ECRIT                                                           B. Rosen
Internet-Draft                                             NeuStar, Inc.
Intended status: Experimental                             H. Schulzrinne
Expires: April 28, 2011 January 11, 2012                                    Columbia U.
                                                           H. Tschofenig
                                                  Nokia Siemens Networks
                                                        October 25, 2010
                                                           July 10, 2011

Common Alerting Protocol (CAP) based Data-Only Emergency Alerts using the Session
                       Initiation Protocol (SIP)
                  draft-ietf-ecrit-data-only-ea-01.txt
                  draft-ietf-ecrit-data-only-ea-02.txt

Abstract

   The Common Alerting Protocol (CAP) is a document format for
   exchanging emergency alerts and public warnings.  CAP is mainly used
   for conveying alerts and warnings between authorities and from
   authorities to citizen/individuals.  This document describes how
   data-only emergency alerts allow
   devices use CAP to issue alerts using the
   CAP document format. emergency alerts.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 28, 2011. January 11, 2012.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   3.  Architectural Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   4.  Protocol Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     4.1.  CAP Transport  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     4.2.  Profiling of the CAP Document Content  . . . . . . . . . .  7
   5.  Example  . .  Error Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   6.  Security Considerations  9
     5.1.  425 (Bad Alert Message) Response Code  . . . . . . . . . .  9
     5.2.  The AlertMsg-Error Header Field  . . . . . . . . . 10
     6.1.  Forgery . . . .  9
   6.  Example  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     6.2.  Replay Attack . . . . . . 12
   7.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     6.3.  Injecting False Alerts . . . 14
   8.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . 16
     8.1.  Registration of the 'application/cap+xml' MIME type  . . . 16
     8.2.  IANA Registration for 425 Response Code  . . . . . . . . . 17
     8.3.  IANA Registration of New AlertMsg-Error Header Field . . . 12
     7.1. 17
     8.4.  IANA Registration of for the
           'application/common-alerting-protocol+xml' MIME type SIP AlertMsg-Error Codes . . . 12
   8. . 18
   9.  Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
   9. 19
   10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     9.1. 20
     10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     9.2. 20
     10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 21
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 22

1.  Introduction

   The Common Alerting Protocol (CAP) [cap] is an XML document format
   for exchanging emergency alerts and public warnings.  CAP is mainly
   used for conveying alerts and warnings between authorities and from
   authorities to citizen/individuals.  This document describes how
   data-only emergency calls are able to utilize the same CAP document
   format.

   Emergency alerts containing data are similar to regular emergency
   calls in the sense that they require emergency call routing
   functionality and may even have the same location requirements.  On
   the other hand, the communication interaction may occur without
   establishment of a voice or video channel.

   Data-only emergency alerts are similar to regular emergency calls in
   the sense that they require emergency call routing functionality and
   may even have the same location requirements.  On the other hand, the
   initial communication interaction will not lead to the establishment
   of a voice or video channel.

   Based on the deployment experience with non-IP based systems we
   distinguish between systems, two types of environments, namely (1) data-only
   emergency
   major deployment scenarios are envisaged:

   1.  Emergency alerts that containing only data are targeted directly to a recipient
       responsible for evaluating the alerts and for taking the necessary next steps, including triggering which could include:

       1.  Sending an emergency call towards alert containing only data toward a Public Safety
           Answering Point (PSAP) and (2) alerts (PSAP);

       2.  Establishing an emergency call with a PSAP that are could include
           audio/video as well as data

   2.  Emergency alerts targeted to a Service URN as used for regular IP-based
       emergency calls where the recipient is not known to the
       originator.  In this scenario, the alert may contain only data
       (e.g. a CAP and a PIDF-LO payload in a SIP MESSAGE) or could be
       included along with establishment of an audio/video channel (e.g.
       SIP INVITE)

   We describe these two cases in more detail in Section 3.

