draft-ietf-jose-json-web-signature-08.txt   draft-ietf-jose-json-web-signature-09.txt 
JOSE Working Group M. Jones JOSE Working Group M. Jones
Internet-Draft Microsoft Internet-Draft Microsoft
Intended status: Standards Track J. Bradley Intended status: Standards Track J. Bradley
Expires: June 30, 2013 Ping Identity Expires: October 25, 2013 Ping Identity
N. Sakimura N. Sakimura
NRI NRI
December 27, 2012 April 23, 2013
JSON Web Signature (JWS) JSON Web Signature (JWS)
draft-ietf-jose-json-web-signature-08 draft-ietf-jose-json-web-signature-09
Abstract Abstract
JSON Web Signature (JWS) is a means of representing content secured JSON Web Signature (JWS) is a means of representing content secured
with digital signatures or Message Authentication Codes (MACs) using with digital signatures or Message Authentication Codes (MACs) using
JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) data structures. Cryptographic JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) data structures. Cryptographic
algorithms and identifiers for use with this specification are algorithms and identifiers for use with this specification are
described in the separate JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) specification. described in the separate JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) specification.
Related encryption capabilities are described in the separate JSON Related encryption capabilities are described in the separate JSON
Web Encryption (JWE) specification. Web Encryption (JWE) specification.
skipping to change at page 1, line 39 skipping to change at page 1, line 39
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Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.1. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.1. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. JSON Web Signature (JWS) Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3. JSON Web Signature (JWS) Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1. Example JWS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.1. Example JWS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. JWS Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4. JWS Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1. Reserved Header Parameter Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4.1. Reserved Header Parameter Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.1.1. "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . . 7 4.1.1. "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.1.2. "jku" (JWK Set URL) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . 8 4.1.2. "jku" (JWK Set URL) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . 8
4.1.3. "jwk" (JSON Web Key) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . 8 4.1.3. "jwk" (JSON Web Key) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . 9
4.1.4. "x5u" (X.509 URL) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . . 8 4.1.4. "x5u" (X.509 URL) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.1.5. "x5t" (X.509 Certificate Thumbprint) Header 4.1.5. "x5t" (X.509 Certificate Thumbprint) Header
Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.1.6. "x5c" (X.509 Certificate Chain) Header Parameter . . . 9 4.1.6. "x5c" (X.509 Certificate Chain) Header Parameter . . . 9
4.1.7. "kid" (Key ID) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4.1.7. "kid" (Key ID) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.1.8. "typ" (Type) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4.1.8. "typ" (Type) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.1.9. "cty" (Content Type) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . 10 4.1.9. "cty" (Content Type) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . 10
4.2. Public Header Parameter Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 4.1.10. "crit" (Critical) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.3. Private Header Parameter Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 4.2. Public Header Parameter Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5. Producing and Consuming JWSs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 4.3. Private Header Parameter Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.1. Message Signing or MACing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 5. Producing and Consuming JWSs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.2. Message Signature or MAC Validation . . . . . . . . . . . 11 5.1. Message Signing or MACing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.3. String Comparison Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 5.2. Message Signature or MAC Validation . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6. Securing JWSs with Cryptographic Algorithms . . . . . . . . . 13 5.3. String Comparison Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 6. Securing JWSs with Cryptographic Algorithms . . . . . . . . . 14
7.1. JSON Web Signature and Encryption Header Parameters 7. JSON Serialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 7.1. Example JWS-JS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7.1.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 8. Implementation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7.1.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7.2. JSON Web Signature and Encryption Type Values Registry . . 15 9.1. JSON Web Signature and Encryption Header Parameters
7.2.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7.2.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 9.1.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
7.3. Media Type Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 9.1.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
7.3.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 9.2. JSON Web Signature and Encryption Type Values Registry . . 19
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 9.2.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
8.1. Cryptographic Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . 17 9.2.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
8.2. JSON Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 9.3. Media Type Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
8.3. Unicode Comparison Security Considerations . . . . . . . . 18 9.3.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 10.1. Cryptographic Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . 21
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 10.2. JSON Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Appendix A. JWS Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 10.3. Unicode Comparison Security Considerations . . . . . . . . 23
A.1. JWS using HMAC SHA-256 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
A.1.1. Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
A.1.2. Decoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
A.1.3. Validating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Appendix A. JWS Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
A.2. JWS using RSA SHA-256 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 A.1. Example JWS using HMAC SHA-256 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
A.2.1. Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 A.1.1. Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
A.2.2. Decoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 A.1.2. Decoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
A.2.3. Validating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 A.1.3. Validating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
A.3. JWS using ECDSA P-256 SHA-256 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 A.2. Example JWS using RSA SHA-256 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
A.3.1. Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 A.2.1. Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
A.3.2. Decoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 A.2.2. Decoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
A.3.3. Validating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 A.2.3. Validating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
A.4. JWS using ECDSA P-521 SHA-512 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 A.3. Example JWS using ECDSA P-256 SHA-256 . . . . . . . . . . 33
A.4.1. Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 A.3.1. Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
A.4.2. Decoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 A.3.2. Decoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
A.4.3. Validating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 A.3.3. Validating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
A.5. Example Plaintext JWS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 A.4. Example JWS using ECDSA P-521 SHA-512 . . . . . . . . . . 36
Appendix B. "x5c" (X.509 Certificate Chain) Example . . . . . . . 33 A.4.1. Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
A.4.2. Decoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
A.4.3. Validating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
A.5. Example Plaintext JWS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Appendix B. "x5c" (X.509 Certificate Chain) Example . . . . . . . 40
Appendix C. Notes on implementing base64url encoding without Appendix C. Notes on implementing base64url encoding without
padding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 padding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Appendix D. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 Appendix D. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Appendix E. Open Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Appendix E. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Appendix F. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
JSON Web Signature (JWS) is a compact format for representing content JSON Web Signature (JWS) is a compact format for representing content
secured with digital signatures or Message Authentication Codes secured with digital signatures or Message Authentication Codes
(MACs) intended for space constrained environments such as HTTP (MACs) intended for space constrained environments such as HTTP
Authorization headers and URI query parameters. It represents this Authorization headers and URI query parameters. It represents this
content using JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) [RFC4627] based data content using JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) [RFC4627] based data
structures. The JWS cryptographic mechanisms provide integrity structures. The JWS cryptographic mechanisms provide integrity
protection for arbitrary sequences of bytes. protection for arbitrary sequences of octets.
Cryptographic algorithms and identifiers for use with this Cryptographic algorithms and identifiers for use with this
specification are described in the separate JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) specification are described in the separate JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)
[JWA] specification. Related encryption capabilities are described [JWA] specification. Related encryption capabilities are described
in the separate JSON Web Encryption (JWE) [JWE] specification. in the separate JSON Web Encryption (JWE) [JWE] specification.
1.1. Notational Conventions 1.1. Notational Conventions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in Key words for use in document are to be interpreted as described in Key words for use in
RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels [RFC2119]. RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels [RFC2119].
2. Terminology 2. Terminology
JSON Web Signature (JWS) A data structure representing a digitally JSON Web Signature (JWS) A data structure representing a digitally
signed or MACed message. The structure consists of three parts: signed or MACed message. The structure represents three values:
the JWS Header, the JWS Payload, and the JWS Signature value. the JWS Header, the JWS Payload, and the JWS Signature.
JSON Text Object A UTF-8 encoded text string representing a JSON JSON Text Object A UTF-8 [RFC3629] encoded text string representing
object; the syntax of JSON objects is defined in Section 2.2 of a JSON object; the syntax of JSON objects is defined in Section
[RFC4627]. 2.2 of [RFC4627].
JWS Header A JSON Text Object that describes the digital signature JWS Header A JSON Text Object that describes the digital signature
or MAC operation applied to create the JWS Signature value. or MAC operation applied to create the JWS Signature value.
JWS Payload The bytes to be secured -- a.k.a., the message. The JWS Payload The sequence of octets to be secured -- a.k.a., the
payload can contain an arbitrary sequence of bytes. message. The payload can contain an arbitrary sequence of octets.
JWS Signature A byte array containing the cryptographic material JWS Signature A sequence of octets containing the cryptographic
that secures the JWS Header and the JWS Payload. material that ensures the integrity of the JWS Header and the JWS
Payload. The JWS Signature value is a digital signature or MAC
value calculated over the JWS Signing Input using the parameters
specified in the JWS Header.
Base64url Encoding The URL- and filename-safe Base64 encoding Base64url Encoding The URL- and filename-safe Base64 encoding
described in RFC 4648 [RFC4648], Section 5, with the (non URL- described in RFC 4648 [RFC4648], Section 5, with the (non URL-
safe) '=' padding characters omitted, as permitted by Section 3.2. safe) '=' padding characters omitted, as permitted by Section 3.2.
(See Appendix C for notes on implementing base64url encoding (See Appendix C for notes on implementing base64url encoding
without padding.) without padding.)
Encoded JWS Header Base64url encoding of the JWS Header. Encoded JWS Header Base64url encoding of the JWS Header.
Encoded JWS Payload Base64url encoding of the JWS Payload. Encoded JWS Payload Base64url encoding of the JWS Payload.
