draft-ietf-hokey-emsk-hierarchy-05.txt   draft-ietf-hokey-emsk-hierarchy-06.txt 
Network Working Group J. Salowey Network Working Group J. Salowey
Internet-Draft Cisco Systems Internet-Draft Cisco Systems
Intended status: Standards Track L. Dondeti Updates: eap-keying (RFC Ed to L. Dondeti
Expires: October 24, 2008 V. Narayanan replace this with RFC number) V. Narayanan
Qualcomm, Inc (if approved) Qualcomm, Inc
M. Nakhjiri Intended status: Standards Track M. Nakhjiri
Motorola Expires: December 25, 2008 Motorola
April 22, 2008 June 23, 2008
Specification for the Derivation of Root Keys from an Extended Master Specification for the Derivation of Root Keys from an Extended Master
Session Key (EMSK) Session Key (EMSK)
draft-ietf-hokey-emsk-hierarchy-05.txt draft-ietf-hokey-emsk-hierarchy-06
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
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have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79. aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
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and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
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This Internet-Draft will expire on October 24, 2008. This Internet-Draft will expire on December 25, 2008.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).
Abstract Abstract
The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) defined the Extended The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) defined the Extended
Master Session Key (EMSK) generation, but reserved it for unspecified Master Session Key (EMSK) generation, but reserved it for unspecified
future uses. This memo reserves the EMSK for the sole purpose of future uses. This memo reserves the EMSK for the sole purpose of
deriving root keys. Root keys are are master keys that can be used deriving root keys. Root keys are are master keys that can be used
for multiple purposes, identified by usage definitions. This for multiple purposes, identified by usage definitions. This
document also specifies a mechanism for avoiding conflicts between document also specifies a mechanism for avoiding conflicts between
root keys by deriving them in a manner that guarantee cryptographic root keys by deriving them in a manner that guarantee cryptographic
separation. Finally, this document also defines one such root key separation. Finally, this document also defines one such root key
usage: domain specific root keys are root keys made available to and usage: domain specific root keys are root keys made available to and
used within specific key management domains. used within specific key management domains.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Applicable usages of keys derived from the EMSK . . . . . 3 1.1. Applicable usages of keys derived from the EMSK . . . . . 3
1.2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2. Cryptographic Separation and Coordinated Key Derivation . . . 5 2. Cryptographic Separation and Coordinated Key Derivation . . . 6
3. EMSK Key Root Derivation Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3. EMSK Key Root Derivation Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1. USRK Derivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.1. USRK Derivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1.1. On the KDFs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.1.1. On the KDFs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.1.2. Default KDF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.1.2. Default KDF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.2. EMSK and USRK Name Derivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.2. EMSK and USRK Name Derivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4. Domain Specific Root Key Derivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 4. Domain Specific Root Key Derivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.1. Applicability of Multi-Domain usages . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4.1. Applicability of Multi-Domain usages . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5. Requirements for Usage Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 5. Requirements for Usage Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.1. Root Key Management Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 5.1. Root Key Management Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6. Requirements for EAP System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 6. Requirements for EAP System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7.1. Key strength . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 7.1. Key strength . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7.2. Cryptographic separation of keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 7.2. Cryptographic separation of keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7.3. Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 7.3. Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7.4. Key Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 7.4. Key Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7.5. Key Lifetime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 7.5. Key Lifetime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7.6. Entropy consideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 7.6. Entropy consideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
8.1. Key Labels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 8.1. Key Labels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
8.2. PRF numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 8.2. PRF numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 19 Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 20
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document deals with keys generated by authenticated key exchange This document deals with keys generated by authenticated key exchange
mechanisms defined within the EAP framework [RFC3748]. EAP defines mechanisms defined within the EAP framework [RFC3748]. EAP defines
two types of keying material; a Master Session Key (MSK) and an two types of keying material; a Master Session Key (MSK) and an
Extended Master Session Key (EMSK). The EAP specification implicitly Extended Master Session Key (EMSK). The EAP specification implicitly
assumes that the MSK produced by EAP will be used for a single assumes that the MSK produced by EAP will be used for a single
purpose at a single device, however it does reserve the EMSK for purpose at a single device, however it does reserve the EMSK for
future use. This document defines the EMSK to be used solely for future use. This document defines the EMSK to be used solely for
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Specific Usage Specific Root Keys (DSUSRK). The DSUSRKs are USRKs Specific Usage Specific Root Keys (DSUSRK). The DSUSRKs are USRKs
specific to a particular key management domain. specific to a particular key management domain.
