--- 1/draft-ietf-hip-cert-03.txt 2010-09-23 13:13:51.000000000 +0200 +++ 2/draft-ietf-hip-cert-04.txt 2010-09-23 13:13:51.000000000 +0200 @@ -1,123 +1,136 @@ Host Identity Protocol Heer Internet-Draft Distributed Systems Group, RWTH -Intended status: Informational Aachen University -Expires: October 30, 2010 Varjonen +Intended status: Experimental Aachen University +Expires: March 27, 2011 Varjonen Helsinki Institute for Information Technology - April 28, 2010 + September 23, 2010 HIP Certificates - draft-ietf-hip-cert-03 + draft-ietf-hip-cert-04 Abstract - This document specifies a certificate parameter called CERT for the - Host Identity Protocol (HIP). The CERT parameter is a container for - X.509.v3 certificates and for Simple Public Key Infrastructure (SPKI) - certificates. It is used for carrying these certificates in HIP - control packets. Additionally, this document specifies the - representations of Host Identity Tags in X.509.v3 and in SPKI - certificates. + The CERT parameter is a container for X.509.v3 certificates and + Simple Public Key Infrastructure (SPKI) certificates. It is used for + carrying these certificates in HIP control packets. This document + only specifies the certificate parameter and the error signaling in + case of a failed verification. The use of certificates including how + certificates are obtained, requested, and which actions are taken + upon successful or failed verification are to be defined in the + documents that use the certificate parameter. Additionally, this + document specifies the representations of Host Identity Tags in + X.509.v3 and SPKI certificates. Requirements Language The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. Status of this Memo - This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the + This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. This document may not be modified, and derivative works of it may not be created, except to format it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other than English. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering - Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute - working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- - Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. + Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that + other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- + Drafts. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." + The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at + http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt. - This Internet-Draft will expire on October 30, 2010. + The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at + http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. + + This Internet-Draft will expire on March 27, 2011. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as - described in the Simplified BSD License. + described in the BSD License. 1. Introduction Digital certificates bind a piece of information to a public key by means of a digital signature, and thus, enable the holder of a private key to generate cryptographically verifiable statements. The Host Identity Protocol (HIP)[RFC5201] defines a new cryptographic - namespace based on asymmetric cryptography. Each host's identity is - derived from a public key, allowing hosts to digitally sign data with - their private key. This document specifies a CERT parameter that is - used to transmit digital signatures in HIP. It fills the placeholder - specified in Section 5.2 of [RFC5201]. + namespace based on asymmetric cryptography. The identity of each + host is derived from a public key, allowing hosts to digitally sign + data with their private key. This document specifies the CERT + parameter, which is used to transmit digital certificates in HIP. It + fills the placeholder specified in Section 5.2 of [RFC5201]. 