draft-ietf-forces-implementation-report-01.txt   draft-ietf-forces-implementation-report-02.txt 
Internet Engineering Task Force E. Haleplidis Internet Engineering Task Force E. Haleplidis
Internet-Draft University of Patras Internet-Draft University of Patras
Intended status: Informational K. Ogawa Intended status: Informational K. Ogawa
Expires: August 29, 2010 NTT Corporation Expires: December 29, 2010 NTT Corporation
W. Wang W. Wang
Zhejiang Gongshang University Zhejiang Gongshang University
J. Hadi Salim J. Hadi Salim
Mojatatu Networks Mojatatu Networks
February 25, 2010 June 27, 2010
Implementation Report for ForCES Implementation Report for ForCES
draft-ietf-forces-implementation-report-01 draft-ietf-forces-implementation-report-02
Abstract Abstract
Forwarding and Control Element Separation (ForCES) defines an Forwarding and Control Element Separation (ForCES) defines an
architectural framework and associated protocols to standardize architectural framework and associated protocols to standardize
information exchange between the control plane and the forwarding information exchange between the control plane and the forwarding
plane in a ForCES Network Element (ForCES NE). RFC3654 has defined plane in a ForCES Network Element (ForCES NE). RFC3654 has defined
the ForCES requirements, and RFC3746 has defined the ForCES the ForCES requirements, and RFC3746 has defined the ForCES
framework. framework.
This document is an implementation report of the ForCES Protocol, This document is an implementation report of the ForCES Protocol,
Model and SCTP-TML, including the report on interoperability testing Model and SCTP-TML, including the report on interoperability testing
and the current state of ForCES implementations. and the current state of ForCES implementations.
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at This Internet-Draft will expire on December 29, 2010.
http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
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This Internet-Draft will expire on August 29, 2010.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Terminology and Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1. Terminology and Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1. ForCES Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.1. ForCES Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2. ForCES Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.2. ForCES Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3. Transport mapping layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.3. Transport mapping layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4. Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. Exceptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 5. Exceptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6. Detail Section . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 6. Detail Section . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.1. Implementation Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 6.1. Implementation Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.1.1. ForCES Protocol Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 6.1.1. ForCES Protocol Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.1.1.1. Protocol Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 6.1.1.1. Protocol Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.1.1.2. MainHeader Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 6.1.1.2. MainHeader Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6.1.1.3. TLV Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 6.1.1.3. TLV Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6.1.1.4. Operation Types Supported . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 6.1.1.4. Operation Types Supported . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6.1.1.5. ForCES Protocol Advanced Features . . . . . . . . 16 6.1.1.5. ForCES Protocol Advanced Features . . . . . . . . 15
6.1.2. ForCES Model Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 6.1.2. ForCES Model Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6.1.2.1. Basic Atomic Types Supported . . . . . . . . . . . 17 6.1.2.1. Basic Atomic Types Supported . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.1.2.2. Compound Types Supported . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 6.1.2.2. Compound Types Supported . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6.1.2.3. LFBs Supported . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 6.1.2.3. LFBs Supported . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6.1.3. ForCES SCTP-TML Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 6.1.3. ForCES SCTP-TML Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
6.1.3.1. TML Priority Ports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 6.1.3.1. TML Priority Ports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
6.1.3.2. Message Handling at specific priorities . . . . . 22 6.1.3.2. Message Handling at specific priorities . . . . . 21
6.1.3.3. TML Security Feature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 6.1.3.3. TML Security Feature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
6.2. Interoperability Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 6.2. Interoperability Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
6.2.1. Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 6.2.1. Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
6.2.1.1. Scenario 1 - Pre-association Setup . . . . . . . . 24 6.2.1.1. Scenario 1 - Pre-association Setup . . . . . . . . 23
6.2.1.2. Scenario 2 - TML priority channels connection . . 25 6.2.1.2. Scenario 2 - TML priority channels connection . . 24
6.2.1.3. Scenario 3 - Association Setup - Association 6.2.1.3. Scenario 3 - Association Setup - Association
Complete . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Complete . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
6.2.1.4. Scenario 4 - CE query . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 6.2.1.4. Scenario 4 - CE query . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
6.2.1.5. Scenario 5 - Heartbeat monitoring . . . . . . . . 26 6.2.1.5. Scenario 5 - Heartbeat monitoring . . . . . . . . 25
6.2.1.6. Scenario 6 - Simple Config Command . . . . . . . . 26 6.2.1.6. Scenario 6 - Simple Config Command . . . . . . . . 25
6.2.1.7. Scenario 7 - Association Teardown . . . . . . . . 27 6.2.1.7. Scenario 7 - Association Teardown . . . . . . . . 26
6.2.2. Tested Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 6.2.2. Tested Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
6.2.2.1. ForCES Protocol Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 6.2.2.1. ForCES Protocol Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
6.2.2.2. ForCES Model Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 6.2.2.2. ForCES Model Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
6.2.2.3. ForCES SCTP-TML Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 6.2.2.3. ForCES SCTP-TML Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
6.2.3. Interoperability Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 6.2.3. Interoperability Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
1. Terminology and Conventions 1. Terminology and Conventions
1.1. Requirements Language 1.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
1.2. Definitions 1.2. Definitions
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plane in a ForCES Network Element (ForCES NE). [RFC3654] has defined plane in a ForCES Network Element (ForCES NE). [RFC3654] has defined
the ForCES requirements, and [RFC3746] has defined the ForCES the ForCES requirements, and [RFC3746] has defined the ForCES
framework. framework.
