draft-ietf-hip-cert-09.txt		draft-ietf-hip-cert-10.txt
	Host Identity Protocol Heer		Host Identity Protocol Heer
	Internet-Draft Distributed Systems Group, RWTH		Internet-Draft Communication and Distributed
	Intended status: Experimental Aachen University		Updates: 5201 (if approved) Systems, RWTH Aachen University
	Expires: July 22, 2011 Varjonen		Intended status: Experimental Varjonen
	Helsinki Institute for Information		Expires: September 10, 2011 Helsinki Institute for Information
	Technology		Technology
	January 18, 2011		March 9, 2011
	Host Identity Protocol Certificates		Host Identity Protocol Certificates
	draft-ietf-hip-cert-09		draft-ietf-hip-cert-10
	Abstract		Abstract
	The CERT parameter is a container for X.509.v3 certificates and		The CERT parameter is a container for digital certificates. It is
	Simple Public Key Infrastructure (SPKI) certificates. It is used for		used for carrying these certificates in Host Identity Protocol (HIP)
	carrying these certificates in Host Identity Protocol (HIP) control		control packets. This document specifies the certificate parameter
	packets. This document specifies the certificate parameter and the		and the error signaling in case of a failed verification.
	error signaling in case of a failed verification. Additionally, this		Additionally, this document specifies the representations of Host
	document specifies the representations of Host Identity Tags in		Identity Tags in X.509.v3 and SPKI certificates.
	X.509.v3 and SPKI certificates.
	The concrete use of certificates including how certificates are		The concrete use of certificates including how certificates are
	obtained, requested, and which actions are taken upon successful or		obtained, requested, and which actions are taken upon successful or
	failed verification are specific to the scenario in which the		failed verification are specific to the scenario in which the
	certificates are used. Hence, the definition of these scenario-		certificates are used. Hence, the definition of these scenario-
	specific aspects are left to the documents that use the CERT		specific aspects are left to the documents that use the CERT
	parameter.		parameter.
	Status of this Memo		Status of this Memo
	This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the		This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
	provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.		provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
	Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on July 22, 2011.		The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
			http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.
			The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
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			This Internet-Draft will expire on September 10, 2011.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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	carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect		carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
	to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must		to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
	include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of		include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
	skipping to change at page 2, line 15		skipping to change at page 2, line 20
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect		carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
	to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must		to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
	include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of		include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
	the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as		the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
	described in the Simplified BSD License.		described in the BSD License.
	This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF		This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF
	Contributions published or made publicly available before November		Contributions published or made publicly available before November
	10, 2008. The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this		10, 2008. The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this
	material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow		material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow
	modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process.		modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process.
	Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling		Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling
	the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified		the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified
	outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may		outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may
	not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format		not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format
	it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other		it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other
	than English.		than English.
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	Digital certificates bind a piece of information to a public key by		Digital certificates bind pieces of information to a public key by
	means of a digital signature, and thus, enable the holder of a		means of a digital signature, and thus, enable the holder of a
	private key to generate cryptographically verifiable statements. The		private key to generate cryptographically verifiable statements. The
	Host Identity Protocol (HIP) [RFC5201] defines a new cryptographic		Host Identity Protocol (HIP) [RFC5201] defines a new cryptographic
	namespace based on asymmetric cryptography. The identity of each		namespace based on asymmetric cryptography. The identity of each
	host is derived from a public key, allowing hosts to digitally sign		host is derived from a public key, allowing hosts to digitally sign
	data and issue certificates with their private key. This document		data and issue certificates with their private key. This document
	specifies the CERT parameter, which is used to transmit digital		specifies the CERT parameter, which is used to transmit digital
	certificates in HIP. It fills the placeholder specified in Section		certificates in HIP. It fills the placeholder specified in Section
	5.2 of [RFC5201].		5.2 of [RFC5201], and thus, updates [RFC5201].
