wdiff draft-ietf-hybi-thewebsocketprotocol-00.txt draft-ietf-hybi-thewebsocketprotocol-01.txt

Network
HyBi Working Group I. Hickson Fette
Internet-Draft Google, Inc.
Intended status: Standards Track May 23, August 31, 2010
Expires: November 24, 2010 March 4, 2011

The WebSocket protocol
draft-ietf-hybi-thewebsocketprotocol-00
draft-ietf-hybi-thewebsocketprotocol-01

Abstract

The WebSocket protocol enables two-way communication between a user
agent running untrusted code running in a controlled environment to a
remote host that has opted-in to communications from that code. The
security model used for this is the Origin-based security model
commonly used by Web browsers. The protocol consists of an initial
handshake followed by basic message framing, layered over TCP. The
goal of this technology is to provide a mechanism for browser-based
applications that need two-way communication with servers that does
not rely on opening multiple HTTP connections (e.g. using
XMLHttpRequest or <iframe>s and long polling).

NOTE! THIS COPY OF THIS DOCUMENT IS OBSOLETE.

For an up-to-date copy of this specification, please see:

http://www.whatwg.org/specs/web-socket-protocol/

Author's note

This document is automatically generated from the same source
document as the HTML specification. [HTML]

Please send feedback to either the hybi@ietf.org list or the
whatwg@whatwg.org mailing list.

Note

This draft is meant to reflect changes in direction in the HyBi
working group. There is not yet consensus on everything in this
draft. Specifically, details about the framing are still under
discussion, however this draft is much closer to what the group is
discussing than the previous draft. There have also been proposals
to change the handshake, so the handshake is also not in a final
form.

Status of this Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on November 24, 2010. March 4, 2011.

This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5
1.1. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5
1.2. Protocol overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5
1.3. Opening handshake . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 9
1.4. Closing handshake . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 12
1.5. Design philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 13
1.6. Security model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 14
1.7. Relationship to TCP and HTTP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 14
1.8. Establishing a connection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 14
1.9. Subprotocols using the WebSocket protocol . . . . . . . . 13 15
2. Conformance requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 17
2.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 17
3. WebSocket URLs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 19
3.1. Parsing WebSocket URLs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 19
3.2. Constructing WebSocket URLs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4. Client-side requirements 20
3.3. Valid WebSocket URLs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.1. Opening handshake 20
4. Data Framing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.2. Data framing . . . . . 21
4.1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
4.3. Handling errors in UTF-8 from the server . . . . . . . 21
4.2. Base Framing Protocol . . 30
5. Server-side requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.3. Fragmentation . . . 32
5.1. Reading the client's opening handshake . . . . . . . . . . 32
5.2. Sending the server's opening handshake . . . . . . . . . 22
4.4. Control Frames . 35
5.3. Data framing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.5. Data Frames . . 39
5.4. Handling errors in UTF-8 from the client . . . . . . . . . 41
6. Closing the connection . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.6. Examples . . . . . . . . 42
6.1. Client-initiated closure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
6.2. Server-initiated closure 24
4.7. Extensibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
6.3. Closure . . . . . 25
5. Opening Handshake . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
7. Security considerations . . 26
5.1. Client Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
8. IANA considerations . . 26
5.2. Server-side requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
5.2.1. Reading the client's opening handshake . . 45
8.1. Registration of ws: scheme . . . . . . 35
5.2.2. Sending the server's opening handshake . . . . . . . . 38
6. Error Handling . . 45
8.2. Registration of wss: scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
8.3. Registration of the "WebSocket" HTTP Upgrade keyword . . . 47
8.4. Sec-WebSocket-Key1 and Sec-WebSocket-Key2 . . . . 43
6.1. Handling errors in UTF-8 from the server . . . . 47
8.5. Sec-WebSocket-Location . . . . . 43
6.2. Handling errors in UTF-8 from the client . . . . . . . . . 43
7. Closing the connection . . . . 48
8.6. Sec-WebSocket-Origin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
7.1. Client-initiated closure . . . 49
8.7. Sec-WebSocket-Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
7.2. Server-initiated closure . . . . 50
9. Using . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
7.3. Closure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
8. Security considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
9. IANA considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
9.1. Registration of ws: scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
9.2. Registration of wss: scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
9.3. Registration of the "WebSocket" HTTP Upgrade keyword . . . 49
9.4. Sec-WebSocket-Key1 and Sec-WebSocket-Key2 . . . . . . . . 49
9.5. Sec-WebSocket-Location . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
9.6. Sec-WebSocket-Origin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
9.7. Sec-WebSocket-Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
10. Using the WebSocket protocol from other specifications . . . . 51
10. 53
11. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
11. 54
12. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 55
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 57

1. Introduction

1.1. Background

_This section is non-normative._

Historically, creating an instant messenger chat client as a Web
application has required an abuse of HTTP to poll the server for
updates while sending upstream notifications as distinct HTTP calls.

This results in a variety of problems:

o The server is forced to use a number of different underlying TCP
connections for each client: one for sending information to the
client, and a new one for each incoming message.

o The wire protocol has a high overhead, with each client-to-server
message having an HTTP header.

o The client-side script is forced to maintain a mapping from the
outgoing connections to the incoming connection to track replies.

A simpler solution would be to use a single TCP connection for
traffic in both directions. This is what the WebSocket protocol
provides. Combined with the WebSocket API, it provides an
alternative to HTTP polling for two-way communication from a Web page
to a remote server. [WSAPI]

The same technique can be used for a variety of Web applications:
games, stock tickers, multiuser applications with simultaneous
editing, user interfaces exposing server-side services in real time,
etc.

1.2. Protocol overview

_This section is non-normative._

The protocol has two parts: a handshake, and then the data transfer.

The handshake from the client looks as follows:

GET /demo HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
Connection: Upgrade
Sec-WebSocket-Key2: 12998 5 Y3 1 .P00
Sec-WebSocket-Protocol: sample
Upgrade: WebSocket
Sec-WebSocket-Key1: 4 @1 46546xW%0l 1 5
Origin: http://example.com

^n:ds[4U

The handshake from the server looks as follows:

HTTP/1.1 101 WebSocket Protocol Handshake
Upgrade: WebSocket
Connection: Upgrade
Sec-WebSocket-Origin: http://example.com
Sec-WebSocket-Location: ws://example.com/demo
Sec-WebSocket-Protocol: sample

8jKS'y:G*Co,Wxa-

The leading line from the client follows the Request-Line format.
The leading line from the server follows the Status-Line format. The
Request-Line and Status-Line productions are defined in the HTTP
specification.

After the leading line in both cases come an unordered ASCII case-
insensitive set of fields, one per line, that each match the
following non-normative ABNF: [RFC5234]
field = 1*name-char colon [ space ] *any-char cr lf
colon = %x003A ; U+003A COLON (:)
space = %x0020 ; U+0020 SPACE
cr = %x000D ; U+000D CARRIAGE RETURN (CR)
lf = %x000A ; U+000A LINE FEED (LF)
name-char = %x0000-0009
/ %x000B-000C
/ %x000E-0039
/ %x003B-10FFFF
; a Unicode character other than
; U+000A LINE FEED (LF),
; U+000D CARRIAGE RETURN (CR),
; or U+003A COLON (:)
any-char = %x0000-0009 / %x000B-000C / %x000E-10FFFF
; a Unicode character other than
; U+000A LINE FEED (LF)
; or U+000D CARRIAGE RETURN (CR)

NOTE: The character set for the above ABNF is Unicode. The fields
themselves are encoded as UTF-8.

Lines that don't match the above production cause the connection to
be aborted.

Finally, after the last field, the client sends 10 bytes starting
with 0x0D 0x0A and followed by 8 random bytes, part of a challenge,
and the server sends 18 bytes starting with 0x0D 0x0A and followed by
16 bytes consisting of a challenge response. The details of this
challenge and other parts of the handshake are described in the next
section.

Once the client and server have both sent their handshakes, and if
the handshake was successful, then the data transfer part starts.
This is a two-way communication channel where each side can,
independently from the other, send data at will.

Data is sent in the form of UTF-8 text. Each frame of data starts
with a 0x00 byte

Clients and ends with servers, after a 0xFF byte, with the UTF-8 text successful handshake, transfer data back
and forth in conceptual units referred to in this specification as
"messages". A message is a complete unit of data at an application
level, with the expectation that many or most applications
implementing this protocol (such as web user agents) provide APIs in
terms of sending and receiving messages. On the network layer, a
message may be represented as one or more frames.

Data is sent on the wire in
between. the form of frames that have an
associated type. Broadly speaking, there are types for textual data,
which is interpreted as UTF-8 text, binary data (whose interpretation
is left up to the application), and control frames, which are not
intended to carry data for the application, but instead for protocol-
level signalling, such as to signal that the connection should be
closed.

The WebSocket protocol uses this framing so that specifications that
use the WebSocket protocol can expose such connections using an
event-based mechanism instead of requiring users of those
specifications to implement buffering and piecing together of
messages manually.

To close the connection cleanly, a control frame consisting of just a 0xFF
byte followed by a 0x00 byte is sent from one
peer to ask that the other peer close the connection. Details are
specified in Section 7.

The protocol is designed to support other frame types in future.
Instead of the 0x00 and 0xFF bytes, other bytes might in future be
defined. Frames denoted by bytes that do not have the high bit set
(0x00 to 0x7F)
Currently only four frame types are treated as a stream of bytes terminated by 0xFF.
Frames denoted by bytes that have the high bit set (0x80 to 0xFF)
have a leading length indicator, which is encoded as a series of
7-bit bytes stored in octets with the 8th bit being set defined -- continuation (used for all but
the last byte. The remainder of the frame is then as much data as
was specified. (The closing handshake contains no
fragmented messages), control frames, text frames, and binary data
frames. Eight frame types are reserved for future use, and therefore
has a length byte of 0x00.) four
frame types are reserved for private use.

This wire format for the data transfer part is described by the
following non-normative ABNF, which is ABNF
given in two alternative
forms: the first describing detail in Section 4. A high level overview of the wire format as allowed by this
specification, and framing
is given in the second describing how an arbitrary bytestream
would be parsed. following figure. [RFC5234]
;

0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-------+-+-------------+-------------------------------+
|M|R|R|R| opcode|R| Payload len | Extended payload length |
|O|S|S|S| (4) |S| (7) | (16/63) |
|R|V|V|V| |V| | (if payload len==126/127) |
|E|1|2|3| |4| | |
+-+-+-+-+-------+-+-------------+ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - +
| Extended payload length continued, if payload len == 127 |
+ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - +-------------------------------+
| | Extension data |
+-------------------------------+ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - +
: :
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
: Application data :
+---------------------------------------------------------------+

MORE: 1 bit

Indicates more fragments follow in the wire protocol as allowed by this specification
frames = *frame
frame = text-frame / closing-frame
text-frame = %x00 *( UTF8-char ) %xFF
closing-frame = %xFF %x00

; current message

RSV1, RSV2, RSV3, RSV4: 1 bit each

Must be 0 unless an extension is negotiated which defines meanings
for non-zero values

Opcode: 4 bits

Defines the wire protocol including error-handling and forward-compatible parsing rules
frames = *frame
frame = text-frame / binary-frame
text-frame = (%x00-7F) *(%x00-FE) %xFF
binary-frame = (%x80-FF) interpretation of the payload data

Payload length: 7 bits

The length < of the payload: if 0-125, that is the payload length.
If 126, the following 2 bytes interpreted as many a 16 bit unsigned
integer are the payload length. If 127, the following 8 bytes
interpreted as given by a 64-bit unsigned integer (the high bit must be 0)
are the payload length. The payload length is the length > of the
Extension data + the length = *(%x80-FF) (%x00-7F) of the Application Data. The UTF8-char rule is defined length
of the Extension data may be zero, in which case the UTF-8 specification. [RFC3629]

NOTE: The above ABNF Payload
length is intended for a binary octet environment.

!!! WARNING: At this time, the WebSocket protocol cannot be used to
send binary length of the Application data. Using any

Extension data: n bytes

Only present if an extension is negotiated during the handshake
which defines it. If present, it is included in the total payload
length.

Application data: n bytes

Arbitrary application data, taking up the remainder of the frame types other than 0x00 and
0xFF
after any extension data. The length of the Application data is invalid. All other frame types are reserved for future use
by future versions
equal to the payload length minus the length of this protocol.

The following diagram summarises the protocol:

Handshake
|
V
Frame type byte <--------------------------------------.
| | |
| `--> (0x00 to 0x7F) --> Data... --> 0xFF -->-+
| |
`--> (0x80 to 0xFE) --> Length --> Data... ------->-' Extension
data.