Encoded JWS Signature Base64url encoding of the JWS Signature. Encoded JWS Signature Base64url encoding of the JWS Signature.
JWS Secured Input The concatenation of the Encoded JWS Header, a JWS Signing Input The concatenation of the Encoded JWS Header, a
period ('.') character, and the Encoded JWS Payload. period ('.') character, and the Encoded JWS Payload.
Header Parameter Name The name of a member of the JWS Header. Header Parameter Name The name of a member of the JWS Header.
Header Parameter Value The value of a member of the JWS Header. Header Parameter Value The value of a member of the JWS Header.
JWS Compact Serialization A representation of the JWS as the JWS Compact Serialization A representation of the JWS as the
concatenation of the Encoded JWS Header, the Encoded JWS Payload, concatenation of the Encoded JWS Header, the Encoded JWS Payload,
and the Encoded JWS Signature in that order, with the three and the Encoded JWS Signature in that order, with the three
strings being separated by two period ('.') characters. strings being separated by two period ('.') characters. This
results in a compact, URL-safe representation.
JWS JSON Serialization A representation of the JWS as a JSON
structure containing Encoded JWS Header, Encoded JWS Payload, and
Encoded JWS Signature values. Unlike the JWS Compact
Serialization, the JWS JSON Serialization enables multiple digital
signatures and/or MACs to be applied to the same content. This
representation is neither compact nor URL-safe.
Collision Resistant Namespace A namespace that allows names to be Collision Resistant Namespace A namespace that allows names to be
allocated in a manner such that they are highly unlikely to allocated in a manner such that they are highly unlikely to
collide with other names. For instance, collision resistance can collide with other names. For instance, collision resistance can
be achieved through administrative delegation of portions of the be achieved through administrative delegation of portions of the
namespace or through use of collision-resistant name allocation namespace or through use of collision-resistant name allocation
functions. Examples of Collision Resistant Namespaces include: functions. Examples of Collision Resistant Namespaces include:
Domain Names, Object Identifiers (OIDs) as defined in the ITU-T Domain Names, Object Identifiers (OIDs) as defined in the ITU-T
X.660 and X.670 Recommendation series, and Universally Unique X.660 and X.670 Recommendation series, and Universally Unique
IDentifiers (UUIDs) [RFC4122]. When using an administratively IDentifiers (UUIDs) [RFC4122]. When using an administratively
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StringOrURI A JSON string value, with the additional requirement StringOrURI A JSON string value, with the additional requirement
that while arbitrary string values MAY be used, any value that while arbitrary string values MAY be used, any value
containing a ":" character MUST be a URI [RFC3986]. StringOrURI containing a ":" character MUST be a URI [RFC3986]. StringOrURI
values are compared as case-sensitive strings with no values are compared as case-sensitive strings with no
transformations or canonicalizations applied. transformations or canonicalizations applied.
3. JSON Web Signature (JWS) Overview 3. JSON Web Signature (JWS) Overview
JWS represents digitally signed or MACed content using JSON data JWS represents digitally signed or MACed content using JSON data
structures and base64url encoding. The representation consists of structures and base64url encoding. Three values are represented in a
three parts: the JWS Header, the JWS Payload, and the JWS Signature. JWS: the JWS Header, the JWS Payload, and the JWS Signature. In the
In the Compact Serialization, the three parts are base64url-encoded Compact Serialization, the three values are base64url-encoded for
for transmission, and represented as the concatenation of the encoded transmission, and represented as the concatenation of the encoded
strings in that order, with the three strings being separated by two strings in that order, with the three strings being separated by two
period ('.') characters. (A JSON Serialization for this information period ('.') characters. A JSON Serialization for this information
is defined in the separate JSON Web Signature JSON Serialization is also defined in Section 7.
(JWS-JS) [JWS-JS] specification.)
The JWS Header describes the signature or MAC method and parameters The JWS Header describes the signature or MAC method and parameters
employed. The JWS Payload is the message content to be secured. The employed. The JWS Payload is the message content to be secured. The
JWS Signature ensures the integrity of both the JWS Header and the JWS Signature ensures the integrity of both the JWS Header and the
JWS Payload. JWS Payload.
3.1. Example JWS 3.1. Example JWS
The following example JWS Header declares that the encoded object is The following example JWS Header declares that the encoded object is
a JSON Web Token (JWT) [JWT] and the JWS Header and the JWS Payload a JSON Web Token (JWT) [JWT] and the JWS Header and the JWS Payload
are secured using the HMAC SHA-256 algorithm: are secured using the HMAC SHA-256 algorithm:
{"typ":"JWT", {"typ":"JWT",
"alg":"HS256"} "alg":"HS256"}
Base64url encoding the bytes of the UTF-8 representation of the JWS Base64url encoding the octets of the UTF-8 representation of the JWS
Header yields this Encoded JWS Header value: Header yields this Encoded JWS Header value:
eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLA0KICJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9 eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLA0KICJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9
The following is an example of a JSON object that can be used as a The following is an example of a JSON object that can be used as a
JWS Payload. (Note that the payload can be any content, and need not JWS Payload. (Note that the payload can be any content, and need not
be a representation of a JSON object.) be a representation of a JSON object.)
{"iss":"joe", {"iss":"joe",
"exp":1300819380, "exp":1300819380,
"http://example.com/is_root":true} "http://example.com/is_root":true}
Base64url encoding the bytes of the UTF-8 representation of the JSON Base64url encoding the octets of the UTF-8 representation of the JSON
object yields the following Encoded JWS Payload (with line breaks for object yields the following Encoded JWS Payload (with line breaks for
display purposes only): display purposes only):
eyJpc3MiOiJqb2UiLA0KICJleHAiOjEzMDA4MTkzODAsDQogImh0dHA6Ly9leGFt eyJpc3MiOiJqb2UiLA0KICJleHAiOjEzMDA4MTkzODAsDQogImh0dHA6Ly9leGFt
cGxlLmNvbS9pc19yb290Ijp0cnVlfQ cGxlLmNvbS9pc19yb290Ijp0cnVlfQ
Computing the HMAC of the bytes of the ASCII [USASCII] representation Computing the HMAC of the octets of the ASCII [USASCII]
of the JWS Secured Input (the concatenation of the Encoded JWS representation of the JWS Signing Input (the concatenation of the
Header, a period ('.') character, and the Encoded JWS Payload) with Encoded JWS Header, a period ('.') character, and the Encoded JWS
the HMAC SHA-256 algorithm using the key specified in Appendix A.1 Payload) with the HMAC SHA-256 algorithm using the key specified in
and base64url encoding the result yields this Encoded JWS Signature Appendix A.1 and base64url encoding the result yields this Encoded
value: JWS Signature value:
dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk
Concatenating these parts in the order Header.Payload.Signature with Concatenating these values in the order Header.Payload.Signature with
period ('.') characters between the parts yields this complete JWS period ('.') characters between the parts yields this complete JWS
representation (with line breaks for display purposes only): representation using the JWS Compact Serialization (with line breaks
for display purposes only):
eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLA0KICJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9 eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLA0KICJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9
. .
eyJpc3MiOiJqb2UiLA0KICJleHAiOjEzMDA4MTkzODAsDQogImh0dHA6Ly9leGFt eyJpc3MiOiJqb2UiLA0KICJleHAiOjEzMDA4MTkzODAsDQogImh0dHA6Ly9leGFt
cGxlLmNvbS9pc19yb290Ijp0cnVlfQ cGxlLmNvbS9pc19yb290Ijp0cnVlfQ
. .
dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk
This computation is illustrated in more detail in Appendix A.1. This computation is illustrated in more detail in Appendix A.1.
4. JWS Header 4. JWS Header
The members of the JSON object represented by the JWS Header describe The members of the JSON object represented by the JWS Header describe
the digital signature or MAC applied to the Encoded JWS Header and the digital signature or MAC applied to the Encoded JWS Header and
the Encoded JWS Payload and optionally additional properties of the the Encoded JWS Payload and optionally additional properties of the
JWS. The Header Parameter Names within this object MUST be unique; JWS. The Header Parameter Names within this object MUST be unique;
JWSs with duplicate Header Parameter Names MUST be rejected. JWSs with duplicate Header Parameter Names MUST be rejected.
Implementations MUST understand the entire contents of the header;
otherwise, the JWS MUST be rejected. Implementations are required to understand the specific header
parameters defined by this specification that are designated as "MUST
be understood" and process them in the manner defined in this
specification. All other header parameters defined by this
specification that are not so designated MUST be ignored when not
understood. Unless listed as a critical header parameter, per
Section 4.1.10, all other header parameters MUST be ignored when not
understood.
There are three classes of Header Parameter Names: Reserved Header There are three classes of Header Parameter Names: Reserved Header
Parameter Names, Public Header Parameter Names, and Private Header Parameter Names, Public Header Parameter Names, and Private Header
Parameter Names. Parameter Names.
4.1. Reserved Header Parameter Names 4.1. Reserved Header Parameter Names
The following Header Parameter Names are reserved with meanings as The following Header Parameter Names are reserved with meanings as
defined below. All the names are short because a core goal of JWSs defined below. All the names are short because a core goal of this
is for the representations to be compact. specification is for the resulting representations using the JWS
Compact Serialization to be compact.
