draft-ietf-i2nsf-applicability-17.txt   draft-ietf-i2nsf-applicability-18.txt 
I2NSF Working Group J. Jeong I2NSF Working Group J. Jeong
Internet-Draft Sungkyunkwan University Internet-Draft Sungkyunkwan University
Intended status: Informational S. Hyun Intended status: Informational S. Hyun
Expires: February 9, 2020 Chosun University Expires: March 18, 2020 Myongji University
T. Ahn T. Ahn
Korea Telecom Korea Telecom
S. Hares S. Hares
Huawei Huawei
D. Lopez D. Lopez
Telefonica I+D Telefonica I+D
August 8, 2019 September 15, 2019
Applicability of Interfaces to Network Security Functions to Network- Applicability of Interfaces to Network Security Functions to Network-
Based Security Services Based Security Services
draft-ietf-i2nsf-applicability-17 draft-ietf-i2nsf-applicability-18
Abstract Abstract
This document describes the applicability of Interface to Network This document describes the applicability of Interface to Network
Security Functions (I2NSF) to network-based security services in Security Functions (I2NSF) to network-based security services in
Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) environments, such as Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) environments, such as
firewall, deep packet inspection, or attack mitigation engines. firewall, deep packet inspection, or attack mitigation engines.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
skipping to change at page 1, line 41 skipping to change at page 1, line 41
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
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material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on February 9, 2020. This Internet-Draft will expire on March 18, 2020.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. I2NSF Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3. I2NSF Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Time-dependent Web Access Control Service . . . . . . . . . . 7 4. Time-dependent Web Access Control Service . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. I2NSF Framework with SFC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 5. Intent-based Security Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6. I2NSF Framework with SDN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 6. I2NSF Framework with SFC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6.1. Firewall: Centralized Firewall System . . . . . . . . . . 14 7. I2NSF Framework with SDN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6.2. Deep Packet Inspection: Centralized VoIP/VoLTE Security 7.1. Firewall: Centralized Firewall System . . . . . . . . . . 19
System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 7.2. Deep Packet Inspection: Centralized VoIP/VoLTE Security
6.3. Attack Mitigation: Centralized DDoS-attack Mitigation System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 7.3. Attack Mitigation: Centralized DDoS-attack Mitigation
7. I2NSF Framework with NFV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 8. I2NSF Framework with NFV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
10. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 10. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 11. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Appendix A. Changes from draft-ietf-i2nsf-applicability-16 . . . 23 12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Appendix A. Changes from draft-ietf-i2nsf-applicability-17 . . . 28
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF) defines a framework Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF) defines a framework
and interfaces for interacting with Network Security Functions and interfaces for interacting with Network Security Functions
(NSFs). Note that an NSF is defined as software that provides a set (NSFs). Note that an NSF is defined as software that provides a set
of security-related services, such as (i) detecting unwanted of security-related services, such as (i) detecting unwanted
activity, (ii) blocking or mitigating the effect of such unwanted activity, (ii) blocking or mitigating the effect of such unwanted
activity in order to fulfill service requirements, and (iii) activity in order to fulfill service requirements, and (iii)
supporting communication stream integrity and confidentiality supporting communication stream integrity and confidentiality
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Registration Interface for a security service [RFC8329]. Registration Interface for a security service [RFC8329].
Security Controller maintains the mapping between a capability and an Security Controller maintains the mapping between a capability and an
NSF, so it can perform to translate a high-level security policy NSF, so it can perform to translate a high-level security policy
received from I2NSF User to a low-level security policy configured received from I2NSF User to a low-level security policy configured
and enforced in an NSF [policy-translation]. Security Controller can and enforced in an NSF [policy-translation]. Security Controller can
monitor the states and security attacks in NSFs through NSF monitor the states and security attacks in NSFs through NSF
monitoring [nsf-monitoring-dm]. monitoring [nsf-monitoring-dm].
This document illustrates the applicability of the I2NSF framework This document illustrates the applicability of the I2NSF framework
with four different scenarios: with five different scenarios:
1. The enforcement of time-dependent web access control. 1. The enforcement of time-dependent web access control.
2. The application of I2NSF to a Service Function Chaining (SFC) 2. The support of intent-based security services through I2NSF and
Security Policy Translator [policy-translation].
3. The application of I2NSF to a Service Function Chaining (SFC)
environment [RFC7665]. environment [RFC7665].
3. The integration of the I2NSF framework with Software-Defined 4. The integration of the I2NSF framework with Software-Defined
Networking (SDN) [RFC7149] to provide different security Networking (SDN) [RFC7149] to provide different security
functionality such as firewalls [opsawg-firewalls], Deep Packet functionality such as firewalls [opsawg-firewalls], Deep Packet
Inspection (DPI), and Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack Inspection (DPI), and Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack
mitigation. mitigation.
4. The use of Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) [ETSI-NFV] as a 5. The use of Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) [ETSI-NFV] as a
supporting technology. supporting technology.
The implementation of I2NSF in these scenarios has allowed us to The implementation of I2NSF in these scenarios has allowed us to
verify the applicability and effectiveness of the I2NSF framework for verify the applicability and effectiveness of the I2NSF framework for
a variety of use cases. a variety of use cases.
2. Terminology 2. Terminology
This document uses the terminology described in [RFC7665], [RFC7149], This document uses the terminology described in [RFC7665], [RFC7149],
[ITU-T.Y.3300], [ONF-SDN-Architecture], [ITU-T.X.800], [ITU-T.Y.3300], [ONF-SDN-Architecture], [ITU-T.X.800],
[NFV-Terminology], [RFC8329], and [i2nsf-terminology]. In addition, [NFV-Terminology], [RFC8329], and [i2nsf-terminology]. In addition,
the following terms are defined below: the following terms are defined below:
o Software-Defined Networking (SDN): A set of techniques that o Centralized DDoS-attack Mitigation System: A centralized mitigator
enables to directly program, orchestrate, control, and manage that can establish and distribute access control policy rules into
network resources, which facilitates the design, delivery and network resources for efficient DDoS-attack mitigation.
operation of network services in a dynamic and scalable manner
[ITU-T.Y.3300]. o Centralized Firewall System: A centralized firewall that can
establish and distribute policy rules into network resources for
efficient firewall management.
o Centralized VoIP Security System: A centralized security system
that handles the security functions required for VoIP and VoLTE
services.
o Firewall: A service function at the junction of two network
segments that inspects some suspicious packets that attempt to
cross the boundary. It also rejects any packet that does not
satisfy certain criteria for, for example, disallowed port numbers
or IP addresses.
o Network Function: A functional block within a network o Network Function: A functional block within a network
infrastructure that has well-defined external interfaces and well- infrastructure that has well-defined external interfaces and well-
defined functional behavior [NFV-Terminology]. defined functional behavior [NFV-Terminology].
o Network Functions Virtualization (NFV): A principle of separating
network functions (or network security functions) from the
hardware they run on by using virtual hardware abstraction
[NFV-Terminology].
o Network Security Function (NSF): Software that provides a set of o Network Security Function (NSF): Software that provides a set of
security-related services. Examples include detecting unwanted security-related services. Examples include detecting unwanted
activity and blocking or mitigating the effect of such unwanted activity and blocking or mitigating the effect of such unwanted
activity in order to fulfill service requirements. The NSF can activity in order to fulfill service requirements. The NSF can
also help in supporting communication stream integrity and also help in supporting communication stream integrity and
confidentiality [i2nsf-terminology]. confidentiality [i2nsf-terminology].
