draft-ietf-grip-framework-irt-06.txt   draft-ietf-grip-framework-irt-07.txt 
Internet Engineering Task Force Nevil Brownlee Internet Engineering Task Force Nevil Brownlee
INTERNET-DRAFT The University of Auckland INTERNET-DRAFT The University of Auckland
Valid for six months Erik Guttman Valid for six months Erik Guttman
Sun Microsystems Sun Microsystems
Expectations for Security Incident Response September 1997
<draft-ietf-grip-framework-irt-06.txt> Expectations for Computer Security Incident Response
<draft-ietf-grip-framework-irt-07.txt>
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
This document is an Internet Draft. Internet Drafts are working This document is an Internet Draft. Internet Drafts are working
documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its Areas, documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its Areas,
and its Working Groups. Note that other groups may also distribute and its Working Groups. Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet Drafts. This Internet Draft is a working documents as Internet Drafts. This Internet Draft is a
product of the GRIP Working Group of the IETF. product of the GRIP Working Group of the IETF.
Internet Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six Internet Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six
skipping to change at page 1, line 34 skipping to change at page 1, line 35
To learn the current status of any Internet Draft, please check the To learn the current status of any Internet Draft, please check the
'1id-abstracts.txt' listing contained in the Internet Drafts shadow '1id-abstracts.txt' listing contained in the Internet Drafts shadow
directories on ftp.is.co.za (Africa), nic.nordu.net (Europe), directories on ftp.is.co.za (Africa), nic.nordu.net (Europe),
munnari.oz.au (Pacific Rim), ds.internic.net (US East Coast), or munnari.oz.au (Pacific Rim), ds.internic.net (US East Coast), or
ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast). ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast).
Abstract Abstract
The purpose of this document is to express the general Internet The purpose of this document is to express the general Internet
community's expectations of Security Incident Response Teams (SIRTs). community's expectations of Computer Security Incident Response
It is not possible to define a set of requirements that would be Teams (CSIRTs). It is not possible to define a set of requirements
appropriate for all teams, but it is possible and helpful to list that would be appropriate for all teams, but it is possible and
and describe the general set of topics and issues which are of helpful to list and describe the general set of topics and issues
concern and interest to constituent communities. which are of concern and interest to constituent communities.
SIRT constituents have a legitimate need and right to fully CSIRT constituents have a legitimate need and right to fully
understand the policies and procedures of "their" Security Incident understand the policies and procedures of 'their' Computer Security
Response Team. One way to support this understanding is to supply Incident Response Team. One way to support this understanding is to
detailed information which users may consider, in the form of a supply detailed information which users may consider, in the form of
formal template completed by the SIRT. An outline of such a a formal template completed by the CSIRT. An outline of such a
template and a filled in example are provided. template and a filled in example are provided.
Expectations for Security Incident Response 20 July 97 Expectations for Computer Security Incident Response 11 September 97
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1 Introduction 1 1 Introduction 1
2 Scope.............................................................3 2 Scope............................................................3
2.1 Publishing SIRT Policies and Procedures ......................3 2.1 Publishing CSIRT Policies and Procedures ....................3
2.2 Relationships between different SIRTs ........................5 2.2 Relationships between different CSIRTs ......................5
2.3 Establishing Secure Communications ...........................5 2.3 Establishing Secure Communications ..........................5
3 Information, Policies and Procedures..............................7 3 Information, Policies and Procedures.............................6
3.1 Obtaining the Document........................................8 3.1 Obtaining the Document.......................................7
3.2 Contact Information ..........................................9 3.2 Contact Information .........................................8
3.3 Charter .....................................................10 3.3 Charter .....................................................9
3.3.1 Mission Statement......................................10 3.3.1 Mission Statement......................................9
3.3.2 Constituency...........................................10 3.3.2 Constituency...........................................9
3.3.3 Sponsoring Organization / Affiliation..................11 3.3.3 Sponsoring Organization / Affiliation..................9
3.3.4 Authority..............................................11 3.3.4 Authority.............................................10
3.4 Policies ....................................................11 3.4 Policies ...................................................10
3.4.1 Types of Incidents and Level of Support................11 3.4.1 Types of Incidents and Level of Support...............10
3.4.2 Co-operation, Interaction and Disclosure of 3.4.2 Co-operation, Interaction and Disclosure of
Information............................................12 Information...........................................11
3.4.3 Communication and Authentication.......................14 3.4.3 Communication and Authentication......................13
3.5 Services ....................................................14 3.5 Services ...................................................13
3.5.1 Incident Response .....................................15 3.5.1 Incident Response ....................................13
3.5.1.1 Incident Triate ...............................15 3.5.1.1 Incident Triate ..............................14
3.5.1.2 Incident Coordination .........................15 3.5.1.2 Incident Coordination ........................14
3.5.1.3 Incident Cure .................................15 3.5.1.3 Incident Resolution...........................14
3.5.2 Proactive Activities ..................................16 3.5.2 Proactive Activities .................................15
3.6 Incident Reporting Forms ....................................16 3.6 Incident Reporting Forms ...................................15
3.7 Disclaimers .................................................17 3.7 Disclaimers ................................................15
Appendix A: Glossary of Terms 17 Appendix A: Glossary of Terms 16
Appendix B: Related Material 19 Appendix B: Related Material 18
Appendix C: Known Security Incident Response Teams 20 Appendix C: Known Computer Security Incident Response Teams 19
Appendix D: Outline for SIRT Template 21 Appendix D: Outline for CSIRT Template 20
Appendix E: Example - 'filled-in' Template for a SIRT 22 Appendix E: Example - 'filled-in' Template for a CSIRT 21
4 Acknowlegments 34 4 Acknowlegments 33
5 References 34 5 References 33
6 Security Considerations 34 6 Security Considerations 33
7 Authors' Addresses 35 7 Authors' Addresses 33
Expectations for Security Incident Response 15 April 97 Expectations for Computer Security Incident Response 11 September 97
1 Introduction 1 Introduction
The GRIP Working Group was formed to create a document that describes The GRIP Working Group was formed to create a document that
the community's expectations of security incident response teams describes the community's expectations of computer security incident
(SIRTs). Although the need for such a document originated in the response teams (CSIRTs). Although the need for such a document
general Internet community, the expectations expressed should also originated in the general Internet community, the expectations
closely match those of more restricted communities. expressed should also closely match those of more restricted
communities.
In the past there have been misunderstandings regarding what to In the past there have been misunderstandings regarding what to
expect from SIRTs. The goal of this document is to provide a expect from CSIRTs. The goal of this document is to provide a
framework for presenting the important subjects (related to incident framework for presenting the important subjects (related to incident
response) that are of concern to the community. response) that are of concern to the community.
Before continuing, it is important to clearly understand what is Before continuing, it is important to clearly understand what is
meant by the term "Security Incident Response Team." For the meant by the term "Computer Security Incident Response Team." For
purposes of this document, a SIRT is a team that performs, the purposes of this document, a CSIRT is a team that performs,
coordinates, and supports the response to security incidents that coordinates, and supports the response to security incidents that
involve sites within a defined constituency (see Appendix A for a involve sites within a defined constituency (see Appendix A for a
more complete definition). Any group calling itself a SIRT for a more complete definition). Any group calling itself a CSIRT for a
specific constituency must therefore react to reported security specific constituency must therefore react to reported security
incidents, and to threats to "their" constituency in ways which the incidents, and to threats to "their" constituency in ways which the
specific community agrees to be in its general interest. specific community agrees to be in its general interest.
Since it is vital that each member of a constituent community be Since it is vital that each member of a constituent community be
able to understand what is reasonable to expect of their team, a SIRT able to understand what is reasonable to expect of their team, a
should make it clear who belongs to their constituency and define the CSIRT should make it clear who belongs to their constituency and
services the team offers to the community. Additionally, each SIRT define the services the team offers to the community. Additionally,
should publish its policies and operating procedures. Similarly, each CSIRT should publish its policies and operating procedures.
these same constituents need to know what is expected of them in Similarly, these same constituents need to know what is expected of
order for them to receive the services of their team. This requires them in order for them to receive the services of their team. This
that the team also publish how and where to report incidents. requires that the team also publish how and where to report
incidents.
This document details a template which will be used by SIRTs to This document details a template which will be used by CSIRTs to
communicate this information to their constituents. The constituents communicate this information to their constituents. The constituents
should certainly expect a SIRT to provide the services they describe should certainly expect a CSIRT to provide the services they describe
in the completed template. in the completed template.
It must be emphasised that without active participation from users, It must be emphasised that without active participation from users,
the effectiveness of the SIRT's services can be greatly diminished. the effectiveness of the CSIRT's services can be greatly diminished.
This is particularly the case with reporting. At a minimum, users This is particularly the case with reporting. At a minimum, users
need to know that they should report security incidents, and know how need to know that they should report security incidents, and know how
and to where they should report them. and to where they should report them.
Many computer security incidents originate outside local community Many computer security incidents originate outside local community
boundaries and affect inside sites, others originate inside the local boundaries and affect inside sites, others originate inside the local
community and affect hosts or users on the outside. Often, community and affect hosts or users on the outside. Often,
therefore, the handling of security incidents will involve multiple therefore, the handling of security incidents will involve multiple
sites and potentially multiple SIRTs. Resolving these incidents will sites and potentially multiple CSIRTs. Resolving these incidents
will require cooperation between individual sites and CSIRTs, and
Expectations for Security Incident Response 15 April 97 between CSIRTs.
require cooperation between individual sites and SIRTs, and between Expectations for Computer Security Incident Response 11 September 97
SIRTs.
Constituent communities need to know exactly how their SIRT will be Constituent communities need to know exactly how their CSIRT will be
working with other SIRTs and organizations outside their working with other CSIRTs and organizations outside their
constituency, and what information will be shared. constituency, and what information will be shared.
The rest of this document describes the set of topics and issues that The rest of this document describes the set of topics and issues
SIRTs need to elaborate for their constituents. However, there is no that CSIRTs need to elaborate for their constituents. However, there
attempt to specify the "correct" answer to any one topic area. is no attempt to specify the "correct" answer to any one topic area.
Rather, each topic is discussed in terms of what that topic means. Rather, each topic is discussed in terms of what that topic means.
For example, five types of policy statements are listed (representing
those policies of interest to the community), but the content of any
one of them will necessarily be specific to a given team.
Chapter two provides an overview of three major areas: the Chapter two provides an overview of three major areas: the
publishing of information by a response team, the definition of the publishing of information by a response team, the definition of the
response team's relationship to other response teams, and the need response team's relationship to other response teams, and the need
for secure communications. Chapter three describes in detail all the for secure communications. Chapter three describes in detail all
types of information that the community needs to know about their the types of information that the community needs to know about
response team. their response team.
For ease of use by the community, these topics are condensed into an For ease of use by the community, these topics are condensed into an
outline template found in Appendix D. This template can be used outline template found in Appendix D. This template can be used
by constituents to elicit information from their SIRT. by constituents to elicit information from their CSIRT.
It is the working group's sincere hope that through clarification It is the working group's sincere hope that through clarification
of the topics in this document, understanding between the community of the topics in this document, understanding between the community
and its SIRTs will be increased. and its CSIRTs will be increased.
2 Scope 2 Scope
The interactions between an incident response team and its The interactions between an incident response team and its
constituent community response team require first that the community constituent community response team require first that the community
understand the policies and procedures of the response team. Second, understand the policies and procedures of the response team.
since many response teams collaborate to handle incidents, the Second, since many response teams collaborate to handle incidents,
community must also understand the relationship between their the community must also understand the relationship between their
response team and other teams. Finally, many interactions will take response team and other teams. Finally, many interactions will take
advantage of existing public infrastructures, so the community needs advantage of existing public infrastructures, so the community needs
to know how those communications will be protected. Each of these to know how those communications will be protected. Each of these
subjects will be described in more detail in the following three subjects will be described in more detail in the following three
sections. sections.