2. CERT Parameter - The CERT parameter is a container for a certain types of digital - certificates. It may either carry SPKI certificates or X.509.v3 + The CERT parameter is a container for certain types of digital + certificates. It MAY either carry SPKI certificates or X.509.v3 certificates. It does not specify any certificate semantics. - However, it defines some organizational parameters that help HIP - hosts to transmit semantically grouped parameters in a more - systematic way. + However, it defines supplementary parameters that help HIP hosts to + transmit semantically grouped CERT parameters in a more systematic + way. The specific use of the CERT parameter for different use cases + is intentionally not discussed in this document. - The CERT parameter may be covered by the HIP SIGNATURE field and is a - non-critical parameter. + The CERT parameter is covered, when present, by the HIP SIGNATURE + field and is a non-critical parameter. - The CERT parameter can be used in all HIP packets but using CERT in - I1 is NOT RECOMMENDED. Each allowed HIP control packet may contain - multiple CERT parameters. These parameters may be related or - unrelated. Related certificates are managed in Cert groups. A Cert - group specifies a group of related CERT parameters that should be - interpreted in a certain order (e.g. for expressing certificate - chains). For grouping CERT parameters, the Cert group and the Cert - count field must be set. Ungrouped certificates exhibit a unique - Cert group field and set the Cert count to 1. CERT parameters with - the same Cert group number in the group field indicate a logical - grouping. The Cert count field indicates the number of CERT - parameters in the group. + The CERT parameter can be used in all HIP packets but using it in the + I1 packet is not recommended because it can increase the processing + times of I1s, which can be problematic when processing storms of I1s. + Each HIP control packet MAY contain multiple CERT parameters. These + parameters MAY be related or unrelated. Related certificates are + managed in Cert groups. A Cert group specifies a group of related + CERT parameters that SHOULD be interpreted in a certain order (e.g. + for expressing certificate chains). For grouping CERT parameters, + the Cert group and the Cert count field MUST be set. Ungrouped + certificates exhibit a unique Cert group field and set the Cert count + to 1. CERT parameters with the same Cert group number in the group + field indicate a logical grouping. The Cert count field indicates + the number of CERT parameters in the group. - CERT parameters that belong to the same Cert group may be contained + CERT parameters that belong to the same Cert group MAY be contained in multiple sequential HIP control packets. This is indicated by a higher Cert count than the amount of CERT parameters with matching - Cert group fields in a HIP control packet. The CERT parameters must + Cert group fields in a HIP control packet. The CERT parameters MUST be placed in ascending order, within a HIP control packet, according - to their Cert group field. Cert groups may only span multiple - packets if the Cert group does not fit the packet. Only one Cert - group may span two subsequent packets. + to their Cert group field. Cert groups MAY only span multiple + packets if the Cert group does not fit the packet. Only a single + Cert group MAY span two subsequent packets. The Cert ID acts as a sequence number to identify the certificates in - a Cert group. The numbers in the Cert ID field must start from 1 up + a Cert group. The numbers in the Cert ID field MUST start from 1 up to Cert count. + The Cert Group and Cert ID namespaces are managed locally by each + host that sends CERT parameters in HIP control packets. + 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Type | Length | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Cert group | Cert count | Cert ID | Cert type | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Certificate / +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ / | Padding | @@ -133,67 +146,65 @@ Padding Any Padding, if necessary, to make the TLV a multiple of 8 bytes. The following certificate types are defined: +--------------------------------+-------------+ | Cert format | Type number | +--------------------------------+-------------+ | X.509.v3 | 1 | | SPKI | 2 | - | URL of X.509.v3 | 3 | - | URL of SPKI | 4 | - | Hash