o Network Functions Virtualization (NFV): A principle of separating o Security Policy Translator (SPT): Software that translates a high-
network functions (or network security functions) from the level security policy for the Consumer-Facing Interface into a
hardware they run on by using virtual hardware abstraction low-level security policy for the NSF-Facing Interface
[NFV-Terminology]. [policy-translation]. The SPT is a core part of the Security
Controller in the I2NSF system.
o Service Function Chaining (SFC): The execution of an ordered set o Service Function Chaining (SFC): The execution of an ordered set
of abstract service functions (i.e., network functions) according of abstract service functions (i.e., network functions) according
to ordering constraints that must be applied to packets, frames, to ordering constraints that must be applied to packets, frames,
and flows selected as a result of classification. The implied and flows selected as a result of classification. The implied
order may not be a linear progression as the architecture allows order may not be a linear progression as the architecture allows
for SFCs that copy to more than one branch, and also allows for for SFCs that copy to more than one branch, and also allows for
cases where there is flexibility in the order in which service cases where there is flexibility in the order in which service
functions need to be applied [RFC7665]. functions need to be applied [RFC7665].
o Firewall: A service function at the junction of two network o Software-Defined Networking (SDN): A set of techniques that
segments that inspects some suspicious packets that attempt to enables to directly program, orchestrate, control, and manage
cross the boundary. It also rejects any packet that does not network resources, which facilitates the design, delivery and
satisfy certain criteria for, for example, disallowed port numbers operation of network services in a dynamic and scalable manner
or IP addresses. [ITU-T.Y.3300].
o Centralized Firewall System: A centralized firewall that can
establish and distribute policy rules into network resources for
efficient firewall management.
o Centralized VoIP Security System: A centralized security system
that handles the security functions required for VoIP and VoLTE
services.
o Centralized DDoS-attack Mitigation System: A centralized mitigator
that can establish and distribute access control policy rules into
network resources for efficient DDoS-attack mitigation.
+------------+ +------------+
| I2NSF User | | I2NSF User |
+------------+ +------------+
^ ^
| Consumer-Facing Interface | Consumer-Facing Interface
v v
+-------------------+ Registration +-----------------------+ +-------------------+ Registration +-----------------------+
|Security Controller|<-------------------->|Developer's Mgmt System| |Security Controller|<-------------------->|Developer's Mgmt System|
+-------------------+ Interface +-----------------------+ +-------------------+ Interface +-----------------------+
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+----------------+ +---------------+ +-----------------------+ +----------------+ +---------------+ +-----------------------+
Figure 1: I2NSF Framework Figure 1: I2NSF Framework
3. I2NSF Framework 3. I2NSF Framework
This section summarizes the I2NSF framework as defined in [RFC8329]. This section summarizes the I2NSF framework as defined in [RFC8329].
As shown in Figure 1, an I2NSF User can use security functions by As shown in Figure 1, an I2NSF User can use security functions by
delivering high-level security policies, which specify security delivering high-level security policies, which specify security
requirements that the I2NSF user wants to enforce, to the Security requirements that the I2NSF user wants to enforce, to the Security
Controller via the Consumer-Facing Interface Controller via the Consumer-Facing Interface (CFI)
[consumer-facing-inf-dm]. [consumer-facing-inf-dm].
The Security Controller receives and analyzes the high-level security The Security Controller receives and analyzes the high-level security
policies from an I2NSF User, and identifies what types of security policies from an I2NSF User, and identifies what types of security
capabilities are required to meet these high-level security policies. capabilities are required to meet these high-level security policies.
The Security Controller then identifies NSFs that have the required The Security Controller then identifies NSFs that have the required
security capabilities, and generates low-level security policies for security capabilities, and generates low-level security policies for
each of the NSFs so that the high-level security policies are each of the NSFs so that the high-level security policies are
eventually enforced by those NSFs [policy-translation]. Finally, the eventually enforced by those NSFs [policy-translation]. Finally, the
Security Controller sends the generated low-level security policies Security Controller sends the generated low-level security policies
to the NSFs via the NSF-Facing Interface [nsf-facing-inf-dm]. to the NSFs via the NSF-Facing Interface (NFI) [nsf-facing-inf-dm].
As shown in Figure 1, with a Developer's Management System (called As shown in Figure 1, with a Developer's Management System (called
DMS), developers (or vendors) inform the Security Controller of the DMS), developers (or vendors) inform the Security Controller of the
capabilities of the NSFs through the Registration Interface capabilities of the NSFs through the Registration Interface (RI)
[registration-inf-dm] for registering (or deregistering) the [registration-inf-dm] for registering (or deregistering) the
corresponding NSFs. Note that the lifecycle management of NSF code corresponding NSFs. Note that the lifecycle management of NSF code
from DMS (e.g., downloading of NSF modules and testing of NSF code) from DMS (e.g., downloading of NSF modules and testing of NSF code)
is out of scope for I2NSF. is out of scope for I2NSF.
The Consumer-Facing Interface can be implemented with the Consumer- The Consumer-Facing Interface can be implemented with the Consumer-
Facing Interface YANG data model [consumer-facing-inf-dm] using Facing Interface YANG data model [consumer-facing-inf-dm] using
RESTCONF [RFC8040] which befits a web-based user interface for an RESTCONF [RFC8040] which befits a web-based user interface for an
I2NSF User to send a Security Controller a high-level security I2NSF User to send a Security Controller a high-level security
policy. Data models specified by YANG [RFC6020] describe high-level policy. Data models specified by YANG [RFC6020] describe high-level
skipping to change at page 7, line 6 skipping to change at page 7, line 12
data model defined in [registration-inf-dm] can be used for the I2NSF data model defined in [registration-inf-dm] can be used for the I2NSF
Registration Interface. Registration Interface.
The I2NSF framework can chain multiple NSFs to implement low-level The I2NSF framework can chain multiple NSFs to implement low-level
security policies with the SFC architecture [RFC7665]. security policies with the SFC architecture [RFC7665].
