draft-ietf-intarea-provisioning-domains-00.txt   draft-ietf-intarea-provisioning-domains-01.txt 
intarea P. Pfister intarea P. Pfister
Internet-Draft E. Vyncke, Ed. Internet-Draft E. Vyncke, Ed.
Intended status: Standards Track Cisco Intended status: Standards Track Cisco
Expires: May 3, 2018 T. Pauly Expires: August 13, 2018 T. Pauly
D. Schinazi D. Schinazi
Apple Apple
M. Keane February 9, 2018
Microsoft
October 30, 2017
Discovering Provisioning Domain Names and Data Discovering Provisioning Domain Names and Data
draft-ietf-intarea-provisioning-domains-00 draft-ietf-intarea-provisioning-domains-01
Abstract Abstract
An increasing number of hosts and networks are connected to the An increasing number of hosts access the Internet via multiple
Internet through multiple interfaces, some of which may provide interfaces or, in IPv6 multi-homed networks, via multiple IPv6 prefix
multiple ways to access the internet by means of multiple IPv6 prefix
configurations. configurations.
This document describes a way for hosts to retrieve additional This document describes a way for hosts to identify such means,
information about their network access characteristics. The set of called Provisioning Domains (PvDs), with Fully Qualified Domain Names
configuration items required to access the Internet is called a (FQDN). Those identifiers are advertised in a new Router
Provisioning Domain (PvD). The PvD is identified by a Fully Advertisement (RA) option and, when present, are associated with the
Qualified Domain Name (FQDN). This identifier, retrieved using a new set of information included within the RA.
Router Advertisement (RA) option, is associated with the set of
information included within the RA and may later be used to retrieve Based on this FQDN, hosts can retrieve additional information about
additional information associated with the PvD by way of an HTTP- their network access characteristics via an HTTP over TLS query.
over-TLS request. This allows applications to select which Provisioning Domains to use
as well as to provide configuration parameters to the transport layer
and above.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on May 3, 2018. This Internet-Draft will expire on August 13, 2018.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Provisioning Domain Identification using Router 3. Provisioning Domain Identification using Router
Advertisements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Advertisements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. PvD ID Option for Router Advertisements . . . . . . . . . 4 3.1. PvD ID Option for Router Advertisements . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. Router Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.2. Router Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.3. Host Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.3. Host Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.3.1. DHCPv6 configuration association . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.3.1. DHCPv6 configuration association . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.3.2. DHCPv4 configuration association . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.3.2. DHCPv4 configuration association . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.3.3. Interconnection Sharing by the Host . . . . . . . . . 7 3.3.3. Interconnection Sharing by the Host . . . . . . . . . 9
4. Provisioning Domain Additional Information . . . . . . . . . 7 4. Provisioning Domain Additional Information . . . . . . . . . 9
4.1. Retrieving the PvD Additional Information . . . . . . . . 7 4.1. Retrieving the PvD Additional Information . . . . . . . . 9
4.2. Providing the PvD Additional Information . . . . . . . . 9 4.2. Operational Consideration to Providing the PvD Additional
4.3. PvD Additional Information Format . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.3.1. Connectivity Characteristics Information . . . . . . 10 4.3. PvD Additional Information Format . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.3.2. Private Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4.3.1. Private Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.3.3. Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4.3.2. Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.4. Detecting misconfiguration and misuse . . . . . . . . . . 12 4.4. Detecting misconfiguration and misuse . . . . . . . . . . 13
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 5. Operation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 7. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
9. Contributor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
10.1. Normative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 10.1. Normative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
10.2. Informative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 10.2. Informative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Appendix A. Changelog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Appendix A. Changelog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
A.1. Version 00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 A.1. Version 00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
A.2. Version 01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 A.2. Version 01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
A.3. Version 02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 A.3. Version 02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
A.4. WG Document version 00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 A.4. WG Document version 00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
A.5. WG Document version 01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Appendix B. Connection monetary cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
B.1. Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
B.2. Price . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
B.3. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
It has become very common in modern networks for hosts to access the It has become very common in modern networks for hosts to access the
network through different network interfaces, tunnels, or next-hop internet through different network interfaces, tunnels, or next-hop
routers. To describe the set of network configurations associated routers. To describe the set of network configurations associated
with %% each access method, the concept of Provisioning Domain (PvD) with each access method, the concept of Provisioning Domain (PvD) was
was defined in [RFC7556]. defined in [RFC7556].
This specification provides a way to identify explicit PvDs with This document specifies a way to identify PvDs with Fully Qualified
Fully Qualified Domain Names (FQDN). The FQDN is thus called PvD ID Domain Names (FQDN), called PvD IDs. Those identifiers are
in this document. The PvD IDs is included in a Router Advertisement advertised in a new Router Advertisement (RA) [RFC4861] option called
[RFC4861] option. This new option, when present, associates the set the PvD ID Router Advertisement option which, when present,
of configurations with the PvD ID in the same RA message. It is associates the PvD ID with all the information present in the Router
worth noting that multiple PvDs (with different PvD IDs) could be Advertisement as well as any configuration object, such as addresses,
provisioned on any host interface, as well as noting that the same deriving from it. The PVD ID Router Advertisement option may also
PvD ID could be used on different interfaces in order to inform the contain a set of other RA options. Since such options are only
host that all PvDs with the same PvD ID, on different interfaces, considered by hosts implementing this specification, network
operators may configure hosts that are 'PvD-aware' with PvDs that are
ignored by other hosts.
Since PvD IDs are used to identify different ways to access the
internet, multiple PvDs (with different PvD IDs) could be provisioned
on a single host interface. Similarly, the same PvD ID could be used
on different interfaces of a host in order to inform that those PvDs
ultimately provide identical services. ultimately provide identical services.
This document also introduces a way for hosts to retrieve additional This document also introduces a way for hosts to retrieve additional
information related to a specific PvD by the mean of an HTTP-over-TLS information related to a specific PvD by means of an HTTP over TLS
query using an URI derived from the PvD ID. The retrieved JSON query using an URI derived from the PvD ID. The retrieved JSON
object contains additional network information that would typically object contains additional information that would typically be
be considered unfit, or too large, to be directly included in the considered unfit, or too large, to be directly included in the Router
Router Advertisements. This information can be used by the Advertisement, but might be considered useful to the applications, or
networking stack, the applications, or even be partially displayed to even sometimes users, when choosing which PvD and transport should be
the users (e.g., by displaying a localized network service name). used.
2. Terminology 2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
[RFC2119]. [RFC2119].
In addition, this document uses the following terminology: In addition, this document uses the following terminology:
PvD: A Provisioning Domain, a set of network configuration Provisioning Domain (PvD): A set of network configuration
information; for more information, see [RFC7556]. information; for more information, see [RFC7556].
PvD ID: A Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN) used to identify a PvD ID: A Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN) used to identify a
PvD. PvD.
Explicit PvD: A PvD uniquely identified with a PvD ID. for more Explicit PvD: A PvD uniquely identified with a PvD ID. For more
information, see [RFC7556]. information, see [RFC7556].
