I2NSF Working Group                                        J. Jeong Jeong, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                                  C. Chung
Intended status: Standards Track                 Sungkyunkwan University
Expires: January 14, March 1, 2021                                            T. Ahn
                                                           Korea Telecom
                                                                R. Kumar
                                                        Juniper Networks
                                                                S. Hares
                                                                  Huawei
                                                           July 13,
                                                         August 28, 2020

            I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface YANG Data Model
            draft-ietf-i2nsf-consumer-facing-interface-dm-09
            draft-ietf-i2nsf-consumer-facing-interface-dm-10

Abstract

   This document describes an information model and a YANG data model
   for the Consumer-Facing Interface between an Interface to Network
   Security Functions (I2NSF) User and Security Controller in an I2NSF
   system in a Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) environment.  The
   information model defines various types of managed objects and the
   relationship among them needed to build the interface.  The
   information model is organized based on the "Event-Condition-Action" (ECA)
   policy model defined by a capability information model for I2NSF [i2nsf-capability-im],
   [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-capability], and the data model is defined for
   enabling different users of a given I2NSF system to define, manage,
   and monitor security policies for specific flows within an
   administrative domain.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 14, March 1, 2021.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   3.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  Information Model for Policy  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.1.  Event Sub-model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.2.  Condition Sub-model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.3.  Action Sub-model  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   5.  Information Model for Policy Endpoint Groups  . . . . . . . .   9  10
     5.1.  User Group  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10  11
     5.2.  Device Group  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11  12
     5.3.  Location Group  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12  13
   6.  Information Model for Threat Prevention . . . . . . . . . . .  13  14
     6.1.  Threat Feed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13  14
     6.2.  Payload Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14  15
   7.  Network Configuration Access Control Model (NACM) for I2NSF
       Consumer-Facing Interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15  16
   8.  YANG Data Model of Consumer-Facing Interface  . . . . . . . .  17  18
     8.1.  YANG Module of Consumer-Facing Interface  . . . . . . . .  18
   9.  XML Configuration Examples of High-Level Security Policy
       Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  40  41
     9.1.  Database Registration: Information of Positions and
           Devices (Endpoint Group)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  40  41
     9.2.  Scenario 1: Block SNS Access during Business Hours  . . .  41  43
     9.3.  Scenario 2: Block Malicious VoIP/VoLTE Packets Coming to
           a Company . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  43  45
     9.4.  Scenario 3: Mitigate HTTP and HTTPS Flood Attacks on a
           Company Web Server  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  45  47
   10. XML Configuration Example of a User Group's Access Control
       for I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface . . . . . . . . . . . . .  46  48
   11. Security IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  48
   12. IANA Considerations . .  50
   12. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  48  50
   13. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  48  50
   14. Contributors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  48  51
   15. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  51  53
     15.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  51  53
     15.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  52
   Appendix A.  Changes from draft-ietf-i2nsf-consumer-facing-
                interface-dm-08  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  53  56
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  53  56

1.  Introduction

   In a framework of Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF), (I2NSF)
   [RFC8329], each vendor can register their NSFs using a Developer's
   Management System (DMS).  Assuming that vendors also provide the
   front-end web applications registered with an I2NSF User, the
   Consumer-Facing Interface is required because the web applications
   developed by each vendor need to have a standard interface specifying
   the data types used when the I2NSF User and Security Controller
   communicate using this interface.  Therefore, this document specifies
   the required information, their data types, and encoding schemes so
   that high-
   level high-level security policies (or configuration information for
   security policies) can be transferred to the Security Controller
   through the Consumer-Facing Interface.  These policies can easily be
   translated by the Security Controller into low-level security
   policies.  The Security Controller delivers the translated policies
   to Network Security Functions (NSFs) according to their respective
   security capabilities for the required securiy enforcement.

   The Consumer-Facing Interface would be built using a set of objects,
   with each object capturing a unique set of information from Security
   Administrator (i.e., I2NSF User [RFC8329]) needed to express a
   Security Policy.  An object may have relationship with various other
   objects to express a complete set of requirements.  An information
   model captures the managed objects and relationship among these
   objects.  The information model proposed in this document is
   structured in accordance with the "Event-Condition-Action" (ECA)
   policy model.

   An NSF Capability model is proposed in [i2nsf-capability-im] [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-capability] as
   the basic model for both the NSF-Facing interface and Consumer-Facing
   Interface security policy model of this document.

   [RFC3444] explains differences between an information and data model.
   This document uses the guidelines in [RFC3444] to define both the
   information and data model for Consumer-Facing Interface.  Figure 1
   shows a high-level abstraction of Consumer-Facing Interface.  A data
   model, which represents an implementation of the information model in
   a specific data representation language, is also defined in this
   document.

                       +-----------------+    +-----------------+
                       | Consumer-Facing |
                       | Consumer-Facing |
                       |    Interface    +--->+    Interface    |
                       |Information Model|    |    Data Model    |
                       +--------+--------+    +-----------------+
                                ^
                                |
                                +-------------+------------+
                                |             |            |
                          +-----+----+  +-----+----+  +----+----+
                          |  Policy  |  | Endpoint |  | Threat  |
                          |          |  |  groups  |  |  feed   |
                          +-----+----+  +----------+  +---------+
                                ^
                                |
                         +------+------+
                         |     Rule    |
                         +------+------+
                                ^
                                |
               +----------------+----------------+
               |                |                |
        +------+------+  +------+------+  +------+------+
        |    Event    |  |  Condition  |  |    Action   |
        +-------------+  +-------------+  +-------------+

      Figure 1: Diagram for High-level Abstraction of Consumer-Facing
                                 Interface

   Data models are defined at a lower level of abstraction and provide
   many details.  They provide details about the implementation of a
   protocol's specification, e.g., rules that explain how to map managed
   objects onto lower-level protocol constructs.  Since conceptual
   models can be implemented in different ways, multiple data models can
   be derived from a single information model.

   The efficient and flexible provisioning of network functions by a
   Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) system leads to a rapid
   advance in the network industry.  As practical applications, Network
   Security Functions (NSFs), such as firewall, Intrusion Detection
   System (IDS)/Intrusion Prevention System (IPS), and attack
   mitigation, can also be provided as Virtual Network Functions (VNF)
   in the NFV system.  By the efficient virtualization technology, these
   VNFs might be automatically provisioned and dynamically migrated
   based on real-time security requirements.  This document presents a
   YANG data model to implement security functions based on NFV.

2.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC3444]
   RFC8174 [RFC2119][RFC3444]
   [RFC8174].

3.  Terminology

   This document uses the terminology described in [i2nsf-terminology]
   [client-facing-inf-req]. [RFC8329].

   This document follows the guidelines of [RFC8407], uses the common
   YANG types defined in [RFC6991], [I-D.ietf-netmod-rfc6991-bis], and adopts the
   Network Management Datastore Architecture (NMDA).  The meaning of the
   symbols in tree diagrams is defined in [RFC8340].

4.  Information Model for Policy

   A Policy object represents a mechanism to express a Security Policy
   by Security Administrator (i.e., I2NSF User) using Consumer-Facing
   Interface toward Security Controller; the policy would be enforced on
   an NSF.  Figure 2 shows the YANG tree of the Policy object.  The
   Policy object SHALL have the following information:

       Name: This field identifies the name of this object.

       Rule: This field contains a list of rules.  These rules are
             defined for 1) communication between two Endpoint Groups,
             2) for preventing communication with externally or
             internally identified threats, and 3) for implementing
             business requirement such as controlling access to internal
             or external resources for meeting regulatory compliance or
             business objectives.  An organization may restrict certain
             communication between a set of user and applications for
             example.  The threats may be from threat feeds obtained
             from external sources or dynamically identified by using
             specialty devices in the network.  Rule conflict analysis
             should be triggered by the monitoring service to perform an
             exhaustive detection of anomalies among the configuration
             rules installed into the security functions.

           +--rw i2nsf-cfi-policy* [policy-name]
              +--rw policy-name          string
              +--rw rules
              +--rw endpoint-groups
              +--rw threat-prevention

                      Figure 2: Policy YANG Data Tree

   A policy is a container of Rule(s).  In order to express a Rule, a
   Rule must have complete information such as where and when a policy
   needs to be applied.  This is done by defining a set of managed
   objects and relationship among them.  A Policy Rule may be related
   segmentation, threat mitigation or telemetry data collection from an
   NSF in the network, which will be specified as the sub-model of the
   policy model in the subsequent sections.  Figure 3 shows the YANG
   data tree of the Rule object.  The rule object SHALL have the
   following information:

       Name: This field identifies the name of this object.

       Event:  This field includes the information to determine whether
             the Rule Condition can be evaluated or not.  See details in
             Section 4.1.

       Condition:  This field contains all the checking conditions to
             apply to the objective traffic.  See details in
             Section 4.2.

       Action:  This field identifies the action taken when a rule is
             matched.  There is always an implicit action to drop
             traffic if no rule is matched for a traffic type.  See
             details in Section 4.3.

      IPsec-Method:

       IPsec-method:  This field contains the information about IPsec
             method type.  There are two types such as IPsec-IKE and
             IPsec-IKEless [i2nsf-ipsec]. [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-sdn-ipsec-flow-protection].

           +--rw rules* [rule-name]
              +--rw rule-name  string
              +--rw event
              +--rw (condition)?
              +--rw action
              +--rw ipsec-method

                       Figure 3: Rule YANG Data Tree

   Note that in the case of policy conflicts, the resolution of the
   conflicted policies conforms to the guidelines of "Information Model
   of NSFs Capabilities" [i2nsf-capability-im]. [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-capability].

4.1.  Event Sub-model

   The Event Object contains information related to scheduling a Rule.
   The Rule could be activated based on a set time or security event.
   Figure 4 shows the YANG tree of the Event object.  Event object SHALL
   have following information:

       Security-event:  This field identifies for which security event
             the policy is enforced.  The examples of security events
             are: "DDOS", "spyware", "trojan", and "ransomware".

