draft-ietf-i2nsf-applicability-02.txt   draft-ietf-i2nsf-applicability-03.txt 
Network Working Group J. Jeong I2NSF Working Group J. Jeong
Internet-Draft S. Hyun Internet-Draft Sungkyunkwan University
Intended status: Informational Sungkyunkwan University Intended status: Informational S. Hyun
Expires: September 6, 2018 T. Ahn Expires: January 3, 2019 Chosun University
T. Ahn
Korea Telecom Korea Telecom
S. Hares S. Hares
Huawei Huawei
D. Lopez D. Lopez
Telefonica I+D Telefonica I+D
March 5, 2018 July 2, 2018
Applicability of Interfaces to Network Security Functions to Network- Applicability of Interfaces to Network Security Functions to Network-
Based Security Services Based Security Services
draft-ietf-i2nsf-applicability-02 draft-ietf-i2nsf-applicability-03
Abstract Abstract
This document describes the applicability of Interface to Network This document describes the applicability of Interface to Network
Security Functions (I2NSF) to network-based security services in Security Functions (I2NSF) to network-based security services in
Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) environments, such as Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) environments, such as
firewall, deep packet inspection, or attack mitigation engines. firewall, deep packet inspection, or attack mitigation engines.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on September 6, 2018. This Internet-Draft will expire on January 3, 2019.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. I2NSF Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. I2NSF Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Time-dependent Web Access Control Service . . . . . . . . 5 3.1. Time-dependent Web Access Control Service . . . . . . . . 5
4. I2NSF Framework with SDN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4. I2NSF Framework with SFC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1. Firewall: Centralized Firewall System . . . . . . . . . . 10 5. I2NSF Framework with SDN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.2. Deep Packet Inspection: Centralized VoIP/VoLTE Security 5.1. Firewall: Centralized Firewall System . . . . . . . . . . 11
System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 5.2. Deep Packet Inspection: Centralized VoIP/VoLTE Security
4.3. Attack Mitigation: Centralized DDoS-attack Mitigation System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 5.3. Attack Mitigation: Centralized DDoS-attack Mitigation
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 6. I2NSF Framework with NFV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
8. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Appendix A. Changes from draft-ietf-i2nsf-applicability-01 . . . 19 9. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 10. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Appendix A. Changes from draft-ietf-i2nsf-applicability-02 . . . 22
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF) defined a framework Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF) defined a framework
and interfaces for interacting with Network Security Functions and interfaces for interacting with Network Security Functions
(NSFs). The I2NSF framework allows heterogeneous NSFs developed by (NSFs). The I2NSF framework allows heterogeneous NSFs developed by
different security solution vendors to be used in the NFV environment different security solution vendors to be used in the NFV environment
by utilizing the capabilities of such products and the virtualization by utilizing the capabilities of such products and the virtualization
of security functions in the NFV platform. In the I2NSF framework, of security functions in the NFV platform. In the I2NSF framework,
each NSF initially registers the profile of its own capabilities into each NSF initially registers the profile of its own capabilities into
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perform the IP address and port number inspection and URL inspection. perform the IP address and port number inspection and URL inspection.
In this scenario, it is assumed that an NSF of firewall has the IP In this scenario, it is assumed that an NSF of firewall has the IP
address and port number inspection capabilities and an NSF of web address and port number inspection capabilities and an NSF of web
filter has URL inspection capability. filter has URL inspection capability.
The Security Controller generates low-level security rules for the The Security Controller generates low-level security rules for the
NSFs to perform IP address and port number inspection, URL NSFs to perform IP address and port number inspection, URL
inspection, and time checking. Specifically, the Security Controller inspection, and time checking. Specifically, the Security Controller
may interoperate with an access control server in the enterprise may interoperate with an access control server in the enterprise
network in order to retrieve the information (e.g., IP address in network in order to retrieve the information (e.g., IP address in
use, company ID, and role) of each employee that is currently using use, company identifier (ID), and role) of each employee that is
the network. Based on the retrieved information, the Security currently using the network. Based on the retrieved information, the
Controller generates low-level security rules to check whether the Security Controller generates low-level security rules to check
source IP address of a received packet matches any one being used by whether the source IP address of a received packet matches any one
a staff member. In addition, the low-level security rules should be being used by a staff member. In addition, the low-level security
able to determine that a received packet is of HTTP protocol. The rules should be able to determine that a received packet is of HTTP
low-level security rules for web filter checks that the target URL protocol. The low-level security rules for web filter checks that
field of a received packet is equal to facebook.com. Finally, the the target URL field of a received packet is equal to facebook.com.