Implicit PvD: A PvD associated with a set of configuration Implicit PvD: A PvD that, in the absence of a PvD ID, is identified
information that, in the absence of a PvD ID, is associated with by the host interface to which it is attached and the address of
the advertising router. the advertising router.
3. Provisioning Domain Identification using Router Advertisements 3. Provisioning Domain Identification using Router Advertisements
Each provisioning domain is identified by a PvD ID. The PvD ID is a Explicit PvDs are identified by a PvD ID. The PvD ID is a Fully
Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN) which MUST belong to the network Qualified Domain Name (FQDN) which MUST belong to the network
operator in order to avoid ambiguity. The same PvD ID MAY be used in operator in order to avoid naming collisions. The same PvD ID MAY be
several access networks when the set of configuration information is used in several access networks when they ultimately provide
identical (e.g. in all home networks subscribed to the same service). identical services (e.g., in all home networks subscribed to the same
service).
3.1. PvD ID Option for Router Advertisements 3.1. PvD ID Option for Router Advertisements
This document introduces a Router Advertisement (RA) option called This document introduces a Router Advertisement (RA) option called
the PvD ID Router Advertisement Option, used to convey the FQDN PvD ID Router Advertisement option. It is used to convey the FQDN
identifying a given PvD. identifying a given PvD (see Figure 1), bind the PvD ID with
configuration information received over DHCPv4 (see Section 3.3.2),
enable the use of HTTP over TLS to retrieve the PvD Additional
Information JSON object (see Section 4), as well as contain any other
RA options which would otherwise be valid in the RA.
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length |H|L| Reserved | | Type | Length |H|L|A| Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Sequence | ... | Sequence Number | ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ... +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ...
... PvD ID FQDN ... ... PvD ID FQDN ...
... +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ... +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
... | Padding | ... | Padding |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| ...
... Router Advertisement message header ...
... (Only present when A-flag is set) ...
... |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Options ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
PvD ID Router Advertisements Option format Figure 1: PvD ID Router Advertisements Option format
Type : (8 bits) To be defined by IANA. Current Type : (8 bits) To be defined by IANA. Current
experimentation uses the value of 253. experimentation uses the value of 254.
Length : (8 bits) The length of the option (including the Type Length : (8 bits) The length of the option in units of 8
and Length fields) in units of 8 octets. octets, including the Type and Length fields, the Router
Advertisement message header, if any, as well as the RA options
that are included within the PvD ID Option.
H-flag : (1 bit) Whether some PvD Additional Information is H-flag : (1 bit) 'HTTP' flag stating whether some PvD
made available through HTTP over TLS, as described in Section 4. Additional Information is made available through HTTP over TLS, as
described in Section 4.
L-flag : (1 bit) Whether the router is also providing IPv4 L-flag : (1 bit) 'Legacy' flag stating whether the router is
information using DHCPv4 (see Section 3.3.2). also providing IPv4 information using DHCPv4 (see Section 3.3.2).
Reserved : (14 bits) Reserved for later use. It MUST be set to A-flag : (1 bit) 'Advertisement' flag stating whether the PvD
ID Option is followed (right after padding to the next 64 bits
boundary) by a Router Advertisement message header (See section
4.2 of target="RFC4861"/>).
Reserved : (13 bits) Reserved for later use. It MUST be set to
zero by the sender and ignored by the receiver. zero by the sender and ignored by the receiver.
Sequence : (16 bits) Sequence number for the PvD Additional Sequence Number: (16 bits) Sequence number for the PvD Additional
Information, as described in Section 4. Information, as described in Section 4.
PvD ID FQDN : The FQDN used as PvD ID encoded as described in PvD ID FQDN : The FQDN used as PvD ID encoded in DNS format, as
Section 3.1 of RFC1035 [RFC1035]. Note that for simple decoding, described in Section 3.1 of [RFC1035]. Domain names compression
the domain names MUST NOT be encoded in the compressed form described in Section 4.1.4 of [RFC1035] MUST NOT be used.
described in Section 4.1.4 of RFC1035 [RFC1035]. This encoding is
the same as the one used in RFC8106 [RFC8106]. The encoding MUST
end with a null (zero-length) label.
Padding : Zero or more padding octets such as to set the option Padding : Zero or more padding octets to the next 8 octets
length (Type and Length fields included) to eight times the value boundary. It MUST be set to zero by the sender, and ignored by
of the Length field. It MUST be set to zero by the sender and the receiver.
ignored by the receiver.
Routers MUST NOT include more than one PvD ID Router Advertisement RA message header : (16 octets) When the A-flag is set, a full
Option in each RA. In case multiple PvD ID options are found in a Router Advertisement message header as specified in [RFC4861].
given RA, hosts MUST ignore all but the first PvD ID option. The 'Type', 'Code' and 'Checksum' fields (i.e. the first 32 bits),
MUST be set to zero by the sender and ignored by the receiver.
The other fields are to be set and parsed as specified in
[RFC4861] or any updating documents.
Options : Zero or more RA options that would otherwise be valid as
part of the Router Advertisement main body, but are instead
included in the PvD ID Option such as to be ignored by hosts that
are not 'PvD-aware'.
Here is an example of a PvD ID option with example.org as the PvD ID
FQDN and including a RDNSS and prefix information options:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+---------------+-----------------------------------------------+
| Type: 254 | Length: 12 |0|0|0| Reserved |
+---------------+-------------------------------+---------------+
| Sequence Number | 7 | e |
+---------------+-----------------------------------------------+
| m | a | m | p |
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| l | e | 3 | o |
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| r | g | 0 | 0 (padding) |
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| 0 (padding) | 0 (padding) | 0 (padding) | 0 (padding) |
+---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| RDNSS option (RFC 6106) length: 5 ...
... ...
... |
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| Prefix Information Option (RFC 4861) length: 4 ...
... |
... |
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
3.2. Router Behavior 3.2. Router Behavior
A router MAY insert only one PvD ID Option in an RA. The included A router MAY send RAs containing at most one PvD ID RA option, but
PvD ID is associated with all the other options included in the same MUST NOT include more than one PvD ID RA option in each RA. In
RA (for example, and not limited to: Prefix Information [RFC4861], particular, the PvD ID RA option MUST NOT contain further PvD ID RA
Recursive DNS Server [RFC8106], Routing Information [RFC4191] options.
options).
In order to provide multiple independent PvDs, a router MUST send The PvD ID Option MAY contain zero, one, or more RA options which
multiple RAs using different source link-local addresses (LLA) (as would otherwise be valid as part of the same RA. Such options are
proposed in [I-D.bowbakova-rtgwg-enterprise-pa-multihoming]), each of processed by PvD-aware hosts, while ignored by others.
which MAY include a PvD ID option. In such cases, routers MAY
originate the different RAs using the same datalink layer address.
If the router is actually a VRRP instance [RFC5798], then the In order to provide multiple different PvDs, a router MUST send
procedure is identical except that the virtual datalink layer address multiple RAs. Different explicit PvDs MAY be advertised with RAs
is used as well as the virtual IPv6 LLA. using the same IPv6 source address; but different implicit PvDs,
advertised with different RAs, MUST use different link local
addresses.