The following sections describe different security service scenarios The following sections describe different security service scenarios
illustrating the applicability of the I2NSF framework. illustrating the applicability of the I2NSF framework.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" ?> <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" ?>
<ietf-i2nsf-cfi-policy:policy> <policy xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-cfi-policy">
<policy-name>block_website</policy-name> <policy-name>block_website</policy-name>
<rule> <rule>
<rule-name>block_website_during_working_hours</rule-name> <rule-name>block_website_during_working_hours</rule-name>
<event> <event>
<time-information> <time-information>
<begin-time>09:00</begin-time> <begin-time>09:00</begin-time>
<end-time>18:00</end-time> <end-time>18:00</end-time>
</time-information> </time-information>
</event> </event>
<condition> <condition>
<firewall-condition> <firewall-condition>
<source-target> <source-target>
<src-target>Staff_Member's_PC</src-target> <src-target>Staff_Members'_PCs</src-target>
</source-target> </source-target>
</firewall-condition> </firewall-condition>
<custom-condition> <custom-condition>
<destination-target> <destination-target>
<dest-target>example.com</dest-target> <dest-target>SNS_Websites</dest-target>
</destination-target> </destination-target>
</custom-condition> </custom-condition>
</condition> </condition>
<action> <action>
<primary-action>drop</primary-action> <primary-action>drop</primary-action>
</action> </action>
</rule> </rule>
</ietf-i2nsf-cfi-policy:policy> </policy>
Figure 2: An XML Example for Time-based Web-filter Figure 2: A High-level Security Policy XML File for Time-based Web
Filter
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" ?>
<i2nsf-security-policy
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-policy-rule-for-nsf">
<system-policy>
<system-policy-name>block_website</system-policy-name>
<rules>
<rule-name>block_website_during_working_hours</rule-name>
<time-intervals>
<absolute-time-interval>
<begin-time>09:00</begin-time>
<end-time>18:00</end-time>
</absolute-time-interval>
</time-intervals>
<condition-clause-container>
<packet-security-ipv6-condition>
<pkt-sec-ipv6-src>
<ipv6-address>
<ipv6>2001:DB8:10:1::10</ipv6>
<ipv6>2001:DB8:10:1::20</ipv6>
<ipv6>2001:DB8:10:1::30</ipv6>
</ipv6-address>
</pkt-sec-ipv6-src>
</packet-security-ipv6-condition>
<packet-security-url-category-condition>
<user-defined-category>example1.com</user-defined-category>
<user-defined-category>example2.com</user-defined-category>
<user-defined-category>example3.com</user-defined-category>
<user-defined-category>example4.com</user-defined-category>
</packet-security-url-category-condition>
</condition-clause-container>
<action-clause-container>
<packet-action>
<egress-action>drop</egress-action>
</packet-action>
</action-clause-container>
</rules>
</system-policy>
</i2nsf-security-policy>
Figure 3: A Low-level Security Policy XML File for Time-based Web
Filter
4. Time-dependent Web Access Control Service 4. Time-dependent Web Access Control Service
This service scenario assumes that an enterprise network This service scenario assumes that an enterprise network
administrator wants to control the staff members' access to a administrator wants to control the staff members' access to a
particular Internet service (e.g., example.com) during business particular Internet service (e.g., social networking service (SNS))
hours. The following is an example high-level security policy rule during business hours. The following is an example high-level
for a web filter that the administrator requests: Block the staff security policy rule for a web filter that the administrator
members' access to example.com from 9 AM (i.e., 09:00) to 6 PM (i.e., requests: Block the staff members' access to SNS websites from 9 AM
18:00) by dropping their packets. Figure 2 is an example XML code (i.e., 09:00) to 6 PM (i.e., 18:00) by dropping their packets.
for this web filter that is sent from the I2NSF User to the Security Figure 2 is a high-level security policy XML code for the web filter
Controller via the Consumer-Facing Interface that is sent from the I2NSF User to the Security Controller via the
[consumer-facing-inf-dm]. Consumer-Facing Interface [consumer-facing-inf-dm].
The security policy name is "block_website" with the tag "policy- The security policy name is "block_website" with the tag "policy-
name", and the security policy rule name is name", and the security policy rule name is
"block_website_during_working_hours" with the tag "rule-name". The "block_website_during_working_hours" with the tag "rule-name". The
filtering event has the time span where the filtering begin time is filtering event has the time span where the filtering begin time is
the time "09:00" (i.e., 9:00AM) with the tag "begin-time", and the the time "09:00" (i.e., 9:00AM) with the tag "begin-time", and the
filtering end time is the time "18:00" (i.e., 6:00PM) with the tag filtering end time is the time "18:00" (i.e., 6:00PM) with the tag
"end-time". The filtering condition has the source target of "end-time". The filtering condition has the source target of
"Staff_Member's_PC" with the tag "src-target", and the destination "Staff_Members'_PCs" with the tag "src-target", and the destination
target of a website "example.com" with the tag "dest-target". Note target of "SNS_Websites" with the tag "dest-target".
that the destination target can be translated to IP address(es)
corresponding to the website's URL, and then either the website's URL Assume that "Staff_Members'_PCs" are 2001:DB8:10:1::10,
or the corresponding IP address(es) can be used by both firewall and 2001:DB8:10:1::20, and 2001:DB8:10:1::30, and that "SNS_Websites" are
web filter. The action is to "drop" the packets satisfying the above example1.com, example2.com, example3.com, and example4.com, as shown
event and condition with the tag "primary-action". in Figure 3. Note that Figure 3 is a low-level security policy XML
code for the web filter that is sent from the Security Controller to
an NSF via the NSF-Facing Interface [nsf-facing-inf-dm].
The source target can by translated by the Security Policy Translator
(SPT) in the Security Controller to the IP addresses of computers (or
mobile devices) used by the staff members. Refer to Section 5 for
the detailed description of the SPT. The destination target can also
be translated by the SPT to the actual websites corresponding to the
symbolic website name "SNS_Websites", and then either each website's
URL or the corresponding IP address(es) can be used by both firewall
and web filter. The action is to "drop" the packets satisfying the
above event and condition with the tag "primary-action".
After receiving the high-level security policy, the Security After receiving the high-level security policy, the Security
Controller identifies required security capabilities, e.g., IP Controller identifies required security capabilities, e.g., IP
address and port number inspection capabilities and URL inspection address and port number inspection capabilities and URL inspection
capability. In this scenario, it is assumed that the IP address and capability. In this scenario, it is assumed that the IP address and
port number inspection capabilities are required to check whether a port number inspection capabilities are required to check whether a
received packet is an HTTP-session packet from a staff member, which received packet is an HTTP-session packet from a staff member, which
is part of an HTTP session generated by the staff member. The URL is part of an HTTP session generated by the staff member. The URL
inspection capability is required to check whether the target URL of inspection capability is required to check whether the target URL of
a received packet is in the example.com domain or not. a received packet is one of the target websites (i.e., example1.com,
example2.com, example3.com, and example4.com) or not.
The Security Controller maintains the security capabilities of each The Security Controller maintains the security capabilities of each
active NSF in the I2NSF system, which have been reported by the active NSF in the I2NSF system, which have been reported by the
Developer's Management System via the Registration interface. Based Developer's Management System via the Registration interface. Based
on this information, the Security Controller identifies NSFs that can on this information, the Security Controller identifies NSFs that can
perform the IP address and port number inspection and URL inspection perform the IP address and port number inspection and URL inspection
[policy-translation]. In this scenario, it is assumed that a through the security policy translation in Section 5. In this
firewall NSF has the IP address and port number inspection scenario, it is assumed that a firewall NSF has the IP address and
capabilities and a web filter NSF has URL inspection capability. port number inspection capabilities and a web filter NSF has URL
inspection capability.
The Security Controller generates low-level security rules for the The Security Controller generates a low-level security policy for the
NSFs to perform IP address and port number inspection, URL NSFs to perform IP address and port number inspection, URL
inspection, and time checking. Specifically, the Security Controller inspection, and time checking, which is shown in Figure 3.
may interoperate with an access control server in the enterprise Specifically, the Security Controller may interoperate with an access
network in order to retrieve the information (e.g., IP address in control server in the enterprise network in order to retrieve the
use, company identifier (ID), and role) of each employee that is information (e.g., IP address in use, company identifier (ID), and
currently using the network. Based on the retrieved information, the role) of each employee that is currently using the network. Based on
Security Controller generates low-level security rules to check the retrieved information, the Security Controller generates a low-
whether the source IP address of a received packet matches any one level security policy to check whether the source IP address of a
being used by a staff member. received packet matches any one being used by a staff member.