2.1 Publishing SIRT Policies and Procedures 2.1 Publishing CSIRT Policies and Procedures
Each user who has access to a Security Incident Response Team should
know as much as possible about the services of and interactions with
this team long before he or she actually needs them.
Expectations for Security Incident Response 15 April 97 Each user who has access to a Computer Security Incident Response
Team should know as much as possible about the services of and
interactions with this team long before he or she actually needs
them.
A clear statement of the policies and procedures of a SIRT helps the A clear statement of the policies and procedures of a CSIRT helps
constituent understand how best to report incidents and what support the constituent understand how best to report incidents and what
to expect afterwards. Will the SIRT assist in resolving the support to expect afterwards. Will the CSIRT assist in resolving
incident? Will it provide help in avoiding incidents in the the incident? Will it provide help in avoiding incidents in the
future? Clear expectations, particularly of the limitations of the future? Clear expectations, particularly of the limitations of the
services provided by a SIRT, will make interaction with it more services provided by a CSIRT, will make interaction with it more
Expectations for Computer Security Incident Response 11 September 97
efficient and effective. efficient and effective.
There are different kinds of response teams: some have very broad There are different kinds of response teams: some have very broad
constituencies (e.g., CERT Coordination Center and the Internet), constituencies (e.g., CERT Coordination Center and the Internet),
others have more bounded constituencies (e.g., DFN-CERT, CIAC), others have more bounded constituencies (e.g., DFN-CERT, CIAC),
and still others have very restricted constituencies (e.g., and still others have very restricted constituencies (e.g.,
commercial response teams, corporate response teams). Regardless commercial response teams, corporate response teams). Regardless
of the type of response team, the constituency supported by it of the type of response team, the constituency supported by it
must be knowledgeable about the team's policies and procedures. must be knowledgeable about the team's policies and procedures.
Therefore, it is mandatory that response teams publish such Therefore, it is mandatory that response teams publish such
information to their constituency. information to their constituency.
A SIRT should communicate all necessary information about its A CSIRT should communicate all necessary information about its
policies and services in a form suitable to the needs of its policies and services in a form suitable to the needs of its
constituency. It is important to understand that not all policies constituency. It is important to understand that not all policies
and procedures need be publicly available. For example, it is not and procedures need be publicly available. For example, it is not
necessary to understand the internal operation of a team in order to necessary to understand the internal operation of a team in order to
interact with it, as when reporting an incident or receiving guidance interact with it, as when reporting an incident or receiving
on how to analyze or secure one's systems. guidance on how to analyze or secure one's systems.
In the past, some teams supplied a kind of Operational Framework, In the past, some teams supplied a kind of Operational Framework,
others provided a Frequently Asked Questions list (FAQ), while still others provided a Frequently Asked Questions list (FAQ), while still
others wrote papers for distribution at user conferences or sent others wrote papers for distribution at user conferences or sent
newsletters. newsletters.
We recommend that each SIRT publish its guidelines and procedures on We recommend that each CSIRT publish its guidelines and procedures
its own information server (e.g. a World Wide Web server). This on its own information server (e.g. a World Wide Web server). This
would allow constituents to easily access it, though the problem would allow constituents to easily access it, though the problem
remains of how a constituent can find "his" or "her" team; people remains of how a constituent can find "his" or "her" team; people
within the constituency have to discover that there is a SIRT "at within the constituency have to discover that there is a CSIRT "at
their disposal." their disposal."
It is foreseen that completed SIRT templates will soon become It is foreseen that completed CSIRT templates will soon become
searchable by modern search engines, which will aid in distributing searchable by modern search engines, which will aid in distributing
information about the existence of SIRTs and basic information information about the existence of CSIRTs and basic information
required to approach them. required to approach them.
It would be very useful to have a central repository containing all It would be very useful to have a central repository containing all
the completed SIRT templates. No such repository exists at the time the completed CSIRT templates. No such repository exists at the
of writing, though this might change in the future. time of writing, though this might change in the future.
Regardless of the source from which the information is retrieved, Regardless of the source from which the information is retrieved,
the user of the template must check its authenticity. It is highly the user of the template must check its authenticity. It is highly
recommended that such vital documents be protected by digital recommended that such vital documents be protected by digital
signatures. These will allow the user to verify that the template signatures. These will allow the user to verify that the template
was indeed published by the CSIRT and that it has not been tampered
Expectations for Security Incident Response 15 April 97
was indeed published by the SIRT and that it has not been tampered
with. This document assumes the reader is familiar with the proper with. This document assumes the reader is familiar with the proper
use of digital signatures to determine whether a document is use of digital signatures to determine whether a document is
authentic. authentic.
2.2 Relationships between different SIRTs Expectations for Computer Security Incident Response 11 September 97
In some cases a SIRT may be able to operate effectively on its own 2.2 Relationships between different CSIRTs
In some cases a CSIRT may be able to operate effectively on its own
and in close cooperation with its constituency. But with today's and in close cooperation with its constituency. But with today's
international networks it is much more likely that most of the international networks it is much more likely that most of the
incidents handled by a SIRT will involve parties external to its incidents handled by a CSIRT will involve parties external to its
constituency. Therefore the team will need to interact with other constituency. Therefore the team will need to interact with other
SIRTs and sites outside its constituency. CSIRTs and sites outside its constituency.
The constituent community should understand the nature and extent of The constituent community should understand the nature and extent of
this collaboration, as very sensitive information about individual this collaboration, as very sensitive information about individual
constituents may be disclosed in the process. constituents may be disclosed in the process.
Inter-SIRT interactions could include asking other teams for advice, Inter-CSIRT interactions could include asking other teams for
disseminating knowledge of problems, and working cooperatively to advice, disseminating knowledge of problems, and working
resolve a security incident affecting one or more of the SIRTs' cooperatively to resolve a security incident affecting one or
constituencies. more of the CSIRTs' constituencies.
In establishing relationships to support such interactions, SIRTs In establishing relationships to support such interactions, CSIRTs
must decide what kinds of agreements can exist between them so as to must decide what kinds of agreements can exist between them so as to
share yet safeguard information, whether this relationship can be share yet safeguard information, whether this relationship can be
disclosed, and if so to whom. disclosed, and if so to whom.
Note that there is a difference between a peering agreement, where Note that there is a difference between a peering agreement, where
the SIRTs involved agree to work together and share information, and the CSIRTs involved agree to work together and share information,
simple co-operation, where a SIRT (or any other organization) simply and simple co-operation, where a CSIRT (or any other organization)
contacts another SIRT and asks for help or advice. simply contacts another CSIRT and asks for help or advice.
Although the establishment of such relationships is very important Although the establishment of such relationships is very important
and affects the ability of a SIRT to support its constituency, it is and affects the ability of a CSIRT to support its constituency, it
up to the teams involved to decide about the details. It is beyond is up to the teams involved to decide about the details. It is
the scope of this document to make recommendations for this process. beyond the scope of this document to make recommendations for this
However, the same set of information used to set expectations for a process. However, the same set of information used to set
user community regarding sharing of information will help other expectations for a user community regarding sharing of information
parties to understand the objectives and services of a specific will help other parties to understand the objectives and services
SIRT, supporting a first contact. of a specific CSIRT, supporting a first contact.
2.3 Establishing Secure Communications 2.3 Establishing Secure Communications
Once one party has decided to share information with another party, Once one party has decided to share information with another party,
or two parties have agreed to share information or work together - as or two parties have agreed to share information or work together -
required for the coordination of security incident response - all as required for the coordination of computer security incident
parties involved need secure communications channels. (In this response - all parties involved need secure communications channels.
context, "secure" refers to the protected transmission of information (In this context, "secure" refers to the protected transmission of
information shared between different parties, and not to the
Expectations for Security Incident Response 15 April 97 appropriate use of the information by the parties.)
shared between different parties, and not to the appropriate use of
the information by the parties.)
The goals of secure communication are: The goals of secure communication are:
- Confidentiality: - Confidentiality:
Can somebody else access the content of the communication? Can somebody else access the content of the communication?
Expectations for Computer Security Incident Response 11 September 97
- Integrity: - Integrity:
Can somebody else manipulate the content of the communication? Can somebody else manipulate the content of the communication?
- Authenticity: - Authenticity:
Am I communicating with the "right" person? Am I communicating with the "right" person?
It is very easy to send forged e-mail, and not hard to establish a It is very easy to send forged e-mail, and not hard to establish a
(false) identity by telephone. Cryptographic techniques, for (false) identity by telephone. Cryptographic techniques, for
example Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) or Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM) example Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) or Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM)
can provide effective ways of securing e-mail. With the correct can provide effective ways of securing e-mail. With the correct
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- Secret keys (for techniques like DES and PGP/conventional - Secret keys (for techniques like DES and PGP/conventional
encryption): Because these must be known to both sender and encryption): Because these must be known to both sender and
receiver, secret keys must be exchanged before the communication receiver, secret keys must be exchanged before the communication
via a secure channel. via a secure channel.
Communication is critical to all aspects of incident response. A Communication is critical to all aspects of incident response. A
team can best support the use of the above-mentioned techniques by team can best support the use of the above-mentioned techniques by
gathering all relevant information, in a consistent way. Specific gathering all relevant information, in a consistent way. Specific
requirements (such as calling a specific number to check the requirements (such as calling a specific number to check the
authenticity of keys) should be clear from the start. SIRT templates authenticity of keys) should be clear from the start. CSIRT
provide a standardized vehicle for delivering this information. templates provide a standardized vehicle for delivering this
information.
It is beyond the scope of this document to address the technical It is beyond the scope of this document to address the technical
and administrative problems of secure communications. The point is and administrative problems of secure communications. The point is
that response teams must support and use a method to secure the that response teams must support and use a method to secure the
communications between themselves and their constituents (or other communications between themselves and their constituents (or other
response teams). Whatever the mechanism is, the level of protection response teams). Whatever the mechanism is, the level of protection
it provides must be acceptable to the constituent community. it provides must be acceptable to the constituent community.
Expectations for Security Incident Response 15 April 97
3 Information, Policies and Procedures 3 Information, Policies and Procedures
In chapter 2 it was mentioned that the policies and procedures of a In chapter 2 it was mentioned that the policies and procedures of a
response team need to be published to their constituent community. response team need to be published to their constituent community.
In this chapter we will list all the types of information that the In this chapter we will list all the types of information that the
community needs to receive from its response team. How this community needs to receive from its response team. How this
information is communicated to a community will differ from team to information is communicated to a community will differ from team to
team, as will the specific information content. The intent here is team, as will the specific information content. The intent here is
to clearly describe the various kinds of information that a to clearly describe the various kinds of information that a
constituent community expects from its response team. constituent community expects from its response team.
To make it easier to understand the issues and topics relevant to the Expectations for Computer Security Incident Response 11 September 97
interaction of constituents with "their" SIRT, we suggest that a SIRT
publish all information, policies, and procedures addressing its To make it easier to understand the issues and topics relevant to
constituency as a document, following the template given in Appendix the interaction of constituents with "their" CSIRT, we suggest that
D. The template structure arranges items, making it easy to supply a CSIRT publish all information, policies, and procedures addressing
specific information; in Appendix E we provide an example of a its constituency as a document, following the template given in
filled-out template for the fictitious XYZ University. While Appendix D. The template structure arranges items, making it easy
no recommendations are made as to what a SIRT should adopt for its to supply specific information; in Appendix E we provide an example
of a filled-out template for the fictitious XYZ University. While
no recommendations are made as to what a CSIRT should adopt for its
policy or procedures, different possibilities are outlined to give policy or procedures, different possibilities are outlined to give
some examples. The most important thing is that a SIRT have a policy some examples. The most important thing is that a CSIRT have a
and that that those who interact with the SIRT be able to obtain and policy and that those who interact with the CSIRT be able to obtain
understand it. and understand it.