2.1. ForCES Protocol 2.1. ForCES Protocol
The ForCES protocol works in a master-slave mode in which FEs are The ForCES protocol works in a master-slave mode in which FEs are
slaves and CEs are masters. The protocol includes commands for slaves and CEs are masters. The protocol includes commands for
transport of Logical Function Block (LFB) configuration information, transport of Logical Function Block (LFB) configuration information,
association setup, status, and event notifications, etc. The reader association setup, status, and event notifications, etc. The reader
is encouraged to read FE-protocol [I-D.ietf-forces-protocol] for is encouraged to read the ForCES Protocol [RFC5810] for further
further information. information.
2.2. ForCES Model 2.2. ForCES Model
The FE-MODEL [I-D.ietf-forces-model] presents a formal way to define The ForCES Model [RFC5812] presents a formal way to define FE Logical
FE Logical Function Blocks (LFBs) using XML. LFB configuration Function Blocks (LFBs) using XML. LFB configuration components,
components, capabilities, and associated events are defined when the capabilities, and associated events are defined when the LFB is
LFB is formally created. The LFBs within the FE are accordingly formally created. The LFBs within the FE are accordingly controlled
controlled in a standardized way by the ForCES protocol. in a standardized way by the ForCES protocol.
2.3. Transport mapping layer 2.3. Transport mapping layer
The TML transports the PL messages. The TML is where the issues of The TML transports the PL messages. The TML is where the issues of
how to achieve transport level reliability, congestion control, how to achieve transport level reliability, congestion control,
multicast, ordering, etc. are handled. All ForCES Protocol Layer multicast, ordering, etc. are handled. All ForCES Protocol Layer
implementations MUST be portable across all TMLs. Although more than implementations MUST be portable across all TMLs. Although more than
one TML may be standardized for the ForCES Protocol, all one TML may be standardized for the ForCES Protocol, all
implementations MUST IMPLEMENT the SCTP TML implementations MUST implement the SCTP-TML [RFC5811].
[I-D.ietf-forces-sctptml].
3. Summary 3. Summary
The authors attest that the ForCES Protocol, Model and SCTP-TML meet The authors attest that the ForCES Protocol, Model and SCTP-TML meet
the requirements for Draft Standard. the requirements for Draft Standard.
Three independent implementations, NTT Japan, University of Patras Three independent implementations, NTT Japan, University of Patras
and Zhejiang Gongshang University, were surveyed and found to already and Zhejiang Gongshang University, were surveyed and found to already
implement all the major features. All implementors mentioned they implement all the major features. All implementors mentioned they
will be implementing all missing features in the future. will be implementing all missing features in the future.
An interop test was conducted in July/2009 for all three An interop test was conducted in July, 2009 for all three
implementations. Two other organizations, Mojatatu Networks and implementations. Two other organizations, Mojatatu Networks and
Hangzhou Baud Information and Networks Technology Corporation, which Hangzhou Baud Information and Networks Technology Corporation, which
independently extended two different well known public domain independently extended two different well known public domain
protocol analyzers, Ethereal/Wireshark and tcpdump, also participated protocol analyzers, Ethereal/Wireshark and tcpdump, also participated
in the interop for a total of five independent organizations in the interop for a total of five independent organizations
implementing. The two protocol analyzers were used to verify implementing. The two protocol analyzers were used to verify
validity of ForCEs protocol messages (and in some cases semantics). validity of ForCEs protocol messages (and in some cases semantics).