of X.509.v3 | 5 | - | Hash of SPKI | 6 | - | LDAP URL of X.509.v3 | 7 | - | LDAP URL of SPKI | 8 | - | Distinguished Name of X.509.v3 | 9 | - | Distinguished Name of SPKI | 10 | + | Hash and URL of X.509.v3 | 3 | + | Hash and URL of SPKI | 4 | + | LDAP URL of X.509.v3 | 5 | + | LDAP URL of SPKI | 6 | + | Distinguished Name of X.509.v3 | 7 | + | Distinguished Name of SPKI | 8 | +--------------------------------+-------------+ - Next sections outline the use of HITs in X.509.v3 and in SPKI + The next sections outline the use of HITs in X.509.v3 and in SPKI certificates. X.509.v3 certificates are defined in [RFC3280]. The - Wire format for X.509.v3 is Distinguished Encoding Rules format as + wire format for X.509.v3 is Distinguished Encoding Rules format as defined in [X.690]. The SPKI and its formats are defined in [RFC2693]. - Hash and URL encodings (3 to 6) are used as defined in [RFC4306]. - Using hash and URL encodings results in smaller HIP control packets, - but requires the receiver to resolve the URL or check local cache - against the hash. + Hash and URL encodings (3 to 4) are used as defined in [RFC4306] + Section 3.6. Using hash and URL encodings results in smaller HIP + control packets, but requires the receiver to resolve the URL or + check a local cache against the hash. - LDAP URL encoding (7 and 8) is used as defined in [RFC2255]. Using - LDAP URL encoding results in smaller HIP control packets, but - requires the receiver to retrieve the certificate or check local - cache against the URL. + LDAP URL encodings (5 and 6) are used as defined in [RFC2255]. Using + LDAP URL encoding results in smaller HIP control packets but requires + the receiver to retrieve the certificate or check a local cache + against the URL. - Distinguished name (DN) encoding (9 and 10) is used as defined in - [RFC1779]. Using LDAP URL encoding results in smaller HIP control + Distinguished name (DN) encodings (7 and 8) are used as defined in + [RFC1779]. Using the DN encoding results in smaller HIP control packets, but requires the receiver to retrieve the certificate or - check local cache against the DN. + check a local cache against the DN. 3. X.509.v3 Certificate Object and Host Identities - HITs need to be enclosed within the certificates, when using X.509.v3 - certificates to transmit information related to HIP hosts. HITs can + When using X.509.v3 certificates to transmit information related to + HIP hosts, HITs MAY be enclosed within the certificates. HITs can represent an issuer, a subject, or both. In X.509.v3 HITs are represented as issuer and subject alternative name extensions as defined in [RFC2459]. If only HIP information is presented as either the issuer or the subject the HIT is also placed into the respective entity's DNs Common Name (CN) section in a colon delimited presentation format. Inclusion of CN is not necessary if DN contains - any other information. It is RECOMMENDED to use FQDN/NAI from the - hosts HOST_ID parameter in DN if one exists. Full HIs are presented - in the public key entries of X.509.v3 certificates. + any other information. It is RECOMMENDED to use the FQDN/NAI from + the hosts HOST_ID parameter in the DN if one exists. The full HIs + are presented in the public key entries of X.509.v3 certificates. - As an example, in a case where the issuer and the subject are both - HIP enabled, the HITs are expressed as follows: + The following example illustrates a case in which the issuer and the + subject are both HIP enabled. Format: Issuer: CN=hit-of-host Subject: CN=hit-of-host X509v3 extensions: X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name: IP Address:HIT-OF-HOST X509v3 Subject Alternative Name: IP Address:HIT-OF-HOST @@ -204,91 +215,137 @@ X509v3 extensions: X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name: IP Address:2001:14:6CF:FAE7:BB79:BF78:7D64:C056 X509v3 Subject Alternative Name: IP Address:2001:14:6CF:FAE7:BB79:BF78:7D64:C056 Appendix B shows a full example X.509.v3 certificate with HIP content. + As another example, consider a managed PKI environment in which the + peers have certificates that are anchored in (potentially