1.3. Opening handshake

_This section is non-normative._

The opening handshake is intended to be compatible with HTTP-based
server-side software, so that a single port can be used by both HTTP
clients talking to that server and WebSocket clients talking to that
server. To this end, the WebSocket client's handshake appears to
HTTP servers to be a regular GET request with an Upgrade offer:

GET / HTTP/1.1
Upgrade: WebSocket
Connection: Upgrade

Fields in the handshake are sent by the client in a random order; the
order is not meaningful.

Additional fields are used to select options in the WebSocket
protocol. The only options available in this version are the
subprotocol selector, |Sec-WebSocket-Protocol|, and |Cookie|, which
can used for sending cookies to the server (e.g. as an authentication
mechanism). The |Sec-WebSocket-Protocol| field takes an arbitrary
string:

Sec-WebSocket-Protocol: chat

This field indicates the subprotocol (the application-level protocol
layered over the WebSocket protocol) that the client intends to use.
The server echoes this field in its handshake to indicate that it
supports that subprotocol.

The other fields in the handshake are all security-related. The
|Host| field is used to protect against DNS rebinding attacks and to
allow multiple domains to be served from one IP address.

Host: example.com

The server includes the hostname in the |Sec-WebSocket-Location|
field of its handshake, so that both the client and the server can
verify that they agree on which host is in use.

The |Origin| field is used to protect against unauthorized cross-
origin use of a WebSocket server by scripts using the |WebSocket| API
in a Web browser. The server specifies which origin it is willing to
receive requests from by including a |Sec-WebSocket-Origin| field
with that origin. If multiple origins are authorized, the server
echoes the value in the |Origin| field of the client's handshake.

Origin: http://example.com

Finally, the server has to prove to the client that it received the
client's WebSocket handshake, so that the server doesn't accept
connections that are not WebSocket connections. This prevents an
attacker from tricking a WebSocket server by sending it carefully-
crafted packets using |XMLHttpRequest| or a |form| submission.

To prove that the handshake was received, the server has to take
three pieces of information and combine them to form a response. The
first two pieces of information come from the |Sec-WebSocket-Key1|
and |Sec-WebSocket-Key2| fields in the client handshake:

Sec-WebSocket-Key1: 18x 6]8vM;54 *(5: { U1]8 z [ 8
Sec-WebSocket-Key2: 1_ tx7X d < nw 334J702) 7]o}` 0

For each of these fields, the server has to take the digits from the
value to obtain a number (in this case 1868545188 and 1733470270
respectively), then divide that number by the number of spaces
characters in the value (in this case 12 and 10) to obtain a 32-bit
number (155712099 and 173347027). These two resulting numbers are
then used in the server handshake, as described below.

The counting of spaces is intended to make it impossible to smuggle
this field into the resource name; making this even harder is the
presence of _two_ such fields, and the use of a newline as the only
reliable indicator that the end of the key has been reached. The use
of random characters interspersed with the spaces and the numbers
ensures that the implementor actually looks for spaces and newlines,
instead of being treating any character like a space, which would
make it again easy to smuggle the fields into the path and trick the
server. Finally, _dividing_ by this number of spaces is intended to
make sure that even the most naive of implementations will check for
spaces, since if ther server does not verify that there are some
spaces, the server will try to divide by zero, which is usually fatal
(a correct handshake will always have at least one space).

The third piece of information is given after the fields, in the last
eight bytes of the handshake, expressed here as they would be seen if
interpreted as ASCII:

Tm[K T2u

The concatenation of the number obtained from processing the |Sec-
WebSocket-Key1| field, expressed as a big-endian 32 bit number, the
number obtained from processing the |Sec-WebSocket-Key2| field, again
expressed as a big-endian 32 bit number, and finally the eight bytes
at the end of the handshake, form a 128 bit string whose MD5 sum is
then used by the server to prove that it read the handshake.

The handshake from the server is much simpler than the client
handshake. The first line is an HTTP Status-Line, with the status
code 101 (the HTTP version and reason phrase aren't important):

HTTP/1.1 101 WebSocket Protocol Handshake

The fields follow. Two of the fields are just for compatibility with
HTTP:

Upgrade: WebSocket
Connection: Upgrade

Two of the fields are part of the security model described above,
echoing the origin and stating the exact host, port, resource name,
and whether the connection is expected to be encrypted:

Sec-WebSocket-Origin: http://example.com
Sec-WebSocket-Location: ws://example.com/

These fields are checked by the Web browser when it is acting as a
|WebSocket| client for scripted pages. A server that only handles
one origin and only serves one resource can therefore just return
hard-coded values and does not need to parse the client's handshake
to verify the correctness of the values.

Option fields can also be included. In this version of the protocol,
the main option field is |Sec-WebSocket-Protocol|, which indicates
the subprotocol that the server speaks. Web browsers verify that the
server included the same value as was specified in the |WebSocket|
constructor, so a server that speaks multiple subprotocols has to
make sure it selects one based on the client's handshake and
specifies the right one in its handshake.

Sec-WebSocket-Protocol: chat

The server can also set cookie-related option fields to _set_
cookies, as in HTTP.

After the fields, the server sends the aforementioned MD5 sum, a 16
byte (128 bit) value, shown here as if interpreted as ASCII:

fQJ,fN/4F4!~K~MH

This value depends on what the client sends, as described above. If
it doesn't match what the client is expecting, the client would
disconnect.

Having part of the handshake appear after the fields ensures that
both the server and the client verify that the connection is not
being interrupted by an HTTP intermediary such as a man-in-the-middle
cache or proxy.

1.4. Closing handshake

_This section is non-normative._
The closing handshake is far simpler than the opening handshake.

Either peer can send a 0xFF control frame with length 0x00 data containing a specified
control sequence to begin the closing handshake. Upon receiving such
a 0xFF frame, the other peer sends an identical 0xFF frame in acknowledgement,
if it hasn't already sent one. Upon receiving _that_ 0xFF control frame,
the first peer then closes the connection, safe in the knowledge that
no further data is forthcoming.

After sending a 0xFF frame, control frame indicating the connection should be
closed, a peer does not send any further data; after receiving a 0xFF frame,
control frame frame indicating the connection should be closed, a
peer discards any further data received.

It is safe for both peers to initiate this handshake simultaneously.

The closing handshake is intended to replace the TCP closing
handshake (FIN/ACK), on the basis that the TCP closing handshake is
not always reliable end-to-end, especially in the presence of man-in-
the-middle proxies and other intermediaries.

1.5. Design philosophy

_This section is non-normative._

The WebSocket protocol is designed on the principle that there should
be minimal framing (the only framing that exists is to make the
protocol frame-based instead of stream-based, and to support a
distinction between Unicode text and binary frames). It is expected
that metadata would be layered on top of WebSocket by the application
layer, in the same way that metadata is layered on top of TCP by the
application layer (HTTP).

Conceptually, WebSocket is really just a layer on top of TCP that
adds a Web "origin"-based security model for browsers; adds an
addressing and protocol naming mechanism to support multiple services
on one port and multiple host names on one IP address; layers a
framing mechanism on top of TCP to get back to the IP packet
mechanism that TCP is built on, but without length limits; and
reimplements the closing handshake in-band. Other than that, it adds
nothing. Basically it is intended to be as close to just exposing
raw TCP to script as possible given the constraints of the Web. It's
also designed in such a way that its servers can share a port with
HTTP servers, by having its handshake be a valid HTTP Upgrade
handshake also.

The protocol is intended to be extensible; future versions will
likely introduce a mechanism to compress data and might support
sending binary data.

1.6. Security model

_This section is non-normative._

The WebSocket protocol uses the origin model used by Web browsers to
restrict which Web pages can contact a WebSocket server when the
WebSocket protocol is used from a Web page. Naturally, when the
WebSocket protocol is used by a dedicated client directly (i.e. not
from a Web page through a Web browser), the origin model is not
useful, as the client can provide any arbitrary origin string.

This protocol is intended to fail to establish a connection with
servers of pre-existing protocols like SMTP or HTTP, while allowing
HTTP servers to opt-in to supporting this protocol if desired. This
is achieved by having a strict and elaborate handshake, and by
limiting the data that can be inserted into the connection before the
handshake is finished (thus limiting how much the server can be
influenced).

It is similarly intended to fail to establish a connection when data
from other protocols, especially HTTP, is sent to a WebSocket server,
for example as might happen if an HTML |form| were submitted to a
WebSocket server. This is primarily achieved by requiring that the
server prove that it read the handshake, which it can only do if the
handshake contains the appropriate parts which themselves can only be
sent by a WebSocket handshake; in particular, fields starting with
|Sec-| cannot be set by an attacker from a Web browser, even when
using |XMLHttpRequest|.

1.7. Relationship to TCP and HTTP

_This section is non-normative._

The WebSocket protocol is an independent TCP-based protocol. Its
only relationship to HTTP is that its handshake is interpreted by
HTTP servers as an Upgrade request.

Based on the expert recommendation of the IANA, the WebSocket
protocol by default uses port 80 for regular WebSocket connections
and port 443 for WebSocket connections tunneled over TLS.

1.8. Establishing a connection

_This section is non-normative._

There are several options for establishing a WebSocket connection.

On the face of it, the simplest method would seem to be to use port
80 to get a direct connection to a WebSocket server. Port 80
traffic, however, will often be intercepted by man-in-the-middle HTTP
proxies, which can lead to the connection failing to be established.

The most reliable method, therefore, is to use TLS encryption and
port 443 to connect directly to a WebSocket server. This has the
advantage of being more secure; however, TLS encryption can be
computationally expensive.

When a connection is to be made to a port that is shared by an HTTP
server (a situation that is quite likely to occur with traffic to
ports 80 and 443), the connection will appear to the HTTP server to
be a regular GET request with an Upgrade offer. In relatively simple
setups with just one IP address and a single server for all traffic
to a single hostname, this might allow a practical way for systems
based on the WebSocket protocol to be deployed. In more elaborate
setups (e.g. with load balancers and multiple servers), a dedicated
set of hosts for WebSocket connections separate from the HTTP servers
is probably easier to manage.

1.9. Subprotocols using the WebSocket protocol

_This section is non-normative._

The client can request that the server use a specific subprotocol by
including the |Sec-Websocket-Protocol| field in its handshake. If it
is specified, the server needs to include the same field and value in
its response for the connection to be established.

These subprotocol names do not need to be registered, but if a
subprotocol is intended to be implemented by multiple independent
WebSocket servers, potential clashes with the names of subprotocols
defined independently can be avoided by using names that contain the
domain name of the subprotocol's originator. For example, if Example
Corporation were to create a Chat subprotocol to be implemented by
many servers around the Web, they could name it "chat.example.com".
If the Example Organisation called their competing subprotocol
"example.org's chat protocol", then the two subprotocols could be
implemented by servers simultaneously, with the server dynamically
selecting which subprotocol to use based on the value sent by the
client.

Subprotocols can be versioned in backwards-incompatible ways by
changing the subprotocol name, eg. going from "bookings.example.net"
to "bookings.example.net2". "v2.bookings.example.net". These subprotocols would be considered
completely separate by WebSocket clients. Backwards-compatible
versioning can be implemented by reusing the same subprotocol string
but carefully designing the actual subprotocol to support this kind
of extensibility.

2. Conformance requirements

All diagrams, examples, and notes in this specification are non-
normative, as are all sections explicitly marked non-normative.
Everything else in this specification is normative.

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT",
"RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in the normative parts of this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC2119. For
readability, these words do not appear in all uppercase letters in
this specification. [RFC2119]

Requirements phrased in the imperative as part of algorithms (such as
"strip any leading space characters" or "return false and abort these
steps") are to be interpreted with the meaning of the key word
("must", "should", "may", etc) used in introducing the algorithm.

Conformance requirements phrased as algorithms or specific steps may
be implemented in any manner, so long as the end result is
equivalent. (In particular, the algorithms defined in this
specification are intended to be easy to follow, and not intended to
be performant.)

Implementations may impose implementation-specific limits on
otherwise unconstrained inputs, e.g. to prevent denial of service
attacks, to guard against running out of memory, or to work around
platform-specific limitations.

The conformance classes defined by this specification are user agents
and servers.

2.1. Terminology

*Converting a string to ASCII lowercase* means replacing all
characters in the range U+0041 to U+005A (i.e. LATIN CAPITAL LETTER
A to LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z) with the corresponding characters in the
range U+0061 to U+007A (i.e. LATIN SMALL LETTER A to LATIN SMALL
LETTER Z).

Comparing two strings in an *ASCII case-insensitive* manner means
comparing them exactly, code point for code point, except that the
characters in the range U+0041 to U+005A (i.e. LATIN CAPITAL LETTER
A to LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z) and the corresponding characters in the
range U+0061 to U+007A (i.e. LATIN SMALL LETTER A to LATIN SMALL
LETTER Z) are considered to also match.

