draft-ietf-hip-rfc6253-bis-00.txt		draft-ietf-hip-rfc6253-bis-01.txt
	Host Identity Protocol Heer		Host Identity Protocol Heer
	Internet-Draft Hirschmann Automation and Control		Internet-Draft Hirschmann Automation and
	Updates: 5201 (if approved) Varjonen		Intended status: Standards Track Control
	Intended status: Standards Track University of Helsinki		Expires: April 7, 2014 Varjonen
	Expires: September 23, 2013 March 22, 2013		University of Helsinki
			October 4, 2013
	Host Identity Protocol Certificates		Host Identity Protocol Certificates
	draft-ietf-hip-rfc6253-bis-00		draft-ietf-hip-rfc6253-bis-01
	Abstract		Abstract
	The CERT parameter is a container for digital certificates. It is		The Certificate (CERT) parameter is a container for digital
	used for carrying these certificates in Host Identity Protocol (HIP)		certificates. It is used for carrying these certificates in Host
	control packets. This document specifies the certificate parameter		Identity Protocol (HIP) control packets. This document specifies the
	and the error signaling in case of a failed verification.		certificate parameter and the error signaling in case of a failed
	Additionally, this document specifies the representations of Host		verification. Additionally, this document specifies the
	Identity Tags in X.509 version 3 (v3) and SPKI certificates.		representations of Host Identity Tags in X.509 version 3 (v3) and
			Simple Public Key Infrastructure (SPKI) certificates.
	The concrete use of certificates including how certificates are		The concrete use cases of certificates, including how certificates
	obtained, requested, and which actions are taken upon successful or		are obtained, requested, and which actions are taken upon successful
	failed verification are specific to the scenario in which the		or failed verification, are specific to the scenario in which the
	certificates are used. Hence, the definition of these scenario-		certificates are used. Hence, the definition of these scenario-
	specific aspects are left to the documents that use the CERT		specific aspects is left to the documents that use the CERT
	parameter.		parameter.
	This document updates RFC 5201.		This document extends I-D.draft-ietf-hip-rfc5201-bis.
	Status of This Memo		Status of this Memo
	This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the		This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
	provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.		provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on September 23, 2013.		This Internet-Draft will expire on April 7, 2014.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect		carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
	skipping to change at page 2, line 34		skipping to change at page 2, line 34
	outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may		outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may
	not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format		not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format
	it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other		it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other
	than English.		than English.
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	Digital certificates bind pieces of information to a public key by		Digital certificates bind pieces of information to a public key by
	means of a digital signature, and thus, enable the holder of a		means of a digital signature, and thus, enable the holder of a
	private key to generate cryptographically verifiable statements. The		private key to generate cryptographically verifiable statements. The
	Host Identity Protocol (HIP) [RFC5201] defines a new cryptographic		Host Identity Protocol (HIP) [I-D.draft-ietf-hip-rfc5201-bis] defines
	namespace based on asymmetric cryptography. The identity of each		a new cryptographic namespace based on asymmetric cryptography. The
	host is derived from a public key, allowing hosts to digitally sign		identity of each host is derived from a public key, allowing hosts to
	data and issue certificates with their private key. This document		digitally sign data and issue certificates with their private key.
	specifies the CERT parameter, which is used to transmit digital		This document specifies the CERT parameter, which is used to transmit
	certificates in HIP. It fills the placeholder specified in		digital certificates in HIP. It fills the placeholder specified in
	Section 5.2 of [RFC5201], and thus, updates [RFC5201].		Section 5.2 of [I-D.draft-ietf-hip-rfc5201-bis], and thus, extends
			[I-D.draft-ietf-hip-rfc5201-bis].
	1.1. Requirements Language		1.1. Requirements Language
	The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",		The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
	"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and		"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
	"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC		"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC
	2119 [RFC2119].		2119 [RFC2119].
	2. CERT Parameter		2. CERT Parameter
	The CERT parameter is a container for certain types of digital		The CERT parameter is a container for certain types of digital
	certificates. It does not specify any certificate semantics.		certificates. It does not specify any certificate semantics.
