draft-ietf-hip-rfc6253-bis-09.txt		rfc8002.txt
	Host Identity Protocol T. Heer		Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) T. Heer
	Internet-Draft Albstadt-Sigmaringen University		Request for Comments: 8002 Albstadt-Sigmaringen University
	Obsoletes: 6253 (if approved) S. Varjonen		Obsoletes: 6253 S. Varjonen
	Updates: 7401 (if approved) University of Helsinki		Updates: 7401 University of Helsinki
	Intended status: Standards Track July 6, 2016		Category: Standards Track October 2016
	Expires: January 7, 2017		ISSN: 2070-1721
	Host Identity Protocol Certificates		Host Identity Protocol Certificates
	draft-ietf-hip-rfc6253-bis-09
	Abstract		Abstract
	The Certificate (CERT) parameter is a container for digital		The Certificate (CERT) parameter is a container for digital
	certificates. It is used for carrying these certificates in Host		certificates. It is used for carrying these certificates in Host
	Identity Protocol (HIP) control packets. This document specifies the		Identity Protocol (HIP) control packets. This document specifies the
	certificate parameter and the error signaling in case of a failed		certificate parameter and the error signaling in case of a failed
	verification. Additionally, this document specifies the		verification. Additionally, this document specifies the
	representations of Host Identity Tags in X.509 version 3 (v3).		representations of Host Identity Tags (HITs) in X.509 version 3 (v3).
	The concrete use cases of certificates, including how certificates		The concrete use cases of certificates, including how certificates
	are obtained, requested, and which actions are taken upon successful		are obtained and requested and which actions are taken upon
	or failed verification, are specific to the scenario in which the		successful or failed verification, are specific to the scenario in
	certificates are used. Hence, the definition of these scenario-		which the certificates are used. Hence, the definition of these
	specific aspects is left to the documents that use the CERT		scenario-specific aspects is left to the documents that use the CERT
	parameter.		parameter.
	This document updates RFC7401 and obsoletes RFC6253.		This document updates RFC 7401 and obsoletes RFC 6253.
	Status of This Memo		Status of This Memo
	This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the		This is an Internet Standards Track document.
	provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		received public review and has been approved for publication by the
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
			Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
	This Internet-Draft will expire on January 7, 2017.		Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
			and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
			http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8002.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect		carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
	to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must		to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
	include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of		include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
	skipping to change at page 2, line 17 ¶		skipping to change at page 2, line 20 ¶
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect		carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
	to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must		to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
	include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of		include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
	the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as		the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
	described in the Simplified BSD License.		described in the Simplified BSD License.
			Table of Contents
			1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
			1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
			2. CERT Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
			3. X.509 v3 Certificate Object and Host Identities . . . . . . . 5
			4. Revocation of Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
			5. Error Signaling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
			6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
			7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
			8. Differences from RFC 6253 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
			9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
			9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
			9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
			Appendix A. X.509 v3 Certificate Example . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
			Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
			Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	Digital certificates bind pieces of information to a public key by		Digital certificates bind pieces of information to a public key by
	means of a digital signature, and thus, enable the holder of a		means of a digital signature and thus enable the holder of a private
	private key to generate cryptographically verifiable statements. The		key to generate cryptographically verifiable statements. The Host
	Host Identity Protocol (HIP) [RFC7401] defines a new cryptographic		Identity Protocol (HIP) [RFC7401] defines a new cryptographic
	namespace based on asymmetric cryptography. The identity of each		namespace based on asymmetric cryptography. The identity of each
	host is derived from a public key, allowing hosts to digitally sign		host is derived from a public key, allowing hosts to digitally sign
	data and issue certificates with their private key. This document		data and issue certificates with their private key. This document
	specifies the CERT parameter, which is used to transmit digital		specifies the CERT parameter, which is used to transmit digital
	certificates in HIP. It fills the placeholder specified in		certificates in HIP. It fills the placeholder specified in
	Section 5.2 of [RFC7401], and thus, updates [RFC7401].		Section 5.2 of [RFC7401] and thus updates [RFC7401].
