draft-ietf-ipv6-deprecate-site-local-01.txt   draft-ietf-ipv6-deprecate-site-local-02.txt 
INTERNET DRAFT C. Huitema INTERNET DRAFT C. Huitema
<draft-ietf-ipv6-deprecate-site-local-01.txt> Microsoft <draft-ietf-ipv6-deprecate-site-local-02.txt> Microsoft
October 13, 2003 B. Carpenter November 18, 2003 B. Carpenter
Expires May 13, 2004 IBM Expires June 18, 2004 IBM
Deprecating Site Local Addresses Deprecating Site Local Addresses
Status of this memo Status of this memo
This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026. all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.
This document is an Internet-Draft. Internet-Drafts are working This document is an Internet-Draft. Internet-Drafts are working
documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas,
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Site-local addresses are defined in the IPv6 addressing architecture Site-local addresses are defined in the IPv6 addressing architecture
[RFC3513], especially in section 2.5.6. [RFC3513], especially in section 2.5.6.
The remainder of this document describes the adverse effects of The remainder of this document describes the adverse effects of
site-local addresses according to the above definition, and formally site-local addresses according to the above definition, and formally
deprecates them. deprecates them.
Carpenter, Huitema. [Page 1] Carpenter, Huitema. [Page 1]
Companion documents will describe the goals of a replacement Companion documents will describe the goals of a replacement
solution [Hain/Templin] and specify a replacement solution solution and specify a replacement solution. However, the formal
[Hinden/Haberman]. However, the formal deprecation allows existing deprecation allows existing usage of site-local addresses to
usage of site-local addresses to continue until the replacement is continue until the replacement is standardized and implemented.
standardized and implemented.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2 Adverse effects of site local addresses 2 Adverse effects of site local addresses
Discussions in the IPv6 working group outlined several defects of Discussions in the IPv6 working group outlined several defects of
the current site local addressing scope. These defects fall in two the current site local addressing scope. These defects fall in two
broad categories: ambiguity of addresses, and fuzzy definition of broad categories: ambiguity of addresses, and fuzzy definition of
sites. sites.
As currently defined, site local addresses are ambiguous: an address As currently defined, site local addresses are ambiguous: an address
such as FEC0::1 can be present in multiple sites, and the address such as FEC0::1 can be present in multiple sites, and the address
itself does not contain any indication of the site to which it itself does not contain any indication of the site to which it
belongs. This creates pain for developers of applications, for the belongs. This creates pain for developers of applications, for the
designers of routers and for the network managers. This pain is designers of routers and for the network managers. This pain is
compounded by the fuzzy nature of the site concept. We will develop compounded by the fuzzy nature of the site concept. We will develop
the specific nature of this pain in the following section. the specific nature of this pain in the following section.
2.1 Developer pain 2.1 Developer pain, scope identifiers
Early feedback from developers indicates that site local addresses Early feedback from developers indicates that site local addresses
are hard to use correctly in an application. This is particularly are hard to use correctly in an application. This is particularly
true for multi-homed hosts, which can be simultaneously connected to true for multi-homed hosts, which can be simultaneously connected to
multiple sites, and for mobile hosts, which can be successively multiple sites, and for mobile hosts, which can be successively
connected to multiple sites. connected to multiple sites.
Applications would learn or remember that the address of some Applications would learn or remember that the address of some
correspondent was "FEC0::1234:5678:9ABC", they would try to feed the correspondent was "FEC0::1234:5678:9ABC", they would try to feed the
address in a socket address structure and issue a connect, and the address in a socket address structure and issue a connect, and the
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host identifier cannot be remembered in memory, or learned from a host identifier cannot be remembered in memory, or learned from a
name server. name server.