Whenever an RA, for a single PvD, would need to be sent via multiple
packets, the PvD ID RA option header (i.e., all fields except the
'Options' field) MUST be repeated in all the transmitted RAs. But
the options within the 'Options' field, MAY be transmitted only once,
included in one of the transmitted PvD ID RA options.
3.3. Host Behavior 3.3. Host Behavior
RAs provide configuration information for IPv6 hosts. When a host Hosts MUST associate received RAs and included configuration
receives an RA message including a PvD ID Option, it MUST associate information (e.g., Router Valid Lifetime, Prefix Information
all the configuration objects which are updated by the received RA [RFC4861], Recursive DNS Server [RFC8106], Routing Information
(the same types as in Section 3.3) with the PvD identified by the PvD [RFC4191] options) with the explicit PvD identified by the first PvD
ID Option, even if some objects are already associated with a ID Option present in the received RA, if any, or with the implicit
different explicit or implicit PvD. PvD ID are compared in a case- PvD identified by the host interface and the source address of the
insensitive manner (i.e., A=a), assuming ASCII with zero parity. received RA otherwise.
Non-alphabetic codes must match exactly (see also Section 3.1 of
[RFC1035]).
If the received RA does not include a PvD ID Option, the host MUST In case multiple PvD ID options are found in a given RA, hosts MUST
associate the configuration objects which are updated by the received ignore all but the first PvD ID option.
RA with an implicit PvD, even if some objects were already associated
with a different explicit or implicit PvD. This implicit PvD MUST be
identified by the LLA of the router sending the RA and the interface
on which the RA was received.
This document does not update the way Router Advertisement options Similarly, hosts MUST associate all network configuration objects
are processed. But in addition to the option processing defined in (e.g., default routers, addresses, more specific routes, DNS
other documents, hosts implementing this specification MUST associate Recursive Resolvers) with the PvD associated with the RA which last
each created or updated object (e.g. address, default route, more updated the object. For example, addresses that are generated using
specific route, DNS server list) with the PvD associated with the a received Prefix Information option (PIO) are associated with the
received RA. PvD of the last received RA which included the given PIO.
PvD IDs MUST be compared in a case-insensitive manner (i.e., A=a),
assuming ASCII with zero parity while non-alphabetic codes must match
exactly (see also Section 3.1 of [RFC1035]). For example,
pvd.example.com or PvD.Example.coM would refer to the same PvD.
While resolving names, executing the default address selection While resolving names, executing the default address selection
algorithm [RFC6724] or executing the default router selection algorithm [RFC6724] or executing the default router selection
algorithm ([RFC2461], [RFC4191] and [RFC8028]), hosts MAY consider algorithm ([RFC2461], [RFC4191] and [RFC8028]), hosts MAY consider
only the configuration associated with an arbitrary set of PvDs. only the configuration associated with an arbitrary set of PvDs.
For example, a host MAY associate a given process with a specific For example, a host MAY associate a given process with a specific
PvD, or a specific set of PvDs, while associating another process PvD, or a specific set of PvDs, while associating another process
with another PvD. A PvD-aware application might also be able to with another PvD. A PvD-aware application might also be able to
select, on a per-connection basis, which PvDs should be used for a select, on a per-connection basis, which PvDs should be used. In
given connection. In particular, constrained devices such as small particular, constrained devices such as small battery operated
battery operated devices (e.g. IoT), or devices with limited CPU or devices (e.g. IoT), or devices with limited CPU or memory resources
memory resources may purposefully use a single PvD while ignoring may purposefully use a single PvD while ignoring some received RAs
some received RAs containing different PvD IDs. containing different PvD IDs.
The way an application expresses its desire to use a given PvD, or a The way an application expresses its desire to use a given PvD, or a
set of PvDs, or the way this selection is enforced, is out of the set of PvDs, or the way this selection is enforced, is out of the
scope of this document. Useful insights about these considerations scope of this document. Useful insights about these considerations
can be found in [I-D.kline-mif-mpvd-api-reqs]. can be found in [I-D.kline-mif-mpvd-api-reqs].
3.3.1. DHCPv6 configuration association 3.3.1. DHCPv6 configuration association
When a host retrieves configuration elements using DHCPv6, they MUST When a host retrieves configuration elements using DHCPv6 (e.g.,
be associated with the explicit or implicit PvD of the RA received on addresses or DNS recursive resolvers), they MUST be associated with
the same interface, sent from the same LLA, and with the O-flag set the explicit or implicit PvD of the RA received on the same
interface, sent from the same LLA, and with the O-flag or M-flag set
[RFC4861]. If no such PvD is found, or whenever multiple different [RFC4861]. If no such PvD is found, or whenever multiple different
PvDs are found, the host behavior is unspecified. PvDs are found, the host behavior is unspecified.
This process requires hosts to keep track of received RAs, associated This process requires hosts to keep track of received RAs, associated
PvD IDs, and routers LLA; it also assumes that the router either acts PvD IDs, and routers LLA; it also assumes that the router either acts
as a DHCPv6 server or relay and uses the same LLA for DHCPv6 and RA as a DHCPv6 server or relay and uses the same LLA for DHCPv6 and RA
traffic (which may not be the case when the router uses VRRP to send traffic (which may not be the case when the router uses VRRP to send
its RA). its RA).
3.3.2. DHCPv4 configuration association 3.3.2. DHCPv4 configuration association
When a host retrieves configuration elements from DHCPv4, they MUST When a host retrieves configuration elements from DHCPv4, they MUST
be associated with the explicit PvD received on the same interface, be associated with the explicit PvD received on the same interface,
whose PVD ID Options L-flag is set and, in the case of a non point- whose PVD ID Options L-flag is set and, in the case of a non point-
to-point link, using the same datalink address. If no such PvD is to-point link, using the same datalink address. If no such PvD is
found, or whenever multiple different PvDs are found, the found, or whenever multiple different PvDs are found, the
configuration elements coming from DHCPv4 MUST be associated with an configuration elements coming from DHCPv4 MUST be associated with the
IPv4-only implicit PvD identified by the interface on which the implicit PvD identified by the interface on which the DHCPv4
DHCPv4 transaction happened. The case of multiple explicit PvD for transaction happened. The case of multiple explicit PvD for an IPv4
an IPv4 interface is undefined. interface is undefined.
3.3.3. Interconnection Sharing by the Host 3.3.3. Interconnection Sharing by the Host
The situation when a node receives RA on one interface (e.g. The situation when a node receives an RA on one interface (e.g.
cellular) and shares this connectivity by also acting as a router by cellular) and shares this connectivity by also acting as a router by
transmitting RA on another interface (e.g. WiFi) is known as transmitting RA on another interface (e.g. WiFi) is known as
'tethering'. It can be done as ND proxy. The exact behavior is TBD 'tethering'. It can be done as ND proxy. The exact behavior is TBD
but it is expected that the one or several PvD associated to the but it is expected that the one or several PvD associated to the
shared interface (e.g. cellular) will also be advertised to the shared interface (e.g. cellular) will also be advertised to the
clients on the other interface (e.g. WiFi). clients on the other interface (e.g. WiFi).
