Internet Engineering Task Force                           Nevil Brownlee
INTERNET-DRAFT                                                John White                                The University of Auckland
                                                          September 1995

                                                   Expires in six months

              Expectations for Security Incident Response

Status of this Memo

This document is an Internet Draft.  Internet Drafts are working
documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its Areas, and
its Working Groups.  Note that other groups may also distribute working
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Please check the I-D abstract listing contained in the Internet-drafts
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This document provides guidelines for Internet Security explains what is expected of Incident Response Teams
(IRTs), provides guidelines for IRTs, and recommends a "template"
through which every IRT should describe itself and its functions.  It
was produced by the GRIP Working Group of the IETF.


1 Introduction                                                         2
  1.1 Template Repository . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3

2 Description Template:  Security Incident Response Team               3

3 Purpose of the Template                                              5
  3.1 Other Related Material  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5

4 Definitions                                                          6
  4.1 Constituency  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6

  4.2 Partner Teams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
  4.3 Security  . . . . . . User Expectations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
  4.4 Incident  . . . . . . . .  3
  1.2 Publishing IRT Templates  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
  4.5  3

2 Description Template:  Security Incident Response Team . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
  4.6 Vendor  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
  4.7 Vulnerability . . . . .               4

3 Purpose of the Template                                              5
  3.1 Other Related Material  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8  6

4 Definitions                                                          7

5 The Security Incident Response Team Template                         8                         9
  5.1 Template Updates  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8  9
    5.1.1 Date of last update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8 .  9
    5.1.2 Distribution List list for Template Updates  . . . . . . . . . .  9
  5.2 Charter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
    5.2.1 Mission Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9 10
    5.2.2 Constituency  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9 10
    5.2.3 Sponsoring organization / affiliation . . . . . . . . . . . 10
    5.2.4 Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 11
  5.3 Policies  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 11
    5.3.1 Types of incidents and level of support . . . . . . . . . . 10 11
    5.3.2 Co-operation and interaction with other organizations . . . 10 11
    5.3.3 Reporting and Disclosure  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 12
    5.3.4 Communication and authentication  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 13
  5.4 Services  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 13
  5.5 Disclaimers . Incident reporting Forms  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
  5.6 Disclaimers . . . . . . 13 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

6 Appendix: Appendix A: Note on procedure definitions                            13                           14

7 Appendix B: Known Incident Response Teams                           15

8 Security Considerations                                             14

8                                             15

9 Author's Addresses                                                  14 Address                                                    16

1 Introduction

The Working Group group was formed to provide guidelines and recommendations
to facilitate the consistent handling of security incidents in the
Internet community.  Although it is focused on the Internet, many of the
concepts discussed will also be useful for other forms of local- and
wide-area networks and internets.

Security incidents and potential threats of them usually extend beyond
institutional or local community boundaries.  "Consistent handling"
implies that any group calling itself an Incident Response Team (IRT)
must react to security incidents or to threats of them in ways which the
general Internet community agrees to be in its general interest.

The "Framework "Expectations for Security Incident Response" is seen as resting on
the work of individual IRTs and the cooperation between them.

This document therefore recommends a "template" through which every IRT
should describe itself and its functions.  It further recommends that
templates should be accessible among teams, to make possible a fully
effective cooperative response framework for incidents or threats across
the entire domain affected by them.

1.1 Template Repository User Expectations

This document provides a detailed discussion of all aspects of incident
response.  It is also intended to provide a common understanding of what
is involved in, and implied by, each section of an IRT's template.

An incident response team exists primarily to support the users in its
constituency.  It is vital that those users understand what they should
expect of their team.  Provided that an IRT has published its template,
a constituent/customer should be able to read the template and discover
what to expect, for example in such areas as privacy and confidentiality
of information, and whether the response team will be contacting
downstream sites.  Users should certainly expect an IRT to provide the
services they detail in their IRT.

An important aspect of incident response is the 'follow through' - every
incident should be investigated and appropriate actions taken.  Users
should be encouraged by their IRT to report incidents so they can be
acted upon.  It must be emphasised that without active participation
(especially reporting) from users the effectiveness of the services they
depend on can be greatly diminished.  As a minimum, users need to know
that they should report security incidents, and know how and where they
should report them.

1.2 Publishing IRT Templates

If templates are to be accessible between IRTs, a central repository
will be needed for them.  The GRIP Working Group believe that some of
the existing Internet archive areas could be used for this purpose.

Each team should be responsible for ensuring that its own template is
available to at least its constituency and its co-operating partner

Digital signatures should be used to protect the completed templates
against modifications.  The keeper of each template repository will be
responsibly for verifying the identity of each IRT loding lodging a template in
the repository.