	However, it defines supplementary parameters that help HIP hosts to		However, it defines supplementary parameters that help HIP hosts to
	transmit semantically grouped CERT parameters in a more systematic		transmit semantically grouped CERT parameters in a more systematic
	way. The specific use of the CERT parameter for different use cases		way. The specific use of the CERT parameter for different use cases
	is intentionally not discussed in this document because it is		is intentionally not discussed in this document. Hence, the use of
	specific to a concrete use case. Hence, the use of the CERT		the CERT parameter will be defined in the documents that use the CERT
	parameter will be defined in the documents that use the CERT
	parameter.		parameter.
	The CERT parameter is covered and protected, when present, by the HIP		The CERT parameter is covered and protected, when present, by the HIP
	SIGNATURE field and is a non-critical parameter.		SIGNATURE field and is a non-critical parameter.
	The CERT parameter can be used in all HIP packets. However, using it		The CERT parameter can be used in all HIP packets. However, using it
	in the first Initiator (I1) packet is NOT RECOMMENDED because it can		in the first Initiator (I1) packet is NOT RECOMMENDED because it can
	increase the processing times of I1s, which can be problematic when		increase the processing times of I1s, which can be problematic when
	processing storms of I1s. Each HIP control packet MAY contain		processing storms of I1s. Each HIP control packet MAY contain
	multiple CERT parameters. These parameters MAY be related or		multiple CERT parameters. These parameters MAY be related or
	skipping to change at page 4, line 23		skipping to change at page 4, line 27
	Type 768		Type 768
	Length Length in octets, excluding Type, Length, and Padding		Length Length in octets, excluding Type, Length, and Padding
	Cert group Group ID grouping multiple related CERT parameters		Cert group Group ID grouping multiple related CERT parameters
	Cert count Total count of certificates that are sent, possibly		Cert count Total count of certificates that are sent, possibly
	in several consecutive HIP control packets.		in several consecutive HIP control packets.
	Cert ID The sequence number for this certificate		Cert ID The sequence number for this certificate
	Cert Type Indicates the type of the certificate		Cert Type Indicates the type of the certificate
	Padding Any Padding, if necessary, to make the TLV a multiple		Padding Any Padding, if necessary, to make the TLV a multiple
	of 8 bytes.		of 8 bytes.
	The certificates MUST use the algorithms defined in [RFC5201] as the		The certificates MUST use the algorithms defined in
	signature and hash algorithms.		[I-D.draft-ietf-hip-rfc5201-bis] as the signature and hash
			algorithms.
	The following certificate types are defined:		The following certificate types are defined:
	+--------------------------------+-------------+		+--------------------------------+-------------+
	| Cert format | Type number |		| Cert format | Type number |
	+--------------------------------+-------------+		+--------------------------------+-------------+
	| Reserved | 0 |		| Reserved | 0 |
	| X.509 v3 | 1 |		| X.509 v3 | 1 |
	| SPKI | 2 |		| SPKI | 2 |
	| Hash and URL of X.509 v3 | 3 |		| Hash and URL of X.509 v3 | 3 |
	| Hash and URL of SPKI | 4 |		| Hash and URL of SPKI | 4 |
	| LDAP URL of X.509 v3 | 5 |		| LDAP URL of X.509 v3 | 5 |
	| LDAP URL of SPKI | 6 |		| LDAP URL of SPKI | 6 |
	| Distinguished Name of X.509 v3 | 7 |		| Distinguished Name of X.509 v3 | 7 |
	| Distinguished Name of SPKI | 8 |		| Distinguished Name of SPKI | 8 |
	+--------------------------------+-------------+		+--------------------------------+-------------+
	The next sections outline the use of Host Identity Tags (HITs) in		The next sections outline the use of Host Identity Tags (HITs) in
	X.509 v3 and in Simple Public Key Infrastructure (SPKI) certificates.		X.509 v3 and in Simple Public Key Infrastructure (SPKI) certificates.
	X.509 v3 certificates and the handling procedures are defined in		X.509 v3 certificates and the handling procedures are defined in
	[RFC5280]. The wire format for X.509 v3 is Distinguished Encoding		[RFC5280]. The wire format for X.509 v3 is the Distinguished
	Rules format as defined in [X.690]. The SPKI, the handling		Encoding Rules format as defined in [X.690]. The SPKI, the handling
	procedures, and the formats are defined in [RFC2693].		procedures, and the formats are defined in [RFC2693].