       Time-information:  This represents the security rule is enforced
             based on the period information with the end time for the
             event.

       Period:  This represents the period of time the rule event is
             active.

       End-time:  This represents the end time of the event.  If the
             rule time has pass the end-time, the rule will stop
             repeating"

       Frequency:  This represents how frequent the rule should be
             enforced.  There are four options: "only-once", "daily",
             "weekly" and "monthly".

           +--rw event
              +--rw security-event        identityref
              +--rw time-information
              |  +--rw start-date-time?   yang:date-and-time
              |  +--rw end-date-time?     yang:date-and-time
              |  +--rw period
              |  |  +--rw start-time?     time
              |  |  +--rw stop-time?      time
              |  |  +--rw day*            identityref
              |  |  +--rw date*           int32
              |  |  +--rw month*          string
              +--rw frequency?            enumeration

                 Figure 4: Event Sub-model YANG Data Tree

4.2.  Condition Sub-model

   This object represents Conditions that Security Administrator wants
   to apply the checking on the traffic in order to determine whether
   the set of actions in the Rule can be executed or not.  The Condition
   Sub-model consists of three different types of containers each
   representing different cases, such as general firewall and DDoS-
   mitigation cases, and a case when the condition is based on the
   payload strings of packets.  Each containers have source and
   destination-target to represent the source and destination for each
   case.  Figure 5 shows the YANG tree of the Condition object.  The
   Condition Sub-model SHALL have following information:

       Case (Firewall-condition):  This field represents the general
             firewall case, where a security admin can set up firewall
             conditions using the information present in this field.
             The source and destination is represented as firewall-
             source and firewall-destination, each referring to the IP-
             address-based groups defined in the endpoint-groups.

       Case (DDoS-condition):  This field represents the condition for
             DDoS mitigation, where a security admin can set up DDoS
             mitigation conditions using the information present in this
             field.  The source and destination is represented as ddos-
             source and ddos-destination, each referring to the device-
             groups defined and registered in the endpoint-groups.

       Case (Custom-condition):  This field contains the payload string
             information.  This information is useful when security rule
             condition is based on the string contents of incoming or
             outgoing packets.  The source and destination is
             represented as custom-source and custom-destination, each
             referring to the payload-groups defined and registered in
             the endpoint-groups.

       Case (Threat-feed-condition):  This field contains the
             information obtained from threat-feeds (e.g., Palo-Alto, or RSA-
             netwitness).
             RSA-netwitness).  This information is useful when security
             rule condition is based on the existing threat reports
             gathered by other sources.  The source and destination is
             represented as threat-feed-source and threat-feed-
             destination.  For clarity, threat-feed-source/destination
             represent the source/destination of a target security
             threat, not the information source/destination of a threat-
             feed.

+--rw condition
   +--:firewall-condition
   |  +--rw source
   |  |       -> /../../user-group/name /i2nsf-cfi-policy/endpoint-groups/user-group/name
   |  +--rw destination*
   |  |       -> /../../user-group/name /i2nsf-cfi-policy/endpoint-groups/user-group/name
   +--:ddos-condition
   |  +--rw source*
   |  |       -> /../../device-group/name /i2nsf-cfi-policy/endpoint-groups/device-group/name
   |  +--rw destination*
   |  |       -> /../../device-group/name /i2nsf-cfi-policy/endpoint-groups/device-group/name
   |  +--rw rate-limit
   |  |  +--rw packet-threshold-per-second? uint32
   +--:location-condition
   |  +--rw source*
   |  |       -> /../../location-group/name /i2nsf-cfi-policy/endpoint-groups/location-group/name
   |  +--rw destination
   |  |       -> /../../location-group/name /i2nsf-cfi-policy/endpoint-groups/location-group/name
   +--:custom-condition
   |  +--rw source*
   |  |       -> /../../payload-content/name /i2nsf-cfi-policy/threat-preventions/payload-content/name
   |  +--rw destination destination?
   |  |       -> /../../payload-content/name /i2nsf-cfi-policy/threat-preventions/payload-content/name
   +--:threat-feed-condition
      +--rw source*
      |       -> /../../threat-feed-list/name /i2nsf-cfi-policy/threat-preventions/threat-feed-list/name
      +--rw destination destination?
      |       -> /../../threat-feed-list/name /i2nsf-cfi-policy/threat-preventions/threat-feed-list/name

               Figure 5: Condition Sub-model YANG Data Tree

4.3.  Action Sub-model

   This object represents actions that Security Admin wants to perform
   based on certain traffic class.  Figure 6 shows the YANG tree of the
   Action object.  The Action object SHALL have following information:

       Primary-action:  This field identifies the action when a rule is
             matched by an NSF.  The action could be one of "PASS",
             "DROP", "ALERT", "RATE-LIMIT", and "MIRROR".

       Secondary-action:  This field identifies the action when a rule
             is matched by an NSF.  The action could be one of "log",
             "syslog", "session-log".

           +--rw action
           +--rw primary-action      identityref
           +--rw secondary-action?   identityref

                 Figure 6: Action Sub-model YANG Data Tree

5.  Information Model for Policy Endpoint Groups

   The Policy Endpoint Group is a very important part of building User-
   Construct based policies.  A Security Administrator would create and
   use these objects to represent a logical entity in their business
   environment, where a Security Policy is to be applied.  There are
   multiple managed objects that constitute a Policy's Endpoint Group Group,
   as shown in Figure 7.  Figure 8 shows the YANG tree of the Endpoint-
   Groups object.  This section lists these objects and relationship
   among them.

   It is assumed that the information of Endpoint Groups (e.g., User-
   group, Device-group, and Location-group) such as the IP address(es)
   of each member in a group are stored in the I2NSF database available
   to the Security Controller, and that the IP address information of
   each group in the I2NSF database is synchronized with other systems
   in the networks under the same administration.

                      +-------------------+
                      |  Endpoint Groups  |
                      +---------+---------+
                                ^
                                |
                 +--------------+----------------+
          1..n
          0..n   |      1..n      0..n    |       1..n       0..n     |
           +-----+----+  +------+-----+  +-------+------+
           |User-group|  |Device-group|  |Location-group|
           +----------+  +------------+  +--------------+

                     Figure 7: Endpoint Group Diagram

           +--rw endpoint-groups
           |  +--rw user-group* [name]
           |  ...
           |  +--rw device-group* [name]
           |  ...
           |  +--rw location-group* [name]
           |  ...

                  Figure 8: Endpoint Group YANG Data Tree

5.1.  User Group

   This object represents a User-Group.  Figure 9 shows the YANG tree of
   the User-Group object.  The User-Group object SHALL have the
   following information:

       Name: This field identifies the name of this object.

      IP-address:

       IPv4: This represents the IPv4 address of a user in the user
             group.

      range-ipv4-address:

       IPv6: This represents the IPv6 address of a user in the user
             group.

       Range-ipv4-address:  This represents the IPv4 address range of a
             user in the user gorup.

      range-ipv6-address: group.

       Range-ipv6-address:  This represents the IPv6 address range of a
             user in the user gorup. group.

            +--rw user-group* [name]
            +--rw name             string
            +--rw (match-type)
               +--:(exact-match-ipv4)
               |  +--rw ipv4?            inet:ipv4-address
               +--:(exact-match-ipv6)
               |  +--rw ipv6?            inet:ipv6-address
               +--:(range-match-ipv4)
               |  +--rw range-ipv4-address
               |  +--rw start-ipv4-address    inet:ipv4-address
               |  +--rw end-ipv4-address      inet:ipv4-address
               +--:(range-match-ipv6)
                  +--rw range-ipv6-address*
                     +--rw start-ipv6-address      inet:ipv6-address
                     +--rw end-ipv6-address        inet:ipv6-address

                    Figure 9: User Group YANG Data Tree

5.2.  Device Group

   This object represents a Device-Group.  Figure 10 shows the YANG tree
   of the Device-group object.  The Device-Group object SHALL have the
   following information:

       Name: This field identifies the name of this object.

      IP-address:

       IPv4: This represents the IPv4 address of a device in the device
             group.

      range-ipv4-address:

       IPv6: This represents the IPv6 address of a device in the device
             group.

       Range-ipv4-address:  This represents the IPv4 address range of a
             device in the device gorup.

      range-ipv6-address: group.

       Range-ipv6-address:  This represents the IPv6 address range of a
             device in the device gorup. group.

       Protocol:  This represents the communication protocols used by
             the devices.  The protocols are "SSH", "FTP", "SMTP",
             "HTTP", "HTTPS", and etc.

            +--rw device-group* [name]
               +--rw name                         string
               +--rw (match-type)
               |  +--:(exact-match-ipv4)
               |  |  +--rw ipv4?            inet:ipv4-address
               |  +--:(exact-match-ipv6)
               |  |  +--rw ipv6?            inet:ipv6-address
               |  +--:(range-match-ipv4)
               |  |  +--rw range-ipv4-address*
               |  |  |  +--rw start-ipv4-address    inet:ipv4-address
               |  |  |  +--rw end-ipv4-address      inet:ipv4-address
               |  +--:(range-match-ipv6)
               |  |  +--rw range-ipv6-address*
               |  |  |  +--rw start-ipv6-address    inet:ipv6-address
               |  |  |  +--rw end-ipv6-address      inet:ipv6-address
               +--rw protocol                      identityref

                  Figure 10: Device Group YANG Data Tree

5.3.  Location Group

   This object represents a location group based on either tag or other
   information.  Figure 11 shows the YANG tree of the Location-Group
   object.  The Location-Group object SHALL have the following
   information:

       Name: This field identifies the name of this object.

      geo-ip-ipv4:

       Geo-ip-ipv4:  This field represents the IPv4 Geo-ip address of a location.

      geo-ip-ipv6:
             location [RFC8805].