The term "URL" is used in this section in a manner consistent with
the terminology used in HTML, namely, to denote a string that might
or might not be a valid URI or IRI and to which certain error
handling behaviors will be applied when the string is parsed. [HTML]

When an implementation is required to _send_ data as part of the
WebSocket protocol, the implementation may delay the actual
transmission arbitrarily, e.g. buffering data so as to send fewer IP
packets.

3. WebSocket URLs

3.1. Parsing WebSocket URLs

The steps to *parse a WebSocket URL's components* from a string /url/
are as follows. These steps return either a /host/, a /port/, a
/resource name/, and a /secure/ flag, or they fail.

1. If the /url/ string is not an absolute URL, then fail this
algorithm. [WEBADDRESSES]

2. Resolve the /url/ string using the resolve a Web address
algorithm defined by the Web addresses specification, with the
URL character encoding set to UTF-8. [WEBADDRESSES] [RFC3629]

NOTE: It doesn't matter what it is resolved relative to, since
we already know it is an absolute URL at this point.

3. If /url/ does not have a <scheme> component whose value, when
converted to ASCII lowercase, is either "ws" or "wss", then fail
this algorithm.

4. If /url/ has a <fragment> component, then fail this algorithm.

5. If the <scheme> component of /url/ is "ws", set /secure/ to
false; otherwise, the <scheme> component is "wss", set /secure/
to true.

6. Let /host/ be the value of the <host> component of /url/,
converted to ASCII lowercase.

7. If /url/ has a <port> component, then let /port/ be that
component's value; otherwise, there is no explicit /port/.

8. If there is no explicit /port/, then: if /secure/ is false, let
/port/ be 80, otherwise let /port/ be 443.

9. Let /resource name/ be the value of the <path> component (which
might be empty) of /url/.

10. If /resource name/ is the empty string, set it to a single
character U+002F SOLIDUS (/).

11. If /url/ has a <query> component, then append a single U+003F
QUESTION MARK character (?) to /resource name/, followed by the
value of the <query> component.

12. Return /host/, /port/, /resource name/, and /secure/.

3.2. Constructing WebSocket URLs

The steps to *construct a WebSocket URL* from a /host/, a /port/, a
/resource name/, and a /secure/ flag, are as follows:

1. Let /url/ be the empty string.

2. If the /secure/ flag is false, then append the string "ws://" to
/url/. Otherwise, append the string "wss://" to /url/.

3. Append /host/ to /url/.

4. If the /secure/ flag is false and port is not 80, or if the
/secure/ flag is true and port is not 443, then append the string
":" followed by /port/ to /url/.

5. Append /resource name/ to /url/.

6. Return /url/.

4. Client-side requirements

_This section only applies to user agents, not to servers._

NOTE: This specification doesn't currently define a limit to the
number of simultaneous connections that a client can establish to a
server.

4.1. Opening handshake

When the user agent is to *establish

3.3. Valid WebSocket URLs

For a WebSocket connection* URL to a
host /host/, on a port /port/, from an origin whose ASCII
serialization is /origin/, with a flag /secure/, with a string giving
a /resource name/, and optionally with a string giving a /protocol/,
it must run be considered valid, the following steps. conditions
MUST hold.

o The /host/ must be ASCII-only (i.e. it must have been punycode-encoded punycode-
encoded already if necessary).

o The /origin/ must not contain characters in the range U+0041 to
U+005A (i.e. LATIN CAPITAL LETTER A to LATIN CAPITAL LETTER Z).

o The /resource name/ and /protocol/ strings must be non-empty
strings of ASCII characters in the range U+0020 to U+007E.

o The /resource name/ string must start with a U+002F SOLIDUS
character (/) and must not contain a U+0020 SPACE character. [ORIGIN]

1. If

Any WebSocket URLs not meeting the user agent already has above criteria are considered
invalid, and a WebSocket connection client MUST NOT attempt to the
remote host (IP address) identified by /host/, even if known by
another name, wait until that connection has been established or
for that make a connection to have failed. If multiple connections an
invalid WebSocket URL. A client SHOULD attempt to
the same IP address are attempted simultaneously, the user agent
must serialize them so that there is no more than one connection
at parse a time running through the following steps.

NOTE: This makes it harder for URL
obtained from any external source (such as a script to perform web site or a denial of
service attack by just opening user)
using the steps specified in Section 3.1 to obtain a large number of valid WebSocket
connections to a remote host.

NOTE: There is no limit to the number of established WebSocket
connections a user agent can have with a single remote host.
Servers can refuse
URL, but MUST NOT attempt to connect users with such an excessive number of
connections, or disconnect resource-hogging users when suffering
high load.

2. _Connect_: If unparsed URL, and
instead only use the user agent parsed version and only if that version is configured to use a proxy when
using
considered valid by the WebSocket criteria above.

4. Data Framing

4.1. Overview

The base framing protocol to connect to host /host/ and/or
port /port/, then connect to is deliberately kept simple so that proxy and ask it to open a TCP
connection to simple
implementations may ignore advanced features. In the host given by /host/ and absence of
extensions negotiated during the port given opening handshake (Section 5), all
reserved bits must be 0 and no reserved opcode values may be used.

4.2. Base Framing Protocol

The base framing protocol is defined by
/port/.

EXAMPLE: For example, if the user agent uses an HTTP proxy
for all traffic, then if it was to try to connect following ABNF [RFC5234]:

ws-frame = frame-more
frame-rsv1
frame-rsv2
frame-rsv3
frame-opcode
frame-rsv4
frame-length
frame-extension
application-data;

frame-more = %x0 ; final frame of message
/ %x1 ; more frames of this message follow

frame-rsv1 = %x0 ; 1 bit, must be 0

frame-rsv2 = %x0 ; 1 bit, must be 0

frame-rsv3 = %x0 ; 1 bit, must be 0

frame-opcode = %x0 ; continuation frame
/ %x1 ; connection close
/ %x2 ; ping
/ %x3 ; pong
/ %x4 ; text frame
/ %x5 ; binary frame
/ %x6-F ; reserved

frame-rsv4 = %x0 ; 1 bit, must be 0

frame-length = %x00-7D
/ %x7E frame-length-16
/ %x7F frame-length-63

frame-length-16 = %x0000-FFFF

frame-length-63 = %x0000000000000000-7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFF

frame-extension = *( %x00-FF ) ; to port 80
on server example.com, it might send the be defined later

application-data = *( %x00-FF )

4.3. Fragmentation

The following lines rules apply to
the proxy server:

CONNECT example.com:80 HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com

If there was a password, the connection might look like:

CONNECT example.com:80 HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
Proxy-authorization: Basic ZWRuYW1vZGU6bm9jYXBlcyE=

Otherwise, if the user agent is not configured to use a proxy,
then open a TCP connection to the host given by /host/ and the
port given by /port/.

NOTE: Implementations that do not expose explicit UI for
selecting a proxy for WebSocket connections separate from other
proxies are encouraged to use a SOCKS proxy for WebSocket
connections, if available, or failing that, to prefer the proxy
configured for HTTPS connections over the proxy configured for
HTTP connections.

For the purpose fragmentation:

o An unfragmented message consists of proxy autoconfiguration scripts, the URL to
pass the function must be constructed from /host/, /port/,
/resource name/, and the /secure/ flag using the steps to
construct a WebSocket URL.

NOTE: The WebSocket protocol can be identified in proxy
autoconfiguration scripts from the scheme ("ws:" for unencrypted
connections and "wss:" for encrypted connections).

3. If the connection could not be opened, then fail the WebSocket
connection and abort these steps.

4. If /secure/ is true, perform a TLS handshake over the
connection. If this fails (e.g. the server's certificate could
not be verified), then fail single frame with the WebSocket connection MORE
bit clear and abort
these steps. Otherwise, all further communication on this
channel must run through the encrypted tunnel. [RFC2246]

User agents must use the Server Name Indication extension in the
TLS handshake. [RFC4366]

5. Send the UTF-8 string "GET" followed by a UTF-8-encoded U+0020
SPACE character to the remote side (the server).

Send the /resource name/ value, encoded as UTF-8.

Send another UTF-8-encoded U+0020 SPACE character, followed by
the UTF-8 string "HTTP/1.1", followed by a UTF-8-encoded U+000D
CARRIAGE RETURN U+000A LINE FEED character pair (CRLF).

6. Let /fields/ be an empty list of strings.

7. Add the string "Upgrade: WebSocket" to /fields/.

8. Add the string "Connection: Upgrade" to /fields/.

9. Let /hostport/ be an empty string.

10. Append the /host/ value, converted to ASCII lowercase, to
/hostport/.

11. If /secure/ is false, and /port/ is not 80, or if /secure/ is
true, and /port/ is not 443, then append a U+003A COLON
character (:) followed by the value opcode other than 0.

o A fragmented message consists of /port/, expressed as a
base-ten integer, to /hostport/.

12. Add the string consisting of single frame with the concatenation of MORE bit
set and an opcode other than 0, followed by zero or more frames
with the string
"Host:", a U+0020 SPACE character, MORE bit set and /hostport/, the opcode set to /fields/.

13. Add 0, and terminated by a
single frame with the string consisting MORE bit clear and an opcode of 0. Its
content is the concatenation of the string
"Origin:", a U+0020 SPACE character, and the /origin/ value, to
/fields/.

14. If there application data from each of
those frames in order.

o _Note: There is no /protocol/, then skip this step.

Otherwise, add an open question as to whether control frames be
interjected in the string consisting middle of the concatenation a fragmented message. If so, it must
be decided whether they be fragmented (which would require keeping
a stack of the
string "Sec-WebSocket-Protocol:", "in-progress" messages)._

o A sender MAY arbitrarily fragment a U+0020 SPACE character, and
the /protocol/ value, single message (which allows
generation of dynamic content without having to /fields/.

15. If buffer the client has any cookies that would data in
order to count it).

o A receiver MUST be relevant prepared to a
resource accessed over HTTP, if /secure/ is false, or HTTPS, accept arbitrarily fragmented
messages, even if the sender sent the message in a single frame.

o An intermediary MAY fragment a message arbitrarily, except that it is true, on host /host/, port /port/,
MUST NOT fragment or otherwise modify any message with /resource name/ as any
reserved bits set or using any reserved opcode, unless it observed
the path (and possibly query parameters), then add negotiation of an extension which it understands and which
defines the interpretation of those values.

4.4. Control Frames

The Close (0x01), Ping (0x02), and Pong (0x03) frames are contol
frames -- they do not supply data to /fields/
any HTTP headers that would be appropriate for that information.
[RFC2616] [RFC2109] [RFC2965]

This includes "HttpOnly" cookies (cookies with the http-only-
flag set ultimate endpoint, but
instead are used to carry out tasks related to true); the WebSocket protocol is not considered a
non-HTTP API for
connection itself.

A receiver MUST take the purpose following action upon receiving control
frames:

Close:

Upon receipt of cookie processing.

16. Let /spaces_1/ be a random integer from 1 close frame, an endpoint SHOULD send a Close
frame to 12 inclusive.

Let /spaces_2/ be the remote recipient, if it has not already done so,
deliver a random integer from 1 close event to 12 inclusive.

EXAMPLE: For example, 5 the application if necessary, and 9.

17. Let /max_1/ be then
close the largest integer not greater than
4,294,967,295 divided by /spaces_1/.

Let /max_2/ be WebSocket.

Ping

Upon receipt of a Ping message, an endpoint SHOULD send a Pong
response as soon as is practical. The Pong response MUST contain
the largest integer not greater than
4,294,967,295 divided by /spaces_2/.

EXAMPLE: Continuing payload provided in the example, 858,993,459 and 477,218,588.

18. Let /number_1/ Ping message, though an implementation
MAY truncate the message at an implementation-defined size which
MUST be a random integer from 0 to /max_1/ inclusive.

Let /number_2/ at least 8 _(TBD)_ bytes.

Ping frames MAY be sent as a random integer from 0 to /max_2/ inclusive.

EXAMPLE: For example, 777,007,543 and 114,997,259.

19. Let /product_1/ keep-alive mechanism, but if so the
interval SHOULD be configurable.

Pong

If a Pong message is received without a matching Ping message
being sent, an endpoint MUST drop the result connection. Otherwise, the
endpoint SHOULD update any liveness timer it may have for the
connection.

4.5. Data Frames

All frame types not listed above are data frames, which transport
application-layer data. The opcode determines the interpretation of multiplying /number_1/ and
/spaces_1/ together.

Let /product_2/ be
the result application data:

Text

The payload data is text data encoded as UTF-8.

Binary

The payload data is arbitrary binary data whose interpretation is
solely up to the application layer.

Additional data frame types will be defined in extensions or in a
subsequent version of multiplying /number_2/ and
/spaces_2/ together.