	Hash and Uniform Resource Locator (URL) encodings (3 and 4) are used		Hash and Uniform Resource Locator (URL) encodings (3 and 4) are used
	as defined in [RFC5996] Section 3.6. Using hash and URL encodings		as defined in Section 3.6 of [RFC5996]. Using hash and URL encodings
	results in smaller HIP control packets than by including the		results in smaller HIP control packets than by including the
	certificate(s), but requires the receiver to resolve the URL or check		certificate(s), but requires the receiver to resolve the URL or check
	a local cache against the hash.		a local cache against the hash.
	LDAP URL encodings (5 and 6) are used as defined in [RFC4516]. Using		Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) URL encodings (5 and 6)
	LDAP URL encoding results in smaller HIP control packets but requires		are used as defined in [RFC4516]. Using LDAP URL encoding results in
	the receiver to retrieve the certificate or check a local cache		smaller HIP control packets but requires the receiver to retrieve the
	against the URL.		certificate or check a local cache against the URL.
	Distinguished name (DN) encodings (7 and 8) are represented by the		Distinguished Name (DN) encodings (7 and 8) are represented by the
	string representation of the certificate's subject DN as defined in		string representation of the certificate's subject DN as defined in
	[RFC4514]. Using the DN encoding results in smaller HIP control		[RFC4514]. Using the DN encoding results in smaller HIP control
	packets, but requires the receiver to retrieve the certificate or		packets, but requires the receiver to retrieve the certificate or
	check a local cache against the DN.		check a local cache against the DN.
	3. X.509 v3 Certificate Object and Host Identities		3. X.509 v3 Certificate Object and Host Identities
	If needed, HITs can represent an issuer, a subject, or both in x.509		If needed, HITs can represent an issuer, a subject, or both in X.509
	v3. HITs are represented as IPv6 addresses as defined in [RFC4843].		v3. HITs are represented as IPv6 addresses as defined in [RFC4843].
	When Host Identifier ( HI ) is used to sign the certificate the		When the Host Identifier (HI) is used to sign the certificate, the
	respective HIT MUST be placed in to the Issuer Alternative Name (IAN)		respective HIT SHOULD be placed into the Issuer Alternative Name
	extension using the GeneralName form iPAddress as defined in		(IAN) extension using the GeneralName form iPAddress as defined in
	[RFC5280]. When the certificate is issued for a HIP host, identified		[RFC5280]. When the certificate is issued for a HIP host, identified
	by a HIT and HI, the respective HIT MUST be placed in to the Subject		by a HIT and HI, the respective HIT SHOULD be placed into the Subject
	Alternative Name (SAN) extension using the GeneralName form iPAddress		Alternative Name (SAN) extension using the GeneralName form
	and the full HI is presented as the subjects public key info as		iPAddress, and the full HI is presented as the subject's public key
	defined in [RFC5280].		info as defined in [RFC5280].
	The following examples illustrate how HITs are presented as issuer		The following examples illustrate how HITs are presented as issuer
	and subject in the X.509 v3 extension alternative names.		and subject in the X.509 v3 extension alternative names.
	Format of X509v3 extensions:		Format of X509v3 extensions:
	X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name:		X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name:
	IP Address:hit-of-issuer		IP Address:hit-of-issuer
	X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:		X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
	IP Address:hit-of-subject		IP Address:hit-of-subject
	Example X509v3 extensions:		Example X509v3 extensions:
	X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name:		X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name:
	IP Address:2001:14:6cf:fae7:bb79:bf78:7d64:c056		IP Address:2001:14:6cf:fae7:bb79:bf78:7d64:c056
	X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:		X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
	IP Address:2001:1C:5a14:26de:a07C:385b:de35:60e3		IP Address:2001:1C:5a14:26de:a07c:385b:de35:60e3
	Appendix B shows a full example X.509 v3 certificate with HIP		Appendix B shows a full example X.509 v3 certificate with HIP
	content.		content.
	As another example, consider a managed Public Key Infrastructure		As another example, consider a managed Public Key Infrastructure
	(PKI) environment in which the peers have certificates that are		(PKI) environment in which the peers have certificates that are
	anchored in (potentially different) managed trust chains. In this		anchored in (potentially different) managed trust chains. In this
	scenario, the certificates issued to HIP hosts are signed by		scenario, the certificates issued to HIP hosts are signed by
	intermediate Certification Authorities (CAs) up to a root CA. In		intermediate Certification Authorities (CAs) up to a root CA. In
	this example, the managed PKI environment is neither HIP aware, nor		this example, the managed PKI environment is neither HIP aware, nor
	can it be configured to compute HITs and include them in the		can it be configured to compute HITs and include them in the
	certificates.		certificates.