4. Provisioning Domain Additional Information 4. Provisioning Domain Additional Information
Once a new PvD ID is discovered, it may be used to retrieve Additional information about the network characteristics can be
additional information about the characteristics of the provided retrieved based on the PvD ID. This set of information is called PvD
connectivity. This set of information is called PvD Additional Additional Information, and is encoded as a JSON object [RFC7159].
Information, and is encoded as a JSON object [RFC7159].
The purpose of this additional set of information is to securely The purpose of this additional set of information is to securely
provide additional information to hosts about the connectivity that provide additional information to applications about the connectivity
is provided using a given interface and source address pair. It that is provided using a given interface and source address pair. It
typically includes data that would be considered too large, or not typically includes data that would be considered too large, or not
critical enough, to be provided within an RA option. The information critical enough, to be provided within an RA option. The information
contained in this object MAY be used by the operating system, network contained in this object MAY be used by the operating system, network
libraries, applications, or users, in order to decide which set of libraries, applications, or users, in order to decide which set of
PvDs should be used for which connection, as described in PvDs should be used for which connection, as described in
Section 3.3. Section 3.3.
4.1. Retrieving the PvD Additional Information 4.1. Retrieving the PvD Additional Information
When the H-flag of the PvD ID Option is set, hosts MAY attempt to When the H-flag of the PvD ID Option is set, hosts MAY attempt to
retrieve the PvD Additional Information associated with a given PvD retrieve the PvD Additional Information associated with a given PvD
by performing an HTTP over TLS [RFC2818] GET query to https://<PvD- by performing an HTTP over TLS [RFC2818] GET query to https://<PvD-
ID>/.well-known/pvd [RFC5785]. Inversely, hosts MUST NOT do so ID>/.well-known/pvd [RFC5785]. Inversely, hosts MUST NOT do so
whenever the H-flag is not set. whenever the H-flag is not set.
Note that the DNS name resolution of <PvD-ID> as well as the actual Note that the DNS name resolution of the PvD ID, the PKI checks as
query MUST be performed using the PvD associated with the PvD ID. In well as the actual query MUST be performed using the considered PvD.
other words, the name resolution, source address selection, as well In other words, the name resolution, PKI checks, source address
as the next-hop router selection MUST be performed while using selection, as well as the next-hop router selection MUST be performed
exclusively the set of configuration information attached with the while using exclusively the set of configuration information attached
PvD, as defined in Section 3.3. In some cases, it may therefore be with the PvD, as defined in Section 3.3. In some cases, it may
necessary to wait for an address to be available for use (e.g., once therefore be necessary to wait for an address to be available for use
the Duplicate Address Detection or DHCPv6 processes are complete) (e.g., once the Duplicate Address Detection or DHCPv6 processes are
before initiating the HTTP over TLS query. If the PvD allows for complete) before initiating the HTTP over TLS query. If the PvD
temporary address per [RFC4941], then host SHOULD use a temporary allows for temporary address per [RFC4941], then hosts SHOULD use a
address to fetch the PvD Additional Information and SHOULD deprecate temporary address to fetch the PvD Additional Information and SHOULD
the used temporary address and generate a new temporary address. deprecate the used temporary address and generate a new temporary
address afterward.
If the HTTP status of the answer is greater than or equal to 400 the If the HTTP status of the answer is greater than or equal to 400 the
host MUST abandon and consider that there is no additional PvD host MUST abandon and consider that there is no additional PvD
information. If the HTTP status of the answer is between 300 and information. If the HTTP status of the answer is between 300 and
399, inclusive, it MUST follow the redirection(s). If the HTTP 399, inclusive, it MUST follow the redirection(s). If the HTTP
status of the answer is between 200 and 299, inclusive, the host MAY status of the answer is between 200 and 299, inclusive, the host MAY
get a file containing a single JSON object. When a JSON object could get a file containing a single JSON object. When a JSON object could
not be retrieved, an error message SHOULD be logged and/or displayed not be retrieved, an error message SHOULD be logged and/or displayed
in a rate-limited fashion. in a rate-limited fashion.
After retrieval of the PvD Additional Information, hosts MUST watch After retrieval of the PvD Additional Information, hosts MUST keep
the PvD ID Sequence field for change. In case a different value than track of the Sequence Number value received in subsequent RAs
the one in the RA Sequence field is observed, or whenever the including the same PvD ID. In case the new value is greater than the
validity time included in the PVD Additional Information JSON object value that was observed when the PvD Additional Information object
is expired, hosts MUST either perform a new query and retrieve a new was retrieved (using serial number arithmetic comparisons [RFC1982]),
version of the object, or, failing that, deprecate the object and or whenever the validity time included in the PVD Additional
stop using it. Information JSON object is expired, hosts MUST either perform a new
query and retrieve a new version of the object, or, failing that,
deprecate the object and stop using the additional information
provided in the JSON object.
Hosts retrieving a new PvD Additional Information object MUST check Hosts retrieving a new PvD Additional Information object MUST check
for the presence and validity of the mandatory fields Section 4.3. A for the presence and validity of the mandatory fields specified in
retrieved object including an outdated expiration time or missing a Section 4.3. A retrieved object including an expiration time that is
mandatory element MUST be ignored. In order to avoid traffic spikes already past or missing a mandatory element MUST be ignored. In
toward the server hosting the PvD Additional Information when an order to avoid synchronized queries toward the server hosting the PvD
object expires, a host which last retrieved an object at a time A, Additional Information when an object expires, a host which last
including a validity time B, SHOULD renew the object at a uniformly retrieved an object at a time A, including a validity time B, SHOULD
random time in the interval [(B-A)/2,A]. renew the object at a uniformly random time in the interval
[(B-A)/2,A].
The PvD Additional Information object includes a set of IPv6 prefixes The PvD Additional Information object includes a set of IPv6 prefixes
(under the key "prefixes") which MUST be checked against all the (under the key "prefixes") which MUST be checked against all the
Prefix Information Options advertised in the RA. If any of the Prefix Information Options advertised in the RA. If any of the
prefixes included in the PIO is not covered by at least one of the prefixes included in the PIO is not covered by at least one of the
listed prefixes, the PvD associated with the tested prefix MUST be listed prefixes, the PvD associated with the tested prefix MUST be
considered unsafe and MUST NOT be used. While this does not prevent considered unsafe and MUST NOT be used. While this does not prevent
a malicious network provider, it does complicate some attack a malicious network provider, it does complicate some attack
scenarios, and may help detecting misconfiguration. scenarios, and may help detecting misconfiguration.
The server providing the JSON files SHOULD also check whether the 4.2. Operational Consideration to Providing the PvD Additional
client address is part of the prefixes listed into the additional Information
information and SHOULD return a 403 response code if there is no
match. The server MAY also use the client address to select the
right JSON object to be returned.