As always, not every aspect for every environment and/or team can As always, not every aspect for every environment and/or team can
be covered. This outline should be seen as a suggestion. Each team be covered. This outline should be seen as a suggestion. Each team
should feel free to include whatever they think is necessary to should feel free to include whatever they think is necessary to
support its constituency. support its constituency.
Expectations for Security Incident Response 15 April 97
3.1 Obtaining the Document 3.1 Obtaining the Document
Details of a SIRT change with time, so the completed template must Details of a CSIRT change with time, so the completed template must
indicate when it was last changed. Additionally, information should indicate when it was last changed. Additionally, information should
be provided concerning how to find out about future updates. Without be provided concerning how to find out about future updates. Without
this, it is inevitable that misunderstandings and misconceptions will this, it is inevitable that misunderstandings and misconceptions
arise over time; an outdated document can do more harm than good. will arise over time; outdated documents can do more harm than good.
- Date of last update This should be sufficient to allow - Date of last update This should be sufficient to allow
anyone interested to evaluate the anyone interested to evaluate the
currency of the template. currency of the template.
- Distribution list Mailing lists are a convenient - Distribution list Mailing lists are a convenient
mechanism to distribute up-to-date mechanism to distribute up-to-date
information to a large number of information to a large number of
users. A team can decide to use its users. A team can decide to use its
own or an already existing list to own or an already existing list to
notify users whenever the document notify users whenever the document
changes. The list might normally changes. The list might normally be
cover the constituency and any other groups the CSIRT has frequent
groups the SIRT has frequent
interactions with. interactions with.
Digital signatures should be used Digital signatures should be used
for update messages sent by a SIRT. for update messages sent by a CSIRT.
- Location of the document The location where a current version - Location of the document The location where a current version
of the document is accessible of the document is accessible through
through a team's online information a team's online information services.
services. Constituents can then Constituents can then easily learn
easily learn more about the team and more about the team and check for
check for recent updates. recent updates. This online version
should also be accompanied by a
This online version should also be digital signature.
accompanied by a digital signature.
Expectations for Security Incident Response 20 July 97 Expectations for Computer Security Incident Response 11 September 97
3.2 Contact Information 3.2 Contact Information
Full details of how to contact the SIRT should be listed here, Full details of how to contact the CSIRT should be listed here,
although this might be very different for different teams; for although this might be very different for different teams; for
example, some might choose not to publicize the names of their team example, some might choose not to publicize the names of their team
members. No further clarification is given when the meaning of the members. No further clarification is given when the meaning of the
item can be assumed. item can be assumed.
- Name of the SIRT - Name of the CSIRT
- Mailing Address - Mailing Address
- Time zone This is useful for coordinating - Time zone This is useful for coordinating
incidents which cross time zones. incidents which cross time zones.
- Telephone number - Telephone number
- Facsimile number - Facsimile number
skipping to change at page 9, line 38 skipping to change at page 8, line 39
- Electronic mail address - Electronic mail address
- Public keys and encryption The use of specific techniques - Public keys and encryption The use of specific techniques
depends on the ability of the depends on the ability of the
communication partners to have communication partners to have
access to programs, keys and so on. access to programs, keys and so on.
Relevant information should be Relevant information should be
given to enable users to determine given to enable users to determine
if and how they can make use of if and how they can make use of
encrypted communication while encrypted communication while
interacting with the SIRT. interacting with the CSIRT.
- Team members - Team members
- Operating Hours The operating hours and holiday - Operating Hours The operating hours and holiday
schedule should be provided here. schedule should be provided here.
Is there a 24 hour hotline? Is there a 24 hour hotline?
- Additional Contact Info Is there any specific customer - Additional Contact Info Is there any specific customer
contact info? contact info?
More detailed contact information can be provided. This might More detailed contact information can be provided. This might
include different contacts for different services, or might be a include different contacts for different services, or might be a
list of online information services. If specific procedures for list of online information services. If specific procedures for
access to some services exist (for example addresses for mailing access to some services exist (for example addresses for mailing
list requests), these should be explained here. list requests), these should be explained here.
Expectations for Security Incident Response 20 July 97 Expectations for Computer Security Incident Response 11 September 97
3.3 Charter 3.3 Charter
Every SIRT must have a charter which specifies what it is to do, and Every CSIRT must have a charter which specifies what it is to do,
the authority under which it will do it. The charter should include and the authority under which it will do it. The charter should
at least the following items: include at least the following items:
- Mission statement - Mission statement
- Constituency - Constituency
- Sponsorship / affiliation - Sponsorship / affiliation
- Authority - Authority
3.3.1 Mission Statement 3.3.1 Mission Statement
The mission statement should focus on the team's core activities, The mission statement should focus on the team's core activities,
already stated in the definition of a SIRT. In order to be already stated in the definition of a CSIRT. In order to be
considered a Security Incident Response Team, the team must support considered a Computer Security Incident Response Team, the team must
the reporting of incidents and support its constituency by dealing support the reporting of incidents and support its constituency by
with incidents. dealing with incidents.
The goals and purposes of a team are especially important, and The goals and purposes of a team are especially important, and
require clear, unambiguous definition. require clear, unambiguous definition.
3.3.2 Constituency 3.3.2 Constituency
A SIRT's constituency can be determined in any of several ways. For A CSIRT's constituency can be determined in any of several ways.
example it could be a company's employees or its paid subscribers, For example it could be a company's employees or its paid
or it could be defined in terms of a technological focus, such as subscribers, or it could be defined in terms of a technological
the users of a particular operating system. focus, such as the users of a particular operating system.
The definition of the constituency should create a perimeter around The definition of the constituency should create a perimeter around
the group to whom the team will provide service. The policy section the group to whom the team will provide service. The policy section
of the document (see below) should explain how requests from outside of the document (see below) should explain how requests from outside
this perimeter will be handled. this perimeter will be handled.
If a SIRT decides not to disclose its constituency, it should If a CSIRT decides not to disclose its constituency, it should
explain the reasoning behind this decision. For example, for-fee explain the reasoning behind this decision. For example, for-fee
SIRTs will not list their clients but will declare that they provide CSIRTs will not list their clients but will declare that they
a service to a large group of customers that are kept confidential provide a service to a large group of customers that are kept
because of the clients' contracts. confidential because of the clients' contracts.
Constituencies might overlap, as when an ISP provides a SIRT which Constituencies might overlap, as when an ISP provides a CSIRT which
delivers services to customer sites that also have SIRTs. The delivers services to customer sites that also have CSIRTs. The
Authority section of the SIRT's description (see below) should Authority section of the CSIRT's description (see below) should
make such relationships clear. make such relationships clear.
Expectations for Security Incident Response 15 April 97
3.3.3 Sponsoring Organization / Affiliation 3.3.3 Sponsoring Organization / Affiliation
The sponsoring organization, which authorizes the actions of the The sponsoring organization, which authorizes the actions of the
SIRT, should be given next. Knowing this will help the users to CSIRT, should be given next. Knowing this will help the users to
understand the background and set-up of the SIRT, and it is vital
information for building trust between a constituent and a SIRT. Expectations for Computer Security Incident Response 11 September 97
understand the background and set-up of the CSIRT, and it is vital
information for building trust between a constituent and a CSIRT.
3.3.4 Authority 3.3.4 Authority
This section will vary greatly from one SIRT to another, based on This section will vary greatly from one CSIRT to another, based on
the relationship between the team and its constituency. While an the relationship between the team and its constituency. While an
organizational SIRT will be given its authority by the management organizational CSIRT will be given its authority by the management
of the organization, a community SIRT will be supported and chosen of the organization, a community CSIRT will be supported and chosen
by the community, usually in a advisory role. by the community, usually in a advisory role.
A SIRT may or may not have the authority to intervene in the A CSIRT may or may not have the authority to intervene in the
operation of all of the systems within its perimeter. It should operation of all of the systems within its perimeter. It should
identify the scope of its control as distinct from the perimeter of identify the scope of its control as distinct from the perimeter of
its constituency. If other SIRTs operate hierarchically within its its constituency. If other CSIRTs operate hierarchically within its
perimeter, this should be mentioned here, and the related SIRTs perimeter, this should be mentioned here, and the related CSIRTs
identified. identified.
Disclosure of a team's authority may expose it to claims of Disclosure of a team's authority may expose it to claims of
liability. Every team should seek legal advice on these matters. liability. Every team should seek legal advice on these matters.
(See section 3.7 for more on liability.) (See section 3.7 for more on liability.)
3.4 Policies 3.4 Policies
It is critical that Incident Response Teams define their policies. It is critical that Incident Response Teams define their policies.
The following sections discuss communication of these policies to The following sections discuss communication of these policies to
skipping to change at page 11, line 51 skipping to change at page 10, line 47
The types of incident which the team is able to address, and the The types of incident which the team is able to address, and the
level of support which the team will offer when responding to each level of support which the team will offer when responding to each
type of incident, should be summarized here in list form. The type of incident, should be summarized here in list form. The
Services section (see below) provides the opportunity to give more Services section (see below) provides the opportunity to give more
detailed descriptions, and to address non-incident-related topics. detailed descriptions, and to address non-incident-related topics.
The level of support may change depending on factors such as the The level of support may change depending on factors such as the
team's workload and the completeness of the information available. team's workload and the completeness of the information available.
Such factors should be outlined and their impact should be Such factors should be outlined and their impact should be
explained. As a list of known types of incidents will be incomplete explained. As a list of known types of incidents will be incomplete
with regard to possible or future incidents, a SIRT should also give with regard to possible or future incidents, a CSIRT should also give
some background on the "default" support for incident types not some background on the "default" support for incident types not
otherwise mentioned. otherwise mentioned.
Expectations for Security Incident Response 15 April 97
The team should state whether it will act on information it receives The team should state whether it will act on information it receives
about vulnerabilities which create opportunities for future about vulnerabilities which create opportunities for future
incidents. A commitment to act on such information on behalf of its incidents. A commitment to act on such information on behalf of its
constituency is regarded as an optional proactive service policy constituency is regarded as an optional proactive service policy
rather than a core service requirement for a SIRT. rather than a core service requirement for a CSIRT.
Expectations for Computer Security Incident Response 11 September 97
3.4.2 Co-operation, Interaction and Disclosure of Information 3.4.2 Co-operation, Interaction and Disclosure of Information
This section should make explicit which related groups the SIRT This section should make explicit which related groups the CSIRT
routinely interacts with. Such interactions are not necessarily routinely interacts with. Such interactions are not necessarily
related to the security incident response provided, but are used to related to the computer security incident response provided, but are
facilitate better cooperation on technical topics or services. By used to facilitate better cooperation on technical topics or
no means need details about cooperation agreements be given out; the services. By no means need details about cooperation agreements be
main objective of this section is to give the constituency a basic given out; the main objective of this section is to give the
understanding of what kind of interactions are established and what constituency a basic understanding of what kind of interactions are
their purpose is. established and what their purpose is.
The reporting and disclosure policy should make clear who will be The reporting and disclosure policy should make clear who will be
the recipients of a SIRT's report in each circumstance. It should the recipients of a CSIRT's report in each circumstance. It should
also note whether the team will expect to operate through another also note whether the team will expect to operate through another
SIRT or directly with a member of another constituency over matters CSIRT or directly with a member of another constituency over matters
specifically concerning that member. specifically concerning that member.
Important examples of related groups a SIRT will interact with are Important examples of related groups a CSIRT will interact with are
listed below. listed below.
Incident Response Teams: Incident Response Teams:
A SIRT will often need to interact with other SIRTs. For example A CSIRT will often need to interact with other CSIRTs. For
a SIRT within a large company may need to report incidents to a example a CSIRT within a large company may need to report
national SIRT, and a national SIRT may need to report incidents incidents to a national CSIRT, and a national CSIRT may need to
to national SIRTs in other countries to deal with all sites report incidents to national CSIRTs in other countries to deal
involved in a large-scale attack. with all sites involved in a large-scale attack.