       Geo-ip-ipv6:  This field represents the IPv6 Geo-ip address of a location.

      continent:
             location [RFC8805].

       Continent:  This field represents the continent where the
             location group member is at. located.

             +--rw location-group* [name]
                +--rw name                 string
                +--rw geo-ip-ipv4    inet:ipv4-address
                +--rw geo-ip-ipv6    inet:ipv6-address
                +--rw continent?           identityref

                 Figure 11: Location Group YANG Data Tree

6.  Information Model for Threat Prevention

   The threat prevention plays an important part in the overall security
   posture by reducing the attack surfaces.  This information could come
   from various threat feeds (i.e., sources for obtaining the threat
   information).  There are multiple managed objects that constitute
   this category.  This section lists these objects and relationship
   among them.  Figure 13 shows the YANG tree of a Threat-Prevention
   object.

                            +-------------------+
                            | Threat Prevention |
                            +---------+---------+
                                      ^
                                      |
                            +---------+---------+
                    1..n
                    0..n    |         1..n         0..n      |
                     +------+------+   +--------+--------+
                     | Threat-feed |   | payload-content |
                     +-------------+   +-----------------+

                   Figure 12: Threat Prevention Diagram

           +--rw threat-prevention
              +--rw threat-feed-list* [name]
                 ...
              +--rw payload-content* [name]
                 ...

                Figure 13: Threat Prevention YANG Data Tree

6.1.  Threat Feed

   This object represents a threat feed which provides the signatures of
   malicious activities.  Figure 14 shows the YANG tree of a Threat-
   feed-list.  The Threat-Feed object SHALL have the following
   information:

      name:

       Name: This field identifies the name of this object.

       Server-ipv4:  This represents the IPv4 server address of the feed
             provider, it which may be either an external or local servers. server.

       Server-ipv6:  This represents the IPv6 server address of the feed
             provider, it which may be either an external or local servers.

      description: server.

       Description:  This is the description of the threat feed.  The
             descriptions
             description should have the clear indication of the
             security attack such as attack type (e.g., APT) and file
             types used (e.g., executable malware).

       Threat-file-types:  This field identifies the information about
             the file types identified and reported by the threat-feed.

      signatures:

       Signatures:  This field contains the threat signatures of
             malicious programs or activities provided by the threat-feed. threat-
             feed.  The examples of signature types are "YARA",
             "SURICATA", and
             "SNORT".

             +--rw threat-prevention
                +--rw threat-feed-list* [name]
                   +--rw name              identityref
                   +--rw server-ipv4?      inet:ipv4-address
                   +--rw server-ipv6?      inet:ipv6-address
                   +--rw description?      string
                   +--rw threat-file-types*     identityref
                   +--rw signatures*            identityref

                   Figure "SNORT" [YARA][SURICATA][SNORT].

   It is assumed that the I2NSF User obtains the threat signatures
   (i.e., threat content patterns) from a threat-feed server (i.e., feed
   provider), which is a server providing threat signatures.  With the
   obtained threat signatures, the I2NSF User can deliver them to the
   Security Controller.  The retrieval of the threat signatures by the
   I2NSF User is out of scope in this document.

             +--rw threat-prevention
                +--rw threat-feed-list* [name]
                   +--rw name              identityref
                   +--rw server-ipv4?      inet:ipv4-address
                   +--rw server-ipv6?      inet:ipv6-address
                   +--rw description?      string
                   +--rw threat-file-types*     identityref
                   +--rw signatures*            identityref

                   Figure 14: Threat Feed YANG Data Tree

6.2.  Payload Content

   This object represents a custom list created for the purpose of
   defining an exception to threat feeds.  Figure 15 shows the YANG tree
   of a Payload-content list.  The Payload-Content object SHALL have the
   following information:

      Name:  This field identifies the name of this object.  For
             example, the name "backdoor" indicates the payload content
             is related to a backdoor attack.

      description:

       Description:  This represents the description of how the payload
             content is related to a security attack.

       Content:  This contains the payload contents, which are involed
             in a security attack, such as strings.

             +--rw payload-content* [name]
                +--rw name         string
                +--rw description  string
                +--rw content*     string

               Figure 15: Payload Content in YANG Data Tree

7.  Network Configuration Access Control Model (NACM) for I2NSF
    Consumer-Facing Interface

   Network Configuration Access Control Model (NACM) provides a user
   group with an access control with the following features [RFC8341]:

   o  Independent control of action, data, and notification access is
      provided.

   o  A simple and familiar set of datastore permissions is used.

   o  Support for YANG security tagging allows default security modes to
      automatically exclude sensitive data.

   o  Separate default access modes for read, write, and execute
      permissions are provided.

   o  Access control rules are applied to configurable groups of users.

   The data model of the I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface utilizes the
   NACM's mechanisms to manage the access control on the I2NSF Consumer-
   Facing Interface.  The NACM with the above features can be used to
   set up the access control rules of a user group in the I2NSF
   Consumer-Facing Interface.

   Figure 16 shows part of the NACM module to enable the access control
   of a user group for the I2NSF Consumer-
   Facing Consumer-Facing Interface.  To use the
   NACM, a user needs to configure either a NETCONF server [RFC6241] or
   a RESTCONF server [RFC8040] to enable the NACM module.  Then, the
   user can simply use an account of root or admin user for the access
   control for the module of the I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface (i.e.,
   ietf-i2nsf-cfi-policy).  An XML example to configure the access
   control a user group for the I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface can be
   seen in Section 10.

   list rule {
     key "name";
     ordered-by user;
     leaf name {
       type string {
         length "1..max";
       }
       description
         "Arbitrary name assigned to the rule.";
     }

     leaf module-name {
       type union {
         type matchall-string-type;
         type string;
       }
       default "*";
       description
         "Name of the module associated with this rule."
     }

     leaf access-operations {
       type union {
         type matchall-string-type;
         type access-operations-type;
       }
       default "*";
       description
         "Access operations associated with this rule."
     }

     leaf action {
       type action-type;
       mandatory true;
       description
         "The access control action associated with the
        rule.  If a rule is determined to match a
        particular request, then this object is used
        to determine whether to permit or deny the
        request.";
     }

               Figure 16: A Part of the NACM YANG Data Model

8.  YANG Data Model of Consumer-Facing Interface

   The main objective of this data model is to provide both an
   information model and the corresponding YANG data model of I2NSF
   Consumer-Facing Interface.  This interface can be used to deliver
   control and management messages between an I2NSF User and Security
   Controller for the I2NSF User's high-level security policies.

   The semantics of the data model must be aligned with the information
   model of the Consumer-Facing Interface.  The transformation of the
   information model was is performed so that this YANG data model can
   facilitate the efficient delivery of the control or management
   messages.

   This data model is designed to support the I2NSF framework that can
   be extended according to the security needs.  In other words, the
   model design is independent of the content and meaning of specific
   policies as well as the implementation approach.  This

   With the YANG data model of I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface, this
   document suggests a VoIP/VoLTE security service as a use case cases for security policy rule
   generation. rules such as time-
   based firewall, VoIP/VoLTE security service, and DDoS-attack
   mitigation in Section 9.

8.1.  YANG Module of Consumer-Facing Interface

   This section describes a YANG data model for module of Consumer-Facing
   Interface, based on Interface.
   This YANG module imports from [RFC6991] and uses the information model typedef of Consumer-Facing
   Interface time
   in [I-D.ietf-netmod-rfc6991-bis].  It makes references to Security Controller. [RFC0854][R
   FC0913][RFC0959][RFC1081][RFC1631][RFC2616][RFC2818][RFC4250][RFC5321
   ].

<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-i2nsf-cfi-policy@2020-07-13.yang" "ietf-i2nsf-cfi-policy@2020-08-28.yang"
module ietf-i2nsf-cfi-policy {
  yang-version 1.1;
  namespace
    "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-cfi-policy";
  prefix
    i2nsf-cfi; cfi-policy;

  import ietf-inet-types{
    prefix inet;
  }

  import ietf-yang-types{
    prefix yang;
  }

  import ietf-netconf-acm {
    prefix nacm;
  }

  organization
    "IETF I2NSF (Interface to Network Security Functions)
     Working Group";

  contact
    "WG Web: <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/i2nsf>
     WG List: <mailto:i2nsf@ietf.org>

     WG Chair: Linda Dunbar
     <mailto:linda.dunbar@futurewei.com>

     WG Chair: Yoav Nir
     <mailto:ynir.ietf@gmail.com>

     Editor: Jaehoon Paul Jeong
     <mailto:pauljeong@skku.edu>

     Editor: Chaehong Chung
     <mailto:darkhong@skku.edu>"; Patrick Lingga
     <mailto:patricklink@skku.edu>";

  description
    "This module is a YANG module for Consumer-Facing Interface.

     Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
     authors of the code. All rights reserved.

         Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
         without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject
     to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License
     set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions
     Relating to IETF Documents
     http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).