--- (Future drafts

Each team should be responsible for ensuring that its own template is
available to at least its own constituency and to any other groups it
needs to interact with frequently.  These groups will present more specific recommendations
    concerning include any
'up-stream' sites and/or IRTs which the sharing team needs to report to.

Whether or not an IRT lodges a copy of Template information) --- its template in a repository, it
should publish one on its own information server so that users in its
constituency can easily find it.  Templates published as pages in the
World Wide Web should include the phrase 'IRT Template' in their title;
this will allow Web search engines to find them easily.

Individual users who observe a security incident should ask their
Internet Service Provider for details of the most suitable IRT to report
it to.

Appendix B (below) provides some pointers to IRTs which were known when
this document was published.

2 Description Template:  Security Incident Response Team

The Template is summarized in the section immediately below, and the
remainder of the document describes its components.

2 Description Template:  Security Incident Response Team

Contact Information
 * name of the team
 * address
 * telephone
 * telefax facsimile
 * other telecommunication like STU-III
 * electronic mail
 * encryption methods for communication: PGP, PEM, MOSS, ..
 * actual list of members on demand (optional)

Template Updates
 * Date of last update
 * Distribution of list for template updates

 * mission statement
 * constituency
 * sponsor / affiliation
 * authority

 * types of incidents
 * level of support
 * disclosure
    - of compromised site's information
    - the compromise of IRT site to constituency
 * cooperation & interaction with
    - incident response teams
    - vendors
    - investigative agencies
    - involved sites
    - press
 * communication & authentication
 * point of customer contacts
 * incident reporting requirements

 * incident response
    - verification
    - understanding
    - coping
    - notification
 * proactive activities

Incident Reporting Forms


3 Purpose of the Template

The Template which this document proposes is expected to be used by a
response team to describe what it does, and in the process create
criteria against which its performance can be measured.  The Template
does not attempt to specify a "correct" way for the team to operate, but
does recommend on specific policies and functions seen as necessary for
such a team to play a consistent role in the overall security framework.
It also comments on additional roles a team might include in the ambit
of its operations.

The primary purposes of the Template are:

  - to help IRTs improve the way they operate;
  - to improve interactions between different IRTs, and between IRTs
    and other organizations such as vendors and law-enforcement

  - to note necessary interactions with their constituencies in setting
    expectations and defining policies;

  - to help new groups understand what it takes to "be" an IRT.

A Template might appear to provide a marketing tool for comparing
different teams, but this kind of marketing use (or abuse) is strongly
discouraged by the GRIP Working Group.

3.1 Other Related Material

This 'Framework for Response Teams' document is the first produced by
the GRIP Working Group.  A second document will set out guide-lines for
technology vendors to help them handle security incidents.  The
definition of terms given in the next section applies to both documents.

Another relevant IETF document is RFC 1244, the Site Security Handbook,
produced by (and being updated by) the Site Security Handbook Working
Group (SSH). Site requirements and recommendations are covered by the
Handbook, while response team expectations and procedures are addressed
by the GRIP documents.

Other documents of interest for the discussion of incident response
teams and their tasks are available by anonymous FTP. A collection can
be found on:


Some especially interesting documents are:

 * CERT-NL Framework

 * FIRST potential members`frame.txt
 * NRL Incident Response Manual

 * Bibliography

4 Definitions

This section defines terms used in describing security incidents and
response teams.  For the purpose of the GRIP documents only a limited
list is really needed.  This should help maintain focus on the purpose
of the documents, and prevent a duplication of other definitions or -
even worse - a proliferation of competing definitions.



Implicit in the purpose of a Security Incident Response Team is the
existence of a constituency.  This is the group of users, sites,
networks or organizations served by the team.

4.2 Partner Teams

Implicit in the purpose of the Template proposed here is the existence
of Partner Teams which are its primary audience, and which share in the
responsibility for addressing security incidents or threats common to
their separate constituencies.

4.3 Security

After considerable discussion, the Working Group decided not to attempt
a definition of "security", but instead to rely on intuition, or on
definitions in other documents such as the Site

Security Handbook.

4.4 Incident

For the purpose of this document:

  'A computer security incident is any event which compromises
  some aspect of computer or network security.'

The definition of an incident may vary between organizations, but at
least the following categories are generally applicable:

 * loss of confidentiality,
 * compromise of integrity,
 * denial of service,
 * misuse,
 * damage.

These are very general categories.  For instance the forging of an
electronic mail message and a successful password attack are two
examples of 'compromise of integrity.'

Within the definition of an incident the word 'compromised' is used.
Sometimes an administrator may only 'suspect' an incident.  During the
handling of a call it must be established whether or not an incident
really occurred.


Security Incident Response Team

Based on two of the definitions given above:

  'A Security Incident Response Team is a group authorized to deal
  with security incidents that occur within its defined constituency.'