Security Controller sends the low-level security rules of the IP Finally, the Security Controller sends the low-level security rules
address and port number inspection to the NSF of firewall and the of the IP address and port number inspection to the NSF of firewall
low-level rules for URL inspection to the NSF of web filter. and the low-level rules for URL inspection to the NSF of web filter.
The following describes how the time-dependent web access control The following describes how the time-dependent web access control
service is enforced by the NSFs of firewall and web filter. service is enforced by the NSFs of firewall and web filter.
1. A staff member tries to access Fackbook.com during business 1. A staff member tries to access Fackbook.com during business
hours, e.g., 10 am. hours, e.g., 10 am.
2. The packet is forwarded from the staff member's device to the 2. The packet is forwarded from the staff member's device to the
firewall, and the firewall checks the source IP address and port firewall, and the firewall checks the source IP address and port
number. Now the firewall identifies the received packet is an number. Now the firewall identifies the received packet is an
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utilized to support such packet forwarding in the I2NSF framework utilized to support such packet forwarding in the I2NSF framework
[nsf-triggered-steering]. [nsf-triggered-steering].
4. The web filter checks the target URL field of the received 4. The web filter checks the target URL field of the received
packet, and realizes the packet is toward Facebook.com. The web packet, and realizes the packet is toward Facebook.com. The web
filter then checks that the current time is in business hours. filter then checks that the current time is in business hours.
If so, the web filter drops the packet, and consequently the If so, the web filter drops the packet, and consequently the
staff member's access to Facebook during business hours is staff member's access to Facebook during business hours is
blocked. blocked.
4. I2NSF Framework with SDN 4. I2NSF Framework with SFC
In the I2NSF architecture, an NSF can trigger an advanced security
action (e.g., DPI and DDoS attack mitigation) on a packet based on
the result of its own security inspection of the packet. For
example, a firewall triggers further inspection of a suspicious
packet with DPI. For this advanced security action to be fulfilled,
the suspicious packet should be forwarded from the current NSF to the
successor NSF. Service Function Chaining (SFC) [RFC7665] is a
technology that enables this advanced security action by steering a
packet with multiple service functions (e.g., NSFs), and this
technology can be utilized by the I2NSF architecture to support the
advanced security action.
SFC generally requires classifiers and service function forwarders
(SFFs); classifiers are responsible for determining which service
function path (SFP) (i.e., an ordered sequence of service functions)
a given packet should pass through, according to pre-configured
classification rules, and SFFs perform forwarding the given packet to
the next service function (e.g., NSF) on the SFP of the packet by
referring to their forwarding tables. In the I2NSF architecture with
SFC, the security controller can take responsibilities of generating
classification rules for classifiers and forwarding tables for SFFs.
In particular, by analyzing high-level security policies from I2NSF
users, the security controller can construct SFPs that are required
to meet the high-level security policies, generates classification
rules of the SFPs, and then configures classifiers with the
classification rules so that relevant traffic packets can follow the
SFPs. Also, based on the global view of NSF instances available in
the system, the security controller can construct forwarding tables
required for SFFs to forward a given packet to the next NSF over the
SFP.
+------------+
| I2NSF User |
+------------+
^
| Consumer-Facing Interface
v
+-------------------+ Registration +-----------------------+
|Security Controller|<-------------------->|Developer's Mgmt System|
+-------------------+ Interface +-----------------------+
^ ^
| | NSF-Facing Interface
| |-------------------------
| |
+-+-+-v-+-+-+-+-+-+ +------v-------+
| +-----------+ | ------>| NSF-1 |
| |Classifier | | | | (Firewall) |
| +-----------+ | | +--------------+
| +-----+ |<-----| +--------------+
| | SFF | | |----->| NSF-2 |
| +-----+ | | | (DPI) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | +--------------+
| .
| .
| .
| +-----------------------+
------>| NSF-n |
|(DDoS-Attack Mitigator)|
+-----------------------+
Figure 2: An I2NSF Framework with SFC
To trigger an advanced security action in the I2NSF architecture, the
current NSF appends a metadata describing the security capability
required for the advanced action to the suspicious packet and sends
the packet to the classifier. Based on the metadata information, the
classifier searches an SFP which includes an NSF with the required
security capability, changes the SFP-related information (e.g.,
service path identifier and service index [RFC8300]) of the packet
with the new SFP that has been found, and then forwards the packet to
the SFF. When receiving the packet, the SFF checks the SFP-related
information such as the service path identifier and service index
contained in the packet and forwards the packet to the next NSF on
the SFP of the packet, according to its forwarding table.