2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

   This document utilizes terminology introduced in
   [I-D.ietf-atoca-requirements].  In particular, the terms for author,
   originator, receiver and recipient, are relevant for this document.
   The originator and the receiver are SIP-based entities while the
   author and the recipient are entities that relate to the alert
   message delivery, when this is relevant for the communication.

3.  Architectural Overview

   This section illustrates two envisioned usage modes; targeted and
   location-based emergency alert routing.  Figure 1 shows a deployment
   variant where a sensor, as the author and originator of the alert, is
   pre-configured (using techniques outside the scope of this document)
   to issue an alert to a receiver or an aggregator, a special form of
   mediator, that processes these messages and performs whatever steps
   are necessary to appropriately react on the alert.  For example, a
   security firm may use different sensor inputs to dispatch their
   security staff to a building they protect. protect or to initiate a third
   party emergency call.

    +------------+              +------------+
    | Sensor     |              | Aggregator |
    |            |              |            |
    +---+--------+              +------+-----+
        |                              |
     Sensors                           |
     trigger                           |
     emergency                         |
     alert                             |
        |        MESSAGE with CAP      |
        |----------------------------->|
        |                              |
        |                           Aggregator
        |                           processes
        |                           emergency
        |                           alert
        |        200 (OK)              |
        |<-----------------------------|
        |                              |
        |                              |

                Figure 1: Targeted Emergency Alert Routing

   In Figure 2 a scenario is shown whereby the alert is routed using
   location information and the Service URN.  In case the LoST
   resolution is done at an  An emergency services
   routing proxy rather than
   at the entity issuing the alert since it (ESRP) may not know use LoST to determine the address of next hop proxy to
   route the receiver. alert message to.  A possible receiver is a PSAP and the
   recipient of the alert may be call taker.  In the generic case, there
   is very likely no prior relationship between the originator and the
   receiver, e.g.  PSAP.  A PSAP, for example, is likely to receive and
   accept alerts from entities it cannot authorize.  This scenario
   corresponds more to the classical emergency services use case and the
   description in [I-D.ietf-ecrit-phonebcp] is applicable.

                           +-----------+                  +----------+
      +--------+           | SIP Proxy ESRP      |                  | PSAP as     |
      | Sensor |           | as Relay           |                  | Receiver          |
      +---+----+           +---+-------+                  +---+------+
          |                    |                              |
       Sensors                 |                              |
       trigger                 |                              |
       emergency               |                              |
       alert                   |                              |
          |                    |                              |
          |                    |                              |
          | MESSAGE with CAP   |                              |
          | (including Service URN,                           |
          | such as urn:service:sos)                          |
          |------------------->|                              |
          |                    |                              |
          |              SIP Proxy              ESRP performs                        |
          |              emergency alert                      |
          |              routing                              |
          |                    |  MESSAGE with CAP            |
          |                    |  (including identity info)   |
          |                    |----------------------------->|
          |                    |                              |
          |                    |                           PSAP
          |                    |                           processes
          |                    |                           emergency
          |                    |                           alert
          |                    |        200 (OK)              |
          |                    |<-----------------------------|
          |                    |                              |
          |  200 (OK)          |                              |
          |<-------------------|                              |
          |                    |                              |
          |                    |                              |

             Figure 2: Location-Based Emergency Alert Routing

4.  Protocol Specification

4.1.  CAP Transport

   Since alerts structured via CAP require a "push" medium, they SHOULD
   be sent via the medium.  The
   following SIP MESSAGE. requests MAY carry the CAP payload defined in this
   document: INVITE [RFC3261], UPDATE [RFC3311], MESSAGE [RFC3428], INFO
   [RFC6086], NOTIFY [RFC3265], and PUBLISH [RFC3903].  The MIME type is
   set to 'application/
   common-alerting-protocol+xml'.

      Alternatively, 'application/cap+xml'.