It should provide a channel for receiving reports about suspected
incidents and for disseminating incident-related information to its
constituency and to other related parties; it should also provide
assistance to members of its constituency in handling these incidents.



A 'vendor' is any entity that produces networking or computing
technology, and is responsible for the technical content of that
technology.  Examples of 'technology' include hardware (routers,
switches, etc), etc.), and software (operating systems, mail forwarding
systems, etc). etc.).

Note that the supplier of a technology is not necessarily the 'vendor'
of that technology.  As an example, an Internet Services Provider (ISP)
might supply routers to each of its customers, but the 'vendor' is the
manufacturer, being the entity responsible for the technical content of
the router, rather than the ISP.



A 'vulnerability' is a characteristic of a piece of technology which can
be exploited to perpetrate a security incident.  For example, if a

program allowed ordinary users to execute operating system commands in
privileged mode, this "feature" would be a vulnerability.

5 The Security Incident Response Team Template

This material which follows is addressed to those responsible for
Security Incident Response Teams.

5.1 Template Updates

Details of an IRT change with time, so the template must indicate when
it was last changed, who will be informed of future changes, and (by
implication) who will not.  Without this, it is inevitable that
misunderstandings and misconceptions will arise over time.

5.1.1 Date of last update

This should be sufficient to allow anyone interested to evaluate the
currency of the template.

5.1.2 Distribution of list for Template Updates

Persons on this list are notified automatically whenever the template is
changed.  The list might normally cover the constituency and immediate
Partner IRTs. any other
groups the IRT has frequent interactions with.  Readers not on the list
can then recognise that they should check the central repository (above)
for possible updates.

Digital signatures should be used for update messages sent by an IRT to
those on its distribution list.

5.2 Charter

Every IRT must have a charter which specifying what it is to do, and the
authority under which it will do it.  The charter should include at
least the following:

 * mission statement
 * constituency
 * sponsor / affiliation
 * authority

5.2.1 Mission Statement

The mission statement should focus on the team's core activities,
already stated in the definition of an IRT. In order to be considered a
Security Incident Response Team, the team MUST provide incident
response, by definition.

The goals and purposes of a team are especially important, and require
clear, succinct definition.

5.2.2 Constituency

An IRT's constituency (as defined above) can be determined in many ways.
For example it could be a company's employees or its paid subscribers,
or it could be defined in terms of a technological focus, such as the
users of a particular operating system.

The definition of constituency should create a perimeter around the
group to whom the team will provide service.  The policy section (below)
should explain how requests from outside the perimeter will be handled.

Constituencies might overlap, as when an ISP supports an IRT, but
delivers services to customer sites which also have IRTs.  The Authority
section (below) should make such relationships clear.

People within the constituency have to learn that there is an IRT for
their purposes; the building of a trusted relationship with the
constituency is an on-going process which never ends.

5.2.3 Sponsoring organization / affiliation

The sponsoring organization, which authorises the actions of the IRT,
should be given next.  Defining the affiliation amounts to stating:
"Who is your God?".

5.2.4 Authority

IRTs may not have authority to intervene in the operation of all the
systems within their perimeter.  They should identify the scope of their
control as distinct from the perimeter of their constituency; if other
IRTs operate hierachically within their perimeter, these should be

--- (Responsibility should be covered here) ---

5.3 Policies

5.3.1 Types of incidents and level of support

The types of incident which the team is authorised to address and the
level of support the team will contribute in assisting with each type of
incident should be summarized here in list form.  The Services section
(later) provides opportunity for more detailed definition.

The team should state whether it will act on information it receives
about vulnerabilities which create opportunities for future incidents.
A commitment to act on such information on behalf of its constituency is
regarded as an optional pro-active service policy rather than a core
service requirement for an IRT.

5.3.2 Co-operation and interaction with other organizations

This section should make explicit the related groups with which the IRT

 * incident response teams
routinely interacts.  Examples of these are listed below.

Incident Response Teams:    An IRT will often need to interact with
other IRTs.  For example an IRT within a large company may need to
report incidents to a national IRT, and a national IRT may need to
report incidents to national IRTs in other countries.

Vendors:    Larger vendors
 * law-enforcement agencies
 * press have their own IRTs, but smaller vendors may
not.  In such cases an IRT will need to work directly with a vendor.

Law-enforcement agencies:    These include the police and other
investigative agencies.  IRTs and users of the template should be
sensitive to local laws and regulations, which may vary considerably in
different countries.

Press:    An IRT may be approached by the Press for information and
comment from time to time.  This is discussed in more detail below
(Reporting and Disclosure).

5.3.3 Reporting and Disclosure

The default status of any and all security-related information which a
team receives can only be 'confidential,' but rigid adherence to this
makes the team a 'black hole.'  Its template should define what
information it will report or disclose, to whom, and when.

