--- 1/draft-ietf-hip-cert-01.txt 2009-10-26 12:12:12.000000000 +0100 +++ 2/draft-ietf-hip-cert-02.txt 2009-10-26 12:12:12.000000000 +0100 @@ -1,21 +1,21 @@ Host Identity Protocol Heer Internet-Draft Distributed Systems Group, RWTH Intended status: Informational Aachen University -Expires: January 2, 2010 Varjonen +Expires: April 29, 2010 Varjonen Helsinki Institute for Information Technology - July 1, 2009 + October 26, 2009 HIP Certificates - draft-ietf-hip-cert-01 + draft-ietf-hip-cert-02 Status of this Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. This document may not be modified, and derivative works of it may not be created, except to format it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other than English. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering @@ -27,102 +27,99 @@ and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt. The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. - This Internet-Draft will expire on January 2, 2010. + This Internet-Draft will expire on April 29, 2010. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents in effect on the date of publication of this document (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info). Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Abstract This document specifies a certificate parameter called CERT for the Host Identity Protocol (HIP). The CERT parameter is a container for - Simple Public Key Infrastructure (SPKI) and X.509.v3 certificates. - It is used for carrying these certificates in HIP control messages. - Additionally, this document specifies the representations of Host - Identity Tags in SPKI and X.509.v3 certificates. + X.509.v3 certificates and for Simple Public Key Infrastructure (SPKI) + certificates. It is used for carrying these certificates in HIP + control packets. Additionally, this document specifies the + representations of Host Identity Tags in X.509.v3 and in SPKI + certificates. Requirements Language The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. 1. Introduction Digital certificates bind a piece of information to a public key by means of a digital signature, and thus, enable the holder of a private key to generate cryptographically verifiable statements. The Host Identity Protocol (HIP)[RFC5201] defines a new cryptographic namespace based on asymmetric cryptography. Each host's identity is derived from a public key, allowing hosts to digitally sign data with - their private key. This document specifies the CERT parameter that - is used to transmit digital signatures in HIP. It corresponds to the - placeholder specified in Section 2 of [RFC5201]. + their private key. This document specifies a CERT parameter that is + used to transmit digital signatures in HIP. It fills the placeholder + specified in Section 5.2 of [RFC5201]. 2. CERT Parameter The CERT parameter is a container for a certain types of digital certificates. It may either carry SPKI certificates or X.509.v3 certificates. It does not specify any certificate semantics. However, it defines some organizational parameters that help HIP hosts to transmit semantically grouped parameters in a more systematic way. The CERT parameter may be covered by the HIP SIGNATURE field and is a non-critical parameter. - Each HIP packet may contain multiple CERT parameters. These - parameters may be related or unrelated. Related certificates are - managed in Cert groups. A cert group specifies a group of related - cert parameters that should be interpreted in a certain order (e.g. - for expressing certificate chains). For grouping Cert parameters, - the Cert group and the Cert count field must be set. Ungrouped - certificates exhibit a unique Cert group field and set the Cert count - to 1. CERT parameters with the same Cert group number in the group - field indicate a logical grouping. The Cert count field indicates - the number of CERT parameters in the group. + The CERT parameter can be used in R1, I2, R2, UPDATE and NOTIFY + control packets. Each allowed HIP control packet may contain + multiple CERT parameters. These parameters may be related or + unrelated. Related certificates are managed in Cert groups. A Cert + group specifies a group of related CERT parameters that should be + interpreted in a certain order (e.g. for expressing certificate + chains). For grouping CERT parameters, the Cert group and the Cert + count field must be set. Ungrouped certificates exhibit a unique + Cert group field and set the Cert count to 1. CERT parameters with + the same Cert group number in the group field indicate a logical + grouping. The Cert count field indicates the number of CERT + parameters in the group. - CERT parameters that belong to the same CERT group may be contained - in multiple sequential packets. This is indicated by a higher Cert - count than the amount of CERT parameters with matching Cert group - fields in a packet. Within a HIP packet, CERT parameters must be - placed in ascending order according to their Cert group field. Cert - groups may only span multiple packets if the Cert group does not fit - the packet. Only one Cert group may span two subsequent packets. + CERT parameters that belong to the same Cert group may be contained + in multiple sequential HIP control packets. This is indicated by a + higher Cert count than the amount of CERT parameters with matching + Cert group fields in a HIP control packet. The CERT parameters must + be