5. I2NSF Framework with SDN
This section describes an I2NSF framework with SDN for I2NSF This section describes an I2NSF framework with SDN for I2NSF
applicability and use cases, such as firewall, deep packet applicability and use cases, such as firewall, deep packet
inspection, and DDoS-attack mitigation functions. SDN enables some inspection, and DDoS-attack mitigation functions. SDN enables some
packet filtering rules to be enforced in the network switches by packet filtering rules to be enforced in the network switches by
controlling their packet forwarding rules. By taking advantage of controlling their packet forwarding rules. By taking advantage of
this capability of SDN, it is possible to optimize the process of this capability of SDN, it is possible to optimize the process of
security service enforcement in the I2NSF system. security service enforcement in the I2NSF system.
Figure 2 shows an I2NSF framework [RFC8329] with SDN networks to Figure 3 shows an I2NSF framework [RFC8329] with SDN networks to
support network-based security services. In this system, the support network-based security services. In this system, the
enforcement of security policy rules is divided into the SDN switches enforcement of security policy rules is divided into the SDN switches
and NSFs. Especially, SDN switches enforce simple packet filtering and NSFs. Especially, SDN switches enforce simple packet filtering
rules that can be translated into their packet forwarding rules, rules that can be translated into their packet forwarding rules,
whereas NSFs enforce NSF-related security rules requiring the whereas NSFs enforce NSF-related security rules requiring the
security capabilities of the NSFs. For this purpose, the Security security capabilities of the NSFs. For this purpose, the Security
Controller instructs the Switch Controller via NSF-Facing Interface Controller instructs the Switch Controller via NSF-Facing Interface
so that SDN switches can perform the required security services with so that SDN switches can perform the required security services with
flow tables under the supervision of the Switch Controller (i.e., SDN flow tables under the supervision of the Switch Controller (i.e., SDN
Controller). Controller).
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| |Switch Controller| | | |Switch Controller| |
| +-----------------+ | | +-----------------+ |
| ^ | | ^ |
| | SDN Southbound Interface | | | SDN Southbound Interface |
| v | | v |
| +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ | | +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ |
| |Switch 1|-|Switch 2|-|Switch 3|......|Switch m| | | |Switch 1|-|Switch 2|-|Switch 3|......|Switch m| |
| +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ | | +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ |
+-------------------------------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------------------------------+
Figure 2: An I2NSF Framework with SDN Network Figure 3: An I2NSF Framework with SDN Network
The following subsections introduce three use cases for cloud-based The following subsections introduce three use cases for cloud-based
security services: (i) firewall system, (ii) deep packet inspection security services: (i) firewall system, (ii) deep packet inspection
system, and (iii) attack mitigation system. [RFC8192] system, and (iii) attack mitigation system. [RFC8192]
4.1. Firewall: Centralized Firewall System 5.1. Firewall: Centralized Firewall System
A centralized network firewall can manage each network resource and A centralized network firewall can manage each network resource and
firewall rules can be managed flexibly by a centralized server for firewall rules can be managed flexibly by a centralized server for
firewall (called Firewall). The centralized network firewall firewall (called Firewall). The centralized network firewall
controls each switch for the network resource management and the controls each switch for the network resource management and the
firewall rules can be added or deleted dynamically. firewall rules can be added or deleted dynamically.
The procedure of firewall operations in this system is as follows: The procedure of firewall operations in this system is as follows:
1. A switch forwards an unknown flow's packet to one of the Switch 1. A switch forwards an unknown flow's packet to one of the Switch
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are permitted or denied for firewall within a specific are permitted or denied for firewall within a specific
organization network under management. Thus, a centralized view organization network under management. Thus, a centralized view
is helpful to determine security policies for such a network. is helpful to determine security policies for such a network.
o Packet-based access mechanism: Packet-based access mechanism is o Packet-based access mechanism: Packet-based access mechanism is
not enough for firewall in practice since the basic unit of access not enough for firewall in practice since the basic unit of access
control is usually users or applications. Therefore, application control is usually users or applications. Therefore, application
level rules can be defined and added to the firewall system level rules can be defined and added to the firewall system
through the centralized server. through the centralized server.
4.2. Deep Packet Inspection: Centralized VoIP/VoLTE Security System 5.2. Deep Packet Inspection: Centralized VoIP/VoLTE Security System
A centralized VoIP/VoLTE security system can monitor each VoIP/VoLTE A centralized VoIP/VoLTE security system can monitor each VoIP/VoLTE
flow and manage VoIP/VoLTE security rules controlled by a centralized flow and manage VoIP/VoLTE security rules controlled by a centralized
server for VoIP/VoLTE security service called VoIP Intrusion server for VoIP/VoLTE security service called VoIP Intrusion
Prevention System (IPS). The VoIP/VoLTE security system controls Prevention System (IPS). The VoIP/VoLTE security system controls
each switch for the VoIP/VoLTE call flow management by manipulating each switch for the VoIP/VoLTE call flow management by manipulating
the rules that can be added, deleted or modified dynamically. the rules that can be added, deleted or modified dynamically.
