draft-ietf-hip-rfc5202-bis-04.txt		draft-ietf-hip-rfc5202-bis-05.txt
	Network Working Group P. Jokela		Network Working Group P. Jokela
	Internet-Draft Ericsson Research NomadicLab		Internet-Draft Ericsson Research NomadicLab
	Obsoletes: 5202 (if approved) R. Moskowitz		Obsoletes: 5202 (if approved) R. Moskowitz
	Intended status: Standards Track ICSAlabs, An Independent		Intended status: Standards Track ICSAlabs, An Independent
	Expires: March 8, 2014 Division of Verizon Business		Expires: May 22, 2014 Division of Verizon Business
	Systems		Systems
	J. Melen		J. Melen
	Ericsson Research NomadicLab		Ericsson Research NomadicLab
	September 4, 2013		November 18, 2013
	Using the Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) Transport Format with the		Using the Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) Transport Format with the
	Host Identity Protocol (HIP)		Host Identity Protocol (HIP)
	draft-ietf-hip-rfc5202-bis-04		draft-ietf-hip-rfc5202-bis-05
	Abstract		Abstract
	This memo specifies an Encapsulated Security Payload (ESP) based		This memo specifies an Encapsulated Security Payload (ESP) based
	mechanism for transmission of user data packets, to be used with the		mechanism for transmission of user data packets, to be used with the
	Host Identity Protocol (HIP). This document obsoletes RFC 5202.		Host Identity Protocol (HIP). This document obsoletes RFC 5202.
	Status of This Memo		Status of This Memo
	This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the		This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
	skipping to change at page 1, line 38		skipping to change at page 1, line 38
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on March 8, 2014.		This Internet-Draft will expire on May 22, 2014.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	skipping to change at page 2, line 45		skipping to change at page 2, line 45
	5.1.1. ESP_INFO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		5.1.1. ESP_INFO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	5.1.2. ESP_TRANSFORM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15		5.1.2. ESP_TRANSFORM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
	5.1.3. NOTIFICATION Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16		5.1.3. NOTIFICATION Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
	5.2. HIP ESP Security Association Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . 16		5.2. HIP ESP Security Association Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
	5.2.1. Setup During Base Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16		5.2.1. Setup During Base Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
	5.3. HIP ESP Rekeying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18		5.3. HIP ESP Rekeying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
	5.3.1. Initializing Rekeying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18		5.3.1. Initializing Rekeying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
	5.3.2. Responding to the Rekeying Initialization . . . . . . 19		5.3.2. Responding to the Rekeying Initialization . . . . . . 19
	5.4. ICMP Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19		5.4. ICMP Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
	5.4.1. Unknown SPI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19		5.4.1. Unknown SPI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
	6. Packet Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19		6. Packet Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
	6.1. Processing Outgoing Application Data . . . . . . . . . . . 20		6.1. Processing Outgoing Application Data . . . . . . . . . . . 20
	6.2. Processing Incoming Application Data . . . . . . . . . . . 20		6.2. Processing Incoming Application Data . . . . . . . . . . . 20
	6.3. HMAC and SIGNATURE Calculation and Verification . . . . . 21		6.3. HMAC and SIGNATURE Calculation and Verification . . . . . 21
	6.4. Processing Incoming ESP SA Initialization (R1) . . . . . . 21		6.4. Processing Incoming ESP SA Initialization (R1) . . . . . . 21
	6.5. Processing Incoming Initialization Reply (I2) . . . . . . 21		6.5. Processing Incoming Initialization Reply (I2) . . . . . . 22
	6.6. Processing Incoming ESP SA Setup Finalization (R2) . . . . 22		6.6. Processing Incoming ESP SA Setup Finalization (R2) . . . . 22
	6.7. Dropping HIP Associations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22		6.7. Dropping HIP Associations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
	6.8. Initiating ESP SA Rekeying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22		6.8. Initiating ESP SA Rekeying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
	6.9. Processing Incoming UPDATE Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . 24		6.9. Processing Incoming UPDATE Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
	6.9.1. Processing UPDATE Packet: No Outstanding Rekeying		6.9.1. Processing UPDATE Packet: No Outstanding Rekeying
	Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24		Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
	6.10. Finalizing Rekeying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25		6.10. Finalizing Rekeying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