	1.1. Requirements Language		1.1. Requirements Language
	The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",		The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
	"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this		"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
	document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].		document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
	2. CERT Parameter		2. CERT Parameter
	The CERT parameter is a container for certain types of digital		The CERT parameter is a container for certain types of digital
	certificates. It MAY either carry SPKI certificates or X.509.v3
	certificates. It does not specify any certificate semantics.		certificates. It does not specify any certificate semantics.
	However, it defines supplementary parameters that help HIP hosts to		However, it defines supplementary parameters that help HIP hosts to
	transmit semantically grouped CERT parameters in a more systematic		transmit semantically grouped CERT parameters in a more systematic
	way. The specific use of the CERT parameter for different use cases		way. The specific use of the CERT parameter for different use cases
	is intentionally not discussed in this document because it is		is intentionally not discussed in this document because it is
	specific to a concrete use case. Hence, the use of the CERT		specific to a concrete use case. Hence, the use of the CERT
	parameter will be defined in the documents that use the CERT		parameter will be defined in the documents that use the CERT
	parameter.		parameter.
	The CERT parameter is covered, when present, by the HIP SIGNATURE		The CERT parameter is covered and protected, when present, by the HIP
	field and is a non-critical parameter.		SIGNATURE field and is a non-critical parameter.
	The CERT parameter can be used in all HIP packets. However, using it		The CERT parameter can be used in all HIP packets. However, using it
	in the I1 packet is not recommended because it can increase the		in the first Initiator (I1) packet is NOT RECOMMENDED because it can
	processing times of I1s, which can be problematic when processing		increase the processing times of I1s, which can be problematic when
	storms of I1s. Each HIP control packet MAY contain multiple CERT		processing storms of I1s. Each HIP control packet MAY contain
	parameters. These parameters MAY be related or unrelated. Related		multiple CERT parameters. These parameters MAY be related or
	certificates are managed in Cert groups. A Cert group specifies a		unrelated. Related certificates are managed in Cert groups. A Cert
	group of related CERT parameters that SHOULD be interpreted in a		group specifies a group of related CERT parameters that SHOULD be
	certain order (e.g., for expressing certificate chains). For		interpreted in a certain order (e.g., for expressing certificate
	grouping CERT parameters, the Cert group and the Cert count field		chains). For grouping CERT parameters, the Cert group and the Cert
	MUST be set. Ungrouped certificates exhibit a unique Cert group		count field MUST be set. Ungrouped certificates exhibit a unique
	field and set the Cert count to 1. CERT parameters with the same		Cert group field and set the Cert count to 1. CERT parameters with
	Cert group number in the group field indicate a logical grouping.		the same Cert group number in the group field indicate a logical
	The Cert count field indicates the number of CERT parameters in the		grouping. The Cert count field indicates the number of CERT
	group.		parameters in the group.
	CERT parameters that belong to the same Cert group MAY be contained		CERT parameters that belong to the same Cert group MAY be contained
	in multiple sequential HIP control packets. This is indicated by a		in multiple sequential HIP control packets. This is indicated by a
	higher Cert count than the amount of CERT parameters with matching		higher Cert count than the amount of CERT parameters with matching
	Cert group fields in a HIP control packet. The CERT parameters MUST		Cert group fields in a HIP control packet. The CERT parameters MUST
	be placed in ascending order, within a HIP control packet, according		be placed in ascending order, within a HIP control packet, according
	to their Cert group field. Cert groups MAY only span multiple		to their Cert group field. Cert groups MAY only span multiple
	packets if the Cert group does not fit the packet. A HIP packet MUST		packets if the Cert group does not fit the packet. A HIP packet MUST
	NOT contain more than one incomplete Cert group that continues in the		NOT contain more than one incomplete Cert group that continues in the
	next HIP control packet.		next HIP control packet.
	skipping to change at page 4, line 27		skipping to change at page 4, line 27
	Type 768		Type 768
	Length Length in octets, excluding Type, Length, and Padding		Length Length in octets, excluding Type, Length, and Padding
	Cert group Group ID grouping multiple related CERT parameters		Cert group Group ID grouping multiple related CERT parameters
	Cert count Total count of certificates that are sent, possibly		Cert count Total count of certificates that are sent, possibly
	in several consecutive HIP control packets.		in several consecutive HIP control packets.