In order to keep root keys for specific purposes separate from one In order to keep root keys for specific purposes separate from one
another, two requirements are defined in the following sections. One another, two requirements are defined in the following sections. One
is coordinated key derivation and another is cryptographic is coordinated key derivation and another is cryptographic
separation. separation.
1.1. Applicable usages of keys derived from the EMSK 1.1. Applicable usages of keys derived from the EMSK
The EMSK is established as part of network access authentication and The EMSK is typically established as part of network access
authorization. The derived keys need to be distributed to the authentication and authorization. It is expected that keys derived
involved parties along with context necessary to use them. The from EMSK will be used in protocols related to network access, such
security of the system relies upon trust relationships between the as handover optimizations, and the scope of these protocols is
parties involved in this process. These trust relationships are the usually restricted to the endpoints of the lower layers over which
basis for applying protection during key transport and ensuring EAP packets are sent.
proper key usage. Hence, deriving USRKs or DSUSRKs for purposes
where placing trust in the entities involved in establishing network
access is inappropriate or not possible is NOT RECOMMENDED.
It is also only feasible to make use of EMSK usages when network In particular, it is inappropriate for the security of higher layer
access occurs over an EAP-capable interface. If it is possible for applications to solely rely on keys derived from network access
an entity to access these services though an interface that does not authentication. Even when used together with another, independent
involve EAP authentication and authorization with the appropriate security mechanism, the use of these keys needs to be carefully
entities then alternate means of authentication and key establishment evaluated with regards to the benefits of the optimization and the
for these services needs to be provided. need to support multiple solutions. Performance optimizations may
not warrant the close tie-in that may be required between the layers
in order to use EAP-based keys. Such optimizations may be offset by
the complexities of managing the validity and usage of key materials.
Keys generated from subsequent EAP authentications may be beyond the
knowledge and control of applications.
From an architectural point of view, applications should not make
assumptions about the lower layer technology (such as network access
authentication) used on any particular hop along the path between the
application endpoints.
From a practical point of view, making such assumptions would
complicate using those applications over lower layers that do not use
EAP, and make it more difficult for applications and network access
technologies to evolve independently of each other.
Parties using keys derived from EMSK also need trust relationships
with the EAP endpoints, and mechanisms for securely communicating the
keys.
For most applications, it is not appropriate to assume that all
current and future access networks are trusted to secure the
application function. Instead, applications should implement the
required security mechanisms in access independent manner.
Implementation considerations may also complicate communication of
keys to an application from the lower layer. For instance, in many
configurations applications may run on a different device than the
one providing EAP-based network access to it.
Given all this, it is NOT RECOMMENDED to use keys derived from the
EMSK as an exclusive security mechanism, when their usage is not
inherently, and by permanent nature, tied to the lower layer where
network access authentication was performed.
Keys derived from EAP are pairwise by nature and are not directly
suitable for multicast or other group usages such as those involved
in some routing protocols. It is possible to use keys derived from
EAP in protocols that distribute group keys to group participants.
The definition of these group key distribution protocols is beyond
the scope of this document and would require additional
specification.
1.2. Terminology 1.2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]
The following terms are taken from [RFC3748]: EAP Server, peer, The following terms are taken from [RFC3748]: EAP Server, peer,
authenticator, Master Session Key (MSK), Extended Master Session Key authenticator, Master Session Key (MSK), Extended Master Session Key
(EMSK), Cryptographic Separation. (EMSK), Cryptographic Separation.