	6.11. Processing NOTIFY Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26		6.11. Processing NOTIFY Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
	7. Keying Material . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26		7. Keying Material . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
	8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26		8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
	9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27		9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
	10. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27		10. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
	11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28		11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
	11.1. Normative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28		11.1. Normative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
	11.2. Informative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28		11.2. Informative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
	Appendix A. A Note on Implementation Options . . . . . . . . . . 29		Appendix A. A Note on Implementation Options . . . . . . . . . . 30
	Appendix B. Bound End-to-End Tunnel mode for ESP . . . . . . . . 30		Appendix B. Bound End-to-End Tunnel mode for ESP . . . . . . . . 30
	B.1. Protocol definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30		B.1. Protocol definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
	B.1.1. Changes to Security Association data structures . . . 30		B.1.1. Changes to Security Association data structures . . . 31
	B.1.2. Packet format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31		B.1.2. Packet format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
	B.1.3. Cryptographic processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33		B.1.3. Cryptographic processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
	B.1.4. IP header processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33		B.1.4. IP header processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
	B.1.5. Handling of outgoing packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33		B.1.5. Handling of outgoing packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
	B.1.6. Handling of incoming packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34		B.1.6. Handling of incoming packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
	B.1.7. IPv4 options handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35		B.1.7. IPv4 options handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	In the Host Identity Protocol Architecture		In the Host Identity Protocol Architecture
	[I-D.ietf-hip-rfc4423-bis], hosts are identified with public keys.		[I-D.ietf-hip-rfc4423-bis], hosts are identified with public keys.
	The Host Identity Protocol [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5201-bis] base exchange		The Host Identity Protocol [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5201-bis] base exchange
	allows any two HIP-supporting hosts to authenticate each other and to		allows any two HIP-supporting hosts to authenticate each other and to
	create a HIP association between themselves. During the base		create a HIP association between themselves. During the base
	exchange, the hosts generate a piece of shared keying material using		exchange, the hosts generate a piece of shared keying material using
	skipping to change at page 15, line 48		skipping to change at page 15, line 48
	DEPRECATED 4		DEPRECATED 4
	DEPRECATED 5		DEPRECATED 5
	DEPRECATED 6		DEPRECATED 6
	NULL-ENCRYPT with HMAC-SHA-256 7 [RFC2410], [RFC4868]		NULL-ENCRYPT with HMAC-SHA-256 7 [RFC2410], [RFC4868]
	AES-128-CBC with HMAC-SHA-256 8 [RFC3602], [RFC4868]		AES-128-CBC with HMAC-SHA-256 8 [RFC3602], [RFC4868]
	AES-256-CBC with HMAC-SHA-256 9 [RFC3602], [RFC4868]		AES-256-CBC with HMAC-SHA-256 9 [RFC3602], [RFC4868]
	AES-CCM-8 10 [RFC4309]		AES-CCM-8 10 [RFC4309]
	AES-CCM-16 11 [RFC4309]		AES-CCM-16 11 [RFC4309]
	AES-GCM with a 8 octet ICV 12 [RFC4106]		AES-GCM with a 8 octet ICV 12 [RFC4106]
	AES-GCM with a 16 octet ICV 13 [RFC4106]		AES-GCM with a 16 octet ICV 13 [RFC4106]
			AES-CMAC-96 14 [RFC4493], [RFC4494]
			AES-GMAC 15 [RFC4543]
	The sender of an ESP transform parameter MUST make sure that there		The sender of an ESP transform parameter MUST make sure that there
	are no more than six (6) Suite IDs in one ESP transform parameter.		are no more than six (6) Suite IDs in one ESP transform parameter.
	Conversely, a recipient MUST be prepared to handle received transform		Conversely, a recipient MUST be prepared to handle received transform
	parameters that contain more than six Suite IDs. The limited number		parameters that contain more than six Suite IDs. The limited number
	of Suite IDs sets the maximum size of the ESP_TRANSFORM parameter.		of Suite IDs sets the maximum size of the ESP_TRANSFORM parameter.
	As the default configuration, the ESP_TRANSFORM parameter MUST		As the default configuration, the ESP_TRANSFORM parameter MUST
	contain at least one of the mandatory Suite IDs. There MAY be a		contain at least one of the mandatory Suite IDs. There MAY be a
	configuration option that allows the administrator to override this		configuration option that allows the administrator to override this
	default.		default.
