draft-ietf-ipsecme-failure-detection-04.txt   draft-ietf-ipsecme-failure-detection-05.txt 
IPsecME Working Group Y. Nir, Ed. IPsecME Working Group Y. Nir, Ed.
Internet-Draft Check Point Internet-Draft Check Point
Intended status: Standards Track D. Wierbowski Intended status: Standards Track D. Wierbowski
Expires: August 15, 2011 IBM Expires: August 22, 2011 IBM
F. Detienne F. Detienne
P. Sethi P. Sethi
Cisco Cisco
February 11, 2011 February 18, 2011
A Quick Crash Detection Method for IKE A Quick Crash Detection Method for IKE
draft-ietf-ipsecme-failure-detection-04 draft-ietf-ipsecme-failure-detection-05
Abstract Abstract
This document describes an extension to the IKEv2 protocol that This document describes an extension to the IKEv2 protocol that
allows for faster detection of SA desynchronization using a saved allows for faster detection of SA desynchronization using a saved
token. token.
When an IPsec tunnel between two IKEv2 peers is disconnected due to a When an IPsec tunnel between two IKEv2 peers is disconnected due to a
restart of one peer, it can take as much as several minutes for the restart of one peer, it can take as much as several minutes for the
other peer to discover that the reboot has occurred, thus delaying other peer to discover that the reboot has occurred, thus delaying
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This Internet-Draft will expire on August 15, 2011. This Internet-Draft will expire on August 22, 2011.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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5.2. A Stateless Method with IP addresses . . . . . . . . . . 12 5.2. A Stateless Method with IP addresses . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.3. Token Lifetime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 5.3. Token Lifetime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6. Backup Gateways . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 6. Backup Gateways . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7. Interaction with Session Resumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 7. Interaction with Session Resumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 8. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
8.1. Who should implement this specification . . . . . . . . . 14 8.1. Who should implement this specification . . . . . . . . . 14
8.2. Response to unknown child SPI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 8.2. Response to unknown child SPI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
9.1. QCD Token Generation and Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 9.1. QCD Token Generation and Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
9.2. QCD Token Transmission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 9.2. QCD Token Transmission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
9.3. QCD Token Enumeration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 9.3. QCD Token Enumeration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
11. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 11. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
12. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 12. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
12.1. Changes from draft-ietf-ipsecme-failure-detection-03 . . 19 12.1. Changes from draft-ietf-ipsecme-failure-detection-04 . . 18
12.2. Changes from draft-ietf-ipsecme-failure-detection-02 . . 19 12.2. Changes from draft-ietf-ipsecme-failure-detection-03 . . 19
12.3. Changes from draft-ietf-ipsecme-failure-detection-01 . . 19 12.3. Changes from draft-ietf-ipsecme-failure-detection-02 . . 19
12.4. Changes from draft-ietf-ipsecme-failure-detection-00 . . 19 12.4. Changes from draft-ietf-ipsecme-failure-detection-01 . . 19
12.5. Changes from draft-nir-ike-qcd-07 . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 12.5. Changes from draft-ietf-ipsecme-failure-detection-00 . . 19
12.6. Changes from draft-nir-ike-qcd-03 and -04 . . . . . . . . 20 12.6. Changes from draft-nir-ike-qcd-07 . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
12.7. Changes from draft-nir-ike-qcd-02 . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 12.7. Changes from draft-nir-ike-qcd-03 and -04 . . . . . . . . 20
12.8. Changes from draft-nir-ike-qcd-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 12.8. Changes from draft-nir-ike-qcd-02 . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
12.9. Changes from draft-nir-ike-qcd-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 12.9. Changes from draft-nir-ike-qcd-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
12.10. Changes from draft-nir-qcr-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 12.10. Changes from draft-nir-ike-qcd-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
12.11. Changes from draft-nir-qcr-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
13.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 13.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
13.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 13.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Appendix A. The Path Not Taken . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Appendix A. The Path Not Taken . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
A.1. Initiating a new IKE SA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 A.1. Initiating a new IKE SA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
A.2. SIR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 A.2. SIR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
A.3. Birth Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 A.3. Birth Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
A.4. Reducing Liveness Check Length . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 A.4. Reducing Liveness Check Length . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
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A message like that is subject to modification, deletion and replay A message like that is subject to modification, deletion and replay
by an attacker. However, these attacks will not compromise the by an attacker. However, these attacks will not compromise the
security of either side. Modification is meaningless because a security of either side. Modification is meaningless because a
modified token is simply an invalid token. Deletion will only cause modified token is simply an invalid token. Deletion will only cause
the protocol not to work, resulting in a delay in tunnel re- the protocol not to work, resulting in a delay in tunnel re-
establishment as described in Section 2. Replay is also meaningless, establishment as described in Section 2. Replay is also meaningless,
because the IKE SA has been deleted after the first transmission. because the IKE SA has been deleted after the first transmission.
