draft-ietf-hokey-erp-aak-06.txt   draft-ietf-hokey-erp-aak-07.txt 
Network Working Group Z. Cao Network Working Group Z. Cao
Internet-Draft H. Deng Internet-Draft H. Deng
Intended status: Standards Track China Mobile Intended status: Standards Track China Mobile
Expires: April 20, 2012 Y. Wang Expires: July 20, 2012 Q. Wu
Q. Wu Huawei
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. G. Zorn
G. Zorn, Ed.
Network Zen Network Zen
October 18, 2011 January 17, 2012
EAP Re-authentication Protocol Extensions for Authenticated Anticipatory EAP Re-authentication Protocol Extensions for Authenticated Anticipatory
Keying (ERP/AAK) Keying (ERP/AAK)
draft-ietf-hokey-erp-aak-06 draft-ietf-hokey-erp-aak-07
Abstract Abstract
The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) is a generic framework The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) is a generic framework
supporting multiple types of authentication methods. supporting multiple types of authentication methods.
The EAP Re-authentication Protocol (ERP) specifies extensions to EAP The EAP Re-authentication Protocol (ERP) specifies extensions to EAP
and the EAP keying hierarchy to support an EAP method-independent and the EAP keying hierarchy to support an EAP method-independent
protocol for efficient re-authentication between the peer and an EAP protocol for efficient re-authentication between the peer and an EAP
re-authentication server through any authenticator. re-authentication server through any authenticator.
skipping to change at page 2, line 4 skipping to change at page 1, line 48
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material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on April 20, 2012.
This Internet-Draft will expire on July 20, 2012.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Standards Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.1. Standards Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2. Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.2. Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. ERP/AAK Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. ERP/AAK Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. ERP/AAK Key Hierarchy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4. ERP/AAK Key Hierarchy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Packet and TLV Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4.1. pRK, pMSK derivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.1. EAP-Initiate/Re-auth-Start Packet Extension . . . . . . . 6 5. Packet and TLV Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.2. EAP-Initiate/Re-auth Packet Extension . . . . . . . . . . 7 5.1. EAP-Initiate/Re-auth-Start Packet and TLV Extension . . . 8
5.3. EAP-Finish/Re-auth extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5.2. EAP-Initiate/Re-auth Packet and TLV Extension . . . . . . 8
5.4. TV and TLV Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 5.3. EAP-Finish/Re-auth packet and TLV extension . . . . . . . 10
6. Lower Layer Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 5.4. TV and TLV Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7. AAA Transport Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 6. Lower Layer Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 7. AAA Transport Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
10. Acknowledgement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 10. Acknowledgement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) [RFC3748] is a generic The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) [RFC3748] is a generic
framework supporting multiple types of authentication methods. In framework supporting multiple types of authentication methods. In
systems where EAP is used for authentication, it is desirable to not systems where EAP is used for authentication, it is desirable to not
repeat the entire EAP exchange with another authenticator. The EAP repeat the entire EAP exchange with another authenticator. The EAP
Re-authentication Protocol (ERP) [RFC5296] specifies extensions to Re-authentication Protocol (ERP) [RFC5296] specifies extensions to
EAP and the EAP keying hierarchy to support an EAP method-independent EAP and the EAP keying hierarchy to support an EAP method-independent
protocol for efficient re-authentication between the peer and an EAP protocol for efficient re-authentication between the peer and an EAP
skipping to change at page 4, line 11 skipping to change at page 4, line 11
MH Mobile Host MH Mobile Host
SAP Serving Attachment Point [RFC5836] SAP Serving Attachment Point [RFC5836]
3. ERP/AAK Overview 3. ERP/AAK Overview
ERP/AAK is intended to allow the establishment of cryptographic ERP/AAK is intended to allow the establishment of cryptographic
keying materials on a single Candidate Attachment Points prior to the keying materials on a single Candidate Attachment Points prior to the
arrival of the MH at the Candidate Access Network (CAN). arrival of the MH at the Candidate Access Network (CAN).
It is assumed that the peer has previously completed full EAP In this document, ERP/AAK support for the peer is assumed. Also it
is assumed that the peer has previously completed full EAP
authentication and the peer or SAP knows the identities of authentication and the peer or SAP knows the identities of
neighboring attachment points. Figure 1 shows the general protocol neighboring attachment points. Note that the behavior of the peer
exchange by which the keying material is established on the CAP. that does not support the ERP-AAK scheme defined in this
This document only discusses the case of distributing the key to a specification is out of the scope of this document.Figure 1 shows the
single CAP. general protocol exchange by which the keying material is established
on the CAP.