A centralized VoIP/VoLTE security system can cooperate with a network A centralized VoIP/VoLTE security system can cooperate with a network
firewall to realize VoIP/VoLTE security service. Specifically, a firewall to realize VoIP/VoLTE security service. Specifically, a
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inspection. inspection.
2. The Firewall analyzes the header fields of the packet, and 2. The Firewall analyzes the header fields of the packet, and
figures out that this is an unknown VoIP call flow's signal figures out that this is an unknown VoIP call flow's signal
packet (e.g., SIP packet) of a suspicious pattern. packet (e.g., SIP packet) of a suspicious pattern.
3. The Firewall triggers an appropriate security service function, 3. The Firewall triggers an appropriate security service function,
such as VoIP IPS, for detailed security analysis of the such as VoIP IPS, for detailed security analysis of the
suspicious signal packet. That is, the firewall sends the packet suspicious signal packet. That is, the firewall sends the packet
to the Service Function Forwarder (SFF) in the I2NSF framework to the Service Function Forwarder (SFF) in the I2NSF framework
[nsf-triggered-steering], as shown in Figure 2. The SFF forwards [nsf-triggered-steering], as shown in Figure 3. The SFF forwards
the suspicious signal packet to the VoIP IPS. the suspicious signal packet to the VoIP IPS.
4. The VoIP IPS analyzes the headers and contents of the signal 4. The VoIP IPS analyzes the headers and contents of the signal
packet, such as calling number and session description headers packet, such as calling number and session description headers
[RFC4566]. [RFC4566].
5. If, for example, the VoIP IPS regards the packet as a spoofed 5. If, for example, the VoIP IPS regards the packet as a spoofed
packet by hackers or a scanning packet searching for VoIP/VoLTE packet by hackers or a scanning packet searching for VoIP/VoLTE
devices, it drops the packet. In addition, the VoIP IPS requests devices, it drops the packet. In addition, the VoIP IPS requests
the Switch Controller to block that packet and the subsequent the Switch Controller to block that packet and the subsequent
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that we need to add VoIP IPS on each network resource. To solve that we need to add VoIP IPS on each network resource. To solve
this, each network resource can be managed centrally such that a this, each network resource can be managed centrally such that a
single VoIP IPS is manipulated by a centralized server. single VoIP IPS is manipulated by a centralized server.
o The establishment of policy: Policy should be established for each o The establishment of policy: Policy should be established for each
network resource. However, it is difficult to describe what flows network resource. However, it is difficult to describe what flows
are permitted or denied for VoIP IPS within a specific are permitted or denied for VoIP IPS within a specific
organization network under management. Thus, a centralized view organization network under management. Thus, a centralized view
is helpful to determine security policies for such a network. is helpful to determine security policies for such a network.
4.3. Attack Mitigation: Centralized DDoS-attack Mitigation System 5.3. Attack Mitigation: Centralized DDoS-attack Mitigation System
A centralized DDoS-attack mitigation can manage each network resource A centralized DDoS-attack mitigation can manage each network resource
and manipulate rules to each switch through a centralized server for and manipulate rules to each switch through a centralized server for
DDoS-attack mitigation (called DDoS-attack Mitigator). The DDoS-attack mitigation (called DDoS-attack Mitigator). The
centralized DDoS-attack mitigation system defends servers against centralized DDoS-attack mitigation system defends servers against
DDoS attacks outside private network, that is, from public network. DDoS attacks outside private network, that is, from public network.
Servers are categorized into stateless servers (e.g., DNS servers) Servers are categorized into stateless servers (e.g., DNS servers)
and stateful servers (e.g., web servers). For DDoS-attack and stateful servers (e.g., web servers). For DDoS-attack
mitigation, traffic flows in switches are dynamically configured by mitigation, traffic flows in switches are dynamically configured by
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So far this document has described the procedure and impact of the So far this document has described the procedure and impact of the
three use cases for network-based security services using the I2NSF three use cases for network-based security services using the I2NSF
framework with SDN networks. To support these use cases in the framework with SDN networks. To support these use cases in the
proposed data-driven security service framework, YANG data models proposed data-driven security service framework, YANG data models
described in [consumer-facing-inf-dm], [nsf-facing-inf-dm], and described in [consumer-facing-inf-dm], [nsf-facing-inf-dm], and
[registration-inf-dm] can be used as Consumer-Facing Interface, NSF- [registration-inf-dm] can be used as Consumer-Facing Interface, NSF-
Facing Interface, and Registration Interface, respectively, along Facing Interface, and Registration Interface, respectively, along
with RESTCONF [RFC8040] and NETCONF [RFC6241]. with RESTCONF [RFC8040] and NETCONF [RFC6241].