	When HIP communications are established, the HIP hosts not only need		When HIP communications are established, the HIP hosts not only need
	to send their identity certificates (or pointers to their		to send their identity certificates (or pointers to their
	certificates), but also the chain of intermediate CAs (or pointers to		certificates), but also the chain of intermediate CAs (or pointers to
	the CAs) up to the root CA, or to a CA that is trusted by the remote		the CAs) up to the root CA, or to a CA that is trusted by the remote
	peer. This chain of certificates MUST be sent in a Cert group as		peer. This chain of certificates SHOULD be sent in a Cert group as
	specified in Section 2. The HIP peers validate each other's		specified in Section 2. The HIP peers validate each other's
	certificates and compute peer HITs based on the certificate public		certificates and compute peer HITs based on the certificate public
	keys.		keys.
	4. SPKI Cert Object and Host Identities		4. SPKI Cert Object and Host Identities
	When using SPKI certificates to transmit information related to HIP		When using SPKI certificates to transmit information related to HIP
	hosts, HITs need to be enclosed within the certificates. HITs can		hosts, HITs need to be enclosed within the certificates. HITs can
	represent an issuer, a subject, or both. In the following we define		represent an issuer, a subject, or both. In the following, we define
	the representation of those identifiers for SPKI given as		the representation of those identifiers for SPKI given as
	S-expressions. Note that the S-expressions are only the human-		S-expressions. Note that the S-expressions are only the human-
	readable representation of SPKI certificates. Full HIs are presented		readable representation of SPKI certificates. Full HIs are presented
	in the public key sequences of SPKI certificates.		in the public key sequences of SPKI certificates.
	As an example the Host Identity Tag of a host is expressed as		As an example, the Host Identity Tag of a host is expressed as
	follows:		follows:
	Format: (hash hit hit-of-host)		Format: (hash hit hit-of-host)
	Example: (hash hit 2001:13:724d:f3c0:6ff0:33c2:15d8:5f50)		Example: (hash hit 2001:13:724d:f3c0:6ff0:33c2:15d8:5f50)
	Appendix A shows a full example SPKI certificate with HIP content.		Appendix A shows a full example of a SPKI certificate with HIP
			content.
	5. Revocation of Certificates		5. Revocation of Certificates
	Revocation of X.509 v3 certificates is handled as defined in		Revocation of X.509 v3 certificates is handled as defined in Section
	Section 5 of [RFC5280]. Revocation of SPKI certificates is handled		5 of [RFC5280]. Revocation of SPKI certificates is handled as
	as defined in Section 5 of [RFC2693].		defined in Section 5 of [RFC2693].
	6. Error signaling		6. Error Signaling
	If the Initiator does not send the certificate that the Responder		If the Initiator does not send the certificate that the Responder
	requires the Responder may take actions (e.g. reject the		requires, the Responder may take actions (e.g. reject the
	connection). The Responder MAY signal this to the Initiator by		connection). The Responder MAY signal this to the Initiator by
	sending a HIP NOTIFY message with NOTIFICATION parameter error type		sending a HIP NOTIFY message with NOTIFICATION parameter error type
	CREDENTIALS_REQUIRED.		CREDENTIALS_REQUIRED.
	If the verification of a certificate fails, a verifier MAY signal		If the verification of a certificate fails, a verifier MAY signal
	this to the provider of the certificate by sending a HIP NOTIFY		this to the provider of the certificate by sending a HIP NOTIFY
	message with NOTIFICATION parameter error type INVALID_CERTIFICATE.		message with NOTIFICATION parameter error type INVALID_CERTIFICATE.
	NOTIFICATION PARAMETER - ERROR TYPES Value		NOTIFICATION PARAMETER - ERROR TYPES Value
	------------------------------------ -----		------------------------------------ -----
	CREDENTIALS_REQUIRED 48		CREDENTIALS_REQUIRED 48
	The Responder is unwilling to set up an association		The Responder is unwilling to set up an association,
	as the Initiator did not send the needed credentials.		as the Initiator did not send the needed credentials.
	INVALID_CERTIFICATE 50		INVALID_CERTIFICATE 50
	Sent in response to a failed verification of a certificate.		Sent in response to a failed verification of a certificate.