In addition, the low-level security rules should be able to determine In addition, the low-level security policy's rule (shortly, low-level
that a received packet uses either the HTTP protocol without security rule) should be able to determine that a received packet
Transport Layer Security (TLS) [RFC8446] or the HTTP protocol with uses either the HTTP protocol without Transport Layer Security (TLS)
TLS as HTTPS. The low-level security rules for web filter check that [RFC8446] or the HTTP protocol with TLS as HTTPS. The low-level
the target URL field of a received packet is equal to example.com, or security rule for web filter checks that the target URL field of a
that the destination IP address of a received packet is an IP address received packet is equal to one of the target SNS websites (i.e.,
corresponding to example.com. Note that if HTTPS is used for an example1.com, example2.com, example3.com, and example4.com), or that
HTTP-session packet, the HTTP protocol header is encrypted, so the the destination IP address of a received packet is an IP address
URL information may not be seen from the packet for the web corresponding to one of the SNS websites. Note that if HTTPS is used
for an HTTP-session packet, the HTTP protocol header is encrypted, so
the URL information may not be seen from the packet for the web
filtering. Thus, the IP address(es) corresponding to the target URL filtering. Thus, the IP address(es) corresponding to the target URL
needs to be obtained from the certificate in TLS versions prior to needs to be obtained from the certificate in TLS versions prior to
1.3 [RFC8446] or the Server Name Indication (SNI) in a TCP-session 1.3 [RFC8446] or the Server Name Indication (SNI) in a TCP-session
packet in TLS versions without the encrypted SNI [tls-esni]. Also, packet in TLS versions without the encrypted SNI [tls-esni]. Also,
to obtain IP address(es) corresponding to a target URL, the DNS name to obtain IP address(es) corresponding to a target URL, the DNS name
resolution process can be observed through a packet capturing tool resolution process can be observed through a packet capturing tool
because the DNS name resolution will translate the target URL into IP because the DNS name resolution will translate the target URL into IP
address(es). The IP addresses obtained through either TLS or DNS can address(es). The IP addresses obtained through either TLS or DNS can
be used by both firewall and web filter for whitelisting or be used by both firewall and web filter for whitelisting or
blacklisting the TCP five-tuples of HTTP sessions. blacklisting the TCP five-tuples of HTTP sessions.
Finally, the Security Controller sends the low-level security rules Finally, the Security Controller sends the low-level security policy
of the IP address and port number inspection to the firewall NSF and of the IP address and port number inspection to the firewall NSF and
the low-level rules for URL inspection to the web filter NSF. the low-level security policy for URL inspection to the web filter
NSF.
The following describes how the time-dependent web access control The following describes how the time-dependent web access control
service is enforced by the NSFs of firewall and web filter. service is enforced by the NSFs of firewall and web filter.
1. A staff member tries to access example.com during business hours, 1. A staff member tries to access one of the target SNS websites
e.g., 10 AM. (i.e., example1.com, example2.com, example3.com, and
example4.com) during business hours, e.g., 10 AM.
2. The packet is forwarded from the staff member's device to the 2. The packet is forwarded from the staff member's device to the
firewall, and the firewall checks the source IP address and port firewall, and the firewall checks the source IP address and port
number. Now the firewall identifies the received packet is an number. Now the firewall identifies the received packet is an
HTTP-session packet from the staff member. HTTP-session packet from the staff member.
3. The firewall triggers the web filter to further inspect the 3. The firewall triggers the web filter to further inspect the
packet, and the packet is forwarded from the firewall to the web packet, and the packet is forwarded from the firewall to the web
filter. The SFC architecture [RFC7665] can be utilized to filter. The SFC architecture [RFC7665] can be utilized to
support such packet forwarding in the I2NSF framework. support such packet forwarding in the I2NSF framework.
4. The web filter checks the received packet's target URL field or 4. The web filter checks the received packet's target URL field or
its destination IP address corresponding to the target URL, and its destination IP address corresponding to the target URL, and
detects that the packet is being sent to the server for detects that the packet is being sent to the server for
example.com. The web filter then checks that the current time is example1.com. The web filter then checks that the current time
within business hours. If so, the web filter drops the packet, is within business hours. If so, the web filter drops the
and consequently the staff member's access to example.com during packet, and consequently the staff member's access to one of the
business hours is blocked. SNS websites (i.e., example1.com, example2.com, example3.com, and
example4.com) during business hours is blocked.
+------------------------+-------------------------+
| |
| I2NSF User |
| |
+------------------------+-------------------------+
| Consumer-Facing Interface
|
High-level Security Policy
Security |
Controller V
+------------------------+-------------------------+
| Security Policy | |
| Translator | |
| +---------------------+----------------------+ |
| | | | |
| | +-------+--------+ | |
| | | Data Extractor | | |
| | +-------+--------+ | |
| | | Extracted Data from | |
| | V High-level Policy | |
| | +-------+--------+ +------+ | |
| | | Data Converter |<-->|NSF DB| | |
| | +-------+--------+ +------+ | |
| | | Required Data for | |
| | V Target NSFs | |
| | +-------+--------+ | |
| | |Policy Generator| | |
| | +-------+--------+ | |
| | | | |
| +---------------------+----------------------+ |
| | |
+------------------------+-------------------------+
| NSF-Facing Interface
|
Low-level Security Policy
|
V
+------------------------+-------------------------+
| |
| NSF(s) |
| |
+------------------------+-------------------------+
Figure 4: Security Policy Translation and Enforcement in I2NSF System
5. Intent-based Security Services
I2NSF aims at providing intent-based security services to configure
specific security policies into NSFs with customer-friendly secuirty
policies at a high level. For example, when an I2NSF User submits a
high-level security policy (e.g., web filtering as shown in Figure 2)
to the Security Controller, the Security Policy Tranlator (SPT) in
the Security Controller will translate it into the correspondong low-
level security policy as shown in Figure 3 [policy-translation]. A
security administrator using the I2NSF User can describe a security
policy without the knowledge of the detailed information about
subjects (e.g., source and destination) and objects (e.g., web
traffic) of the security policy's rule(s).
Figure 4 shows the security policy translation and enforcement in the
I2NSF system [policy-translation]. As shown in Figure 4, an I2NSF
User delivers a high-level security policy to the Security Controller
using the Consumer-Facing Interface (denoted as CFI). The high-level
security policy is translated by the SPT in the Security Controller
into the corresponding low-level security policy which is
understandable by target NSF(s). The Security Controller delivers
the low-level security policy to the appropriate NSF(s) to enforce
the policy's rules.
The SPT consists of three modules for security policy translations
such as Data Extractor, Data Converter, and Policy Generator, as
shown in Figure 4. The Data Extractor extracts data from a high-
level security policy delivered by the I2NSF User. The data
correspond to the leaf nodes in the YANG data model for the Consumer-
Facing Interface. In the high-level policy in Figure 2, the data are
the tag values of policy-name, rule-name, begin-time, end-time, src-
target, dest-target, and primary-action. That is, the tag values are
"block_website", "block_website_during_working_hours", "09:00",
"18:00", "Staff_Members'_PCs", "SNS_Websites", and "drop."
The Data Converter converts the extracted high-level policy data
received from the Data Extractor into the corresponding low-level
policy data. The low-level policy data have the capability
information of NSFs to be selected as target NSFs for the required
security service enforcement specified by the high-level security
policy. The tag values in the extracted high-level policy data are
replaced with the tag values in the low-level policy data, which are
the leaf nodes of the YANG data model for the NSF-Facing Interface
(denoted as NFI). The value of each leaf node in CFI is translated
into the value of the corresponding leaf node in NFI. For example,
"block_website" of policy-name in CFI (in Figure 2) is translated
into "block_website" of system-policy-name in NFI (in Figure 3). The
tag values of rule-name, begin-time, end-time, and primary-action in
CFI are mapped into the same values of rule-name, begin-time, end-
time, and egress-action in NFI. However, the tag values of src-
target and dest-target in CFI are translated into IP addresses and
URLs, respectively, for the sake of NFI. That is,
"Staff_Members'_PCs" of CFI is translated into three IPv6 addresses
such as "2001:DB8:10:1::10", "2001:DB8:10:1::20", and
"2001:DB8:10:1::30" for the sake of NFI. Also, "SNS_Websites" of CFI
is translated into four URLs such as "example1.com", "example2.com",
"example3.com", and "example4.com" for the sake of NFI. In addition
to the data conversion, the Data Converter searches for appropriate
NSFs having capabilities corresponding to the leaf nodes of the YANG
data model for NFI. For the data conversion and NSF search, an NSF
database (denoted as NSF DB) can be consulted, as shown in Figure 4,
because the NSF DB has the capability information of NSFs that the
DMS(s) registered with the Security Controller using the Registration
Interface.