There were no notable difficulties in the interoperability test and There were no notable difficulties in the interoperability test and
almost all issues were code bugs that were dealt with mostly on site almost all issues were code bugs that were dealt with mostly on site
and tests repeated successfully. and tests repeated successfully as stated in Section 6.2.3.
4. Methodology 4. Methodology
This report has both an implementation experience survey as well as This report has both an implementation experience survey as well as
the results of the interoperability test. the results of the interoperability test.
The survey information was gathered after implementors answered a The survey information was gathered after implementors answered a
brief questionnaire with all ForCES Protocol, Model and SCTP-TML brief questionnaire with all ForCES Protocol, Model and SCTP-TML
features. The results can be seen in ForCES Features (Section 6.1) features. The results can be seen in Section 6.1
The interoperability results were part of the interoperability test. The interoperability results were part of the interoperability test.
Extended Ethereal and extended Tcpdump were used to verify the Extended Ethereal and extended Tcpdump were used to verify the
results. The results can be seen in Interoperability Report results. The results can be seen in Section 6.2
(Section 6.2)
5. Exceptions 5. Exceptions
The core features of the ForCES Protocol, Model and SCTP-TML have The core features of the ForCES Protocol, Model and SCTP-TML have
been implemented and tested in an interop in July, 2009. The been implemented and tested in an interop in July, 2009. The
intention of the interop testing was to validate that all the main intention of the interop testing was to validate that all the main
features of the 3 core documents were inter-operable amongst features of the 3 core documents were inter-operable amongst
different implementations. The tested features can be seen in Tested different implementations. The tested features can be seen in
Features (Section 6.2.2). Section 6.2.2.
Different organizations surveyed have implemented certain features Different organizations surveyed have implemented certain features
but not others. This approach is driven by presence of different but not others. This approach is driven by presence of different
LFBs the different organizations have currently implemented. All LFBs the different organizations have currently implemented. All
organizations surveyed have indicated intention to implement all organizations surveyed have indicated intention to implement all
outstanding features in due time. The implemented features can be outstanding features in due time. The implemented features can be
seen in Section 6.1. seen in Section 6.1.
The mandated TML security requirement, IPSec, was not validated The mandated TML security requirement, IPSec, was not validated
during the interop and is not discussed in this document. Since during the interop and is not discussed in this document. Since
IPSec is well known and is widely deployed not testing in presence of IPSec is well known and widely deployed not testing in presence of
IPSec does not invalidate the tests done. IPSec does not invalidate the tests done. Note that Section 6.1.3.3
indicates that none of the implementations reporting included support
for IPSec, but all indicated their intention to implement.
Although the SCTP priority ports have been changed since the Although the SCTP priority ports have been changed since the
interoperability test with the latest SCTP-TML draft, the change has interoperability test with the latest SCTP-TML draft, the change has
no impact in the validity of the interoperability test. no impact in the validity of the interoperability test.
6. Detail Section 6. Detail Section
6.1. Implementation Experience 6.1. Implementation Experience
Three different organizations have implemented the ForCES Protocol, Three different organizations have implemented the ForCES Protocol,
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o The IP of the CE that connected to o The IP of the CE that connected to
o The TML priority ports. o The TML priority ports.
6.2.1.2. Scenario 2 - TML priority channels connection 6.2.1.2. Scenario 2 - TML priority channels connection
For the interoperability test, the SCTP was used as TML. The TML For the interoperability test, the SCTP was used as TML. The TML
connection with the associating element was needed for the scenario 2 connection with the associating element was needed for the scenario 2
to be successful. to be successful.
Although the latest SCTP-TML document [I-D.ietf-forces-sctptml] Although SCTP-TML [RFC5811] defines 3 priority channels, with
defines 3 priority channels, with specific ports: specific ports:
o High priority - Port number: 6704 o High priority - Port number: 6704
o Medium priority - Port number: 6705 o Medium priority - Port number: 6705
o Lower priority - Port number: 6706 o Lower priority - Port number: 6706
At the time of the interoperability test, the sctp ports of the three At the time of the interoperability test, the sctp ports of the three
priority channels were the following: priority channels were the following:
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these priority ports. these priority ports.
6.2.3. Interoperability Results 6.2.3. Interoperability Results
All implementations were found to be interoperable with each other. All implementations were found to be interoperable with each other.
All scenarios were tested successfully. All scenarios were tested successfully.