+------+ +-----+ +-----+ +-----------+ +------+ +-----+ +-----+ +-----------+
| Peer | | SAP | | CAP | | EA Server | | Peer | | SAP | | CAP | | EA Server |
+--+---+ +--+--+ +--+--+ +-----+-----+ +--+---+ +--+--+ +--+--+ +-----+-----+
| | | | | | | |
1. | [EAP-Initiate/ | | | a. | [EAP-Initiate/ | | |
| Re-auth-start | | | | Re-auth-start | | |
| (E-flag) | | | | (E-flag) | | |
|<---------------| | | |<---------------| | |
| | | | | | | |
2. | EAP-Initiate/ | | | b. | EAP-Initiate/ | | |
| Re-auth | | | | Re-auth | | |
| (E-flag) | | | | (E-flag) | | |
|--------------->| | | |--------------->| | |
3. | | AAA(EAP-Initiate/Re-auth(E-flag))| c. | | AAA(EAP-Initiate/Re-auth(E-flag))|
| |--------------------------------->| | |--------------------------------->|
| | | +---------+---------+ | | | +---------+---------+
| | | | CA authorized & | | | | | CA authorized & |
4. | | | | authenticated; | d. | | | | and EA Keying |
| | | | EA keying | | | | | Distribution |
| | | | materials derived |
| | | +---------+---------+ | | | +---------+---------+
5. | | | |
| | | AAA(pMSK) |
| | |<----------------->|
| | | | | | | |
6. | | AAA (EAP-Finish/Re-auth(E-flag)) | | | | |
f. | | AAA (EAP-Finish/Re-auth(E-flag)) |
| |<---------------------------------| | |<---------------------------------|
7. | EAP-Finish/ | | | g. | EAP-Finish/ | | |
| Re-auth(E-flag)| | | | Re-auth(E-flag)| | |
|<---------------| | | |<---------------| | |
| | | | | | | |
Figure 1: ERP/AAK Operation Figure 1: ERP/AAK Exchange
+-----------+ +---------+
| | | |
| EA Server | | CAP |
| | | |
+-----|-----+ +----|----+
| |
| |
| AAA Request(pMSK) |
e.1|------------------------->|
| |
| |
| |
| AAA Response (Success) |
e.2|<-------------------------|
| |
| |
| |
Figure 2: Key Distribution for ERP/AAK
ERP/AAK re-uses the packet format defined by ERP, but specifies a new ERP/AAK re-uses the packet format defined by ERP, but specifies a new
flag to differentiate EAP early-authentication from EAP re- flag to differentiate EAP early-authentication from EAP re-
authentication. The peer initiates ERP/AAK itself, or does so in authentication. The peer initiates ERP/AAK itself, or does so in
response to an EAP-Initiate/Re-Auth-Start message from the SAP. In response to an EAP-Initiate/Re-Auth-Start message from the SAP.
this document, SAP support for ERP/AAK is assumed. If either the
peer or the SAP does not support ERP/AAK, it should fall back to full
EAP authentication.
The SAP may send the identity of a candidate attachment point to the In the latter case, the SAP MAY send the identity of a candidate
peer in the EAP-Initiate/Re-auth-Start message. If the EAP-Initiate/ attachment point to the peer in the EAP-Initiate/Re-auth-Start
Re-auth-Start packet is not supported by the peer, it is silently message (see a. in the figure 1). If the EAP-Initiate/ Re-auth-Start
discarded. packet is not supported by the peer, it MUST be silently discarded.
The peer sends an early-authentication request message (EAP-Initiate/ If the peer initiate ERP/AAK, the peer MAY send an early-
Re-auth with the 'E' flag set) containing the keyName-NAI, the CAP- authentication request message (EAP-Initiate/ Re-auth with the 'E'
Identifier, rIK and sequence number. The realm in the keyName-NAI flag set) containing the keyName-NAI, the CAP- Identifier, rIK and
field is used to locate the peer's ERP/AAK server. The CAP- sequence number (see b. in the figure 1). The realm in the keyName-
Identifier is used to identify the CAP. The rIK is used to protect NAI field is used to locate the peer's ERP/AAK server. The CAP-
the message. The sequence number is used for replay protection. Identifier is used to identify the CAP. The rIK is defined in
RFC5296 and used to protect the integrity of the message. The
sequence number is used for replay protection.
The SAP encapsulates the early-authentication message into a AAA The SAP SHOULD verify the integrity of the message at step b. If
message and sends it to the peer's ERP/AAK server in the realm This verifications fail, the SAP MUST send an EAP- Finish/Re-auth
indicated in the keyName-NAI field. message with the Result flag set to '1' (Failure).In success case,
the SAP SHOULD encapsulate the early-authentication message into a
AAA message and send it to the peer's ERP/AAK server in the realm
indicated in the keyName-NAI field (see c. in the figure 1).
Upon receiving the message, the ERP/AAK server first checks its Upon receiving the message, the ERP/AAK server first uses the keyName
integrity and freshness, then verifies the identity of the peer by indicated in the keyName-NAI to look up the rIK and checks the
checking the username portion of the KeyName-NAI. Next, the server integrity and freshness of the message, then verifies the identity of
authenticates and authorizes the CAP specified in the CAP-Identifier the peer by checking the username portion of the KeyName-NAI. If any
TLV. If any of the checks fail, the server sends an early- of the checks fail, the server SHOULD send an early- authentication
authentication finish message (EAP-Finish/Re-auth with E-flag set) finish message (EAP-Finish/Re-auth with E-flag set) with the Result
with the Result flag set to '1'. flag set to '1'. Next, the server SHOULD authorize the CAP specified
in the CAP-Identifier TLV. In success case, the server derives a
pMSK from the pRK for each CAP carried in the the CAP-Identifier
field using the sequence number associated with CAP-Identifier as an
input to the key derivation. (see d. in the figure 1)
The ERP/AAK server transports the pMSK to the authenticated and Then The ERP/AAK server transports the pMSK to the authorized CAP via
authorized CAP via AAA as described in Section 7. AAA Section 7 as described in figure 2 (see e.1,e.2 in the figure 2).