4.2. Providing the PvD Additional Information
Whenever the H-flag is set in the PvD RA Option, a valid PvD Whenever the H-flag is set in the PvD RA Option, a valid PvD
Additional Information object MUST be made available to all hosts Additional Information object MUST be made available to all hosts
receiving the RA by the network operator. In particular, when a receiving the RA by the network operator. In particular, when a
captive portal is present, hosts MUST still be allowed to access the captive portal is present, hosts MUST still be allowed to perform
DNS, PKI and HTTP over TLS operations related to the retrieval of the
object, even before logging into the captive portal. object, even before logging into the captive portal.
Routers MAY increment the PVD ID Sequence number in order to inform Routers MAY increment the PVD ID Sequence number in order to inform
host that a new PvD Additional Information object is available and host that a new PvD Additional Information object is available and
should be retrieved. should be retrieved.
The server providing the JSON files SHOULD also check whether the
client address is part of the prefixes listed into the additional
information and SHOULD return a 403 response code if there is no
match.
4.3. PvD Additional Information Format 4.3. PvD Additional Information Format
The PvD Additional Information is a JSON object. The PvD Additional Information is a JSON object.
The following array presents the mandatory keys which MUST be The following table presents the mandatory keys which MUST be
included in the object: included in the object:
+----------+-----------------+-------------+------------------------+ +----------+-----------------+-------------+------------------------+
| JSON key | Description | Type | Example | | JSON key | Description | Type | Example |
+----------+-----------------+-------------+------------------------+ +----------+-----------------+-------------+------------------------+
| name | Human-readable | UTF-8 | "Awesome Wifi" | | name | Human-readable | UTF-8 | "Awesome Wifi" |
| | service name | string | | | | service name | string | |
| | | [RFC3629] | | | | | [RFC3629] | |
| expires | Date after | [RFC3339] | "2017-07-23T06:00:00Z" | | expires | Date after | [RFC3339] | "2017-07-23T06:00:00Z" |
| | which this | | | | | which this | | |
skipping to change at page 10, line 4 skipping to change at page 11, line 41
| prefixes | Array of IPv6 | Array of | ["2001:db8:1::/48", | | prefixes | Array of IPv6 | Array of | ["2001:db8:1::/48", |
| | prefixes valid | strings | "2001:db8:4::/48"] | | | prefixes valid | strings | "2001:db8:4::/48"] |
| | for this PVD | | | | | for this PVD | | |
+----------+-----------------+-------------+------------------------+ +----------+-----------------+-------------+------------------------+
A retrieved object which does not include a valid string associated A retrieved object which does not include a valid string associated
with the "name" key at the root of the object, or a valid date with the "name" key at the root of the object, or a valid date
associated with the "expires" key, also at the root of the object, associated with the "expires" key, also at the root of the object,
MUST be ignored. In such cases, an error message SHOULD be logged MUST be ignored. In such cases, an error message SHOULD be logged
and/or displayed in a rate-limited fashion. If the PIO of the and/or displayed in a rate-limited fashion. If the PIO of the
received RA is not included in the "prefixes" key, the retrieved received RA is not covered by at least one of the "prefixes" key, the
object SHOULD be ignored. retrieved object SHOULD be ignored.
The following table presents some optional keys which MAY be included The following table presents some optional keys which MAY be included
in the object. in the object.
+-----------------+-----------------+---------+---------------------+ +---------------+-----------------+---------+-----------------------+
| JSON key | Description | Type | Example | | JSON key | Description | Type | Example |
+-----------------+-----------------+---------+---------------------+ +---------------+-----------------+---------+-----------------------+
| localizedName | Localized user- | UTF-8 | "Wifi Genial" | | localizedName | Localized user- | UTF-8 | "Wifi Genial" |
| | visible service | string | | | | visible service | string | |
| | name, language | | | | | name, language | | |
| | can be selected | | | | | can be selected | | |
| | based on the | | | | | based on the | | |
| | HTTP Accept- | | | | | HTTP Accept- | | |
| | Language header | | | | | Language header | | |
| | in the request. | | | | | in the request. | | |
| dnsZones | DNS zones | array | ["example.com","sub | | dnsZones | DNS zones | array | ["example.com","sub.e |
| | searchable and | of DNS | .example.org"] | | | searchable and | of DNS | xample.org"] |
| | accessible | zones | | | | accessible | zones | |
| noInternet | No Internet, | boolean | true | | noInternet | No Internet, | boolean | true |
| | set when the | | | | | set when the | | |
| | PvD only | | | | | PvD only | | |
| | provides | | | | | provides | | |
| | restricted | | | | | restricted | | |
| | access to a set | | | | | access to a set | | |
| | of services | | | | | of services | | |
| characteristics | Connectivity | JSON | See Section 4.3.1 | +---------------+-----------------+---------+-----------------------+
| | characteristics | object | |
| metered | metered, when | boolean | false |
| | the access | | |
| | volume is | | |
| | limited | | |
+-----------------+-----------------+---------+---------------------+
It is worth noting that the JSON format allows for extensions. It is worth noting that the JSON format allows for extensions.
Whenever an unknown key is encountered, it MUST be ignored along with Whenever an unknown key is encountered, it MUST be ignored along with
its associated elements. its associated elements.
4.3.1. Connectivity Characteristics Information 4.3.1. Private Extensions
The following set of keys can be used to signal certain
characteristics of the connection towards the PvD.
They should reflect characteristics of the overall access technology
which is not limited to the link the host is connected to, but rather
a combination of the link technology, CPE upstream connectivity, and
further quality of service considerations.
+---------------+--------------+---------------------+--------------+
| JSON key | Description | Type | Example |
+---------------+--------------+---------------------+--------------+
| maxThroughput | Maximum | object({down(int), | {"down": |
| | achievable | up(int)}) in kbit/s | 10000, "up": |
| | throughput | | 5000} |
| minLatency | Minimum | object({down(int), | {"down": 10, |
| | achievable | up(int)}) in msec | "up": 20} |
| | latency | | |
| rl | Maximum | object({down(int), | {"down": |
| | achievable | up(int)}) in losses | 0.1, "up": |
| | reliability | every 1000 packets | 1} |
+---------------+--------------+---------------------+--------------+
4.3.2. Private Extensions
JSON keys starting with "x-" are reserved for private use and can be JSON keys starting with "x-" are reserved for private use and can be
utilized to provide information that is specific to vendor, user or utilized to provide information that is specific to vendor, user or
enterprise. It is RECOMMENDED to use one of the patterns "x-FQDN- enterprise. It is RECOMMENDED to use one of the patterns "x-FQDN-
KEY" or "x-PEN-KEY" where FQDN is a fully qualified domain name or KEY" or "x-PEN-KEY" where FQDN is a fully qualified domain name or
PEN is a private enterprise number [PEN] under control of the author PEN is a private enterprise number [PEN] under control of the author
of the extension to avoid collisions. of the extension to avoid collisions.
4.3.3. Example 4.3.2. Example
Here are two examples based on the keys defined in this section. Here are two examples based on the keys defined in this section.