	1.1. Requirements Language		1.1. Requirements Language
	The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",		The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
	"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and		"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
	"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC		"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
	2119 [RFC2119].		RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
	2. CERT Parameter		2. CERT Parameter
	The CERT parameter is a container for certain types of digital		The CERT parameter is a container for certain types of digital
	certificates. It does not specify any certificate semantics.		certificates. It does not specify any certificate semantics.
	However, it defines supplementary parameters that help HIP hosts to		However, it defines supplementary parameters that help HIP hosts to
	transmit semantically grouped CERT parameters in a more systematic		transmit semantically grouped CERT parameters in a more systematic
	way. The specific use of the CERT parameter for different use cases		way. The specific use of the CERT parameter for different use cases
	is intentionally not discussed in this document. Hence, the use of		is intentionally not discussed in this document. Hence, the use of
	the CERT parameter will be defined in the documents that use the CERT		the CERT parameter will be defined in the documents that use the CERT
	parameter.		parameter.
	The CERT parameter is covered and protected, when present, by the HIP		The CERT parameter is covered and protected, when present, by the HIP
	SIGNATURE field and is a non-critical parameter.		SIGNATURE field and is a non-critical parameter.
	The CERT parameter can be used in all HIP packets. However, using it		The CERT parameter can be used in all HIP packets. However, using it
	in the first Initiator (I1) packet is NOT RECOMMENDED because it can		in the first Initiator (I1) packet is NOT RECOMMENDED because it can
	increase the processing times of I1s, which can be problematic when		increase the processing times of I1s, which can be problematic when
	processing storms of I1s. Each HIP control packet MAY contain		processing storms of I1s. Each HIP control packet MAY contain
	multiple CERT parameters each carrying one certificate. These		multiple CERT parameters, each carrying one certificate. These
	parameters MAY be related or unrelated. Related certificates are		parameters MAY be related or unrelated. Related certificates are
	managed in CERT groups. A CERT group specifies a group of related		managed in CERT groups. A CERT group specifies a group of related
	CERT parameters that SHOULD be interpreted in a certain order (e.g.,		CERT parameters that SHOULD be interpreted in a certain order (e.g.,
	for expressing certificate chains). Ungrouped certificates exhibit a		for expressing certificate chains). Ungrouped certificates exhibit a
	unique CERT group field and set the CERT count to 1. CERT parameters		unique CERT group field and set the CERT count to 1. CERT parameters
	with the same group number in the CERT group field indicate a logical		with the same group number in the CERT group field indicate a logical
	grouping. The CERT count field indicates the number of CERT		grouping. The CERT count field indicates the number of CERT
	parameters in the group.		parameters in the group.
	CERT parameters that belong to the same CERT group MAY be contained		CERT parameters that belong to the same CERT group MAY be contained
	skipping to change at page 3, line 33 ¶		skipping to change at page 4, line 19 ¶
	be placed in ascending order, within a HIP control packet, according		be placed in ascending order, within a HIP control packet, according
	to their CERT group field. CERT groups MAY only span multiple		to their CERT group field. CERT groups MAY only span multiple
	packets if the CERT group does not fit the packet. A HIP packet MUST		packets if the CERT group does not fit the packet. A HIP packet MUST
	NOT contain more than one incomplete CERT group that continues in the		NOT contain more than one incomplete CERT group that continues in the
	next HIP control packet.		next HIP control packet.
	The CERT ID acts as a sequence number to identify the certificates in		The CERT ID acts as a sequence number to identify the certificates in
	a CERT group. The numbers in the CERT ID field MUST start from 1 up		a CERT group. The numbers in the CERT ID field MUST start from 1 up
	to CERT count.		to CERT count.
	The CERT Group and CERT ID namespaces are managed locally by each		The CERT group and CERT ID namespaces are managed locally by each
	host that sends CERT parameters in HIP control packets.		host that sends CERT parameters in HIP control packets.