Collaboration between SIRTs may lead to disclosure of Collaboration between CSIRTs may lead to disclosure of
information. The following are examples of such disclosure, information. The following are examples of such disclosure,
but are not intended to be an exhaustive list: but are not intended to be an exhaustive list:
- Reporting incidents within the constituency to other teams. - Reporting incidents within the constituency to other teams.
If this is done, site-related information may become public If this is done, site-related information may become public
knowledge, accessible to everyone, in particular the press. knowledge, accessible to everyone, in particular the press.
- Handling incidents occurring within the constituency, but - Handling incidents occurring within the constituency, but
reported from outside it (which implies that some information reported from outside it (which implies that some information
has already been disclosed off-site). has already been disclosed off-site).
- Reporting observations from within the constituency indicating - Reporting observations from within the constituency indicating
suspected or confirmed incidents outside it. suspected or confirmed incidents outside it.
- Acting on reports of incidents occurring outside the - Acting on reports of incidents occurring outside the
constituency. constituency.
Expectations for Security Incident Response 20 July 97
- Passing information about vulnerabilities to vendors, to - Passing information about vulnerabilities to vendors, to
partner SIRTs or directly to affected sites lying within or partner CSIRTs or directly to affected sites lying within or
outside the constituency. outside the constituency.
- Feedback to parties reporting incidents or vulnerabilities. - Feedback to parties reporting incidents or vulnerabilities.
Expectations for Computer Security Incident Response 11 September 97
- The provision of contact information relating to members of - The provision of contact information relating to members of
the constituency, members of other constituencies, other the constituency, members of other constituencies, other
SIRTs, or law-enforcement agencies. CSIRTs, or law-enforcement agencies.
Vendors: Vendors:
Larger vendors have their own SIRTs, but smaller vendors may not. Some vendors have their own CSIRTs, but some vendors may not.
In such cases a SIRT will need to work directly with a vendor to In such cases a CSIRT will need to work directly with a vendor to
suggest improvements or modifications, to analyse the technical suggest improvements or modifications, to analyse the technical
problem or to test provided solutions. problem or to test provided solutions. Vendors play a special
role in handling an incident if their products' vulnerabilities
are involved in the incident.
Law-enforcement agencies: Law-enforcement agencies:
These include the police and other investigative agencies. SIRTs These include the police and other investigative agencies. CSIRTs
and users of the template should be sensitive to local laws and and users of the template should be sensitive to local laws and
regulations, which may vary considerably in different countries. regulations, which may vary considerably in different countries.
A SIRT might advise on technical details of attacks or seek A CSIRT might advise on technical details of attacks or seek
advice on the legal implications of an incident. Local laws and advice on the legal implications of an incident. Local laws and
regulations may include specific reporting and confidentiality regulations may include specific reporting and confidentiality
requirements. requirements.
Press: Press:
A SIRT may be approached by the press for information and comment A CSIRT may be approached by the press for information and
from time to time. comment from time to time.
An explicit policy concerning disclosure to the press can be An explicit policy concerning disclosure to the press can be
helpful, particularly in clarifying the expectations of a SIRT's helpful, particularly in clarifying the expectations of a CSIRT's
constituency. The press policy will have to clarify the same constituency. The press policy will have to clarify the same
topics as above more specifically, as the constituency will topics as above more specifically, as the constituency will
usually be very sensitive to press contacts. usually be very sensitive to press contacts.
Other: Other:
This might include research activities or the relation to the This might include research activities or the relation to the
sponsoring organization. sponsoring organization.
The default status of any and all security-related information which The default status of any and all security-related information which
a team receives will usually be 'confidential,' but rigid adherence a team receives will usually be 'confidential,' but rigid adherence
to this makes the team to appear to be an informational 'black to this makes the team to appear to be an informational 'black
hole,' which may reduce the likelihood of the team's obtaining hole,' which may reduce the likelihood of the team's obtaining
cooperation from clients and from other organizations. The SIRT's cooperation from clients and from other organizations. The CSIRT's
template should define what information it will report or disclose, template should define what information it will report or disclose,
to whom, and when. to whom, and when.
Different teams are likely to be subject to different legal Different teams are likely to be subject to different legal
restraints requiring or limiting disclosure, especially if they work restraints requiring or limiting disclosure, especially if they work
in different jurisdictions. In addition, they may have reporting in different jurisdictions. In addition, they may have reporting
requirements imposed by their sponsoring organization. Each team's requirements imposed by their sponsoring organization. Each team's
Expectations for Security Incident Response 15 April 97
template should specify any such constraints, both to clarify users' template should specify any such constraints, both to clarify users'
expectations and to inform other teams. expectations and to inform other teams.
Conflicts of interest, particularly in commercial matters, may also Conflicts of interest, particularly in commercial matters, may also
restrain disclosure by a team; this document does not recommend on restrain disclosure by a team; this document does not recommend on
how such conflicts should be addressed. how such conflicts should be addressed.
Expectations for Computer Security Incident Response 11 September 97
A team will normally collect statistics. If statistical information A team will normally collect statistics. If statistical information
is distributed, the template's reporting and disclosure policy is distributed, the template's reporting and disclosure policy
should say so, and should describe how to obtain such statistics. should say so, and should describe how to obtain such statistics.
3.4.3 Communication and Authentication 3.4.3 Communication and Authentication
Methods of secure and verifiable communication should be established. You must have a policy which describes methods of secure and
This is necessary for communication between SIRTs and between a SIRT verifiable communication that you will use. This is necessary for
and its constituents. The template should include public keys or communication between CSIRTs and between a CSIRT and its
pointers to them, including key fingerprints, together with constituents. The template should include public keys or pointers
guidelines on how to use this information to check authenticity and to them, including key fingerprints, together with guidelines on how
how to deal with corrupted information (for example where to report to use this information to check authenticity and how to deal with
this fact). corrupted information (for example where to report this fact).
At the moment it is recommended that as a minimum every SIRT have At the moment it is recommended that as a minimum every CSIRT have
(if possible), a PGP key available. A team may also (if possible), a PGP key available. A team may also
make other mechanisms available (for example PEM, MOSS, S/MIME), make other mechanisms available (for example PEM, MOSS, S/MIME),
according to its needs and the needs of its constituents. Note according to its needs and the needs of its constituents. Note
however, that SIRTs and users should be sensitive to local laws and however, that CSIRTs and users should be sensitive to local laws and
regulations. Some countries do not allow strong encryption, or regulations. Some countries do not allow strong encryption, or
enforce specific policies on the use of encryption technology. In enforce specific policies on the use of encryption technology. In
addition to encrypting sensitive information whenever possible, addition to encrypting sensitive information whenever possible,
correspondence should include digital signatures. (Please note that correspondence should include digital signatures. (Please note that
in most countries, the protection of authenticity by using digital in most countries, the protection of authenticity by using digital
signatures is not affected by existing encryption regulations.) signatures is not affected by existing encryption regulations.)
For communication via telephone or facsimile a SIRT may keep secret For communication via telephone or facsimile a CSIRT may keep secret
authentication data for parties with whom they may deal, such as an authentication data for parties with whom they may deal, such as an
agreed password or phrase. Obviously, such secret keys must not be agreed password or phrase. Obviously, such secret keys must not be
published, though their existence may be. published, though their existence may be.
3.5 Services 3.5 Services
Services provided by a SIRT can be roughly divided into two Services provided by a CSIRT can be roughly divided into two
categories: real-time activities directly related to the main task of categories: real-time activities directly related to the main task
incident response, and non-real-time proactive activities, supportive of incident response, and non-real-time proactive activities,
of the incident response task. The second category and part of the supportive of the incident response task. The second category and
first category consist of services which are optional in the sense part of the first category consist of services which are optional
that not all SIRTs will offer them. in the sense that not all CSIRTs will offer them.
Expectations for Security Incident Response 15 April 97
3.5.1 Incident Response 3.5.1 Incident Response
Incident response usually includes assessing incoming reports about Incident response usually includes assessing incoming reports about
incidents ("Incident Triage") and following up on these with other incidents ("Incident Triage") and following up on these with other
SIRTs, ISPs and sites ("Incident Coordination"). A third range of CSIRTs, ISPs and sites ("Incident Coordination"). A third range of
services, helping a local site to recover from an incident ("Incident services, helping a local site to recover from an incident
Cure"), is comprised of typically optional services, which not all ("Incident Resolution"), is comprised of typically optional
SIRTs will offer. services, which not all CSIRTs will offer.
Expectations for Computer Security Incident Response 11 September 97
3.5.1.1 Incident Triage 3.5.1.1 Incident Triage
Incident triage usually includes: Incident triage usually includes:
- Report assessment Interpreting incoming incident - Report assessment Interpreting incoming incident
reports, prioritizing them,and reports, prioritizing them,and
relating them to ongoing incidents relating them to ongoing incidents
and trends. and trends.
skipping to change at page 15, line 43 skipping to change at page 14, line 34
- Information categorization Categorization the incident related - Information categorization Categorization the incident related
information (logfiles, contact information (logfiles, contact
information, etc.) with respect to information, etc.) with respect to
the information disclosure policy. the information disclosure policy.
- Coordination Notification of other involved - Coordination Notification of other involved
parties on a need-to-know basis, as parties on a need-to-know basis, as
per the information disclosure per the information disclosure
policy. policy.
3.5.1.3 Incident Cure 3.5.1.3 Incident Resolution
Usually additional or optional, incident cure services include: Usually additional or optional, incident resolution services
include:
- Technical Assistance This may include analysis of - Technical Assistance This may include analysis of
compromised systems. compromised systems.
- Eradication Elimination of the cause of a - Eradication Elimination of the cause of a
security incident (the vulnerability security incident (the vulnerability
exploited), and its effects (for exploited), and its effects (for
example, continuing access to the example, continuing access to the
system by an intruder). system by an intruder).
Expectations for Security Incident Response 20 July 97
- Recovery Aid in restoring affected systems - Recovery Aid in restoring affected systems
and services to their status before and services to their status before
the security incident. the security incident.
Expectations for Computer Security Incident Response 11 September 97
3.5.2. Proactive Activities 3.5.2. Proactive Activities
Usually additional or optional, proactive services might include: Usually additional or optional, proactive services might include:
- Information provision This might include an archive of - Information provision This might include an archive of
known vulnerabilities, patches or known vulnerabilities, patches or
resolutions of past problems, or resolutions of past problems, or
advisory mailing lists. advisory mailing lists.
- Security Tools This may include tools for auditing - Security Tools This may include tools for auditing
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- Education and training - Education and training
- Product evaluation - Product evaluation
- Site security auditing and consulting - Site security auditing and consulting
3.6 Incident Reporting Forms 3.6 Incident Reporting Forms
The use of reporting forms makes it simpler for both users and The use of reporting forms makes it simpler for both users and
teams to deal with incidents. The constituent can prepare answers to teams to deal with incidents. The constituent can prepare answers
various important questions before he or she actually contacts the to various important questions before he or she actually contacts
team, and can therefore come well prepared. The team gets all the the team, and can therefore come well prepared. The team gets all
necessary information at once with the first report and can proceed the necessary information at once with the first report and can
efficiently. proceed efficiently.
Depending on the objectives and services of a particular SIRT, Depending on the objectives and services of a particular CSIRT,
multiple forms may be used, for example a reporting form for a new multiple forms may be used, for example a reporting form for a new
vulnerability may be very different from the form used for reporting vulnerability may be very different from the form used for reporting
incidents. incidents.