Additional reserved Header Parameter Names MAY be defined via the Additional reserved Header Parameter Names MAY be defined via the
IANA JSON Web Signature and Encryption Header Parameters registry IANA JSON Web Signature and Encryption Header Parameters registry
Section 7.1. As indicated by the common registry, JWSs and JWEs Section 9.1. As indicated by the common registry, JWSs and JWEs
share a common header parameter space; when a parameter is used by share a common header parameter space; when a parameter is used by
both specifications, its usage must be compatible between the both specifications, its usage must be compatible between the
specifications. specifications.
4.1.1. "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter 4.1.1. "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter
The "alg" (algorithm) header parameter identifies the cryptographic The "alg" (algorithm) header parameter identifies the cryptographic
algorithm used to secure the JWS. The algorithm specified by the algorithm used to secure the JWS. The algorithm specified by the
"alg" value MUST be supported by the implementation and there MUST be "alg" value MUST be supported by the implementation and there MUST be
a key for use with that algorithm associated with the party that a key for use with that algorithm associated with the party that
digitally signed or MACed the content or the JWS MUST be rejected. digitally signed or MACed the content or the JWS MUST be rejected.
"alg" values SHOULD either be registered in the IANA JSON Web "alg" values SHOULD either be registered in the IANA JSON Web
Signature and Encryption Algorithms registry [JWA] or be a value that Signature and Encryption Algorithms registry [JWA] or be a value that
contains a Collision Resistant Namespace. The "alg" value is a case contains a Collision Resistant Namespace. The "alg" value is a case
sensitive string containing a StringOrURI value. Use of this header sensitive string containing a StringOrURI value. Use of this header
parameter is REQUIRED. parameter is REQUIRED. This header parameter MUST be understood by
implementations.
A list of defined "alg" values can be found in the IANA JSON Web A list of defined "alg" values can be found in the IANA JSON Web
Signature and Encryption Algorithms registry [JWA]; the initial Signature and Encryption Algorithms registry [JWA]; the initial
contents of this registry are the values defined in Section 3.1 of contents of this registry are the values defined in Section 3.1 of
the JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) [JWA] specification. the JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) [JWA] specification.
4.1.2. "jku" (JWK Set URL) Header Parameter 4.1.2. "jku" (JWK Set URL) Header Parameter
The "jku" (JWK Set URL) header parameter is a URI [RFC3986] that The "jku" (JWK Set URL) header parameter is a URI [RFC3986] that
refers to a resource for a set of JSON-encoded public keys, one of refers to a resource for a set of JSON-encoded public keys, one of
which corresponds to the key used to digitally sign the JWS. The which corresponds to the key used to digitally sign the JWS. The
keys MUST be encoded as a JSON Web Key Set (JWK Set) [JWK]. The keys MUST be encoded as a JSON Web Key Set (JWK Set) [JWK]. The
protocol used to acquire the resource MUST provide integrity protocol used to acquire the resource MUST provide integrity
protection; an HTTP GET request to retrieve the certificate MUST use protection; an HTTP GET request to retrieve the certificate MUST use
TLS [RFC2818] [RFC5246]; the identity of the server MUST be TLS [RFC2818] [RFC5246]; the identity of the server MUST be
validated, as per Section 3.1 of HTTP Over TLS [RFC2818]. Use of validated, as per Section 3.1 of HTTP Over TLS [RFC2818]. Use of
this header parameter is OPTIONAL. this header parameter is OPTIONAL.
4.1.3. "jwk" (JSON Web Key) Header Parameter 4.1.3. "jwk" (JSON Web Key) Header Parameter
The "jwk" (JSON Web Key) header parameter is a public key that The "jwk" (JSON Web Key) header parameter is the public key that
corresponds to the key used to digitally sign the JWS. This key is corresponds to the key used to digitally sign the JWS. This key is
represented as a JSON Web Key [JWK]. Use of this header parameter is represented as a JSON Web Key [JWK]. Use of this header parameter is
OPTIONAL. OPTIONAL.
4.1.4. "x5u" (X.509 URL) Header Parameter 4.1.4. "x5u" (X.509 URL) Header Parameter
The "x5u" (X.509 URL) header parameter is a URI [RFC3986] that refers The "x5u" (X.509 URL) header parameter is a URI [RFC3986] that refers
to a resource for the X.509 public key certificate or certificate to a resource for the X.509 public key certificate or certificate
chain [RFC5280] corresponding to the key used to digitally sign the chain [RFC5280] corresponding to the key used to digitally sign the
JWS. The identified resource MUST provide a representation of the JWS. The identified resource MUST provide a representation of the
certificate or certificate chain that conforms to RFC 5280 [RFC5280] certificate or certificate chain that conforms to RFC 5280 [RFC5280]
in PEM encoded form [RFC1421]. The certificate containing the public in PEM encoded form [RFC1421]. The certificate containing the public
key of the entity that digitally signed the JWS MUST be the first key corresponding to the key used to digitally sign the JWS MUST be
certificate. This MAY be followed by additional certificates, with the first certificate. This MAY be followed by additional
each subsequent certificate being the one used to certify the certificates, with each subsequent certificate being the one used to
previous one. The protocol used to acquire the resource MUST provide certify the previous one. The protocol used to acquire the resource
integrity protection; an HTTP GET request to retrieve the certificate MUST provide integrity protection; an HTTP GET request to retrieve
MUST use TLS [RFC2818] [RFC5246]; the identity of the server MUST be the certificate MUST use TLS [RFC2818] [RFC5246]; the identity of the
validated, as per Section 3.1 of HTTP Over TLS [RFC2818]. Use of server MUST be validated, as per Section 3.1 of HTTP Over TLS
this header parameter is OPTIONAL. [RFC2818]. Use of this header parameter is OPTIONAL.
4.1.5. "x5t" (X.509 Certificate Thumbprint) Header Parameter 4.1.5. "x5t" (X.509 Certificate Thumbprint) Header Parameter
The "x5t" (X.509 Certificate Thumbprint) header parameter provides a The "x5t" (X.509 Certificate Thumbprint) header parameter provides a
base64url encoded SHA-1 thumbprint (a.k.a. digest) of the DER base64url encoded SHA-1 thumbprint (a.k.a. digest) of the DER
encoding of the X.509 certificate [RFC5280] corresponding to the key encoding of the X.509 certificate [RFC5280] corresponding to the key
used to digitally sign the JWS. Use of this header parameter is used to digitally sign the JWS. Use of this header parameter is
OPTIONAL. OPTIONAL.
If, in the future, certificate thumbprints need to be computed using If, in the future, certificate thumbprints need to be computed using
hash functions other than SHA-1, it is suggested that additional hash functions other than SHA-1, it is suggested that additional
related header parameters be defined for that purpose. For example, related header parameters be defined for that purpose. For example,
it is suggested that a new "x5t#S256" (X.509 Certificate Thumbprint it is suggested that a new "x5t#S256" (X.509 Certificate Thumbprint
using SHA-256) header parameter could be defined by registering it in using SHA-256) header parameter could be defined by registering it in
the IANA JSON Web Signature and Encryption Header Parameters registry the IANA JSON Web Signature and Encryption Header Parameters registry
Section 7.1. Section 9.1.
4.1.6. "x5c" (X.509 Certificate Chain) Header Parameter 4.1.6. "x5c" (X.509 Certificate Chain) Header Parameter
The "x5c" (X.509 Certificate Chain) header parameter contains the The "x5c" (X.509 Certificate Chain) header parameter contains the
X.509 public key certificate or certificate chain [RFC5280] X.509 public key certificate or certificate chain [RFC5280]
corresponding to the key used to digitally sign the JWS. The corresponding to the key used to digitally sign the JWS. The
certificate or certificate chain is represented as an array of certificate or certificate chain is represented as an array of
certificate value strings. Each string is a base64 encoded certificate value strings. Each string is a base64 encoded
([RFC4648] Section 4 -- not base64url encoded) DER [ITU.X690.1994] ([RFC4648] Section 4 -- not base64url encoded) DER [ITU.X690.1994]
PKIX certificate value. The certificate containing the public key of PKIX certificate value. The certificate containing the public key
the entity that digitally signed the JWS MUST be the first corresponding to the key used to digitally sign the JWS MUST be the
certificate. This MAY be followed by additional certificates, with first certificate. This MAY be followed by additional certificates,
each subsequent certificate being the one used to certify the with each subsequent certificate being the one used to certify the
previous one. The recipient MUST verify the certificate chain previous one. The recipient MUST verify the certificate chain
according to [RFC5280] and reject the JWS if any validation failure according to [RFC5280] and reject the JWS if any validation failure
occurs. Use of this header parameter is OPTIONAL. occurs. Use of this header parameter is OPTIONAL.
See Appendix B for an example "x5c" value. See Appendix B for an example "x5c" value.