	0 1 2 3		0 1 2 3
	0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1		0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	| Type | Length |		| Type | Length |
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	| CERT group | CERT count | CERT ID | CERT type |		| CERT group | CERT count | CERT ID | CERT type |
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	| Certificate /		| Certificate /
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	/ | Padding (variable length) |		/ | Padding (variable length) |
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	Type 768		Type 768
	Length Length in octets, excluding Type, Length, and Padding		Length Length in octets, excluding Type, Length, and
	CERT group Group ID grouping multiple related CERT parameters		Padding.
			CERT group Group ID grouping multiple related CERT parameters.
	CERT count Total count of certificates that are sent, possibly		CERT count Total count of certificates that are sent, possibly
	in several consecutive HIP control packets.		in several consecutive HIP control packets.
			CERT ID The sequence number for this certificate.
	CERT ID The sequence number for this certificate		CERT Type Indicates the type of the certificate.
	CERT Type Indicates the type of the certificate
	Padding Any Padding, if necessary, to make the TLV a multiple		Padding Any Padding, if necessary, to make the TLV a multiple
	of 8 bytes. Any added padding bytes MUST be zeroed by		of 8 bytes. Any added padding bytes MUST be zeroed
	the sender, and their values SHOULD NOT be checked by		by the sender, and their values SHOULD NOT be checked
	the receiver.		by the receiver.
	The certificates MUST use the algorithms defined in [RFC7401] as the		The certificates MUST use the algorithms defined in [RFC7401] as the
	signature and hash algorithms.		signature and hash algorithms.
	The following certificate types are defined:		The following certificate types are defined:
	+--------------------------------+-------------+		+--------------------------------+-------------+
	| CERT format | Type number |		| CERT format | Type number |
	+--------------------------------+-------------+		+--------------------------------+-------------+
	| Reserved | 0 |		| Reserved | 0 |
	| X.509 v3 | 1 |		| X.509 v3 | 1 |
	| Obsoleted | 2 |		| Obsoleted | 2 |
	| Hash and URL of X.509 v3 | 3 |		| Hash and URL of X.509 v3 | 3 |
	| Obsoleted | 4 |		| Obsoleted | 4 |
	| LDAP URL of X.509 v3 | 5 |		| LDAP URL of X.509 v3 | 5 |
	| Obsoleted | 6 |		| Obsoleted | 6 |
	| Distinguished Name of X.509 v3 | 7 |		| Distinguished Name of X.509 v3 | 7 |
	| Obsoleted | 8 |		| Obsoleted | 8 |
	+--------------------------------+-------------+		+--------------------------------+-------------+
	The next sections outline the use of Host Identity Tags (HITs) in		The next sections outline the use of HITs in X.509 v3. X.509 v3
	X.509 v3. X.509 v3 certificates and the handling procedures are		certificates and the handling procedures are defined in [RFC5280].
	defined in [RFC5280]. The wire format for X.509 v3 is the		The wire format for X.509 v3 is the Distinguished Encoding Rules
	Distinguished Encoding Rules format as defined in [X.690].		format as defined in [X.690].
	Hash and Uniform Resource Locator (URL) encoding (3) is used as		Hash and Uniform Resource Locator (URL) encoding (3) is used as
	defined in Section 3.6 of [RFC7296]. Using hash and URL encodings		defined in Section 3.6 of [RFC7296]. Using hash and URL encodings
	results in smaller HIP control packets than by including the		result in smaller HIP control packets than by including the
	certificate(s), but requires the receiver to resolve the URL or check		certificate(s) but requires the receiver to resolve the URL or check
	a local cache against the hash.		a local cache against the hash.
	Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) URL encoding (5) is used		Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) URL encoding (5) is used
	as defined in [RFC4516]. Using LDAP URL encoding results in smaller		as defined in [RFC4516]. Using LDAP URL encoding results in smaller
	HIP control packets but requires the receiver to retrieve the		HIP control packets but requires the receiver to retrieve the
	certificate or check a local cache against the URL.		certificate or check a local cache against the URL.