Note that key distribution in the figure 2 is one part of step d. in
the figure 1.
Finally, the ERP/AAK server sends the early-authentication finish Finally, in response to the EAP-Initiate/Re-auth message, the ERP/AAK
message (EAP-Finish/Re-auth with E-flag set) containing the identity server sends the early-authentication finish message (EAP-Finish/
of the authorized CAP to the peer via the SAP. Re-auth with E-flag set) containing the identity of the authorized
CAP to the peer via the SAP and associated lifetime of pMSK,
Optionally, if the peer also requests the server for the rRK
lifetime, the EA server SHOULD send the rRK lifetime in the EAP-
Finish/Re-auth message. (see f.,g. in the figure 1).
4. ERP/AAK Key Hierarchy 4. ERP/AAK Key Hierarchy
As an optimization of ERP, ERP/AAK uses a key hierarchy similar to As an extension of ERP, ERP/AAK uses a key hierarchy similar to that
that of ERP. The EMSK is used to derive the ERP/AAK pre-established of ERP. The ERP/AAK pre-established Root Key (pRK) is derived from
Root Key (pRK). Similarly, the ERP/AAK pre-established Integrity Key either EMSK or DSRK as specified in the section 4.1. In general, the
(pIK) and the pre-established Master Session Key (pMSK) are derived pRK is derived from the EMSK in case of the peer moving in the home
from the pRK. The pMSK is established for the CAP when the peer AAA realm and derived from the DRSK in case of the peer moving in a
early authenticates to the network. The pIK is established for the visited realm. The DSRK is delivered from the EAP server to the ERP/
peer to re-authenticate the network after handover. The hierarchy AAK server as specified in [I-D.ietf-dime-local-keytran]. If the
relationship is illustrated in Figure 2, below.
DSRK EMSK
| |
+---+---+---+---+
| | |
pRK rRK ...
Figure 2
The EMSK and DSRK both can be used to derive the pRK. In general,
the pRK is derived from the EMSK in case of the peer moving in the
home AAA realm and derived from the DRSK in case of the peer moving
in a visited realm. The DSRK is delivered from the EAP server to the
ERP/AAK server as specified in [I-D.ietf-dime-local-keytran]. If the
peer has previously been authenticated by means of ERP or ERP/AAK, peer has previously been authenticated by means of ERP or ERP/AAK,
the DSRK SHOULD be directly re-used. the DSRK SHOULD be directly re-used.
DSRK EMSK
| |
+---+---+---+---+
|
pRK ...
Figure 3: ERP/AAK Root Key Derivation
Similarly,the pre-established Master Session Key (pMSK) are derived
from the pRK. The pMSK is established for the CAP when the peer
early authenticates to the network. The hierarchy relationship is
illustrated Figure 4,
pRK pRK
| |
+--------+--------+ +--------+--------+
| | | |
pIK pMSK ... pMSK ...
Figure 3 Figure 4: ERP/AAK Key Hierarchy
The pRK is used to derive the pIK and pMSK for the CAP. below.
4.1. pRK, pMSK derivation
The rRK is derived as specified in [RFC5295].
pRK = KDF (K, S), where
K = EMSK or K = DSRK and
S = pRK Label | "\0" | length
The pRK Label is an IANA-assigned 8-bit ASCII string:
EAP Early-Authentication Root Key@ietf.org
assigned from the "USRK key labels" name space in accordance with
[RFC5295]. The KDF and algorithm agility for the KDF are as defined
in [RFC5295].
The pMSK is derived as follows.
pMSK = KDF (K, S), where
K = pRK and
S = pMSK label | "\0" | SEQ | length
The pMSK label is the 8-bit ASCII string:
Early-Authentication Master Session Key@ietf.org
The length field refers to the length of the pMSK in octets encoded
as specified in [RFC5295]. SEQ is sent by either the peer or the
server in the ERP/AAK message using SEQ field or Sequence number TLV
and encoded as an 8-bit number specified in the section 5.2 and
section 5.3.
5. Packet and TLV Extension 5. Packet and TLV Extension
This section describes the packet and TLV extensions for the ERP/AAK This section describes the packet and TLV extensions for the ERP/AAK
exchange. exchange.
5.1. EAP-Initiate/Re-auth-Start Packet Extension 5.1. EAP-Initiate/Re-auth-Start Packet and TLV Extension
Figure 4 shows the changed parameters contained in the EAP-Initiate/ Figure 5 shows the changed parameters contained in the EAP-Initiate/
Re-auth-Start packet defined in RFC 5296 [RFC5296]. Re-auth-Start packet defined in RFC 5296 [RFC5296].