In short, the developer pain is caused by the ambiguity of site In short, the developer pain is caused by the ambiguity of site
local addresses. Since site-local addresses are ambiguous, local addresses. Since site-local addresses are ambiguous,
application developers have to manage the "site identifiers" that application developers have to manage the "site identifiers" that
qualify the addresses of the hosts. This management of identifiers qualify the addresses of the hosts. This management of identifiers
has proven hard to understand by developers, and also hard to has proven hard to understand by developers, and also hard to
execute by those developers who understand the concept. execute by those developers who understand the concept.
2.2 Manager pain, leaks 2.2 Developer pain, local addresses
Simple client/server applications that do share IP addresses at the
Carpenter, Huitema. [Page 2] Carpenter, Huitema. [Page 2]
application layer are made more complex by IPv6 site-local
addressing. These applications need to make intelligent decisions
about the addresses that should and shouldn't be passed across site
boundaries. These decisions, in practice, require that the
applications acquire some knowledge of the network topology. Site
local addresses may be used when client and server are in the same
site, but trying to use them when client and server are in different
sites may result in unexpected errors (i.e. connection reset by
peer) or the establishment of connections with the wrong node. The
robustness and security implications of sending packets to an
unexpected end-point will differ from application to application.
Multi-party applications that pass IP addresses at the application
layer present a particular challenge. Even if a node can correctly
determine whether a single remote node belongs or not to the local
site, it will have no way of knowing where those addresses may
eventually be sent. The best course of action for these
applications might be to use only global addresses. However, this
would prevent the use of these applications on isolated or
intermittently connected networks that only have site-local
addresses available, and might be incompatible with the use of site-
local addresses for access control in some cases.
In summary, the ambiguity of site local addresses leads to
unexpected application behavior when application payloads carry
these addresses outside the local site.
2.3 Manager pain, leaks
The management of IPv6 site local addresses is in many ways similar The management of IPv6 site local addresses is in many ways similar
to the management of RFC 1918 [RFC1918] addresses in some IPv4 to the management of RFC 1918 [RFC1918] addresses in some IPv4
networks. In theory, the private addresses defined in RFC 1918 networks. In theory, the private addresses defined in RFC 1918
should only be used locally, and should never appear in the should only be used locally, and should never appear in the
Internet. In practice, these addresses "leak". The conjunction of Internet. In practice, these addresses "leak". The conjunction of
leaks and ambiguity ends up causing management problems. leaks and ambiguity ends up causing management problems.
Names and literal addresses of "private" hosts leak in mail Names and literal addresses of "private" hosts leak in mail
messages, web pages, or files. Private addresses end up being used messages, web pages, or files. Private addresses end up being used
as source or destination of TCP requests or UDP messages, for as source or destination of TCP requests or UDP messages, for
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The experience with RFC1918 addresses also shows some non trivial The experience with RFC1918 addresses also shows some non trivial
leaks, besides pacing these addresses in IP headers. Private leaks, besides pacing these addresses in IP headers. Private
addresses also end up being used as targets of reverse DNS queries addresses also end up being used as targets of reverse DNS queries
for RFC1918, uselessly overloading the DNS infrastructure. In for RFC1918, uselessly overloading the DNS infrastructure. In
general, many applications that use IP addresses directly end up general, many applications that use IP addresses directly end up
passing RFC1918 addresses in application payloads, creating passing RFC1918 addresses in application payloads, creating
confusion and failures. confusion and failures.
The leakage issue is largely unavoidable. While some applications The leakage issue is largely unavoidable. While some applications
are intrinsically scoped (eg. Router Advertisement, Neighbor are intrinsically scoped (eg. Router Advertisement, Neighbor
Carpenter, Huitema. [Page 3]
Discovery), most applications have no concept of scope, and no way Discovery), most applications have no concept of scope, and no way
of expressing scope. As a result, "stuff leaks across the borders". of expressing scope. As a result, "stuff leaks across the borders".
Since the addresses are ambiguous, the network managers cannot Since the addresses are ambiguous, the network managers cannot
easily find out "who did it". Leaks are thus hard to fix, resulting easily find out "who did it". Leaks are thus hard to fix, resulting
in a lot of frustration. in a lot of frustration.