9.2. QCD Token Transmission 9.2. QCD Token Transmission
A token maker MUST NOT send a valid QCD token in an A token maker MUST NOT send a valid QCD token in an unprotected
unprotectedmessage for an existing IKE SA. message for an existing IKE SA.
This requirement is obvious and easy in the case of a single gateway. This requirement is obvious and easy in the case of a single gateway.
However, some implementations use a load balancer to divide the load However, some implementations use a load balancer to divide the load
between several physical gateways. It MUST NOT be possible even in between several physical gateways. It MUST NOT be possible even in
such a configuration to trick one gateway into sending a valid QCD such a configuration to trick one gateway into sending a valid QCD
token for an IKE SA which is valid on another gateway. This is true token for an IKE SA which is valid on another gateway. This is true
whether the attempt to trick the gateway uses the token taker's IP whether the attempt to trick the gateway uses the token taker's IP
address or a different IP address. address or a different IP address.
Because it includes the token taker's IP address in the token IPsec Failure Detection is not applicable to deployments where the
generation, the method in Section 5.2 prevents revealing the QCD QCD secret is shared by multiple gateways and the gateways cannot
token for an existing pair of IKE SPIs to an attacker who is using a assess whether the token can be legitimately sent in the clear while
different IP address. Note that the use of this method causes the another gateway may actually still own the SA's. Load balancer
tokens to be invalidated whenever the token taker's address changes. configurations typically fall in this category. In order for a load
It is also important to note that this method does not prevent balancing configuration of IPsec gateways to support this
revealing the QCD token to a man-in-the-middle attacker who is
spoofing the token taker's IP address, if that attacker is able to
direct messages to a cluster member other than the member responsible
for the IKE SA.
This document does not specify how a load-sharing configuration of
IPsec gateways would work, but in order to support this
specification, all members MUST be able to tell whether a particular specification, all members MUST be able to tell whether a particular
IKE SA is active anywhere in the cluster. One way to do it is to IKE SA is active anywhere in the cluster. One way to do it is to
synchronize a list of active IKE SPIs among all the cluster members. synchronize a list of active IKE SPIs among all the cluster members.
If an attacker can somehow access a QCD token while the SA's are Because it includes the token taker's IP address in the token
still active, this attacker will be able to tear down the sessions at generation, the method in Section 5.2 can (under certain conditions)
will. In particular, avoiding false positives is critical to the prevent revealing the QCD token for an existing pair of IKE SPIs to
security of the proposal and a token maker MUST NOT send a QCD token an attacker who is using a different IP address, even in a load-
in an unprotected message for an existing IKE SA. IPsec Failure sharing cluster without state synchronization. This method does not
Detection is thus not applicable to deployments where the QCD token prevent revealing the QCD token to an active attacker who is spoofing
is shared by multiple gateways and the gateways can not assess the token taker's IP address. Such an attacker may attempt to direct
whether the token can be legitimately sent in the clear while another messages to a cluster member other than the member responsible for
gateway may actually still own the SA's. Load balancer designs the IKE SA in an attempt to trick that gateway into sending a QCD
typically fall in this category. token for a valid IKE SA. This method should not be used unless the
load balancer guarantees that IKE packets from the same source IP
address always go to the same cluster member.
