draft-ietf-grow-bgp-reject-00.txt   draft-ietf-grow-bgp-reject-01.txt 
Global Routing Operations J. Mauch Global Routing Operations J. Mauch
Internet-Draft J. Snijders Internet-Draft J. Snijders
Intended status: Standards Track NTT Intended status: Standards Track NTT
Expires: June 30, 2016 December 28, 2015 Expires: November 11, 2016 May 10, 2016
By default reject propagation when no policy is associated with a BGP By default reject propagation when no policy is associated with a BGP
peering session. peering session.
draft-ietf-grow-bgp-reject-00 draft-ietf-grow-bgp-reject-01
Abstract Abstract
This document defines the default behaviour of a BGP speaker when no This document defines the default behaviour of a BGP speaker when no
explicit policy is associated with a BGP peering session. explicit policy is associated with a BGP peering session.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on June 30, 2016. This Internet-Draft will expire on November 11, 2016.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
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6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
BGP [RFC4271] speakers have many default settings which need to be BGP [RFC4271] speakers have many default settings which need to be
revisited as part of improving the routing ecosystem. There is a revisited as part of improving the routing ecosystem. There is a
need to provide guidace to BGP implementors for the default behaviors need to provide guidance to BGP implementors for the default
of a well functioning internet ecosystem. Routing leaks behaviors of a well functioning internet ecosystem. Routing leaks
[I-D.ietf-idr-route-leak-detection-mitigation] are part of the [I-D.ietf-idr-route-leak-detection-mitigation] are part of the
problem, but software defects and operator misconfigurations are just problem, but software defects and operator misconfigurations are just
a few of the attacks on internet stability we aim to address. a few of the attacks on internet stability we aim to address.
Usually BGP speakers accept all routes from a configured peer or Usually BGP speakers accept all routes from a configured peer or
neighbor. This practice dates back to the early days of internet neighbor. This practice dates back to the early days of internet
protocols in being very permissive in offering routing information to protocols in being very permissive in offering routing information to
allow all networks to reach each other. With the core of the allow all networks to reach each other. With the core of the
internet becoming more densely interconnected the risk of a internet becoming more densely interconnected the risk of a
misbehaving edge device or BGP speaking customer poses signficiant misbehaving edge device or BGP speaking customer poses signficiant
risks to the reachability of critical services. risks to the reachability of critical services.
This proposal intends to solve this situation with the requiring the This proposal intends to solve this situation by requiring the
explicity configuration of BGP policy for any non-iBGP speaking explicit configuration of BGP policy for any non-iBGP speaking
session such as customers, peers or confederation boundaries. When session such as customers, peers or confederation boundaries. When
this solution is implemented, devices will no longer pass routes this solution is implemented, devices will no longer pass routes
without explicit policy. without explicit policy.
2. Requirements Language 2. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
3. Solution Requirements 3. Solution Requirements
The following requirements apply to the solution described in this The following requirements apply to the solution described in this
document: document:
o Software MUST mark any routes from an eBGP peer as 'invalid' in o Software MUST mark any routes from an eBGP peer as 'invalid' in
the Adj-RIB-In, if no explicit policy was configured. the Adj-RIB-In, if no explicit policy was configured.
o Software MUST NOT advertise any routes to an eBGP peer without an o Software MUST NOT advertise any routes to an eBGP peer without an
operator configuring a policy operator configuring a policy.
o Software MUST NOT require a configuration directive to operate in o Software MUST NOT require a configuration directive to operate in
this mode. this mode.
o Software MUST provide protection from internal failures preventing o Software MUST provide protection from internal failures preventing
the advertisement and acceptance of routes the advertisement and acceptance of routes.
o Software MAY provide a configuration option to disable this o Software MAY provide a configuration option to disable this
security capability. security capability.
4. Acknowledgements 4. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank the following people for their The authors would like to thank the following people for their
comments and support: Shane Amante, Christopher Morrow, Robert comments and support: Shane Amante, Christopher Morrow, Robert
Raszuk. Raszuk, Greg Skinner.
5. Security Considerations 5. Security Considerations
This document addresses the basic security posture of a BGP speaking This document addresses the basic security posture of a BGP speaking
device within a network. Operators have a need for implementors to device within a network. Operators have a need for implementors to
address the problem through a behavior change to mitigate against address the problem through a behavior change to mitigate against
possible attacks from a permissive security posture. Attacks and possible attacks from a permissive security posture. Attacks and
inadvertent advertisements cause business impact necessitating this inadvertent advertisements cause business impact necessitating this
default behavior. default behavior.
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Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006, DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>.
7.2. Informative References 7.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-idr-route-leak-detection-mitigation] [I-D.ietf-idr-route-leak-detection-mitigation]
Sriram, K., Montgomery, D., Dickson, B., Patel, K., and A. Sriram, K., Montgomery, D., Dickson, B., Patel, K., and A.
Robachevsky, "Methods for Detection and Mitigation of BGP Robachevsky, "Methods for Detection and Mitigation of BGP
Route Leaks", draft-ietf-idr-route-leak-detection- Route Leaks", draft-ietf-idr-route-leak-detection-
mitigation-01 (work in progress), October 2015. mitigation-02 (work in progress), March 2016.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Jared Mauch Jared Mauch
NTT Communications, Inc. NTT Communications, Inc.
8285 Reese Lane 8285 Reese Lane
Ann Arbor Michigan 48103 Ann Arbor Michigan 48103
US US
Email: jmauch@us.ntt.net Email: jmauch@us.ntt.net
Job Snijders Job Snijders
NTT Communications, Inc. NTT Communications, Inc.
Amsterdam Theodorus Majofskistraat 100
Amsterdam 1065 SZ
NL NL
Email: job@ntt.net Email: job@ntt.net
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