2.3 Router pain, routing tables 2.4 Router pain, routing tables
The ambiguity of site local addresses also creates problems for the The ambiguity of site local addresses also creates problems for the
routers. In theory, site local addresses are only used within a routers. In theory, site local addresses are only used within a
contiguous site, and all routers in that site can treat them as if contiguous site, and all routers in that site can treat them as if
they were not ambiguous. In practice, problem occurs when sites are they were not ambiguous. In practice, problem occurs when sites are
disjoint, or when routers have to handle several sites. disjoint, or when routers have to handle several sites.
In theory, sites should never be disjoint. In practice, if site In theory, sites should never be disjoint. In practice, if site
local addressing is used throughout a large network, some elements local addressing is used throughout a large network, some elements
of the site will not be directly connected. This will create a of the site will not be directly connected. This will create a
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techniques, or the use of multi-sited routers, or both. techniques, or the use of multi-sited routers, or both.
Ambiguous addresses have fairly obvious consequences on multi-sited Ambiguous addresses have fairly obvious consequences on multi-sited
routers. In classic router architecture, the exit interface is a routers. In classic router architecture, the exit interface is a
direct function of the destination address, as specified by a single direct function of the destination address, as specified by a single
routing table. However, if a router is connected to multiple sites, routing table. However, if a router is connected to multiple sites,
the routing of site local packets depends on the interface on which the routing of site local packets depends on the interface on which
the packet arrived. Interfaces have to be associated to sites, and the packet arrived. Interfaces have to be associated to sites, and
the routing entries for the site local addresses are site-dependent. the routing entries for the site local addresses are site-dependent.
The route management software and the routing protocols have to The route management software and the routing protocols have to
Carpenter, Huitema. [Page 3]
account for the site boundaries. This can be particularly hard to do account for the site boundaries. This can be particularly hard to do
when sites are adjacent or overlap. when sites are adjacent or overlap.
In multi-homed routers, such as for example site border routers, the In multi-homed routers, such as for example site border routers, the
routing process should be complemented by a filtering process, to routing process should be complemented by a filtering process, to
guarantee that packets sourced with a site local address never leave guarantee that packets sourced with a site local address never leave
the site. This filtering process will in turn interact with the the site. This filtering process will in turn interact with the
routing of packets, as it may cause the drop of packets sent to a routing of packets, as it may cause the drop of packets sent to a
global address, even if that global address happen to belong to the global address, even if that global address happen to belong to the
target site. target site.
In summary, the ambiguity of site local addresses makes them hard to In summary, the ambiguity of site local addresses makes them hard to
manage in multi-sited routers, while the requirement to support manage in multi-sited routers, while the requirement to support
disjoint sites creates a demand for such routers. disjoint sites creates a demand for such routers.
2.4 Site is an ill-defined concept 2.5 Site is an ill-defined concept
The current definition of scopes follows an idealized "concentric The current definition of scopes follows an idealized "concentric
scopes" model. Hosts are supposed to be attached to a link, which scopes" model. Hosts are supposed to be attached to a link, which
belongs to a site, which belongs to the Internet. Packets could be belongs to a site, which belongs to the Internet. Packets could be
sent to the same link, the same site, or outside that site. However, sent to the same link, the same site, or outside that site. However,
experts have been arguing about the definition of sites for years experts have been arguing about the definition of sites for years
and have reached no sort of consensus. That suggests that there is and have reached no sort of consensus. That suggests that there is
Carpenter, Huitema. [Page 4]
in fact no consensus to be reached. in fact no consensus to be reached.