	Distinguished Name (DN) encoding (7) is represented by the string		Distinguished Name (DN) encoding (7) is represented by the string
	representation of the certificate's subject DN as defined in		representation of the certificate's subject DN as defined in
	[RFC4514]. Using the DN encoding results in smaller HIP control		[RFC4514]. Using the DN encoding results in smaller HIP control
	packets, but requires the receiver to retrieve the certificate or		packets but requires the receiver to retrieve the certificate or
	check a local cache against the DN.		check a local cache against the DN.
	3. X.509 v3 Certificate Object and Host Identities		3. X.509 v3 Certificate Object and Host Identities
	If needed, HITs can represent an issuer, a subject, or both in X.509		If needed, HITs can represent an issuer, a subject, or both in X.509
	v3. HITs are represented as IPv6 addresses as defined in [RFC7343].		v3. HITs are represented as IPv6 addresses as defined in [RFC7343].
	When the Host Identifier (HI) is used to sign the certificate, the		When the Host Identifier (HI) is used to sign the certificate, the
	respective HIT SHOULD be placed into the Issuer Alternative Name		respective HIT SHOULD be placed into the Issuer Alternative Name
	(IAN) extension using the GeneralName form iPAddress as defined in		(IAN) extension using the GeneralName form iPAddress as defined in
	[RFC5280]. When the certificate is issued for a HIP host, identified		[RFC5280]. When the certificate is issued for a HIP host, identified
	by a HIT and HI, the respective HIT SHOULD be placed into the Subject		by a HIT and an HI, the respective HIT SHOULD be placed into the
	Alternative Name (SAN) extension using the GeneralName form		Subject Alternative Name (SAN) extension using the GeneralName form
	iPAddress, and the full HI is presented as the subject's public key		iPAddress, and the full HI is presented as the subject's public key
	info as defined in [RFC5280].		info as defined in [RFC5280].
	The following examples illustrate how HITs are presented as issuer		The following examples illustrate how HITs are presented as the
	and subject in the X.509 v3 extension alternative names.		issuer and subject in the X.509 v3 extension alternative names.
	Format of X509v3 extensions:		Format of X509v3 extensions:
	X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name:		X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name:
	IP Address:hit-of-issuer		IP Address:hit-of-issuer
	X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:		X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
	IP Address:hit-of-subject		IP Address:hit-of-subject
	Example X509v3 extensions:		Example X509v3 extensions:
	X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name:		X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name:
	IP Address:2001:24:6cf:fae7:bb79:bf78:7d64:c056		IP Address:2001:24:6cf:fae7:bb79:bf78:7d64:c056
	skipping to change at page 5, line 41 ¶		skipping to change at page 6, line 31 ¶
	IP Address:2001:2c:5a14:26de:a07c:385b:de35:60e3		IP Address:2001:2c:5a14:26de:a07c:385b:de35:60e3
	Appendix A shows a full example X.509 v3 certificate with HIP		Appendix A shows a full example X.509 v3 certificate with HIP
	content.		content.
	As another example, consider a managed Public Key Infrastructure		As another example, consider a managed Public Key Infrastructure
	(PKI) environment in which the peers have certificates that are		(PKI) environment in which the peers have certificates that are
	anchored in (potentially different) managed trust chains. In this		anchored in (potentially different) managed trust chains. In this
	scenario, the certificates issued to HIP hosts are signed by		scenario, the certificates issued to HIP hosts are signed by
	intermediate Certification Authorities (CAs) up to a root CA. In		intermediate Certification Authorities (CAs) up to a root CA. In
	this example, the managed PKI environment is neither HIP aware, nor		this example, the managed PKI environment is neither HIP aware nor
	can it be configured to compute HITs and include them in the		can it be configured to compute HITs and include them in the
	certificates.		certificates.