	Notification Data MAY contain n groups of 2 octets (n calculated		Notification Data MAY contain n groups of 2 octets (n calculated
	from the NOTIFICATION parameter length), in order Cert group and		from the NOTIFICATION parameter length), in order Cert group and
	Cert ID of the certificate parameter that caused the failure.		Cert ID of the CERT parameter that caused the failure.
	7. IANA Considerations		7. IANA Considerations
	This document defines the CERT parameter for the Host Identity		This document defines the CERT parameter for the Host Identity
	Protocol [RFC5201]. This parameter is defined in Section 2 with type		Protocol [I-D.draft-ietf-hip-rfc5201-bis]. This parameter is defined
	768. The parameter type number is also defined in [RFC5201].		in Section 2 with type 768. The parameter type number is also
			defined in [I-D.draft-ietf-hip-rfc5201-bis].
	The CERT parameter has 8-bit unsigned integer field for different		The CERT parameter has an 8-bit unsigned integer field for different
	certificate types, for which IANA is to create and maintain a new		certificate types, for which IANA is to create and maintain a new
	sub-registry entitled "HIP certificate types" under the "Host		sub-registry entitled "HIP certificate types" under the "Host
	Identity Protocol (HIP) Parameters". Initial values for the		Identity Protocol (HIP) Parameters". Initial values for the
	Certificate type registry are given in Section 2. New values for the		Certificate type registry are given in Section 2. New values for the
	Certificate types from the unassigned space are assigned through IETF		Certificate types from the unassigned space are assigned through IETF
	Review.		Review.
	In Section 6 this document defines two new types for "NOTIFY message		In Section 6, this document defines two new types for the "NOTIFY
	types" sub-registry under "Host Identity Protocol (HIP) Parameters".		message types" sub-registry under "Host Identity Protocol (HIP)
			Parameters".
	8. Security Considerations		8. Security Considerations
	Certificate grouping allows the certificates to be sent in multiple		Certificate grouping allows the certificates to be sent in multiple
	consecutive packets. This might allow similar attacks as IP-layer		consecutive packets. This might allow similar attacks, as IP-layer
	fragmentation allows, for example sending of fragments in wrong order		fragmentation allows, for example, the sending of fragments in the
	and skipping some fragments to delay or stall packet processing by		wrong order and skipping some fragments to delay or stall packet
	the victim in order to use resources (e.g. CPU or memory). Hence,		processing by the victim in order to use resources (e.g., CPU or
	hosts SHOULD implement mechanisms to discard certificate groups with		memory). Hence, hosts SHOULD implement mechanisms to discard
	outstanding certificates if state space is scarce.		certificate groups with outstanding certificates if state space is
			scarce.
	Checking of the URL and LDAP entries might allow DoS attacks, where		Checking of the URL and LDAP entries might allow denial-of-service
	the target host may be subjected to bogus work.		(DoS) attacks, where the target host may be subjected to bogus work.
	Security considerations for SPKI certificates are discussed in		Security considerations for SPKI certificates are discussed in
	[RFC2693] and for X.509 v3 in [RFC5280]		[RFC2693] and for X.509 v3 in [RFC5280].
	9. Acknowledgements		9. Acknowledgements
	The authors would like to thank A. Keranen, D. Mattes, M. Komu and		The authors would like to thank A. Keranen, D. Mattes, M. Komu and T.
	T. Henderson for the fruitful conversations on the subject. D.		Henderson for the fruitful conversations on the subject. D. Mattes
	Mattes most notably contributed the non-HIP aware use case in		most notably contributed the non-HIP aware use case in Section 3.
	Section 3.
	10. Normative References		10. Normative References
			[I-D.draft-ietf-hip-rfc5201-bis]
			Moskowitz, R., Heer, T., Jokela, P., and T. Henderson,
			"Host Identity Protocol Version 2 (HIPv2)",
			<draft-ietf-hip-rfc5201-bis-13>.
	[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate		[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
	Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.		Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
	[RFC2693] Ellison, C., Frantz, B., Lampson, B., Rivest, R., Thomas,		[RFC2693] Ellison, C., Frantz, B., Lampson, B., Rivest, R., Thomas,
	B., and T. Ylonen, "SPKI Certificate Theory", RFC 2693,		B., and T. Ylonen, "SPKI Certificate Theory", RFC 2693,
	September 1999.		September 1999.