   If the SIP PUBLISH mechanism or other SIP messages
      could server does not support the functionality required to fulfill
   the request then a 501 Not Implemented MUST be used.  However, returned by RFC 3261
   [RFC3261].  This is the usage appropriate response when a UAS does not
   recognize the request method and is not capable of SIP MESSAGE supporting it for
   any user.

   The 415 Unsupported Media Type error MUST be returned by RFC 3261
   [RFC3261] if the server is refusing to service the request because
   the message body of the request is in a simple
      enough approach from an implementation point format not supported by the
   server for the requested method.  The server MUST return a list of view.
   acceptable formats using the Accept, Accept-Encoding, or Accept-
   Language header field, depending on the specific problem with the
   content.

4.2.  Profiling of the CAP Document Content

   The usage of CAP MUST conform to the specification provided with
   [cap].  For the usage with SIP the following additional requirements
   are imposed:

   sender:  A few sub-categories for putting a value in the <sender>
      element have to be considered:

      Originator is a SIP entity, Author indication irrelevant:  When
         the CAP alert was created by a SIP-based entity originator and it is not
         useful to be explicit about the author of the alert then the
         <sender> element MUST be populated with the SIP URI of the user
         agent.

      Originator is a non-SIP entity, Author indication irrelevant:  In
         case that entity. the alert was created by a non-SIP based entity and
         the identity of this original sender wants to be preserved then
         this identity MUST be placed into the <sender> element.  In
         this category the it is not useful to be explicit about the
         author of the alert.  The specific type of identity being used
         will depends on the technology being used by the original
         originator.

      Author indication relevant:  In case the author is different from
         the actual originator of the message and this distinction wants
         to be preserved then the <sender> element MUST NOT contain the
         SIP URI.

   incidents:  The <incidents> element MUST be present whenever there is
      a possibility that alert information needs to be updated.  The
      initial message will then contain an incident identifier carried
      in the <incidents> element.  This incident identifier MUST be
      chosen in such a way that it is unique for a given <sender,
      expires, incidents> combination.  Note that the <expires> element
      is optional and may not be present.

   scope:  The value of the <scope> element MUST be set to "private" "Private" as
      the alert is not meant for public consumption.  The <addresses>
      element is, however, not used by this specification since the
      message routing is performed by SIP and the respective address
      information is already available in the geolocation header. other SIP headers.  Populating location
      information twice into different parts of the message can quickly may lead to
      inconsistency.

   parameter:  The <parameter> element MAY contain additional
      information specific to the sensor.

   area:  It is RECOMMENDED to omit this element when constructing a
      message.  In case that the CAP message already contained an <area>
      element then the specified location information MUST be copied
      into the PIDF-LO structure of the geolocation header element. 'geolocation' header.

5.  Example

   Figure 3 shows  Error Handling

   This section defines a CAP document indicating new error response code and a BURLARY alert issued by header field for
   additional information.

5.1.  425 (Bad Alert Message) Response Code

   This SIP extension creates a
   sensor with the identity 'sensor1@domain.com'. new location-specific response code,
   defined as follows,

      425 (Bad Alert Message)

   The location 425 response code is a rejection of the
   sensor can be obtained from the attached geolocation information request due to its
   included alert content, indicating that it was malformed or not
   satisfactory for the recipient's purpose.

   A SIP intermediary can also reject an alert it receives from a UA
   when it understands that the provided alert is malformed.

   Section 5.2 describes a AlertMsg-Error header field with more details
   about what was wrong with the alert message in the request.  This
   header field MUST be included in the 425 response.

   It is only appropriate to generate a 425 response when the responding
   entity has no other information in the request that are usable by the
   responder.

   A 425 response code MUST NOT be sent in response to a request that
   lacks an alert message entirely, as the user agent in that case may
   not support this extension at all.

   A 425 response is a final response within a transaction, and MUST NOT
   terminate an existing dialog.