     This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see
     the RFC itself for full legal notices.";

  revision "2020-07-13"{ "2020-08-28"{
    description "The latest revision"; "Initial revision.";
    reference
      "draft-ietf-consumer-facing-interface-dm-08";
      "RFC XXXX: I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface YANG Data Model";
  }

  identity malware-file-type {
    description
      "Base identity for malware file types.";
  }

  identity executable-file {
    base malware-file-type;
    description
      "Identity for executable file types.";

  }

  identity doc-file {
    base malware-file-type;
    description
      "Identity for Microsoft document file types.";
  }

  identity html-app-file {
    base malware-file-type;
    description
      "Identity for html application file types.";
  }

  identity javascript-file {
    base malware-file-type;
    description
      "Identity for Javascript file types.";
  }

  identity pdf-file {
    base malware-file-type;
    description
      "Identity for pdf file types.";
  }

  identity dll-file {
    base malware-file-type;
    description
      "Identity for dll file types.";
  }

  identity msi-file {
    base malware-file-type;
    description
      "Identity for Microsoft installer file types.";
  }

  identity security-event-type {
    description
      "Base identity for security event types.";
  }

  identity ddos {
    base security-event-type;
    description
      "Identity for DDoS event types.";
  }
  identity spyware {
    base security-event-type;
    description
      "Identity for spyware event types.";
  }

  identity trojan {
    base security-event-type;
    description
      "Identity for Trojan infection event types.";
  }

  identity ransomware {
    base security-event-type;
    description
      "Identity for ransomware infection event types.";
  }

  identity i2nsf-ipsec {
    description
      "Base identity for IPsec method types.";
    reference
      "draft-ietf-i2nsf-sdn-ipsec-flow-protection-07";
      "draft-ietf-i2nsf-sdn-ipsec-flow-protection-08: Software-Defined
       Networking (SDN)-based IPsec Flow Protection - IPsec method
       types can be selected.";
  }

  identity ipsec-ike {
    base i2nsf-ipsec;
    description
      "Identity for ipsec-ike.";
    reference
      "draft-ietf-i2nsf-sdn-ipsec-flow-protection-07";
      "draft-ietf-i2nsf-sdn-ipsec-flow-protection-08: Software-Defined
       Networking (SDN)-based IPsec Flow Protection - IPsec method
       type with IKE is selected.";
  }

  identity ipsec-ikeless {
    base i2nsf-ipsec;
    description
      "Identity for ipsec-ikeless.";
    reference
      "draft-ietf-i2nsf-sdn-ipsec-flow-protection-07";
      "draft-ietf-i2nsf-sdn-ipsec-flow-protection-08: Software-Defined
       Networking (SDN)-based IPsec Flow Protection - IPsec method
       type without IKE is selected.";
  }

  identity continent {
    description
      "Base Identity for continent types.";
  }

  identity africa {
    base continent;
    description
      "Identity for africa."; Africa.";
  }

  identity asia {
    base continent;
    description
      "Identity for asia."; Asia.";
  }

  identity europe {
    base continent;
    description
      "Identity for europe."; Europe.";
  }

  identity north-america {
    base continent;
    description
      "Identity for north-america."; North America.";
  }

  identity south-america {
    base continent;
    description
      "Identity for south-america."; South America.";
  }

  identity oceania {
    base continent;
    description
      "Identity for Oceania";
  }

  identity protocol-type {
    description
      "This identity represents the protocol types.";
  }

  identity ftp {
    base protocol-type;
    description
      "The identity for ftp protocol.";
    reference
      "RFC 959: File Transfer Protocol (FTP)";
  }

  identity ssh {
    base protocol-type;
    description
      "The identity for ssh protocol.";
    reference
      "RFC 4250: The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol";
  }

  identity telnet {
    base protocol-type;
    description
      "The identity for telnet.";
    reference
      "RFC 854: Telnet Protocol";
  }

  identity smtp {
    base protocol-type;
    description
      "The identity for smtp.";
    reference
      "RFC 5321: Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP)";
  }

  identity sftp {
    base protocol-type;
    description
      "The identity for sftp.";
    reference
      "RFC 913: Simple File Transfer Protocol (SFTP)";
  }

  identity http {
    base protocol-type;
    description
      "The identity for http.";
    reference
      "RFC 2616: Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP)";
  }

  identity https {
    base protocol-type;
    description
      "The identity for https.";
    reference
      "RFC 2818: HTTP over TLS (HTTPS)";
  }

  identity pop3 {
    base protocol-type;
    description
      "The identity for pop3.";
    reference
      "RFC 1081: Post Office Protocol -Version 3 (POP3)";
  }

  identity nat {
    base protocol-type;
    description
      "The identity for nat.";
    reference
      "RFC 1631: The IP Network Address Translator (NAT)";
  }

  identity primary-action {
    description
      "This identity represents the primary actions, such as
       PASS, DROP, ALERT, RATE-LIMIT, and MIRROR.";
  }

  identity pass {
    base primary-action;
    description
      "The identity for pass.";
  }

  identity drop {
    base primary-action;
    description
      "The identity for drop.";
  }

  identity alert {
    base primary-action;
    description
      "The identity for alert.";
  }

  identity rate-limit {
    base primary-action;
    description
      "The identity for rate-limit.";
  }

  identity mirror {
    base primary-action;
    description
      "The identity for mirroring.";
  }

  identity secondary-action {
    description
      "This field identifies additional actions if a rule is
       matched. This could be one of 'LOG', 'SYSLOG',
       'SESSION-LOG', etc.";
  }

  identity log {
    base secondary-action;
    description
      "The identity for logging.";
  }

  identity syslog {
    base secondary-action;
    description
      "The identity for system logging.";
  }

  identity session-log {
    base secondary-action;
    description
      "The identity for session logging.";
  }

  identity signature-type {
    description
      "This represents the base identity for signature types.";
  }

  identity signature-yara {
    base signature-type;
    description
      "This represents the YARA signatures.";
    reference
      "YARA: YARA signatures are explained.";
  }

  identity signature-snort {
    base signature-type;
    description
      "This represents the SNORT signatures.";
    reference
      "SNORT: SNORT signatures are explained.";
  }

  identity signature-suricata {
    base signature-type;
    description
      "This represents the SURICATA signatures.";
    reference
      "SURICATA: SURICATA signatures are explained.";
  }

  identity threat-feed-type {
    description
      "This represents the base identity for threat-feed.";
  }

  identity day {
    description
      "This represents the base for days.";
  }

  identity monday {
    base day;
    description
      "This represents monday."; Monday.";
  }

  identity tuesday {
    base day;
    description
      "This represents tuesday."; Tuesday.";
  }

  identity wednesday {
    base day;
    description
      "This represents wednesday."; Wednesday.";
  }

  identity thursday {
    base day;
    description
      "This represents thursday."; Thursday.";
  }
  identity friday {
    base day;
    description
      "This represents friday."; Friday.";
  }

  identity saturday {
    base day;
    description
      "This represents saturday."; Saturday.";
  }

  identity sunday {
    base day;
    description
      "This represents sunday."; Sunday.";
  }

 /*
  * Typedefs
  */
  typedef time{ time {
    type string {
      pattern '\d{2}:\d{2}:\d{2}(\.\d+)?' '(0[0-9]|1[0-9]|2[0-3]):[0-5][0-9]:[0-5][0-9](\.\d+)?'
        + '(Z|[\+\-]\d{2}:\d{2})'; '(Z|[\+\-]((1[0-3]|0[0-9]):([0-5][0-9])|14:00))?';
    }
    description
      "This is the format
      "The time type represents an instance of time of time."; zero-duration
       that recurs every day.";
    reference
      "draft-ietf-netmod-rfc6991-bis-04: Common YANG Data Types -
       typedef time is used.";
  }

 /*
  * Groupings
  */

  grouping ipv4-list {
    description
      "Grouping for ipv4 based ip-addresses."; an IPv4 address list.";
    leaf-list ipv4 {
      type inet:ipv4-address;
      description
        "This is the entry for the ipv4 ip-addresses."; an IPv4 address list.";
    }
  }
  grouping ipv6-list {
    description
      "Grouping for ipv6 based ip-addresses."; an IPv6 address list.";
    leaf-list ipv6 {
      type inet:ipv6-address;
      description
        "This is the entry for the ipv6 ip-addresses."; an IPv6 address list.";
    }
  }

  grouping ipv4 {
    description
      "Grouping for ipv4 based ip-address."; an IPv4 address.";
    leaf ipv4 {
      type inet:ipv4-address;
      description
        "This is the entry for the ipv4 ip-address."; an IPv4 address.";
    }
  }

  grouping ipv6 {
    description
      "Grouping for ipv6 based ip-address."; an IPv6 address.";
    leaf ipv6 {
      type inet:ipv6-address;
      description
        "This is the entry for the ipv6 ip-address."; an IPv6 address.";
    }
  }

  grouping ip-address-info {
    description
      "There are two types to configure a security policy
      for an IPv4 address, such as exact match and range match.";
    choice match-type {
      description
        "User can choose between 'exact match' and 'range match'.";
      case exact-match-ipv4 {
        uses ipv4;
        description
          "Exact ip-address match for ipv4 type IPv4 addresses";
      }
      case exact-match-ipv6 {
        uses ipv6;
        description
          "Exact ip-address match for ipv6 type IPv6 addresses";
      }
      case range-match-ipv4 {
        container range-ipv4-address {
          leaf start-ipv4-address {
            type inet:ipv4-address;
            mandatory true;
            description
              "Start
              "A start IPv4 address for a range match.";
          }
          leaf end-ipv4-address {
            type inet:ipv4-address;
            mandatory true;
            description
              "End
              "An end IPv4 address for a range match.";
          }
          description
            "Range
            "A range match for an IP-address."; IPv4 addresses is provided.  Note that the
             start IPv4 address must be lower than the end IPv4 address.";
        }
      }
      case range-match-ipv6 {
        container range-ipv6-address {
          leaf start-ipv6-address {
            type inet:ipv6-address;
            mandatory true;
            description
              "Start
              "A start IPv6 address for a range match.";
          }
          leaf end-ipv6-address {
            type inet:ipv6-address;
            mandatory true;
            description
              "End
              "An end IPv6 address for a range match.";
          }
          description
            "Range
            "A range match for an IP-address."; IPv6 addresses is provided.  Note that the
             start IPv6 address must be lower than the end IPv4 address.";
        }
      }
    }
  }