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Code | Identifier | Length | | Code | Identifier | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type |E| Reserved | 1 or more TVs or TLVs ~ | Type |E| Reserved | 1 or more TVs or TLVs ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 4 Figure 5
Flags Flags
'E' - The E flag is used to indicate early-authentication.
Reserved: MUST be set to 0. 'E' - The E flag is used to indicate early-authentication. This
field MUST be set to '1' if early authentication is in use and MUST
be set to '0' otherwise.
The rest of the 7 bits (Reserved ) MUST be set to 0 and ignored on
reception.
TVs and TLVs TVs and TLVs
CAP-Identifier: Carried in a TLV payload. The format is identical to CAP-Identifier: Carried in a TLV payload. The format is identical to
that of a DiameterIdentity [RFC3588]. It is used by the SAP to that of a DiameterIdentity [RFC3588]. It is used by the SAP to
advertise the identity of the CAP to the peer. Exactly one CAP- advertise the identity of the CAP to the peer. Exactly one CAP-
Identifier TLV MAY be included in the EAP-Initiate/Re-auth-Start Identifier TLV MAY be included in the EAP-Initiate/Re-auth-Start
packet if the SAP has performed CAP discovery. packet if the SAP has performed CAP discovery.
If the EAP-Initiate/Re-auth-Start packet is not supported by the If the EAP-Initiate/Re-auth-Start packet is not supported by the
peer, it is discarded silently. peer, it is discarded silently.
5.2. EAP-Initiate/Re-auth Packet Extension 5.2. EAP-Initiate/Re-auth Packet and TLV Extension
Figure 5 illustrates the changed parameters contained in the EAP- Figure 6 illustrates the changed parameters contained in the EAP-
Initiate/Re-auth packet defined in RFC 5296 [RFC5296]. Initiate/Re-auth packet defined in RFC 5296 [RFC5296].
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Code | Identifier | Length | | Code | Identifier | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type |R|x|L|E|Resved | SEQ | | Type |R|x|L|E|Resved | SEQ |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| 1 or more TVs or TLVs ~ | 1 or more TVs or TLVs ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Cryptosuite | Authentication Tag ~ | Cryptosuite | Authentication Tag ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 5 Figure 6
Flags Flags
'x' - The x flag is reserved. It MUST be set to 0. 'x' - The x flag is reserved. It MUST be set to 0.
'E' - The E flag is used to indicate early-authentication. 'E' - The E flag is used to indicate early-authentication.
The rest of the 4 bits (Resved) MUST be set to 0 and ignored on The rest of the 4 bits (Resved) MUST be set to 0 and ignored on
reception. reception.
SEQ SEQ
A 16-bit sequence number is used for replay protection. As defined in Section 5.3.2 of [RFC5296],this field is 16-bit
sequence number and used for replay protection.
TVs and TLVs TVs and TLVs
keyName-NAI: As defined in RFC 5296 [RFC5296], this is carried in a keyName-NAI: As defined in RFC 5296 [RFC5296], this is carried in a
TLV payload. The Type is 1. The NAI is variable in length, not TLV payload. The Type is 1. The NAI is variable in length, not
exceeding 253 octets. The username part of the NAI is the EMSKname exceeding 253 octets. The username part of the NAI is the EMSKname
used to identify the peer. The realm part of the NAI is the peer's used to identify the peer. The realm part of the NAI is the peer's
home domain name or the domain to which the peer is currently home domain name if the peer communicates with the home EA server or
attached. Exactly one keyName-NAI attribute SHALL be present in an the domain to which the peer is currently attached (i.e., local
EAP-Initiate/Re-auth packet. domain name) if the peer communicates with the local EA server. The
SAP knows if the KeyName-NAI carry local domain name by comparing the
domain name carried in KeyName-NAI with local domain name which is
associated with the SAP and SAP has already known. Exactly one
keyName-NAI attribute SHALL be present in an EAP-Initiate/Re-auth
packet and The realm part of it SHOULD follows the use of
internationalized domain names defined in the RFC5890 [RFC5890].
CAP-Identifier: Carried in a TLV payload. It is used to indicate the CAP-Identifier: Carried in a TLV payload.The Type is TBD (less than
FQDN of a CAP. 128). This field is used to indicate the FQDN of a CAP. The value
field MUST be encoded as specified in Section 8 of RFC 3315
[RFC3315]. There at least one instance of the CAP-Identifier TLV
MUST be present in the ERP/AAK-Key TLV.
Sequence number: Carried in a TV payload. The Type is TBD (less than Sequence number: The Type is TBD (less than 128). The value field is
128). It is used in the derivation of the pMSK for each CAP. Each a 16-bit field and used in the derivation of the pMSK for a CAP. If
CAP-Identifier in the packet MUST be associated with a unique multiple CAP-Identifiers are carried,each CAP-Identifier in the
sequence number. packet MUST be associated with a unique sequence number and followed
by that sequence number.