The Policy Generator generates a low-level security policy
corresponding to the low-level policy data made by the Data Converter
per a target NSF. That is, the Policy Generator can build such a
low-level security policy XML file like Figure 3 with the NSF DB
because the NSF DB has the mapping information between the CFI YANG
data model and the NFI YANG data model.
Therefore, by allowing the I2NSF User to express its security policy
without knowing the detailed information of entities for security
policies, the I2NSF can efficiently support the intent-based security
services with the help of the security policy translator along with
the NSF DB.
+------------+ +------------+
| I2NSF User | | I2NSF User |
+------------+ +------------+
^ ^
| Consumer-Facing Interface | Consumer-Facing Interface
v v
+-------------------+ Registration +-----------------------+ +-------------------+ Registration +-----------------------+
|Security Controller|<-------------------->|Developer's Mgmt System| |Security Controller|<-------------------->|Developer's Mgmt System|
+-------------------+ Interface +-----------------------+ +-------------------+ Interface +-----------------------+
skipping to change at page 10, line 35 skipping to change at page 15, line 35
| +-----+ | | | (DPI) | | +-----+ | | | (DPI) |
+-----------------+ | +--------------+ +-----------------+ | +--------------+
| . | .
| . | .
| . | .
| +-----------------------+ | +-----------------------+
------>| NSF-n | ------>| NSF-n |
|(DDoS-Attack Mitigator)| |(DDoS-Attack Mitigator)|
+-----------------------+ +-----------------------+
Figure 3: An I2NSF Framework with SFC Figure 5: An I2NSF Framework with SFC
5. I2NSF Framework with SFC 6. I2NSF Framework with SFC
In the I2NSF architecture, an NSF can trigger an advanced security In the I2NSF architecture, an NSF can trigger an advanced security
action (e.g., DPI or DDoS attack mitigation) on a packet based on the action (e.g., DPI or DDoS attack mitigation) on a packet based on the
result of its own security inspection of the packet. For example, a result of its own security inspection of the packet. For example, a
firewall triggers further inspection of a suspicious packet with DPI. firewall triggers further inspection of a suspicious packet with DPI.
For this advanced security action to be fulfilled, the suspicious For this advanced security action to be fulfilled, the suspicious
packet should be forwarded from the current NSF to the successor NSF. packet should be forwarded from the current NSF to the successor NSF.
SFC [RFC7665] is a technology that enables this advanced security SFC [RFC7665] is a technology that enables this advanced security
action by steering a packet with multiple service functions (e.g., action by steering a packet with multiple service functions (e.g.,
NSFs), and this technology can be utilized by the I2NSF architecture NSFs), and this technology can be utilized by the I2NSF architecture
to support the advanced security action. to support the advanced security action.
Figure 3 shows an I2NSF framework with the support of SFC. As shown Figure 5 shows an I2NSF framework with the support of SFC. As shown
in the figure, SFC generally requires classifiers and service in the figure, SFC generally requires classifiers and service
function forwarders (SFFs); classifiers are responsible for function forwarders (SFFs); classifiers are responsible for
determining which service function path (SFP) (i.e., an ordered determining which service function path (SFP) (i.e., an ordered
sequence of service functions) a given packet should pass through, sequence of service functions) a given packet should pass through,
according to pre-configured classification rules, and SFFs perform according to pre-configured classification rules, and SFFs perform
forwarding the given packet to the next service function (e.g., NSF) forwarding the given packet to the next service function (e.g., NSF)
on the SFP of the packet by referring to their forwarding tables. In on the SFP of the packet by referring to their forwarding tables. In
the I2NSF architecture with SFC, the Security Controller can take the I2NSF architecture with SFC, the Security Controller can take
responsibilities of generating classification rules for classifiers responsibilities of generating classification rules for classifiers
and forwarding tables for SFFs. By analyzing high-level security and forwarding tables for SFFs. By analyzing high-level security
skipping to change at page 12, line 38 skipping to change at page 17, line 38
| +----------------+ | | +----------------+ |
| ^ | | ^ |
| | SDN Southbound Interface | | | SDN Southbound Interface |
| v | | v |
| +--------+ +------------+ +--------+ +--------+ | | +--------+ +------------+ +--------+ +--------+ |
| |Switch-1|-| Switch-2 |-|Switch-3|.......|Switch-m| | | |Switch-1|-| Switch-2 |-|Switch-3|.......|Switch-m| |
| | | |(Classifier)| | (SFF) | | | | | | | |(Classifier)| | (SFF) | | | |
| +--------+ +------------+ +--------+ +--------+ | | +--------+ +------------+ +--------+ +--------+ |
+-------------------------------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------------------------------+
Figure 4: An I2NSF Framework with SDN Network Figure 6: An I2NSF Framework with SDN Network
6. I2NSF Framework with SDN 7. I2NSF Framework with SDN
This section describes an I2NSF framework with SDN for I2NSF This section describes an I2NSF framework with SDN for I2NSF
applicability and use cases, such as firewall, deep packet applicability and use cases, such as firewall, deep packet
inspection, and DDoS-attack mitigation functions. SDN enables some inspection, and DDoS-attack mitigation functions. SDN enables some
packet filtering rules to be enforced in network forwarding elements packet filtering rules to be enforced in network forwarding elements
(e.g., switch) by controlling their packet forwarding rules. By (e.g., switch) by controlling their packet forwarding rules. By
taking advantage of this capability of SDN, it is possible to taking advantage of this capability of SDN, it is possible to
optimize the process of security service enforcement in the I2NSF optimize the process of security service enforcement in the I2NSF
system. For example, for efficient firewall services, simple packet system. For example, for efficient firewall services, simple packet
filtering can be performed by SDN forwarding elements (e.g., filtering can be performed by SDN forwarding elements (e.g.,
switches), and complicated packet filtering based on packet payloads switches), and complicated packet filtering based on packet payloads
can be performed by a firewall NSF. This optimized firewall using can be performed by a firewall NSF. This optimized firewall using
both SDN forwarding elements and a firewall NSF is more efficient both SDN forwarding elements and a firewall NSF is more efficient
than a firewall where SDN forwarding elements forward all the packets than a firewall where SDN forwarding elements forward all the packets
to a firewall NSF for packet filtering. This is because packets to to a firewall NSF for packet filtering. This is because packets to
be filtered out can be early dropped by SDN forwarding elements be filtered out can be early dropped by SDN forwarding elements
without consuming further network bandwidth due to the forwarding of without consuming further network bandwidth due to the forwarding of
the packets to the firewall NSF. the packets to the firewall NSF.
Figure 4 shows an I2NSF framework [RFC8329] with SDN networks to Figure 6 shows an I2NSF framework [RFC8329] with SDN networks to
support network-based security services. In this system, the support network-based security services. In this system, the
enforcement of security policy rules is divided into the SDN enforcement of security policy rules is divided into the SDN
forwarding elements (e.g., a switch running as either a hardware forwarding elements (e.g., a switch running as either a hardware
middle box or a software virtual switch) and NSFs (e.g., a firewall middle box or a software virtual switch) and NSFs (e.g., a firewall
running in a form of a VNF [ETSI-NFV]). Note that NSFs are created running in a form of a VNF [ETSI-NFV]). Note that NSFs are created
or removed by the NFV Management and Orchestration (MANO) or removed by the NFV Management and Orchestration (MANO)
[ETSI-NFV-MANO], performing the lifecycle management of NSFs as VNFs. [ETSI-NFV-MANO], performing the lifecycle management of NSFs as VNFs.