The following issues were found and dealt with. The following issues were found and dealt with.
1. Some messages were sent to the wrong priority channels. There 1. Some messages were sent on the wrong priority channels. There
was some ambiguities on the SCTP-TML document on what must be were some ambiguities on the SCTP-TML document on how to deal
the correct response from the CE and FE. Should it respond in with such a situation. The possibilities were: an FE response
the same channel, should it respond in the correct channel, or on the same (wrong) channel as a CE query; on the correctly
should it drop the packet? This has been corrected by changing documented channel for the message; or to simply drop the
the word recommended to MUST in the SCTP-TML document regarding packet. This has been corrected by mandating the message to
priority channel messaging . channel mapping to be a MUST in the SCTP-TML document [RFC5811]
before it was published as an RFC.
2. At some point, a CE sent a TearDown message to the FE. The CE 2. At some point, a CE sent a TearDown message to the FE. The CE
expected the FE to shut down the connection, and the FE waited expected the FE to shut down the connection, and the FE waited
the CE to shut down the connection and were caught in a the CE to shut down the connection and were caught in a
deadlock. This was a code bug and was fixed. deadlock. This was a code bug and was fixed.
3. Sometimes the association setup message, only on the remote 3. Sometimes, only when the CE and FE were remote to each other
connection test, although sent, was not received by the other (one being in China and another in Greece), the association
end and made impossible the association. This was caused by setup message was not received by the CE side and therefore an
network problems. association never completed. This was not an implementation
issue, rather it was a network issue. This issue is solved with
the retransmission of the non delivered messages.
4. An implementation did not take into account that the padding in 4. An implementation did not take into account that the padding in
TLVs MUST NOT be included in the length of the TLV. This was a TLVs MUST NOT be included in the length of the TLV. This was a
code bug and was fixed. code bug and was fixed.
5. EM Flag was set to reserved by a CE and was not ignored by the 5. EM Flag was set to reserved by a CE and was not ignored by the
FE. This was a code bug and was fixed. FE. This was a code bug and was fixed.
6. After the FEHBPolicy was set to 1 the FE didn't send any 6. After the FEHBPolicy was set to 1 the FE didn't send any
HeartBeats. This was a code bug and was fixed. HeartBeats. This was a code bug and was fixed.
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heartbeats, this was a success, but this is an implementation heartbeats, this was a success, but this is an implementation
issue implementers should keep in mind. This is a SCTP options issue implementers should keep in mind. This is a SCTP options
issue. Nothing was needed to be done. issue. Nothing was needed to be done.
9. A CE crashed due to unknown LFBSelector values. This was a code 9. A CE crashed due to unknown LFBSelector values. This was a code
bug and was fixed. bug and was fixed.
10. With the remote connection from China, which was behind a NAT, 10. With the remote connection from China, which was behind a NAT,
to Greece there were a lot of ForCES packet retransmission. The to Greece there were a lot of ForCES packet retransmission. The
problem is that packets like Heartbeats were retransmitted. problem is that packets like Heartbeats were retransmitted.
This was a SCTP issue. SCTP-PR was needed to be used. This was an implementation issue regarding SCTP usage
implementers should keep in mind. SCTP-PR option was needed to
be used. Nothing was needed to be done.
The interoperability test went so well that an additional extended The interoperability test went so well that an additional extended
test was added to test for batching messages. This test was also test was added to test for batching messages. This test was also
done successfully. done successfully.
7. Acknowledgements 7. Acknowledgements
The authors like to give thanks to Professors Odysseas Koufopavlou The authors like to give thanks to Professors Odysseas Koufopavlou
and Spyros Denazis, and the Department of Electrical and Computer and Spyros Denazis, and the Department of Electrical and Computer
Engineering in the University of Patras who hosted the ForCES Engineering in the University of Patras who hosted the ForCES
skipping to change at page 35, line 23 skipping to change at page 34, line 23
Gao, and other participants from Zhejiang Gongshang University which Gao, and other participants from Zhejiang Gongshang University which
connected remotely. This allowed the discovery of a series of issues connected remotely. This allowed the discovery of a series of issues
that would have been uncaught otherwise. that would have been uncaught otherwise.
The authors would like to thank also Hideaki Iwata and Yoshinobu The authors would like to thank also Hideaki Iwata and Yoshinobu
Morimoto for participating locally at the interoperability test and Morimoto for participating locally at the interoperability test and
also Hiroki Date and Hidefumi Otsuka all part of NTT Japan for also Hiroki Date and Hidefumi Otsuka all part of NTT Japan for
contributing to the interoperability test. contributing to the interoperability test.