placed in ascending order, within a HIP control packet, according + to their Cert group field. Cert groups may only span multiple + packets if the Cert group does not fit the packet. Only one Cert + group may span two subsequent packets. The Cert ID acts as a sequence number to identify the certificates in a Cert group. The numbers in the Cert ID field must start from 1 up to Cert count. - The CERT parameter can be used in R1, I2, R2, UPDATE and NOTIFY - messages. When CERT parameter is used in R1 message it is NOT - recommended to use grouping or hash and URL encodings. Initiator and - Responder can detect middleboxes on the path after R1 message is sent - by checking if control packets contain ECHO_REQUEST_M parameters as - defined in [HIP.middle_auth]. - 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Type | Length | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Cert group | Cert count | Cert ID | Cert type | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Certificate / +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ / | Padding | @@ -133,77 +130,72 @@ Cert group Group ID grouping multiple related CERT parameters Cert count Total count of certificates that are sent, possibly in several consecutive HIP control packets. Cert ID The sequence number for this certificate Cert Type Describes the type of the certificate Padding Any Padding, if necessary, to make the TLV a multiple of 8 bytes. The following certificate types are defined: - +--------------------------+-------------+ + +--------------------------------+-------------+ | Cert format | Type number | - +--------------------------+-------------+ - | SPKI | 1 | - | X.509.v3 | 2 | - | Hash and URL of SPKI | 3 | - | Hash and URL of X.509.v3 | 4 | - +--------------------------+-------------+ + +--------------------------------+-------------+ + | X.509.v3 | 1 | + | SPKI | 2 | + | URL of X.509.v3 | 3 | + | URL of SPKI | 4 | + | Hash of X.509.v3 | 5 | + | Hash of SPKI | 6 | + | LDAP URL of X.509.v3 | 7 | + | LDAP URL of SPKI | 8 | + | Distinguished Name of X.509.v3 | 9 | + | Distinguished Name of SPKI | 10 | + +--------------------------------+-------------+ - All implementations MUST support SPKI. The next section outlines the - use of HITs in SPKI. The SPKI and its formats are defined in - [RFC2693]. X.509.v3 certificates are defined in [RFC3280]. Wire - format for X.509.v3 is Distinguished Encoding Rules format as defined - in [X.690]. + Next sections outline the use of HITs in X.509.v3 and in SPKI + certificates. X.509.v3 certificates are defined in [RFC3280]. The + Wire format for X.509.v3 is Distinguished Encoding Rules format as + defined in [X.690]. The SPKI and its formats are defined in + [RFC2693]. - Hash and URL encodings (3 and 4) are used as defined in [RFC4306]. + Hash and URL encodings (3 to 6) are used as defined in [RFC4306]. Using hash and URL encodings results in smaller HIP control packets, but requires the receiver to resolve the URL or check local cache against the hash. - It is not recommended to use hash and URL encodings when HIP-aware - middleboxes are present on the communication path between peers - because fetching remote certificates require the middlebox to buffer - the packets and to request remote data. This makes these devices - prone to denial of service (DoS) attacks. Moreover, middleboxes and - responders that request remote certificates can be used as deflectors - for distributed denial of service attacks. - -3. SPKI Cert Object and Host Identities - - When using SPKI certificates to transmit information related to HIP - hosts, HITs need to be enclosed within the certificates. In the - following we define the representation of those identifiers for SPKI - given as S-expressions. Note that the S-expressions are only the - human-readable representation of SPKI certificates. - - As an example the Host Identity Tag of a host is expressed as - follows: - - Format: (hash hit hit-of-host) - Example: (hash hit 2001:13:724d:f3c0:6ff0:33c2:15d8:5f50) + LDAP URL encoding (7 and 8) is used as defined in [RFC2255]. Using + LDAP URL encoding results in smaller HIP control packets, but + requires the receiver to retrieve the certificate or check local + cache against the URL. - Appendix A shows a full example SPKI certificate with HIP content. + Distinguished name (DN) encoding (9 and 10) is used as defined in + [RFC1779]. Using LDAP URL encoding results in smaller HIP control + packets, but requires the receiver to retrieve the certificate or + check local cache against the DN. -4. X.509.v3 Certificate Object and Host Identities +3. X.509.v3 Certificate Object and Host Identities - When using X.509.v3 certificates to transmit information related to - HIP hosts, HITs need to be enclosed within the certificates. HITs - are represented as issuer and subject alternative name X.509.v3 - extensions as defined in [RFC2459]. Because the Distinguished Name - (DN) in X.509.v3 certificate cannot be empty HITs are also placed - into the Common Name (CN) in a colon delimited presentation format. - Placing CN is not necessary if DN contains any other information. It - is RECOMMENDED to use FQDN/NAI from the hosts HOST_ID parameter in DN - if one exists. + HITs need to be enclosed within the certificates, when using X.509.v3 + certificates to transmit information related to HIP hosts. HITs can + represent an issuer, a subject, or both. In X.509.v3 HITs are + represented as issuer and subject alternative name extensions as + defined in [RFC2459]. If only HIP information is presented as either + the issuer or the subject the HIT is also placed into the respective + entity's DNs Common Name (CN) section in a colon delimited + presentation format. Inclusion of CN is not necessary if DN contains + any other information. It is RECOMMENDED to use FQDN/NAI from the + hosts HOST_ID parameter in DN if one exists. Full HIs are presented + in the public key entries of X.509.v3 certificates. - As an example the HIT of a host is expressed as follows: + As an example, in a case where the issuer and the subject are both + HIP enabled, the HITs are expressed as follows: Format: Issuer: CN=hit-of-host Subject: CN=hit-of-host X509v3 extensions: X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name: IP Address:HIT-OF-HOST X509v3 Subject Alternative Name: IP Address:HIT-OF-HOST @@ -214,78 +206,120 @@ X509v3 extensions: X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name: IP Address:2001:14:6CF:FAE7:BB79:BF78:7D64:C056 X509v3 Subject Alternative Name: IP Address:2001:14:6CF:FAE7:BB79:BF78:7D64:C056 Appendix B shows a full example X.509.v3 certificate with HIP content. +4. SPKI Cert Object and Host Identities + + HITs need to be enclosed within the certificates, when using SPKI + certificates to transmit information related to HIP hosts. HITs can + represent an issuer, a subject, or both. In the following we define + the representation of those identifiers for SPKI given as + S-expressions. Note that the S-expressions are only the human- + readable representation of SPKI certificates. Full HIs are presented + in the public key sequences of SPKI certificates. + + As an example the Host Identity Tag of a host is expressed as + follows: + + Format: (hash hit hit-of-host) + Example: (hash hit 2001:13:724d:f3c0:6ff0:33c2:15d8:5f50) + + Appendix A shows a full example SPKI certificate with HIP content. + 5. Revocation of Certificates Revocation of SPKI certificates is handled as defined in Section 5. in [RFC2693] Revocation of X.509.v3 certificates is handled as defined in Section 5 in [RFC2459]. -6. IANA Considerations +6. Signaling + + HIP end-hosts and HIP-aware middleboxes need to inform, the initiator + or the responder, of the need for a certificate or need for a chain + of certificates. They also need a way to inform about failing to + meet required conditions. HIP services [HIP.service] describes the + signaling. Signaling for the requirements and failures with + certificates is described in Section 4.1 of [HIP.service]. + +7. IANA Considerations This document defines the CERT parameter for the Host Identity Protocol [RFC5201]. This parameter is defined in Section 2 with type 768. The parameter type number is also defined in [RFC5201]. The - Cert Group and Cert ID namespaces are managed locally by each peer - that sends CERT parameters in HIP packets. + Cert Group and Cert ID namespaces are managed locally by each host + that sends CERT parameters in HIP control packets. -7. Security Considerations +8. Security Considerations Certificate grouping allows the certificates to be sent in multiple consecutive packets. This might allow similar attacks as IP-layer fragmentation allows, i.e. sending of fragments in wrong order and skipping some fragments to delay or stall packet processing by the victim in order to use resources (e.g. CPU or memory). -8. Acknowledgements + It is not recommended to use grouping or hash and URL encodings when + HIP-aware middleboxes are anticipated to be present on the + communication path between peers because fetching remote certificates + require the middlebox to buffer the packets and to request remote + data. This makes these devices prone to denial of service (DoS) + attacks. Moreover, middleboxes and responders that request remote + certificates can be used as deflectors for distributed denial of + service attacks. + +9. Acknowledgements The authors would like to thank M. Komu and T. Henderson of fruitful conversations on the subject. -9. References +10. References -9.1. Normative References +10.1. Normative References - [HIP.middle_auth] - Heer, T., "End-Host Authentication for HIP Middleboxes", - . + [HIP.service] + Heer, T., Wirtz, H., and S. Varjonen, "Service Identifiers + for HIP", . + + [RFC1779] Kille, S., "A String Representation of Distinguished + Names", RFC 1779, March 1995. [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. + [RFC2255] Howes, T. and M. Smith, "The LDAP URL Format", RFC 2255, + December 1997. + [RFC2459] Housley, R., Ford, W., Polk, T., and D. Solo, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and CRL Profile", RFC 2459, January 1999. [RFC2693] Ellison, C., Frantz, B., Lampson, B., Rivest, R., Thomas, B., and T. Ylonen, "SPKI Certificate Theory", RFC 2693, September 1999. [RFC3280] Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W., and D. Solo, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280, April 2002. [RFC4306] Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol", RFC 4306, December 2005. [RFC5201] Moskowitz, R., Nikander, P., Jokela, P., and T. Henderson, "Host Identity Protocol", RFC 5201, April 2008. -9.2. Informative References +10.2. Informative References [X.690] ITU-T, "Recommendation X.690 Information Technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)", July 2002, . Appendix A. SPKI certificate example