Refer to Section 7 for the detailed discussion of the NSF lifecycle Refer to Section 8 for the detailed discussion of the NSF lifecycle
management in the NFV MANO for I2NSF. For security policy management in the NFV MANO for I2NSF. For security policy
enforcement (e.g., packet filtering), the Security Controller enforcement (e.g., packet filtering), the Security Controller
instructs the SDN Controller via NSF-Facing Interface so that SDN instructs the SDN Controller via NSF-Facing Interface so that SDN
forwarding elements can perform the required security services with forwarding elements can perform the required security services with
flow tables under the supervision of the SDN Controller. flow tables under the supervision of the SDN Controller.
As an example, let us consider two different types of security rules: As an example, let us consider two different types of security rules:
Rule A is a simple packet filtering rule that checks only the IP Rule A is a simple packet filtering rule that checks only the IP
address and port number of a given packet, whereas rule B is a time- address and port number of a given packet, whereas rule B is a time-
consuming packet inspection rule for analyzing whether an attached consuming packet inspection rule for analyzing whether an attached
skipping to change at page 14, line 22 skipping to change at page 19, line 22
the capabilities each VNF can offer [ETSI-NFV-MANO]. This subsystem the capabilities each VNF can offer [ETSI-NFV-MANO]. This subsystem
can determine whether a given software element (VNF instance) is an can determine whether a given software element (VNF instance) is an
NSF or a virtualized SDN switch. For example, if a VNF instance has NSF or a virtualized SDN switch. For example, if a VNF instance has
anti-malware capability according to the description of the VNF, it anti-malware capability according to the description of the VNF, it
could be considered as an NSF. A VNF onboarding system could be considered as an NSF. A VNF onboarding system
[VNF-ONBOARDING] can be used as such a subsystem that maintains the [VNF-ONBOARDING] can be used as such a subsystem that maintains the
descriptions of each VNF to tell whether a VNF instance is for an NSF descriptions of each VNF to tell whether a VNF instance is for an NSF
or for a virtualized SDN switch. or for a virtualized SDN switch.
For the support of SFC in the I2NSF framework with SDN, as shown in For the support of SFC in the I2NSF framework with SDN, as shown in
Figure 4, network forwarding elements (e.g., switch) can play the Figure 6, network forwarding elements (e.g., switch) can play the
role of either SFC Classifier or SFF, which are explained in role of either SFC Classifier or SFF, which are explained in
Section 5. Classifier and SFF have an NSF-Facing Interface with Section 6. Classifier and SFF have an NSF-Facing Interface with
Security Controller. This interface is used to update security Security Controller. This interface is used to update security
service function chaining information for traffic flows. For service function chaining information for traffic flows. For
example, when it needs to update an SFP for a traffic flow in an SDN example, when it needs to update an SFP for a traffic flow in an SDN
network, as shown in Figure 4, SFF (denoted as Switch-3) asks network, as shown in Figure 6, SFF (denoted as Switch-3) asks
Security Controller to update the SFP for the traffic flow (needing Security Controller to update the SFP for the traffic flow (needing
another security service as an NSF) via NSF-Facing Interface. This another security service as an NSF) via NSF-Facing Interface. This
update lets Security Controller ask Classifier (denoted as Switch-2) update lets Security Controller ask Classifier (denoted as Switch-2)
to update the mapping between the traffic flow and SFP in Classifier to update the mapping between the traffic flow and SFP in Classifier
via NSF-Facing Interface. via NSF-Facing Interface.
The following subsections introduce three use cases from [RFC8192] The following subsections introduce three use cases from [RFC8192]
for cloud-based security services: (i) firewall system, (ii) deep for cloud-based security services: (i) firewall system, (ii) deep
packet inspection system, and (iii) attack mitigation system. packet inspection system, and (iii) attack mitigation system.
6.1. Firewall: Centralized Firewall System 7.1. Firewall: Centralized Firewall System
A centralized network firewall can manage each network resource and A centralized network firewall can manage each network resource and
apply common rules to individual network elements (e.g., switch). apply common rules to individual network elements (e.g., switch).
The centralized network firewall controls each forwarding element, The centralized network firewall controls each forwarding element,
and firewall rules can be added or deleted dynamically. and firewall rules can be added or deleted dynamically.
A time-based firewall can be enforced with packet filtering rules and A time-based firewall can be enforced with packet filtering rules and
a time span (e.g., work hours). With this time-based firewall, a a time span (e.g., work hours). With this time-based firewall, a
time-based security policy can be enforced, as explained in time-based security policy can be enforced, as explained in
Section 4. For example, employees at a company are allowed to access Section 4. For example, employees at a company are allowed to access
social networking service websites during lunch time or after work social networking service websites during lunch time or after work
hours. hours.
6.2. Deep Packet Inspection: Centralized VoIP/VoLTE Security System 7.2. Deep Packet Inspection: Centralized VoIP/VoLTE Security System
A centralized VoIP/VoLTE security system can monitor each VoIP/VoLTE A centralized VoIP/VoLTE security system can monitor each VoIP/VoLTE
flow and manage VoIP/VoLTE security rules, according to the flow and manage VoIP/VoLTE security rules, according to the
configuration of a VoIP/VoLTE security service called VoIP Intrusion configuration of a VoIP/VoLTE security service called VoIP Intrusion
Prevention System (IPS). This centralized VoIP/VoLTE security system Prevention System (IPS). This centralized VoIP/VoLTE security system
controls each switch for the VoIP/VoLTE call flow management by controls each switch for the VoIP/VoLTE call flow management by
manipulating the rules that can be added, deleted or modified manipulating the rules that can be added, deleted or modified
dynamically. dynamically.
The centralized VoIP/VoLTE security system can cooperate with a The centralized VoIP/VoLTE security system can cooperate with a
network firewall to realize VoIP/VoLTE security service. network firewall to realize VoIP/VoLTE security service.
Specifically, a network firewall performs the basic security check of Specifically, a network firewall performs the basic security check of
an unknown flow's packet observed by a switch. If the network an unknown flow's packet observed by a switch. If the network
firewall detects that the packet is an unknown VoIP call flow's firewall detects that the packet is an unknown VoIP call flow's
packet that exhibits some suspicious patterns, then it triggers the packet that exhibits some suspicious patterns, then it triggers the
VoIP/VoLTE security system for more specialized security analysis of VoIP/VoLTE security system for more specialized security analysis of
the suspicious VoIP call packet. the suspicious VoIP call packet.
6.3. Attack Mitigation: Centralized DDoS-attack Mitigation System 7.3. Attack Mitigation: Centralized DDoS-attack Mitigation System
A centralized DDoS-attack mitigation can manage each network resource A centralized DDoS-attack mitigation can manage each network resource
and configure rules to each switch for DDoS-attack mitigation (called and configure rules to each switch for DDoS-attack mitigation (called
DDoS-attack Mitigator) on a common server. The centralized DDoS- DDoS-attack Mitigator) on a common server. The centralized DDoS-
attack mitigation system defends servers against DDoS attacks outside attack mitigation system defends servers against DDoS attacks outside
the private network, that is, from public networks the private network, that is, from public networks
[RFC8612][dots-architecture]. [RFC8612][dots-architecture].