EXAMPLE: Continuing the example, 3,885,037,715 protocol.

4.6. Examples

_This section is non-normative._

o A single-frame text message

* 0x04 0x05 "Hello"

o A fragmented text message

* 0x84 0x03 "Hel"

* 0x00 0x02 "lo"

o Ping request and
1,034,975,331.

20. Let /key_1/ be response

* 0x02 0x05 "Hello"
* 0x03 0x05 "Hello"

o 256 bytes binary message in a string consisting single frame

* 0x05 0x7E 0x0100 [256 bytes of /product_1/, expressed binary data]

o 64KiB binary message in a single frame

* 0x05 0x7F 0x0000000000010000 [65536 bytes of binary data]

4.7. Extensibility

Extensions will be defined which extend the base ten using protocol, but only
if their use is negotiated during the numerals handshake. The following
mechanisms will be used for extension:

o Extension data may be placed in the range U+0030 DIGIT ZERO (0) payload before the application
data.

o Reserved bits can be allocated for per-frame needs.

o Reserved opcode values can be defined.

o Reserved bits can be allocated to U+0039 DIGIT NINE (9).

Let /key_2/ the opcode field if more opcode
values are needed.

o A reserved bit or an "extension" opcode can be a string consisting defined which
allocates additional bits out of /product_2/, expressed in
base ten using the numerals in the range U+0030 DIGIT ZERO (0) payload area to U+0039 DIGIT NINE (9).

EXAMPLE: Continuing the example, "3885037715" and "1034975331".

21. Insert between one and twelve random characters from define larger
opcodes or more per-frame bits.

5. Opening Handshake

5.1. Client Requirements

When the ranges
U+0021 user agent is to U+002F and U+003A *establish a WebSocket connection* to U+007E into /key_1/ at random
positions.

Insert between one and twelve random characters a
host /host/, on a port /port/, from an origin whose ASCII
serialization is /origin/, with a flag /secure/, with a string giving
a /resource name/, and optionally with a string giving a /protocol/,
it must run the ranges
U+0021 to U+002F following steps. [ORIGIN]

1. Verify that the WebSocket URL and U+003A to U+007E into /key_2/ at random
positions.

NOTE: This corresponds its components are valid
according to random printable ASCII characters
other than Section 3.3. If any of the requirements are not
met, the client MUST fail the digits WebSocket connection and abort
these steps.

2. If the U+0020 SPACE character.

EXAMPLE: Continuing the example, this could lead user agent already has a WebSocket connection to "P388O503D&
ul7{K%gX(%715" and "1N?|kUT0or3o4I97N5-S3O31".

22. Insert /spaces_1/ U+0020 SPACE characters into /key_1/ at random
positions other than the start
remote host (IP address) identified by /host/, even if known by
another name, wait until that connection has been established or end of the string.

Insert /spaces_2/ U+0020 SPACE characters into /key_2/ at random
positions other than
for that connection to have failed. If multiple connections to
the start or end of same IP address are attempted simultaneously, the string.

EXAMPLE: Continuing user agent
must serialize them so that there is no more than one connection
at a time running through the example, this could lead following steps.

NOTE: This makes it harder for a script to "P388 O503D&
ul7 {K%gX( %7 15" and "1 N ?|k UT0or 3o 4 I97N 5-S3O 31".

23. Add the string consisting perform a denial of the concatenation
service attack by just opening a large number of the string
"Sec-WebSocket-Key1:", WebSocket
connections to a U+0020 SPACE character, and the /key_1/
value, remote host.

NOTE: There is no limit to /fields/.

Add the string consisting number of the concatenation established WebSocket
connections a user agent can have with a single remote host.
Servers can refuse to connect users with an excessive number of
connections, or disconnect resource-hogging users when suffering
high load.

3. _Connect_: If the string
"Sec-WebSocket-Key2:", user agent is configured to use a U+0020 SPACE character, proxy when
using the WebSocket protocol to connect to host /host/ and/or
port /port/, then connect to that proxy and the /key_2/
value, ask it to /fields/.

24. For each string in /fields/, in open a random order: send TCP
connection to the string,
encoded as UTF-8, followed host given by a UTF-8-encoded U+000D CARRIAGE
RETURN U+000A LINE FEED character pair (CRLF). It is important
that the fields be output in a random order so that servers not
depend on /host/ and the particular order used port given by any particular client.

25. Send a UTF-8-encoded U+000D CARRIAGE RETURN U+000A LINE FEED
character pair (CRLF).

26. Let /key3/ be a string consisting of eight random bytes (or
equivalently, a random 64 bit integer encoded in big-endian
order).
/port/.

EXAMPLE: For example, 0x47 0x30 0x22 0x2D 0x5A 0x3F 0x47 0x58.

27. Send /key3/ to the server.

28. Read bytes from if the user agent uses an HTTP proxy
for all traffic, then if it was to try to connect to port 80
on server until either example.com, it might send the connection closes,
or a 0x0A byte is read. Let /field/ be these bytes, including following lines to
the 0x0A byte. proxy server:

CONNECT example.com:80 HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com

If /field/ is not at least seven bytes long, or if there was a password, the last two
bytes aren't 0x0D and 0x0A respectively, or connection might look like:

CONNECT example.com:80 HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
Proxy-authorization: Basic ZWRuYW1vZGU6bm9jYXBlcyE=

Otherwise, if it does the user agent is not
contain at least two 0x20 bytes, configured to use a proxy,
then fail the WebSocket open a TCP connection to the host given by /host/ and abort these steps.

User agents may apply the
port given by /port/.

NOTE: Implementations that do not expose explicit UI for
selecting a timeout proxy for WebSocket connections separate from other
proxies are encouraged to this step, failing the use a SOCKS proxy for WebSocket connection
connections, if available, or failing that, to prefer the server does not send back data in a
suitable time period.

29. Let /code/ be proxy
configured for HTTPS connections over the substring proxy configured for
HTTP connections.

For the purpose of /field/ that starts from proxy autoconfiguration scripts, the byte
after URL to
pass the first 0x20 byte, function must be constructed from /host/, /port/,
/resource name/, and ends with the byte before /secure/ flag using the
second 0x20 byte.

30. steps to
construct a WebSocket URL.

NOTE: The WebSocket protocol can be identified in proxy
autoconfiguration scripts from the scheme ("ws:" for unencrypted
connections and "wss:" for encrypted connections).

4. If /code/ is not three bytes long, or if any of the bytes in
/code/ are connection could not in the range 0x30 to 0x39, be opened, then fail the WebSocket
connection and abort these steps.

31.

5. If /code/, interpreted as UTF-8, /secure/ is "101", then move to true, perform a TLS handshake over the next
step.
connection. If /code/, interpreted as UTF-8, is "407", then either close this fails (e.g. the
connection and jump back to step 2, providing appropriate
authentication information, or server's certificate could
not be verified), then fail the WebSocket connection.
407 is connection and abort
these steps. Otherwise, all further communication on this
channel must run through the code used by HTTP meaning "Proxy Authentication
Required". encrypted tunnel. [RFC2246]

User agents that support proxy authentication must
interpret use the Server Name Indication extension in the
TLS handshake. [RFC4366]

6. Send the response as defined UTF-8 string "GET" followed by HTTP (e.g. a UTF-8-encoded U+0020
SPACE character to find and
interpret the |Proxy-Authenticate| header).

Otherwise, fail remote side (the server).

Send the WebSocket connection and abort these steps.

32. /resource name/ value, encoded as UTF-8.

Send another UTF-8-encoded U+0020 SPACE character, followed by
the UTF-8 string "HTTP/1.1", followed by a UTF-8-encoded U+000D
CARRIAGE RETURN U+000A LINE FEED character pair (CRLF).

7. Let /fields/ be a an empty list of name-value pairs, initially empty.

33. _Field_: strings.

8. Add the string "Upgrade: WebSocket" to /fields/.

9. Add the string "Connection: Upgrade" to /fields/.

10. Let /name/ and /value/ /hostport/ be an empty byte arrays.

34. Read a byte from string.

11. Append the server. /host/ value, converted to ASCII lowercase, to
/hostport/.

12. If the connection closes before this byte /secure/ is received, then fail
the WebSocket connection false, and abort these steps.

Otherwise, handle /port/ is not 80, or if /secure/ is
true, and /port/ is not 443, then append a U+003A COLON
character (:) followed by the byte value of /port/, expressed as described in a
base-ten integer, to /hostport/.

13. Add the appropriate entry
below:

-> If string consisting of the byte is 0x0D (ASCII CR)
If concatenation of the /name/ byte array is empty, then jump string
"Host:", a U+0020 SPACE character, and /hostport/, to /fields/.

14. Add the fields
processing step. Otherwise, fail string consisting of the WebSocket connection concatenation of the string
"Origin:", a U+0020 SPACE character, and abort these steps.

-> If the byte /origin/ value, to
/fields/.

15. If there is 0x0A (ASCII LF)
Fail no /protocol/, then skip this step.

Otherwise, add the string consisting of the WebSocket connection concatenation of the
string "Sec-WebSocket-Protocol:", a U+0020 SPACE character, and abort these steps.

-> If
the byte is 0x3A (ASCII :)
Move on /protocol/ value, to the next step.

-> /fields/.

16. If the byte is in the range 0x41 client has any cookies that would be relevant to 0x5A (ASCII A-Z)
Append a byte whose value
resource accessed over HTTP, if /secure/ is false, or HTTPS, if
it is true, on host /host/, port /port/, with /resource name/ as
the byte's value plus 0x20 path (and possibly query parameters), then add to
the /name/ byte array and redo this step /fields/
any HTTP headers that would be appropriate for that information.
[RFC2616] [RFC2109] [RFC2965]

This includes "HttpOnly" cookies (cookies with the next byte.

-> Otherwise
Append the byte http-only-
flag set to true); the /name/ byte array and redo this step WebSocket protocol is not considered a
non-HTTP API for the next byte.

NOTE: This reads purpose of cookie processing.

17. Let /spaces_1/ be a field name, terminated by random integer from 1 to 12 inclusive.

Let /spaces_2/ be a colon, converting
upper-case ASCII letters random integer from 1 to lowercase, 12 inclusive.

EXAMPLE: For example, 5 and aborting if a stray
CR or LF is found.

35. 9.

18. Let /count/ equal 0.

NOTE: This is used in /max_1/ be the next step to skip past a space
character after largest integer not greater than
4,294,967,295 divided by /spaces_1/.

Let /max_2/ be the colon, if necessary.

36. Read largest integer not greater than
4,294,967,295 divided by /spaces_2/.

EXAMPLE: Continuing the example, 858,993,459 and 477,218,588.

19. Let /number_1/ be a random integer from 0 to /max_1/ inclusive.

Let /number_2/ be a byte random integer from the server 0 to /max_2/ inclusive.

EXAMPLE: For example, 777,007,543 and increment /count/ by 1.

If the connection closes before this byte is received, then fail 114,997,259.

20. Let /product_1/ be the WebSocket connection result of multiplying /number_1/ and abort these steps.

Otherwise, handle the byte as described in the appropriate entry
below:

-> If
/spaces_1/ together.

Let /product_2/ be the byte is 0x20 (ASCII space) result of multiplying /number_2/ and /count/ equals 1
Ignore
/spaces_2/ together.

EXAMPLE: Continuing the byte example, 3,885,037,715 and redo this step for
1,034,975,331.

21. Let /key_1/ be a string consisting of /product_1/, expressed in
base ten using the next byte.

-> If numerals in the byte is 0x0D (ASCII CR)
Move on range U+0030 DIGIT ZERO (0)
to U+0039 DIGIT NINE (9).

Let /key_2/ be a string consisting of /product_2/, expressed in
base ten using the next step.

-> If numerals in the byte is 0x0A (ASCII LF)
Fail range U+0030 DIGIT ZERO (0)
to U+0039 DIGIT NINE (9).

EXAMPLE: Continuing the WebSocket connection example, "3885037715" and abort these steps.

-> Otherwise
Append "1034975331".

22. Insert between one and twelve random characters from the byte ranges
U+0021 to the /value/ byte array U+002F and redo this step
for U+003A to U+007E into /key_1/ at random
positions.

Insert between one and twelve random characters from the next byte. ranges
U+0021 to U+002F and U+003A to U+007E into /key_2/ at random
positions.

NOTE: This reads a field value, terminated by a CRLF, skipping
past a single space after the colon if there is one.

37. Read a byte from corresponds to random printable ASCII characters
other than the server.

If digits and the connection closes before U+0020 SPACE character.

EXAMPLE: Continuing the example, this byte is received, could lead to "P388O503D&
ul7{K%gX(%715" and "1N?|kUT0or3o4I97N5-S3O31".

23. Insert /spaces_1/ U+0020 SPACE characters into /key_1/ at random
positions other than the start or if end of the
byte is not a 0x0A byte (ASCII LF), then fail string.