Apart from link-local, scope boundaries are ill-defined. What is a Apart from link-local, scope boundaries are ill-defined. What is a
site? Is the whole of a corporate network a site, or are sites site? Is the whole of a corporate network a site, or are sites
limited to single geographic locations? Many networks today are limited to single geographic locations? Many networks today are
split between an internal area and an outside facing "DMZ", split between an internal area and an outside facing "DMZ",
separated by a firewall. Servers in the DMZ are supposedly separated by a firewall. Servers in the DMZ are supposedly
accessible by both the internal hosts and external hosts on the accessible by both the internal hosts and external hosts on the
Internet. Does the DMZ belong to the same site as the internal host? Internet. Does the DMZ belong to the same site as the internal host?
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splits, etc. Specifically, this means that scope *cannot* be mapped splits, etc. Specifically, this means that scope *cannot* be mapped
into concentric circles such as a naive link/local/global model. into concentric circles such as a naive link/local/global model.
Scopes overlap and extend into one another. The scope relationship Scopes overlap and extend into one another. The scope relationship
between two hosts may even be different for different protocols. between two hosts may even be different for different protocols.
In summary, the current concept of site is naive, and does not map In summary, the current concept of site is naive, and does not map
operational requirements. operational requirements.
3 Development of a better alternative 3 Development of a better alternative
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The previous section reviewed the arguments against site-local The previous section reviewed the arguments against site-local
addresses. Obviously, site locals also have some benefits, without addresses. Obviously, site locals also have some benefits, without
which they would have been removed from the specification long ago. which they would have been removed from the specification long ago.
The perceived benefits of site local are that they are simple, The perceived benefits of site local are that they are simple,
stable, and private [Hain/Templin]. However, it appears that these stable, and private. However, it appears that these benefits can be
benefits can be also obtained with an alternative architecture, for also obtained with an alternative architecture, for example
example [Hinden/Haberman], in which addresses are not ambiguous and [Hinden/Haberman], in which addresses are not ambiguous and do not
do not have a simple explicit scope. have a simple explicit scope.
Having non-ambiguous address solves a large part of the developers' Having non-ambiguous address solves a large part of the developers'
pain, as it removes the need to manage site identifiers. The pain, as it removes the need to manage site identifiers. The
application can use the addresses as if they were regular global application can use the addresses as if they were regular global
addresses, and the stack will be able to use standard techniques to addresses, and the stack will be able to use standard techniques to
discover which interface should be used. Some level of pain will discover which interface should be used. Some level of pain will
remain, as these addresses will not always be reachable; however, remain, as these addresses will not always be reachable; however,
applications can deal with the un-reachability issues by trying applications can deal with the un-reachability issues by trying
connections at a different time, or with a different address. connections at a different time, or with a different address.
Speculatively, a more sophisticated scope mechanism might be Speculatively, a more sophisticated scope mechanism might be
introduced at a later date. introduced at a later date.
Having non ambiguous addresses will not eliminate the leaks that Having non ambiguous addresses will not eliminate the leaks that
cause management pain. However, since the addresses are not cause management pain. However, since the addresses are not
Carpenter, Huitema. [Page 5]
ambiguous, debugging these leaks will be much simpler. ambiguous, debugging these leaks will be much simpler.
Having non ambiguous addresses will solve a large part of the router Having non ambiguous addresses will solve a large part of the router
issues: since addresses are not ambiguous, routers will be able to issues: since addresses are not ambiguous, routers will be able to
use standard routing techniques, and will not need different routing use standard routing techniques, and will not need different routing
tables for each interface. Some of the pain will remain at border tables for each interface. Some of the pain will remain at border
routers, which will need to filter packets from some ranges of routers, which will need to filter packets from some ranges of
source addresses; this is however a fairly common function. source addresses; this is however a fairly common function.
Avoiding the explicit declaration of scope will remove the issues Avoiding the explicit declaration of scope will remove the issues
linked to the ambiguity of the site concept. Non-reachability can be linked to the ambiguity of the site concept. Non-reachability can be
obtained by using "firewalls" where appropriate. The firewall rules obtained by using "firewalls" where appropriate. The firewall rules
can explicitly accommodate various network configurations, by can explicitly accommodate various network configurations, by
accepting of refusing traffic to and from ranges of the new non- accepting of refusing traffic to and from ranges of the new non-
ambiguous addresses. ambiguous addresses.