It is most efficient to provide forms through the online information It is most efficient to provide forms through the online information
services of the team. The exact pointers to them should be given in services of the team. The exact pointers to them should be given in
the SIRT description document, together with statements about the CSIRT description document, together with statements about
appropriate use, and guidelines for when and how to use the forms. appropriate use, and guidelines for when and how to use the forms.
If separate e-mail addresses are supported for form-based reporting, If separate e-mail addresses are supported for form-based reporting,
they should be listed here again. they should be listed here again.
One example of such a form is the Incident Reporting Form provided by One example of such a form is the Incident Reporting Form provided
the CERT Coordination Center: by the CERT Coordination Center:
- ftp://info.cert.org/incident_reporting_form - ftp://info.cert.org/incident_reporting_form
Expectations for Security Incident Response 20 July 97
3.7 Disclaimers 3.7 Disclaimers
Although the SIRT description document does not constitute a Although the CSIRT description document does not constitute a
contract, liability may conceivably result from its descriptions of contract, liability may conceivably result from its descriptions of
services and purposes. The inclusion of a disclaimer at the end of services and purposes. The inclusion of a disclaimer at the end of
the template is therefore recommended and should warn the user about the template is therefore recommended and should warn the user about
possible limitations. possible limitations.
Expectations for Computer Security Incident Response 11 September 97
In situations where the original version of a document must be In situations where the original version of a document must be
translated into another language, the translation should carry a translated into another language, the translation should carry a
disclaimer and a pointer to the original. For example: disclaimer and a pointer to the original. For example:
Although we tried to carefully translate the original Although we tried to carefully translate the original
document from German into English, we can not be certain document from German into English, we can not be certain
that both documents express the same thoughts in the same that both documents express the same thoughts in the same
level of detail and correctness. In all cases, where there level of detail and correctness. In all cases, where there
is a difference between both versions, the German version is a difference between both versions, the German version
will prevail. will prevail.
The use of and protection by disclaimers is affected by local laws The use of and protection by disclaimers is affected by local laws
and regulations, of which each SIRT should be aware. If in doubt and regulations, of which each CSIRT should be aware. If in doubt
the SIRT should check the disclaimer with a lawyer. the CSIRT should check the disclaimer with a lawyer.
Appendix A: Glossary of Terms Appendix A: Glossary of Terms
This glossary defines terms used in describing security incidents and This glossary defines terms used in describing security incidents
Security Incident Response Teams. Only a limited list is included. and Computer Security Incident Response Teams. Only a limited list
For more definitions please refer to other sources, for example to is included. For more definitions please refer to other sources,
the Internet User's Glossary [RFC 1983]. for example to the Internet User's Glossary [RFC 1983].
Constituency: Constituency:
Implicit in the purpose of a Security Incident Response Team is Implicit in the purpose of a Computer Security Incident Response
the existence of a constituency. This is the group of users, Team is the existence of a constituency. This is the group of
sites, networks or organizations served by the team. The team users, sites, networks or organizations served by the team. The
must be recognized by its constituency in order to be effective. team must be recognized by its constituency in order to be
effective.
Security Incident: Security Incident:
For the purpose of this document, this term is a synonym of For the purpose of this document, this term is a synonym of
Computer Security Incident: any adverse event which compromises Computer Security Incident: any adverse event which compromises
some aspect of computer or network security. some aspect of computer or network security.
The definition of an incident may vary between organizations, but The definition of an incident may vary between organizations, but
at least the following categories are generally applicable: at least the following categories are generally applicable:
- Loss of confidentiality of information. - Loss of confidentiality of information.
- Compromise of integrity of information. - Compromise of integrity of information.
- Denial of service. - Denial of service.
- Misuse of service, systems or information. - Misuse of service, systems or information.
- Damage to systems. - Damage to systems.
Expectations for Security Incident Response 20 July 97
These are very general categories. For instance the replacement These are very general categories. For instance the replacement
of a system utility program by a Trojan Horse is an example of of a system utility program by a Trojan Horse is an example of
'compromise of integrity,' and a successful password attack is an 'compromise of integrity,' and a successful password attack is an
example of 'loss of confidentiality.' Attacks, even if they example of 'loss of confidentiality.' Attacks, even if they
failed because of proper protection, can be regarded as failed because of proper protection, can be regarded as
Incidents. Incidents.
Within the definition of an incident the word 'compromised' is Within the definition of an incident the word 'compromised' is
Expectations for Computer Security Incident Response 11 September 97
used. Sometimes an administrator may only 'suspect' an incident. used. Sometimes an administrator may only 'suspect' an incident.
During the response it must be established whether or not an During the response it must be established whether or not an
incident has really occurred. incident has really occurred.
Security Incident Response Team: Computer Security Incident Response Team:
Based on two of the definitions given above, a SIRT is a team Based on two of the definitions given above, a CSIRT is a team
that coordinates and supports the response to security incidents that coordinates and supports the response to security incidents
that involve sites within a defined constituency. that involve sites within a defined constituency.
In order to be considered a SIRT, a team must: In order to be considered a CSIRT, a team must:
- Provide a (secure) channel for receiving reports about - Provide a (secure) channel for receiving reports about
suspected incidents. suspected incidents.
- Provide assistance to members of its constituency in - Provide assistance to members of its constituency in
handling these incidents. handling these incidents.
- Disseminate incident-related information to its - Disseminate incident-related information to its
constituency and to other involved parties. constituency and to other involved parties.
Note that we are not referring here to police or other law Note that we are not referring here to police or other law
enforcement bodies which may investigate computer-related crime. enforcement bodies which may investigate computer-related crime.
SIRT members, indeed, need not have any powers beyond CSIRT members, indeed, need not have any powers beyond
those of ordinary citizens. those of ordinary citizens.
Vendor: Vendor:
A 'vendor' is any entity that produces networking or computing A 'vendor' is any entity that produces networking or computing
technology, and is responsible for the technical content of that technology, and is responsible for the technical content of that
technology. Examples of 'technology' include hardware (desktop technology. Examples of 'technology' include hardware (desktop
computers, routers, switches, etc.), and software (operating computers, routers, switches, etc.), and software (operating
systems, mail forwarding systems, etc.). systems, mail forwarding systems, etc.).
Note that the supplier of a technology is not necessarily the Note that the supplier of a technology is not necessarily the
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than the ISP, is the entity responsible for the technical content than the ISP, is the entity responsible for the technical content
of the router. of the router.
Vulnerability: Vulnerability:
A 'vulnerability' is a characteristic of a piece of technology A 'vulnerability' is a characteristic of a piece of technology
which can be exploited to perpetrate a security incident. For which can be exploited to perpetrate a security incident. For
example, if a program unintentionally allowed ordinary users to example, if a program unintentionally allowed ordinary users to
execute arbitrary operating system commands in privileged mode, execute arbitrary operating system commands in privileged mode,
this "feature" would be a vulnerability. this "feature" would be a vulnerability.
Expectations for Security Incident Response 20 July 97 Expectations for Computer Security Incident Response 11 September 97
Appendix B: Related Material Appendix B: Related Material
Important issues in responding to security incidents on a site level Important issues in responding to security incidents on a site level
are contained in [RFC 1244], the Site Security Handbook, produced by are contained in [RFC 1244], the Site Security Handbook, produced by
the Site Security Handbook Working Group (SSH). This document will the Site Security Handbook Working Group (SSH). This document will
be updated by the SSH working group and will give recommendations be updated by the SSH working group and will give recommendations
for local policies and procedures, mainly related to the avoidance for local policies and procedures, mainly related to the avoidance
of security incidents. of security incidents.
Other documents of interest for the discussion of SIRTs and their Other documents of interest for the discussion of CSIRTs and their
tasks are available by anonymous FTP. A collection can be found on: tasks are available by anonymous FTP. A collection can be found on:
- ftp://ftp.cert.dfn.de/pub/docs/csir/ - ftp://ftp.cert.dfn.de/pub/docs/csir/
Please refer to file 01-README for further information about Please refer to file 01-README for further information about
the content of this directory. the content of this directory.
Some especially interesting documents in relation to this document Some especially interesting documents in relation to this document
are as follows: are as follows:
- ftp://ftp.nic.surfnet.nl/surfnet/net-security/cert-nl/docs/ - ftp://ftp.nic.surfnet.nl/surfnet/net-security/cert-nl/docs/
reports/R-92-01 reports/R-92-01
This report contains the Operational Framework of CERT-NL, the This report contains the Operational Framework of CERT-NL, the
SIRT of SURFnet (network provider in the Netherlands). CSIRT of SURFnet (network provider in the Netherlands).
- For readers interested in the operation of FIRST (Forum of - For readers interested in the operation of FIRST (Forum of
Incident Response and Security Teams) more information is Incident Response and Security Teams) more information is
collected in Appendix C. collected in Appendix C.
- http://hightop.nrl.navy.mil/news/incident.html - http://hightop.nrl.navy.mil/news/incident.html
This document leads to the NRL Incident Response Manual. This document leads to the NRL Incident Response Manual.
- http://www.cert.dfn.de/eng/team/kpk/certbib.html - http://www.cert.dfn.de/eng/team/kpk/certbib.html
This document contains an annotated bibliography of available This document contains an annotated bibliography of available
material, documents and files about the operation of SIRTs material, documents and files about the operation of CSIRTs
with links to many of the referenced items. with links to many of the referenced items.
- ftp://info.cert.org/incident_reporting_form - ftp://info.cert.org/incident_reporting_form
This Incident Reporting Form is provided by the CERT This Incident Reporting Form is provided by the CERT
Coordination Center to gather incident information and to avoid Coordination Center to gather incident information and to avoid
additional delays caused by the need to request more detailed additional delays caused by the need to request more detailed
information from the reporting site. information from the reporting site.
- http://www.cert.org/cert.faqintro.html - http://www.cert.org/cert.faqintro.html
A collection of frequently asked questions from the CERT A collection of frequently asked questions from the CERT
Coordination Center. Coordination Center.
Expectations for Security Incident Response 20 July 97 Expectations for Computer Security Incident Response 11 September 97
Appendix C: Known Security Incident Response Teams Appendix C: Known Computer Security Incident Response Teams
Today, there are many different SIRTs but no single source lists Today, there are many different CSIRTs but no single source lists
every team. Most of the major and long established teams (the first every team. Most of the major and long established teams (the first
SIRT was founded in 1988) are nowadays members of FIRST, the CSIRT was founded in 1988) are nowadays members of FIRST, the
worldwide Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams. At the worldwide Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams. At the
time of writing, more than 55 teams are members (1 in Australia, 13 time of writing, more than 55 teams are members (1 in Australia, 13
in Europe, all others in North America). Information about FIRST in Europe, all others in North America). Information about FIRST
can be found: can be found:
- http://www.first.org/ - http://www.first.org/
The actual list of members is available also, with the relevant The current list of members is available also, with the relevant
contact information and some additional information provided by the contact information and some additional information provided by the
particular teams: particular teams:
- http://www.first.org/team-info/ - http://www.first.org/team-info/
For SIRTs which want to become members of this forum (please note For CSIRTs which want to become members of this forum (please note
that a team needs a sponsor - a team which is already a full member that a team needs a sponsor - a team which is already a full member
of FIRST - to be introduced), the following files contain more of FIRST - to be introduced), the following files contain more
information: information:
- http://www.first.org/about/op_frame.html - http://www.first.org/about/op_frame.html
The Operational Framework of FIRST. The Operational Framework of FIRST.
- http://www.first.org/docs/newmem.html - http://www.first.org/docs/newmem.html
Guidelines for teams which want to become members of FIRST. Guidelines for teams which want to become members of FIRST.
Many of the European teams, regardless of whether they are members Many of the European teams, regardless of whether they are members
of FIRST or not, are listed by countries on a page maintained by of FIRST or not, are listed by countries on a page maintained by
the German SIRT: the German CSIRT:
- http://www.cert.dfn.de/eng/csir/europe/certs.html - http://www.cert.dfn.de/eng/csir/europe/certs.html
To learn about existing teams suitable to one's needs it is To learn about existing teams suitable to one's needs it is
often helpful to ask either known teams or an Internet Service often helpful to ask either known teams or an Internet Service
Provider for the "right" contact. Provider for the "right" contact.