Insert /spaces_2/ U+0020 SPACE characters into /key_2/ at random
positions other than the WebSocket
connection start or end of the string.

EXAMPLE: Continuing the example, this could lead to "P388 O503D&
ul7 {K%gX( %7 15" and abort these steps.

NOTE: This skips past "1 N ?|k UT0or 3o 4 I97N 5-S3O 31".

24. Add the LF byte string consisting of the CRLF after concatenation of the field.

38. Append an entry string
"Sec-WebSocket-Key1:", a U+0020 SPACE character, and the /key_1/
value, to /fields/.

Add the /fields/ list that has string consisting of the name given by concatenation of the string obtained by interpreting the /name/ byte array as
"Sec-WebSocket-Key2:", a
UTF-8 byte stream U+0020 SPACE character, and the value given by the /key_2/
value, to /fields/.

25. For each string obtained by
interpreting in /fields/, in a random order: send the /value/ byte array string,
encoded as UTF-8, followed by a UTF-8 byte stream.

39. Return UTF-8-encoded U+000D CARRIAGE
RETURN U+000A LINE FEED character pair (CRLF). It is important
that the fields be output in a random order so that servers not
depend on the particular order used by any particular client.

26. Send a UTF-8-encoded U+000D CARRIAGE RETURN U+000A LINE FEED
character pair (CRLF).

27. Let /key3/ be a string consisting of eight random bytes (or
equivalently, a random 64 bit integer encoded in big-endian
order).

EXAMPLE: For example, 0x47 0x30 0x22 0x2D 0x5A 0x3F 0x47 0x58.

28. Send /key3/ to the "Field" step above.

40. _Fields processing_: server.

29. Read a byte bytes from the server.

If server until either the connection closes before this byte is received, closes,
or if the
byte is not a 0x0A byte (ASCII LF), then fail the WebSocket
connection and abort is read. Let /field/ be these steps.

NOTE: This skips past the LF byte of the CRLF after the blank
line after bytes, including
the fields.

41. 0x0A byte.

If there is not exactly one entry in the /fields/ list whose
name is "upgrade", or if there is not exactly one entry in the
/fields/ list whose name is "connection", or if there /field/ is not
exactly one entry in the /fields/ list whose name is "sec-
websocket-origin", at least seven bytes long, or if there is not exactly one entry in the
/fields/ list whose name is "sec-websocket-location", last two
bytes aren't 0x0D and 0x0A respectively, or if the
/protocol/ was specified but there is it does not exactly one entry in
the /fields/ list whose name is "sec-websocket-protocol", or if
there are any entries in the /fields/ list whose names are the
empty string,
contain at least two 0x20 bytes, then fail the WebSocket
connection and abort these steps. Otherwise, handle each entry in the /fields/ list as
follows:

-> If

User agents may apply a timeout to this step, failing the entry's name is "upgrade"
If
WebSocket connection if the value is server does not exactly equal to send back data in a
suitable time period.

30. Let /code/ be the substring of /field/ that starts from the string "WebSocket",
then fail byte
after the WebSocket connection first 0x20 byte, and abort these steps.

-> If ends with the entry's name is "connection"
If byte before the value, converted to ASCII lowercase,
second 0x20 byte.

31. If /code/ is not exactly
equal to three bytes long, or if any of the string "upgrade", bytes in
/code/ are not in the range 0x30 to 0x39, then fail the
WebSocket connection and abort these steps.

32. If the entry's name /code/, interpreted as UTF-8, is "sec-websocket-origin"
If "101", then move to the value next
step.

If /code/, interpreted as UTF-8, is not exactly equal to /origin/, "407", then fail either close the
WebSocket
connection and abort these steps. [ORIGIN]

-> If jump back to step 2, providing appropriate
authentication information, or fail the entry's name WebSocket connection.
407 is "sec-websocket-location"
If the value is not exactly equal to a string obtained from code used by HTTP meaning "Proxy Authentication
Required". User agents that support proxy authentication must
interpret the steps response as defined by HTTP (e.g. to construct a WebSocket URL from /host/, /port/,
/resource name/, find and
interpret the /secure/ flag, then |Proxy-Authenticate| header).

Otherwise, fail the WebSocket connection and abort these steps.

-> If the entry's name is "sec-websocket-protocol"
If there was

33. Let /fields/ be a /protocol/ specified, list of name-value pairs, initially empty.

34. _Field_: Let /name/ and /value/ be empty byte arrays.

35. Read a byte from the value server.

If the connection closes before this byte is not
exactly equal to /protocol/, received, then fail
the WebSocket connection and abort these steps. (If no /protocol/ was
specified, the field is ignored.)

-> If the entry's name is "set-cookie" or "set-cookie2" or
another cookie-related field name
If the relevant specification is supported by the user agent,

Otherwise, handle the cookie byte as defined by described in the appropriate
specification, with the resource being entry
below:

-> If the one with byte is 0x0D (ASCII CR)
If the host
/host/, /name/ byte array is empty, then jump to the port /port/, fields
processing step. Otherwise, fail the path (and possibly query
parameters) /resource name/, WebSocket connection
and abort these steps.

-> If the scheme |http| if
/secure/ byte is false 0x0A (ASCII LF)
Fail the WebSocket connection and |https| if /secure/ is true. [RFC2109]
[RFC2965] abort these steps.

-> If the relevant specification byte is not supported by the user
agent, then 0x3A (ASCII :)
Move on to the field must be ignored. next step.

-> Any other name
Ignore it.

42. Let /challenge/ be the concatenation of /number_1/, expressed as
a big-endian 32 bit integer, /number_2/, expressed as a big-
endian 32 bit integer, and If the eight bytes of /key_3/ byte is in the
order they were sent on range 0x41 to 0x5A (ASCII A-Z)
Append a byte whose value is the wire.

EXAMPLE: Using byte's value plus 0x20 to
the examples given earlier, /name/ byte array and redo this leads to step for the 16
bytes 0x2E 0x50 0x31 0xB7 0x06 0xDA 0xB8 0x0B 0x47 0x30 0x22
0x2D 0x5A 0x3F 0x47 0x58.

43. Let /expected/ be next byte.

-> Otherwise
Append the MD5 fingerprint of /challenge/ as a big-
endian 128 bit string. [RFC1321]

EXAMPLE: Using byte to the examples given earlier, /name/ byte array and redo this leads step
for the next byte.

NOTE: This reads a field name, terminated by a colon, converting
upper-case ASCII letters to lowercase, and aborting if a stray
CR or LF is found.

36. Let /count/ equal 0.

NOTE: This is used in the 16
bytes 0x30 0x73 0x74 0x33 0x52 0x6C 0x26 0x71 0x2D 0x32 0x5A
0x55 0x5E 0x77 0x65 0x75. In ASCII, these bytes correspond next step to skip past a space
character after the string "0st3Rl&q-2ZU^weu".

44. colon, if necessary.

37. Read sixteen bytes a byte from the server. Let /reply/ be those bytes. server and increment /count/ by 1.

If the connection closes before these bytes are this byte is received, then fail
the WebSocket connection and abort these steps.

45.

Otherwise, handle the byte as described in the appropriate entry
below:

-> If /reply/ does not exactly equal /expected/, then fail the byte is 0x20 (ASCII space) and /count/ equals 1
Ignore the byte and redo this step for the next byte.

-> If the byte is 0x0D (ASCII CR)
Move on to the next step.

-> If the byte is 0x0A (ASCII LF)
Fail the WebSocket connection and abort these steps.

46. The *WebSocket connection is established*. Now

-> Otherwise
Append the user agent
must send and receive byte to the /value/ byte array and redo this step
for the next byte.

NOTE: This reads a field value, terminated by a CRLF, skipping
past a single space after the colon if there is one.

38. Read a byte from the server.

If the connection as described in closes before this byte is received, or if the next section.

4.2. Data framing

Once
byte is not a 0x0A byte (ASCII LF), then fail the WebSocket
connection is established, and abort these steps.

NOTE: This skips past the user agent must run
through LF byte of the CRLF after the field.

39. Append an entry to the /fields/ list that has the name given by
the string obtained by interpreting the following state machine for /name/ byte array as a
UTF-8 byte stream and the bytes sent value given by the server.
If at any point during these steps a read is attempted but fails
because string obtained by
interpreting the WebSocket connection is closed, then abort.

1. Try /value/ byte array as a UTF-8 byte stream.

40. Return to read the "Field" step above.

41. _Fields processing_: Read a byte from the server. Let /frame type/ be that
byte.

2. Let /error/ be false.

3. Handle the /frame type/ byte as follows:

If the high-order bit of the /frame type/ connection closes before this byte is set (i.e. received, or if
/frame type/ _and_ed with 0x80 returns 0x80)
Run these steps:

1. Let /length/ be zero.

2. _Length_: Read the
byte is not a byte, let /b/ be that byte.

3. Let /b_v/ be an integer corresponding to 0x0A byte (ASCII LF), then fail the low 7 bits of
/b/ (the value you would get by _and_ing /b/ with 0x7F).

4. Multiply /length/ by 128, add /b_v/ to that result, WebSocket
connection and
store abort these steps.

NOTE: This skips past the final result in /length/.

5. LF byte of the CRLF after the blank
line after the fields.

42. If there is not exactly one entry in the high-order bit of /b/ /fields/ list whose
name is set (i.e. "upgrade", or if /b/ _and_ed
with 0x80 returns 0x80), then return to there is not exactly one entry in the step above
labeled _length_.

6. Read /length/ bytes.

!!! WARNING: It
/fields/ list whose name is possible for a server to (innocently "connection", or maliciously) send frames with lengths greater than
2**(31) if there is not
exactly one entry in the /fields/ list whose name is "sec-
websocket-origin", or 2**(32) bytes, overflowing a signed if there is not exactly one entry in the
/fields/ list whose name is "sec-websocket-location", or unsigned
32bit integer. User agents may therefore impose
implementation-specific limits on if the lengths of invalid
frames that they will skip; even supporting frames 2GB in
length
/protocol/ was specified but there is considered, at not exactly one entry in
the time of writing, as going
well above and beyond /fields/ list whose name is "sec-websocket-protocol", or if
there are any entries in the call of duty.

7. Discard /fields/ list whose names are the read bytes.

8. If
empty string, then fail the /frame type/ is 0xFF WebSocket connection and abort these
steps. Otherwise, handle each entry in the /length/ was 0, then
run /fields/ list as
follows:

-> If the following substeps:

1. entry's name is "upgrade"
If the WebSocket closing handshake has value is not yet
started, then start the WebSocket closing handshake.

2. Wait until either exactly equal to the WebSocket closing handshake has
started or string "WebSocket",
then fail the WebSocket connection and abort these steps.

-> If the entry's name is closed.

3. "connection"
If the WebSocket connection value, converted to ASCII lowercase, is not already closed, exactly
equal to the string "upgrade", then close fail the WebSocket connection: *The WebSocket
closing handshake has finished*. (If the
connection
closes before this happens, then the closing handshake
doesn't finish.)

4. Abort and abort these steps. Any data on the connection after
the 0xFF frame is discarded.

Otherwise, let /error/ be true.

-> If the high-order bit of the /frame type/ byte entry's name is _not_ set (i.e.
if /frame type/ _and_ed with 0x80 returns 0x00)
Run these steps:

1. Let /raw data/ be an empty byte array.

2. _Data_: Read a byte, let /b/ be that byte.

3. "sec-websocket-origin"
If /b/ the value is not 0xFF, then append /b/ to /raw data/ and
return exactly equal to /origin/, then fail the previous step (labeled _data_).

4. Interpret /raw data/ as a UTF-8 string,
WebSocket connection and store that
string in /data/.

5. abort these steps. [ORIGIN]

-> If /frame type/ is 0x00, then *a WebSocket message has
been received* with text /data/. Otherwise, discard the
data and let /error/ be true.

4. entry's name is "sec-websocket-location"
If /error/ the value is true, then *a WebSocket error has been detected*.

5. Return not exactly equal to a string obtained from
the first step steps to read construct a WebSocket URL from /host/, /port/,
/resource name/, and the next byte. /secure/ flag, then fail the
WebSocket connection and abort these steps.

-> If the user agent entry's name is faced with content that "sec-websocket-protocol"
If there was a /protocol/ specified, and the value is too large to be
handled appropriately, runs out of resources for buffering incoming
data, or hits an artificial resource limit intended not
exactly equal to avoid resource
starvation, /protocol/, then it must fail the WebSocket connection.

Once a WebSocket
connection and abort these steps. (If no /protocol/ was
specified, the field is established, but before ignored.)