Cryptosuite Cryptosuite
This field indicates the integrity algorithm used for ERP/AAK. Key This field indicates the integrity algorithm used for ERP/AAK. Key
lengths and output lengths are either indicated or obvious from the lengths and output lengths are either indicated or obvious from the
cryptosuite name. We specify some cryptosuites below: cryptosuite name, e.g., HMAC-SHA256-128 denotes HMAC computed using
the SHA-256 function [RFC4868] and with the 256 bit key length and
0 RESERVED output truncated to 128 bits [RFC2104]. We specify some cryptosuites
below:
1 HMAC-SHA256-64 0~1 RESERVED
2 HMAC-SHA256-128 2 HMAC-SHA256-128
3 HMAC-SHA256-256 3 HMAC-SHA256-256
HMAC-SHA256-128 is mandatory to implement and should be enabled in HMAC-SHA256-128 is mandatory to implement and should be enabled in
the default configuration. the default configuration.
Authentication Tag Authentication Tag
This field contains the integrity checksum over the ERP/AAK packet, This field contains the integrity checksum over the ERP/AAK packet,
excluding the authentication tag field itself. The length of the excluding the authentication tag field itself. The value field is
field is indicated by the Cryptosuite. calculated using the integrity algorithm indicated in the Cryptosuite
field and rIK specified in [RFC5296] as the secret key. The length
of the field is indicated by the Cryptosuite.
The peer uses authentication tag to determine the validity of the
EAP-Finish/Re-auth message originates at a server.
If the message doesn't pass verification or authentication tag is not
included in the message, the message SHOULD be discarded silently.
If the EAP-Initiate/Re-auth packet is not supported by the SAP, it is If the EAP-Initiate/Re-auth packet is not supported by the SAP, it is
discarded silently. discarded silently.
5.3. EAP-Finish/Re-auth extension 5.3. EAP-Finish/Re-auth packet and TLV extension
Figure 6 shows the changed parameters contained in the EAP-Finish/ Figure 7 shows the changed parameters contained in the EAP-Finish/
Re-auth packet defined in [RFC5296]. Re-auth packet defined in [RFC5296].
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Code | Identifier | Length | | Code | Identifier | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type |R|x|L|E|Resved | SEQ | | Type |R|x|L|E|Resved | SEQ |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| 1 or more TVs or TLVs ~ | 1 or more TVs or TLVs ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Cryptosuite | Authentication Tag ~ | Cryptosuite | Authentication Tag ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 6 Figure 7
Flags Flags
'x' - The x flag is reserved. It MUST be set to 0. 'x' - The x flag is reserved. It MUST be set to 0.
'E' - The E flag is used to indicate early-authentication. 'E' - The E flag is used to indicate early-authentication.
The rest of the 4 bits (Resved) MUST be set to 0 and ignored on The rest of the 4 bits (Resved) MUST be set to 0 and ignored on
reception. reception.
SEQ SEQ
A 16-bit sequence number is used for replay protection. As defined in Section 5.3.2 of [RFC5296], this field is 16-bit
sequence number and used for replay protection.
TVs and TLVs TVs and TLVs
keyName-NAI: As defined in RFC 5296 [RFC5296], this is carried in a keyName-NAI: As defined in RFC 5296 [RFC5296], this is carried in a
TLV payload. The Type is 1. The NAI is variable in length, not TLV payload. The Type is 1. The NAI is variable in length, not
exceeding 253 octets. The realm part of the NAI is the home domain exceeding 253 octets. The realm part of the NAI is the home domain
name. Exactly one keyName-NAI attribute SHALL be present in an EAP- name. Exactly one keyName-NAI attribute SHALL be present in an EAP-
Finish/Re-auth packet. Finish/Re-auth packet.
ERP/AAK-Key: Carried in a TLV payload for the key container. The ERP/AAK-Key: Carried in a TLV payload for the key container. The
type is TBD. Exactly one ERP/AAK-key SHALL be present in an EAP- type is TBD. Exactly one ERP/AAK-key SHALL only be present in an
Finish/Re-auth packet. EAP-Finish/Re-auth packet.
ERP/AAK-Key ::= ERP/AAK-Key ::=
{ sub-TLV: CAP-Identifier } { sub-TLV: CAP-Identifier }
{ sub-TLV: pMSK-lifetime } { sub-TLV: pMSK-lifetime }
{ sub-TLV: pRK-lifetime } { sub-TLV: pRK-lifetime }
{ sub-TLV: Cryptosuites } { sub-TLV: Cryptosuites }
CAP-Identifier CAP-Identifier
Carried in a sub-TLV payload. It is used to indicate the Carried in a sub-TLV payload. The Type is TBD (less than 128).
identifier of the candidate authenticator. There exactly one This field is used to indicate the identifier of the candidate
instance of the CAP-Identifier TLV MUST be present in the ERP/ authenticator. The value field MUST be encoded as specified in
AAK-Key TLV. Section 8 of RFC 3315 [RFC3315]. There at least one instance of
the CAP-Identifier TLV MUST be present in the ERP/ AAK-Key TLV.