5. Security Considerations 6. I2NSF Framework with NFV
This section discusses the implementation of the I2NSF framework with
Network Functions Virtualization (called NFV).
+--------------------+
+-------------------------------------------+ | ---------------- |
| I2NSF User (OSS/BSS) | | | NFV | |
+------+------------------------------------+ | | Orchestrator +-+ |
| Consumer-Facing Interface | ---+------------ | |
+------|------------------------------------+ | | | |
| ----+-------------------------------- | | | | |
| | Security Controller(EM) | | | | | |
| ----+-------------+-------------+---- | | ---+---------- | |
| | NSF-Facing Interface | |(a)-| Developer's| | |
| ----+---- ----+---- ----+---- | | Mgmt System| | |
| |NSF(VNF)| |NSF(VNF)| |NSF(VNF)| |(b)-| (VNFM) | | |
| ----+---- ----+---- ----+---- | | ---+---------- | |
| | | | | | | | |
+------|-------------|-------------|--------+ | | | |
| | | | | | |
+------+-------------+-------------+--------+ | | | |
| NFV Infrastructure (NFVI) | | | | |
| ----------- ----------- ----------- | | | | |
| | Virtual | | Virtual | | Virtual | | | | | |
| | Compute | | Storage | | Network | | | | | |
| ----------- ----------- ----------- | | ---+------ | |
| +---------------------------------------+ | | | | | |
| | Virtualization Layer | |--|-| VIM(s) +-------- |
| +---------------------------------------+ | | | | |
| +---------------------------------------+ | | ---------- |
| | ----------- ----------- ----------- | | | |
| | | Compute | | Storage | | Network | | | | |
| | | hardware| | hardware| | hardware| | | | |
| | ----------- ----------- ----------- | | | |
| | Hardware resources | | | NFV Management |
| +---------------------------------------+ | | and Orchestration |
+-------------------------------------------+ +--------------------+
(a) = Registration Interface
(b) = Ve-Vnfm Interface
Figure 4: I2NSF Framework Implementation in NFV Reference
Architectural Framework
NFV is a promising technology for improving the elasticity and
efficiency of network resource utilization. In NFV environments,
NSFs can be deployed in the forms of software-based virtual instances
rather than physical appliances. Virtualizing NSFs makes it possible
to rapidly and flexibly respond to the amount of service requests by
dynamically increasing or decreasing the number of NSF instances.
Moreover, NFV technology facilitates flexibly including or excluding
NSFs from multiple security solution vendors according to the changes
on security requirements. In order to take advantages of the NFV
technology, the I2NSF framework can be implemented on top of an NFV
infrastructure as show in Figure 4.
Figure 4 shows an I2NSF framework implementation based on the NFV
reference architecture that the European Telecommunications Standards
Institute (ETSI) defines [ETSI-NFV]. The NSFs are deployed as
virtual network functions (VNFs) in Figure 4. The Developer's
Management System in the I2NSF framework is responsible for creating
or removing NSF instances, and can be implemented as the virtual
network functions manager (VNFM) in the NFV architecture that
performs the life-cycle management of VNFs. The Security Controller
can be implemented as the Element Management (EM) in the NFV
architecture that controls and monitors the configurations (e.g.,
function parameters and security policy rules) of VNFs. Finally, the
I2NSF User can be implemented as OSS/BSS (Operational Support
Systems/Business Support Systems) in the NFV architecture that
provides interfaces for users in the NFV system.
The operation procedure in the I2NSF framework based on the NFV
architecture is as follows:
1. The Developer's Mgmt System (DMS) has a set of virtual machine
(VM) images of NSFs, and each VM image can be used to create an
NSF instance that provides a set of security capabilities. The
DMS initially registers a mapping table of the ID of each VM
image and the set of capabilities that can be provided by an NSF
instance created from the VM image into the Security Controller.
2. If the Security Controller does not have any instantiated NSF
that has the set of capabilities required to meet the security
requirements from users, it searches the mapping table
(registered by the DMS) for the VM image ID corresponding to the
required set of capabilities.
3. The Security Controller requests the DMS to instantiate an NSF
with the VM image ID.
4. When receiving the instantiation request, the DMS first asks the
NFV orchestrator for the permission required to create the NSF
instance, requests the VIM to allocate resources for the NSF
instance, and finally creates the NSF instance based on the
allocated resources.
5. Once the NSF instance has been created, the DMS performs the
initial configurations of the NSF instance and then notifies the
Security Controller of the NSF instance.
6. After being notified of the created NSF instance, the Security
Controller delivers low-level security policy rules to the NSF
instance for policy enforcement.
The I2NSF framework can be implemented based on the NFV architecture.