	When HIP communications are established, the HIP hosts not only need		When HIP communications are established, the HIP hosts not only need
	to send their identity certificates (or pointers to their		to send their identity certificates (or pointers to their
	certificates), but also the chain of intermediate CAs (or pointers to		certificates) but also the chain of intermediate CAs (or pointers to
	the CAs) up to the root CA, or to a CA that is trusted by the remote		the CAs) up to the root CA, or to a CA that is trusted by the remote
	peer. This chain of certificates SHOULD be sent in a CERT group as		peer. This chain of certificates SHOULD be sent in a CERT group as
	specified in Section 2. The HIP peers validate each other's		specified in Section 2. The HIP peers validate each other's
	certificates and compute peer HITs based on the certificate public		certificates and compute peer HITs based on the certificate public
	keys.		keys.
	4. Revocation of Certificates		4. Revocation of Certificates
	Revocation of X.509 v3 certificates is handled as defined in		Revocation of X.509 v3 certificates is handled as defined in
	Section 5 of [RFC5280] with two exceptions. First, any HIP		Section 5 of [RFC5280] with two exceptions. First, any HIP
	certificate serial number that appears on the CRL is treated as		certificate serial number that appears on the Certificate Revocation
	invalid regardless of the reason code. Second, the certificateHold		List (CRL) is treated as invalid regardless of the reason code.
	is not supported.		Second, the certificateHold is not supported.
	5. Error Signaling		5. Error Signaling
	If the Initiator does not send all the certificates that the		If the Initiator does not send all the certificates that the
	Responder requires, the Responder may take actions (e.g. reject the		Responder requires, the Responder may take actions (e.g., reject the
	connection). The Responder MAY signal this to the Initiator by		connection). The Responder MAY signal this to the Initiator by
	sending a HIP NOTIFY message with NOTIFICATION parameter error type		sending a HIP NOTIFY message with NOTIFICATION parameter error type
	CREDENTIALS_REQUIRED.		CREDENTIALS_REQUIRED.
	If the verification of a certificate fails, a verifier MAY signal		If the verification of a certificate fails, a verifier MAY signal
	this to the provider of the certificate by sending a HIP NOTIFY		this to the provider of the certificate by sending a HIP NOTIFY
	message with NOTIFICATION parameter error type INVALID_CERTIFICATE.		message with NOTIFICATION parameter error type INVALID_CERTIFICATE.
	NOTIFICATION PARAMETER - ERROR TYPES Value		NOTIFICATION PARAMETER - ERROR TYPES Value
	------------------------------------ -----		------------------------------------ -----
	CREDENTIALS_REQUIRED 48		CREDENTIALS_REQUIRED 48
	The Responder is unwilling to set up an association,		The Responder is unwilling to set up an association,
	as the Initiator did not send the needed credentials.		as the Initiator did not send the needed credentials.
	INVALID_CERTIFICATE 50		INVALID_CERTIFICATE 50
	Sent in response to a failed verification of a certificate.		Sent in response to a failed verification of a certificate.
	Notification Data MAY contain CERT group and CERT ID octet		Notification Data MAY contain a CERT group and CERT ID octet
	(in this order) of the CERT parameter that caused the		(in this order) of the CERT parameter that caused the
	failure.		failure.
	6. IANA Considerations		6. IANA Considerations
	This document defines the CERT parameter for the Host Identity		This document defines the CERT parameter for HIP [RFC7401]. The CERT
	Protocol [RFC7401]. The CERT parameter type number (768) is defined		parameter type number (768) is defined in [RFC7401].
	in [RFC7401].
	The CERT parameter has an 8-bit unsigned integer field for different		The CERT parameter has an 8-bit unsigned integer field for different
	certificate types, for which IANA has created and maintains a sub-		certificate types, for which IANA has created and maintains a
	registry entitled "HIP certificate types" under the "Host Identity		subregistry entitled "HIP Certificate Types" under "Host Identity
	Protocol (HIP) Parameters". Values for the Certificate type registry		Protocol (HIP) Parameters". Values for the "HIP Certificate Types"
	are given in Section 2. New values for the Certificate types from		registry are given in Section 2. New values for the Certificate
	the unassigned space are assigned through IETF Review.		types from the unassigned space are assigned through IETF Review.