Expectations for Security Incident Response 20 July 97 Expectations for Computer Security Incident Response 11 September 97
Appendix D: Outline for SIRT Template Appendix D: Outline for CSIRT Template
This outline summarizes in point form the issues addressed in this This outline summarizes in point form the issues addressed in this
document, and is the recommended template for a SIRT description document, and is the recommended template for a CSIRT description
document. Its structure is designed to facilitate the communication document. Its structure is designed to facilitate the communication
of a SIRT's policies, procedures, and other relevant information to of a CSIRT's policies, procedures, and other relevant information to
its constituency and to outside organizations such as other SIRTs. its constituency and to outside organizations such as other CSIRTs.
A 'filled-in' example of this template is given as Appendix E. A 'filled-in' example of this template is given as Appendix E.
1. Document Information 1. Document Information
1.1 Date of Last Update 1.1 Date of Last Update
1.2 Distribution List for Notifications 1.2 Distribution List for Notifications
1.3 Locations where this Document May Be Found 1.3 Locations where this Document May Be Found
2. Contact Information 2. Contact Information
2.1 Name of the Team 2.1 Name of the Team
2.2 Address 2.2 Address
skipping to change at page 21, line 49 skipping to change at page 20, line 49
4. Policies 4. Policies
4.1 Types of Incidents and Level of Support 4.1 Types of Incidents and Level of Support
4.2 Co-operation, Interaction and Disclosure of Information 4.2 Co-operation, Interaction and Disclosure of Information
4.3 Communication and Authentication 4.3 Communication and Authentication
5. Services 5. Services
5.1 Incident Response 5.1 Incident Response
5.1.1. Incident Triage 5.1.1. Incident Triage
5.1.2. Incident Coordination 5.1.2. Incident Coordination
5.1.3. Incident Cure 5.1.3. Incident Resolution
5.2 Proactive Activities 5.2 Proactive Activities
6. Incident Reporting Forms 6. Incident Reporting Forms
7. Disclaimers 7. Disclaimers
Expectations for Security Incident Response 20 July 97 Expectations for Computer Security Incident Response 11 September 97
Appendix E: Example - 'filled-in' Template for a SIRT Appendix E: Example - 'filled-in' Template for a CSIRT
Below is an example of a filled-in template for a fictitious SIRT Below is an example of a filled-in template for a fictitious CSIRT
called XYZ-SIRT. This text is for example purposes only, and does called XYZ-CSIRT. This text is for example purposes only, and does
not constitute endorsement by the working group or the IETF of any not constitute endorsement by the working group or the IETF of any
particular set of procedures or policies. While SIRTs are welcome particular set of procedures or policies. While CSIRTs are welcome
to use any or all of this text if they wish, such use is of course to use any or all of this text if they wish, such use is of course
not mandatory, or even appropriate in most cases. not mandatory, or even appropriate in most cases.
SIRT Description for XYZ-CERT CSIRT Description for XYZ-CERT
----------------------------- -----------------------------
1. About this document 1. About this document
1.1 Date of Last Update 1.1 Date of Last Update
This is version 1.01, published 1997/03/31. This is version 1.01, published 1997/03/31.
1.2 Distribution List for Notifications 1.2 Distribution List for Notifications
Notifications of updates are submitted to our mailing list Notifications of updates are submitted to our mailing list
<xyz-cert-info@xyz-univ.ca>. Subscription requests for this <xyz-cert-info@xyz-univ.ca>. Subscription requests for this
list should be sent to the Majordomo at list should be sent to the Majordomo at
<xyz-cert-info-request@xyz-univ.ca>; the body of the message <xyz-cert-info-request@xyz-univ.ca>; the body of the message
should consist of the word "subscribe". Send the word "help" should consist of the word "subscribe". Send the word "help"
instead if you don't know how to use a Majordomo list manager. instead if you don't know how to use a Majordomo list manager.
This mailing list is moderated. This mailing list is moderated.
1.3 Locations where this Document May Be Found 1.3 Locations where this Document May Be Found
The current version of this SIRT description document is The current version of this CSIRT description document is
available from the XYZ-CERT WWW site; its URL is available from the XYZ-CERT WWW site; its URL is
http://www.xyz-univ.ca/xyz-cert/english/sirt-descr.txt http://www.xyz-univ.ca/xyz-cert/english/CSIRT-descr.txt
Une version francaise de ce document est igalement disponible: Une version francaise de ce document est igalement disponible:
http://www.xyz-univ.ca/xyz-cert/francais/sirt-descr.txt http://www.xyz-univ.ca/xyz-cert/francais/CSIRT-descr.txt
Please make sure you are using the latest version. Please make sure you are using the latest version.
1.4 Authenticating this Document 1.4 Authenticating this Document
Both the English and French versions of this document have Both the English and French versions of this document have
been signed with the XYZ-CERT's PGP key. The signatures are been signed with the XYZ-CERT's PGP key. The signatures are
also on our Web site, under: also on our Web site, under:
http://www.xyz-univ.ca/xyz-cert/english/sirt-descr.asc http://www.xyz-univ.ca/xyz-cert/english/CSIRT-descr.asc
http://www.xyz-univ.ca/xyz-cert/francais/sirt-descr.asc http://www.xyz-univ.ca/xyz-cert/francais/CSIRT-descr.asc
2. Contact Information 2. Contact Information
2.1 Name of the Team 2.1 Name of the Team
"XYZ-CERT": the XYZ University Computer Emergency Response "XYZ-CERT": the XYZ University Computer Emergency Response
Team. Team.
Expectations for Security Incident Response 20 July 97 Expectations for Computer Security Incident Response 11 September 97
2.2 Address 2.2 Address
XYZ-CERT XYZ-CERT
XYZ University, Computing Services Department XYZ University, Computing Services Department
12345 Rue Principale 12345 Rue Principale
UniversityTown, Quebec UniversityTown, Quebec
Canada H0H 0H0 Canada H0H 0H0
2.3 Time Zone 2.3 Time Zone
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fellow universities in Quebec have at least one staff member fellow universities in Quebec have at least one staff member
who knows the XYZ-CERT coordinator Zoe Doe, Zoe Doe has who knows the XYZ-CERT coordinator Zoe Doe, Zoe Doe has
signed the XYZ-CERT key, and will be happy to confirm its signed the XYZ-CERT key, and will be happy to confirm its
fingerprint and that of her own key to those people who know fingerprint and that of her own key to those people who know
her, by telephone or in person. her, by telephone or in person.
2.9 Team Members 2.9 Team Members
Zoe Doe of Computing Services is the XYZ-CERT coordinator. Zoe Doe of Computing Services is the XYZ-CERT coordinator.
Backup coordinators and other team members, along with their Backup coordinators and other team members, along with their
areas of expertise and contact information, are listed in the
Expectations for Security Incident Response 20 July 97 Expectations for Computer Security Incident Response 11 September 97
areas of expertise and contact information, are listed in the
XYZ-CERT web pages, at XYZ-CERT web pages, at
http://www.xyz-univ.ca/xyz-cert/teamlist.html http://www.xyz-univ.ca/xyz-cert/teamlist.html
Management, liaison and supervision are provided by Steve Tree, Management, liaison and supervision are provided by Steve Tree,
Assistant Director (Technical Services), Computing Services. Assistant Director (Technical Services), Computing Services.
2.10 Other Information 2.10 Other Information
General information about the XYZ-CERT, as well as links to General information about the XYZ-CERT, as well as links to
various recommended security resources, can be found at various recommended security resources, can be found at
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assist XYZ community in responding to such incidents when they assist XYZ community in responding to such incidents when they
occur. occur.
3.2 Constituency 3.2 Constituency
The XYZ-CERT's constituency is the XYZ University community, The XYZ-CERT's constituency is the XYZ University community,
as defined in the context of the "XYZ University Policy on as defined in the context of the "XYZ University Policy on
Computing Facilities". This policy is available at Computing Facilities". This policy is available at
http://www-compserv.xyz-univ.ca/policies/pcf.html http://www-compserv.xyz-univ.ca/policies/pcf.html
Expectations for Security Incident Response 20 July 97
However, please note that, notwithtanding the above, XYZ-CERT However, please note that, notwithtanding the above, XYZ-CERT
services will be provided for on-site systems only. services will be provided for on-site systems only.
Expectations for Computer Security Incident Response 11 September 97
3.3 Sponsorship and/or Affiliation 3.3 Sponsorship and/or Affiliation
The XYZ-CERT is currently completing the application process The XYZ-CERT is sponsored by the ACME Canadian Research
for membership in FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Network. It maintains affiliations with various University
Security Teams. More information about FIRST is available CSIRTs throughout Canada and the USA on an as needed basis.
from
http://www.first.org/
3.4 Authority 3.4 Authority
The XYZ-CERT operates under the auspices of, and with authority The XYZ-CERT operates under the auspices of, and with authority
delegated by, the Department of Computing Services of XYZ delegated by, the Department of Computing Services of XYZ
University. For further information on the mandate and University. For further information on the mandate and
authority of the Department of Computing Services, please authority of the Department of Computing Services, please
refer to the XYZ University "Policy on Computing Facilities", refer to the XYZ University "Policy on Computing Facilities",
available at available at
http://www-compserv.xyz-univ.ca/policies/pcf.html http://www-compserv.xyz-univ.ca/policies/pcf.html
skipping to change at page 25, line 44 skipping to change at page 24, line 39
CCSA (Committee of Computer Systems Administrators), and have CCSA (Committee of Computer Systems Administrators), and have
all of the powers and responsibilities assigned to Systems all of the powers and responsibilities assigned to Systems
Administrators by the Policy on Computing Facilities, or are Administrators by the Policy on Computing Facilities, or are
members of University management. members of University management.
Members of the XYZ University community who wish to appeal the Members of the XYZ University community who wish to appeal the
actions of the XYZ-CERT should contact the Assistant Director actions of the XYZ-CERT should contact the Assistant Director
(Technical Services), Computing Services. If this recourse is (Technical Services), Computing Services. If this recourse is
not satisfactory, the matter may be referred to the Director not satisfactory, the matter may be referred to the Director
of Computing Services (in the case of perceived of Computing Services (in the case of perceived
problems with existing policy), or to the the XYZ University problems with existing policy), or to the XYZ University
Office of Rights and Responsibilities (in the case of perceived Office of Rights and Responsibilities (in the case of perceived
errors in the application of existing policy). errors in the application of existing policy).
4. Policies 4. Policies
4.1 Types of Incidents and Level of Support 4.1 Types of Incidents and Level of Support
The XYZ-CERT is authorized to address all types of computer The XYZ-CERT is authorized to address all types of computer
security incidents which occur, or threaten to occur, at security incidents which occur, or threaten to occur, at
XYZ University. XYZ University.
The level of support given by XYZ-CERT will vary depending on The level of support given by XYZ-CERT will vary depending on
the type and severity of the incident or issue, the type of the type and severity of the incident or issue, the type of
Expectations for Security Incident Response 20 July 97
constituent, the size of the user community affected, and the constituent, the size of the user community affected, and the
XYZ-CERT's resources at the time, though in all cases some XYZ-CERT's resources at the time, though in all cases some
response will be made within one working day. Resources will response will be made within one working day. Resources will
be assigned according to the following priorities, listed in be assigned according to the following priorities, listed in
decreasing order: decreasing order:
Expectations for Computer Security Incident Response 11 September 97
- Threats to the physical safety of human beings. - Threats to the physical safety of human beings.
- Root or system-level attacks on any Management Information - Root or system-level attacks on any Management Information
System, or any part of the backbone network infrastructure. System, or any part of the backbone network infrastructure.