-> If the WebSocket
closing handshake has started, entry's name is "set-cookie" or "set-cookie2" or
another cookie-related field name
If the relevant specification is supported by the user agent must use agent,
handle the following
steps to *send /data/ using cookie as defined by the WebSocket*:

1. Send a 0x00 byte to appropriate
specification, with the server.

2. Encode /data/ using UTF-8 and send resource being the resulting byte stream to one with the server.

3. Send a 0xFF byte to host
/host/, the server.

Once port /port/, the WebSocket closing handshake has started, path (and possibly query
parameters) /resource name/, and the user agent must
not send any further data on scheme |http| if
/secure/ is false and |https| if /secure/ is true. [RFC2109]
[RFC2965]

If the connection.

Once a WebSocket connection relevant specification is established, not supported by the user agent
agent, then the field must use be ignored.

-> Any other name
Ignore it.

43. Let /challenge/ be the concatenation of /number_1/, expressed as
a big-endian 32 bit integer, /number_2/, expressed as a big-
endian 32 bit integer, and the eight bytes of /key_3/ in the
order they were sent on the following steps wire.

EXAMPLE: Using the examples given earlier, this leads to *start the WebSocket closing handshake*.
These steps must 16
bytes 0x2E 0x50 0x31 0xB7 0x06 0xDA 0xB8 0x0B 0x47 0x30 0x22
0x2D 0x5A 0x3F 0x47 0x58.

44. Let /expected/ be run asynchronously relative to whatever algorithm
invoked this one.

1. If the WebSocket closing handshake has started, then abort these
steps.

2. Send MD5 fingerprint of /challenge/ as a 0xFF byte big-
endian 128 bit string. [RFC1321]

EXAMPLE: Using the examples given earlier, this leads to the server.

3. Send a 0x00 byte 16
bytes 0x30 0x73 0x74 0x33 0x52 0x6C 0x26 0x71 0x2D 0x32 0x5A
0x55 0x5E 0x77 0x65 0x75. In ASCII, these bytes correspond to
the server.

4. *The WebSocket closing handshake has started*.

5. Wait a user-agent-determined length of time, or until string "0st3Rl&q-2ZU^weu".

45. Read sixteen bytes from the
WebSocket connection is closed.

6. server. Let /reply/ be those bytes.

If the WebSocket connection is not already closed, closes before these bytes are received, then close
fail the WebSocket connection. (If this happens, then the closing
handshake doesn't finish.)

NOTE: The closing handshake finishes once the server returns the 0xFF
packet, as described above. connection and abort these steps.

46. If at any point there is a fatal problem with sending data to the
server, the user agent must /reply/ does not exactly equal /expected/, then fail the
WebSocket connection.

4.3. Handling errors in UTF-8 from the server

When a client is to interpret a byte stream as UTF-8 but finds that
the byte stream connection and abort these steps.

47. The *WebSocket connection is not in fact a valid UTF-8 stream, then any bytes
or sequences of bytes that are not valid UTF-8 sequences established*. Now the user agent
must be
interpreted send and receive to and from the connection as a U+FFFD REPLACEMENT CHARACTER.

5. described in
the next section.

5.2. Server-side requirements

_This section only applies to servers._

5.1.

5.2.1. Reading the client's opening handshake

When a client starts a WebSocket connection, it sends its part of the
opening handshake. The server must parse at least part of this
handshake in order to obtain the necessary information to generate
the server part of the handshake.

The client handshake consists of the following parts. If the server,
while reading the handshake, finds that the client did not send a
handshake that matches the description below, the server should abort
the WebSocket connection.

1. The three-character UTF-8 string "GET".

2. A UTF-8-encoded U+0020 SPACE character (0x20 byte).

3. A string consisting of all the bytes up to the next UTF-8-encoded
U+0020 SPACE character (0x20 byte). The result of decoding this
string as a UTF-8 string is the name of the resource requested by
the server. If the server only supports one resource, then this
can safely be ignored; the client verifies that the right
resource is supported based on the information included in the
server's own handshake. The resource name will begin with U+002F
SOLIDUS character (/) and will only include characters in the
range U+0021 to U+007E.

4. A string of bytes terminated by a UTF-8-encoded U+000D CARRIAGE
RETURN U+000A LINE FEED character pair (CRLF). All the
characters from the second 0x20 byte up to the first 0x0D 0x0A
byte pair in the data from the client can be safely ignored. (It
will probably be the string "HTTP/1.1".)

5. A series of fields.

Each field is terminated by a UTF-8-encoded U+000D CARRIAGE
RETURN U+000A LINE FEED character pair (CRLF). The end of the
fields is denoted by the terminating CRLF pair being followed
immediately by another CRLF pair.

NOTE: In other words, the fields start with the first 0x0D 0x0A
byte pair, end with the first 0x0D 0x0A 0x0D 0x0A byte sequence,
and are separate from each other by 0x0D 0x0A byte pairs.

The fields are encoded as UTF-8.

Each field consists of a name, consisting of one or more
characters in the ranges U+0021 to U+0039 and U+003B to U+007E,
followed by a U+003A COLON character (:) and a U+0020 SPACE
character, followed by zero or more characters forming the value.

The expected field names, the meaning of their corresponding
values, and the processing servers are required to apply to those
fields, are described below, after the description of the client
handshake.

6. After the first 0x0D 0x0A 0x0D 0x0A byte sequence, indicating the
end of the fields, the client sends eight random bytes. These
are used in constructing the server handshake.

The expected field names, and the meaning of their corresponding
values, are as follows. Field names must be compared in an ASCII
case-insensitive manner.

|Upgrade|
Invariant part of the handshake. Will always have a value that is
an ASCII case-insensitive match for the string "WebSocket".

Can be safely ignored, though the server should abort the
WebSocket connection if this field is absent or has a different
value, to avoid vulnerability to cross-protocol attacks.

|Connection|
Invariant part of the handshake. Will always have a value that is
an ASCII case-insensitive match for the string "Upgrade".

Can be safely ignored, though the server should abort the
WebSocket connection if this field is absent or has a different
value, to avoid vulnerability to cross-protocol attacks.

|Host|
The value gives the hostname that the client intended to use when
opening the WebSocket. It would be of interest in particular to
virtual hosting environments, where one server might serve
multiple hosts, and might therefore want to return different data.

Can be safely ignored, though the server should abort the
WebSocket connection if this field is absent or has a value that
does not match the server's host name, to avoid vulnerability to
cross-protocol attacks and DNS rebinding attacks.

|Origin|
The value gives the scheme, hostname, and port (if it's not the
default port for the given scheme) of the page that asked the
client to open the WebSocket. It would be interesting if the
server's operator had deals with operators of other sites, since
the server could then decide how to respond (or indeed, _whether_
to respond) based on which site was requesting a connection.
[ORIGIN] match for the string "WebSocket".

Can be safely ignored, though the server should abort the
WebSocket connection if this field is absent or has a value that
does not match one of the origins the server is expecting to
communicate with, different
value, to avoid vulnerability to cross-protocol attacks
and cross-site scripting attacks.

|Sec-WebSocket-Protocol|
The value gives the name

|Connection|
Invariant part of the handshake. Will always have a subprotocol value that the client is
intending to select. It would be interesting if
an ASCII case-insensitive match for the server
supports multiple protocols or protocol versions. string "Upgrade".

Can be safely ignored, though the server may should abort the
WebSocket connection if the this field is absent but the conventions for
communicating with the server are such that the field is expected;
and the server should abort the WebSocket connection if the field or has a value that does not match one of the subprotocols that the
server supports, different
value, to avoid integrity errors once the connection is
established.

|Sec-WebSocket-Key1|

|Sec-WebSocket-Key2| vulnerability to cross-protocol attacks.

|Host|
The values provide the information required for computing value gives the
server's handshake, as described in hostname that the next section.

Other fields
Other fields can be used, such as "Cookie", for authentication
purposes. Their semantics are equivalent client intended to use when
opening the semantics of the
HTTP headers with the same names.

Unrecognized fields can WebSocket. It would be safely ignored, and are probably either
the result of intermediaries injecting fields unrelated interest in particular to the
operation of the WebSocket protocol, or clients that support future
versions of the protocol offering options that the
virtual hosting environments, where one server doesn't
support.

5.2. Sending the server's opening handshake

When a client establishes a WebSocket connection might serve
multiple hosts, and might therefore want to a server, the
server must run the following steps.

1. If return different data.

Can be safely ignored, though the server supports encryption, perform a TLS handshake over should abort the connection. If
WebSocket connection if this fails (e.g. the client indicated field is absent or has a host
name in the extended client hello "server_name" extension value that
the server
does not host), then close the connection; otherwise,
all further communication for match the connection (including server's host name, to avoid vulnerability to
cross-protocol attacks and DNS rebinding attacks.

|Origin|
The value gives the
server handshake) must run through scheme, hostname, and port (if it's not the encrypted tunnel.
[RFC2246]

2. Establish
default port for the following information:

/host/
The host name or IP address given scheme) of the WebSocket server, as it is page that asked the
client to open the WebSocket. It would be addressed by clients. The host name must be punycode-
encoded interesting if necessary. If the
server's operator had deals with operators of other sites, since
the server can respond could then decide how to requests respond (or indeed, _whether_
to multiple hosts (e.g. in a virtual hosting environment),
then the value should be derived from the client's handshake,
specifically from the "Host" field.

/port/
The port number respond) based on which the server expected and/or received
the site was requesting a connection.

/resource name/
An identifier for the service provided by the server. If
[ORIGIN]

Can be safely ignored, though the server provides multiple services, then the value should be
derived from the resource name given in the client's
handshake.

/secure flag/
True if abort the
WebSocket connection if this field is encrypted absent or if the server expected
it to be encrypted; false otherwise.

/origin/
The ASCII serialization has a value that
does not match one of the origin that origins the server is
willing expecting to
communicate with, converted to ASCII lowercase.
If the server can respond avoid vulnerability to requests from multiple origins
(or indeed, all origins), then the cross-protocol attacks
and cross-site scripting attacks.

|Sec-WebSocket-Protocol|
The value should be derived
from the client's handshake, specifically from gives the "Origin"
field. [ORIGIN]

/subprotocol/
Either null, or name of a string representing the subprotocol that the
server client is ready
intending to use. If select. It would be interesting if the server
supports multiple
subprotocols, then the value should protocols or protocol versions.

Can be derived from safely ignored, though the
client's handshake, specifically from server may abort the "Sec-WebSocket-
Protocol" field. The absence of such a field is equivalent
to WebSocket
connection if the null value. The empty string field is not the same as absent but the
null value conventions for these purposes.

/key_1/
The value of the "Sec-WebSocket-Key1" field in
communicating with the client's
handshake.

/key_2/
The value of server are such that the "Sec-WebSocket-Key2" field in the client's
handshake.

/key_3/
The eight random bytes sent after is expected;
and the first 0x0D 0x0A 0x0D
0x0A sequence in server should abort the client's handshake.

3. Let /location/ be WebSocket connection if the string that results from constructing field
has a
WebSocket URL from /host/, /port/, /resource name/, and /secure
flag/.

4. Let /key-number_1/ be value that does not match one of the digits (characters in subprotocols that the range U+0030
DIGIT ZERO (0)
server supports, to U+0039 DIGIT NINE (9)) in /key_1/, interpreted
as a base ten integer, ignoring all other characters in /key_1/.

Let /key-number_2/ be avoid integrity errors once the digits (characters in connection is
established.

|Sec-WebSocket-Key1|

|Sec-WebSocket-Key2|
The values provide the range U+0030
DIGIT ZERO (0) to U+0039 DIGIT NINE (9)) in /key_2/, interpreted information required for computing the
server's handshake, as a base ten integer, ignoring all other characters described in /key_2/.

EXAMPLE: For example, assume that the client handshake was:

GET / HTTP/1.1
Connection: Upgrade
Host: example.com
Upgrade: WebSocket
Sec-WebSocket-Key1: 3e6b263 4 17 80
Origin: http://example.com
Sec-WebSocket-Key2: 17 9 G`ZD9 2 2b 7X 3 /r90

WjN}|M(6

The /key-number_1/ would next section.

Other fields
Other fields can be used, such as "Cookie", for authentication
purposes. Their semantics are equivalent to the number 3,626,341,780, and semantics of the
/key-number_2/ would be
HTTP headers with the number 1,799,227,390.

In this example, incidentally, /key_3/ is "WjN}|M(6", or 0x57
0x6A 0x4E 0x7D 0x7C 0x4D 0x28 0x36.

5. Let /spaces_1/ same names.

Unrecognized fields can be safely ignored, and are probably either
the number result of U+0020 SPACE characters in
/key_1/.

Let /spaces_2/ be intermediaries injecting fields unrelated to the number
operation of U+0020 SPACE characters in
/key_2/.

If either /spaces_1/ the WebSocket protocol, or /spaces_2/ is zero, then abort clients that support future
versions of the protocol offering options that the server doesn't
support.