Additionally thanks are given to Xinping Wang for her help in writing Additionally thanks are given to Xinping Wang for her help in writing
the interoperability draft an Fenggen Jia for extending the Ethereal the interoperability draft and Fenggen Jia for extending the Ethereal
protocol analyzer. protocol analyzer.
8. IANA Considerations 8. IANA Considerations
This memo includes no request to IANA. This memo includes no request to IANA.
9. Security Considerations 9. Security Considerations
For Security considerations please see [I-D.ietf-forces-protocol] and No security elements of the protocol or the SCTP TML [RFC5811]
[I-D.ietf-forces-sctptml] specification were tested.
The survey indicated that no security elements were implemented but
all participants indicated their intention to implement
For security considerations regarding the ForCES Protocol and the
SCTP-TML please see [RFC5810] and [RFC5811]
10. References 10. References
10.1. Normative References 10.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-forces-model] [RFC5810] Doria, A., Hadi Salim, J., Haas, R., Khosravi, H., Wang,
Halpern, J. and J. Salim, "ForCES Forwarding Element W., Dong, L., Gopal, R., and J. Halpern, "Forwarding and
Model", draft-ietf-forces-model-16 (work in progress), Control Element Separation (ForCES) Protocol
October 2008. Specification", RFC 5810, March 2010.
[I-D.ietf-forces-protocol] [RFC5811] Hadi Salim, J. and K. Ogawa, "SCTP-Based Transport Mapping
Dong, L., Doria, A., Gopal, R., HAAS, R., Salim, J., Layer (TML) for the Forwarding and Control Element
Khosravi, H., and W. Wang, "ForCES Protocol Separation (ForCES) Protocol", RFC 5811, March 2010.
Specification", draft-ietf-forces-protocol-22 (work in
progress), March 2009.
[I-D.ietf-forces-sctptml] [RFC5812] Halpern, J. and J. Hadi Salim, "Forwarding and Control
Salim, J. and K. Ogawa, "SCTP based TML (Transport Mapping Element Separation (ForCES) Forwarding Element Model",
Layer) for ForCES protocol", draft-ietf-forces-sctptml-08 RFC 5812, March 2010.
(work in progress), January 2010.
10.2. Informative References 10.2. Informative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2629] Rose, M., "Writing I-Ds and RFCs using XML", RFC 2629,
June 1999.
[RFC3552] Rescorla, E. and B. Korver, "Guidelines for Writing RFC
Text on Security Considerations", BCP 72, RFC 3552,
July 2003.
[RFC3654] Khosravi, H. and T. Anderson, "Requirements for Separation [RFC3654] Khosravi, H. and T. Anderson, "Requirements for Separation
of IP Control and Forwarding", RFC 3654, November 2003. of IP Control and Forwarding", RFC 3654, November 2003.
[RFC3746] Yang, L., Dantu, R., Anderson, T., and R. Gopal, [RFC3746] Yang, L., Dantu, R., Anderson, T., and R. Gopal,
"Forwarding and Control Element Separation (ForCES) "Forwarding and Control Element Separation (ForCES)
Framework", RFC 3746, April 2004. Framework", RFC 3746, April 2004.
[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
May 2008.
[RFC5657] Dusseault, L. and R. Sparks, "Guidance on Interoperation [RFC5657] Dusseault, L. and R. Sparks, "Guidance on Interoperation
and Implementation Reports for Advancement to Draft and Implementation Reports for Advancement to Draft
Standard", BCP 9, RFC 5657, September 2009. Standard", BCP 9, RFC 5657, September 2009.
[ethereal] [ethereal]
"Ethereal is a protocol analyzer. The specific ethereal "Ethereal is a protocol analyzer. The specific ethereal
that was used is an updated Ethereal, by Fenggen Jia, that that was used is an updated Ethereal, by Fenggen Jia, that
can analyze and decode the ForCES protocol messages.", <ht can analyze and decode the ForCES protocol messages.", <ht
tp://peach.ease.lsoft.com/scripts/ tp://peach.ease.lsoft.com/scripts/
wa.exe?A2=ind0906&L=FORCES&T=0&F=&S=&P=1048>. wa.exe?A2=ind0906&L=FORCES&T=0&F=&S=&P=1048>.
 End of changes. 29 change blocks. 
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