9.3. QCD Token Enumeration 9.3. QCD Token Enumeration
An attacker may try to attack QCD if the generation algorithm An attacker may try to attack QCD if the generation algorithm
described in Section 5.1 is used. The attacker will send several described in Section 5.1 is used. The attacker will send several
fake IKE requests to the gateway under attack, receiving and fake IKE requests to the gateway under attack, receiving and
recording the QCD Tokens in the responses. This will allow the recording the QCD Tokens in the responses. This will allow the
attacker to create a dictionary of IKE SPIs to QCD Tokens, which can attacker to create a dictionary of IKE SPIs to QCD Tokens, which can
later be used to tear down any IKE SA. later be used to tear down any IKE SA.
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Others who have contributed valuable comments are, in alphabetical Others who have contributed valuable comments are, in alphabetical
order, Lakshminath Dondeti, Paul Hoffman, Tero Kivinen, Scott C order, Lakshminath Dondeti, Paul Hoffman, Tero Kivinen, Scott C
Moonen, and Keith Welter. Moonen, and Keith Welter.
12. Change Log 12. Change Log
This section lists all changes in this document This section lists all changes in this document
NOTE TO RFC EDITOR : Please remove this section in the final RFC NOTE TO RFC EDITOR : Please remove this section in the final RFC
12.1. Changes from draft-ietf-ipsecme-failure-detection-03 12.1. Changes from draft-ietf-ipsecme-failure-detection-04
o Some more rephrasing of section 9.2 based on suggestions by Tero
Kivinen and Dave Wierbowski.
12.2. Changes from draft-ietf-ipsecme-failure-detection-03
o Merged section 9.4 into section 9.2. o Merged section 9.4 into section 9.2.
o Multiple typos discovered by Scott Moonen, Keith Welter and Yaron. o Multiple typos discovered by Scott Moonen, Keith Welter and Yaron.
12.2. Changes from draft-ietf-ipsecme-failure-detection-02 12.3. Changes from draft-ietf-ipsecme-failure-detection-02
o Moved section 7 to Appendix A. Also changed some wording. o Moved section 7 to Appendix A. Also changed some wording.
o Fixed some language in the "interaction with session resumption" o Fixed some language in the "interaction with session resumption"
section to say that although liveness check MUST be done, there section to say that although liveness check MUST be done, there
are no time limits to how long an implementation takes before are no time limits to how long an implementation takes before
starting liveness check, or ending it. starting liveness check, or ending it.
12.3. Changes from draft-ietf-ipsecme-failure-detection-01 12.4. Changes from draft-ietf-ipsecme-failure-detection-01
o Fixed the language requiring random IKE SPIs. o Fixed the language requiring random IKE SPIs.
o Some better explanation of the reasons to choose the methods in o Some better explanation of the reasons to choose the methods in
Section 5.2 and the method in Section 5.1, to close issue #193. Section 5.2 and the method in Section 5.1, to close issue #193.
o Added text to the beginning of Section 9 to accomodate issue #194. o Added text to the beginning of Section 9 to accomodate issue #194.
12.4. Changes from draft-ietf-ipsecme-failure-detection-00 12.5. Changes from draft-ietf-ipsecme-failure-detection-00
o Nits pointed out by Scott and Yaron. o Nits pointed out by Scott and Yaron.
o Pratima and Frederic are back on board. o Pratima and Frederic are back on board.
o Changed IKEv2bis draft reference to RFC 5996. o Changed IKEv2bis draft reference to RFC 5996.
o Resolved issues #189, #190, #191, and #192: o Resolved issues #189, #190, #191, and #192:
* Renamed section 4.5 and removed the requirement to send an * Renamed section 4.5 and removed the requirement to send an
acknowledgement for the unprotected message. acknowledgement for the unprotected message.