different) + managed trust chains. In this scenario, the certificates issued to + HIP hosts are signed by intermediate Certificate Authorities (CAs) up + to a root CA. In this example, the managed PKI environment is + neither HIP aware, nor can it be configured to compute HITs and + include them in the certificates. + + In this scenario, it is recommended that the HIP peers have and use + some mechanism of defining trusted root CAs for the purpose of + establishing HIP communications. Furthermore it is recommended that + the HIP peers have and use some mechanism of checking peer + certificate validity for revocation, signature, minimum cryptographic + strength, etc., up to the trusted root CA. + + When HIP communications are established, the HIP hosts not only need + to send their identity certificates (or pointers to their + certificates), but also the chain of intermediate CAs (or pointers to + the CAs) up to the root CA, or to a CA that is trusted by the remote + peer. This chain of certificates MUST be sent in a Cert group as + specified in Section 2. The HIP peers validate each other's + Certificates and compute peer HITs based on the Certificate public + keys. + 4. SPKI Cert Object and Host Identities - HITs need to be enclosed within the certificates, when using SPKI - certificates to transmit information related to HIP hosts. HITs can + When using SPKI certificates to transmit information related to HIP + hosts, HITs need to be enclosed within the certificates. HITs can represent an issuer, a subject, or both. In the following we define the representation of those identifiers for SPKI given as S-expressions. Note that the S-expressions are only the human- readable representation of SPKI certificates. Full HIs are presented in the public key sequences of SPKI certificates. As an example the Host Identity Tag of a host is expressed as follows: Format: (hash hit hit-of-host) Example: (hash hit 2001:13:724d:f3c0:6ff0:33c2:15d8:5f50) Appendix A shows a full example SPKI certificate with HIP content. 5. Revocation of Certificates - Revocation of SPKI certificates is handled as defined in Section 5. - in [RFC2693] Revocation of X.509.v3 certificates is handled as - defined in Section 5 in [RFC2459]. + Revocation of X.509.v3 certificates is handled as defined in Section + 5 in [RFC2459]. Revocation of SPKI certificates is handled as + defined in Section 5 in [RFC2693]. -6. Signaling +6. Error signaling - HIP end-hosts and HIP-aware middleboxes need to inform, the initiator - or the responder, of the need for a certificate or need for a chain - of certificates. They also need a way to inform about failing to - meet required conditions. HIP services [HIP.service] describes the - signaling. Signaling for the requirements and failures with - certificates is described in Section 4.1 of [HIP.service]. + If the Initiator does not send the certificate that the Responder + requires the Responder may take actions (e.g. blocking the + connection). The Responder MAY signal this to the Initiator by + sending a HIP NOTIFY message with NOTIFICATION parameter error type + CREDENTIALS_NEEDED. + + If the verification of a certificate fails, a verifier MAY signal + this to the provider of the certificate by sending a HIP NOTIFY + message with NOTIFICATION parameter error type INVALID_CERTIFICATE. + + NOTIFICATION PARAMETER - ERROR TYPES Value + ------------------------------------ ----- + + CREDENTIALS_REQUIRED 48 + + The Responder is unwilling to set up an association + as the Initiator did not send the needed credentials. + + INVALID_CERTIFICATE 50 + + Sent in response to a failed verification of a certificate. + Notification Data contains 4 octets, in order Cert group, + Cert count, Cert ID, and Cert type of the certificate + parameter that caused the failure. 