	In Section 5, this document defines two types for the "NOTIFY message		In Section 5, this document defines two types for the "NOTIFY Message
	types" sub-registry under "Host Identity Protocol (HIP) Parameters".		Types" subregistry under "Host Identity Protocol (HIP) Parameters".
	As this document obsoletes [RFC6253], references to [RFC6253] in IANA		As this document obsoletes [RFC6253], references to [RFC6253] in IANA
	registries must be replaced by references to this document. This		registries have been replaced by references to this document. This
	document changes Certificate type registry in Section 2.		document changes the "HIP Certificate Types" registry in Section 2.
	The following updates to the "HIP Certificate Types" registry must be		The following updates to the "HIP Certificate Types" registry have
	made.		been made.
	The references must be updated from [RFC6253] to this document.		The references have been updated from [RFC6253] to this document.
	This document obsoleted the type numbers "2", "4", "6", "8" for		This document obsoleted the type numbers "2", "4", "6", and "8"
	the SPKI certificates.		for the Simple Public Key Infrastructure (SPKI) certificates.
	7. Security Considerations		7. Security Considerations
	Certificate grouping allows the certificates to be sent in multiple		Certificate grouping allows the certificates to be sent in multiple
	consecutive packets. This might allow similar attacks, as IP-layer		consecutive packets. This might allow similar attacks, as IP-layer
	fragmentation allows, for example, the sending of fragments in the		fragmentation allows, for example, the sending of fragments in the
	wrong order and skipping some fragments to delay or stall packet		wrong order and skipping some fragments to delay or stall packet
	processing by the victim in order to use resources (e.g., CPU or		processing by the victim in order to use resources (e.g., CPU or
	memory). Hence, hosts SHOULD implement mechanisms to discard		memory). Hence, hosts SHOULD implement mechanisms to discard
	certificate groups with outstanding certificates if state space is		certificate groups with outstanding certificates if state space is
	scarce.		scarce.
	Although, CERT parameter is allowed in the first Initiator (I1)		Although the CERT parameter is allowed in the I1 packet, it is NOT
	packet it is NOT RECOMMENDED because it can increase the processing		RECOMMENDED because it can increase the processing times of I1s,
	times of I1s, which can be problematic when processing storms of I1s.		which can be problematic when processing storms of I1s. Furthermore,
	Furthermore, Initiator has to take into consideration that the		the Initiator has to take into consideration that the Responder can
	Responder can drop the CERT parameter in I1 without processing the		drop the CERT parameter in I1 without processing the parameter.
	parameter.
	Checking of the URL and LDAP entries might allow denial-of-service		Checking of the URL and LDAP entries might allow denial-of-service
	(DoS) attacks, where the target host may be subjected to bogus work.		(DoS) attacks, where the target host may be subjected to bogus work.
	Security considerations for X.509 v3 are discussed in [RFC5280].		Security considerations for X.509 v3 are discussed in [RFC5280].
	8. Differences from RFC 6253		8. Differences from RFC 6253
	This section summarizes the technical changes made from [RFC6253].		This section summarizes the technical changes made from [RFC6253].
	This section is informational, intended to help implementors of the		This section is informational and is intended to help implementors of
	previous protocol version. If any text in this section contradicts		the previous protocol version. If any text in this section
	text in other portions of this specification, the text found outside		contradicts text in other portions of this specification, the text
	of this section should be considered normative.		found outside of this section should be considered normative.
	The following changes have been made.
	o Support for Simple Public Key Infrastructure (SPKI) certificates
	has been removed.
	9. Acknowledgements		The following change has been made.
	The authors would like to thank A. Keranen, D. Mattes, M. Komu and T.		o Support for SPKI certificates has been removed.
	Henderson for the fruitful conversations on the subject. D. Mattes
	most notably contributed the non-HIP aware use case in Section 3.