  grouping ipsec-based-method {
    description
      "This represents the ipsec-based method.";
    list ipsec-method {
      key "method";
      description
        "This represents the list of IPsec method types.";
      leaf method {
        type identityref {
          base i2nsf-ipsec;
        }
        description
          "This represents IPsec IKE and IPsec IKEless cases.  If this
           is not set, it cannot support IPsec IKE or IPsec IKEless.";
        reference
          "draft-ietf-i2nsf-sdn-ipsec-flow-protection-07";
          "draft-ietf-i2nsf-sdn-ipsec-flow-protection-08:
           Software-Defined Networking (SDN)-based IPsec Flow Protection
           - IPsec method types can be selected.";
      }
    }
  }

  grouping user-group {
    description
      "The grouping for user-group entities, and contains information
       such as name & ip-address.";
    leaf name {
      type string;
      description
        "This represents the name of a user-group.  A user-group name
         is used to map a user-group's name (e.g., employees) to an ip IP
         address. It is implementation dependent"; dependent on implementation.";
    }
    uses ip-address-info{
      refine match-type{
        mandatory true;
      }
      description
        "This represent the IP address addresses of a user-group.";
    }
  }

  grouping device-group {
    description
      "This group represents device group information such as ip-address
       protocol.";
    leaf name {
      type string;
      description
      "This represents the name of a device-group.";
    }
    uses ip-address-info{
      refine match-type{
        mandatory true;
      }
    }
    leaf-list protocol {
      type identityref {
        base protocol-type;
      }
      description
        "This represents the communication protocols of devices.  If this
         is not set, it cannot support the appropriate protocol";
    }
  }

  grouping location-group {
    description
      "This group represents location-group information such as geo-ip
       and continent.";
    leaf name {
      type string;
      description
        "This represents the name of a location.";
    }
    list geo-ip-ipv4 {
      key "ipv4-address";
      description
        "This represents the list of IPv4 address addresses based on a location.";
      leaf ipv4-address{
        type inet:ipv4-address;
        description
          "This represents an IPv4 geo-ip address of a location.";
      }
      leaf ipv4-prefix{
        type inet:ipv4-prefix;
        description
          "This represents the prefix for the IPv4-address."; IPv4 addresses.";
      }
    }
    list geo-ip-ipv6 {
      key "ipv6-address";
      description
        "This represents the list of IPv6 address addresses based on a location.";
      leaf ipv6-address{
        type inet:ipv6-address;
        description
          "This represents an IPv6 geo-ip address of a location.";
      }
      leaf ipv6-prefix{
        type inet:ipv6-prefix;
        description
          "This represents the prefix for the IPv6-address."; IPv6 addresses.";
      }

    }
    leaf continent {
      type identityref {
        base continent;
      }
      default asia;
      description
        "location-group-based on
        "location-group has geo-ip addresses of
        respective the corresponding
         continent.";
    }
  }

  grouping threat-feed-info {
    description
      "This is the grouping for the threat-feed-list";
    leaf threat-type {
      type identityref {
        base threat-feed-type;
      }
      description
        "This represents the type of the threat-feed.";
    }
    leaf server-ipv4 {
      type inet:ipv4-address;
      description
        "The IPv4 ip-address address for the threat-feed server.";
    }
    leaf server-ipv6 {
      type inet:ipv6-address;
      description
        "The IPv6 ip-address address for the threat-feed server.";
    }
    leaf description {
      type string;
      description
        "This represents the descriptions of a threat-feed.  The
         description should include information, such as
        the type, related threat,
         method, and file type.  Structured Threat Information Expression
         (STIX) can be used for description of a threat [STIX].";
    }
  }

  grouping payload-string {
    description
      "The grouping for payload-string content.  It contains information
       such as name and string content.";
    leaf description {
      type string;
      description
        "This represents the description of a payload.  If this is not
         set, it cannot support the description of how the payload content
         is related to a security attack.";
    }
    leaf-list content {
      type string;
      description
        "This represents the string of the payload contents.  This content
         leaf-list contains the payload of a packet to analyze a threat.
         Due to the types of threats, the type of the content is defined
         as a string to accommodate any kind of a payload type such as
         HTTP, HTTPS, and SIP.  If this is not set, it cannot support the
         payload contents involved in a security attack as strings"; a string.";
    }
  }

  list i2nsf-cfi-policy {
    key "policy-name";
    description
      "This is the a security policy list.  Each policy in the list contains
       a list of security policy rules, and is a policy instance to have complete
       the information
      such as of where and when a policy needs to be applied.";
    leaf policy-name {
      type string;
      description
        "The name which identifies the policy.";
    }
    container rules{
      description
        "This container is for has rules.";
      nacm:default-deny-write;
      list rule {
        key "rule-name";
        ordered-by user;
        leaf rule-name {
          type string;
          description
            "This represents the name for the a rule.";
        }
        description
          "There can be a single or multiple number of rules.";

        container event {
          description
            "This represents the an event (e.g., (i.e., a security
            event, event), for which
             a security rule is made.)"; made.";
          leaf security-event {
            type identityref {
              base security-event-type;
            }
            description
              "This contains the description of a security
              events. event.  If this
               is not set, it cannot support which what security event is enforced"; will be
               enforced.";
          }

          container time-information {
            description
              "The time information when the a security policy rule should be
               applied.";
            leaf start-date-time {
              type yang:date-and-time;
              description
                "This is the start date and time for policy."; a security policy
                 rule.";
            }
            leaf end-date-time {
              type yang:date-and-time;
              description
                "This is the end date and time for policy. a policy rule.  The
                 policy rule will stop working after the specified
                end-date-time";
                 end-date-time.";
            }
            container period{
              when
                "/i2nsf-cfi-policy/rules/rule/event/frequency!='only-once'";
                "../../frequency!='only-once'";
              description
                "This represents the repetition time.  In the case of where
                 the frequency is weekly, the days can be set.";
              leaf start-time {
                type time;
                description
                  "This is period a period's start time for an event.";
                reference
                  "RFC 6991-bis: Common YANG Data Types - The time type
                   represents an instance of time of zero-duration that
                   recurs every day.  When RFC 6991-bis becomes an RFC,
                   time must be replaced with yang:time.";
              }
              leaf end-time {
                type time;
                description
                  "This is period a period's end time for an event.";
                reference
                  "RFC 6991-bis: Common YANG Data Types - The time type
                   represents an instance of time of zero-duration that
                   recurs every day.  When RFC 6991-bis becomes an RFC,
                   time must be replaced with yang:time.";
              }
              leaf-list day {
                when
                  "/i2nsf-cfi-policy/rules/rule/event/frequency='weekly'";
                  "../../../frequency='weekly'";
                type identityref{
                  base day;
                }
                min-elements 1;
                description
                  "This represents the repeated day of every week (e.g., monday
                   Monday and tuesday). Tuesday).  More than one day can be specified";
                   specified.";
              }
              leaf-list date {
                when
                  "/i2nsf-cfi-policy/rules/rule/event/frequency='monthly'";
                  "../../../frequency='monthly'";
                type int32{
                  range "1..31";
                }
                min-elements 1;
                description
                  "This represents the repeated date of every month.  More
                   than one date can be specified.";
              }
              leaf-list month {
                when
                  "/i2nsf-cfi-policy/rules/rule/event/frequency='yearly'";
                  "../../../frequency='yearly'";
                type string{
                  pattern '\d{2}-\d{2}';
                }
                min-elements 1;
                description
                  "This represents the repeated date and month of every
                   year.  More than one can be specified.
                  Pattern  A pattern used
                   here is Month-Date Month and Date (MM-DD).";
              }
            }
          }

          leaf frequency {
            type enumeration {
              enum only-once {
                description
                  "This represents that the rule is immediately enforced
                   only once immediately and not repeated.  The policy will
                   continuously be active from
                  start time and terminated at the start-time to the
                   end-time.";
              }
              enum daily {
                description
                  "This represents that the rule is enforced on a daily
                   basis.  The policy will be repeated daily until the
                   end-date.";
              }
              enum weekly {
                description
                  "This represents that the rule is enforced on a weekly
                   basis.  The policy will be repeated weekly until the
                   end-date.  The repeated days can be specified.";
              }
              enum monthly {
                description
                  "This represents that the rule is enforced on a monthly
                   basis. The policy will be repeated monthly until the
                   end-date.";
              }
              enum yearly {
                description
                  "This represents that the rule is enforced on a yearly
                   basis.  The policy will be repeated yearly until the
                   end-date.";
              }
            }
            default only-once;
            description
              "This represents how frequent frequently the rule should be enforced.";
          }
        }

        container condition {
          description
          "The conditions
          "Conditions for general security policies.";
          container firewall-condition {
            description
              "The
              "A general firewall condition.";
            leaf source {
              type leafref {
                path
                  "/i2nsf-cfi-policy/endpoint-groups/user-group/name";
              }
              description
              "This describes the paths path to the source reference."; source.";
            }
            leaf-list destination {
              type leafref {
                path
                  "/i2nsf-cfi-policy/endpoint-groups/user-group/name";
              }
              description
                "This describes the paths to the destination
                target reference."; destinations.";
            }
          }

          container ddos-condition {
            description
              "The
              "A condition for a DDoS mitigation."; attack.";
            leaf-list source {
              type leafref {
                path
                  "/i2nsf-cfi-policy/endpoint-groups/device-group/name";
              }
              description
                "This describes the path paths to the
                source target references."; sources.";
            }
            leaf-list destination {
              type leafref {
                path
                  "/i2nsf-cfi-policy/endpoint-groups/device-group/name";
              }
              description
                "This describes the path paths to the destination target
                references."; destinations.";
            }
            container rate-limit {
              description
                "This describes the rate-limit.";
              leaf packet-threshold-per-second {
                type uint32;
                description
                  "This is a trigger value for the condition."; a rate limit for a
                   DDoS-attack mitigation.";
              }
            }
          }

          container location-condition {
            description
              "The
              "A condition for location based a location-based connection";
            leaf-list source {
              type leafref {
                path
                  "/i2nsf-cfi-policy/endpoint-groups/location-group/name";