Servers are categorized into stateless servers (e.g., DNS servers) Servers are categorized into stateless servers (e.g., DNS servers)
and stateful servers (e.g., web servers). For DDoS-attack and stateful servers (e.g., web servers). For DDoS-attack
skipping to change at page 16, line 43 skipping to change at page 21, line 43
| | | Compute | | Storage | | Network | | | | | | | | Compute | | Storage | | Network | | | | |
| | | Hardware| | Hardware| | Hardware| | | | | | | | Hardware| | Hardware| | Hardware| | | | |
| | ----------- ----------- ----------- | | | | | | ----------- ----------- ----------- | | | |
| | Hardware Resources | | | NFV Management | | | Hardware Resources | | | NFV Management |
| +---------------------------------------+ | | and Orchestration | | +---------------------------------------+ | | and Orchestration |
| | | (MANO) | | | | (MANO) |
+-------------------------------------------+ +--------------------+ +-------------------------------------------+ +--------------------+
(a) = Registration Interface (a) = Registration Interface
(b) = Ve-Vnfm Interface (b) = Ve-Vnfm Interface
Figure 5: I2NSF Framework Implementation with respect to the NFV Figure 7: I2NSF Framework Implementation with respect to the NFV
Reference Architectural Framework Reference Architectural Framework
7. I2NSF Framework with NFV 8. I2NSF Framework with NFV
This section discusses the implementation of the I2NSF framework This section discusses the implementation of the I2NSF framework
using Network Functions Virtualization (NFV). using Network Functions Virtualization (NFV).
NFV is a promising technology for improving the elasticity and NFV is a promising technology for improving the elasticity and
efficiency of network resource utilization. In NFV environments, efficiency of network resource utilization. In NFV environments,
NSFs can be deployed in the forms of software-based virtual instances NSFs can be deployed in the forms of software-based virtual instances
rather than physical appliances. Virtualizing NSFs makes it possible rather than physical appliances. Virtualizing NSFs makes it possible
to rapidly and flexibly respond to the amount of service requests by to rapidly and flexibly respond to the amount of service requests by
dynamically increasing or decreasing the number of NSF instances. dynamically increasing or decreasing the number of NSF instances.
Moreover, NFV technology facilitates flexibly including or excluding Moreover, NFV technology facilitates flexibly including or excluding
NSFs from multiple security solution vendors according to the changes NSFs from multiple security solution vendors according to the changes
on security requirements. In order to take advantages of the NFV on security requirements. In order to take advantages of the NFV
technology, the I2NSF framework can be implemented on top of an NFV technology, the I2NSF framework can be implemented on top of an NFV
infrastructure as show in Figure 5. infrastructure as show in Figure 7.
Figure 5 shows an I2NSF framework implementation based on the NFV Figure 7 shows an I2NSF framework implementation based on the NFV
reference architecture that the European Telecommunications Standards reference architecture that the European Telecommunications Standards
Institute (ETSI) defines [ETSI-NFV]. The NSFs are deployed as VNFs Institute (ETSI) defines [ETSI-NFV]. The NSFs are deployed as VNFs
in Figure 5. The Developer's Management System (DMS) in the I2NSF in Figure 7. The Developer's Management System (DMS) in the I2NSF
framework is responsible for registering capability information of framework is responsible for registering capability information of
NSFs into the Security Controller. However, those NSFs are created NSFs into the Security Controller. However, those NSFs are created
or removed by a virtual network function manager (VNFM) in the NFV or removed by a virtual network function manager (VNFM) in the NFV
MANO that performs the lifecycle management of VNFs. Note that the MANO that performs the lifecycle management of VNFs. Note that the
lifecycle management of VNFs is out of scope for I2NSF. The Security lifecycle management of VNFs is out of scope for I2NSF. The Security
Controller controls and monitors the configurations (e.g., function Controller controls and monitors the configurations (e.g., function
parameters and security policy rules) of VNFs via the NSF-Facing parameters and security policy rules) of VNFs via the NSF-Facing
Interface along with the NSF monitoring capability Interface along with the NSF monitoring capability
[nsf-facing-inf-dm][nsf-monitoring-dm]. Both the DMS and Security [nsf-facing-inf-dm][nsf-monitoring-dm]. Both the DMS and Security
Controller can be implemented as the Element Managements (EMs) in the Controller can be implemented as the Element Managements (EMs) in the
skipping to change at page 18, line 23 skipping to change at page 23, line 23
notifies the Security Controller of the NSF instance. notifies the Security Controller of the NSF instance.
6. After being notified of the created NSF instance, the Security 6. After being notified of the created NSF instance, the Security
Controller delivers low-level security policy rules to the NSF Controller delivers low-level security policy rules to the NSF
instance for policy enforcement. instance for policy enforcement.
We can conclude that the I2NSF framework can be implemented based on We can conclude that the I2NSF framework can be implemented based on
the NFV architecture framework. Note that the registration of the the NFV architecture framework. Note that the registration of the
capabilities of NSFs is performed through the Registration Interface capabilities of NSFs is performed through the Registration Interface
and the lifecycle management for NSFs (VNFs) is performed through the and the lifecycle management for NSFs (VNFs) is performed through the
Ve-Vnfm interface between the DMS and VNFM, as shown in Figure 5. Ve-Vnfm interface between the DMS and VNFM, as shown in Figure 7.
8. Security Considerations 9. Security Considerations
The same security considerations for the I2NSF framework [RFC8329] The same security considerations for the I2NSF framework [RFC8329]
are applicable to this document. are applicable to this document.
This document shares all the security issues of SDN that are This document shares all the security issues of SDN that are
specified in the "Security Considerations" section of [ITU-T.Y.3300]. specified in the "Security Considerations" section of [ITU-T.Y.3300].
The role of the DMS is to provide an I2NSF system with the software The role of the DMS is to provide an I2NSF system with the software
packages or images for NSF execution. The DMS must not access NSFs packages or images for NSF execution. The DMS must not access NSFs
in activated status. An inside attacker or a supply chain attacker in activated status. An inside attacker or a supply chain attacker
skipping to change at page 19, line 8 skipping to change at page 24, line 8
NSFs from an untrusted DMS or without prior testing. The practices NSFs from an untrusted DMS or without prior testing. The practices
by which these packages are downloaded and loaded into the system are by which these packages are downloaded and loaded into the system are
out of scope for I2NSF. out of scope for I2NSF.
I2NSF system operators should audit and monitor interactions with I2NSF system operators should audit and monitor interactions with
DMSs. Additionally, the operators should monitor the running NSFs DMSs. Additionally, the operators should monitor the running NSFs
through the I2NSF NSF Monitoring Interface [nsf-monitoring-dm] as through the I2NSF NSF Monitoring Interface [nsf-monitoring-dm] as
part of the I2NSF NSF-Facing Interface. Note that the mechanics for part of the I2NSF NSF-Facing Interface. Note that the mechanics for
monitoring the DMSs are out of scope for I2NSF. monitoring the DMSs are out of scope for I2NSF.
9. Acknowledgments 10. Acknowledgments
This work was supported by Institute of Information & Communications This work was supported by Institute of Information & Communications
Technology Planning & Evaluation (IITP) grant funded by the Korea Technology Planning & Evaluation (IITP) grant funded by the Korea
MSIT (Ministry of Science and ICT) (R-20160222-002755, Cloud based MSIT (Ministry of Science and ICT) (R-20160222-002755, Cloud based
Security Intelligence Technology Development for the Customized Security Intelligence Technology Development for the Customized
Security Service Provisioning). Security Service Provisioning).
