draft-ietf-httpbis-http2-tls13-01.txt   draft-ietf-httpbis-http2-tls13-02.txt 
HTTP D. Benjamin HTTP D. Benjamin
Internet-Draft Google LLC Internet-Draft Google LLC
Updates: 7540 (if approved) September 13, 2019 Updates: 7540 (if approved) September 20, 2019
Intended status: Standards Track Intended status: Standards Track
Expires: March 16, 2020 Expires: March 23, 2020
Using TLS 1.3 with HTTP/2 Using TLS 1.3 with HTTP/2
draft-ietf-httpbis-http2-tls13-01 draft-ietf-httpbis-http2-tls13-02
Abstract Abstract
This document updates HTTP/2 to prohibit TLS 1.3 post-handshake This document updates HTTP/2 to prohibit TLS 1.3 post-handshake
authentication, as an analog to existing TLS 1.2 renegotiation authentication, as an analog to existing TLS 1.2 renegotiation
restriction. restriction.
Note to Readers Note to Readers
_RFC EDITOR: please remove this section before publication_ _RFC EDITOR: please remove this section before publication_
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on March 16, 2020. This Internet-Draft will expire on March 23, 2020.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] and earlier support renegotiation, a mechanism for TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] and earlier support renegotiation, a mechanism for
changing parameters and keys partway through a connection. This was changing parameters and keys partway through a connection. This was
sometimes used to implement reactive client authentication in sometimes used to implement reactive client authentication in
HTTP/1.1 [RFC7230], where the server decides whether to request a HTTP/1.1 [RFC7230], where the server decides whether to request a
client certificate based on the HTTP request. client certificate based on the HTTP request.
HTTP/2 [RFC7540] multiplexes multiple HTTP requests over a single HTTP/2 [RFC7540] multiplexes multiple HTTP requests over a single
connection, which is incompatible with the mechanism above. Clients connection, which is incompatible with the mechanism above. Clients
cannot correlate the certificate request with the HTTP request which cannot correlate the certificate request with the HTTP request which
triggered it. Thus, section 9.2.1 of [RFC7540] forbids triggered it. Thus, Section 9.2.1 of [RFC7540] forbids
renegotiation. renegotiation.
TLS 1.3 [RFC8446] updates TLS 1.2 to remove renegotiation in favor of TLS 1.3 [RFC8446] updates TLS 1.2 to remove renegotiation in favor of
separate post-handshake authentication and key update mechanisms. separate post-handshake authentication and key update mechanisms.
The former shares the same problems with multiplexed protocols, but The former shares the same problems with multiplexed protocols, but
the prohibition in HTTP/2 only applies to TLS 1.2 renegotiation. the prohibition in HTTP/2 only applies to TLS 1.2 renegotiation.
This document updates HTTP/2 to similarly forbid TLS 1.3 post- This document updates HTTP/2 to similarly forbid TLS 1.3 post-
handshake authentication. handshake authentication.
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The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here. capitals, as shown here.
3. Post-Handshake Authentication in HTTP/2 3. Post-Handshake Authentication in HTTP/2
HTTP/2 servers MUST NOT send post-handshake TLS 1.3 HTTP/2 servers MUST NOT send post-handshake TLS 1.3
CertificateRequest messages. HTTP/2 clients MUST treat TLS 1.3 post- CertificateRequest messages. HTTP/2 clients MUST treat TLS 1.3 post-
handshake authentication as a connection error (see section 5.4.1 of handshake authentication as a connection error (see Section 5.4.1 of
[RFC7540]) of type PROTOCOL_ERROR. [RFC7540]) of type PROTOCOL_ERROR.
[RFC7540] permitted renegotiation before the HTTP/2 connection [RFC7540] permitted renegotiation before the HTTP/2 connection
preface to provide confidentiality of the client certificate. TLS preface to provide confidentiality of the client certificate. TLS
1.3 encrypts the client certificate in the initial handshake, so this 1.3 encrypts the client certificate in the initial handshake, so this
is no longer necessary. HTTP/2 servers MUST NOT send post-handshake is no longer necessary. HTTP/2 servers MUST NOT send post-handshake
TLS 1.3 CertificateRequest messages before the connection preface. TLS 1.3 CertificateRequest messages before the connection preface.
The above applies even if the client offered the The above applies even if the client offered the
"post_handshake_auth" TLS extension. This extension is advertised "post_handshake_auth" TLS extension. This extension is advertised
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