Different teams are likely to be subject to different legal restraints
requiring or limiting disclosure, especially if they work in different
jurisdictions.  Each team's template should specify any such restraints,
both to clarify users' expectations and to inform other teams.

Conflicts of interest, particularly in commercial matters, may also
restrain disclosure by a team; the present Draft does not recommend on
how such conflicts should be addressed.

An explicit policy concerning disclosure to the Press can be helpful,
particularly in clarifying the expectations of an IRT's constituency.

'Disclosure' includes:

  - reporting incidents within the constituency to other teams;

  - handling incidents occurring within the constituency, but reported
    from outside it.

  - reporting observations from within the constituency indicating
    suspected or confirmed incidents outside it;

  - acting on reports of incidents occurring outside the constituency;

  - passing information about vulnerabilities to vendors, to Partner
    IRTs or directly to affected sites lying within or outside the

  - feed-back to parties reporting incidents or vulnerabilities;

  - the provision of contact information relating to members of the
    constituency, members of other constituencies, other IRTs or law-
    enforcement agencies.

The reporting and disclosure policy should make clear who will be the
recipients of an IRT's reports in each circumstance.  It should also
note whether the team will expect to deal through another IRT or
directly with a member of another constituency over matters directly
involving that member.

A team will normally collect statistics.  If they are distributed, the
template's reporting and disclosure policy should say so, and should
list the recipients.

5.3.4 Communication and authentication

Methods of secure and verifiable communication should be established.
This is necessary for communication between IRTs and between an IRT and
its constituents.  The template should include public keys or pointers
to them, including key fingerprints, together with guidelines on how to
use this information to check authenticity.

At the moment it is recommended that every IRT have, as a minimum, a PGP
key available, since PGP is available world-wide.  Teams may also make
other mechanisms available, for example PEM.

For comunication communication via telephone or facsimile an IRT may keep secret
authentication data for parties with whom they may deal, such as an
agreed password or phrase.

5.4 Services

Services should be defined in two sections, as listed below.

 * direct incident response
    + verification of incident
    + technical assistance analysis to understand compromise
    + notification of other involved parties
    + eradication
    + recovery

 * optional
    + information provision
       - vunerablility vulnerability archive
       - patches and resolutions
    + tools
    + education
    + audit and consulting
    + product evaluation

5.5 Incident reporting Forms

Samples of reporting forms used by the IRT (or pointers to them) should
be included at this point in a template.

5.6 Disclaimers

Although the template does not constitute a contract, liability might
conceivably result from its descriptions of services and purposes.  The
inclusion of a disclaimer at the end of the template is recommended.

It should be noted that some forms of reporting or disclosure relating
to specific incidents or vulnerabilities can imply liability, and IRTs
should consider the inclusion of disclaimers in such material.

In situations where the original version of a template must be
translated into another language, the translation should carry a
disclaimer and a pointer to the original.  For example:

    Although we tried to carefully translate our German template
    into English, we can not be certain that both documents express
    the same thoughts in the same level of detail and correctness.
    In all cases, where there is a difference between both
    versions, the German version is the binding version for our

6 Appendix: Appendix A: Note on procedure definitions

Policies and statements of services in the template have to be
implemented as procedures, but descriptions of those procedures should
not be included in the template.

The following notes are intended to assist those seeking to form or to
improve their IRTs.

 * External
    + identify other response teams
    + define supported clients:
        - by domain, through registration system, other means
    + establish secure communication practices
        - use of network, cell-phones, etc
    + define information that a client site must/should provide
        - use of reporting forms

* Internal
  + secure the team's infrastructure
  + protect information servers
  + protect sensitive data
  + define expiry of sensitive data
  + define disposal practice for sensitive data
  + establish methods for gathering and keeping statistics
  + establish 'knowledge base' of lessons learned from past incidents
  + create practical implementations of disclosure policies
  + document explicit practices for disclosure to the Press

The Site Security Handbook is a first resource to consult in securing a
team's infrastructure.  IRT-specific security measures may evolve later.

7 Appendix B: Known Incident Response Teams

FIRST is the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams.  Information
about FIRST can be found via their World Wide Web home page:

This page contains pointers to 'Team Contact Information' for IRTs who
are FIRST members, and to 'Teams with WWW Servers.'

8 Security Considerations

This document discusses the operation of Security Incident Response
Teams, and is therefore not directly concerned with the security of
protocols or network systems themselves.

Nonetheless, it is vital that IRTs establish secure communication
channels with other teams, and with members of their constituency.
They must also secure their own systems and infrastructure.


9 Author's Addresses Address

    Nevil Brownlee
    The University of Auckland

    Phone: +64 9 373 7599 x8941

    John White
    The University of Auckland

    Phone: +64 9 373 7599 x8946