--- 1/draft-ietf-grow-bgp-reject-04.txt 2017-04-12 05:13:38.173067190 -0700 +++ 2/draft-ietf-grow-bgp-reject-05.txt 2017-04-12 05:13:38.201067850 -0700 @@ -1,21 +1,21 @@ Global Routing Operations J. Mauch Internet-Draft Akamai Intended status: Standards Track J. Snijders -Expires: September 28, 2017 NTT +Expires: October 12, 2017 NTT G. Hankins Nokia - March 27, 2017 + April 10, 2017 Default EBGP Route Propagation Behavior Without Policies - draft-ietf-grow-bgp-reject-04 + draft-ietf-grow-bgp-reject-05 Abstract This document defines the default behavior of a BGP speaker when there is no import or export policy associated with an External BGP session. Requirements Language The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", @@ -30,41 +30,41 @@ Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." - This Internet-Draft will expire on September 28, 2017. + This Internet-Draft will expire on October 12, 2017. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 - 2. Solution Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 + 2. Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 6. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1. Introduction @@ -84,48 +84,45 @@ interconnected, the risk of a misbehaving BGP speaker poses significant risks to Internet routing. This specification intends to improve this situation by requiring the explicit configuration of a BGP import and export policy for any External BGP (EBGP) session such as customers, peers, or confederation boundaries for all enabled address families. When this solution is implemented, BGP speakers do not accept or send routes without policies configured on EBGP sessions. -2. Solution Requirements +2. Solution - The following requirements apply to the solution described in this - document: + The following requirements apply to all BGP speakers: - o Software MUST consider any routes ineligible for route selection - (section 9.1.1 [RFC4271]), if no import policy was configured for - the EBGP peer. + o A BGP speaker MUST consider any routes advertised by an EBGP peer + ineligible for route selection (section 9.1.1 [RFC4271]), if no + import policy was configured for the peer. - o Software MUST NOT advertise any routes to an EBGP peer, if no - export policy was configured. + o A BGP speaker MUST NOT advertise any routes to an EBGP peer, if no + export policy was configured for the peer. - o Software SHOULD fall back to an "import nothing" and "export + o A BGP speaker SHOULD fall back to an "import nothing" and "export nothing" mode following failure of internal components, such as a policy engine. - o Software MUST operate in this mode by default. - - o Software MAY provide a configuration option to disable this - security capability. + o A BGP speaker MAY provide a configuration option to disable the + preceding behaviors, but it MUST implement them by default. 3. Acknowledgments The authors would like to thank the following people for their comments, support and review: Shane Amante, Christopher Morrow, Robert Raszuk, Greg Skinner, Adam Chappell, Sriram Kotikalapudi, - Brian Dickson, Jeffrey Haas, John Heasley, Ignas Bagdonas and Donald - Smith. + Brian Dickson, Jeffrey Haas, John Heasley, Ignas Bagdonas, Donald + Smith, and Dale Worley. 4. Security Considerations This document addresses a basic routing security issue caused by permissive default routing policy configurations. Operators need implementers to address this problem with more secure defaults to mitigate collateral damage on Internet routing. Inadvertent or adversarial advertisements cause business impact that can be mitigated by a secure default behavior.