              }
              description
                "This describes the path paths to the location
                source reference."; a location's sources.";
            }
            leaf-list destination {
              type leafref {
                path
                  "/i2nsf-cfi-policy/endpoint-groups/location-group/name";
              }
              description
                "This describes the path paths to the location
                destination reference."; a location's destinations.";
            }
          }

          container custom-condition {
            description
              "The
              "A condition based on packet contents."; a packet's content.";
            leaf-list source {
              type leafref {
               path
                "/i2nsf-cfi-policy/threat-preventions/payload-content/name";
              }
              description
                "Describes
                "This describes the payload string content condition
                source."; paths to a packet content's sources.";
            }
            leaf destination {
              type leafref {
               path
               "/i2nsf-cfi-policy/threat-preventions/payload-content/name";
              }
              description
                "Describes
                "This describes the payload string content condition path to a packet content's
                 destination.";
            }
          }

          container threat-feed-condition {
            description
              "The
              "A condition based on the threat-feed information.";
            leaf-list source {
              type leafref {
               path
               "/i2nsf-cfi-policy/threat-preventions/threat-feed-list/name";
              }
              description
                "Describes
                "This describes the threat-feed condition source."; paths to a threat-feed's sources.";
            }
            leaf destination {
              type leafref {
               path
               "/i2nsf-cfi-policy/threat-preventions/threat-feed-list/name";
              }
              description
                "Describes
                "This describes the threat-feed condition path to a threat-feed's destination.";
            }
          }
        }

        container actions {
          description
            "This is the action container.";
          leaf primary-action {
            type identityref {
              base primary-action;
            }
            description
              "This represent the primary actions (e.g., PASS, DROP, ALERT,
               and MIRROR) to be applied to a condition.  If this is not
               set, it cannot support the primary actions.";
          }
          leaf secondary-action {
            type identityref {
              base secondary-action;
            }
            description
              "This represents the secondary actions (e.g., log and syslog)
               to be applied if they are needed.  If this is not set, it
               cannot support the secondary actions.";
          }
        }

        container ipsec-method {
          description
            "This container represents the IPsec method such as IKE case
             and IKEless cases."; case.";
          leaf method {
            type identityref {
              base i2nsf-ipsec;
            }
            description
              "This references represents the IPsec method types,
              which includes IPsec type such as IKE case and IPsec
               IKEless
              cases. case.  If this is not set, it cannot support
               either IPsec IKE or IPsec IKEless.";
            reference
              "draft-ietf-i2nsf-sdn-ipsec-flow-protection-07";
              "draft-ietf-i2nsf-sdn-ipsec-flow-protection-08:
               Software-Defined Networking (SDN)-based IPsec Flow
               Protection - IPsec method types can be selected.";
          }
        }
      }
    }
    container endpoint-groups {
      description
        "A logical entity in their a business environment, where a security
         policy is to be applied.";
      list user-group{
        uses user-group;
        key "name";
        description
          "This represents the a user group.";
      }
      list device-group {
        key "name";
        uses device-group;
        description
          "This represents the a device group.";
      }
      list location-group{
        key "name";
        uses location-group;
        description
          "This represents the a location group.";
      }
    }

    container threat-preventions {
      description
        "this
        "This describes the list of threat-prevention."; threat-preventions.";
      list threat-feed-list {
        key "name";
        description
          "There can be a single or multiple number of threat-feeds.";
        leaf name {
          type string;
          description
            "This represents the name of the threat-feed.";
        }
        uses threat-feed-info;
        leaf-list threat-file-types {
          type identityref {
            base malware-file-type;
          }
          default executable-file;
          description
            "This contains a list of file types needed to be scanned for the virus.";
             a security threat (e.g., virus).";
        }
        leaf-list signatures {
          type identityref {
            base signature-type;
          }
          default signature-suricata;
          description
            "This contains a list of signatures or hashes of the threats.";
        }
      }
      list payload-content {
        key "name";
        leaf name {
          type string;
          description
            "This represents the name of a packet's payload-content.  It
             should give an idea of why a specific payload content is
             marked as a threat.  For example, the name 'backdoor'
             indicates the payload content is related to a backdoor
             attack.";
        }
        description
          "This represents the a payload-string group.";
        uses payload-string;
      }
    }
  }
}
<CODE ENDS>

               Figure 17: YANG for Consumer-Facing Interface

9.  XML Configuration Examples of High-Level Security Policy Rules

   Note:  This section is informative with XML configuration examples.

   This section is informative with XML configuration examples.

   This section shows XML configuration examples of high-level security
   policy rules that are delivered from the I2NSF User to the Security
   Controller over the Consumer-Facing Interface.  The considered use
   cases are: Database registration, time-based firewall for web
   filtering, VoIP/VoLTE security service, and DDoS-attack mitigation.

9.1.  Database Registration: Information of Positions and Devices
      (Endpoint Group)

   If new endpoints are introduced to the network, it is necessary to
   first register their data to the database.  For example, if new
   members are newly introduced in either of three different groups
   (i.e., user-group, device-group, and payload-group), each of them
   should be registered with information such as ip-addresses or
   protocols used by devices.

   Figure 18 shows an example XML representation of the registered
   information for the user-group and
   device-group. device-group with IPv4 addresses
   [RFC5737].

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" ?>
<i2nsf-cfi-policy xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-cfi-policy">
  <endpoint-groups>
    <user-group>
      <name>employees</name>
      <range-ipv4-address>
        <start-ipv4-address>221.159.112.1</start-ipv4-address>
        <end-ipv4-address>221.159.112.90</end-ipv4-address>
        <start-ipv4-address>192.0.2.11</start-ipv4-address>
        <end-ipv4-address>192.0.2.90</end-ipv4-address>
      </range-ipv4-address>
    </user-group>
    <device-group>
      <name>webservers</name>
      <range-ipv4-address>
        <start-ipv4-address>221.159.112.91</start-ipv4-address>
        <end-ipv4-address>221.159.112.97</end-ipv4-address>
        <start-ipv4-address>198.51.100.11</start-ipv4-address>
        <end-ipv4-address>198.51.100.20</end-ipv4-address>
      </range-ipv4-address>
      <protocol>http</protocol>
      <protocol>https</protocol>
      <protocol>cfi-policy:http</protocol>
      <protocol>cfi-policy:https</protocol>
    </device-group>
  </endpoint-groups>
</i2nsf-cfi-policy>

    Figure 18: Registering User-group and Device-group Information with
                              IPv4 Addresses

   Also, Figure 19 shows an example XML representation of the registered
   information for the user-group and device-group with IPv6 addresses
   [RFC3849].

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" ?>
<i2nsf-cfi-policy xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-cfi-policy">
  <endpoint-groups>
    <user-group>
      <name>employees</name>
      <range-ipv6-address>
        <start-ipv6-address>2001:DB8:0:1::11</start-ipv6-address>
        <end-ipv6-address>2001:DB8:0:1::90</end-ipv6-address>
      </range-ipv6-address>
    </user-group>
    <device-group>
      <name>webservers</name>
      <range-ipv6-address>
        <start-ipv6-address>2001:DB8:0:2::11</start-ipv6-address>
        <end-ipv6-address>2001:DB8:0:2::20</end-ipv6-address>
      </range-ipv6-address>
      <protocol>cfi-policy:http</protocol>
      <protocol>cfi-policy:https</protocol>
    </device-group>
  </endpoint-groups>
</i2nsf-cfi-policy>

    Figure 19: Registering User-group and Device-group Information with
                              IPv6 Addresses

9.2.  Scenario 1: Block SNS Access during Business Hours

   The first example scenario is to "block SNS access during office
   hours" using a time-based firewall policy.  In this scenario, all
   users registered as "employees" in the user-group list are unable to
   access Social Networking Services (SNS) during the office hours
   (weekdays).  The XML instance is described below:

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" ?>
<i2nsf-cfi-policy xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-cfi-policy">
  <policy-name>security_policy_for_blocking_sns123</policy-name>
  <rules>
    <rule>
      <rule-name>block_access_to_sns_during_office_hours</rule-name>
      <event>
        <time-information>
          <start-date-time>2020-03-11T09:00:00.00Z</start-date-time>
          <end-date-time>2020-12-31T18:00:00.00Z</end-date-time>
          <period>
            <start-time>09:00:00Z</start-time>
            <end-time>18:00:00Z</end-time>
            <day>monday</day>
            <day>tuesday</day>
            <day>wednesday</day>
            <day>thursday</day>
            <day>friday</day>
            <day>cfi-policy:monday</day>
            <day>cfi-policy:tuesday</day>
            <day>cfi-policy:wednesday</day>
            <day>cfi-policy:thursday</day>
            <day>cfi-policy:friday</day>
          </period>
        </time-information>
        <frequency>weekly</frequency>
      </event>
      <condition>
        <firewall-condition>
          <source>employees</source>
        </firewall-condition>
        <custom-condition>
          <destination>sns-websites</destination>
        </custom-condition>
      </condition>
      <actions>
        <primary-action>drop</primary-action>
        <primary-action>cfi-policy:drop</primary-action>
      </actions>
    </rule>
  </rules>
</i2nsf-cfi-policy>

             Figure 19: 20: An XML Example for Time-based Firewall

   Time-based-condition Firewall

   1.  The policy name is "security_policy_for_blocking_sns".

   2.  The rule name is "block_access_to_sns_during_office_hours".

   3.  The Source is "employees".

   4.  The destination target is "sns-websites". "sns-websites" is the
       key which represents the list containing the information, such as
       URL, about sns-websites.

