draft-ietf-httpbis-http2-tls13-02.txt   draft-ietf-httpbis-http2-tls13-03.txt 
HTTP D. Benjamin HTTP D. Benjamin
Internet-Draft Google LLC Internet-Draft Google LLC
Updates: 7540 (if approved) September 20, 2019 Updates: 7540 (if approved) October 17, 2019
Intended status: Standards Track Intended status: Standards Track
Expires: March 23, 2020 Expires: April 19, 2020
Using TLS 1.3 with HTTP/2 Using TLS 1.3 with HTTP/2
draft-ietf-httpbis-http2-tls13-02 draft-ietf-httpbis-http2-tls13-03
Abstract Abstract
This document updates HTTP/2 to prohibit TLS 1.3 post-handshake This document updates RFC 7540 by forbidding TLS 1.3 post-handshake
authentication, as an analog to existing TLS 1.2 renegotiation authentication, as an analog to the existing TLS 1.2 renegotiation
restriction. restriction.
Note to Readers Note to Readers
_RFC EDITOR: please remove this section before publication_ _RFC EDITOR: please remove this section before publication_
Discussion of this draft takes place on the HTTP working group Discussion of this draft takes place on the HTTP working group
mailing list (ietf-http-wg@w3.org), which is archived at mailing list (ietf-http-wg@w3.org), which is archived at
https://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/ietf-http-wg/ [1]. https://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/ietf-http-wg/ [1].
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on March 23, 2020. This Internet-Draft will expire on April 19, 2020.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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HTTP/2 [RFC7540] multiplexes multiple HTTP requests over a single HTTP/2 [RFC7540] multiplexes multiple HTTP requests over a single
connection, which is incompatible with the mechanism above. Clients connection, which is incompatible with the mechanism above. Clients
cannot correlate the certificate request with the HTTP request which cannot correlate the certificate request with the HTTP request which
triggered it. Thus, Section 9.2.1 of [RFC7540] forbids triggered it. Thus, Section 9.2.1 of [RFC7540] forbids
renegotiation. renegotiation.
TLS 1.3 [RFC8446] updates TLS 1.2 to remove renegotiation in favor of TLS 1.3 [RFC8446] updates TLS 1.2 to remove renegotiation in favor of
separate post-handshake authentication and key update mechanisms. separate post-handshake authentication and key update mechanisms.
The former shares the same problems with multiplexed protocols, but The former shares the same problems with multiplexed protocols, but
the prohibition in HTTP/2 only applies to TLS 1.2 renegotiation. the prohibition in [RFC7540] only applies to TLS 1.2 renegotiation.
This document updates HTTP/2 to similarly forbid TLS 1.3 post- This document updates HTTP/2 to similarly forbid TLS 1.3 post-
handshake authentication. handshake authentication.
2. Requirements Language 2. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here. capitals, as shown here.
3. Post-Handshake Authentication in HTTP/2 3. Post-Handshake Authentication in HTTP/2
HTTP/2 servers MUST NOT send post-handshake TLS 1.3 HTTP/2 servers MUST NOT send post-handshake TLS 1.3
CertificateRequest messages. HTTP/2 clients MUST treat TLS 1.3 post- CertificateRequest messages. HTTP/2 clients MUST treat such messages
handshake authentication as a connection error (see Section 5.4.1 of as connection errors (see Section 5.4.1 of [RFC7540]) of type
[RFC7540]) of type PROTOCOL_ERROR. PROTOCOL_ERROR.
[RFC7540] permitted renegotiation before the HTTP/2 connection [RFC7540] permitted renegotiation before the HTTP/2 connection
preface to provide confidentiality of the client certificate. TLS preface to provide confidentiality of the client certificate. TLS
1.3 encrypts the client certificate in the initial handshake, so this 1.3 encrypts the client certificate in the initial handshake, so this
is no longer necessary. HTTP/2 servers MUST NOT send post-handshake is no longer necessary. HTTP/2 servers MUST NOT send post-handshake
TLS 1.3 CertificateRequest messages before the connection preface. TLS 1.3 CertificateRequest messages before the connection preface.
The above applies even if the client offered the The above applies even if the client offered the
"post_handshake_auth" TLS extension. This extension is advertised "post_handshake_auth" TLS extension. This extension is advertised
independently of the selected ALPN protocol [RFC7301], so it is not independently of the selected ALPN protocol [RFC7301], so it is not
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KeyUpdate messages only affect TLS itself and do not require any KeyUpdate messages only affect TLS itself and do not require any
interaction with the application protocol. HTTP/2 implementations interaction with the application protocol. HTTP/2 implementations
MUST support key updates when TLS 1.3 is negotiated. MUST support key updates when TLS 1.3 is negotiated.
NewSessionTicket messages are also permitted. Though these interact NewSessionTicket messages are also permitted. Though these interact
with HTTP when early data is enabled, these interactions are defined with HTTP when early data is enabled, these interactions are defined
in [RFC8470] and allowed for in the design of HTTP/2. in [RFC8470] and allowed for in the design of HTTP/2.
Unless the use of a new type of TLS message depends on an interaction Unless the use of a new type of TLS message depends on an interaction
with the application layer protocol, that TLS message can be sent with the application-layer protocol, that TLS message can be sent
after the handshake completes. after the handshake completes.
5. Security Considerations 5. Security Considerations
This document resolves a compatibility concern between HTTP/2 and TLS This document resolves a compatibility concern between HTTP/2 and TLS
1.3 when supporting post-handshake authentication with HTTP/1.1. 1.3 when supporting post-handshake authentication with HTTP/1.1.
This lowers the barrier for deploying TLS 1.3, a major security This lowers the barrier for deploying TLS 1.3, a major security
improvement over TLS 1.2. improvement over TLS 1.2.
6. IANA Considerations 6. IANA Considerations
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