5.2.  The AlertMsg-Error Header Field

   The AlertMsg-Error header provides additional information about what
   was wrong with the original request.  In some cases the provided
   information will be used for debugging purposes.

   The AlertMsg-Error header field has the following ABNF [RFC5234]:

      message-header          /= AlertMsg-Error
                                 ; (message-header from 3261)
      AlertMsg-Error        = "AlertMsg-Error" HCOLON
                                   ErrorValue
      ErrorValue       =  error-code
                                  *(SEMI error-params)
      error-code      = 1*3DIGIT
      error-params    = error-code-text
                                 / generic-param ; from RFC3261
      error-code-text = "code" EQUAL quoted-string ; from RFC3261

   HCOLON, SEMI, and EQUAL are defined in RFC3261 [RFC3261].  DIGIT is
   defined in RFC5234 [RFC5234].

   The AlertMsg-Error header field MUST contain only one ErrorValue to
   indicate what was wrong with the alert payload the recipient
   determined was bad.

   The ErrorValue contains a 3-digit error code indicating what was
   wrong with the alert in the request.  This error code has a
   corresponding quoted error text string that is human understandable.
   The text string are OPTIONAL, but RECOMMENDED for human readability,
   similar to the string phrase used for SIP response codes.  That said,
   the strings are complete enough for rendering to the user, if so
   desired.  The strings in this document are recommendations, and are
   not standardized - meaning an operator can change the strings - but
   MUST NOT change the meaning of the error code.  Similar to how RFC
   3261 specifies, there MUST NOT be more than one string per error
   code.

   The AlertMsg-Error header field MAY be included in any response as an
   alert message was in the request part of the same transaction.  For
   example, a UA includes an alert in an MESSAGE to a PSAP.  The PSAP
   can accept this MESSAGE, thus creating a dialog, even though his UA
   determined the alert message contained in the MESSAGE was bad.  The
   PSAP merely includes a AlertMsg-Error header value in the 200 OK to
   the MESSAGE informing the UA that the MESSAGE was accepted but the
   alert provided was bad.

   If, on the other hand, the PSAP cannot accept the MESSAGE without a
   suitable alert message, a 425 response is sent.

   A SIP intermediary that requires the UA's alert message in order to
   properly process the MESSAGE may also sends a 425 with a AlertMsg-
   Error code.

   This document defines an initial list of error code ranges for any
   SIP response, including provisional responses (other than 100 Trying)
   and the new 425 response.  There MUST be no more than one AlertMsg-
   Error code in a SIP response.

   AlertMsg-Error: 100 ; code="Cannot Process the Alert Payload"

   AlertMsg-Error: 101 ; code="Alert Payload was not present or could
   not be found"

   AlertMsg-Error: 102 ; code="Not enough information to determine the
   purpose of the alert"

   AlertMsg-Error: 103 ; code="Alert Payload was corrupted"

   Additionally, if an LR cannot or chooses not to process the alert
   message from a SIP request, a 500 (Server Internal Error) SHOULD be
   used with or without a configurable Retry-After header field.

6.  Example

   Figure 3 shows a CAP document indicating a BURLARY alert issued by a
   sensor with the identity 'sensor1@domain.com'.  The location of the
   sensor can be obtained from the attached location information
   provided via the geolocation 'geolocation' header contained in the SIP MESSAGE
   structure.  Additionally, the sensor provided some data long with the
   alert message using proprietary information elements only to be
   processed by the receiver, a SIP entity acting as an aggregator.
   This example reflects the description in Figure 1.

    MESSAGE sip:aggregator@domain.com SIP/2.0
    Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sensor1.domain.com;branch=z9hG4bK776sgdkse
    Max-Forwards: 70
    From: sip:sensor1@domain.com;tag=49583
    To: sip:aggregator@domain.com
    Call-ID: asd88asd77a@1.2.3.4
    Geolocation: <cid:abcdef@domain.com>
      ;routing-allowed=yes
    Supported: geolocation
    Accept: application/pidf+xml, application/common-alerting-protocol+xml application/cap+xml
    CSeq: 1 MESSAGE
    Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary=boundary1
    Content-Length: ...