Note that the registration of the capabilities of NSFs is performed
through the Registration Interface and the life-cycle management for
NSFs (VNFs) is performed through the Ve-Vnfm interface, as shown in
Figure 4. More details about the I2NSF framework based on the NFV
reference architecture are described in [i2nsf-nfv-architecture].
7. Security Considerations
The I2NSF framework with SDN networks in this document is derived The I2NSF framework with SDN networks in this document is derived
from the I2NSF framework [RFC8329], so the security considerations of from the I2NSF framework [RFC8329], so the security considerations of
the I2NSF framework should be included in this document. Therefore, the I2NSF framework should be included in this document. Therefore,
proper secure communication channels should be used the delivery of proper secure communication channels should be used the delivery of
control or management messages among the components in the proposed control or management messages among the components in the proposed
framework. framework.
This document shares all the security issues of SDN that are This document shares all the security issues of SDN that are
specified in the "Security Considerations" section of [ITU-T.Y.3300]. specified in the "Security Considerations" section of [ITU-T.Y.3300].
6. Acknowledgments 8. Acknowledgments
This work was supported by Institute for Information & communications This work was supported by Institute for Information & communications
Technology Promotion (IITP) grant funded by the Korea government Technology Promotion (IITP) grant funded by the Korea government
(MSIP) (No.R-20160222-002755, Cloud based Security Intelligence (MSIP) (No.R-20160222-002755, Cloud based Security Intelligence
Technology Development for the Customized Security Service Technology Development for the Customized Security Service
Provisioning). Provisioning).
7. Contributors 9. Contributors
I2NSF is a group effort. I2NSF has had a number of contributing I2NSF is a group effort. I2NSF has had a number of contributing
authors. The following are considered co-authors: authors. The following are considered co-authors:
o Hyoungshick Kim (Sungkyunkwan University) o Hyoungshick Kim (Sungkyunkwan University)
o Jinyong Tim Kim (Sungkyunkwan University)
o Hyunsik Yang (Soongsil University)
o Younghan Kim (Soongsil University)
o Jung-Soo Park (ETRI) o Jung-Soo Park (ETRI)
o Se-Hui Lee (Korea Telecom) o Se-Hui Lee (Korea Telecom)
o Mohamed Boucadair (Orange) o Mohamed Boucadair (Orange)
8. Informative References 10. Informative References
[AVANT-GUARD] [AVANT-GUARD]
Shin, S., Yegneswaran, V., Porras, P., and G. Gu, "AVANT- Shin, S., Yegneswaran, V., Porras, P., and G. Gu, "AVANT-
GUARD: Scalable and Vigilant Switch Flow Management in GUARD: Scalable and Vigilant Switch Flow Management in
Software-Defined Networks", ACM CCS, November 2013. Software-Defined Networks", ACM CCS, November 2013.
[consumer-facing-inf-dm] [consumer-facing-inf-dm]
Jeong, J., Kim, E., Ahn, T., Kumar, R., and S. Hares, Jeong, J., Kim, E., Ahn, T., Kumar, R., and S. Hares,
"I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface YANG Data Model", draft- "I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface YANG Data Model", draft-
ietf-i2nsf-consumer-facing-interface-dm-00 (work in ietf-i2nsf-consumer-facing-interface-dm-01 (work in
progress), March 2018. progress), July 2018.
[consumer-facing-inf-im] [consumer-facing-inf-im]
Kumar, R., Lohiya, A., Qi, D., Bitar, N., Palislamovic, Kumar, R., Lohiya, A., Qi, D., Bitar, N., Palislamovic,
S., Xia, L., and J. Jeong, "Information Model for S., Xia, L., and J. Jeong, "Information Model for
Consumer-Facing Interface to Security Controller", draft- Consumer-Facing Interface to Security Controller", draft-
kumar-i2nsf-client-facing-interface-im-04 (work in kumar-i2nsf-client-facing-interface-im-06 (work in
progress), October 2017. progress), July 2018.
[ETSI-NFV] [ETSI-NFV]
ETSI GS NFV 002 V1.1.1, "Network Functions Virtualisation ETSI GS NFV 002 V1.1.1, "Network Functions Virtualization
(NFV); Architectural Framework", October 2013. (NFV); Architectural Framework", October 2013.
[i2nsf-nfv-architecture]
Yang, H. and Y. Kim, "I2NSF on the NFV Reference
Architecture", draft-yang-i2nsf-nfv-architecture-02 (work
in progress), June 2018.