4.1.7. "kid" (Key ID) Header Parameter 4.1.7. "kid" (Key ID) Header Parameter
The "kid" (key ID) header parameter is a hint indicating which key The "kid" (key ID) header parameter is a hint indicating which key
was used to secure the JWS. This parameter allows originators to was used to secure the JWS. This parameter allows originators to
explicitly signal a change of key to recipients. Should the explicitly signal a change of key to recipients. Should the
recipient be unable to locate a key corresponding to the "kid" value, recipient be unable to locate a key corresponding to the "kid" value,
they SHOULD treat that condition as an error. The interpretation of they SHOULD treat that condition as an error. The interpretation of
the "kid" value is unspecified. Its value MUST be a string. Use of the "kid" value is unspecified. Its value MUST be a string. Use of
this header parameter is OPTIONAL. this header parameter is OPTIONAL.
When used with a JWK, the "kid" value MAY be used to match a JWK When used with a JWK, the "kid" value can be used to match a JWK
"kid" parameter value. "kid" parameter value.
4.1.8. "typ" (Type) Header Parameter 4.1.8. "typ" (Type) Header Parameter
The "typ" (type) header parameter is used to declare the type of this The "typ" (type) header parameter is used to declare the type of this
object. The type value "JWS" MAY be used to indicate that this object. The type value "JWS" is used to indicate that this object is
object is a JWS. The "typ" value is a case sensitive string. Use of a JWS using the JWS Compact Serialization. The type value "JWS-JS"
is used to indicate that this object is a JWS using the JWS JSON
Serialization. The "typ" value is a case sensitive string. Use of
this header parameter is OPTIONAL. this header parameter is OPTIONAL.
MIME Media Type [RFC2046] values MAY be used as "typ" values. MIME Media Type [RFC2046] values MAY be used as "typ" values.
"typ" values SHOULD either be registered in the IANA JSON Web "typ" values SHOULD either be registered in the IANA JSON Web
Signature and Encryption Type Values registry Section 7.2 or be a Signature and Encryption Type Values registry Section 9.2 or be a
value that contains a Collision Resistant Namespace. value that contains a Collision Resistant Namespace.
4.1.9. "cty" (Content Type) Header Parameter 4.1.9. "cty" (Content Type) Header Parameter
The "cty" (content type) header parameter is used to declare the type The "cty" (content type) header parameter is used to declare the type
of the secured content (the Payload). The "cty" value is a case of the secured content (the Payload). For example, the JSON Web
sensitive string. Use of this header parameter is OPTIONAL. Token (JWT) [JWT] specification uses the "cty" value "JWT" to
indicate that the Payload is a JSON Web Token (JWT). The "cty" value
is a case sensitive string. Use of this header parameter is
OPTIONAL.
The values used for the "cty" header parameter come from the same The values used for the "cty" header parameter come from the same
value space as the "typ" header parameter, with the same rules value space as the "typ" header parameter, with the same rules
applying. applying.
4.1.10. "crit" (Critical) Header Parameter
The "crit" (critical) header parameter is array listing the names of
header parameters that are present in the JWS Header that MUST be
understood and processed by the implementation or if not understood,
MUST cause the JWS to be rejected. This list MUST NOT include header
parameters defined by this specification, duplicate names, or names
that do not occur as header parameters within the JWS. Use of this
header parameter is OPTIONAL. This header parameter MUST be
understood by implementations.
An example use, along with a hypothetical "exp" (expiration-time)
field is:
{"alg":"ES256",
"crit":["exp"],
"exp":1363284000
}
4.2. Public Header Parameter Names 4.2. Public Header Parameter Names
Additional Header Parameter Names can be defined by those using JWSs. Additional Header Parameter Names can be defined by those using JWSs.
However, in order to prevent collisions, any new Header Parameter However, in order to prevent collisions, any new Header Parameter
Name SHOULD either be registered in the IANA JSON Web Signature and Name SHOULD either be registered in the IANA JSON Web Signature and
Encryption Header Parameters registry Section 7.1 or be a Public Encryption Header Parameters registry Section 9.1 or be a Public
Name: a value that contains a Collision Resistant Namespace. In each Name: a value that contains a Collision Resistant Namespace. In each
case, the definer of the name or value needs to take reasonable case, the definer of the name or value needs to take reasonable
precautions to make sure they are in control of the part of the precautions to make sure they are in control of the part of the
namespace they use to define the Header Parameter Name. namespace they use to define the Header Parameter Name.
New header parameters should be introduced sparingly, as they can New header parameters should be introduced sparingly, as they can
result in non-interoperable JWSs. result in non-interoperable JWSs.
4.3. Private Header Parameter Names 4.3. Private Header Parameter Names
skipping to change at page 10, line 44 skipping to change at page 12, line 4
4.3. Private Header Parameter Names 4.3. Private Header Parameter Names
A producer and consumer of a JWS may agree to use Header Parameter A producer and consumer of a JWS may agree to use Header Parameter
Names that are Private Names: names that are not Reserved Names Names that are Private Names: names that are not Reserved Names
Section 4.1 or Public Names Section 4.2. Unlike Public Names, Section 4.1 or Public Names Section 4.2. Unlike Public Names,
Private Names are subject to collision and should be used with Private Names are subject to collision and should be used with
caution. caution.
5. Producing and Consuming JWSs 5. Producing and Consuming JWSs
5.1. Message Signing or MACing 5.1. Message Signing or MACing
To create a JWS, one MUST perform these steps. The order of the To create a JWS, one MUST perform these steps. The order of the
steps is not significant in cases where there are no dependencies steps is not significant in cases where there are no dependencies
between the inputs and outputs of the steps. between the inputs and outputs of the steps.
1. Create the content to be used as the JWS Payload. 1. Create the content to be used as the JWS Payload.
2. Base64url encode the bytes of the JWS Payload. This encoding 2. Base64url encode the octets of the JWS Payload. This encoding
becomes the Encoded JWS Payload. becomes the Encoded JWS Payload.
3. Create a JWS Header containing the desired set of header 3. Create a JWS Header containing the desired set of header
parameters. Note that white space is explicitly allowed in the parameters. Note that white space is explicitly allowed in the
representation and no canonicalization need be performed before representation and no canonicalization need be performed before
encoding. encoding.
4. Base64url encode the bytes of the UTF-8 representation of the JWS 4. Base64url encode the octets of the UTF-8 representation of the
Header to create the Encoded JWS Header. JWS Header to create the Encoded JWS Header.
5. Compute the JWS Signature in the manner defined for the 5. Compute the JWS Signature in the manner defined for the
particular algorithm being used. The JWS Secured Input is always particular algorithm being used over the JWS Signing Input (the
the concatenation of the Encoded JWS Header, a period ('.') concatenation of the Encoded JWS Header, a period ('.')
character, and the Encoded JWS Payload. The "alg" (algorithm) character, and the Encoded JWS Payload). The "alg" (algorithm)
header parameter MUST be present in the JSON Header, with the header parameter MUST be present in the JWS Header, with the
algorithm value accurately representing the algorithm used to algorithm value accurately representing the algorithm used to
construct the JWS Signature. construct the JWS Signature.
6. Base64url encode the representation of the JWS Signature to 6. Base64url encode the representation of the JWS Signature to
create the Encoded JWS Signature. create the Encoded JWS Signature.
7. The three encoded parts, taken together, are the result. The 7. The three encoded parts are the result values used in both the
Compact Serialization of this result is the concatenation of the JWS Compact Serialization and the JWS JSON Serialization
Encoded JWS Header, the Encoded JWS Payload, and the Encoded JWS representations.
8. If the JWS JSON Serialization is being used, repeat this process
for each digital signature or MAC value being applied.
9. Create the desired serialized output. The JWS Compact
Serialization of this result is the concatenation of the Encoded
JWS Header, the Encoded JWS Payload, and the Encoded JWS
Signature in that order, with the three strings being separated Signature in that order, with the three strings being separated
by two period ('.') characters. by two period ('.') characters. The JWS JSON Serialization is
described in Section 7.
5.2. Message Signature or MAC Validation 5.2. Message Signature or MAC Validation
When validating a JWS, the following steps MUST be taken. The order When validating a JWS, the following steps MUST be taken. The order
of the steps is not significant in cases where there are no of the steps is not significant in cases where there are no
dependencies between the inputs and outputs of the steps. If any of dependencies between the inputs and outputs of the steps. If any of
the listed steps fails, then the JWS MUST be rejected. the listed steps fails, then the JWS MUST be rejected.
1. Parse the three parts of the input (which are separated by period 1. Parse the serialized input to determine the values of the Encoded
('.') characters when using the JWS Compact Serialization) into JWS Header, the Encoded JWS Payload, and the Encoded JWS
the Encoded JWS Header, the Encoded JWS Payload, and the Encoded Signature. When using the JWS Compact Serialization, these three
JWS Signature. values are represented as text strings in that order, separated
by two period ('.') characters. The JWS JSON Serialization is
described in Section 7.
2. The Encoded JWS Header MUST be successfully base64url decoded 2. The Encoded JWS Header MUST be successfully base64url decoded
following the restriction given in this specification that no following the restriction given in this specification that no
padding characters have been used. padding characters have been used.