    --boundary1

    Content-Type: common-alerting-protocol+xml cap+xml
    Content-ID: <abcdef2@domain.com>
   <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>

   <alert xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:emergency:cap:1.1">
     <identifier>S-1</identifier>
     <sender>sip:sensor1@domain.com</sender>
     <sent>2008-11-19T14:57:00-07:00</sent>
     <status>Actual</status>
     <msgType>Alert</msgType>
     <scope>Private</scope>
     <incidents>abc1234</incidents>
     <info>
         <category>Security</category>
         <event>BURGLARY</event>
         <urgency>Expected</urgency>
         <certainty>Likely</certainty>
         <severity>Moderate</severity>
         <senderName>SENSOR 1</senderName>
         <parameter>
           <valueName>SENSOR-DATA-NAMESPACE1</valueName>
           <value>123</value>
         </parameter>
         <parameter>
           <valueName>SENSOR-DATA-NAMESPACE2</valueName>
           <value>TRUE</value>
         </parameter>
     </info>
    </alert>

    --boundary1

    Content-Type: application/pidf+xml
    Content-ID: <abcdef2@domain.com>
    <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
        <presence
           xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:pidf"
           xmlns:gp="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:pidf:geopriv10"
           xmlns:gbp="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:pidf:geopriv10:basicPolicy"
           xmlns:cl="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:pidf:geopriv10:civicAddr"
           xmlns:gml="http://www.opengis.net/gml"
          entity="pres:sensor1@domain.com">
        <tuple id="12345">
           xmlns:dm="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:pidf:data-model"
           entity="pres:alice@atlanta.example.com">
         <dm:device id="sensor1"> id="sensor">
           <gp:geopriv>
             <gp:location-info>
               <gml:location>
                 <gml:Point srsName="urn:ogc:def:crs:EPSG::4326">
                   <gml:pos>32.86726 -97.16054</gml:pos>
                 </gml:Point>
              </gml:location>
             </gp:location-info>
             <gp:usage-rules>
              <gp:retransmission-allowed>yes
              </gp:retransmission-allowed>
              <gp:retention-expiry>2010-07-30T20:00:00Z
              </gp:retention-expiry>
               <gbp:retransmission-allowed>false
               </gbp:retransmission-allowed>
               <gbp:retention-expiry>2010-11-14T20:00:00Z
               </gbp:retention-expiry>
             </gp:usage-rules>
             <gp:method>802.11</gp:method>
           </gp:geopriv>
          <dm:deviceID>mac:1234567890ab</dm:deviceID>
          <dm:timestamp>2010-07-28T20:57:29Z</dm:timestamp>
           <dm:timestamp>2010-11-04T20:57:29Z</dm:timestamp>
         </dm:device>
        </tuple>
       </presence>
    --boundary1--

               Figure 3: Example Message conveying an Alert

6.

7.  Security Considerations

   This section discusses security considerations when using SIP to make
   data-only user agents
   issue emergency alerts utilizing CAP.  Location specific threats are
   not unique to this document and the discussion are discussed in
   [I-D.ietf-ecrit-trustworthy-location].

6.1.  Forgery

   Threat:

      An adversary could forge or alter
   [I-D.ietf-ecrit-trustworthy-location] and
   [I-D.ietf-sipcore-location-conveyance].

   The ECRIT emergency services architecture [I-D.ietf-ecrit-phonebcp]
   considers classical individual-to-authority emergency calling and the
   identity of the emergency caller does not play a CAP document role at the time of
   the call establishment itself, i.e., a response to report false the emergency alarms.

