (APIs) and browsers.
Network RID is the less constrained of the defined UAS RID means. Network RID is the less constrained of the defined UAS RID means.
[F3411-19] specifies only Net-RID SP to Net-RID DP information [F3411-19] specifies only Net-RID SP to Net-RID DP information
exchanges. It is presumed that IETF efforts supporting the more exchanges. It is presumed that IETF efforts supporting the more
constrained Broadcast RID (see next section) can be generalized for constrained Broadcast RID (see next section) can be generalized for
Network RID and potentially also for UAS to USS or other UTM Network RID and potentially also for UAS to USS or other UTM
communications. communications.
3.2. Broadcast RID 3.2. Broadcast RID
+-------------------+ +-------------------+
| Unmanned Aircraft | | Unmanned Aircraft |
+---------o---------+ +---------o---------+
| |
| |
| |
| app messages directly over one-way RF data link | app messages directly over one-way RF data link
| |
| |
| v
+------------------o-------------------+ +------------------o-------------------+
| Observer's device (e.g., smartphone) | | Observer's device (e.g., smartphone) |
+--------------------------------------+ +--------------------------------------+
Figure 4: "Broadcast RID Information Flow" Figure 4: "Broadcast RID Information Flow"
Figure 4 illustrates Broadcast RID information flow. Note the Figure 4 illustrates Broadcast RID information flow. Note the
absence of the Internet from the figure. This is because Broadcast absence of the Internet from the figure. This is because Broadcast
RID is one-way direct transmission of application layer messages over RID is one-way direct transmission of application layer messages over
a RF data link (without IP) from the UA to local Observer devices. a RF data link (without IP) from the UA to local Observer devices.
skipping to change at page 31, line 36 skipping to change at page 30, line 51
verifying an asymmetric cryptographic signature using a verifying an asymmetric cryptographic signature using a
sender provided public key from which the asserted ID can be sender provided public key from which the asserted ID can be
at least partially derived), even on an Observer device at least partially derived), even on an Observer device
lacking Internet connectivity at the time of observation. lacking Internet connectivity at the time of observation.
GEN-2 Provable Binding: DRIP MUST enable binding all other GEN-2 Provable Binding: DRIP MUST enable binding all other
[F3411-19] messages from the same actual current sender to [F3411-19] messages from the same actual current sender to
the UAS ID asserted in the Basic ID message. the UAS ID asserted in the Basic ID message.
GEN-3 Provable Registration: DRIP MUST enable verification that the GEN-3 Provable Registration: DRIP MUST enable verification that the
UAS ID is in a registry and identification of which one, even UAS ID is in a registry and identification of that registry,
on an Observer device lacking Internet connectivity at the even on an Observer device lacking Internet connectivity at
time of observation; with UAS ID Type 3, the same sender may the time of observation; with UAS ID Type 3, the same sender
have multiple IDs, potentially in different registries, but may have multiple IDs, potentially in different registries,
each ID must clearly indicate in which registry it can be but each ID must clearly indicate in which registry it can be
found. found.
GEN-4 Readability: DRIP MUST enable information (regulation GEN-4 Readability: DRIP MUST enable information (regulation
required elements, whether sent via UAS RID or looked up in required elements, whether sent via UAS RID or looked up in
registries) to be read and utilized by both humans and registries) to be read and utilized by both humans and
software. software.
GEN-5 Gateway: DRIP MUST enable Broadcast RID to Network RID GEN-5 Gateway: DRIP MUST enable Broadcast RID to Network RID
application layer gateways to stamp messages with precise application layer gateways to stamp messages with precise
date/time received and receiver location, then relay them to date/time received and receiver location, then relay them to
a network service (e.g., SDSP or distributed ledger). a network service (e.g., SDSP or distributed ledger).
GEN-6 Finger: DRIP MUST enable dynamically establishing, with AAA, GEN-6 Contact: DRIP MUST enable dynamically establishing, with AAA,
per policy, strongly mutually authenticated, end-to-end per policy, strongly mutually authenticated, end-to-end
strongly encrypted communications with the UAS RID sender and strongly encrypted communications with the UAS RID sender and
entities looked up from the UAS ID, including at least the entities looked up from the UAS ID, including at least the
remote pilot and USS. pilot (remote pilot or Pilot In Command), the USS (if any)
under which the operation is being conducted, and registries
in which data on the UA and pilot are held.
GEN-7 QoS: DRIP MUST enable policy based specification of GEN-7 QoS: DRIP MUST enable policy based specification of
performance and reliability parameters. performance and reliability parameters.
GEN-8 Mobility: DRIP MUST support physical and logical mobility of GEN-8 Mobility: DRIP MUST support physical and logical mobility of
UA, GCS and Observers. DRIP SHOULD support mobility of UA, GCS and Observers. DRIP SHOULD support mobility of
essentially all participating nodes (UA, GCS, Observers, Net- essentially all participating nodes (UA, GCS, Observers, Net-
RID SP, Net-RID DP, Private Registry, SDSP, and potentially RID SP, Net-RID DP, Private Registry, SDSP, and potentially
others as RID and UTM evolve). others as RID and UTM evolve).
 End of changes. 32 change blocks. 
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