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additional KDFs. KDFs are assigned numbers through IANA following additional KDFs. KDFs are assigned numbers through IANA following
the policy set in section Section 8. The rules for negotiating a KDF the policy set in section Section 8. The rules for negotiating a KDF
are as follows: are as follows:
o If no other KDF is specified the KDF specified in this document o If no other KDF is specified the KDF specified in this document
MUST be used. This is the "default" KDF. MUST be used. This is the "default" KDF.
o The initial authenticated key exchange MAY specify a favored KDF. o The initial authenticated key exchange MAY specify a favored KDF.
For example an EAP method may define a preferred KDF to use in its For example an EAP method may define a preferred KDF to use in its
specification. If the initial authenticated key exchange specification. If the initial authenticated key exchange
specifies a KDF then this MUST override the default KDF. specifies a KDF then this MUST override the default KDF.
o A system MAY specify a separate default KDF if all participants
within the system have the knowledge of which KDF to use. If
specified this MUST take precedence over key exchange defined KDF.
Note that usage definitions MUST NOT concern themselves with the Note that usage definitions MUST NOT concern themselves with the
details of the KDF construction or the KDF selection, they only need details of the KDF construction or the KDF selection, they only need
to worry about the inputs specified in Section 3. to worry about the inputs specified in Section 3.
3.1.2. Default KDF 3.1.2. Default KDF
The default KDF for deriving root keys from an EMSK is taken from the The default KDF for deriving root keys from an EMSK is taken from the
PRF+ key expansion specified in [RFC4306] based on HMAC-SHA-256 PRF+ key expansion specified in [RFC4306] based on HMAC-SHA-256
[SHA256]. The PRF+ construction was chosen because of its simplicity [SHA256]. The PRF+ construction was chosen because of its simplicity
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this specification may be exported from this boundary. this specification may be exported from this boundary.
o The EMSK MUST be unique for each EAP session o The EMSK MUST be unique for each EAP session
o The EAP method MUST provide an identifier for the EAP transaction o The EAP method MUST provide an identifier for the EAP transaction
that generated the key that generated the key
o The system MUST define which usage definitions are used and how o The system MUST define which usage definitions are used and how
they are invoked. they are invoked.
o The system may define ways to select an alternate PRF for key o The system may define ways to select an alternate PRF for key
derivation as defined in Section 3.1. derivation as defined in Section 3.1.
The system MAY use the MSK transmitted to the NAS in any way it The system MAY use the MSK transmitted to the NAS in any way it
chooses. This is required for backward compatibility. New usage chooses in accordance with [RFC3748] [I-D.ietf-eap-keying] and other
definitions following this specification MUST NOT use the MSK. If relevant specifications. This is required for backward
more than one usage uses the MSK, then the cryptographic separation compatibility. New usage definitions following this specification
is not achieved. Implementations MUST prevent such combinations. MUST NOT use the MSK. If more than one usage uses the MSK, then the
cryptographic separation is not achieved. Implementations MUST
prevent such combinations.
7. Security Considerations 7. Security Considerations
7.1. Key strength 7.1. Key strength
The effective key strength of the derived keys will never be greater The effective key strength of the derived keys will never be greater
than the strength of the EMSK (or a master key internal to an EAP than the strength of the EMSK (or a master key internal to an EAP
mechanism). mechanism).
7.2. Cryptographic separation of keys 7.2. Cryptographic separation of keys
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The number of root keys derived from the EMSK is expected to be low. The number of root keys derived from the EMSK is expected to be low.
Note that there is no randomness required to be introduced into the Note that there is no randomness required to be introduced into the
EMSK to root key derivation beyond the root key labels. Thus, if EMSK to root key derivation beyond the root key labels. Thus, if
many keys are going to be derived from an Root Key it is important many keys are going to be derived from an Root Key it is important
that Root Key to child key derivation introduce fresh random numbers that Root Key to child key derivation introduce fresh random numbers
in deriving each key. in deriving each key.