* Moved the QCD token from the last to the first IKE_AUTH * Moved the QCD token from the last to the first IKE_AUTH
request. request.
* Added a MUST to Section 9.3 to require that IKE SPIs be * Added a MUST to Section 9.3 to require that IKE SPIs be
randomly generated. randomly generated.
* Changed the language in Section 8.1, to not use RFC 2119 * Changed the language in Section 8.1, to not use RFC 2119
terminology. terminology.
* Moved the section describing why one would want the method * Moved the section describing why one would want the method
dependant on IP addresses (in Section 5.2 from operational dependant on IP addresses (in Section 5.2 from operational
considerations to security considerations. considerations to security considerations.
12.5. Changes from draft-nir-ike-qcd-07 12.6. Changes from draft-nir-ike-qcd-07
o First WG version. o First WG version.
o Addressed Scott C Moonen's concern about collisions of QCD tokens. o Addressed Scott C Moonen's concern about collisions of QCD tokens.
o Updated references to point to IKEv2bis instead of RFC 4306 and o Updated references to point to IKEv2bis instead of RFC 4306 and
4718. Also converted draft reference for resumption to RFC 5723. 4718. Also converted draft reference for resumption to RFC 5723.
o Added Dave Wiebrowski as author, and removed Pratima and Frederic. o Added Dave Wiebrowski as author, and removed Pratima and Frederic.
12.6. Changes from draft-nir-ike-qcd-03 and -04 12.7. Changes from draft-nir-ike-qcd-03 and -04
Mostly editorial changes and cleaning up. Mostly editorial changes and cleaning up.
12.7. Changes from draft-nir-ike-qcd-02 12.8. Changes from draft-nir-ike-qcd-02
o Described QCD token enumeration, following a question by o Described QCD token enumeration, following a question by
Lakshminath Dondeti. Lakshminath Dondeti.
o Added the ability to replace the QCD token for an existing IKE SA. o Added the ability to replace the QCD token for an existing IKE SA.
o Added tokens dependent on peer IP address and their interaction o Added tokens dependent on peer IP address and their interaction
with MOBIKE. with MOBIKE.
12.8. Changes from draft-nir-ike-qcd-01 12.9. Changes from draft-nir-ike-qcd-01
o Removed stateless method. o Removed stateless method.
o Added discussion of rekeying and resumption. o Added discussion of rekeying and resumption.
o Added discussion of non-synchronized load-balanced clusters of o Added discussion of non-synchronized load-balanced clusters of
gateways in the security considerations. gateways in the security considerations.
o Other wording fixes. o Other wording fixes.
12.9. Changes from draft-nir-ike-qcd-00 12.10. Changes from draft-nir-ike-qcd-00
o Merged proposal with draft-detienne-ikev2-recovery o Merged proposal with draft-detienne-ikev2-recovery
o Changed the protocol so that the rebooted peer generates the o Changed the protocol so that the rebooted peer generates the
token. This has the effect, that the need for persistent storage token. This has the effect, that the need for persistent storage
is eliminated. is eliminated.
o Added discussion of birth certificates. o Added discussion of birth certificates.
12.10. Changes from draft-nir-qcr-00 12.11. Changes from draft-nir-qcr-00
o Changed name to reflect that this relates to IKE. Also changed o Changed name to reflect that this relates to IKE. Also changed
from quick crash recovery to quick crash detection to avoid from quick crash recovery to quick crash detection to avoid
confusion with IFARE. confusion with IFARE.
o Added more operational considerations. o Added more operational considerations.
o Added interaction with IFARE. o Added interaction with IFARE.
o Added discussion of backup gateways. o Added discussion of backup gateways.
13. References 13. References
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