[i2nsf-nsf-cap-im] [i2nsf-nsf-cap-im]
Xia, L., Strassner, J., Basile, C., and D. Lopez, Xia, L., Strassner, J., Basile, C., and D. Lopez,
"Information Model of NSFs Capabilities", draft-ietf- "Information Model of NSFs Capabilities", draft-ietf-
i2nsf-capability-00 (work in progress), September 2017. i2nsf-capability-02 (work in progress), July 2018.
[i2nsf-terminology] [i2nsf-terminology]
Hares, S., Strassner, J., Lopez, D., Xia, L., and H. Hares, S., Strassner, J., Lopez, D., Xia, L., and H.
Birkholz, "Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF) Birkholz, "Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF)
Terminology", draft-ietf-i2nsf-terminology-05 (work in Terminology", draft-ietf-i2nsf-terminology-05 (work in
progress), January 2018. progress), January 2018.
[ITU-T.X.1252] [ITU-T.X.1252]
Recommendation ITU-T X.1252, "Baseline Identity Management Recommendation ITU-T X.1252, "Baseline Identity Management
Terms and Definitions", April 2010. Terms and Definitions", April 2010.
skipping to change at page 16, line 50 skipping to change at page 20, line 28
March 1991. March 1991.
[ITU-T.Y.3300] [ITU-T.Y.3300]
Recommendation ITU-T Y.3300, "Framework of Software- Recommendation ITU-T Y.3300, "Framework of Software-
Defined Networking", June 2014. Defined Networking", June 2014.
[nsf-facing-inf-dm] [nsf-facing-inf-dm]
Kim, J., Jeong, J., Park, J., Hares, S., and Q. Lin, Kim, J., Jeong, J., Park, J., Hares, S., and Q. Lin,
"I2NSF Network Security Function-Facing Interface YANG "I2NSF Network Security Function-Facing Interface YANG
Data Model", draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-facing-interface-data- Data Model", draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-facing-interface-data-
model-00 (work in progress), March 2018. model-01 (work in progress), July 2018.
[nsf-triggered-steering] [nsf-triggered-steering]
Hyun, S., Jeong, J., Park, J., and S. Hares, "Service Hyun, S., Jeong, J., Park, J., and S. Hares, "Service
Function Chaining-Enabled I2NSF Architecture", draft-hyun- Function Chaining-Enabled I2NSF Architecture", draft-hyun-
i2nsf-nsf-triggered-steering-05 (work in progress), March i2nsf-nsf-triggered-steering-06 (work in progress), July
2018. 2018.
[ONF-OpenFlow] [ONF-OpenFlow]
ONF, "OpenFlow Switch Specification (Version 1.4.0)", ONF, "OpenFlow Switch Specification (Version 1.4.0)",
October 2013. October 2013.
[ONF-SDN-Architecture] [ONF-SDN-Architecture]
ONF, "SDN Architecture", June 2014. ONF, "SDN Architecture", June 2014.
[opsawg-firewalls] [opsawg-firewalls]
Baker, F. and P. Hoffman, "On Firewalls in Internet Baker, F. and P. Hoffman, "On Firewalls in Internet
Security", draft-ietf-opsawg-firewalls-01 (work in Security", draft-ietf-opsawg-firewalls-01 (work in
progress), October 2012. progress), October 2012.
[registration-inf-dm] [registration-inf-dm]
Hyun, S., Jeong, J., Roh, T., Wi, S., and J. Park, "I2NSF Hyun, S., Jeong, J., Roh, T., Wi, S., and J. Park, "I2NSF
Registration Interface YANG Data Model", draft-hyun-i2nsf- Registration Interface YANG Data Model", draft-hyun-i2nsf-
registration-dm-03 (work in progress), March 2018. registration-dm-04 (work in progress), July 2018.
[registration-inf-im] [registration-inf-im]
Hyun, S., Jeong, J., Roh, T., Wi, S., and J. Park, "I2NSF Hyun, S., Jeong, J., Roh, T., Wi, S., and J. Park, "I2NSF
Registration Interface Information Model", draft-hyun- Registration Interface Information Model", draft-hyun-
i2nsf-registration-interface-im-04 (work in progress), i2nsf-registration-interface-im-05 (work in progress),
March 2018. July 2018.
[RFC4566] Handley, M., Jacobson, V., and C. Perkins, "SDP: Session [RFC4566] Handley, M., Jacobson, V., and C. Perkins, "SDP: Session
Description Protocol", RFC 4566, July 2006. Description Protocol", RFC 4566, July 2006.
[RFC6020] Bjorklund, M., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for the [RFC6020] Bjorklund, M., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for the
Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020, Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020,
October 2010. October 2010.
[RFC6241] Enns, R., Bjorklund, M., Schoenwaelder, J., and A. [RFC6241] Enns, R., Bjorklund, M., Schoenwaelder, J., and A.
Bierman, "Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", Bierman, "Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)",
RFC 6241, June 2011. RFC 6241, June 2011.