   5.  The action required is to "drop" any attempt to connect to
       websites related to Social networking.

   6.  The IPsec method type used for nsf traffic steering is set to
       "ipsec-ike".

9.3.  Scenario 2: Block Malicious VoIP/VoLTE Packets Coming to a Company

   The second example scenario is to "block malicious VoIP/VoLTE packets
   coming to a company" using a VoIP policy.  In this scenario, the
   calls comming from from VOIP and/or VOLTE sources with VOLTE IDs that
   are classified as malicious are dropped.  The IP addresses of the
   employees and malicious VOIP IDs should be blocked are stored in the
   database or datastore of the enterprise.  Here and the rest of the
   cases assume that the security administrators or someone responsible
   for the existing and newly generated policies, are not aware of which
   and/or how many NSFs are needed to meet the security requirements.
   Figure 20 21 represents the XML document generated from YANG discussed
   in previous sections.  Once a high-level seucurity policy is created
   by a security admin, it is delivered by the Consumer-Facing
   Interface, through RESTCONF server, to the security controller.  The
   XML instance is described below:

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" ?>
<i2nsf-cfi-policy xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-cfi-policy">
  <policy-name>
          security_policy_for_blocking_malicious_voip_packets
        </policy-name>
  <rules>
    <rule>
      <rule-name>Block_malicious_voip_and_volte_packets</rule-name>
      <conditions>
      <condition>
        <custom-condition>
          <source>malicious-id</source>
        </custom-condition>
        <firewall-condition>
          <destination>employees</destination>
        </firewall-condition>
      </conditions>
      </condition>
      <actions>
        <primary-action>drop</primary-action>
        <primary-action>cfi-policy:drop</primary-action>
      </actions>
      <ipsec-method>
        <method>ipsec-ikeless</method>
        <method>cfi-policy:ipsec-ikeless</method>
      </ipsec-method>
    </rule>
  </rules>
</i2nsf-cfi-policy>

            Figure 20: 21: An XML Example for VoIP Security Service

   Custom-condition Firewall

   1.  The policy name is
       "security_policy_for_blocking_malicious_voip_packets".

   2.  The rule name is "Block_malicious_voip_and_volte_packets".

   3.  The Source is "malicious-id".  This can be a single ID or a list
       of IDs, depending on how the ID are stored in the database.  The
       "malicious-id" is the key so that the security admin can read
       every stored malicious VOIP IDs that are named as "malicious-id".

   4.  The destination target is "employees". "employees" is the key
       which represents the list containing information about employees,
       such as IP addresses.

   5.  The action required is "drop" when any incoming packets are from
       "malicious-id".

   6.  The IPsec method used for nsf traffic steering is set to "ipsec-
       ikeless".

9.4.  Scenario 3: Mitigate HTTP and HTTPS Flood Attacks on a Company Web
      Server

   The third example scenario is to "Mitigate HTTP and HTTPS flood
   attacks on a company web server" using a DDoS-attack mitigation
   policy.  Here, the time information is not set because the service
   provided by the network should be maintained at all times.  If the
   packets sent by any sources are more than the set threshold, then the
   admin can set the percentage of the packets to be dropped to safely
   maintain the service.  In this scenario, the source is set as "any"
   to block any sources which send abnormal amount of packets.  The
   destination is set as "web_server01".  Once the rule is set and
   delivered and enforced to the nsfs by the securiy controller, the
   NSFs will monitor the incoming packet amounts and the destination to
   act according to the rule set.  The XML instance is described below:

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" ?>
<i2nsf-cfi-policy xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-cfi-policy">
  <policy-name>security_policy_for_ddos_attacks</policy-name>
  <rules>
    <rule>
      <rule-name>100_packets_per_second</rule-name>
      <conditions>
        <ddos-condition>
          <destination>webservers</destination>
          <rate-limit>
            <packet-threshold-per-second>100</packet-threshold-per-second>
          </rate-limit>
        </ddos-condition>
      </conditions>
      <actions>
        <primary-action>drop</primary-action>
        <primary-action>cfi-policy:drop</primary-action>
      </actions>
      <ipsec-method>
        <method>ipsec-ikeless</method>
        <method>cfi-policy:ipsec-ikeless</method>
      </ipsec-method>
    </rule>
  </rules>
</i2nsf-cfi-policy>

           Figure 21: 22: An XML Example for DDoS-attack Mitigation

   DDoS-condition Firewall
   1.  The policy name is "security_policy_for_ddos_attacks".

   2.  The rule name is "100_packets_per_second".

   3.  The destination target is "webservers". "webservers" is the key
       which represents the list containing information, such as IP
       addresses and ports, about web-servers.

   4.  The rate limit exists to limit the incoming amount of packets per
       second.  In this case the rate limit is "100" packets per second.
       This amount depends on the packet receiving capacity of the
       server devices.

   5.  The Source is all sources which send abnormal amount of packets.

   6.  The action required is to "drop" packet reception is more than
       100 packets per second.

   7.  The IPsec method used for nsf traffic steering is set to "ipsec-
       ike".

10.  XML Configuration Example of a User Group's Access Control for
     I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface

   Note:  This section is informative with an XML configuration example.

   This is an example for creating privileges for a group of users
   (i.e., a user group) to access and use the I2NSF Consumer-Facing
   Interface to create security policies via the interface.  For the
   access control of the Consumer-Facing Interface, the NACM module can
   be used.  Figure 22 23 shows an XML example the access control of a user
   group (named Example-Group) for I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface A
   group called Example-Group can be created and configured with NACM
   for the Consumer-Facing Interface.  For Example-Group, a rule list
   can created with the name of Example-Group-Rules.  Example-Group-
   Rules has two rules of Example-Group-Rule1 and Example-Group-Rule2 as
   follows.  For Example-Group-Rule1, the privilege of "Read" is allowed
   to Example-Group for the Consumer-Facing Interface.  On the other
   hand, for Example-Group-Rule2, the privileges of "Create", "Update",
   and "Delete" are denied against Example-Group for the Consumer-Facing
   Interface.

   <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" ?>
   <nacm xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-netconf-acm">
     <enable-nacm>true</enable-nacm>
     <groups>
       <group>
         <name>Example-Group</name>
         <user-name>Alice</user-name>
         <user-name>Bob</user-name>
         <user-name>Eve</user-name>
       </group>
     </groups>
     <rule-list>
       <name>Example-Group-Rules</name>
       <group>Example-Group</group>
       <rule>
         <name>Example-Group-Rule1</name>
         <access-operations>read</access-operations>
         <module-name>ietf-i2nsf-cfi-policy</module-name>
         <action>permit</action>
       </rule>
       <rule>
         <name>Example-Group-Rule2</name>
         <access-operations>create update delete</access-operations>
         <module-name>ietf-i2nsf-cfi-policy</module-name>
         <action>deny</action>
       </rule>
     </rule-list>
   </nacm>

   Figure 22: 23: An XML Example of a User Group's Access Control for I2NSF
                         Consumer-Facing Interface

   The access control for the I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface is as
   follows.

   1.  The NACM is enabled.

   2.  As a group name, Example-Group is specified.

   3.  As members of the group, Alice, Bob, and Eve are specified.

   4.  As a rule list name, Example-Group-Rules is specified for
       managing privileges of Example-Group's members.

   5.  As the first rule name, Example-Group-Rule1 is specified.  This
       rule is used to give read privilege to Example-Group's members
       for the module of the I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface.

   6.  As the second rule name, Example-Group-Rule2 is specified.  This
       rule is used to deny create, update, and delete privileges
       against Example-Group's members for the module of the I2NSF
       Consumer-Facing Interface.

11.  IANA Considerations

   This document requests IANA to register the following URI in the
   "IETF XML Registry" [RFC3688]:

   URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-cfi-policy
   Registrant Contact: The IESG.
   XML: N/A; the requested URI is an XML namespace.

   This document requests IANA to register the following YANG module in
   the "YANG Module Names" registry [RFC7950][RFC8525].

   name: ietf-i2nsf-cfi-policy
   namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-cfi-policy
   prefix: cfi-policy
   reference: RFC XXXX

12.  Security Considerations

   The data model for the I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface is based on
   the I2NSF framework [RFC8329], so the same security considerations
   with the I2NSF framework should be included in this document.  The
   data model needs a secure communication channel to protect the
   Consumer-Facing Interface between the I2NSF User and Security
   Controller.  Also, the data model's management access control is
   based on Network Configuration Access Control Model(NACM) mechanisms
   [RFC8341].

12.  IANA Considerations

   This document requests IANA to register the following URI in the
   "IETF XML Registry" [RFC3688]:

   URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-cfi-policy
   Registrant Contact: The I2NSF.
   XML: N/A; the requested URI is an XML namespace.

   This document requests IANA to register the following YANG module in
   the "YANG Module Names" registry [RFC7950].

   name: ietf-i2nsf-cfi-policy
   namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-cfi-policy
   prefix: cfi-policy
   reference: RFC 7950

13.  Acknowledgments

   This work was supported by Institute of Information & Communications
   Technology Planning & Evaluation (IITP) grant funded by the Korea
   MSIT (Ministry of Science and ICT) (R-20160222-002755, Cloud based
   Security Intelligence Technology Development for the Customized
   Security Service Provisioning).  This work was supported in part by
   the IITP (2020-0-00395, Standard Development of Blockchain based
   Network Management Automation Technology).

14.  Contributors

   This document is made by the group effort of I2NSF working group.
   Many people actively contributed to this document, such as Mahdi F.
   Dachmehchi and Daeyoung Hyun.  The authors sincerely appreciate their
   contributions.