{ {
"name": "Foo Wireless", "name": "Foo Wireless",
"localizedName": "Foo-France Wifi", "localizedName": "Foo-France Wifi",
"expires": "2017-07-23T06:00:00Z", "expires": "2017-07-23T06:00:00Z",
"prefixes" : ["2001:db8:1::/48", "2001:db8:4::/48"], "prefixes" : ["2001:db8:1::/48", "2001:db8:4::/48"],
"characteristics": {
"maxThroughput": { "down":200000, "up": 50000 },
"minLatency": { "down": 0.1, "up": 1 }
}
} }
{ {
"name": "Bar 4G", "name": "Bar 4G",
"localizedName": "Bar US 4G", "localizedName": "Bar US 4G",
"expires": "2017-07-23T06:00:00Z", "expires": "2017-07-23T06:00:00Z",
"prefixes": ["2001:db8:1::/48", "2001:db8:4::/48"], "prefixes": ["2001:db8:1::/48", "2001:db8:4::/48"],
"metered": true,
"characteristics": {
"maxThroughput": { "down":80000, "up": 20000 }
}
} }
4.4. Detecting misconfiguration and misuse 4.4. Detecting misconfiguration and misuse
Although some solutions such as IPsec or SEND [RFC3971] can be used When a host retrieves the PvD Additional Information, it MUST verify
that the TLS server certificate is valid for the performed request
(e.g., that the Subject Name is equal to the PvD ID expressed as an
FQDN). This authentication creates a secure binding between the
information provided by the trusted Router Advertisement, and the
HTTPS server. But this does not mean the Advertising Router and the
PvD server belong to the same entity.
Hosts MUST verify that all prefixes in the RA PIO are covered by a
prefix from the PvD Additional Information. An adversarial router
willing to fake the use of a given explicit PvD, without any access
to the actual PvD Additional Information, would need to perform NAT66
in order to circumvent this check.
It is also RECOMMENDED that the HTTPS server checks the source
addresses of incoming connections (see Section 4.1). This check give
reasonable assurance that neither NPTv6 [RFC6296] nor NAT66 were used
and restricts the information to the valid network users.
5. Operation Considerations
This section describes some use cases of PvD. For sake of
simplicity, the RA messages will not be described in the usual ASCII
art but rather in an indented list. For example, a RA message
containing some options and a PvD ID option that also contains other
options will be described as:
o RA Header: router lifetime = 6000
o Prefix Information Option: length = 4, prefix = 2001:db8:cafe::/64
o PvD ID header: length = 3+ 5 +4 , PvD ID FQDN = example.org,
A-flag = 0 (actual length of the header with padding 24 bytes = 3
* 8 bytes)
* Recursive DNS Server: length = 5, addresses=
[2001:db8:cafe::53, 2001:db8:f00d::53]
* Prefix Information Option: length = 4, prefix =
2001:db8:f00d::/64
It is expected that for some years, networks will have a mix of PvD-
aware hosts and PvD-ignorant hosts. If there is a need to give
specific information to PvD-aware hosts only, then it is recommended
to send TWO RA messages: one for each class of hosts. For example,
here is the RA for PvD-ignorant hosts:
o RA Header: router lifetime = 6000 (PvD-ignorant hosts will use
this router as a default router)
o Prefix Information Option: length = 4, prefix = 2001:db8:cafe::/64
o Recursive DNS Server Option: length = 3, addresses=
[2001:db8:cafe::53]
o PvD ID header: length = 3+ 2, PvD ID FQDN = foo.example.org,
A-flag = 1 (actual length of the header 24 bytes = 3 * 8 bytes)
* RA Header: router lifetime = 0 (PvD-aware hosts will not use
this router as a default router), implicit length = 2
And here is a RA example for PvD-aware hosts:
o RA Header: router lifetime = 0 (PvD-ignorant hosts will not use
this router as a default router)
o PvD ID header: length = 3+ 2 + 4 + 3, PvD ID FQDN = example.org,
A-flag = 1 (actual length of the header 24 bytes = 3 * 8 bytes)
* RA Header: router lifetime = 1600 (PvD-aware hosts will use
this router as a default router), implicit length = 2
* Prefix Information Option: length = 4, prefix =
2001:db8:f00d::/64
* Recursive DNS Server Option: length = 3, addresses=
[2001:db8:f00d::53]
In the above example, PvD-ignorant hosts will only use the first RA
sent from their default router and using the 2001:db8:cafe::/64
prefix. PvD-aware hosts will autonomously configure addresses from
both PIOs, but will only use the source address in 2001:db8:f00d::/64
to communicate past the first hop router since only the router
sending the second RA will be used as default router; similarly, they
will use the DNS server 2001:db8:f00d::53 when communicating with
this adress.
6. Security Considerations
Although some solutions such as IPsec or SeND [RFC3971] can be used
in order to secure the IPv6 Neighbor Discovery Protocol, actual in order to secure the IPv6 Neighbor Discovery Protocol, actual
deployments largely rely on link layer or physical layer security deployments largely rely on link layer or physical layer security
mechanisms (e.g. 802.1x [IEEE8021X]) in conjunction with RA Guard mechanisms (e.g. 802.1x [IEEE8021X]) in conjunction with RA Guard
[RFC6105]. [RFC6105].
This specification does not improve the Neighbor Discovery Protocol This specification does not improve the Neighbor Discovery Protocol
security model, but extends the purely link-local configuration security model, but extends the purely link-local trust relationship
retrieval mechanisms with HTTP-over-TLS communications and some between the host and the default routers with HTTP over TLS
checks to detect misconfiguration and some misuses. communications which servers are authenticated as rightful owners of
the FQDN received within the trusted PvD ID RA option.
When a host retrieves the PvD Additional Information, it MUST verify
that the HTTPS server certificate is valid and that the Subject Name
is equal to the PvD ID expressed as an FQDN. This authentication
creates a secure binding between the information provided by the
trusted Router Advertisement, and the HTTPS server. But this does
not mean the Advertising Router and the PvD server belong to the same
entity.
When the "prefixes" key is included in the PvD Additional
Information, then host MUST verify that all prefixes in the RA PIO
are covered by a prefixes from the PvD Additional Informaion. An
adversarial router willing to fake the use of a given explicit PvD,
without any access to the actual PvD Additional Information, would
need to perform NAT66 in order to circumvent this check.
It is also RECOMMENDED that the HTTPS server checks the source
addresses of incoming connections (see Section 4.1). This checks
give reasonable assurance that NAT66 was not used and also restrict
the information to the valid network users.
5. Security Considerations
It must be noted that the Section 4.4 of this document only provides It must be noted that Section 4.4 of this document only provides
reasonable assurance against misconfiguration but does not prevent an reasonable assurance against misconfiguration but does not prevent an
hostile network access provider to wrong information that could lead hostile network access provider to wrong information that could lead
applications or hosts to select an hostile PvD. Users should always applications or hosts to select an hostile PvD. Users should always
apply caution when connecting to an unknown network. apply caution when connecting to an unknown network.
6. Privacy Considerations 7. Privacy Considerations
When a host retrieves via HTTPS the additional information, all nodes
on the path (including the HTTPS server) can detect that the node is
active.