[RFC7149] Boucadair, M. and C. Jacquenet, "Software-Defined [RFC7149] Boucadair, M. and C. Jacquenet, "Software-Defined
Networking: A Perspective from within a Service Provider Networking: A Perspective from within a Service Provider
Environment", RFC 7149, March 2014. Environment", RFC 7149, March 2014.
[RFC7665] Halpern, J. and C. Pignataro, "Service Function Chaining
(SFC) Architecture", RFC 7665, October 2015.
[RFC8040] Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., and K. Watsen, "RESTCONF [RFC8040] Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., and K. Watsen, "RESTCONF
Protocol", RFC 8040, January 2017. Protocol", RFC 8040, January 2017.
[RFC8192] Hares, S., Lopez, D., Zarny, M., Jacquenet, C., Kumar, R., [RFC8192] Hares, S., Lopez, D., Zarny, M., Jacquenet, C., Kumar, R.,
and J. Jeong, "Interface to Network Security Functions and J. Jeong, "Interface to Network Security Functions
(I2NSF): Problem Statement and Use Cases", RFC 8192, July (I2NSF): Problem Statement and Use Cases", RFC 8192, July
2017. 2017.
[RFC8300] Quinn, P., Elzur, U., and C. Pignataro, "Network Service
Header (NSH)", RFC 8300, January 2018.
[RFC8329] Lopez, D., Lopez, E., Dunbar, L., Strassner, J., and R. [RFC8329] Lopez, D., Lopez, E., Dunbar, L., Strassner, J., and R.
Kumar, "Framework for Interface to Network Security Kumar, "Framework for Interface to Network Security
Functions", RFC 8329, February 2018. Functions", RFC 8329, February 2018.
Appendix A. Changes from draft-ietf-i2nsf-applicability-01 Appendix A. Changes from draft-ietf-i2nsf-applicability-02
The following changes have been made from draft-ietf-i2nsf- The following changes have been made from draft-ietf-i2nsf-
applicability-01: applicability-02:
o In Section 4, it is clarified what types of security policy rules o In Section 4, it is explained how the I2NSF framework and SFC can
can be enforced by SDN switches or NSFs in the environment of be combined to support chaining NSFs.
I2NSF framework with SDN.
o In Section 4, it is explained what should be done by the Security o In Section 6, it is explained how the I2NSF framework can be
Controller in order to divide the enforcement of security policy implemented based on the NFV reference architecture.
rules into the SDN switches and NSFs in the I2NSF framework with
SDN.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Jaehoon Paul Jeong Jaehoon Paul Jeong
Department of Software Department of Software
Sungkyunkwan University Sungkyunkwan University
2066 Seobu-Ro, Jangan-Gu 2066 Seobu-Ro, Jangan-Gu
Suwon, Gyeonggi-Do 16419 Suwon, Gyeonggi-Do 16419
Republic of Korea Republic of Korea
Phone: +82 31 299 4957 Phone: +82 31 299 4957
Fax: +82 31 290 7996 Fax: +82 31 290 7996
EMail: pauljeong@skku.edu EMail: pauljeong@skku.edu
URI: http://iotlab.skku.edu/people-jaehoon-jeong.php URI: http://iotlab.skku.edu/people-jaehoon-jeong.php
Sangwon Hyun Sangwon Hyun
Department of Software Department of Computer Engineering
Sungkyunkwan University Chosun University
2066 Seobu-Ro, Jangan-Gu 309 Pilmun-daero, Dong-Gu
Suwon, Gyeonggi-Do 16419 Gwangju 61452
Republic of Korea Republic of Korea
Phone: +82 31 290 7222 Phone: +82 62 230 7473
Fax: +82 31 299 6673 EMail: shyun@chosun.ac.kr
EMail: swhyun77@skku.edu
URI: http://imtl.skku.ac.kr/
Tae-Jin Ahn Tae-Jin Ahn
Korea Telecom Korea Telecom
70 Yuseong-Ro, Yuseong-Gu 70 Yuseong-Ro, Yuseong-Gu
Daejeon 305-811 Daejeon 305-811
Republic of Korea Republic of Korea
Phone: +82 42 870 8409 Phone: +82 42 870 8409
EMail: taejin.ahn@kt.com EMail: taejin.ahn@kt.com
Susan Hares Susan Hares
Huawei Huawei
7453 Hickory Hill 7453 Hickory Hill
Saline, MI 48176 Saline, MI 48176
USA USA
Phone: +1-734-604-0332 Phone: +1-734-604-0332
EMail: shares@ndzh.com EMail: shares@ndzh.com
Diego R. Lopez Diego R. Lopez
 End of changes. 36 change blocks. 
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