pMSK-lifetime pMSK-lifetime
Carried in a sub-TLV payload. The Type is TBD. The value field Carried in a sub-TLV payload of EAP-Finish/Re-auth message. The
is a 32-bit field and contains the lifetime of the pMSK in Type is TBD. The value field is an unsigned 32-bit field and
seconds. If the 'L' flag is set, the pMSK Lifetime attribute contains the lifetime of the pMSK in seconds. This value is
SHOULD be present. calculated by the server after pRK-lifetime computation upon
receiving EAP-Initiate/Re-auth message. The rIK SHOULD share the
same lifetime as pMSK.If the 'L' flag is set, the pMSK-Lifetime
attribute MUST be present.
pRK-lifetime pRK-lifetime
Carried in a sub-TLV payload. The Type is TBD. The value field Carried in a sub-TLV payload of EAP-Finish/Re-auth message. The
is a 32-bit field and contains the lifetime of the pRK in seconds. Type is TBD. The value field is an unsigned 32-bit field and
If the 'L' flag is set, the pRK Lifetime attribute SHOULD be contains the lifetime of the pRK in seconds. This value is
present. calculated by the server before pMSK-lifetime computation upon
receiving EAP-Initiate/Re-auth message. If the 'L' flag is set,
the pRK-Lifetime attribute MUST be present.
List of Cryptosuites List of Cryptosuites
Carried in a sub-TLV payload. The Type is 5 [RFC5296]. The value Carried in a sub-TLV payload. The Type is 5 [RFC5296]. The value
field contains a list of cryptosuites, each 1 octet in length. field contains a list of cryptosuites (at least one cryptosuite
The allowed cryptosuite values are as specified in Section 5.2, SHOULD be included), each 1 octet in length. The allowed
above. The server SHOULD include this attribute if the cryptosuite values are as specified in Section 5.2, above. The
cryptosuite used in the EAP-Initiate/Re-auth message was not server SHOULD include this attribute if the cryptosuite used in
acceptable and the message is being rejected. The server MAY the EAP-Initiate/Re-auth message was not acceptable and the
include this attribute in other cases. The server MAY use this message is being rejected. The server MAY include this attribute
attribute to signal to the peer about its cryptographic algorithm in other cases. The server MAY use this attribute to signal to
capabilities. the peer about its cryptographic algorithm capabilities.
Cryptosuite Cryptosuite
This field indicates the integrity algorithm and PRF used for ERP/ This field indicates the integrity algorithm and PRF used for ERP/
AAK. Key lengths and output lengths are either indicated or obvious AAK. HMAC-SHA256-128 is mandatory to implement and should be enabled
from the cryptosuite name. in the default configuration. Key lengths and output lengths are
either indicated or obvious from the cryptosuite name.
Authentication Tag Authentication Tag
This field contains the integrity checksum over the ERP/AAK packet, This field contains the integrity checksum over the ERP/AAK packet,
excluding the authentication tag field itself. The length of the excluding the authentication tag field itself. The value field is
field is indicated by the Cryptosuite. calculated using the integrity algorithm indicated in the Cryptosuite
field and rIK [RFC5296] as the integrity key. The length of the
field is indicated by the corresponding Cryptosuite.
The peer uses authentication tag to determine the validity of the
EAP-Finish/Re-auth message originates at a server.
If the message doesn't pass verification or authentication tag is not
included in the message, the message SHOULD be discarded silently.
If the EAP-Initiate/Re-auth packet is not supported by the SAP, it is
discarded silently.
5.4. TV and TLV Attributes 5.4. TV and TLV Attributes
With the exception of the rRK Lifetime and rMSK Lifetime TV payloads, With the exception of the rRK-Lifetime and rMSK-Lifetime TV payloads,
the attributes specified in Section 5.3.4 of [RFC5296] also apply to the attributes specified in Section 5.3.4 of [RFC5296] also apply to
this document. In this document, new attributes which may be present this document. In this document, new attributes which may be present
in the EAP-Initiate and EAP-Finish messages are defined as below: in the EAP-Initiate and EAP-Finish messages are defined as below:
o Sequence number: This is a TV payload. The type is TBD. o Sequence number: This is a TV payload. The type is TBD.
o ERP/AAK-Key: This is a TLV payload. The type is TBD. o ERP/AAK-Key: This is a TLV payload. The type is TBD.
o pRK Lifetime: This is a TV payload. The type is TBD. o pRK-Lifetime: This is a TV payload. The type is TBD.
o pMSK Lifetime: This is a TV payload. The type is TBD. o pMSK-Lifetime: This is a TV payload. The type is TBD.
o List of Cryptosuites: This is a TLV payload. The type is TBD. o List of Cryptosuites: This is a TLV payload. The type is TBD.
6. Lower Layer Considerations 6. Lower Layer Considerations
Similar to ERP, some lower layer specifications may need to be Similar to ERP, some lower layer specifications may need to be
revised to support ERP/AAK; refer to of Section 6 [RFC5296] for revised to support ERP/AAK; refer to of Section 6 [RFC5296] for
additional guidance. additional guidance.