   Countermeasures:

      To avoid this kind call
   will not depend on the identity of attack, the entities must assure caller.  In case of emergency
   alerts generated by devices, like sensors, the processing may be
   different in order to reduce the number of falsely generated
   emergency alerts.  Alerts may get triggered based on certain sensor
   input that proper
      mechanisms may have been caused by other factors than the actual
   occurrence of an alert relevant event.  For example, a sensor may
   simply be malfunctioning.  For this purpose not all alert messages
   are directly sent to a PSAP but are rather pre-processed by a
   separate entity, potentially under supervision by a human, to filter
   alerts and potentially correlate received alerts with others to
   obtain a larger picture of the ongoing situation.  These two message
   routing examples are shown in Figure 1 and in Figure 2.

   In any case, for protecting alerts that are initiated by sensors the CAP documents identity
   may play an important role in deciding whether to accept or ignore an
   incoming alert message.  With the scenario shown in Figure 1 it is
   very likely that only authorized sensor input will be processed.  For
   this purpose it needs to be ensured that no alert messages from an
   unknown origin are employed, e.g.,
      signing accepted.  Two types of information elements can
   be used for this purpose:

   1.  SIP itself provides security mechanisms that allow the
       verification of the originator's identity.  These mechanisms can
       be re-used, such as P-Asserted-Identity [RFC3325] or SIP Identity
       [RFC4474].  The latter provides a cryptographic assurance while
       the former relies on a chain of trust model.

   2.  CAP document itself. provides additional security mechanisms and the ability to
       carry additional information about the sender's identity.
       Section 3.3.2.1 of [cap]
      specifies the signing [cap] specifies the signing algorithms of CAP
       documents.

   In addition to the desire to perform identity-based access control
   the classical communication security threats need to be considered,
   including integrity protection to prevent forgery and replay of alert
   messages in transit.  To deal with replay of CAP documents.  This does not protect
      against a legitimate sensor sending phrank alerts after being
      compromised.

6.2.  Replay Attack

   Threat:

      An adversary could eavesdrop alerts and reply them at a later
      time.

   Countermeasures:

      A CAP document
   contains the mandatory <identifier>, <sender>, <sent> elements and an
   optional <expire> element.  These attributes make the CAP document
   unique for a specific sender and provide time restrictions.  An
   entity that has received a CAP message already within the indicated
   timeframe is able to detect a replayed message and, if the content of
   that message is unchanged, then no additional security vulnerability
   is created.  Additionally, it is RECOMMENDED to make use of SIP
   security mechanisms, such as SIP Identity [RFC4474], to tie the CAP
   message to the SIP message.

6.3.  Injecting False Alerts

   Threat:

      When an entity receives a CAP message it has to determine whether
      the entity distributing the CAP messages is genuine to avoid
      accepting messages that are injected by adversaries.  In scenario

   Countermeasures:

      For some types  To provide protection of data-only emergency calls author/originator and the receiver/recipient have a relationship with each other and
      hence it is possible (using cryptographic techniques) to verify
      whether a entire SIP
   message was indeed issued by an authorized entity.
      Figure 1 is such an environment.  Standard exchange between neighboring SIP security mechanisms
      can be re-used for this purpose.  For example, identity based
      access control is a viable approach utilizing the asserted
      identity of entities the alert originator using P-Asserted-Identity
      [RFC3325] or SIP Identity [RFC4474].

      There are, however, other types usage of data-only emergency calls where
      there TLS is no such relationship between the author/originator and
      the receiver/recipient.  Incoming alerts need to be treated more
      carefully than multi-media emergency calls
   mandatory.

   Note that contain additional
      information, such as audio, to allow none of the security mechanism in this document protect
   against a call taker to sort out
      phrank calls.

7. compromised sensor sending crafted alerts.

8.  IANA Considerations

7.1.