3. The resulting JWS Header MUST be completely valid JSON syntax 3. The resulting JWS Header MUST be completely valid JSON syntax
conforming to RFC 4627 [RFC4627]. conforming to RFC 4627 [RFC4627].
4. The resulting JWS Header MUST be validated to only include 4. The resulting JWS Header MUST be validated to only include
parameters and values whose syntax and semantics are both parameters and values whose syntax and semantics are both
understood and supported. understood and supported or that are specified as being ignored
when not understood.
5. The Encoded JWS Payload MUST be successfully base64url decoded 5. The Encoded JWS Payload MUST be successfully base64url decoded
following the restriction given in this specification that no following the restriction given in this specification that no
padding characters have been used. padding characters have been used.
6. The Encoded JWS Signature MUST be successfully base64url decoded 6. The Encoded JWS Signature MUST be successfully base64url decoded
following the restriction given in this specification that no following the restriction given in this specification that no
padding characters have been used. padding characters have been used.
7. The JWS Signature MUST be successfully validated against the JWS 7. The JWS Signature MUST be successfully validated against the JWS
Secured Input (the concatenation of the Encoded JWS Header, a Signing Input (the concatenation of the Encoded JWS Header, a
period ('.') character, and the Encoded JWS Payload) in the period ('.') character, and the Encoded JWS Payload) in the
manner defined for the algorithm being used, which MUST be manner defined for the algorithm being used, which MUST be
accurately represented by the value of the "alg" (algorithm) accurately represented by the value of the "alg" (algorithm)
header parameter, which MUST be present. header parameter, which MUST be present.
8. If the JWS JSON Serialization is being used, repeat this process
for each digital signature or MAC value contained in the
representation.
5.3. String Comparison Rules 5.3. String Comparison Rules
Processing a JWS inevitably requires comparing known strings to Processing a JWS inevitably requires comparing known strings to
values in JSON objects. For example, in checking what the algorithm values in JSON objects. For example, in checking what the algorithm
is, the Unicode string encoding "alg" will be checked against the is, the Unicode string encoding "alg" will be checked against the
member names in the JWS Header to see if there is a matching Header member names in the JWS Header to see if there is a matching Header
Parameter Name. A similar process occurs when determining if the Parameter Name. A similar process occurs when determining if the
value of the "alg" header parameter represents a supported algorithm. value of the "alg" header parameter represents a supported algorithm.
Comparisons between JSON strings and other Unicode strings MUST be Comparisons between JSON strings and other Unicode strings MUST be
skipping to change at page 12, line 51 skipping to change at page 14, line 32
3. Unicode Normalization [USA15] MUST NOT be applied at any point to 3. Unicode Normalization [USA15] MUST NOT be applied at any point to
either the JSON string or to the string it is to be compared either the JSON string or to the string it is to be compared
against. against.
4. Comparisons between the two strings MUST be performed as a 4. Comparisons between the two strings MUST be performed as a
Unicode code point to code point equality comparison. (Note that Unicode code point to code point equality comparison. (Note that
values that originally used different Unicode encodings (UTF-8, values that originally used different Unicode encodings (UTF-8,
UTF-16, etc.) may result in the same code point values.) UTF-16, etc.) may result in the same code point values.)
Also, see the JSON security considerations in Section 8.2 and the Also, see the JSON security considerations in Section 10.2 and the
Unicode security considerations in Section 8.3. Unicode security considerations in Section 10.3.
6. Securing JWSs with Cryptographic Algorithms 6. Securing JWSs with Cryptographic Algorithms
JWS uses cryptographic algorithms to digitally sign or MAC the JWS JWS uses cryptographic algorithms to digitally sign or MAC the JWS
Header and the JWS Payload. The JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) [JWA] Header and the JWS Payload. The JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) [JWA]
specification describes a set of cryptographic algorithms and specification describes a set of cryptographic algorithms and
identifiers to be used with this specification. Specifically, identifiers to be used with this specification. Specifically,
Section 3.1 specifies a set of "alg" (algorithm) header parameter Section 3.1 specifies a set of "alg" (algorithm) header parameter
values intended for use this specification. It also describes the values intended for use this specification. It also describes the
semantics and operations that are specific to these algorithms. semantics and operations that are specific to these algorithms.
Public keys employed for digital signing can be identified using the Public keys employed for digital signing can be identified using the
Header Parameter methods described in Section 4.1 or can be Header Parameter methods described in Section 4.1 or can be
distributed using methods that are outside the scope of this distributed using methods that are outside the scope of this
specification. specification.
7. IANA Considerations 7. JSON Serialization
The JWS JSON Serialization represents digitally signed or MACed
content as a JSON object with a "signatures" member containing an
array of per-signature information and a "payload" member containing
a shared Encoded JWS Payload value. Each member of the "signatures"
array is a JSON object with a "header" member containing an Encoded
JWS Header value and a "signature" member containing an Encoded JWS
Signature value.
Unlike the JWS Compact Serialization, content using the JWS JSON
Serialization MAY be secured with more than one digital signature
and/or MAC value. Each is represented as an Encoded JWS Signature
value in the "signature" member of an object in the "signatures"
array. For each signature, there is an Encoded JWS Encoded Header
value in the "header" member of the same object in the "signatures"
array. This specifies the digital signature or MAC applied to the
Encoded JWS Header value and the shared Encoded JWS Payload value to
create the JWS Signature value. Therefore, the syntax is:
{"signatures":[
{"header":"<header 1 contents>",
"signature":"<signature 1 contents>"},
...
{"header":"<header N contents>",
"signature":"<signature N contents>"}],
"payload":"<payload contents>"
}
The contents of the Encoded JWS Header, Encoded JWS Payload, and
Encoded JWS Signature values are exactly as specified in the rest of
this specification. They are interpreted and validated in the same
manner, with each corresponding "header" and "signature" value being
created and validated together.
Each JWS Signature value is computed on the JWS Signing Input
corresponding to the concatenation of the Encoded JWS Header, a
period ('.') character, and the Encoded JWS Payload in the same
manner as for the JWS Compact Serialization. This has the desirable
result that each Encoded JWS Signature value in the "signatures"
array is identical to the value that would be used for the same
parameter in the JWS Compact Serialization, as is the shared JWS
Payload value.
7.1. Example JWS-JS
This section contains an example using the JWS JSON Serialization.
This example demonstrates the capability for conveying multiple
digital signatures and/or MACs for the same payload.
The Encoded JWS Payload used in this example is the same as used in
the examples in Appendix A (with line breaks for display purposes
only):
eyJpc3MiOiJqb2UiLA0KICJleHAiOjEzMDA4MTkzODAsDQogImh0dHA6Ly9leGFt
cGxlLmNvbS9pc19yb290Ijp0cnVlfQ
Two digital signatures are used in this example: an RSA SHA-256
signature, for which the header and signature values are the same as
in Appendix A.2, and an ECDSA P-256 SHA-256 signature, for which the
header and signature values are the same as in Appendix A.3. The two
Decoded JWS Header Segments used are:
{"alg":"RS256"}
and:
{"alg":"ES256"}
Since the computations of the JWS Header and JWS Signature values are
the same as in Appendix A.2 and Appendix A.3, they are not repeated
here.
The complete JSON Web Signature JSON Serialization (JWS-JS) for these
values is as follows (with line breaks for display purposes only):
{"signatures":[
{"header":"eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9",
"signature":
"cC4hiUPoj9Eetdgtv3hF80EGrhuB__dzERat0XF9g2VtQgr9PJbu3XOiZj5RZ
mh7AAuHIm4Bh-0Qc_lF5YKt_O8W2Fp5jujGbds9uJdbF9CUAr7t1dnZcAcQjb
KBYNX4BAynRFdiuB--f_nZLgrnbyTyWzO75vRK5h6xBArLIARNPvkSjtQBMHl
b1L07Qe7K0GarZRmB_eSN9383LcOLn6_dO--xi12jzDwusC-eOkHWEsqtFZES
c6BfI7noOPqvhJ1phCnvWh6IeYI2w9QOYEUipUTI8np6LbgGY9Fs98rqVt5AX
LIhWkWywlVmtVrBp0igcN_IoypGlUPQGe77Rw"},
{"header":"eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiJ9",
"signature":
"DtEhU3ljbEg8L38VWAfUAqOyKAM6-Xx-F4GawxaepmXFCgfTjDxw5djxLa8IS
lSApmWQxfKTUJqPP3-Kg6NU1Q"}],
"payload":
"eyJpc3MiOiJqb2UiLA0KICJleHAiOjEzMDA4MTkzODAsDQogImh0dHA6Ly9leGF
tcGxlLmNvbS9pc19yb290Ijp0cnVlfQ"
}
8. Implementation Considerations
The JWS Compact Serialization is mandatory to implement.
Implementation of the JWS JSON Serialization is OPTIONAL.
9. IANA Considerations
The following registration procedure is used for all the registries The following registration procedure is used for all the registries
established by this specification. established by this specification.