	Cert ID The sequence number for this certificate		Cert ID The sequence number for this certificate
	Cert Type Indicates the type of the certificate		Cert Type Indicates the type of the certificate
	Padding Any Padding, if necessary, to make the TLV a multiple		Padding Any Padding, if necessary, to make the TLV a multiple
	of 8 bytes.		of 8 bytes.
			The certificates MUST use the algorithms defined in [RFC5201] as the
			signature and hash algorithms.
	The following certificate types are defined:		The following certificate types are defined:
	+--------------------------------+-------------+		+--------------------------------+-------------+
	| Cert format | Type number |		| Cert format | Type number |
	+--------------------------------+-------------+		+--------------------------------+-------------+
			| Reserved | 0 |
	| X.509.v3 | 1 |		| X.509.v3 | 1 |
	| SPKI | 2 |		| SPKI | 2 |
	| Hash and URL of X.509.v3 | 3 |		| Hash and URL of X.509.v3 | 3 |
	| Hash and URL of SPKI | 4 |		| Hash and URL of SPKI | 4 |
	| LDAP URL of X.509.v3 | 5 |		| LDAP URL of X.509.v3 | 5 |
	| LDAP URL of SPKI | 6 |		| LDAP URL of SPKI | 6 |
	| Distinguished Name of X.509.v3 | 7 |		| Distinguished Name of X.509.v3 | 7 |
	| Distinguished Name of SPKI | 8 |		| Distinguished Name of SPKI | 8 |
	+--------------------------------+-------------+		+--------------------------------+-------------+
	The next sections outline the use of HITs in X.509.v3 and in SPKI		The next sections outline the use of Host Identity Tags (HITs) in
	certificates. X.509.v3 certificates are defined in [RFC5280]. The		X.509.v3 and in Simple Public Key Infrastructure (SPKI) certificates.
	wire format for X.509.v3 is Distinguished Encoding Rules format as		X.509.v3 certificates and the handling procedures are defined in
	defined in [X.690]. The SPKI and its formats are defined in		[RFC5280]. The wire format for X.509.v3 is Distinguished Encoding
	[RFC2693].		Rules format as defined in [X.690]. The SPKI, the handling
			procedures, and the formats are defined in [RFC2693].
	Hash and URL encodings (3 and 4) are used as defined in [RFC5996]		Hash and Uniform Resource Locator (URL) encodings (3 and 4) are used
	Section 3.6. Using hash and URL encodings results in smaller HIP		as defined in [RFC5996] Section 3.6. Using hash and URL encodings
	control packets, but requires the receiver to resolve the URL or		results in smaller HIP control packets, but requires the receiver to
	check a local cache against the hash.		resolve the URL or check a local cache against the hash.
	LDAP URL encodings (5 and 6) are used as defined in [RFC4516]. Using		LDAP URL encodings (5 and 6) are used as defined in [RFC4516]. Using
	LDAP URL encoding results in smaller HIP control packets but requires		LDAP URL encoding results in smaller HIP control packets but requires
	the receiver to retrieve the certificate or check a local cache		the receiver to retrieve the certificate or check a local cache
	against the URL.		against the URL.
	Distinguished name (DN) encodings (7 and 8) are used as defined in		Distinguished name (DN) encodings (7 and 8) are used as defined in
	[RFC4514]. Using the DN encoding results in smaller HIP control		[RFC4514]. Using the DN encoding results in smaller HIP control
	packets, but requires the receiver to retrieve the certificate or		packets, but requires the receiver to retrieve the certificate or
	check a local cache against the DN.		check a local cache against the DN.