8.1.  Registration of the 'application/common-alerting-protocol+xml' 'application/cap+xml' MIME type

   To:  ietf-types@iana.org

   Subject:  Registration of MIME media type application/ common-
      alerting-protocol+xml cap+xml

   MIME media type name:  application

   MIME subtype name:  common-alerting-protocol+xml  cap+xml

   Required parameters:  (none)

   Optional parameters:  charset; Indicates the character encoding of
      enclosed XML.  Default is UTF-8 [RFC3629].

   Encoding considerations:  Uses XML, which can employ 8-bit
      characters, depending on the character encoding used.  See RFC
      3023 [RFC3023], Section 3.2.

   Security considerations:  This content type is designed to carry
      payloads of the Common Alerting Protocol (CAP).

   Interoperability considerations:  This content type provides a way to
      convey CAP payloads.

   Published specification:  RFC XXX [Replace by the RFC number of this
      specification].

   Applications which use this media type:  Applications that convey
      alerts and warnings according to the CAP standard.

   Additional information:  OASIS has published the Common Alerting
      Protocol at http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/
      documents.php&wg_abbrev=emergency

   Person & and email address to contact for further information:  Hannes
      Tschofenig, Hannes.Tschofenig@nsn.com

   Intended usage:  Limited use

   Author/Change controller:  IETF SIPPING working group

   Other information: further information:  Hannes
      Tschofenig, Hannes.Tschofenig@nsn.com

   Intended usage:  Limited use

   Author/Change controller:  IETF ECRIT working group

   Other information:  This media type is a specialization of
      application/xml RFC 3023 [RFC3023], and many of the considerations
      described there also apply to application/cap+xml.

8.2.  IANA Registration for 425 Response Code

   In the SIP Response Codes registry, the following is added

   Reference: RFC-XXXX (i.e., this document)

   Response code: 425 (recommended number to assign)

   Default reason phrase: Bad Alert Message

      Registry:
        Response Code                               Reference
        ------------------------------------------  ---------
        Request Failure 4xx
          425 Bad Alert Message                   [this doc]

   This SIP Response code is defined in Section 5.

8.3.  IANA Registration of New AlertMsg-Error Header Field

   The SIP AlertMsg-error header field is created by this document, with
   its definition and rules in Section 5, to be added to the IANA sip-
   parameters registry with two actions:

   1.  Update the Header Fields registry with

      Registry:
        Header Name        compact    Reference
        -----------------  -------    ---------
        AlertMsg-Error             [this doc]

   2.  In the portion titled "Header Field Parameters and Parameter
       Values", add

                                               Predefined
      Header Field        Parameter Name       Values      Reference
      -----------------   -------------------  ----------  ---------
      AlertMsg-Error   code                 yes         [this doc]

8.4.  IANA Registration for the SIP AlertMsg-Error Codes

   This media type is document creates a specialization of
      application/xml RFC 3023 [RFC3023], and many of new registry for SIP, called "AlertMsg-Error
   Codes".  AlertMsg-Error codes provide reason for the considerations
      described there also apply error discovered
   by recipients, categorized by action to application/
      common-alerting-protocol+xml.

8. be taken by error recipient.
   The initial values for this registry are shown below.

   Registry Name: AlertMsg-Error Codes

   Reference: [this doc]

   Registration Procedures: Specification Required

   Code Default Reason Phrase                                 Reference
   ---- ---------------------------------------------------   ---------
   100  "Cannot Process the Alert Payload"                    [this doc]

   101  "Alert Payload was not present or could not be found" [this doc]

   102  "Not enough information to determine
         the purpose of the alert"                            [this doc]

   103  "Alert Payload was corrupted"                         [this doc]

   Details of these error codes are in Section 5.

9.  Acknowledgments

   The authors would like to thank the participants of the Early Warning
   adhoc meeting at IETF#69 for their feedback.  Additionally, we would
   like to thank the members of the NENA Long Term Direction Working
   Group for their feedback.

9.

   Additionally, we would like to thank Martin Thomson, James
   Winterbottom, Shida Schubert, Bernard Aboba, and Marc Linsner for
   their review comments.