Values are registered with a Specification Required [RFC5226] after a Values are registered with a Specification Required [RFC5226] after a
two-week review period on the [TBD]@ietf.org mailing list, on the two-week review period on the [TBD]@ietf.org mailing list, on the
advice of one or more Designated Experts. However, to allow for the advice of one or more Designated Experts. However, to allow for the
allocation of values prior to publication, the Designated Expert(s) allocation of values prior to publication, the Designated Expert(s)
may approve registration once they are satisfied that such a may approve registration once they are satisfied that such a
specification will be published. specification will be published.
skipping to change at page 13, line 48 skipping to change at page 17, line 38
Within the review period, the Designated Expert(s) will either Within the review period, the Designated Expert(s) will either
approve or deny the registration request, communicating this decision approve or deny the registration request, communicating this decision
to the review list and IANA. Denials should include an explanation to the review list and IANA. Denials should include an explanation
and, if applicable, suggestions as to how to make the request and, if applicable, suggestions as to how to make the request
successful. successful.
IANA must only accept registry updates from the Designated Expert(s) IANA must only accept registry updates from the Designated Expert(s)
and should direct all requests for registration to the review mailing and should direct all requests for registration to the review mailing
list. list.
7.1. JSON Web Signature and Encryption Header Parameters Registry 9.1. JSON Web Signature and Encryption Header Parameters Registry
This specification establishes the IANA JSON Web Signature and This specification establishes the IANA JSON Web Signature and
Encryption Header Parameters registry for reserved JWS and JWE Header Encryption Header Parameters registry for reserved JWS and JWE Header
Parameter Names. The registry records the reserved Header Parameter Parameter Names. The registry records the reserved Header Parameter
Name and a reference to the specification that defines it. The same Name and a reference to the specification that defines it. The same
Header Parameter Name may be registered multiple times, provided that Header Parameter Name MAY be registered multiple times, provided that
the parameter usage is compatible between the specifications. the parameter usage is compatible between the specifications.
Different registrations of the same Header Parameter Name will Different registrations of the same Header Parameter Name will
typically use different Header Parameter Usage Location(s) values. typically use different Header Parameter Usage Location(s) values.
7.1.1. Registration Template 9.1.1. Registration Template
Header Parameter Name: Header Parameter Name:
The name requested (e.g., "example"). This name is case The name requested (e.g., "example"). This name is case
sensitive. Names that match other registered names in a case sensitive. Names that match other registered names in a case
insensitive manner SHOULD NOT be accepted. insensitive manner SHOULD NOT be accepted.
Header Parameter Usage Location(s): Header Parameter Usage Location(s):
The header parameter usage locations, which should be one or more The header parameter usage locations, which should be one or more
of the values "JWS" or "JWE". of the values "JWS" or "JWE".
skipping to change at page 14, line 33 skipping to change at page 18, line 27
For Standards Track RFCs, state "IETF". For others, give the name For Standards Track RFCs, state "IETF". For others, give the name
of the responsible party. Other details (e.g., postal address, of the responsible party. Other details (e.g., postal address,
email address, home page URI) may also be included. email address, home page URI) may also be included.
Specification Document(s): Specification Document(s):
Reference to the document(s) that specify the parameter, Reference to the document(s) that specify the parameter,
preferably including URI(s) that can be used to retrieve copies of preferably including URI(s) that can be used to retrieve copies of
the document(s). An indication of the relevant sections may also the document(s). An indication of the relevant sections may also
be included but is not required. be included but is not required.
7.1.2. Initial Registry Contents 9.1.2. Initial Registry Contents
This specification registers the Header Parameter Names defined in This specification registers the Header Parameter Names defined in
Section 4.1 in this registry. Section 4.1 in this registry.
o Header Parameter Name: "alg" o Header Parameter Name: "alg"
o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWS o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWS
o Change Controller: IETF o Change Controller: IETF
o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.1 of [[ this document ]] o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.1 of [[ this document ]]
o Header Parameter Name: "jku" o Header Parameter Name: "jku"
skipping to change at page 15, line 37 skipping to change at page 19, line 29
o Header Parameter Name: "typ" o Header Parameter Name: "typ"
o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWS o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWS
o Change Controller: IETF o Change Controller: IETF
o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.8 of [[ this document ]] o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.8 of [[ this document ]]
o Header Parameter Name: "cty" o Header Parameter Name: "cty"
o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWS o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWS
o Change Controller: IETF o Change Controller: IETF
o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.9 of [[ this document ]] o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.9 of [[ this document ]]
7.2. JSON Web Signature and Encryption Type Values Registry o Header Parameter Name: "crit"
o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWS
o Change Controller: IETF
o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.10 of [[ this document ]]
9.2. JSON Web Signature and Encryption Type Values Registry
This specification establishes the IANA JSON Web Signature and This specification establishes the IANA JSON Web Signature and
Encryption Type Values registry for values of the JWS and JWE "typ" Encryption Type Values registry for values of the JWS and JWE "typ"
(type) header parameter. It is RECOMMENDED that all registered "typ" (type) header parameter. It is RECOMMENDED that all registered "typ"
values also include a MIME Media Type [RFC2046] value that the values also include a MIME Media Type [RFC2046] value that the
registered value is a short name for. The registry records the "typ" registered value is a short name for. The registry records the "typ"
value, the MIME type value that it is an abbreviation for (if any), value, the MIME type value that it is an abbreviation for (if any),
and a reference to the specification that defines it. and a reference to the specification that defines it.
MIME Media Type [RFC2046] values MUST NOT be directly registered as MIME Media Type [RFC2046] values MUST NOT be directly registered as
new "typ" values; rather, new "typ" values MAY be registered as short new "typ" values; rather, new "typ" values MAY be registered as short
names for MIME types. names for MIME types.
7.2.1. Registration Template 9.2.1. Registration Template
"typ" Header Parameter Value: "typ" Header Parameter Value:
The name requested (e.g., "example"). This name is case The name requested (e.g., "example"). This name is case
sensitive. Names that match other registered names in a case sensitive. Names that match other registered names in a case
insensitive manner SHOULD NOT be accepted. insensitive manner SHOULD NOT be accepted.
Abbreviation for MIME Type: Abbreviation for MIME Type:
The MIME type that this name is an abbreviation for (e.g., The MIME type that this name is an abbreviation for (e.g.,
"application/example"). "application/example").
Change Controller: Change Controller:
For Standards Track RFCs, state "IETF". For others, give the name For Standards Track RFCs, state "IETF". For others, give the name
of the responsible party. Other details (e.g., postal address, of the responsible party. Other details (e.g., postal address,
email address, home page URI) may also be included. email address, home page URI) may also be included.
Specification Document(s): Specification Document(s):
Reference to the document(s) that specify the parameter, Reference to the document(s) that specify the parameter,
preferably including URI(s) that can be used to retrieve copies of preferably including URI(s) that can be used to retrieve copies of
the document(s). An indication of the relevant sections may also the document(s). An indication of the relevant sections may also
be included but is not required. be included but is not required.
7.2.2. Initial Registry Contents 9.2.2. Initial Registry Contents
This specification registers the "JWS" type value in this registry: This specification registers the "JWS" and "JWS-JS" type values in
this registry:
o "typ" Header Parameter Value: "JWS" o "typ" Header Parameter Value: "JWS"
o Abbreviation for MIME type: application/jws o Abbreviation for MIME type: application/jws
o Change Controller: IETF o Change Controller: IETF
o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.8 of [[ this document ]] o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.8 of [[ this document ]]
7.3. Media Type Registration o "typ" Header Parameter Value: "JWS-JS"
o Abbreviation for MIME type: application/jws-js
o Change Controller: IETF
o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.8 of [[ this document ]]
7.3.1. Registry Contents 9.3. Media Type Registration
This specification registers the "application/jws" Media Type 9.3.1. Registry Contents
[RFC2046] in the MIME Media Type registry [RFC4288] to indicate that
the content is a JWS using the Compact Serialization. This specification registers the "application/jws" and
"application/jws-js" Media Types [RFC2046] in the MIME Media Type
registry [RFC4288] to indicate, respectively, that the content is a
JWS using the JWS Compact Serialization or a JWS using the JWS JSON
Serialization.
o Type name: application o Type name: application
o Subtype name: jws o Subtype name: jws
o Required parameters: n/a o Required parameters: n/a
o Optional parameters: n/a o Optional parameters: n/a
o Encoding considerations: JWS values are encoded as a series of o Encoding considerations: JWS values are encoded as a series of
base64url encoded values (some of which may be the empty string) base64url encoded values (some of which may be the empty string)
separated by period ('.') characters separated by period ('.') characters
o Security considerations: See the Security Considerations section o Security considerations: See the Security Considerations section
of this document of [[ this document ]]
o Interoperability considerations: n/a o Interoperability considerations: n/a
o Published specification: [[ this document ]] o Published specification: [[ this document ]]
o Applications that use this media type: OpenID Connect, Mozilla o Applications that use this media type: OpenID Connect, Mozilla
Browser ID, Salesforce, Google, numerous others that use signed Persona, Salesforce, Google, numerous others that use signed JWTs
JWTs
o Additional information: Magic number(s): n/a, File extension(s): o Additional information: Magic number(s): n/a, File extension(s):
n/a, Macintosh file type code(s): n/a n/a, Macintosh file type code(s): n/a
o Person & email address to contact for further information: Michael o Person & email address to contact for further information: Michael
B. Jones, mbj@microsoft.com B. Jones, mbj@microsoft.com
o Intended usage: COMMON o Intended usage: COMMON
o Restrictions on usage: none o Restrictions on usage: none
o Author: Michael B. Jones, mbj@microsoft.com o Author: Michael B. Jones, mbj@microsoft.com
o Change Controller: IETF o Change Controller: IETF
8. Security Considerations o Type name: application
o Subtype name: jws-js
o Required parameters: n/a
o Optional parameters: n/a
o Encoding considerations: JWS-JS values are represented as a JSON
Object; UTF-8 encoding SHOULD be employed for the JSON object.