   The following are co-authors of this document:

   Patrick Lingga
   Department of Electronic, Electrical and Computer Engineering
   Sungkyunkwan University
   2066 Seo-ro Jangan-gu
   Suwon, Gyeonggi-do 16419
   Republic of Korea

   EMail: patricklink@skku.edu

   Hyoungshick Kim
   Department of Computer Science and Engineering
   Sungkyunkwan University
   2066 Seo-ro Jangan-gu
   Suwon, Gyeonggi-do 16419
   Republic of Korea

   EMail: hyoung@skku.edu

   Eunsoo Kim
   Department of Electronic, Electrical and Computer Engineering
   Sungkyunkwan University
   2066 Seo-ro Jangan-gu
   Suwon, Gyeonggi-do 16419
   Republic of Korea

   EMail: eskim86@skku.edu

   Seungjin Lee
   Department of Electronic, Electrical and Computer Engineering
   Sungkyunkwan University
   2066 Seo-ro Jangan-gu
   Suwon, Gyeonggi-do 16419
   Republic of Korea

   EMail: jine33@skku.edu
   Jinyong Tim Kim
   Department of Electronic, Electrical and Computer Engineering
   Sungkyunkwan University
   2066 Seo-ro Jangan-gu
   Suwon, Gyeonggi-do 16419
   Republic of Korea

   EMail: timkim@skku.edu

   Anil Lohiya
   Juniper Networks
   1133 Innovation Way
   Sunnyvale, CA 94089
   US

   EMail: alohiya@juniper.net

   Dave Qi
   Bloomberg
   731 Lexington Avenue
   New York, NY 10022
   US

   EMail: DQI@bloomberg.net

   Nabil Bitar
   Nokia
   755 Ravendale Drive
   Mountain View, CA 94043
   US

   EMail: nabil.bitar@nokia.com

   Senad Palislamovic
   Nokia
   755 Ravendale Drive
   Mountain View, CA 94043
   US

   EMail: senad.palislamovic@nokia.com

   Liang Xia
   Huawei
   101 Software Avenue
   Nanjing, Jiangsu 210012
   China

   EMail: Frank.Xialiang@huawei.com

15.  References

15.1.  Normative References

   [i2nsf-ipsec]
              Marin-Lopez, R., Lopez-Millan, G., and F. Pereniguez-
              Garcia, "Software-Defined Networking (SDN)-based IPsec
              Flow Protection", draft-ietf-i2nsf-sdn-ipsec-flow-
              protection-08

   [I-D.ietf-netmod-rfc6991-bis]
              Schoenwaelder, J., "Common YANG Data Types", draft-ietf-
              netmod-rfc6991-bis-04 (work in progress), June July 2020.

   [RFC0854]  Postel, J. and J. Reynolds, "Telnet Protocol
              Specification", STD 8, RFC 854, DOI 10.17487/RFC0854, May
              1983, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc854>.

   [RFC0913]  Lottor, M., "Simple File Transfer Protocol", RFC 913,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC0913, September 1984,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc913>.

   [RFC0959]  Postel, J. and J. Reynolds, "File Transfer Protocol",
              STD 9, RFC 959, DOI 10.17487/RFC0959, October 1985,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc959>.

   [RFC1081]  Rose, M., "Post Office Protocol: Version 3", RFC 1081,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC1081, November 1988,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1081>.

   [RFC1631]  Egevang, K. and P. Francis, "The IP Network Address
              Translator (NAT)", RFC 1631, DOI 10.17487/RFC1631, May
              1994, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1631>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC2616]  Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H.,
              Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext
              Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2616, June 1999,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2616>.

   [RFC2818]  Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2818, May 2000,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2818>.

   [RFC3444]  Pras, A. and J. Schoenwaelder, "On the Difference between
              Information Models and Data Models", RFC 3444,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3444, January 2003,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3444>.

   [RFC3688]  Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, January 2004,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3688>.

   [RFC3849]  Huston, G., Lord, A., and P. Smith, "IPv6 Address Prefix
              Reserved for Documentation", RFC 3849,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3849, July 2004,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3849>.

   [RFC4250]  Lehtinen, S. and C. Lonvick, Ed., "The Secure Shell (SSH)
              Protocol Assigned Numbers", RFC 4250,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4250, January 2006,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4250>.

   [RFC5321]  Klensin, J., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", RFC 5321,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5321, October 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5321>.

   [RFC5737]  Arkko, J., Cotton, M., and L. Vegoda, "IPv4 Address Blocks
              Reserved for Documentation", RFC 5737,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5737, January 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5737>.

   [RFC6020]  Bjorklund, M., Ed., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for
              the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6020, October 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6020>.

   [RFC6241]  Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed.,
              and A. Bierman, Ed., "Network Configuration Protocol
              (NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241, June 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6241>.

   [RFC6991]  Schoenwaelder, J., Ed., "Common YANG Data Types",
              RFC 6991, DOI 10.17487/RFC6991, July 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6991>.

   [RFC7950]  Bjorklund, M., Ed., "The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling Language",
              RFC 7950, DOI 10.17487/RFC7950, August 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7950>.

   [RFC8040]  Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., and K. Watsen, "RESTCONF
              Protocol", RFC 8040, DOI 10.17487/RFC8040, January 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8040>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8192]  Hares, S., Lopez, D., Zarny, M., Jacquenet, C., Kumar, R.,
              and J. Jeong, "Interface to Network Security Functions
              (I2NSF): Problem Statement and Use Cases", RFC 8192,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8192, July 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8192>.

   [RFC8329]  Lopez, D., Lopez, E., Dunbar, L., Strassner, J., and R.
              Kumar, "Framework for Interface to Network Security
              Functions", RFC 8329, DOI 10.17487/RFC8329, February 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8329>.

   [RFC8340]  Bjorklund, M. and L. Berger, Ed., "YANG Tree Diagrams",
              BCP 215, RFC 8340, DOI 10.17487/RFC8340, March 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8340>.

   [RFC8341]  Bierman, A. and M. Bjorklund, "Network Configuration
              Access Control Model", STD 91, RFC 8341,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8341, March 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8341>.

   [RFC8407]  Bierman, A., "Guidelines for Authors and Reviewers of
              Documents Containing YANG Data Models", BCP 216, RFC 8407,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8407, October 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8407>.

15.2.  Informative References

   [client-facing-inf-req]
              Kumar, R., Lohiya,

   [RFC8525]  Bierman, A., Qi, D., Bitar, N., Palislamovic, Bjorklund, M., Schoenwaelder, J., Watsen, K.,
              and R. Wilton, "YANG Library", RFC 8525,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8525, March 2019,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8525>.

   [RFC8805]  Kline, E., Duleba, K., Szamonek, Z., Moser, S., and L. Xia, "Requirements W.
              Kumari, "A Format for Client-Facing Interface
              to Security Controller", draft-ietf-i2nsf-client-facing-
              interface-req-05 (work in progress), May 2018.

   [i2nsf-capability-im] Self-Published IP Geolocation
              Feeds", RFC 8805, DOI 10.17487/RFC8805, August 2020,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8805>.

15.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-capability]
              Xia, L., Strassner, J., Basile, C., and D. Lopez,
              "Information Model of NSFs Capabilities", draft-ietf-
              i2nsf-capability-05 (work in progress), April 2019.

   [i2nsf-terminology]
              Hares, S., Strassner, J.,

   [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-sdn-ipsec-flow-protection]
              Lopez, D., Xia, L., R., Lopez-Millan, G., and H.
              Birkholz, "Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF)
              Terminology", draft-ietf-i2nsf-terminology-08 F. Pereniguez-Garcia,
              "Software-Defined Networking (SDN)-based IPsec Flow
              Protection", draft-ietf-i2nsf-sdn-ipsec-flow-protection-08
              (work in progress), July 2019. June 2020.

   [SNORT]    Roesch, M., Green, C., and B. Caswell, "SNORT", SNORT
              Documents https://www.snort.org/#documents, August 2020.

   [STIX]     Jordan, B., Piazza, R., and T. Darley, "STIX "Structured Threat
              Information Expression (STIX)", STIX Version 2.1", 2.1:
              Committee Specification 01 https://docs.oasis-
              open.org/cti/stix/v2.1/stix-v2.1.pdf, March 2020.

Appendix A.  Changes from draft-ietf-i2nsf-consumer-facing-interface-
             dm-08

   The following changes are made from draft-ietf-i2nsf-consumer-facing-
   interface-dm-08:

   o  This version is revised according to the comments from Jan
      Lindblad who reviewed this document as a YANG doctor.

   [SURICATA]
              Julien, V. and , "SURICATA", SURICATA Documents
              https://suricata-ids.org/docs/, August 2020.

   [YARA]     Alvarez, V., Bengen, H., Metz, J., Buehlmann, S., and W.
              Shields, "YARA", YARA
              Documents https://yara.readthedocs.io/en/v3.5.0/, August
              2020.

Authors' Addresses

   Jaehoon Paul Jeong (editor)
   Department of Computer Science and Engineering
   Sungkyunkwan University
   2066 Seobu-Ro, Jangan-Gu
   Suwon, Gyeonggi-Do  16419
   Republic of Korea

   Phone: +82 31 299 4957
   Fax:   +82 31 290 7996
   EMail: pauljeong@skku.edu
   URI:   http://iotlab.skku.edu/people-jaehoon-jeong.php
   Chaehong Chung
   Department of Electronic, Electrical and Computer Engineering
   Sungkyunkwan University
   2066 Seobu-Ro, Jangan-Gu
   Suwon, Gyeonggi-Do  16419
   Republic of Korea

   Phone: +82 31 299 4957
   EMail: darkhong@skku.edu

   Tae-Jin Ahn
   Korea Telecom
   70 Yuseong-Ro, Yuseong-Gu
   Daejeon  305-811
   Republic of Korea

   Phone: +82 42 870 8409
   EMail: taejin.ahn@kt.com

   Rakesh Kumar
   Juniper Networks
   1133 Innovation Way
   Sunnyvale, CA  94089
   USA

   EMail: rkkumar@juniper.net

   Susan Hares
   Huawei
   7453 Hickory Hill
   Saline, MI  48176
   USA

   Phone: +1-734-604-0332
   EMail: shares@ndzh.com