	10. References		9. References
	10.1. Normative References		9.1. Normative References
	[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate		[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
	Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.		Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
			DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
			<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
	[RFC4514] Zeilenga, K., "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol		[RFC4514] Zeilenga, K., Ed., "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
	(LDAP): String Representation of Distinguished Names", RFC		(LDAP): String Representation of Distinguished Names",
	4514, June 2006.		RFC 4514, DOI 10.17487/RFC4514, June 2006,
			<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4514>.
	[RFC4516] Smith, M. and T. Howes, "Lightweight Directory Access		[RFC4516] Smith, M., Ed. and T. Howes, "Lightweight Directory Access
	Protocol (LDAP): Uniform Resource Locator", RFC 4516, June		Protocol (LDAP): Uniform Resource Locator", RFC 4516,
	2006.		DOI 10.17487/RFC4516, June 2006,
			<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4516>.
	[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,		[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
	Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key		Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
	Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List		Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
	(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.		(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
			<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
	[RFC7296] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T.		[RFC7296] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T.
	Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2		Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
	(IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October		(IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October
	2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296>.		2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296>.
	[RFC7343] Laganier, J. and F. Dupont, "An IPv6 Prefix for Overlay		[RFC7343] Laganier, J. and F. Dupont, "An IPv6 Prefix for Overlay
	Routable Cryptographic Hash Identifiers Version 2		Routable Cryptographic Hash Identifiers Version 2
	(ORCHIDv2)", RFC 7343, DOI 10.17487/RFC7343, September		(ORCHIDv2)", RFC 7343, DOI 10.17487/RFC7343, September
	2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7343>.		2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7343>.
	[RFC7401] Moskowitz, R., Heer, T., Jokela, P., and T. Henderson,		[RFC7401] Moskowitz, R., Ed., Heer, T., Jokela, P., and T.
	"Host Identity Protocol Version 2 (HIPv2)", RFC 7401,		Henderson, "Host Identity Protocol Version 2 (HIPv2)",
	April 2015.		RFC 7401, DOI 10.17487/RFC7401, April 2015,
			<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7401>.
	[X.690] ITU-T, , "Recommendation X.690 (2002) | ISO/IEC		[X.690] ITU-T, , "Information Technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
	8825-1:2002, Information Technology - ASN.1 encoding		Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical
	rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),		Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules
	Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding		(DER)", ITU-T Recommendation X.690 | ISO/IEC 8825-1,
	Rules (DER)", July 2002.		August 2015.
	10.2. Informative References		9.2. Informative References
	[RFC6253] Heer, T. and S. Varjonen, "Host Identity Protocol		[RFC6253] Heer, T. and S. Varjonen, "Host Identity Protocol
	Certificates", RFC 6253, DOI 10.17487/RFC6253, May 2011,		Certificates", RFC 6253, DOI 10.17487/RFC6253, May 2011,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6253>.		<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6253>.
	Appendix A. X.509 v3 certificate example		Appendix A. X.509 v3 Certificate Example
	This section shows a X.509 v3 certificate with encoded HITs.		This section shows an X.509 v3 certificate with encoded HITs.