One question remains, anycast addressing. Anycast addresses are One question remains, anycast addressing. Anycast addresses are
ambiguous by construction, since they refer by definition to any ambiguous by construction, since they refer by definition to any
host that has been assigned a given anycast address. Link-local or host that has been assigned a given anycast address. Link-local or
global anycast addresses can be"baked in the code". Further study is global anycast addresses can be "baked in the code". Further study
required on the need for anycast addresses with scope between link- is required on the need for anycast addresses with scope between
local and global. link-local and global.
4 Deprecation 4 Deprecation
This document formally deprecates the IPv6 site-local unicast prefix This document formally deprecates the IPv6 site-local unicast prefix
defined in [RFC3513], i.e. 1111111011 binary or FEC0::/10. The defined in [RFC3513], i.e. 1111111011 binary or FEC0::/10. The
special behavior of this prefix MUST no longer be supported in new special behavior of this prefix MUST no longer be supported in new
implementations. The prefix MUST NOT be reassigned for other use implementations. The prefix MUST NOT be reassigned for other use
Carpenter, Huitema. [Page 5]
except by a future IETF standards action. Future versions of the except by a future IETF standards action. Future versions of the
addressing architecture [RFC3513] will include this information. addressing architecture [RFC3513] will include this information.
However, router implementations SHOULD be configured to prevent However, router implementations SHOULD be configured to prevent
routing of this prefix by default. routing of this prefix by default.
The references to site local addresses should be removed as soon as
practical from the revision of the Default Address Selection for
Internet Protocol version 6 [RFC3484], the revision of the Basic
Socket Interface Extensions for IPv6 [RFC3493], and from the
revision of the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Addressing
Architecture [RFC3513]. Incidental references to site local
addresses should be removed from other IETF documents if and when
they are updated. These documents include [RFC2772, RFC2894,
RFC3082, RFC3111, RFC3142, RFC3177, RFC3316].
Existing implementations and deployments MAY continue to use this Existing implementations and deployments MAY continue to use this
prefix. prefix.
5 Security Considerations 5 Security Considerations
The site-local unicast prefix allows for some blocking action in The site-local unicast prefix allows for some blocking action in
firewall rules and address selection rules, which are commonly firewall rules and address selection rules, which are commonly
Carpenter, Huitema. [Page 6]
viewed as a security feature since they prevent packets crossing viewed as a security feature since they prevent packets crossing
administrative boundaries. Such blocking rules can be configured for administrative boundaries. Such blocking rules can be configured for
any prefix, including the expected future replacement for the site- any prefix, including the expected future replacement for the site-
local prefix. If these blocking rules are actually enforced, the local prefix. If these blocking rules are actually enforced, the
deprecation of the site-local prefix does not endanger security. deprecation of the site-local prefix does not endanger security.
6 IANA Considerations 6 IANA Considerations
IANA is specifically requested not to reassign the 1111111011 binary IANA is specifically requested not to reassign the 1111111011 binary
or FEC0::/10 prefix unless requested to do so by a future IETF or FEC0::/10 prefix unless requested to do so by a future IETF
standards action. standards action.
7 Copyright 7 Copyright
The following copyright notice is copied from RFC 2026 [Bradner, The following copyright notice is copied from RFC 2026 [Bradner,
1996], Section 10.4, and describes the applicable copyright for this 1996], Section 10.4, and describes the applicable copyright for this
document. document.
Copyright (C) The Internet Society October 10, 2003. All Rights Copyright (C) The Internet Society November 14, 2003. All Rights
Reserved. Reserved.
This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph
are included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this are included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this
document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of
developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for
copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be
followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than
English. English.
The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assignees. revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assignees.