o Security considerations: See the Security Considerations section
of [[ this document ]]
o Interoperability considerations: n/a
o Published specification: [[ this document ]]
o Applications that use this media type: TBD
o Additional information: Magic number(s): n/a, File extension(s):
n/a, Macintosh file type code(s): n/a
o Person & email address to contact for further information: Michael
B. Jones, mbj@microsoft.com
o Intended usage: COMMON
o Restrictions on usage: none
o Author: Michael B. Jones, mbj@microsoft.com
o Change Controller: IETF
8.1. Cryptographic Security Considerations 10. Security Considerations
10.1. Cryptographic Security Considerations
All of the security issues faced by any cryptographic application All of the security issues faced by any cryptographic application
must be faced by a JWS/JWE/JWK agent. Among these issues are must be faced by a JWS/JWE/JWK agent. Among these issues are
protecting the user's private and symmetric keys, preventing various protecting the user's private and symmetric keys, preventing various
attacks, and helping the user avoid mistakes such as inadvertently attacks, and helping the user avoid mistakes such as inadvertently
encrypting a message for the wrong recipient. The entire list of encrypting a message for the wrong recipient. The entire list of
security considerations is beyond the scope of this document, but security considerations is beyond the scope of this document, but
some significant concerns are listed here. some significant concerns are listed here.
All the security considerations in XML DSIG 2.0 All the security considerations in XML DSIG 2.0
skipping to change at page 17, line 46 skipping to change at page 22, line 23
practices documented in XML Signature Best Practices practices documented in XML Signature Best Practices
[W3C.WD-xmldsig-bestpractices-20110809] also apply to this [W3C.WD-xmldsig-bestpractices-20110809] also apply to this
specification, other than those that are XML specific. specification, other than those that are XML specific.
Keys are only as strong as the amount of entropy used to generate Keys are only as strong as the amount of entropy used to generate
them. A minimum of 128 bits of entropy should be used for all keys, them. A minimum of 128 bits of entropy should be used for all keys,
and depending upon the application context, more may be required. In and depending upon the application context, more may be required. In
particular, it may be difficult to generate sufficiently random particular, it may be difficult to generate sufficiently random
values in some browsers and application environments. values in some browsers and application environments.
Creators of JWSs should not allow third parties to insert arbitrary
content into the message without adding entropy not controlled by the
third party.
When utilizing TLS to retrieve information, the authority providing When utilizing TLS to retrieve information, the authority providing
the resource MUST be authenticated and the information retrieved MUST the resource MUST be authenticated and the information retrieved MUST
be free from modification. be free from modification.
When cryptographic algorithms are implemented in such a way that When cryptographic algorithms are implemented in such a way that
successful operations take a different amount of time than successful operations take a different amount of time than
unsuccessful operations, attackers may be able to use the time unsuccessful operations, attackers may be able to use the time
difference to obtain information about the keys employed. Therefore, difference to obtain information about the keys employed. Therefore,
such timing differences must be avoided. such timing differences must be avoided.
skipping to change at page 18, line 24 skipping to change at page 23, line 5
certificate store used by the intended victim. A prerequisite to certificate store used by the intended victim. A prerequisite to
this attack succeeding is the attacker having write access to the this attack succeeding is the attacker having write access to the
intended victim's certificate store. intended victim's certificate store.
If, in the future, certificate thumbprints need to be computed using If, in the future, certificate thumbprints need to be computed using
hash functions other than SHA-1, it is suggested that additional hash functions other than SHA-1, it is suggested that additional
related header parameters be defined for that purpose. For example, related header parameters be defined for that purpose. For example,
it is suggested that a new "x5t#S256" (X.509 Certificate Thumbprint it is suggested that a new "x5t#S256" (X.509 Certificate Thumbprint
using SHA-256) header parameter could be defined and used. using SHA-256) header parameter could be defined and used.
8.2. JSON Security Considerations 10.2. JSON Security Considerations
Strict JSON validation is a security requirement. If malformed JSON Strict JSON validation is a security requirement. If malformed JSON
is received, then the intent of the sender is impossible to reliably is received, then the intent of the sender is impossible to reliably
discern. Ambiguous and potentially exploitable situations could discern. Ambiguous and potentially exploitable situations could
arise if the JSON parser used does not reject malformed JSON syntax. arise if the JSON parser used does not reject malformed JSON syntax.
Section 2.2 of the JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) specification Section 2.2 of the JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) specification
[RFC4627] states "The names within an object SHOULD be unique", [RFC4627] states "The names within an object SHOULD be unique",
whereas this specification states that "Header Parameter Names within whereas this specification states that "Header Parameter Names within
this object MUST be unique; JWSs with duplicate Header Parameter this object MUST be unique; JWSs with duplicate Header Parameter
Names MUST be rejected". Thus, this specification requires that the Names MUST be rejected". Thus, this specification requires that the
Section 2.2 "SHOULD" be treated as a "MUST". Ambiguous and Section 2.2 "SHOULD" be treated as a "MUST". Ambiguous and
potentially exploitable situations could arise if the JSON parser potentially exploitable situations could arise if the JSON parser
used does not enforce the uniqueness of member names. used does not enforce the uniqueness of member names.
8.3. Unicode Comparison Security Considerations Some JSON parsers might not reject input that contains extra
significant characters after a valid input. For instance, the input
"{"tag":"value"}ABCD" contains a valid JSON object followed by the
extra characters "ABCD". Such input MUST be rejected in its
entirety.
10.3. Unicode Comparison Security Considerations
Header Parameter Names and algorithm names are Unicode strings. For Header Parameter Names and algorithm names are Unicode strings. For
security reasons, the representations of these names must be compared security reasons, the representations of these names must be compared
verbatim after performing any escape processing (as per RFC 4627 verbatim after performing any escape processing (as per RFC 4627
[RFC4627], Section 2.5). This means, for instance, that these JSON [RFC4627], Section 2.5). This means, for instance, that these JSON
strings must compare as being equal ("sig", "\u0073ig"), whereas strings must compare as being equal ("sig", "\u0073ig"), whereas
these must all compare as being not equal to the first set or to each these must all compare as being not equal to the first set or to each
other ("SIG", "Sig", "si\u0047"). other ("SIG", "Sig", "si\u0047").
JSON strings MAY contain characters outside the Unicode Basic JSON strings can contain characters outside the Unicode Basic
Multilingual Plane. For instance, the G clef character (U+1D11E) may Multilingual Plane. For instance, the G clef character (U+1D11E) may
be represented in a JSON string as "\uD834\uDD1E". Ideally, JWS be represented in a JSON string as "\uD834\uDD1E". Ideally, JWS
implementations SHOULD ensure that characters outside the Basic implementations SHOULD ensure that characters outside the Basic
Multilingual Plane are preserved and compared correctly; Multilingual Plane are preserved and compared correctly;
alternatively, if this is not possible due to these characters alternatively, if this is not possible due to these characters
exercising limitations present in the underlying JSON implementation, exercising limitations present in the underlying JSON implementation,
then input containing them MUST be rejected. then input containing them MUST be rejected.
9. References 11. References
9.1. Normative References 11.1. Normative References
[ITU.X690.1994] [ITU.X690.1994]
International Telecommunications Union, "Information International Telecommunications Union, "Information
Technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic
Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and
Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)", ITU-T Recommendation Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)", ITU-T Recommendation
X.690, 1994. X.690, 1994.
[JWA] Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", [JWA] Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)",
draft-ietf-jose-json-web-algorithms (work in progress), draft-ietf-jose-json-web-algorithms (work in progress),
December 2012. April 2013.
[JWK] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", [JWK] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)",
draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key (work in progress), draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key (work in progress),
December 2012. April 2013.
[RFC1421] Linn, J., "Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic [RFC1421] Linn, J., "Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic
Mail: Part I: Message Encryption and Authentication Mail: Part I: Message Encryption and Authentication
Procedures", RFC 1421, February 1993. Procedures", RFC 1421, February 1993.
[RFC2046] Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail [RFC2046] Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail
Extensions (MIME) Part Two: Media Types", RFC 2046, Extensions (MIME) Part Two: Media Types", RFC 2046,
November 1996. November 1996.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
skipping to change at page 20, line 4 skipping to change at page 24, line 38
[RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, May 2000. [RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, May 2000.
[RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO [RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, November 2003. 10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, November 2003.
[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform [RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66, Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
RFC 3986, January 2005. RFC 3986, January 2005.