	[RFC4514] Zeilenga, K., "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol		[RFC4514] Zeilenga, K., "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
	(LDAP): String Representation of Distinguished Names", RFC		(LDAP): String Representation of Distinguished Names",
	4514, June 2006.		RFC 4514, June 2006.
	[RFC4516] Smith, M. and T. Howes, "Lightweight Directory Access		[RFC4516] Smith, M. and T. Howes, "Lightweight Directory Access
	Protocol (LDAP): Uniform Resource Locator", RFC 4516, June		Protocol (LDAP): Uniform Resource Locator", RFC 4516,
	2006.		June 2006.
	[RFC4843] Nikander, P., Laganier, J., and F. Dupont, "An IPv6 Prefix		[RFC4843] Nikander, P., Laganier, J., and F. Dupont, "An IPv6 Prefix
	for Overlay Routable Cryptographic Hash Identifiers		for Overlay Routable Cryptographic Hash Identifiers
	(ORCHID)", RFC 4843, April 2007.		(ORCHID)", RFC 4843, April 2007.
	[RFC5201] Moskowitz, R., Nikander, P., Jokela, P., and T. Henderson,
	"Host Identity Protocol", RFC 5201, April 2008.
	[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,		[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
	Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key		Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
	Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List		Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
	(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.		(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
	[RFC5996] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., and P. Eronen,		[RFC5996] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., and P. Eronen,
	"Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)", RFC		"Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)",
	5996, September 2010.		RFC 5996, September 2010.
	[X.690] ITU-T, , "Recommendation X.690 (2002) | ISO/IEC		[X.690] ITU-T, "Recommendation X.690 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8825-1:2002,
	8825-1:2002, Information Technology - ASN.1 encoding		Information Technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
	rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),		Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical
	Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding		Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules
	Rules (DER)", July 2002.		(DER)", July 2002.
	Appendix A. SPKI certificate example		Appendix A. SPKI certificate example
	This section shows a SPKI certificate with encoded HITs. The example		This section shows an SPKI certificate with encoded HITs. The
	has been indented for readability.		example has been indented for readability.
	(sequence		(sequence
	(public_key		(public_key
	(rsa-pkcs1-sha1		(rsa-pkcs1-sha1
	(e #010001#)		(e #010001#)
	(n |yDwznOwX0w+zvQbpWoTnfWrUPLKW2NFrpXbsIcH/QBSLb		(n |yDwznOwX0w+zvQbpWoTnfWrUPLKW2NFrpXbsIcH/QBSLb
	k1RKTZhLasFwvtSHAjqh220W8gRiQAGIqKplyrDEqSrJp		k1RKTZhLasFwvtSHAjqh220W8gRiQAGIqKplyrDEqSrJp
	OdIsHIQ8BQhJAyILWA1Sa6f5wAnWozDfgdXoKLNdT8ZNB		OdIsHIQ8BQhJAyILWA1Sa6f5wAnWozDfgdXoKLNdT8ZNB
	mzluPiw4ozc78p6MHElH75Hm3yHaWxT+s83M=|		mzluPiw4ozc78p6MHElH75Hm3yHaWxT+s83M=|
	)		)
	skipping to change at page 10, line 4		skipping to change at page 10, line 33
	(not-before "2011-01-12_13:43:09")		(not-before "2011-01-12_13:43:09")
	(not-after "2011-01-22_13:43:09")		(not-after "2011-01-22_13:43:09")
	)		)
	(signature		(signature
	(hash sha1 |h5fC8HUMATTtK0cjYqIgeN3HCIMA|)		(hash sha1 |h5fC8HUMATTtK0cjYqIgeN3HCIMA|)
	|u8NTRutINI/AeeZgN6bngjvjYPtVahvY7MhGfenTpT7MCgBy		|u8NTRutINI/AeeZgN6bngjvjYPtVahvY7MhGfenTpT7MCgBy
	NoZglqH5Cy2vH6LrQFYWx0MjWoYwHKimEuBKCNd4TK6hrCyAI		NoZglqH5Cy2vH6LrQFYWx0MjWoYwHKimEuBKCNd4TK6hrCyAI
	CIDJAZ70TyKXgONwDNWPOmcc3lFmsih8ezkoBseFWHqRGISIm		CIDJAZ70TyKXgONwDNWPOmcc3lFmsih8ezkoBseFWHqRGISIm
	MLdeaMciP4lVfxPY2AQKdMrBc=|		MLdeaMciP4lVfxPY2AQKdMrBc=|
	)		)
	)		)
	Appendix B. X.509.v3 certificate example		Appendix B. X.509 v3 certificate example
	This section shows a X.509 v3 certificate with encoded HITs.		This section shows a X.509 v3 certificate with encoded HITs.