This document and the information contained herein is provided on an This document and the information contained herein is provided on an
Carpenter, Huitema. [Page 6]
"AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING
TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION
HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
8 Intellectual Property 8 Intellectual Property
The following notice is copied from RFC 2026 [Bradner, 1996], The following notice is copied from RFC 2026 [Bradner, 1996],
Section 10.4, and describes the position of the IETF concerning Section 10.4, and describes the position of the IETF concerning
intellectual property claims made against this document. intellectual property claims made against this document.
The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
Carpenter, Huitema. [Page 7]
intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to
pertain to the implementation or use other technology described in pertain to the implementation or use other technology described in
this document or the extent to which any license under such rights this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
might or might not be available; neither does it represent that it might or might not be available; neither does it represent that it
has made any effort to identify any such rights. Information on the has made any effort to identify any such rights. Information on the
IETF's procedures with respect to rights in standards-track and IETF's procedures with respect to rights in standards-track and
standards-related documentation can be found in BCP-11. Copies of standards-related documentation can be found in BCP-11. Copies of
claims of rights made available for publication and any assurances claims of rights made available for publication and any assurances
of licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made of licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made
to obtain a general license or permission for the use of such to obtain a general license or permission for the use of such
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The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
rights which may cover technology that may be required to practice rights which may cover technology that may be required to practice
this standard. Please address the information to the IETF Executive this standard. Please address the information to the IETF Executive
Director. Director.
9 Acknowledgements 9 Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Fred Templin, Peter Bieringer, The authors would like to thank Fred Templin, Peter Bieringer,
Chirayu Patel, Pekka Savola, and Alain Baudot for their review of Chirayu Patel, Pekka Savola, and Alain Baudot for their review of
the initial draft. the initial draft. The text of section 2.2 includes 2 paragraphs
taken from a draft by Margaret Wasserman describing the impact of
site local addressing. Alain Durand pointed out the need to revise
existing RFC that make reference to site local addresses.
10 References 10 References
Normative References Normative References
[RFC3513] Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing [RFC3513] Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing
Architecture", RFC 3513, April 2003 Architecture", RFC 3513, April 2003
[RFC2119] S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, March 1997.
Informative references Informative references
[RFC1918] Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, B., Karrenberg, D., de Groot, G. [RFC1918] Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, B., Karrenberg, D., de Groot, G.
J. and E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets", RFC J. and E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets", RFC
Carpenter, Huitema. [Page 7]
1918, February 1996 1918, February 1996
[Hain/Templin] Hain, T. and F. Templin, "Addressing Requirements for
Local Communications within Sites", work in progress.
[Hinden/Haberman] Hinden, R. and B. Haberman, "Unique Local IPv6 [Hinden/Haberman] Hinden, R. and B. Haberman, "Unique Local IPv6
Unicast Addresses", work in progress. Unicast Addresses", work in progress.
[RFC2772] Rockell, R. and R. Fink. "6Bone Backbone Routing
Guidelines." RFC 2772, February 2000.
[RFC2894] M. Crawford. "Router Renumbering for IPv6." RFC 2894,
August 2000.
Carpenter, Huitema. [Page 8]
[RFC3082] Kempf, J. and J. Goldschmidt. "Notification and
Subscription for SLP." RFC 3082, March 2001.
[RFC3111] E. Guttman. "Service Location Protocol Modifications for
IPv6." RFC 3111, May 2001.
[RFC3142] Hagino, J. and K. Yamamoto. "An IPv6-to-IPv4 Transport
Relay Translator." RFC 3142, June 2001.
[RFC3177] IAB, IESG. "IAB/IESG Recommendations on IPv6 Address." RFC
3177, September 2001.
[RFC3316] Arkko, J., Kuijpers, G., Soliman, H., Loughney, J. and J.
Wiljakka. "Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) for Some Second and
Third Generation Cellular Hosts." RFC 3316, April 2003.
[RFC3484] R. Draves. "Default Address Selection for Internet
Protocol version 6 (IPv6)." RFC 3484, February 2003.