7. IANA Considerations This document defines the CERT parameter for the Host Identity Protocol [RFC5201]. This parameter is defined in Section 2 with type - 768. The parameter type number is also defined in [RFC5201]. The - Cert Group and Cert ID namespaces are managed locally by each host - that sends CERT parameters in HIP control packets. + 768. The parameter type number is also defined in [RFC5201]. + + The CERT parameter has 8-bit unsigned integer field for different + certificate types, for which IANA is to create and maintain a new + sub-registry entitled "HIP certificate types" under the "Host + Identity Protocol (HIP) Parameters". Initial values for the + Certificate type registry are given in Section 2. + + In Section 6 this document defines two new types for "NOTIFY message + types" sub-registry under "Host Identity Protocol (HIP) Parameters". 8. Security Considerations Certificate grouping allows the certificates to be sent in multiple consecutive packets. This might allow similar attacks as IP-layer - fragmentation allows, i.e. sending of fragments in wrong order and - skipping some fragments to delay or stall packet processing by the - victim in order to use resources (e.g. CPU or memory). + fragmentation allows, for example sending of fragments in wrong order + and skipping some fragments to delay or stall packet processing by + the victim in order to use resources (e.g. CPU or memory). It is not recommended to use grouping or hash and URL encodings when - HIP-aware middleboxes are anticipated to be present on the + HIP aware middleboxes are anticipated to be present on the communication path between peers because fetching remote certificates require the middlebox to buffer the packets and to request remote data. This makes these devices prone to denial of service (DoS) attacks. Moreover, middleboxes and responders that request remote certificates can be used as deflectors for distributed denial of service attacks. 9. Acknowledgements - The authors would like to thank M. Komu and T. Henderson of fruitful - conversations on the subject. + The authors would like to thank A. Keranen, D. Mattes, M. Komu and T. + Henderson for the fruitful conversations on the subject. D. Mattes + most notably contributed the non-HIP aware use case in Section 3. 10. References 10.1. Normative References - [HIP.service] - Heer, T., Wirtz, H., and S. Varjonen, "Service Identifiers - for HIP", . - [RFC1779] Kille, S., "A String Representation of Distinguished Names", RFC 1779, March 1995. [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. [RFC2255] Howes, T. and M. Smith, "The LDAP URL Format", RFC 2255, December 1997. [RFC2459] Housley, R., Ford, W., Polk, T., and D. Solo, "Internet @@ -314,128 +371,151 @@ [X.690] ITU-T, "Recommendation X.690 Information Technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)", July 2002, . Appendix A. SPKI certificate example - This section shows a self-signed SPKI certificate of HIT 2001:14:6cf: - fae7:bb79:bf78:7d64:c056. The example has been indented for - readability. + This section shows a SPKI certificate with encoded HITs. The example + has been indented for readability. (sequence (public_key (rsa-pkcs1-sha1 (e #010001#) - (n |n1CheoELqYRSkHYMQddub2TpILl+6H9wC/as6zFCZqOY43hsZgAjG0F - GoQwtyOyQjzO2Ykb2TmUCZemTYui/sR0zIbdwg1xafKl7ggZDkhk5an - PtGDxJxFalTYo6/A5ZQv8uatbaJgB/G7VM8G+O9HLucadad2zQUXpQf - gbK3S8=| + (n |uV7M1dl7OcJCPnlJrX8MvQ8SmE6wne5idnp7VfDMolestu + JqvB69z3UwlVuSr3VVaQvDSA+15BUweYkis/1+UVnSDdcS + XUTz6AUTH1tPifoebYPp4s+9XG/vAh7I25pImjW4uL6Jvq + vI3WBE36wBt3Zmq12hpdA8jSIE1CRZYA8=| ) ) ) (cert (issuer - (hash hit 2001:0014:06cf:fae7:bb79:bf78:7d64:c056) + (hash hit 2001:001e:d709:1980:5c6a:bb0c:7650:a027) ) (subject - (hash hit 2001:0014:06cf:fae7:bb79:bf78:7d64:c056) + (hash hit 2001:001c:5a14:26de:a07c:385b:de35:60e3) ) - (not-before "2008-07-12_22:11:07") - (not-after "2008-07-22_22:11:07") + (not-before "2010-06-22_16:40:47") + (not-after "2010-07-02_16:40:47") ) (signature - (hash sha1 |kfElDhagiK0Bsqtj32Gq3t/1mxgA|) - |HiIqjjZIUzypvoxQyO0UovPm5uC4Xte0scEcBnENDIfn2DNy/bAtxGEdKq4O - dW80vTCmkF8/HXclgXLLVch3DxRNdSbYiiks000HpQt/OKqlTH+uUHBcHOAo - E42LmDskM9T5KQJoC/CH7871zfvojPnpkl2dUngOWv4q0r/wSJ0=| + (hash sha1 |+UzjNn5+bXo3aMZQNGGtapKdlFAA|) + |Fhioyxi0mpHa2aq2ofhotsauYyDuCa45mMAQ+yTEGOzcc1K+Prx + +O6kFecKxl+Cwz9qXEI6a/zfAnZqLj18yvszM1D/tH+W3RKl2LW + +lASsCDKXOi9ObNx+Dwzj3YlHABPxt4gGk0XVadEMXfCPDqiLF+ + zMR9fW5/OaJ+vRwhKs=| ) ) Appendix B. X.509.v3 certificate