5.2.2. Sending the server's opening handshake

When a client establishes a WebSocket connection. This is connection to a symptom of server, the
server must run the following steps.

1. If the server supports encryption, perform a cross-protocol
attack.

EXAMPLE: In TLS handshake over
the example above, /spaces_1/ would be 4 and
/spaces_2/ would be 10.

6. connection. If /key-number_1/ is this fails (e.g. the client indicated a host
name in the extended client hello "server_name" extension that
the server does not an integral multiple of /spaces_1/, host), then abort close the WebSocket connection.

If /key-number_2/ is not an integral multiple connection; otherwise,
all further communication for the connection (including the
server handshake) must run through the encrypted tunnel.
[RFC2246]

2. Establish the following information:

/host/
The host name or IP address of /spaces_2/,
then abort the WebSocket connection.

NOTE: This can only happen if the client server, as it is not a conforming
WebSocket client.

7. Let /part_1/ be /key-number_1/ divided by /spaces_1/.

Let /part_2/
to be /key-number_2/ divided addressed by /spaces_2/.

EXAMPLE: In the example above, /part_1/ would be 906,585,445 and
/part_2/ would be 179,922,739.

8. Let /challenge/ clients. The host name must be punycode-
encoded if necessary. If the concatenation of /part_1/, expressed as a
big-endian 32 bit integer, /part_2/, expressed as a big-endian
32 bit integer, and the eight bytes of /key_3/ server can respond to requests
to multiple hosts (e.g. in a virtual hosting environment),
then the order they
were sent on the wire.

EXAMPLE: In the example above, this would value should be derived from the 16 bytes 0x36
0x09 0x65 0x65 0x0A 0xB9 0x67 0x33 0x57 0x6A 0x4E 0x7D 0x7C 0x4D
0x28 0x36.

9. Let /response/ be client's handshake,
specifically from the MD5 fingerprint of /challenge/ as a big-
endian 128 bit string. [RFC1321]

EXAMPLE: In "Host" field.

/port/
The port number on which the example above, this would be server expected and/or received
the 16 bytes 0x6E
0x60 0x39 0x65 0x42 0x6B 0x39 0x7A 0x24 0x52 0x38 0x70 0x4F 0x74
0x56 0x62, or "n`9eBk9z$R8pOtVb" in ASCII.

10. Send connection.

/resource name/
An identifier for the following line, terminated service provided by the two characters U+000D
CARRIAGE RETURN and U+000A LINE FEED (CRLF) and encoded as
UTF-8, to server. If the
server provides multiple services, then the client:

HTTP/1.1 101 WebSocket Protocol Handshake

This line may value should be sent differently if necessary, but must match
derived from the Status-Line production defined resource name given in the HTTP specification,
with the Status-Code having client's
handshake.

/secure flag/

True if the value 101.

11. Send connection is encrypted or if the following fields server expected
it to the client. Each field must be
sent as a line consisting encrypted; false otherwise.

/origin/
The ASCII serialization of the field name, which must be an origin that the server is
willing to communicate with, converted to ASCII case-insensitive match for lowercase.
If the field name in server can respond to requests from multiple origins
(or indeed, all origins), then the list
below, followed by a U+003A COLON character (:) and value should be derived
from the client's handshake, specifically from the "Origin"
field. [ORIGIN]

/subprotocol/
Either null, or a U+0020
SPACE character, followed by string representing the field value as specified in subprotocol the
list below, followed by
server is ready to use. If the server supports multiple
subprotocols, then the two characters U+000D CARRIAGE
RETURN and U+000A LINE FEED (CRLF). The lines must be encoded
as UTF-8. The lines may be sent in any order.

|Upgrade|
The value must should be derived from the string "WebSocket".

|Connection|
client's handshake, specifically from the "Sec-WebSocket-
Protocol" field. The value must be absence of such a field is equivalent
to the string "Upgrade".

|Sec-WebSocket-Location| null value. The empty string is not the same as the
null value must be /location/

|Sec-WebSocket-Origin| for these purposes.

/key_1/
The value must be /origin/

|Sec-WebSocket-Protocol|
This of the "Sec-WebSocket-Key1" field must be included if /subprotocol/ is not null, and
must not be included if /subprotocol/ is null.

If included, in the client's
handshake.

/key_2/
The value must be /subprotocol/

Optionally, include "Set-Cookie", "Set-Cookie2", or other
cookie-related fields, with values equal to of the values that
would be used for "Sec-WebSocket-Key2" field in the identically named HTTP headers. [RFC2109]
[RFC2965]

12. Send two client's
handshake.

/key_3/
The eight random bytes sent after the first 0x0D 0x0A (ASCII CRLF).

13. Send /response/.

This completes 0x0D
0x0A sequence in the server's client's handshake. If the server finishes these
steps without aborting

3. Let /location/ be the string that results from constructing a
WebSocket connection, URL from /host/, /port/, /resource name/, and if /secure
flag/.

4. Let /key-number_1/ be the client
does not then fail digits (characters in the connection, then range U+0030
DIGIT ZERO (0) to U+0039 DIGIT NINE (9)) in /key_1/, interpreted
as a base ten integer, ignoring all other characters in /key_1/.

Let /key-number_2/ be the connection is established
and digits (characters in the server may begin and receiving sending data, range U+0030
DIGIT ZERO (0) to U+0039 DIGIT NINE (9)) in /key_2/, interpreted
as described a base ten integer, ignoring all other characters in /key_2/.

EXAMPLE: For example, assume that the next section.

5.3. Data framing client handshake was:

GET / HTTP/1.1
Connection: Upgrade
Host: example.com
Upgrade: WebSocket
Sec-WebSocket-Key1: 3e6b263 4 17 80
Origin: http://example.com
Sec-WebSocket-Key2: 17 9 G`ZD9 2 2b 7X 3 /r90

WjN}|M(6

The server must run through /key-number_1/ would be the following steps to process number 3,626,341,780, and the
/key-number_2/ would be the number 1,799,227,390.

In this example, incidentally, /key_3/ is "WjN}|M(6", or 0x57
0x6A 0x4E 0x7D 0x7C 0x4D 0x28 0x36.

5. Let /spaces_1/ be the bytes
sent by number of U+0020 SPACE characters in
/key_1/.

Let /spaces_2/ be the client. number of U+0020 SPACE characters in
/key_2/.

If at any point during these steps a read either /spaces_1/ or /spaces_2/ is
attempted but fails because zero, then abort the
WebSocket connection connection. This is closed, then
abort.

1. _Frame_: Read a byte from symptom of a cross-protocol
attack.

EXAMPLE: In the client. Let /type/ example above, /spaces_1/ would be that byte.

2. 4 and
/spaces_2/ would be 10.

6. If the most significant bit of /type/ /key-number_1/ is not set, an integral multiple of /spaces_1/,
then run abort the
following steps:

1. WebSocket connection.

If /type/ /key-number_2/ is not a 0x00 byte, an integral multiple of /spaces_2/,
then the server may abort these
steps and either immediately disconnect from the client or
set WebSocket connection.

NOTE: This can only happen if the /client terminated/ flag.

2. client is not a conforming
WebSocket client.

7. Let /raw data/ /part_1/ be an empty byte array.

3. _Data_: Read a byte, let /b/ /key-number_1/ divided by /spaces_1/.

Let /part_2/ be that byte.

4. If /b/ is not 0xFF, then append /b/ to /raw data/ /key-number_2/ divided by /spaces_2/.

EXAMPLE: In the example above, /part_1/ would be 906,585,445 and return
to
/part_2/ would be 179,922,739.

8. Let /challenge/ be the previous step (labeled _data_).

5. If /type/ was 0x00, interpret /raw data/ concatenation of /part_1/, expressed as a UTF-8 string,
big-endian 32 bit integer, /part_2/, expressed as a big-endian
32 bit integer, and apply whatever server-specific processing is to occur for
the resulting string (the message from the client).

Otherwise, the most significant bit eight bytes of /type/ is set. Run /key_3/ in the
following steps.

6. If /type/ is not a 0xFF byte, then order they
were sent on the server may abort
these steps and either immediately disconnect from wire.

EXAMPLE: In the
client or set example above, this would be the /client terminated/ flag.

7. 16 bytes 0x36
0x09 0x65 0x65 0x0A 0xB9 0x67 0x33 0x57 0x6A 0x4E 0x7D 0x7C 0x4D
0x28 0x36.

9. Let /length/ /response/ be zero.

8. _Length_: Read the MD5 fingerprint of /challenge/ as a byte, let /b/ big-
endian 128 bit string. [RFC1321]

EXAMPLE: In the example above, this would be that byte.

9. If /b/ is not a 0x00 byte, then run these substeps:

1. The server may abort these steps and either immediately
disconnect from the client 16 bytes 0x6E
0x60 0x39 0x65 0x42 0x6B 0x39 0x7A 0x24 0x52 0x38 0x70 0x4F 0x74
0x56 0x62, or set the /client
terminated/ flag.

2. Let /b_v/ be an integer corresponding to "n`9eBk9z$R8pOtVb" in ASCII.

10. Send the low 7 bits
of /b/ (the value you would get by _and_ing /b/ with
0x7F).

3. Multiply /length/ following line, terminated by 128, add /b_v/ to that result, the two characters U+000D
CARRIAGE RETURN and
store U+000A LINE FEED (CRLF) and encoded as
UTF-8, to the final result client:

HTTP/1.1 101 WebSocket Protocol Handshake

This line may be sent differently if necessary, but must match
the Status-Line production defined in /length/.

4. If the high-order bit of /b/ is set (i.e. if /b/ _and_ed HTTP specification,
with 0x80 returns 0x80), then return to the step above
labeled _length_.

5. Read /length/ bytes.

!!! WARNING: It is possible for a malicious client Status-Code having the value 101.

11. Send the following fields to
send frames with lengths greater than 2**(31) or 2**(32)
bytes, overflowing a signed or unsigned 32bit integer.
Servers may therefore impose implementation-specific
limits on the lengths of invalid frames that they will
skip, if they support skipping such frames at all. If a
server cannot correctly skip past client. Each field must be
sent as a long frame, then line consisting of the
server field name, which must abort these steps (discarding all future
data), and should either immediately disconnect from the
client or set be an
ASCII case-insensitive match for the /client terminated/ flag.

6. Discard field name in the read bytes.

10. If /type/ is 0xFF list
below, followed by a U+003A COLON character (:) and /length/ is 0, then set a U+0020
SPACE character, followed by the /client
terminated/ flag field value as specified in the
list below, followed by the two characters U+000D CARRIAGE
RETURN and abort these steps. All further data U+000A LINE FEED (CRLF). The lines must be encoded
as UTF-8. The lines may be sent by in any order.

|Upgrade|
The value must be the client should string "WebSocket".

|Connection|
The value must be discarded.

3. Return to the step labeled _frame_. string "Upgrade".

|Sec-WebSocket-Location|
The server value must run through be /location/

|Sec-WebSocket-Origin|
The value must be /origin/

|Sec-WebSocket-Protocol|
This field must be included if /subprotocol/ is not null, and
must not be included if /subprotocol/ is null.

If included, the following steps to send strings value must be /subprotocol/

Optionally, include "Set-Cookie", "Set-Cookie2", or other
cookie-related fields, with values equal to the client:

1. Send a 0x00 byte to values that
would be used for the client to indicate identically named HTTP headers. [RFC2109]
[RFC2965]

12. Send two bytes 0x0D 0x0A (ASCII CRLF).

13. Send /response/.

This completes the start of a string.

2. Encode /data/ using UTF-8 and send server's handshake. If the resulting byte stream to server finishes these
steps without aborting the client.

3. Send a 0xFF byte to WebSocket connection, and if the client to indicate the end of
does not then fail the
message.

At any time, connection, then the connection is established
and the server may decide to terminate begin and receiving sending data, as described in
the WebSocket
connection by running through next section.

6. Error Handling

6.1. Handling errors in UTF-8 from the following steps:

1. Send a 0xFF byte and server

When a 0x00 byte to the client is to indicate the
start of the closing handshake.

2. Wait until the /client terminated/ flag has been set, or until interpret a
server-defined timeout expires.

3. Close the WebSocket connection.

Once these steps have started, byte stream as UTF-8 but finds that
the server must byte stream is not send in fact a valid UTF-8 stream, then any further
data to the server. The 0xFF 0x00 bytes indicate the end
or sequences of the
server's data, and further bytes will that are not valid UTF-8 sequences must be discarded by the client.

5.4.
interpreted as a U+FFFD REPLACEMENT CHARACTER.