As it can be expected that the HTTPS server is located in the same Retrieval of the PvD Additional Information over HTTPS requires early
management domain as the client (usually, it will be within an communications between the connecting host and a server which may be
enterprise network, WiFi hotspot, or Service Provider network), the located further than the first hop router. Although this server is
network operator as usually other means to also detect the new active likely to be located within the same administrative domain as the
node (DHCP, Neighbor Discovery Protocol cache inspection or DNS default router, this property can't be ensured. Therefore, hosts
request logging). In this case, privacy is not worsened by using willing to retrieve the PvD Additional Information before using it
PvD. without leaking identity information, SHOULD make use of an IPv6
Privacy Address and SHOULD NOT include any privacy sensitive data,
such as User Agent header or HTTP cookie, while performing the HTTP
over TLS query.
It must also be noted that most operating systems implement a system From a privacy perspective, retrieving the PvD Additional Information
to detect the presence of a captive portal and also connect to a is not different from establishing a first connexion to a remote
well-known web site over the Internet, for example to server, or even performing a single DNS lookup. For example, most
http://captive.example.com/hotspot-detect.html. This detection operating systems already perform early queries to well known web
mechanism is exposing the activity of the detecting node not only sites, such as http://captive.example.com/hotspot-detect.html, in
within the management domain but also to all nodes outside this order to detect the presence of a captive portal.
domain on the path to the captive.example.com server. As PvD can
also be used to detect captive portal, then the PvD actually
preserves privacy.
Finally, the fetching of additional information is an option and There may be some cases where hosts, for privacy reasons, should
could be disabled by the host. refrain from accessing servers that are located outside a certain
network boundary. In practice, this could be implemented as a
whitelist of 'trusted' FQDNs and/or IP prefixes that the host is
allowed to communicate with. In such scenarios, the host SHOULD
check that the provided PvD ID, as well as the IP address that it
resolves into, are part of the allowed whitelist.
7. IANA Considerations 8. IANA Considerations
IANA is asked to assign the value TBD from the IPv6 Neighbor IANA is asked to assign the value TBD from the IPv6 Neighbor
Discovery Option Formats registry for the PvD ID Router Advertisement Discovery Option Formats registry for the PvD ID Router Advertisement
option. option.
IANA is asked to assign the value "pvd" from the Well-Known URIs IANA is asked to assign the value "pvd" from the Well-Known URIs
registry. registry.
IANA is asked to create and maintain a new registry entitled IANA is asked to create and maintain a new registry entitled
"Additional Information PvD Keys" containing ASCII strings. The "Additional Information PvD Keys" containing ASCII strings. The
initial content of this registry are given below; future assignements initial content of this registry are given in Section 4.3; future
are to be made through Expert Review [BCP36]. assignments are to be made through Expert Review [BCP36].
8. Acknowledgements Finally, IANA is asked to create and maintain a new registry entitled
"PvD ID Router Advertisement option Flags" reserving bit positions
from 0 to 15 to be used in the PvD ID Router Advertisement option
bitmask. Bit position 0, 1 and 2 are reserved by this document (as
specified in Figure 1). Future assignments require a Standard Track
RFC document.
9. Acknowledgements
Many thanks to M. Stenberg and S. Barth for their earlier work: Many thanks to M. Stenberg and S. Barth for their earlier work:
[I-D.stenberg-mif-mpvd-dns]. [I-D.stenberg-mif-mpvd-dns], as well as to Basile Bruneau who was
author of an early version of this document.
Thanks also to Mikael Abrahamson, Ray Bellis, Lorenzo Colitti, Thanks also to Marcus Keane, Mikael Abrahamson, Ray Bellis, Lorenzo
Thierry Danis, Bob Hinden, Tatuya Jinmei, Erik Kline, Ted Lemon, Jen Colitti, Bob Hinden, Tatuya Jinmei, Erik Kline, Ted Lemon, Jen
Lenkova, Mark Townsley, James Woodyatt for useful and interesting Lenkova, Mark Townsley and James Woodyatt for useful and interesting
discussions. discussions.
Finally, many thanks to Thierry Danis for his implementation work Finally, special thanks to Thierry Danis and Wenqin Shao for their
([github]), Tom Jones for his integration effort into the Neat valuable inputs and implementation efforts ([github]), Tom Jones for
project and Rigil Salim for his implementation work. his integration effort into the NEAT project and Rigil Salim for his
implementation work.
9. Contributor
Basile Bruneau was a co-author of this document while he was studying
at the Polytechnique Paris.
10. References 10. References
10.1. Normative references 10.1. Normative references
[I-D.bowbakova-rtgwg-enterprise-pa-multihoming]
Baker, F., Bowers, C., and J. Linkova, "Enterprise
Multihoming using Provider-Assigned Addresses without
Network Prefix Translation: Requirements and Solution",
draft-bowbakova-rtgwg-enterprise-pa-multihoming-01 (work
in progress), October 2016.
[RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and [RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, DOI 10.17487/RFC1035, specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, DOI 10.17487/RFC1035,
November 1987, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1035>. November 1987, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1035>.
[RFC1982] Elz, R. and R. Bush, "Serial Number Arithmetic", RFC 1982,
DOI 10.17487/RFC1982, August 1996,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1982>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2461] Narten, T., Nordmark, E., and W. Simpson, "Neighbor [RFC2461] Narten, T., Nordmark, E., and W. Simpson, "Neighbor
Discovery for IP Version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 2461, Discovery for IP Version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 2461,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2461, December 1998, DOI 10.17487/RFC2461, December 1998,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2461>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2461>.
skipping to change at page 16, line 10 skipping to change at page 18, line 35
[RFC4941] Narten, T., Draves, R., and S. Krishnan, "Privacy [RFC4941] Narten, T., Draves, R., and S. Krishnan, "Privacy
Extensions for Stateless Address Autoconfiguration in Extensions for Stateless Address Autoconfiguration in
IPv6", RFC 4941, DOI 10.17487/RFC4941, September 2007, IPv6", RFC 4941, DOI 10.17487/RFC4941, September 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4941>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4941>.
[RFC5785] Nottingham, M. and E. Hammer-Lahav, "Defining Well-Known [RFC5785] Nottingham, M. and E. Hammer-Lahav, "Defining Well-Known
Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs)", RFC 5785, Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs)", RFC 5785,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5785, April 2010, DOI 10.17487/RFC5785, April 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5785>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5785>.
[RFC5798] Nadas, S., Ed., "Virtual Router Redundancy Protocol (VRRP)
Version 3 for IPv4 and IPv6", RFC 5798,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5798, March 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5798>.
[RFC6105] Levy-Abegnoli, E., Van de Velde, G., Popoviciu, C., and J. [RFC6105] Levy-Abegnoli, E., Van de Velde, G., Popoviciu, C., and J.
Mohacsi, "IPv6 Router Advertisement Guard", RFC 6105, Mohacsi, "IPv6 Router Advertisement Guard", RFC 6105,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6105, February 2011, DOI 10.17487/RFC6105, February 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6105>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6105>.
[RFC6296] Wasserman, M. and F. Baker, "IPv6-to-IPv6 Network Prefix
Translation", RFC 6296, DOI 10.17487/RFC6296, June 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6296>.