8. IANA Considerations 8. IANA Considerations
The keywords "PRIVATE USE", "SPECIFICATION REQUIRED" and "IETF The keywords "Private Use", "Specification Required" and "IETF
CONSENSUS" that appear in this document when used to describe Consensus" that appear in this document when used to describe
namespace allocation are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2434]. namespace allocation are to be interpreted as described in [RFC5226].
8.1. Key Labels 8.1. Key Labels
This specification introduces a new name space for "USRK key labels". This specification introduces a new name space for "USRK key labels".
Key labels are of one of two formats: "label-string" or Key labels MUST be printable US-ASCII strings, and MUST NOT contain
"label-string@specorg" (without the double quotes). the characters at-sign ("@") except as noted below, comma (","),
whitespace, control characters (ASCII codes 32 or less), or the ASCII
code 127 (DEL). Labels are case-sensitive, and MUST NOT be longer
than 64 characters.
Labels of the form "label-string" registered by the IANA MUST be Labels can be assigned based on Specification Required policy
printable US-ASCII strings, and MUST NOT contain the characters at- [RFC5226]. In addition, the labels "experimental1" and
sign ("@"), comma (","), whitespace, control characters (ASCII codes "experimental2" are reserved for experimental use. The following
32 or less), or the ASCII code 127 (DEL). Labels are case-sensitive, considerations apply to their use:
and MUST NOT be longer than 64 characters. Labels of this form are
assigned based on the IETF CONSENSUS policy.
Labels with the at-sign in them of the form "label-string@specorg" Production networks do not necessarily support the use of
where the part preceding the at-sign is the label. The format of the experimental code points. The network scope of support for
part preceding the at-sign is not specified; however, these labels experimental values should carefully be evaluated before deploying
MUST be printable US-ASCII strings, and MUST NOT contain the comma any experiment across extended network domains, such as the public
character (","), whitespace, control characters (ASCII codes 32 or Internet. The potential to disrupt the stable operation of EAP
less), or the ASCII code 127 (DEL). They MUST have only a single at- devices is a consideration when planning an experiment using such
sign in them. The part following the at-sign MUST be a valid, fully code points.
qualified Internet domain name [RFC1034] controlled by the person or
organization defining the label. Labels are case-sensitive, and MUST
NOT be longer than 64 characters. It is up to each organization how
it manages its local namespace. Note that the total number of octets
in a label is limited to 255. It has been noted that these labels
resemble STD 11 [RFC0822] addresses and network access identifiers
(NAI) defined in [RFC4282]. This is purely coincidental and has
nothing to do with STD 11 [RFC0822] or [RFC4282]. An example of a
key label is "service@example.com" (without the double quotes).
Labels within the "ietf.org" organization are assigned based on the The network administrators should ensure that each code point is used
IETF CONSENSUS policy with specification recommended. Labels from consistently to avoid interference between experiments. Particular
other organizations may be registered with IANA by the person or attention should be given to security vulnerabilities and the freedom
organization controlling the domain with an assignment policy of of different domains to employ their own experiments. Cross-domain
SPECIFICATION REQUIRED. It is RECOMMENDED that the specification usage is NOT RECOMMENDED.
contain the following information:
The following labels are reserved by this document: "EMSK", Similarly, labels "private1" and "private2" have been reserved for
"dsrk@ietf.org". Private Use within an organization. Again, cross-domain usage of
these labels is NOT RECOMMENDED.
Labels starting with a string and followed by the "@" and a valid,
fully qualified Internet domain name [RFC1034] can be requested by by
the person or organization who are in control of the domain name.
Such labels can be allocated based on Specification Required. It is
RECOMMENDED that the specification contain the following information:
o A description of the usage o A description of the usage
o The key label to be used o The key label to be used
o Length of the Root Key o Length of the Root Key
o If optional data is used, what it is and how it is maintained o If optional data is used, what it is and how it is maintained
o How child keys will be derived from the Root Key and how they will o How child keys will be derived from the Root Key and how they will
be used be used
o How lifetime of the Root Key and its child keys will be managed o How lifetime of the Root Key and its child keys will be managed
o Where the Root Keys or child keys will be used and how they are o Where the Root Keys or child keys will be used and how they are
communicated if necessary communicated if necessary
The following labels are reserved by this document: "EMSK",
"dsrk@ietf.org".