6.2. Handling errors in UTF-8 from the client

When a server is to interpret a byte stream as UTF-8 but finds that
the byte stream is not in fact a valid UTF-8 stream, behavior is
undefined. A server could close the connection, convert invalid byte
sequences to U+FFFD REPLACEMENT CHARACTERs, store the data verbatim,
or perform application-specific processing. Subprotocols layered on
the WebSocket protocol might define specific behavior for servers.

7. Closing the connection

6.1.

7.1. Client-initiated closure

Certain algorithms require the user agent to *fail the WebSocket
connection*. To do so, the user agent must close the WebSocket
connection, and may report the problem to the user (which would be
especially useful for developers).

Except as indicated above or as specified by the application layer
(e.g. a script using the WebSocket API), user agents should not close
the connection.

User agents must not convey any failure information to scripts in a
way that would allow a script to distinguish the following
situations:

o A server whose host name could not be resolved.

o A server to which packets could not successfully be routed.

o A server that refused the connection on the specified port.

o A server that did not complete the opening handshake (e.g. because
it was not a WebSocket server).

o A WebSocket server that sent a correct opening handshake, but that
specified options that caused the client to drop the connection
(e.g. the server specified an origin that differed from the
script's).

o A WebSocket server that abruptly closed the connection after
successfully completing the opening handshake.

6.2.

7.2. Server-initiated closure

Certain algorithms require or recommend that the server *abort the
WebSocket connection* during the opening handshake. To do so, the
server must simply close the WebSocket connection.

6.3.

7.3. Closure

To *close the WebSocket connection*, the user agent or server must
close the TCP connection, using whatever mechanism possible (e.g.
either the TCP RST or FIN mechanisms). When a user agent notices
that the server has closed its connection, it must immediately close
its side of the connection also. Whether the user agent or the
server closes the connection first, it is said that the *WebSocket
connection is closed*. If the connection was closed after the client
finished the WebSocket closing handshake, then the WebSocket
connection is said to have been closed _cleanly_.

Servers may close the WebSocket connection whenever desired. User
agents should not close the WebSocket connection arbitrarily.

8. Security considerations

While this protocol is intended to be used by scripts in Web pages,
it can also be used directly by hosts. Such hosts are acting on
their own behalf, and can therefore send fake "Origin" fields,
misleading the server. Servers should therefore be careful about
assuming that they are talking directly to scripts from known
origins, and must consider that they might be accessed in unexpected
ways. In particular, a server should not trust that any input is
valid.

EXAMPLE: For example, if the server uses input as part of SQL
queries, all input text should be escaped before being passed to the
SQL server, lest the server be susceptible to SQL injection.

Servers that are not intended to process input from any Web page but
only for certain sites should verify the "Origin" field is an origin
they expect, and should only respond with the corresponding "Sec-
WebSocket-Origin" if it is an accepted origin. Servers that only
accept input from one origin can just send back that value in the
"Sec-WebSocket-Origin" field, without bothering to check the client's
value.

If at any time a server is faced with data that it does not
understand, or that violates some criteria by which the server
determines safety of input, or when the server sees a handshake that
does not correspond to the values the server is expecting (e.g.
incorrect path or origin), the server should just disconnect. It is
always safe to disconnect.

The biggest security risk when sending text data using this protocol
is sending data using the wrong encoding. If an attacker can trick
the server into sending data encoded as ISO-8859-1 verbatim (for
instance), rather than encoded as UTF-8, then the attacker could
inject arbitrary frames into the data stream.

9. IANA considerations

8.1.

9.1. Registration of ws: scheme

A |ws:| URL identifies a WebSocket server and resource name.

URI scheme name.
ws

Status.
Permanent.

URI scheme syntax.
In ABNF terms using the terminals from the URI specifications:
[RFC5234] [RFC3986]

"ws" ":" hier-part [ "?" query ]

The path and query components form the resource name sent to the
server to identify the kind of service desired. Other components
have the meanings described in RFC3986.

URI scheme semantics.
The only operation for this scheme is to open a connection using
the WebSocket protocol.

Encoding considerations.
Characters in the host component that are excluded by the syntax
defined above must be converted from Unicode to ASCII by applying
the IDNA ToASCII algorithm to the Unicode host name, with both the
AllowUnassigned and UseSTD3ASCIIRules flags set, and using the
result of this algorithm as the host in the URI. [RFC3490]

Characters in other components that are excluded by the syntax
defined above must be converted from Unicode to ASCII by first
encoding the characters as UTF-8 and then replacing the
corresponding bytes using their percent-encoded form as defined in
the URI and IRI specification. [RFC3986] [RFC3987]

Applications/protocols that use this URI scheme name.
WebSocket protocol.

Interoperability considerations.
None.

Security considerations.
See "Security considerations" section above.

Contact.
Ian Hickson <ian@hixie.ch>

Author/Change controller.
Ian Hickson <ian@hixie.ch>

References.
This document.

8.2.

9.2. Registration of wss: scheme

A |wss:| URL identifies a WebSocket server and resource name, and
indicates that traffic over that connection is to be encrypted.

URI scheme name.
wss

Status.
Permanent.

URI scheme syntax.
In ABNF terms using the terminals from the URI specifications:
[RFC5234] [RFC3986]

"wss" ":" hier-part [ "?" query ]

The path and query components form the resource name sent to the
server to identify the kind of service desired. Other components
have the meanings described in RFC3986.

URI scheme semantics.
The only operation for this scheme is to open a connection using
the WebSocket protocol, encrypted using TLS.

Applications/protocols that use this URI scheme name.
WebSocket protocol over TLS.

Interoperability considerations.
None.

Security considerations.
See "Security considerations" section above.

Contact.
Ian Hickson <ian@hixie.ch>

Author/Change controller.
Ian Hickson <ian@hixie.ch>

References.
This document.

8.3.

9.3. Registration of the "WebSocket" HTTP Upgrade keyword

Name of token.
WebSocket

Author/Change controller.
Ian Hickson <ian@hixie.ch>

Contact.
Ian Hickson <ian@hixie.ch>

References.
This document.

8.4.

9.4. Sec-WebSocket-Key1 and Sec-WebSocket-Key2

This section describes two header fields for registration in the
Permanent Message Header Field Registry. [RFC3864]

Header field name
Sec-WebSocket-Key1

Applicable protocol
http

Status
reserved; do not use outside WebSocket handshake

Author/Change controller
IETF

Specification document(s)
This document is the relevant specification.

Related information
None.

Header field name
Sec-WebSocket-Key2

Applicable protocol
http

Status
reserved; do not use outside WebSocket handshake

Author/Change controller
IETF

Specification document(s)
This document is the relevant specification.

Related information
None.

The |Sec-WebSocket-Key1| and |Sec-WebSocket-Key2| headers are used in
the WebSocket handshake. They are sent from the client to the server
to provide part of the information used by the server to prove that
it received a valid WebSocket handshake. This helps ensure that the
server does not accept connections from non-Web-Socket clients (e.g.
HTTP clients) that are being abused to send data to unsuspecting
WebSocket servers.

8.5.

9.5. Sec-WebSocket-Location

This section describes a header field for registration in the
Permanent Message Header Field Registry. [RFC3864]

Header field name
Sec-WebSocket-Location

Applicable protocol
http

Status
reserved; do not use outside WebSocket handshake

Author/Change controller
IETF

Specification document(s)
This document is the relevant specification.

Related information
None.

The |Sec-WebSocket-Location| header is used in the WebSocket
handshake. It is sent from the server to the client to confirm the
URL of the connection. This enables the client to verify that the
connection was established to the right server, port, and path,
instead of relying on the server to verify that the requested host,
port, and path are correct.

8.6.

9.6. Sec-WebSocket-Origin

This section describes a header field for registration in the
Permanent Message Header Field Registry. [RFC3864]

Header field name
Sec-WebSocket-Origin

Applicable protocol
http

Status
reserved; do not use outside WebSocket handshake

Author/Change controller
IETF

Specification document(s)
This document is the relevant specification.

Related information
None.

The |Sec-WebSocket-Origin| header is used in the WebSocket handshake.
It is sent from the server to the client to confirm the origin of the
script that opened the connection. This enables user agents to
verify that the server is willing to serve the script that opened the
connection.

8.7.

9.7. Sec-WebSocket-Protocol

This section describes a header field for registration in the
Permanent Message Header Field Registry. [RFC3864]

Header field name
Sec-WebSocket-Protocol

Applicable protocol
http

Status
reserved; do not use outside WebSocket handshake

Author/Change controller
IETF

Specification document(s)
This document is the relevant specification.

Related information
None.

The |Sec-WebSocket-Protocol| header is used in the WebSocket
handshake. It is sent from the client to the server and back from
the server to the client to confirm the subprotocol of the
connection. This enables scripts to both select a subprotocol and be
sure that the server agreed to serve that subprotocol.

10. Using the WebSocket protocol from other specifications

The WebSocket protocol is intended to be used by another
specification to provide a generic mechanism for dynamic author-
defined content, e.g. in a specification defining a scripted API.

Such a specification first needs to "establish a WebSocket
connection", providing that algorithm with:

o The destination, consisting of a /host/ and a /port/.

o A /resource name/, which allows for multiple services to be
identified at one host and port.

o A /secure/ flag, which is true if the connection is to be
encrypted, and false otherwise.

o An ASCII serialization of an origin that is being made responsible
for the connection. [ORIGIN]

o Optionally a string identifying a protocol that is to be layered
over the WebSocket connection.

The /host/, /port/, /resource name/, and /secure/ flag are usually
obtained from a URL using the steps to parse a WebSocket URL's
components. These steps fail if the URL does not specify a
WebSocket.

If a connection can be established, then it is said that the
"WebSocket connection is established".

If at any time the connection is to be closed, then the specification
needs to use the "close the WebSocket connection" algorithm.

When the connection is closed, for any reason including failure to
establish the connection in the first place, it is said that the
"WebSocket connection is closed".

While a connection is open, the specification will need to handle the
cases when "a WebSocket message has been received" with text /data/.

To send some text /data/ to an open connection, the specification
needs to "send /data/ using the WebSocket".

10.

11. Acknowledgements

The WebSocket protocol is

Special thanks are due to Ian Hickson, who was the result of many years of development, original author
and as such hundreds editor of people have contributed to the this protocol. The initial design of this
specification
during its lifetime. Unfortunately, since benefitted from the specification started
as nothing but a minor section participation of many people in the larger
WHATWG Web Applications
1.0 specification, and later the HTML5 specification, no record was
kept of who exactly contributed WHATWG mailing list. Contributions to what ended up becoming this that specification as opposed to
are not tracked by section, but a list of all who contributed to other parts of that
document.

The reader
specification is therefore referred to the Acknowledgements section of given in the WHATWG HTML specification specification. [HTML]

Special thanks also to John Tamplin for providing a full list significant
amount of all contributions
that have been made to text for the source document from which Data Framing section of this
specification is generated. [HTML]

11. specification.

12. Normative References

[HTML] Hickson, I., "HTML", May August 2010,
<http://whatwg.org/html5>.

[ORIGIN] Barth, A., Jackson, C., and I. Hickson, "The HTTP Origin
Header", draft-abarth-origin (work in progress),
September 2009,
<http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-abarth-origin>.

[RFC1321] Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC 1321,
April 1992.

[RFC2109] Kristol, D. and L. Montulli, "HTTP State Management
Mechanism", RFC 2109, February 1997.

[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

[RFC2246] Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0",
RFC 2246, January 1999.

[RFC2616] Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H.,
Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext
Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999.

[RFC2965] Kristol, D. and L. Montulli, "HTTP State Management
Mechanism", RFC 2965, October 2000.

[RFC3490] Faltstrom, P., Hoffman, P., and A. Costello,
"Internationalizing Domain Names in Applications (IDNA)",
RFC 3490, March 2003.

[RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, November 2003.

[RFC3864] Klyne, G., Nottingham, M., and J. Mogul, "Registration
Procedures for Message Header Fields", BCP 90, RFC 3864,
September 2004.

[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
RFC 3986, January 2005.

[RFC3987] Duerst, M. and M. Suignard, "Internationalized Resource
Identifiers (IRIs)", RFC 3987, January 2005.

[RFC4366] Blake-Wilson, S., Nystrom, M., Hopwood, D., Mikkelsen, J.,
and T. Wright, "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Extensions", RFC 4366, April 2006.

[RFC5234] Crocker, D. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234, January 2008.

[WEBADDRESSES]
Connolly, D. and C. Sperberg-McQueen, "Web addresses in
HTML 5", May 2009, <http://www.w3.org/html/wg/href/draft>.

[WSAPI] Hickson, I., "The Web Sockets API", May August 2010,
<http://dev.w3.org/html5/websockets/>.

Author's Address

Ian Hickson Fette
Google, Inc.

Email: ian@hixie.ch ifette+ietf@google.com
URI: http://ln.hixie.ch/ http://www.ianfette.com/