	Mandatory implementations: AES-128-CBC with HMAC-SHA-256 and NULL		Mandatory implementations: AES-128-CBC with HMAC-SHA-256 and NULL
	with HMAC-SHA-256.		with HMAC-SHA-256.
	skipping to change at page 28, line 12		skipping to change at page 28, line 20
	also valid for this document. Many people have given valuable		also valid for this document. Many people have given valuable
	feedback, and our apologies to anyone whose name is missing.		feedback, and our apologies to anyone whose name is missing.
	11. References		11. References
	11.1. Normative references		11.1. Normative references
	[I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5201-bis] Moskowitz, R., Heer, T., Jokela, P., and		[I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5201-bis] Moskowitz, R., Heer, T., Jokela, P., and
	T. Henderson, "Host Identity Protocol		T. Henderson, "Host Identity Protocol
	Version 2 (HIPv2)",		Version 2 (HIPv2)",
	draft-ietf-hip-rfc5201-bis-12 (work in		draft-ietf-hip-rfc5201-bis-14 (work in
	progress), June 2013.		progress), October 2013.
	[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs		[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs
	to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14,		to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14,
	RFC 2119, March 1997.		RFC 2119, March 1997.
	[RFC2404] Madson, C. and R. Glenn, "The Use of		[RFC2404] Madson, C. and R. Glenn, "The Use of
	HMAC-SHA-1-96 within ESP and AH",		HMAC-SHA-1-96 within ESP and AH",
	RFC 2404, November 1998.		RFC 2404, November 1998.
	[RFC2410] Glenn, R. and S. Kent, "The NULL		[RFC2410] Glenn, R. and S. Kent, "The NULL
	skipping to change at page 28, line 44		skipping to change at page 29, line 5
	RFC 4106, June 2005.		RFC 4106, June 2005.
	[RFC4303] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security		[RFC4303] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security
	Payload (ESP)", RFC 4303, December 2005.		Payload (ESP)", RFC 4303, December 2005.
	[RFC4309] Housley, R., "Using Advanced Encryption		[RFC4309] Housley, R., "Using Advanced Encryption
	Standard (AES) CCM Mode with IPsec		Standard (AES) CCM Mode with IPsec
	Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",		Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
	RFC 4309, December 2005.		RFC 4309, December 2005.
			[RFC4493] Song, JH., Poovendran, R., Lee, J., and
			T. Iwata, "The AES-CMAC Algorithm",
			RFC 4493, June 2006.
			[RFC4494] Song, JH., Poovendran, R., and J. Lee,
			"The AES-CMAC-96 Algorithm and Its Use
			with IPsec", RFC 4494, June 2006.
			[RFC4543] McGrew, D. and J. Viega, "The Use of
			Galois Message Authentication Code (GMAC)
			in IPsec ESP and AH", RFC 4543, May 2006.
	[RFC4868] Kelly, S. and S. Frankel, "Using HMAC-		[RFC4868] Kelly, S. and S. Frankel, "Using HMAC-
	SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512		SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512
	with IPsec", RFC 4868, May 2007.		with IPsec", RFC 4868, May 2007.
	11.2. Informative references		11.2. Informative references
	[I-D.ietf-hip-rfc4423-bis] Moskowitz, R., "Host Identity Protocol		[I-D.ietf-hip-rfc4423-bis] Moskowitz, R. and M. Komu, "Host Identity
	Architecture",		Protocol Architecture",
	draft-ietf-hip-rfc4423-bis-05 (work in		draft-ietf-hip-rfc4423-bis-06 (work in
	progress), September 2012.		progress), November 2013.
	[RFC0791] Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5,		[RFC0791] Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5,
	RFC 791, September 1981.		RFC 791, September 1981.
	[RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security		[RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security
	Architecture for the Internet Protocol",		Architecture for the Internet Protocol",
	RFC 4301, December 2005.		RFC 4301, December 2005.
	[RFC5206] Henderson, T., Ed., "End-Host Mobility		[RFC5206] Henderson, T., Ed., "End-Host Mobility
	and Multihoming with the Host Identity		and Multihoming with the Host Identity
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