	Certificate:		Certificate:
	Data:		Data:
	Version: 3 (0x2)		Version: 3 (0x2)
	Serial Number: 12705268244493839545 (0xb0522e27291b2cb9)		Serial Number: 12705268244493839545 (0xb0522e27291b2cb9)
	Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption		Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
	Issuer: DC=Example, DC=com, CN=Example issuing host		Issuer: DC=Example, DC=com, CN=Example issuing host
	Validity		Validity
	Not Before: Feb 25 11:28:29 2016 GMT		Not Before: Feb 25 11:28:29 2016 GMT
	Not After : Feb 24 11:28:29 2017 GMT		Not After : Feb 24 11:28:29 2017 GMT
	skipping to change at page 10, line 43 ¶		skipping to change at page 13, line 5 ¶
	yol46ihcvAJKVM2qqZmN1jnpXqlzGl2TVTmbchrCoB/jTLBBmJcCAwEAAaM8MDow		yol46ihcvAJKVM2qqZmN1jnpXqlzGl2TVTmbchrCoB/jTLBBmJcCAwEAAaM8MDow
	GwYDVR0RBBQwEocQIAEAJ9z8DLj4hdU/TmNItzAbBgNVHRIEFDAShxAgAQAt+Hhk		GwYDVR0RBBQwEocQIAEAJ9z8DLj4hdU/TmNItzAbBgNVHRIEFDAShxAgAQAt+Hhk
	wWfjlxaIvWjkMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4IBAQBt5qmmMMSrPoY5Ht52TU6kLWNN		wWfjlxaIvWjkMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4IBAQBt5qmmMMSrPoY5Ht52TU6kLWNN
	u0G/0wxmE4tNslBZNvyuQp7IoEEaHJRWBSiCNE5jdYcxJWc2phoPuPfbA+fdppom		u0G/0wxmE4tNslBZNvyuQp7IoEEaHJRWBSiCNE5jdYcxJWc2phoPuPfbA+fdppom
	xGjiz1lU5u7Mp877Vr8xYPTL5/AOUPi3xTwa3nTQqoPlFSWxv76kf68K3ggJDhMd		xGjiz1lU5u7Mp877Vr8xYPTL5/AOUPi3xTwa3nTQqoPlFSWxv76kf68K3ggJDhMd
	KjsamdmvEPwIkl/Y0BDWuQyG2oU7RLWXkBACT1ofrgcwa/XmEpNy4hDJjiwAi9bw		KjsamdmvEPwIkl/Y0BDWuQyG2oU7RLWXkBACT1ofrgcwa/XmEpNy4hDJjiwAi9bw
	BcP/kSRpbVtaDEAoAfJbRbibrp5z6d2D4IXXrWyxgaygMDedYL2SO9KhIYeLxNla		BcP/kSRpbVtaDEAoAfJbRbibrp5z6d2D4IXXrWyxgaygMDedYL2SO9KhIYeLxNla
	XCFWPgJ+82+l3kB1gPVBaFyyYfsdmqWXqNSpgkWGeTxjdj39hqD4FIRVwYz6		XCFWPgJ+82+l3kB1gPVBaFyyYfsdmqWXqNSpgkWGeTxjdj39hqD4FIRVwYz6
	-----END CERTIFICATE-----		-----END CERTIFICATE-----
	Appendix B. Change log		Acknowledgments
	Contents of draft-ietf-hip-rfc6253-bis-00:
	o RFC6253 was submitted as draft-RFC.
	Changes from version 01 to 02:
	o Updated the references.
	Changes from version 02 to 03:
	o Fixed the nits raised by the working group.
	Changes from version 03 to 04:
	o Added "obsoletes RFC 6253".
	Changes from version 04 to 05:
	o Updates to contact details.
	o Correct updates and obsoletes headers.
	o Removed the pre5378 disclaimer.
	o Updated references.
	o Removed the SPKI references from the document.
	Changes from version 05 to 06:
	o Addressed the Int-Dir review comments from Korhonen.
	Changes from version 06 to 07:
	o Addressed the GenArt, OPSdir, SecDir, and IANA comments.
	Changes from version 07 to 08:
	o Addresses one editorial nit for CERT group numbers.
	Changes from version 08 to 09:
	o Rewrote the IANA section.		The authors would like to thank A. Keranen, D. Mattes, M. Komu, and
			T. Henderson for the fruitful conversations on the subject.
			D. Mattes most notably contributed the non-HIP-aware use case in
			Section 3.
	Authors' Addresses		Authors' Addresses
	Tobias Heer		Tobias Heer
	Albstadt-Sigmaringen University		Albstadt-Sigmaringen University
	Poststr. 6		Poststr. 6
	72458 Albstadt		72458 Albstadt
	Germany		Germany
	Email: heer@hs-albsig.de		Email: heer@hs-albsig.de
End of changes. 53 change blocks.
	163 lines changed or deleted		136 lines changed or added
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