Global Routing Operations J. Mauch Internet-Draft J. Snijders Intended status: Standards Track NTT Expires:November 11, 2016May10,4, 2017 G. Hankins Nokia October 31, 2016By default reject propagation when no policy is associated with a BGP peering session. draft-ietf-grow-bgp-reject-01Default IPv4 and IPv6 Unicast EBGP Route Propagation Behavior Without Policies draft-ietf-grow-bgp-reject-02 Abstract This document defines the defaultbehaviourbehavior of a BGP speaker when there is noexplicitimport or export policyisassociated with a BGPpeering session.session for the IPv4 or IPv6 Unicast Address Family. Requirements Language The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire onNovember 11, 2016.May 4, 2017. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2. Solution RequirementsLanguage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23 3.Solution RequirementsAcknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2 4. Acknowledgements. . . 3 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5.SecurityIANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 6.IANA ConsiderationsContributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1. Introduction BGP [RFC4271] speakers have many default settings which need to be revisited as part of improving the routing ecosystem. There is a need to provide guidance to BGPimplementorsimplementers for the default behaviors of a well functioninginternetInternet ecosystem. Routing leaks[I-D.ietf-idr-route-leak-detection-mitigation][RFC7908] are part of the problem, but software defects and operator misconfigurations are just a few of the attacks oninternetInternet stability we aim to address.UsuallyMany BGP speakers send and accept all routes from aconfiguredpeeror neighbor.by default. This practice dates back to the early days ofinternet protocols in being verythe Internet, where operators were permissive in offering routing information to allow all networks to reach each other.WithAs thecore of the internet becomingInternet has become more denselyinterconnectedinterconnected, the risk of a misbehavingedge device orBGPspeaking customerspeaker posessignficiantsignificant risks tothe reachability of critical services.Internet routing. Thisproposalspecification intends tosolveimprove this situation by requiring the explicit configuration of a BGP import and export policy for anynon-iBGPEBGP speaking session such as customers,peerspeers, or confederationboundaries.boundaries in a base router or VPN instances. When this solution is implemented,devices will no longer passBGP speakers do not accept or send routes withoutexplicit policy.policies configured on EBGP sessions. 2.Requirements Language The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. 3.Solution Requirements The following requirements for the IPv4 and IPv6 Unicast Address Family apply to the solution described in this document: o Software MUSTmarkconsider any routes from aneBGPEBGP peeras 'invalid' in the Adj-RIB-In,invalid, if noexplicitimport policy was configured. o Software MUST NOT advertise any routes to aneBGP peer without an operator configuring a policy. o Software MUST NOT require a configuration directive to operate in this mode.EBGP peer, if no export policy was configured. o SoftwareMUSTSHOULD provide protection from internal failures preventing the advertisement and acceptance of routes. o Software MUST operate in this mode by default. o Software MAY provide a configuration option to disable this security capability.4. Acknowledgements3. Acknowledgments The authors would like to thank the following people for theircommentscomments, support andsupport:review: Shane Amante, Christopher Morrow, Robert Raszuk, GregSkinner. 5.Skinner, Adam Chappell, Sriram Kotikalapudi, and Brian Dickson. 4. Security Considerations This document addresses the basic securityposturebehavior of how a BGPspeaking device withinspeaker propagates routes in anetwork.default configuration without policies. Operators have a need forimplementorsimplementers to address the problem through a behavior change to mitigate against possible attacks from a permissive securityposture.behavior. Attacks and inadvertent advertisements cause business impactnecessitating thisthat can be mitigated by a secure default behavior.6.5. IANA Considerations This document has no actions for IANA. 6. Contributors The following people contributed to successful deployment of solution described in this document: Jakob Heitz Cisco Email: jheitz@cisco.com Ondrej Filip CZ.NIC Email: ondrej.filip@nic.cz 7. References 7.1. Normative References [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. [RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>. 7.2. Informative References[I-D.ietf-idr-route-leak-detection-mitigation][RFC7908] Sriram, K., Montgomery, D.,Dickson, B., Patel, K.,McPherson, D., Osterweil, E., andA. Robachevsky, "Methods for DetectionB. Dickson, "Problem Definition andMitigationClassification of BGP Route Leaks",draft-ietf-idr-route-leak-detection- mitigation-02 (work in progress), March 2016.RFC 7908, DOI 10.17487/RFC7908, June 2016, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7908>. Authors' Addresses Jared Mauch NTTCommunications, Inc.Communications 8285 Reese Lane Ann Arbor Michigan 48103 US Email: jmauch@us.ntt.net Job Snijders NTTCommunications, Inc.Communications Theodorus Majofskistraat 100 Amsterdam 1065 SZ NL Email: job@ntt.net Greg Hankins Nokia 777 E. Middlefield Road Mountain View, CA 94043 USA Email: greg.hankins@nokia.com