This work has been partially supported by the European Commission This work has been partially supported by the European Commission
under Horizon 2020 grant agreement no. 700199 "Securing against under Horizon 2020 grant agreement no. 700199 "Securing against
intruders and other threats through a NFV-enabled environment intruders and other threats through a NFV-enabled environment
(SHIELD)". This support does not imply endorsement. (SHIELD)". This support does not imply endorsement.
10. Contributors 11. Contributors
I2NSF is a group effort. I2NSF has had a number of contributing I2NSF is a group effort. I2NSF has had a number of contributing
authors. The following are considered co-authors: authors. The following are considered co-authors:
o Hyoungshick Kim (Sungkyunkwan University) o Hyoungshick Kim (Sungkyunkwan University)
o Jinyong Tim Kim (Sungkyunkwan University) o Jinyong Tim Kim (Sungkyunkwan University)
o Hyunsik Yang (Soongsil University) o Hyunsik Yang (Soongsil University)
o Younghan Kim (Soongsil University) o Younghan Kim (Soongsil University)
o Jung-Soo Park (ETRI) o Jung-Soo Park (ETRI)
o Se-Hui Lee (Korea Telecom) o Se-Hui Lee (Korea Telecom)
o Mohamed Boucadair (Orange) o Mohamed Boucadair (Orange)
11. References 12. References
11.1. Normative References 12.1. Normative References
[AVANT-GUARD] [AVANT-GUARD]
Shin, S., Yegneswaran, V., Porras, P., and G. Gu, "AVANT- Shin, S., Yegneswaran, V., Porras, P., and G. Gu, "AVANT-
GUARD: Scalable and Vigilant Switch Flow Management in GUARD: Scalable and Vigilant Switch Flow Management in
Software-Defined Networks", ACM CCS, November 2013. Software-Defined Networks", ACM CCS, November 2013.
[consumer-facing-inf-dm] [consumer-facing-inf-dm]
Jeong, J., Kim, E., Ahn, T., Kumar, R., and S. Hares, Jeong, J., Kim, E., Ahn, T., Kumar, R., and S. Hares,
"I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface YANG Data Model", draft- "I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface YANG Data Model", draft-
ietf-i2nsf-consumer-facing-interface-dm-06 (work in ietf-i2nsf-consumer-facing-interface-dm-06 (work in
skipping to change at page 21, line 47 skipping to change at page 26, line 47
[RFC8329] Lopez, D., Lopez, E., Dunbar, L., Strassner, J., and R. [RFC8329] Lopez, D., Lopez, E., Dunbar, L., Strassner, J., and R.
Kumar, "Framework for Interface to Network Security Kumar, "Framework for Interface to Network Security
Functions", RFC 8329, February 2018. Functions", RFC 8329, February 2018.
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol [RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, August 2018. Version 1.3", RFC 8446, August 2018.
[RFC8612] Mortensen, A., Reddy, T., and R. Moskowitz, "DDoS Open [RFC8612] Mortensen, A., Reddy, T., and R. Moskowitz, "DDoS Open
Threat Signaling (DOTS) Requirements", RFC 8612, May 2019. Threat Signaling (DOTS) Requirements", RFC 8612, May 2019.
11.2. Informative References 12.2. Informative References
[ETSI-NFV-MANO] [ETSI-NFV-MANO]
"Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV); Management and "Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV); Management and
Orchestration", Available: Orchestration", Available:
https://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_gs/nfv- https://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_gs/nfv-
man/001_099/001/01.01.01_60/gs_nfv-man001v010101p.pdf, man/001_099/001/01.01.01_60/gs_nfv-man001v010101p.pdf,
December 2014. December 2014.
[i2nsf-terminology] [i2nsf-terminology]
Hares, S., Strassner, J., Lopez, D., Xia, L., and H. Hares, S., Strassner, J., Lopez, D., Xia, L., and H.
skipping to change at page 23, line 5 skipping to change at page 28, line 5
[tls-esni] [tls-esni]
Rescorla, E., Oku, K., Sullivan, N., and C. Wood, Rescorla, E., Oku, K., Sullivan, N., and C. Wood,
"Encrypted Server Name Indication for TLS 1.3", draft- "Encrypted Server Name Indication for TLS 1.3", draft-
ietf-tls-esni-04 (work in progress), July 2019. ietf-tls-esni-04 (work in progress), July 2019.
[VNF-ONBOARDING] [VNF-ONBOARDING]
"VNF Onboarding", Available: "VNF Onboarding", Available:
https://wiki.opnfv.org/display/mano/VNF+Onboarding, https://wiki.opnfv.org/display/mano/VNF+Onboarding,
November 2016. November 2016.
Appendix A. Changes from draft-ietf-i2nsf-applicability-16 Appendix A. Changes from draft-ietf-i2nsf-applicability-17
The following changes have been made from draft-ietf-i2nsf- The following changes have been made from draft-ietf-i2nsf-
applicability-16: applicability-17:
o The data model drafts for I2NSF are referenced as Normative o In Section 4, a high-level security policy XML file in Figure 2
references rather than Informative references. and the corresponding low-level security policy XML file Figure 3
are constructed using the Consumer-Facing Interface data model and
the NSF-Facing data model, respectively.
o An RFC and a draft for Distributed-Denial-of-Service Open Threat o For the applicability of I2NSF to the real world, Section 5 is
Signaling (DOTS) are referenced for attack mitigation. added to support the Intent-based Security Services using I2NSF.
This section explains the security policy translation based on an
I2NSF User's intents on the required security services. Figure 4
shows the archiecture and procedure of the I2NSF security policy
translator.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Jaehoon Paul Jeong Jaehoon Paul Jeong
Department of Computer Science and Engineering Department of Computer Science and Engineering
Sungkyunkwan University Sungkyunkwan University
2066 Seobu-Ro, Jangan-Gu 2066 Seobu-Ro, Jangan-Gu
Suwon, Gyeonggi-Do 16419 Suwon, Gyeonggi-Do 16419
Republic of Korea Republic of Korea
Phone: +82 31 299 4957 Phone: +82 31 299 4957
Fax: +82 31 290 7996 Fax: +82 31 290 7996
EMail: pauljeong@skku.edu EMail: pauljeong@skku.edu
URI: http://iotlab.skku.edu/people-jaehoon-jeong.php URI: http://iotlab.skku.edu/people-jaehoon-jeong.php
Sangwon Hyun Sangwon Hyun
Department of Computer Engineering Department of Computer Engineering
Chosun University Myongji University
309 Pilmun-daero, Dong-Gu 116 Myongji-ro, Cheoin-gu
Gwangju 61452 Yongin 17058
Republic of Korea Republic of Korea
Phone: +82 62 230 7473 Phone: +82 62 230 7473
EMail: shyun@chosun.ac.kr EMail: shyun@chosun.ac.kr
Tae-Jin Ahn Tae-Jin Ahn
Korea Telecom Korea Telecom
70 Yuseong-Ro, Yuseong-Gu 70 Yuseong-Ro, Yuseong-Gu
Daejeon 305-811 Daejeon 305-811
Republic of Korea Republic of Korea
Phone: +82 42 870 8409 Phone: +82 42 870 8409
EMail: taejin.ahn@kt.com EMail: taejin.ahn@kt.com
Susan Hares Susan Hares
Huawei Huawei
7453 Hickory Hill 7453 Hickory Hill
Saline, MI 48176 Saline, MI 48176
USA USA
Phone: +1-734-604-0332 Phone: +1-734-604-0332
EMail: shares@ndzh.com EMail: shares@ndzh.com
Diego R. Lopez Diego R. Lopez
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