7. AAA Transport Considerations 7. AAA Transport Considerations
AAA transport of ERP/AAK messages is the same as AAA transport of the AAA transport of ERP/AAK messages is the same as AAA transport of the
ERP message [RFC5296]. In addition, the document requires AAA ERP message [RFC5296]. In addition, the document requires AAA
transport of the ERP/AAK keying materials delivered by the ERP/AAK transport of the ERP/AAK keying materials delivered by the ERP/AAK
server to the CAP. Hence, a new Diameter ERP/AAK application message server to the CAP. Hence, a new AAA message for ERP/AAK application
should be specified to transport the keying materials. should be specified to transport the keying materials.
8. Security Considerations 8. Security Considerations
This section provides an analysis of the protocol in accordance with This section provides an analysis of the protocol in accordance with
the AAA key management requirements specified in RFC 4962 [RFC4962]. the AAA key management requirements specified in RFC 4962 [RFC4962].
o Cryptographic algorithm independence: ERP-AAK satisfies this o Cryptographic algorithm independence: ERP-AAK satisfies this
requirement. The algorithm chosen by the peer is indicated in the requirement. The algorithm chosen by the peer for calculating the
EAP-Initiate/Re-auth message. If the chosen algorithm is authentication tag is indicated in the EAP-Initiate/Re-auth
unacceptable, the EAP server returns an EAP- Finish/Re-auth message. If the chosen algorithm is unacceptable, the EAP server
message with Failure indication. returns an EAP- Finish/Re-auth message with Failure indication.
o Strong, fresh session keys: ERP-AAK results in the derivation of o Strong, fresh session keys: ERP-AAK results in the derivation of
strong, fresh keys that are unique for the given CAP. An pMSK is strong, fresh keys that are unique for the given CAP. An pMSK is
always derived on-demand when the peer requires a key with a new always derived on-demand when the peer requires a key with a new
CAP. The derivation ensures that the compromise of one pMSK does CAP. The derivation ensures that the compromise of one pMSK does
not result in the compromise of a different pMSK at any time. not result in the compromise of a different pMSK at any time.
o Limit key scope: The scope of all the keys derived by ERP-AAK is o Limit key scope: The scope of all the keys derived by ERP-AAK is
well defined. The pRK is used to derive the pIK and pMSK for the well defined. The pRK is used to derive the pMSK for the CAP.
CAP. Different sequence numbers for each CAP MUST be used to Different sequence numbers for each CAP MUST be used to derive a
derive a unique pMSK. unique pMSK.
o Replay detection mechanism: For replay protection of ERP-AAK o Replay detection mechanism: For replay protection of ERP-AAK
messages, a sequence number associated with the pMSK is used. messages, a sequence number associated with the pMSK is used.The
peer increments the sequence number by one after it sends an ERP/
AAK message. The server sets the expected sequence number to the
received sequence number plus one after verifying the validity of
the received message and responds to the message. If multiple
CAP-identifier are carried, a unique sequence number for each pMSK
SHOULD be associated for each CAP-Identifier.
o Authenticate all parties: The EAP Re-auth Protocol provides mutual o Authenticate all parties: The EAP Re-auth Protocol provides mutual
authentication of the peer and the server. The peer and SAP are authentication of the peer and the server. The peer and SAP are
authenticated via ERP. The CAP is authenticated and trusted by authenticated via ERP. The CAP is authenticated and trusted by
the SAP. the SAP.
o Peer and authenticator authorization: The peer and authenticator o Peer and authenticator authorization: The peer and authenticator
demonstrate possession of the same key material without disclosing demonstrate possession of the same key material without disclosing
it, as part of the lower layer secure authentication protocol. it, as part of the lower layer secure authentication protocol.
skipping to change at page 12, line 42 skipping to change at page 15, line 20
domain-specific keys are further restricted to be used only in the domain-specific keys are further restricted to be used only in the
domain for which the keys are derived. Any other restrictions of domain for which the keys are derived. Any other restrictions of
session keys may be imposed by the specific lower layer and are session keys may be imposed by the specific lower layer and are
out of scope for this specification. out of scope for this specification.
9. IANA Considerations 9. IANA Considerations
IANA is requested to assign four TLV type values from the registry of IANA is requested to assign four TLV type values from the registry of
EAP Initiate and Finish Attributes maintained at EAP Initiate and Finish Attributes maintained at
http://www.iana.org/assignments/eap-numbers/eap-numbers.xml. http://www.iana.org/assignments/eap-numbers/eap-numbers.xml.
New TLV types: with the following assigned number:
o Sequence number o Sequence number: This is a TV payload. The type is 7.
o ERP/AAK-Key o ERP/AAK-Key: This is a TLV payload. The type is 8.
o pRK Lifetime o pRK Lifetime: This is a TLV payload. The type is 9.
o pMSK Lifetime o pMSK Lifetime: This is a TLV payload. The type is 10.
This document reuses the crytosuites we have already created for 'Re-
authentication Cryptosuites' in [RFC5296].