10.  References

9.1.

10.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", March 1997.

   [cap]      Jones, E. and A. Botterell, "Common Alerting Protocol v.
              1.1", October 2005.

   [RFC3265]  Roach, A., "Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)-Specific
              Event Notification", RFC 3265, June 2002.

   [RFC3903]  Niemi, A., "Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Extension
              for Event State Publication", RFC 3903, October 2004.

   [RFC3023]  Murata, M., St. Laurent, S., and D. Kohn, "XML Media
              Types", RFC 3023, January 2001.

   [RFC3629]  Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
              10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, November 2003.

   [I-D.ietf-ecrit-trustworthy-location]
              Tschofenig, H., Schulzrinne, H., and B. Aboba,
              "Trustworthy Location Information",
              draft-ietf-ecrit-trustworthy-location-01 (work in
              progress), October 2010.

9.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-ecrit-phonebcp]
              Rosen, B. and J. Polk, "Best Current Practice for
              Communications Services in support of Emergency Calling",
              draft-ietf-ecrit-phonebcp-15
              draft-ietf-ecrit-phonebcp-17 (work in progress),
              July 2010.
              March 2011.

   [I-D.ietf-sipcore-location-conveyance]
              Polk, J., Rosen, B., and J. Peterson, "Location Conveyance
              for the Session Initiation Protocol",
              draft-ietf-sipcore-location-conveyance-08 (work in
              progress), May 2011.

   [RFC3261]  Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston,
              A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E.
              Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261,
              June 2002.

   [RFC3311]  Rosenberg, J., "The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)
              UPDATE Method", RFC 3311, October 2002.

   [RFC3428]  Campbell, B., Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Huitema, C.,
              and D. Gurle, "Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Extension
              for Instant Messaging", RFC 3428, December 2002.

   [RFC6086]  Holmberg, C., Burger, E., and H. Kaplan, "Session
              Initiation Protocol (SIP) INFO Method and Package
              Framework", RFC 6086, January 2011.

   [RFC3265]  Roach, A., "Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)-Specific
              Event Notification", RFC 3265, June 2002.

   [RFC3903]  Niemi, A., "Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Extension
              for Event State Publication", RFC 3903, October 2004.

   [RFC5234]  Crocker, D. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
              Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234, January 2008.

10.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-atoca-requirements]
              Schulzrinne, H., Norreys, S., Rosen, B., and H.
              Tschofenig, "Requirements, Terminology and Framework for
              Exigent Communications", draft-ietf-atoca-requirements-00 draft-ietf-atoca-requirements-01
              (work in progress), January 2011.

   [I-D.ietf-ecrit-trustworthy-location]
              Tschofenig, H., Schulzrinne, H., and B. Aboba,
              "Trustworthy Location Information",
              draft-ietf-ecrit-trustworthy-location-02 (work in
              progress), September 2010. May 2011.

   [RFC4474]  Peterson, J. and C. Jennings, "Enhancements for
              Authenticated Identity Management in the Session
              Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 4474, August 2006.

   [RFC3325]  Jennings, C., Peterson, J., and M. Watson, "Private
              Extensions to the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) for
              Asserted Identity within Trusted Networks", RFC 3325,
              November 2002.

Authors' Addresses

   Brian Rosen
   NeuStar, Inc.
   470 Conrad Dr
   Mars, PA  16046
   US

   Phone:
   Email: br@brianrosen.net

   Henning Schulzrinne
   Columbia University
   Department of Computer Science
   450 Computer Science Building
   New York, NY  10027
   US

   Phone: +1 212 939 7004
   Email: hgs+ecrit@cs.columbia.edu
   URI:   http://www.cs.columbia.edu

   Hannes Tschofenig
   Nokia Siemens Networks
   Linnoitustie 6
   Espoo  02600
   Finland

   Phone: +358 (50) 4871445
   Email: Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net
   URI:   http://www.tschofenig.priv.at