	3. X.509.v3 Certificate Object and Host Identities		3. X.509.v3 Certificate Object and Host Identities
	When using X.509.v3 certificates to transmit information related to		HITs can represent an issuer, a subject, or both in x.509.v3. HITs
	HIP hosts, HITs MAY be enclosed within the certificates. HITs can		are represented as IPv6 addresses as defined in [RFC4843]. When Host
	represent an issuer, a subject, or both. In X.509.v3 HITs are		Identifier ( HI ) is used to sign the certificate the respective HIT
	represented as issuer or subject alternative name extensions as		MUST be placed in to the Issuer Alternative Name (IAN) extension
	defined in [RFC5280]. If only the HIT of the host is presented as		using the GeneralName form iPAddress as defined in [RFC5280]. When
	either the issuer or the subject the respective HIT MUST be placed		the certificate is issued for a HIP host, identified by a HIT and HI,
	into the respective entity's DN's Common Name (CN) section in a colon		the respective HIT MUST be placed in to the Subject Alternative Name
	delimited presentation format defined in [RFC5952]. Inclusion of CN		(SAN) extension using the GeneralName form iPAddress and the full HI
	is not necessary if DN contains any other naming information. It is		is presented as the subjects public key info as defined in [RFC5280].
	RECOMMENDED to use the FQDN/NAI from the hosts HOST_ID parameter in
	the DN if one exists. The full HIs are presented in the public key
	entries of X.509.v3 certificates.
	The following examples illustrate how HITs are presented as issuer		The following examples illustrate how HITs are presented as issuer
	and subject in the DN and in the X.509.v3 extension alternative		and subject in the X.509.v3 extension alternative names.
	names.
	Format of DN:
	Issuer: CN=hit-of-issuer
	Subject: CN=hit-of-subject
	Example DN:
	Issuer: CN=2001:14:6cf:fae7:bb79:bf78:7d64:c056
	Subject: CN=2001:1c:5a14:26de:a07c:385b:de35:60e3
	Format of X509v3 extensions:		Format of X509v3 extensions:
	X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name:		X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name:
	IP Address:hit-of-issuer		IP Address:hit-of-issuer
	X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:		X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
	IP Address:hit-of-subject		IP Address:hit-of-subject
	Example X509v3 extensions:		Example X509v3 extensions:
	X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name:		X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name:
	IP Address:2001:14:6cf:fae7:bb79:bf78:7d64:c056		IP Address:2001:14:6cf:fae7:bb79:bf78:7d64:c056
	X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:		X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
	IP Address:2001:1C:5a14:26de:a07C:385b:de35:60e3		IP Address:2001:1C:5a14:26de:a07C:385b:de35:60e3
	Appendix B shows a full example X.509.v3 certificate with HIP		Appendix B shows a full example X.509.v3 certificate with HIP
	content.		content.
	As another example, consider a managed PKI environment in which the		As another example, consider a managed Public Key Infrastructure
	peers have certificates that are anchored in (potentially different)		(PKI) environment in which the peers have certificates that are
	managed trust chains. In this scenario, the certificates issued to		anchored in (potentially different) managed trust chains. In this
	HIP hosts are signed by intermediate Certificate Authorities (CAs) up		scenario, the certificates issued to HIP hosts are signed by
	to a root CA. In this example, the managed PKI environment is		intermediate Certificate Authorities (CAs) up to a root CA. In this
	neither HIP aware, nor can it be configured to compute HITs and		example, the managed PKI environment is neither HIP aware, nor can it
	include them in the certificates.		be configured to compute HITs and include them in the certificates.
	In this scenario, it is RECOMMENDED that the HIP peers have and use
	some mechanism of defining trusted root CAs for the purpose of
	establishing HIP communications. Furthermore it is recommended that
	the HIP peers have and use some mechanism of checking peer
	certificate validity for revocation, signature, minimum cryptographic
	strength, etc., up to the trusted root CA.