Further, this document registers a Early authentication usage label
from the "USRK Key Labels" name space with a value:
EAP Early-Authentication Root Key@ietf.org
10. Acknowledgement 10. Acknowledgement
In writing this document, we have received reviews from many experts In writing this document, Yungui Wang contributed to early versions
in the IETF, including Tom Taylor, Tena Zou, Tim Polk, Tan Zhang and of this document and we have received reviews from many experts in
Semyon Mizikovsky. We apologize if we miss some of those who have the IETF, including Tom Taylor, Tena Zou, Tim Polk, Tan Zhang and
helped us. Semyon Mizikovsky, Stephen Farrell,Sujing Zhou. We apologize if we
miss some of those who have helped us.
11. References 11. References
11.1. Normative References 11.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in
RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels",
BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3315] Droms, R., Ed., Bound, J., Volz, B.,
Lemon, T., Perkins, C., and M. Carney,
"Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
for IPv6 (DHCPv6)", RFC 3315,
July 2003.
[RFC5295] Salowey, J., Dondeti, L., Narayanan,
V., and M. Nakhjiri, "Specification
for the Derivation of Root Keys from
an Extended Master Session Key
(EMSK)", August 2008.
[RFC5296] Narayanan, V. and L. Dondeti, "EAP [RFC5296] Narayanan, V. and L. Dondeti, "EAP
Extensions for EAP Re-authentication Extensions for EAP Re-authentication
Protocol (ERP)", RFC 5296, Protocol (ERP)", RFC 5296,
August 2008. August 2008.
11.2. Informative References 11.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-dime-local-keytran] Zorn, G., Wu, W., and V. Cakulev, [I-D.ietf-dime-local-keytran] Zorn, G., Wu, W., and V. Cakulev,
"Diameter Attribute-Value Pairs for "Diameter Attribute-Value Pairs for
Cryptographic Key Transport", Cryptographic Key Transport",
draft-ietf-dime-local-keytran-14 (work draft-ietf-dime-local-keytran-14 (work
in progress), August 2011. in progress), August 2011.
[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R.
Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for
Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
February 1997.
[RFC3588] Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, [RFC3588] Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman,
E., Zorn, G., and J. Arkko, "Diameter E., Zorn, G., and J. Arkko, "Diameter
Base Protocol", RFC 3588, Base Protocol", RFC 3588,
September 2003. September 2003.
[RFC3748] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., [RFC3748] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J.,
Carlson, J., and H. Levkowetz, Carlson, J., and H. Levkowetz,
"Extensible Authentication Protocol "Extensible Authentication Protocol
(EAP)", RFC 3748, June 2004. (EAP)", RFC 3748, June 2004.
[RFC4868] Kelly, S. and S. Frankel, "Using HMAC-
SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-
512 with IPsec", RFC 4868, May 2007.
[RFC4962] Housley, R. and B. Aboba, "Guidance [RFC4962] Housley, R. and B. Aboba, "Guidance
for Authentication, Authorization, and for Authentication, Authorization, and
Accounting (AAA) Key Management", Accounting (AAA) Key Management",
BCP 132, RFC 4962, July 2007. BCP 132, RFC 4962, July 2007.
[RFC5836] Ohba, Y., Wu, Q., and G. Zorn, [RFC5836] Ohba, Y., Wu, Q., and G. Zorn,
"Extensible Authentication Protocol "Extensible Authentication Protocol
(EAP) Early Authentication Problem (EAP) Early Authentication Problem
Statement", RFC 5836, April 2010. Statement", RFC 5836, April 2010.
[RFC5890] Klensin, J., "Internationalized Domain
Names for Applications (IDNA):
Definitions and Document Framework",
RFC 5890, August 2010.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Zhen Cao Zhen Cao
China Mobile China Mobile
53A Xibianmennei Ave., Xuanwu District 53A Xibianmennei Ave., Xuanwu District
Beijing, Beijing 100053 Beijing, Beijing 100053
P.R. China P.R. China
EMail: zehn.cao@gmail.com EMail: zehn.cao@gmail.com
Hui Deng Hui Deng
China Mobile China Mobile
53A Xibianmennei Ave., Xuanwu District 53A Xibianmennei Ave., Xuanwu District
Beijing, Beijing 100053 Beijing, Beijing 100053
P.R. China P.R. China
EMail: denghui02@gmail.com EMail: denghui02@gmail.com
Yungui Wang
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
Floor 10, HuiHong Mansion, No.91 BaiXia Rd.
Nanjing, Jiangsu 210001
P.R. China
Phone: +86 25 84565893
EMail: w52006@huawei.com
Qin Wu Qin Wu
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. Huawei
Floor 12, HuiHong Mansion, No.91 BaiXia Rd. Floor 12, HuiHong Mansion, No.91 BaiXia Rd.
Nanjing, Jiangsu 210001 Nanjing, Jiangsu 210001
P.R. China P.R. China
Phone: +86 25 84565892 Phone: +86 25 56623633
EMail: bill.wu@huawei.com EMail: sunseawq@huawei.com
Glen Zorn (editor) Glen Zorn
Network Zen Network Zen
227/358 Thanon Sanphawut 227/358 Thanon Sanphawut
Bang Na, Bangkok 10260 Bang Na, Bangkok 10260
Thailand Thailand
Phone: +66 (0) 87-040-4617 Phone: +66 (0) 87-040-4617
EMail: glenzorn@gmail.com EMail: glenzorn@gmail.com
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