example - This section shows a self-signed X.509.v3 certificate of HIT 2001:14: - 6cf:fae7:bb79:bf78:7d64:c056. + This section shows a X.509.v3 certificate with encoded HITs. Certificate: Data: Version: 3 (0x2) Serial Number: 0 (0x0) Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption - Issuer: CN=2001:14:6cf:fae7:bb79:bf78:7d64:c056 + Issuer: CN=2001:1e:d709:1980:5c6a:bb0c:7650:a027 Validity - Not Before: Jul 12 18:58:38 2008 GMT - Not After : Jul 22 18:58:38 2008 GMT - Subject: CN=2001:14:6cf:fae7:bb79:bf78:7d64:c056 + Not Before: Jun 22 13:39:32 2010 GMT + Not After : Jul 2 13:39:32 2010 GMT + Subject: CN=2001:1c:5a14:26de:a07c:385b:de35:60e3 Subject Public Key Info: Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption RSA Public Key: (1024 bit) Modulus (1024 bit): - 00:9f:50:a1:7a:81:0b:a9:84:52:90:76:0c:41:d7: - 6e:6f:64:e9:20:b9:7e:e8:7f:70:0b:f6:ac:eb:31: - 42:66:a3:98:e3:78:6c:66:00:23:1b:41:46:a1:0c: - 2d:c8:ec:90:8f:33:b6:62:46:f6:4e:65:02:65:e9: - 93:62:e8:bf:b1:1d:33:21:b7:70:83:5c:5a:7c:a9: - 7b:82:06:43:92:19:39:6a:73:ed:18:3c:49:c4:56: - a5:4d:8a:3a:fc:0e:59:42:ff:2e:6a:d6:da:26:00: - 7f:1b:b5:4c:f0:6f:8e:f4:72:ee:71:a7:5a:77:6c: - d0:51:7a:50:7e:06:ca:dd:2f + 00:b9:5e:cc:d5:d9:7b:39:c2:42:3e:79:49:ad:7f: + 0c:bd:0f:12:98:4e:b0:9d:ee:62:76:7a:7b:55:f0: + cc:a2:57:ac:b6:e2:6a:bc:1e:bd:cf:75:30:95:5b: + 92:af:75:55:69:0b:c3:48:0f:b5:e4:15:30:79:89: + 22:b3:fd:7e:51:59:d2:0d:d7:12:5d:44:f3:e8:05: + 13:1f:5b:4f:89:fa:1e:6d:83:e9:e2:cf:bd:5c:6f: + ef:02:1e:c8:db:9a:48:9a:35:b8:b8:be:89:be:ab: + c8:dd:60:44:df:ac:01:b7:76:66:ab:5d:a1:a5:d0: + 3c:8d:22:04:d4:24:59:60:0f Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) X509v3 extensions: - X509v3 Basic Constraints: - CA:TRUE X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name: - IP Address:2001:14:6CF:FAE7:BB79:BF78:7D64:C056 + IP Address:2001:1E:D709:1980:5C6A:BB0C:7650:A027 X509v3 Subject Alternative Name: - IP Address:2001:14:6CF:FAE7:BB79:BF78:7D64:C056 + IP Address:2001:1C:5A14:26DE:A07C:385B:DE35:60E3 Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption - 19:32:0b:72:a8:6c:f9:65:20:5b:1d:9a:e1:c7:39:97:c7:8a: - 4d:d1:01:f9:7d:0b:0d:6f:61:a2:e3:2c:62:30:28:f6:36:db: - 62:bc:7f:d1:9b:6d:cc:da:e3:9b:90:e7:53:9e:55:28:51:7e: - 39:de:23:24:f5:a9:97:7a:ba:ce:54:3e:cf:8b:68:04:f6:be: - 78:94:9f:d3:20:62:96:14:84:51:af:c7:ba:30:ae:b1:d6:7e: - 7f:32:42:9c:f6:f5:76:27:0a:28:58:8b:b5:85:e7:e9:5a:ff: - aa:4c:57:55:95:09:33:ac:0b:8c:fd:05:4a:5e:60:e7:7f:d7: - 42:f0 + 48:a1:25:fb:01:31:d9:80:76:1b:1a:2d:00:f1:26:22:3c:3b: + 20:a0:cb:b2:28:d2:0c:21:d3:9e:3b:4a:ab:3d:f6:ea:ad:46: + f6:f5:c4:4f:71:ce:3e:7b:65:8d:58:75:2e:99:25:82:5f:73: + 10:c6:c2:f0:4b:35:ff:5c:65:ac:fc:a4:a7:76:50:ab:62:50: + b8:86:21:e6:83:e1:c1:3d:20:c9:8e:13:ab:d7:4b:d4:ab:2d: + 72:9d:f0:9f:5f:e0:6f:95:fa:a1:95:64:3f:74:63:e5:a8:1d: + f7:e6:48:98:33:53:7b:91:6d:b0:cb:af:32:15:8c:e0:01:a0: + a0:b8 Appendix C. Change log Changes from version 00 to 01: o Revised text about DN usage. o Revised text about Cert group usage. Changes from version 01 to 02: o Revised the type numbers. o Added a section about signaling. Changes from version 02 to 03: o Revised text about CERT use in control packets. + Changes from version 03 to 04: + + o Added the non-HIP aware use case to the Section 3. + + o Clarified that the HITs are not always required in the + certificates. + + o Rewrote the signaling section. + + o LDAP URL to LDAP DN in Section 2 last paragraph. + + o CERT is always covered by a signature as it's type number requires + + o New example certificates + + o Style and language clean-ups + + o Changed IANA considerations + + o Revised the type numbers + + o RFC 2119 keywords + + o Updated the IANA considerations section + + o Rewrote the abstract + Authors' Addresses Tobias Heer Distributed Systems Group, RWTH Aachen University Ahornstrasse 55 Aachen Germany Phone: +49 241 80 214 36 Email: heer@cs.rwth-aachen.de URI: http://ds.cs.rwth-aachen.de/members/heer Samu Varjonen Helsinki Institute for Information Technology - Metsnneidonkuja 4 + Metsaenneidonkuja 4 Helsinki Finland - Fax: +35896949768 Email: samu.varjonen@hiit.fi URI: http://www.hiit.fi