	When HIP communications are established, the HIP hosts not only need		When HIP communications are established, the HIP hosts not only need
	to send their identity certificates (or pointers to their		to send their identity certificates (or pointers to their
	certificates), but also the chain of intermediate CAs (or pointers to		certificates), but also the chain of intermediate CAs (or pointers to
	the CAs) up to the root CA, or to a CA that is trusted by the remote		the CAs) up to the root CA, or to a CA that is trusted by the remote
	peer. This chain of certificates MUST be sent in a Cert group as		peer. This chain of certificates MUST be sent in a Cert group as
	specified in Section 2. The HIP peers validate each other's		specified in Section 2. The HIP peers validate each other's
	certificates and compute peer HITs based on the certificate public		certificates and compute peer HITs based on the certificate public
	keys.		keys.
	skipping to change at page 8, line 30		skipping to change at page 7, line 38
	7. IANA Considerations		7. IANA Considerations
	This document defines the CERT parameter for the Host Identity		This document defines the CERT parameter for the Host Identity
	Protocol [RFC5201]. This parameter is defined in Section 2 with type		Protocol [RFC5201]. This parameter is defined in Section 2 with type
	768. The parameter type number is also defined in [RFC5201].		768. The parameter type number is also defined in [RFC5201].
	The CERT parameter has 8-bit unsigned integer field for different		The CERT parameter has 8-bit unsigned integer field for different
	certificate types, for which IANA is to create and maintain a new		certificate types, for which IANA is to create and maintain a new
	sub-registry entitled "HIP certificate types" under the "Host		sub-registry entitled "HIP certificate types" under the "Host
	Identity Protocol (HIP) Parameters". Initial values for the		Identity Protocol (HIP) Parameters". Initial values for the
	Certificate type registry are given in Section 2.		Certificate type registry are given in Section 2. New values for the
			Certificate types from the unassigned space are assigned through IETF
			Review.
	In Section 6 this document defines two new types for "NOTIFY message		In Section 6 this document defines two new types for "NOTIFY message
	types" sub-registry under "Host Identity Protocol (HIP) Parameters".		types" sub-registry under "Host Identity Protocol (HIP) Parameters".
	8. Security Considerations		8. Security Considerations
	Certificate grouping allows the certificates to be sent in multiple		Certificate grouping allows the certificates to be sent in multiple
	consecutive packets. This might allow similar attacks as IP-layer		consecutive packets. This might allow similar attacks as IP-layer
	fragmentation allows, for example sending of fragments in wrong order		fragmentation allows, for example sending of fragments in wrong order
	and skipping some fragments to delay or stall packet processing by		and skipping some fragments to delay or stall packet processing by
	the victim in order to use resources (e.g. CPU or memory). Hence,		the victim in order to use resources (e.g. CPU or memory). Hence,
	hosts SHOULD implement mechanisms to discard certificate groups with		hosts SHOULD implement mechanisms to discard certificate groups with
	outstanding certificates if state space is scarce.		outstanding certificates if state space is scarce.
			Checking of the URL and LDAP entries might allow DoS attacks, where
			the target host may be subjected to bogus work.
			Security considerations for SPKI certificates are discussed in
			[RFC2693] and for X.509.v3 in [RFC5280]
	9. Acknowledgements		9. Acknowledgements
	The authors would like to thank A. Keranen, D. Mattes, M. Komu and T.		The authors would like to thank A. Keranen, D. Mattes, M. Komu and T.
	Henderson for the fruitful conversations on the subject. D. Mattes		Henderson for the fruitful conversations on the subject. D. Mattes
	most notably contributed the non-HIP aware use case in Section 3.		most notably contributed the non-HIP aware use case in Section 3.
	10. References		10. Normative References
	10.1. Normative References
	[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate		[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
	Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.		Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
	[RFC2693] Ellison, C., Frantz, B., Lampson, B., Rivest, R., Thomas,		[RFC2693] Ellison, C., Frantz, B., Lampson, B., Rivest, R., Thomas,
	B., and T. Ylonen, "SPKI Certificate Theory", RFC 2693,		B., and T. Ylonen, "SPKI Certificate Theory", RFC 2693,
	September 1999.		September 1999.