[RFC6724] Thaler, D., Ed., Draves, R., Matsumoto, A., and T. Chown, [RFC6724] Thaler, D., Ed., Draves, R., Matsumoto, A., and T. Chown,
"Default Address Selection for Internet Protocol Version 6 "Default Address Selection for Internet Protocol Version 6
(IPv6)", RFC 6724, DOI 10.17487/RFC6724, September 2012, (IPv6)", RFC 6724, DOI 10.17487/RFC6724, September 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6724>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6724>.
[RFC7556] Anipko, D., Ed., "Multiple Provisioning Domain [RFC7556] Anipko, D., Ed., "Multiple Provisioning Domain
Architecture", RFC 7556, DOI 10.17487/RFC7556, June 2015, Architecture", RFC 7556, DOI 10.17487/RFC7556, June 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7556>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7556>.
[RFC8028] Baker, F. and B. Carpenter, "First-Hop Router Selection by [RFC8028] Baker, F. and B. Carpenter, "First-Hop Router Selection by
skipping to change at page 18, line 27 skipping to change at page 21, line 5
dnsZones key is added back dnsZones key is added back
draft of a privacy consideration section and added that a draft of a privacy consideration section and added that a
temporary address should be used to retrieve the PvD additional temporary address should be used to retrieve the PvD additional
information information
per Bob Hinden's request: the document is now aiming at standard per Bob Hinden's request: the document is now aiming at standard
track and security considerations have been moved to the main track and security considerations have been moved to the main
section section
Appendix B. Connection monetary cost A.5. WG Document version 01
NOTE: This section is included as a request for comment on the
potential use and syntax.
The billing of a connection can be done in a lot of different ways.
The user can have a global traffic threshold per month, after which
his throughput is limited, or after which he/she pays each megabyte.
He/she can also have an unlimited access to some websites, or an
unlimited access during the weekends.
An option is to split the bill in elementary billings, which have
conditions (a start date, an end date, a destination IP address...).
The global billing is an ordered list of elementary billings. To
know the cost of a transmission, the host goes through the list, and
the first elementary billing whose the conditions are fulfilled gives
the cost. If no elementary billing conditions match the request, the
host MUST make no assumption about the cost.
B.1. Conditions
Here are the potential conditions for an elementary billing. All
conditions MUST be fulfill.
+-----------+-------------+---------------+-------------------------+
| Key | Description | Type | JSON Example |
+-----------+-------------+---------------+-------------------------+
| beginDate | Date before | ISO 8601 | "1977-04-22T06:00:00Z" |
| | which the | | |
| | billing is | | |
| | not valid | | |
| endDate | Date after | ISO 8601 | "1977-04-22T06:00:00Z" |
| | which the | | |
| | billing is | | |
| | not valid | | |
| domains | FQDNs whose | array(string) | ["deezer.com","spotify. |
| | the billing | | com"] |
| | is limited | | |
| prefixes4 | IPv4 | array(string) | ["78.40.123.182/32","78 |
| | prefixes | | .40.123.183/32"] |
| | whose the | | |
| | billing is | | |
| | limited | | |
| prefixes6 | IPv6 | array(string) | ["2a00:1450:4007:80e::2 |
| | prefixes | | 00e/64"] |
| | whose the | | |
| | billing is | | |
| | limited | | |
+-----------+-------------+---------------+-------------------------+
B.2. Price
Here are the different possibilities for the cost of an elementary
billing. A missing key means "all/unlimited/unrestricted". If the
elementary billing selected has a trafficRemaining of 0 kb, then it
means that the user has no access to the network. Actually, if the
last elementary billing has a trafficRemaining parameter, it means
that when the user will reach the threshold, he/she will not have
access to the network anymore.
+------------------+------------------+--------------+--------------+
| Key | Description | Type | JSON Example |
+------------------+------------------+--------------+--------------+
| pricePerGb | The price per | float | 2 |
| | Gigabit | (currency | |
| | | per Gb) | |
| currency | The currency | ISO 4217 | "EUR" |
| | used | | |
| throughputMax | The maximum | float (kb/s) | 100000 |
| | achievable | | |
| | throughput | | |
| trafficRemaining | The traffic | float (kB) | 12000000 |
| | remaining | | |
+------------------+------------------+--------------+--------------+
B.3. Examples
Example for a user with 20 GB per month for 40 EUR, then reach a Removing references to 'metered' and 'characteristics' keys.
threshold, and with unlimited data during weekends and to Those may be in scope of the PvD work, but this document will
example.com: focus on essential parts only.
[ Removing appendix section regarding link quality and billing
{ information.
"domains": ["example.com"]
},
{
"prefixes4": ["78.40.123.182/32","78.40.123.183/32"]
},
{
"beginDate": "2016-07-16T00:00:00Z",
"endDate": "2016-07-17T23:59:59Z",
},
{
"beginDate": "2016-06-20T00:00:00Z",
"endDate": "2016-07-19T23:59:59Z",
"trafficRemaining": 12000000
},
{
"throughputMax": 100000
}
]
If the host tries to download data from example.com, the conditions The PvD RA Option may now contain other RA options such that PvD-
of the first elementary billing are fulfilled, so the host takes this aware hosts may receive configuration information otherwise
elementary billing, finds no cost indication in it and so deduces invisible to non-PvD-aware hosts.
that it is totally free. If the host tries to exchange data with
foobar.com and the date is 2016-07-14T19:00:00Z, the conditions of
the first, second and third elementary billing are not fulfilled.
But the conditions of the fourth are. So the host takes this Clarify that the additional PvD Additional Information is not
elementary billing and sees that there is a threshold, 12 GB are intended to modify host's networking stack behavior, but rather
remaining. provide information to the Application, used to select which PvDs
must be used and provide configuration parameters to the transport
layer.
Another example for a user abroad, who has 3 GB per year abroad, and The RA option padding is used to increase the option size to the
then pay each MB: next 64 (was 32) bits boundary.
[ Better detail the Security model and Privacy considerations.
{
"beginDate": "2016-02-10T00:00:00Z",
"endDate": "2017-02-09T23:59:59Z",
"trafficRemaining": 3000000
},
{
"pricePerGb": 30,
"currency": "EUR"
}
]
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Pierre Pfister Pierre Pfister
Cisco Cisco
11 Rue Camille Desmoulins 11 Rue Camille Desmoulins
Issy-les-Moulineaux 92130 Issy-les-Moulineaux 92130
France France
Email: ppfister@cisco.com Email: ppfister@cisco.com
skipping to change at page 22, line 8 skipping to change at line 979
Email: evyncke@cisco.com Email: evyncke@cisco.com
Tommy Pauly Tommy Pauly
Apple Apple
Email: tpauly@apple.com Email: tpauly@apple.com
David Schinazi David Schinazi
Apple Apple
Email: dschinazi@apple.com Email: dschinazi@apple.com
Marcus Keane
Microsoft
Sandyford Industrial Estate
Dublin 18
Ireland
Email: Marcus.Keane@microsoft.com
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