- Root or system-level attacks on any large public service - Root or system-level attacks on any large public service
machine, either multi-user or dedicated-purpose. machine, either multi-user or dedicated-purpose.
- Compromise of restricted confidential service accounts or - Compromise of restricted confidential service accounts or
software installations, in particular those used for MIS software installations, in particular those used for MIS
applications containing confidential data, or those used applications containing confidential data, or those used
for system administration. for system administration.
- Denial of service attacks on any of the above three items. - Denial of service attacks on any of the above three items.
skipping to change at page 27, line 4 skipping to change at page 25, line 52
variation in the level of system administrator expertise at XYZ variation in the level of system administrator expertise at XYZ
University, and while the XYZ-CERT will endeavor to present University, and while the XYZ-CERT will endeavor to present
information and assistance at a level appropriate to each information and assistance at a level appropriate to each
person, the XYZ-CERT cannot train system administrators on the person, the XYZ-CERT cannot train system administrators on the
fly, and it cannot perform system maintenance on their behalf. fly, and it cannot perform system maintenance on their behalf.
In most cases, the XYZ-CERT will provide pointers to the In most cases, the XYZ-CERT will provide pointers to the
information needed to implement appropriate measures. information needed to implement appropriate measures.
The XYZ-CERT is committed to keeping the XYZ University system The XYZ-CERT is committed to keeping the XYZ University system
administration community informed of potential vulnerabilities, administration community informed of potential vulnerabilities,
Expectations for Security Incident Response 20 July 97
and where possible, will inform this community of such and where possible, will inform this community of such
vulnerabilities before they are actively exploited. vulnerabilities before they are actively exploited.
4.2 Co-operation, Interaction and Disclosure of Information 4.2 Co-operation, Interaction and Disclosure of Information
While there are legal and ethical restrictions on the flow of While there are legal and ethical restrictions on the flow of
information from XYZ-CERT, many of which are also outlined in information from XYZ-CERT, many of which are also outlined in
Expectations for Computer Security Incident Response 11 September 97
the XYZ University Policy on Computing Facilities, and all of the XYZ University Policy on Computing Facilities, and all of
which will be respected, the XYZ-CERT acknowledges its which will be respected, the XYZ-CERT acknowledges its
indebtedness to, and declares its intention to contribute to, indebtedness to, and declares its intention to contribute to,
the spirit of cooperation that created the Internet. the spirit of cooperation that created the Internet.
Therefore, while appropriate measures will be taken to protect Therefore, while appropriate measures will be taken to protect
the identity of members of our constituency and members of the identity of members of our constituency and members of
neighbouring sites where necessary, the XYZ-CERT will otherwise neighbouring sites where necessary, the XYZ-CERT will otherwise
share information freely when this will assist others in share information freely when this will assist others in
resolving or preventing security incidents. resolving or preventing security incidents.
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a sample .cshrc file as modified by an intruder, or to a sample .cshrc file as modified by an intruder, or to
demonstrate a particular social engineering attack). demonstrate a particular social engineering attack).
- Intruder information is similar to private user - Intruder information is similar to private user
information, but concerns intruders. information, but concerns intruders.
While intruder information, and in particular identifying While intruder information, and in particular identifying
information, will not be released to the public (unless it information, will not be released to the public (unless it
becomes a matter of public record, for example because becomes a matter of public record, for example because
criminal charges have been laid), it will be exchanged criminal charges have been laid), it will be exchanged
freely with system administrators and SIRTs tracking an freely with system administrators and CSIRTs tracking an
incident. incident.
Expectations for Security Incident Response 20 July 97
- Private site information is technical information about - Private site information is technical information about
particular systems or sites. particular systems or sites.
It will not be released without the permission of the site It will not be released without the permission of the site
in question, except as provided for below. in question, except as provided for below.
- Vulnerability information is technical information about - Vulnerability information is technical information about
vulnerabilities or attacks, including fixes and vulnerabilities or attacks, including fixes and
Expectations for Computer Security Incident Response 11 September 97
workarounds. workarounds.
Vulnerability information will be released freely, though Vulnerability information will be released freely, though
every effort will be made to inform the relevant vendor every effort will be made to inform the relevant vendor
before the general public is informed. before the general public is informed.
- Embarrassing information includes the statement that an - Embarrassing information includes the statement that an
incident has occurred, and information about its extent or incident has occurred, and information about its extent or
severity. Embarrassing information may concern a site or severity. Embarrassing information may concern a site or
a particular user or group of users. a particular user or group of users.
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permission of the site or users in question, except as permission of the site or users in question, except as
provided for below. provided for below.
- Statistical information is embarrassing information with - Statistical information is embarrassing information with
the identifying information stripped off. the identifying information stripped off.
Statistical information will be released at the discretion Statistical information will be released at the discretion
of the Computing Services Department. of the Computing Services Department.
- Contact information explains how to reach system - Contact information explains how to reach system
administrators and SIRTs. administrators and CSIRTs.
Contact information will be released freely, except where Contact information will be released freely, except where
the contact person or entity has requested that this not the contact person or entity has requested that this not
be the case, or where XYZ-CERT has reason to believe that be the case, or where XYZ-CERT has reason to believe that
the dissemination of this information would not be the dissemination of this information would not be
appreciated. appreciated.
Potential recipients of information from the XYZ-CERT will be Potential recipients of information from the XYZ-CERT will be
classified as follows: classified as follows:
- Because of the nature of their responsibilities and - Because of the nature of their responsibilities and
consequent expectations of confidentiality, members of XYZ consequent expectations of confidentiality, members of XYZ
University management are entitled to receive whatever University management are entitled to receive whatever
information is necessary to facilitate the handling of information is necessary to facilitate the handling of
computer security incidents which occur in their computer security incidents which occur in their
jurisdictions. jurisdictions.
- Members of the Office of Rights and Responsibilities are - Members of the Office of Rights and Responsibilities are
entitled to receive whatever information they request entitled to receive whatever information they request
concerning a computer security incident or related matter concerning a computer security incident or related matter
Expectations for Security Incident Response 20 July 97
which has been referred to them for resolution. The same is which has been referred to them for resolution. The same is
true for the XYZ Security Department, when its assistance in true for the XYZ Security Department, when its assistance in
an investigation has been enlisted, or when the investigation an investigation has been enlisted, or when the investigation
has been instigated at its request. has been instigated at its request.
- System administrators at XYZ University who are members of - System administrators at XYZ University who are members of
the CCSA are also, by virtue of their responsibilities, the CCSA are also, by virtue of their responsibilities,
trusted with confidential information. However, unless such trusted with confidential information. However, unless such
people are also members of XYZ-CERT, they will be given only people are also members of XYZ-CERT, they will be given only
Expectations for Computer Security Incident Response 11 September 97
that confidential information which they must have in order that confidential information which they must have in order
to assist with an investigation, or in order to secure their to assist with an investigation, or in order to secure their
own systems. own systems.
- Users at XYZ University are entitled to information which - Users at XYZ University are entitled to information which
pertains to the security of their own computer accounts, pertains to the security of their own computer accounts,
even if this means revealing "intruder information", or even if this means revealing "intruder information", or
"embarrasssing information" about another user. For "embarrasssing information" about another user. For
example, if account aaaa is cracked and the intruder attacks example, if account aaaa is cracked and the intruder attacks
account bbbb, user bbbb is entitled to know that aaaa was account bbbb, user bbbb is entitled to know that aaaa was
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- The public at large will receive no restricted information. - The public at large will receive no restricted information.
In fact, no particular effort will be made to communicate In fact, no particular effort will be made to communicate
with the public at large, though the XYZ-CERT recognizes with the public at large, though the XYZ-CERT recognizes
that, for all intents and purposes, information made that, for all intents and purposes, information made
available to the XYZ University community is in effect made available to the XYZ University community is in effect made
available to the community at large, and will tailor the available to the community at large, and will tailor the
information in consequence. information in consequence.
- The computer security community will be treated the same way - The computer security community will be treated the same way
the general public is treated. While members of XYZ-CERT may the general public is treated. While members of XYZ-CERT may
Expectations for Security Incident Response 20 July 97
participate in discussions within the computer security participate in discussions within the computer security
community, such as newsgroups, mailing lists (including the community, such as newsgroups, mailing lists (including the
full-disclosure list "bugtraq"), and conferences, they will full-disclosure list "bugtraq"), and conferences, they will
treat such forums as though they were the public at large. treat such forums as though they were the public at large.
While technical issues (including vulnerabilities) may be While technical issues (including vulnerabilities) may be
discussed to any level of detail, any examples taken from discussed to any level of detail, any examples taken from
XYZ-CERT experience will be disguised to avoid identifying XYZ-CERT experience will be disguised to avoid identifying
the affected parties. the affected parties.
Expectations for Computer Security Incident Response 11 September 97
- The press will also be considered as part of the general - The press will also be considered as part of the general
public. The XYZ-CERT will not interact directly with the public. The XYZ-CERT will not interact directly with the
Press concerning computer security incidents, except to point Press concerning computer security incidents, except to point
them toward information already released to the general them toward information already released to the general
public. If necessary, information will be provided to the public. If necessary, information will be provided to the
XYZ University Public Relations Department, and to the XYZ University Public Relations Department, and to the
Customer Relations group of the Computing Services Customer Relations group of the Computing Services
Department. All incident-related queries will be referred to Department. All incident-related queries will be referred to
these two bodies. The above does not affect the ability of these two bodies. The above does not affect the ability of
members of XYZ-CERT to grant interviews on general computer members of XYZ-CERT to grant interviews on general computer
security topics; in fact, they are encouraged to do to, as a security topics; in fact, they are encouraged to do to, as a
public service to the community. public service to the community.
- Other sites and SIRTs, when they are partners in the - Other sites and CSIRTs, when they are partners in the
investigation of a computer security incident, will in some investigation of a computer security incident, will in some
cases be trusted with confidential information. This will cases be trusted with confidential information. This will
happen only if the foreign site's bona fide can be verified, happen only if the foreign site's bona fide can be verified,
and the information transmitted will be limited to that which and the information transmitted will be limited to that which
is likely to be helpful in resolving the incident. Such is likely to be helpful in resolving the incident. Such
information sharing is most likely to happen in the case of information sharing is most likely to happen in the case of
sites well known to XYZ-CERT (for example, several other sites well known to XYZ-CERT (for example, several other
Quebec universities have informal but well-established Quebec universities have informal but well-established
working relationships with XYZ University in such mattters). working relationships with XYZ University in such mattters).
For the purposes of resolving a security incident, otherwise For the purposes of resolving a security incident, otherwise
semi-private but relatively harmless user information such as semi-private but relatively harmless user information such as
the provenance of connections to user accounts will not be the provenance of connections to user accounts will not be
considered highly sensitive, and can be transmitted to a considered highly sensitive, and can be transmitted to a
foreign site without excessive precautions. "Intruder foreign site without excessive precautions. "Intruder
information" will be transmitted freely to other system information" will be transmitted freely to other system
administrators and SIRTs. "Embarrassing information" can be administrators and CSIRTs. "Embarrassing information" can be
transmitted when there is reasonable assurance that it will transmitted when there is reasonable assurance that it will
remain confidential, and when it is necessary to resolve an remain confidential, and when it is necessary to resolve an
incident. incident.
- Vendors will be considered as foreign SIRTs for most intents - Vendors will be considered as foreign CSIRTs for most intents
and purposes. The XYZ-CERT wishes to encourage vendors of and purposes. The XYZ-CERT wishes to encourage vendors of
all kinds of networking and computer equipment, software, and all kinds of networking and computer equipment, software, and
services to improve the security of their products. In aid services to improve the security of their products. In aid
of this, a vulnerability discovered in such a product will be of this, a vulnerability discovered in such a product will be
reported to its vendor, along with all technical details reported to its vendor, along with all technical details
needed to identify and fix the problem. Identifying details needed to identify and fix the problem. Identifying details
Expectations for Security Incident Response 20 July 97
will not be given to the vendor without the permission of the will not be given to the vendor without the permission of the
affected parties. affected parties.