	[RFC4514] Zeilenga, K., "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol		[RFC4514] Zeilenga, K., "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
	(LDAP): String Representation of Distinguished Names",		(LDAP): String Representation of Distinguished Names",
	RFC 4514, June 2006.		RFC 4514, June 2006.
	[RFC4516] Smith, M. and T. Howes, "Lightweight Directory Access		[RFC4516] Smith, M. and T. Howes, "Lightweight Directory Access
	Protocol (LDAP): Uniform Resource Locator", RFC 4516,		Protocol (LDAP): Uniform Resource Locator", RFC 4516,
	June 2006.		June 2006.
			[RFC4843] Nikander, P., Laganier, J., and F. Dupont, "An IPv6 Prefix
			for Overlay Routable Cryptographic Hash Identifiers
			(ORCHID)", RFC 4843, April 2007.
	[RFC5201] Moskowitz, R., Nikander, P., Jokela, P., and T. Henderson,		[RFC5201] Moskowitz, R., Nikander, P., Jokela, P., and T. Henderson,
	"Host Identity Protocol", RFC 5201, April 2008.		"Host Identity Protocol", RFC 5201, April 2008.
	[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,		[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
	Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key		Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
	Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List		Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
	(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.		(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
	[RFC5952] Kawamura, S. and M. Kawashima, "A Recommendation for IPv6
	Address Text Representation", RFC 5952, August 2010.
	[RFC5996] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., and P. Eronen,		[RFC5996] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., and P. Eronen,
	"Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)",		"Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)",
	RFC 5996, September 2010.		RFC 5996, September 2010.
	10.2. Informative References		[X.690] ITU-T, "Recommendation X.690 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8825-1:2002,
			Information Technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
	[X.690] ITU-T, "Recommendation X.690 Information Technology -		Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical
	ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding		Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules
	Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and		(DER)", July 2002.
	Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)", July 2002, <http://
	www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/languages/
	X.690-0207.pdf>.
	Appendix A. SPKI certificate example		Appendix A. SPKI certificate example
	This section shows a SPKI certificate with encoded HITs. The example		This section shows a SPKI certificate with encoded HITs. The example
	has been indented for readability.		has been indented for readability.
	(sequence		(sequence
	(public_key		(public_key
	(rsa-pkcs1-sha1		(rsa-pkcs1-sha1
	(e #010001#)		(e #010001#)
	skipping to change at page 13, line 30		skipping to change at page 12, line 39
	leading zeroes in HITs).		leading zeroes in HITs).
	Changes from version 07 to 08:		Changes from version 07 to 08:
	o Updated and checked the references.		o Updated and checked the references.
	Changes from version 08 to 09:		Changes from version 08 to 09:
	o Fixing boilerplate.		o Fixing boilerplate.
			Changes from version 09 to 10:
			o IANA considerations updated based on the IANA review.
			o Updates based on the hip-chairs review.
			o Updates based on the Gen-ART review.
	Authors' Addresses		Authors' Addresses
	Tobias Heer		Tobias Heer
	Distributed Systems Group, RWTH Aachen University		Communication and Distributed Systems, RWTH Aachen University
	Ahornstrasse 55		Ahornstrasse 55
	Aachen		Aachen
	Germany		Germany
	Phone: +49 241 80 214 36		Phone: +49 241 80 20 776
	Email: heer@cs.rwth-aachen.de		Email: heer@cs.rwth-aachen.de
	URI: http://ds.cs.rwth-aachen.de/members/heer		URI: http://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/team/tobias-heer/
	Samu Varjonen		Samu Varjonen
	Helsinki Institute for Information Technology		Helsinki Institute for Information Technology
	Gustaf Haellstroemin katu 2b		Gustaf Haellstroemin katu 2b
	Helsinki		Helsinki
	Finland		Finland
	Email: samu.varjonen@hiit.fi		Email: samu.varjonen@hiit.fi
	URI: http://www.hiit.fi		URI: http://www.hiit.fi
End of changes. 31 change blocks.
	100 lines changed or deleted		103 lines changed or added
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