8.2. PRF numbers 8.2. PRF numbers
This specification introduces a new number space for "EMSK PRF This specification introduces a new number space for "EMSK PRF
numbers". The numbers are int he range 0 to 255 Numbers from 0 to numbers". The numbers are int he range 0 to 255 Numbers from 0 to
220 are assigned through the policy IETF CONSENSUS and numbers in the 220 are assigned through the policy IETF Consensus and numbers in the
range 221 to 255 are left for PRIVATE USE. The initial registry range 221 to 255 are left for Private Use. The initial registry
should contain the following values: should contain the following values:
0 RESERVED 0 RESERVED
1 HMAC-SHA-256 PRF+ (Default) 1 HMAC-SHA-256 PRF+ (Default)
9. Acknowledgements 9. Acknowledgements
This document expands upon previous collaboration with Pasi Eronen. This document expands upon previous collaboration with Pasi Eronen.
This document reflects conversations with Bernard Aboba, Jari Arkko, This document reflects conversations with Bernard Aboba, Jari Arkko,
Avi Lior, David McGrew, Henry Haverinen, Hao Zhou, Russ Housley, Glen Avi Lior, David McGrew, Henry Haverinen, Hao Zhou, Russ Housley, Glen
Zorn, Charles Clancy, Dan Harkins, Alan DeKok, Yoshi Ohba and members Zorn, Charles Clancy, Dan Harkins, Alan DeKok, Yoshi Ohba and members
of the EAP and HOKEY working groups. of the EAP and HOKEY working groups.
Thanks to Dan Harkins for the idea of using a single root key name to Thanks to Dan Harkins for the idea of using a single root key name to
refer to all keys. refer to all keys.
10. References 10. References
10.1. Normative References 10.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-eap-keying]
Aboba, B., Simon, D., and P. Eronen, "Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP) Key Management Framework",
draft-ietf-eap-keying-22 (work in progress),
November 2007.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2434] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 2434,
October 1998.
[RFC3748] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H. [RFC3748] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H.
Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)", Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)",
RFC 3748, June 2004. RFC 3748, June 2004.
[RFC4306] Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol", [RFC4306] Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol",
RFC 4306, December 2005. RFC 4306, December 2005.
[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
May 2008.
[SHA256] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure [SHA256] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure
Hash Standard", FIPS 180-2, August 2002. Hash Standard", FIPS 180-2, August 2002.
With Change Notice 1 dated February 2004 With Change Notice 1 dated February 2004
10.2. Informative References 10.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-eap-keying]
Aboba, B., Simon, D., and P. Eronen, "Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP) Key Management Framework",
draft-ietf-eap-keying-22 (work in progress),
November 2007.
[RFC0822] Crocker, D., "Standard for the format of ARPA Internet [RFC0822] Crocker, D., "Standard for the format of ARPA Internet
text messages", STD 11, RFC 822, August 1982. text messages", STD 11, RFC 822, August 1982.
[RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities", [RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987. STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987.
[RFC4282] Aboba, B., Beadles, M., Arkko, J., and P. Eronen, "The [RFC4282] Aboba, B., Beadles, M., Arkko, J., and P. Eronen, "The
Network Access Identifier", RFC 4282, December 2005. Network Access Identifier", RFC 4282, December 2005.
[RFC4346] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security [RFC4346] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
skipping to change at page 19, line 44 skipping to change at line 898
attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of
such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at
http://www.ietf.org/ipr. http://www.ietf.org/ipr.
The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement
this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at
ietf-ipr@ietf.org. ietf-ipr@ietf.org.
Acknowledgment
Funding for the RFC Editor function is provided by the IETF
Administrative Support Activity (IASA).
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