[RFC3493] Gilligan, R., Thomson, S., Bound, J., McCann, J. and W.
Stevens. "Basic Socket Interface Extensions for IPv6." RFC 3493,
February 2003.
[RFC3513] Hinden, R. and S. Deering. "Internet Protocol Version 6
(IPv6) Addressing Architecture." RFC 3513, April 2003.
11 Authors' Addresses 11 Authors' Addresses
Christian Huitema Christian Huitema
Microsoft Corporation Microsoft Corporation
One Microsoft Way One Microsoft Way
Redmond, WA 98052-6399 Redmond, WA 98052-6399
USA USA
Email: huitema@microsoft.com Email: huitema@microsoft.com
Brian Carpenter Brian Carpenter
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Email: brc@zurich.ibm.com Email: brc@zurich.ibm.com
12 History of changes 12 History of changes
12.1 Changes from draft-00 to draft-01 12.1 Changes from draft-00 to draft-01
Changed the text in the introduction to say that the decision was Changed the text in the introduction to say that the decision was
"confirmed" in July 2003. "confirmed" in July 2003.
Add some explanatory text in section 2.2, address leak, and section Add some explanatory text in section 2.2, address leak, and section
Carpenter, Huitema. [Page 9]
2.3, routing pain. 2.3, routing pain.
In section 4, and 5 change the erroneous "link local" to "site In section 4, and 5 change the erroneous "link local" to "site
local". local".
Add a reference to RFC 2119 describing the use of keywords. Add a reference to RFC 2119 describing the use of keywords.
In section 5, qualify that the replacement of site local is only as In section 5, qualify that the replacement of site local is only as
secure if blocking rules are actually implemented at site secure if blocking rules are actually implemented at site
boundaries. boundaries.
Carpenter, Huitema. [Page 8] 12.2 Changes from draft-01 to draft-02
Carpenter, Huitema. [Page 9] Inserted a new section "2.2 Developer pain, local addresses" to
capture the pain caused by ambiguous addresses carried in
application payloads.
Added a paragraph in section 4 recommending the removal of
references to site local addresses from several RFC. Added these RFC
to the Reference section.
Removed the reference to the draft "Addressing Requirements for
Local Communications within Sites", in order to avoid references to
drafts that may slow down document publication.
Table of Contents: Table of Contents:
1 Introduction .................................................... 1 1 Introduction .................................................... 1
2 Adverse effects of site local addresses ......................... 2 2 Adverse effects of site local addresses ......................... 2
2.1 Developer pain ................................................ 2 2.1 Developer pain, scope identifiers ............................. 2
2.2 Manager pain, leaks ........................................... 2 2.2 Developer pain, local addresses ............................... 2
2.3 Router pain, routing tables ................................... 3 2.3 Manager pain, leaks ........................................... 3
2.4 Site is an ill-defined concept ................................ 4 2.4 Router pain, routing tables ................................... 4
3 Development of a better alternative ............................. 4 2.5 Site is an ill-defined concept ................................ 4
4 Deprecation ..................................................... 5 3 Development of a better alternative ............................. 5
4 Deprecation ..................................................... 6
5 Security Considerations ......................................... 6 5 Security Considerations ......................................... 6
6 IANA Considerations ............................................. 6 6 IANA Considerations ............................................. 7
7 Copyright ....................................................... 6 7 Copyright ....................................................... 7
8 Intellectual Property ........................................... 7 8 Intellectual Property ........................................... 7
9 Acknowledgements ................................................ 7 9 Acknowledgements ................................................ 8
10 References ..................................................... 7 10 References ..................................................... 8
11 Authors' Addresses ............................................. 8 11 Authors' Addresses ............................................. 9
12 History of changes ............................................. 8 12 History of changes ............................................. 9
12.1 Changes from draft-00 to draft-01 ............................ 8 12.1 Changes from draft-00 to draft-01 ............................ 9
12.2 Changes from draft-01 to draft-02 ............................ 10
 End of changes. 

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