- Law enforcement officers will receive full cooperation from - Law enforcement officers will receive full cooperation from
the XYZ-CERT, including any information they require to the XYZ-CERT, including any information they require to
pursue an investigation, in accordance with the Policy on pursue an investigation, in accordance with the Policy on
Computing Facilities. Computing Facilities.
Expectations for Computer Security Incident Response 11 September 97
4.3 Communication and Authentication 4.3 Communication and Authentication
In view of the types of information that the XYZ-CERT will In view of the types of information that the XYZ-CERT will
likely be dealing with, telephones will be considered likely be dealing with, telephones will be considered
sufficiently secure to be used even unencrypted. Unencrypted sufficiently secure to be used even unencrypted. Unencrypted
e-mail will not be considered particularly secure, but will be e-mail will not be considered particularly secure, but will be
sufficient for the transmission of low-sensitivity data. If sufficient for the transmission of low-sensitivity data. If
it is necessary to send highly sensitive data by e-mail, PGP it is necessary to send highly sensitive data by e-mail, PGP
will be used. Network file transfers will be considered to will be used. Network file transfers will be considered to
be similar to e-mail for these purposes: sensitive data should be similar to e-mail for these purposes: sensitive data should
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neighbor sites, referrals from known trusted people will neighbor sites, referrals from known trusted people will
suffice to identify someone. Otherwise, appropriate methods suffice to identify someone. Otherwise, appropriate methods
will be used, such as a search of FIRST members, the use of will be used, such as a search of FIRST members, the use of
WHOIS and other Internet registration information, etc, along WHOIS and other Internet registration information, etc, along
with telephone call-back or e-mail mail-back to ensure that with telephone call-back or e-mail mail-back to ensure that
the party is not an impostor. Incoming e-mail whose data must the party is not an impostor. Incoming e-mail whose data must
be trusted will be checked with the originator personally, or be trusted will be checked with the originator personally, or
by means of digital signatures (PGP in particular is by means of digital signatures (PGP in particular is
supported). supported).
Expectations for Security Incident Response 20 July 97
5. Services 5. Services
5.1 Incident Response 5.1 Incident Response
XYZ-CERT will assist system administrators in handling the XYZ-CERT will assist system administrators in handling the
technical and organizational aspects of incidents. In technical and organizational aspects of incidents. In
particular, it will provide assistance or advice with respect particular, it will provide assistance or advice with respect
to the following aspects of incident management: to the following aspects of incident management:
5.1.1 Incident Triage
- Investigating whether indeed an incident occured.
- Determining the extent of the incident. - Determining the extent of the incident.
5.1.2 Incident Coordination
- Determining the initial cause of the incident - Determining the initial cause of the incident
(vulnerability exploited). (vulnerability exploited).
- Facilitating contact with other sites which may be - Facilitating contact with other sites which may be
involved. involved.
- Facilitating contact with XYZ University Security and/or
appropriate law enforcement officials, if necessary.
- Making reports to other CSIRTs.
- Composing announcements to users, if applicable.
Expectations for Computer Security Incident Response 11 September 97
5.1.3 Incident Resolution
- Removing the vulnerability. - Removing the vulnerability.
- Securing the system from the effects of the incident. - Securing the system from the effects of the incident.
- Evaluating whether certain actions are likely to reap - Evaluating whether certain actions are likely to reap
results in proportion to their cost and risk, in results in proportion to their cost and risk, in
particular those actions aimed at an eventual prosecution particular those actions aimed at an eventual prosecution
or disciplinary action: collection of evidence after the or disciplinary action: collection of evidence after the
fact, observation of an incident in progress, setting fact, observation of an incident in progress, setting
traps for intruders, etc. traps for intruders, etc.
- Collecting evidence where criminal prosecution, or - Collecting evidence where criminal prosecution, or
University disciplinary action, is contemplated. University disciplinary action, is contemplated.
- Facilitating contact with XYZ University Security and/or
appropriate law enforcement officials, if necessary.
- Making reports to other SIRTs.
- Composing announcements to users, if applicable.
In addition, XYZ-CERT will collect statistics concerning In addition, XYZ-CERT will collect statistics concerning
incidents which occur within or involve the XYZ University incidents which occur within or involve the XYZ University
community, and will notify the community as necessary to community, and will notify the community as necessary to
assist it in protecting against known attacks. assist it in protecting against known attacks.
To make use of XYZ-CERT's incident response services, please To make use of XYZ-CERT's incident response services, please
send e-mail as per section 2.11 above. Please remember that send e-mail as per section 2.11 above. Please remember that
the amount of assistance available will vary according to the amount of assistance available will vary according to
the parameters described in section 4.1. the parameters described in section 4.1.
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services to the extent possible depending on its resources: services to the extent possible depending on its resources:
- Information services - Information services
- List of departmental security contacts, administrative - List of departmental security contacts, administrative
and technical. These lists will be available to the and technical. These lists will be available to the
general public, via commonly-available channels such as general public, via commonly-available channels such as
the World Wide Web and/or the Domain Name Service. the World Wide Web and/or the Domain Name Service.
- Mailing lists to inform security contacts of new - Mailing lists to inform security contacts of new
information relevant to their computing environments. information relevant to their computing environments.
These lists will be available only to XYZ University These lists will be available only to XYZ University
system administrators. system administrators.
Expectations for Security Incident Response 20 July 97
- Repository of vendor-provided and other security-related - Repository of vendor-provided and other security-related
patches for various operating systems. This repository patches for various operating systems. This repository
will be available to the general public wherever will be available to the general public wherever
license restrictions allow it, and will be provided via license restrictions allow it, and will be provided via
commonly-available channels such as the World Wide Web commonly-available channels such as the World Wide Web
and/or ftp. and/or ftp.
- Repository of security tools and documentation for - Repository of security tools and documentation for
use by sysadmins. Where possible, precompiled use by sysadmins. Where possible, precompiled
ready-to-install versions will be supplied. These will ready-to-install versions will be supplied. These will
be supplied to the general public via www or ftp as be supplied to the general public via www or ftp as
above. above.
- "Clipping" service for various existing resources, such - "Clipping" service for various existing resources, such
as major mailing lists and newsgroups. The resulting as major mailing lists and newsgroups. The resulting
clippings will be made available either on the clippings will be made available either on the
restricted mailing list or on the web site, depending restricted mailing list or on the web site, depending
on their sensitivity and urgency. on their sensitivity and urgency.
Expectations for Computer Security Incident Response 11 September 97
- Training services - Training services
- Members of the XYZ-CERT will give periodic seminars on - Members of the XYZ-CERT will give periodic seminars on
computer security related topics; these seminars will computer security related topics; these seminars will
be open to XYZ University system administrators. be open to XYZ University system administrators.
- Auditing services - Auditing services
- Central file integrity checking service for Unix - Central file integrity checking service for Unix
machines, and for any other platforms capable of machines, and for any other platforms capable of
running "tripwire". running "tripwire".
- Security level assignments; machines and subnetworks - Security level assignments; machines and subnetworks
at XYZ University will be audited and assigned a at XYZ University will be audited and assigned a
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statistical reports will be made available to the XYZ statistical reports will be made available to the XYZ
University community. University community.
Detailed descriptions of the above services, along with Detailed descriptions of the above services, along with
instructions for joining mailing lists, downloading instructions for joining mailing lists, downloading
information, or participating in certain services such as the information, or participating in certain services such as the
central logging and file integrity checking services, are central logging and file integrity checking services, are
available on the XYZ-CERT web site, as per section 2.10 available on the XYZ-CERT web site, as per section 2.10
above. above.
Expectations for Security Incident Response 20 July 97
6. Incident Reporting Forms 6. Incident Reporting Forms
There are no local forms developed yet for reporting incidents There are no local forms developed yet for reporting incidents
to XYZ-CERT. If possible, please make use of the Incident to XYZ-CERT. If possible, please make use of the Incident
Reporting Form of the CERT Coordination Center (Pittsburgh, Reporting Form of the CERT Coordination Center (Pittsburgh,
PA). The actual version is available from: PA). The current version is available from:
ftp://info.cert.org/incident_reporting_form ftp://info.cert.org/incident_reporting_form
7. Disclaimers 7. Disclaimers
While every precaution will be taken in the preparation of While every precaution will be taken in the preparation of
information, notifications and alerts, XYZ-CERT assumes no information, notifications and alerts, XYZ-CERT assumes no
responsibility for errors or omissions, or for damages responsibility for errors or omissions, or for damages
resulting from the use of the information contained within. resulting from the use of the information contained within.
Expectations for Computer Security Incident Response 11 September 97
4 Acknowlegements 4 Acknowlegements
The editors gratefully acknowledge the contributed material and The editors gratefully acknowledge the contributed material and
editorial scrutiny of Anne Bennett. Thanks also to Don Stikvoort editorial scrutiny of Anne Bennett. Thanks also to Don Stikvoort
for assistance reworking the description of Incident Response Team for assistance reworking the description of Incident Response Team
services. services.
5 References 5 References
[RFC 1244] P. Holbrooks, J. Reynolds / Site Security Handbook. - [RFC 1244] P. Holbrooks, J. Reynolds / Site Security Handbook. -
July 23, 1991. - 101 pages. - FYI 8. July 23, 1991. - 101 pages. - FYI 8.
[RFC 1983] G. Malkin / Internet Users' Glossary. - [RFC 1983] G. Malkin / Internet Users' Glossary. -
August 16, 1996. - 62 pages. - FYI 18. August 16, 1996. - 62 pages. - FYI 18.
6 Security Considerations 6 Security Considerations
This document discusses the operation of Security Incident Response This document discusses the operation of Computer Security
Teams, and the teams' interactions with their constituencies and Incident Response Teams, and the teams' interactions with their
with other organizations. It is, therefore, not directly concerned constituencies and with other organizations. It is, therefore,
with the security of protocols, applications, or network systems not directly concerned with the security of protocols, applications,
themselves. It is not even concerned with particular responses and or network systems themselves. It is not even concerned with
reactions to security incidents, but only with the appropriate particular responses and reactions to security incidents, but only
description of the responses provided by SIRTs. with the appropriate description of the responses provided by
CSIRTs.
Nonetheless, it is vital that the SIRTs themselves operate securely, Nonetheless, it is vital that the CSIRTs themselves operate securely,
which means that they must establish secure communication channels which means that they must establish secure communication channels
with other teams, and with members of their constituency. They must with other teams, and with members of their constituency. They must
also secure their own systems and infrastructure, to protect the also secure their own systems and infrastructure, to protect the
interests of their constituency and to maintain the confidentiality interests of their constituency and to maintain the confidentiality
of the identity of victims and reporters of security incidents. of the identity of victims and reporters of security incidents.
Expectations for Security Incident Response 20 July 97
7 Authors' Addresses 7 Authors' Addresses
Nevil Brownlee ITSS Technology Development Nevil Brownlee Erik Guttman
The University of Auckland ITSS Technology Development Sun Microsystems, Inc.
The University of Auckland Bahnstr. 2
74915 Waibstadt Germany
Phone: +64 9 373 7599 x8941 Phone: +64 9 373 7599 x8941
E-mail: n.brownlee@auckland.ac.nz E-mail: n.brownlee@auckland.ac.nz Phone: +49 7263 911484
E-Mail: Erik.Guttman@sun.com
Erik Guttman
Sun Microsystems, Inc.
Gaisbergstr. 6
69115 Heidelberg Germany
Phone: +49 6221 601649
E-Mail: eguttman@eng.sun.com
This document expires January 20, 1998. This document expires March 11, 1998.
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