draft-ietf-grow-bgp-reject-01.txt   draft-ietf-grow-bgp-reject-02.txt 
Global Routing Operations J. Mauch Global Routing Operations J. Mauch
Internet-Draft J. Snijders Internet-Draft J. Snijders
Intended status: Standards Track NTT Intended status: Standards Track NTT
Expires: November 11, 2016 May 10, 2016 Expires: May 4, 2017 G. Hankins
Nokia
October 31, 2016
By default reject propagation when no policy is associated with a BGP Default IPv4 and IPv6 Unicast EBGP Route Propagation Behavior Without
peering session. Policies
draft-ietf-grow-bgp-reject-01 draft-ietf-grow-bgp-reject-02
Abstract Abstract
This document defines the default behaviour of a BGP speaker when no This document defines the default behavior of a BGP speaker when
explicit policy is associated with a BGP peering session. there is no import or export policy associated with a BGP session for
the IPv4 or IPv6 Unicast Address Family.
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on November 11, 2016. This Internet-Draft will expire on May 4, 2017.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2. Solution Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Solution Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 3. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 6. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
BGP [RFC4271] speakers have many default settings which need to be BGP [RFC4271] speakers have many default settings which need to be
revisited as part of improving the routing ecosystem. There is a revisited as part of improving the routing ecosystem. There is a
need to provide guidance to BGP implementors for the default need to provide guidance to BGP implementers for the default
behaviors of a well functioning internet ecosystem. Routing leaks behaviors of a well functioning Internet ecosystem. Routing leaks
[I-D.ietf-idr-route-leak-detection-mitigation] are part of the [RFC7908] are part of the problem, but software defects and operator
problem, but software defects and operator misconfigurations are just misconfigurations are just a few of the attacks on Internet stability
a few of the attacks on internet stability we aim to address. we aim to address.
Usually BGP speakers accept all routes from a configured peer or
neighbor. This practice dates back to the early days of internet
protocols in being very permissive in offering routing information to
allow all networks to reach each other. With the core of the
internet becoming more densely interconnected the risk of a
misbehaving edge device or BGP speaking customer poses signficiant
risks to the reachability of critical services.
This proposal intends to solve this situation by requiring the
explicit configuration of BGP policy for any non-iBGP speaking
session such as customers, peers or confederation boundaries. When
this solution is implemented, devices will no longer pass routes
without explicit policy.
2. Requirements Language Many BGP speakers send and accept all routes from a peer by default.
This practice dates back to the early days of the Internet, where
operators were permissive in offering routing information to allow
all networks to reach each other. As the Internet has become more
densely interconnected, the risk of a misbehaving BGP speaker poses
significant risks to Internet routing.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", This specification intends to improve this situation by requiring the
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this explicit configuration of a BGP import and export policy for any EBGP
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. speaking session such as customers, peers, or confederation
boundaries in a base router or VPN instances. When this solution is
implemented, BGP speakers do not accept or send routes without
policies configured on EBGP sessions.
3. Solution Requirements 2. Solution Requirements
The following requirements apply to the solution described in this The following requirements for the IPv4 and IPv6 Unicast Address
document: Family apply to the solution described in this document:
o Software MUST mark any routes from an eBGP peer as 'invalid' in o Software MUST consider any routes from an EBGP peer invalid, if no
the Adj-RIB-In, if no explicit policy was configured. import policy was configured.
o Software MUST NOT advertise any routes to an eBGP peer without an o Software MUST NOT advertise any routes to an EBGP peer, if no
operator configuring a policy. export policy was configured.
o Software MUST NOT require a configuration directive to operate in o Software SHOULD provide protection from internal failures
this mode. preventing the advertisement and acceptance of routes.
o Software MUST provide protection from internal failures preventing o Software MUST operate in this mode by default.
the advertisement and acceptance of routes.
o Software MAY provide a configuration option to disable this o Software MAY provide a configuration option to disable this
security capability. security capability.
4. Acknowledgements 3. Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank the following people for their The authors would like to thank the following people for their
comments and support: Shane Amante, Christopher Morrow, Robert comments, support and review: Shane Amante, Christopher Morrow,
Raszuk, Greg Skinner. Robert Raszuk, Greg Skinner, Adam Chappell, Sriram Kotikalapudi, and
Brian Dickson.
5. Security Considerations 4. Security Considerations
This document addresses the basic security posture of a BGP speaking This document addresses the basic security behavior of how a BGP
device within a network. Operators have a need for implementors to speaker propagates routes in a default configuration without
address the problem through a behavior change to mitigate against policies. Operators have a need for implementers to address the
possible attacks from a permissive security posture. Attacks and problem through a behavior change to mitigate against possible
inadvertent advertisements cause business impact necessitating this attacks from a permissive security behavior. Attacks and inadvertent
default behavior. advertisements cause business impact that can be mitigated by a
secure default behavior.
6. IANA Considerations 5. IANA Considerations
This document has no actions for IANA. This document has no actions for IANA.
6. Contributors
The following people contributed to successful deployment of solution
described in this document:
Jakob Heitz
Cisco
Email: jheitz@cisco.com
Ondrej Filip
CZ.NIC
Email: ondrej.filip@nic.cz
7. References 7. References
7.1. Normative References 7.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A [RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A
Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006, DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>.
7.2. Informative References 7.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-idr-route-leak-detection-mitigation] [RFC7908] Sriram, K., Montgomery, D., McPherson, D., Osterweil, E.,
Sriram, K., Montgomery, D., Dickson, B., Patel, K., and A. and B. Dickson, "Problem Definition and Classification of
Robachevsky, "Methods for Detection and Mitigation of BGP BGP Route Leaks", RFC 7908, DOI 10.17487/RFC7908, June
Route Leaks", draft-ietf-idr-route-leak-detection- 2016, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7908>.
mitigation-02 (work in progress), March 2016.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Jared Mauch Jared Mauch
NTT Communications, Inc. NTT Communications
8285 Reese Lane 8285 Reese Lane
Ann Arbor Michigan 48103 Ann Arbor Michigan 48103
US US
Email: jmauch@us.ntt.net Email: jmauch@us.ntt.net
Job Snijders Job Snijders
NTT Communications, Inc. NTT Communications
Theodorus Majofskistraat 100 Theodorus Majofskistraat 100
Amsterdam 1065 SZ Amsterdam 1065 SZ
NL NL
Email: job@ntt.net Email: job@ntt.net
Greg Hankins
Nokia
777 E. Middlefield Road
Mountain View, CA 94043
USA
Email: greg.hankins@nokia.com
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