	Certificate:		Certificate:
	Data:		Data:
	Version: 3 (0x2)		Version: 3 (0x2)
	Serial Number: 0 (0x0)		Serial Number: 0 (0x0)
	Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption		Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption
	Issuer: CN=Example issuing host, DC=example, DC=com		Issuer: CN=Example issuing host, DC=example, DC=com
	Validity		Validity
	skipping to change at page 10, line 37		skipping to change at page 11, line 31
	fa:98:87:0d:22:ab:d8:6a:61:74:a9:ee:0b:ae:cd:		fa:98:87:0d:22:ab:d8:6a:61:74:a9:ee:0b:ae:cd:
	18:6f:05:ab:69:66:42:46:00:a2:c0:0c:3a:28:67:		18:6f:05:ab:69:66:42:46:00:a2:c0:0c:3a:28:67:
	09:cc:52:27:da:79:3e:67:d7:d8:d0:7c:f1:a1:26:		09:cc:52:27:da:79:3e:67:d7:d8:d0:7c:f1:a1:26:
	fa:38:8f:73:f5:b0:20:c6:f2:0b:7d:77:43:aa:c7:		fa:38:8f:73:f5:b0:20:c6:f2:0b:7d:77:43:aa:c7:
	98:91:7e:1e:04:31:0d:ca:94:55:20:c4:4f:ba:b1:		98:91:7e:1e:04:31:0d:ca:94:55:20:c4:4f:ba:b1:
	df:d4:61:9d:dd:b9:b5:47:94:6c:06:91:69:30:42:		df:d4:61:9d:dd:b9:b5:47:94:6c:06:91:69:30:42:
	9c:0a:8b:e3:00:ce:49:ab:e3		9c:0a:8b:e3:00:ce:49:ab:e3
	Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)		Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
	X509v3 extensions:		X509v3 extensions:
	X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name:		X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name:
	IP Address:2001:13:8D83:41C5:DC9F:38ED:E742:7281		IP Address:2001:13:8d83:41c5:dc9f:38ed:e742:7281
	X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:		X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
	IP Address:2001:1C:6E02:D3E0:9B90:8417:673E:99DB		IP Address:2001:1c:6e02:d3e0:9b90:8417:673e:99db
	Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption		Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption
	83:68:b4:38:63:a6:ae:57:68:e2:4d:73:5d:8f:11:e4:ba:30:		83:68:b4:38:63:a6:ae:57:68:e2:4d:73:5d:8f:11:e4:ba:30:
	a0:19:ca:86:22:e9:6b:e9:36:96:af:95:bd:e8:02:b9:72:2f:		a0:19:ca:86:22:e9:6b:e9:36:96:af:95:bd:e8:02:b9:72:2f:
	30:a2:62:ac:b2:fa:3d:25:c5:24:fd:8d:32:aa:01:4f:a5:8a:		30:a2:62:ac:b2:fa:3d:25:c5:24:fd:8d:32:aa:01:4f:a5:8a:
	f5:06:52:56:0a:86:55:39:2b:ee:7a:7b:46:14:d7:5d:15:82:		f5:06:52:56:0a:86:55:39:2b:ee:7a:7b:46:14:d7:5d:15:82:
	4d:74:06:ca:b7:8c:54:c1:6b:33:7f:77:82:d8:95:e1:05:ca:		4d:74:06:ca:b7:8c:54:c1:6b:33:7f:77:82:d8:95:e1:05:ca:
	e2:0d:22:1d:86:fc:1c:c4:a4:cf:c6:bc:ab:ec:b8:2a:1e:4b:		e2:0d:22:1d:86:fc:1c:c4:a4:cf:c6:bc:ab:ec:b8:2a:1e:4b:
	04:7e:49:9c:8f:9d:98:58:9c:63:c5:97:b5:41:94:f7:ef:93:		04:7e:49:9c:8f:9d:98:58:9c:63:c5:97:b5:41:94:f7:ef:93:
	57:29		57:29
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