[RFC4288] Freed, N. and J. Klensin, "Media Type Specifications and [RFC4288] Freed, N. and J. Klensin, "Media Type Specifications and
Registration Procedures", BCP 13, RFC 4288, December 2005. Registration Procedures", RFC 4288, December 2005.
[RFC4627] Crockford, D., "The application/json Media Type for [RFC4627] Crockford, D., "The application/json Media Type for
JavaScript Object Notation (JSON)", RFC 4627, July 2006. JavaScript Object Notation (JSON)", RFC 4627, July 2006.
[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data [RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
Encodings", RFC 4648, October 2006. Encodings", RFC 4648, October 2006.
[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an [RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226, IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
May 2008. May 2008.
skipping to change at page 20, line 37 skipping to change at page 25, line 23
[USASCII] American National Standards Institute, "Coded Character [USASCII] American National Standards Institute, "Coded Character
Set -- 7-bit American Standard Code for Information Set -- 7-bit American Standard Code for Information
Interchange", ANSI X3.4, 1986. Interchange", ANSI X3.4, 1986.
[W3C.WD-xmldsig-bestpractices-20110809] [W3C.WD-xmldsig-bestpractices-20110809]
Datta, P. and F. Hirsch, "XML Signature Best Practices", Datta, P. and F. Hirsch, "XML Signature Best Practices",
World Wide Web Consortium WD WD-xmldsig-bestpractices- World Wide Web Consortium WD WD-xmldsig-bestpractices-
20110809, August 2011, <http://www.w3.org/TR/2011/ 20110809, August 2011, <http://www.w3.org/TR/2011/
WD-xmldsig-bestpractices-20110809>. WD-xmldsig-bestpractices-20110809>.
9.2. Informative References 11.2. Informative References
[CanvasApp] [CanvasApp]
Facebook, "Canvas Applications", 2010. Facebook, "Canvas Applications", 2010.
[JSS] Bradley, J. and N. Sakimura (editor), "JSON Simple Sign", [JSS] Bradley, J. and N. Sakimura (editor), "JSON Simple Sign",
September 2010. September 2010.
[JWE] Jones, M., Rescorla, E., and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web [JWE] Jones, M., Rescorla, E., and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web
Encryption (JWE)", draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption Encryption (JWE)", draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption
(work in progress), December 2012. (work in progress), April 2013.
[JWS-JS] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
Signature JSON Serialization (JWS-JS)",
draft-jones-jose-jws-json-serialization (work in
progress), December 2012.
[JWT] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token [JWT] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token (work in (JWT)", draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token (work in
progress), December 2012. progress), April 2013.
[MagicSignatures] [MagicSignatures]
Panzer (editor), J., Laurie, B., and D. Balfanz, "Magic Panzer (editor), J., Laurie, B., and D. Balfanz, "Magic
Signatures", January 2011. Signatures", January 2011.
[RFC4122] Leach, P., Mealling, M., and R. Salz, "A Universally [RFC4122] Leach, P., Mealling, M., and R. Salz, "A Universally
Unique IDentifier (UUID) URN Namespace", RFC 4122, Unique IDentifier (UUID) URN Namespace", RFC 4122,
July 2005. July 2005.
[W3C.CR-xmldsig-core2-20120124] [W3C.CR-xmldsig-core2-20120124]
Yiu, K., Solo, D., Eastlake, D., Datta, P., Hirsch, F., Eastlake, D., Reagle, J., Yiu, K., Solo, D., Datta, P.,
Reagle, J., Cantor, S., and T. Roessler, "XML Signature Hirsch, F., Cantor, S., and T. Roessler, "XML Signature
Syntax and Processing Version 2.0", World Wide Web Syntax and Processing Version 2.0", World Wide Web
Consortium CR CR-xmldsig-core2-20120124, January 2012, Consortium CR CR-xmldsig-core2-20120124, January 2012,
<http://www.w3.org/TR/2012/CR-xmldsig-core2-20120124>. <http://www.w3.org/TR/2012/CR-xmldsig-core2-20120124>.
Appendix A. JWS Examples Appendix A. JWS Examples
This section provides several examples of JWSs. While these examples This section provides several examples of JWSs. While these examples
all represent JSON Web Tokens (JWTs) [JWT], the payload can be any all represent JSON Web Tokens (JWTs) [JWT], the payload can be any
base64url encoded content. base64url encoded content.
A.1. JWS using HMAC SHA-256 A.1. Example JWS using HMAC SHA-256
A.1.1. Encoding A.1.1. Encoding
The following example JWS Header declares that the data structure is The following example JWS Header declares that the data structure is
a JSON Web Token (JWT) [JWT] and the JWS Secured Input is secured a JSON Web Token (JWT) [JWT] and the JWS Signing Input is secured
using the HMAC SHA-256 algorithm. using the HMAC SHA-256 algorithm.
{"typ":"JWT", {"typ":"JWT",
"alg":"HS256"} "alg":"HS256"}
The following byte array contains the UTF-8 representation of the JWS The following octet sequence contains the UTF-8 representation of the
Header: JWS Header:
[123, 34, 116, 121, 112, 34, 58, 34, 74, 87, 84, 34, 44, 13, 10, 32, [123, 34, 116, 121, 112, 34, 58, 34, 74, 87, 84, 34, 44, 13, 10, 32,
34, 97, 108, 103, 34, 58, 34, 72, 83, 50, 53, 54, 34, 125] 34, 97, 108, 103, 34, 58, 34, 72, 83, 50, 53, 54, 34, 125]
Base64url encoding these bytes yields this Encoded JWS Header value: Base64url encoding these octets yields this Encoded JWS Header value:
eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLA0KICJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9 eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLA0KICJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9
The JWS Payload used in this example is the bytes of the UTF-8 The JWS Payload used in this example is the octets of the UTF-8
representation of the JSON object below. (Note that the payload can representation of the JSON object below. (Note that the payload can
be any base64url encoded sequence of bytes, and need not be a be any base64url encoded octet sequence, and need not be a base64url
base64url encoded JSON object.) encoded JSON object.)
{"iss":"joe", {"iss":"joe",
"exp":1300819380, "exp":1300819380,
"http://example.com/is_root":true} "http://example.com/is_root":true}
The following byte array, which is the UTF-8 representation of the The following octet sequence, which is the UTF-8 representation of
JSON object above, is the JWS Payload: the JSON object above, is the JWS Payload:
[123, 34, 105, 115, 115, 34, 58, 34, 106, 111, 101, 34, 44, 13, 10, [123, 34, 105, 115, 115, 34, 58, 34, 106, 111, 101, 34, 44, 13, 10,
32, 34, 101, 120, 112, 34, 58, 49, 51, 48, 48, 56, 49, 57, 51, 56, 32, 34, 101, 120, 112, 34, 58, 49, 51, 48, 48, 56, 49, 57, 51, 56,
48, 44, 13, 10, 32, 34, 104, 116, 116, 112, 58, 47, 47, 101, 120, 97, 48, 44, 13, 10, 32, 34, 104, 116, 116, 112, 58, 47, 47, 101, 120, 97,
109, 112, 108, 101, 46, 99, 111, 109, 47, 105, 115, 95, 114, 111, 109, 112, 108, 101, 46, 99, 111, 109, 47, 105, 115, 95, 114, 111,
111, 116, 34, 58, 116, 114, 117, 101, 125] 111, 116, 34, 58, 116, 114, 117, 101, 125]
Base64url encoding the above yields the Encoded JWS Payload value Base64url encoding the above yields the Encoded JWS Payload value
(with line breaks for display purposes only): (with line breaks for display purposes only):
eyJpc3MiOiJqb2UiLA0KICJleHAiOjEzMDA4MTkzODAsDQogImh0dHA6Ly9leGFt eyJpc3MiOiJqb2UiLA0KICJleHAiOjEzMDA4MTkzODAsDQogImh0dHA6Ly9leGFt
cGxlLmNvbS9pc19yb290Ijp0cnVlfQ cGxlLmNvbS9pc19yb290Ijp0cnVlfQ
Concatenating the Encoded JWS Header, a period ('.') character, and Concatenating the Encoded JWS Header, a period ('.') character, and
the Encoded JWS Payload yields this JWS Secured Input value (with the Encoded JWS Payload yields this JWS Signing Input value (with
line breaks for display purposes only): line breaks for display purposes only):
eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLA0KICJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9 eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLA0KICJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9
. .
eyJpc3MiOiJqb2UiLA0KICJleHAiOjEzMDA4MTkzODAsDQogImh0dHA6Ly9leGFt eyJpc3MiOiJqb2UiLA0KICJleHAiOjEzMDA4MTkzODAsDQogImh0dHA6Ly9leGFt
cGxlLmNvbS9pc19yb290Ijp0cnVlfQ cGxlLmNvbS9pc19yb290Ijp0cnVlfQ
The ASCII representation of the JWS Secured Input is the following The ASCII representation of the JWS Signing Input is the following
byte array: octet sequence:
[101, 121, 74, 48, 101, 88, 65, 105, 79, 105, 74, 75, 86, 49, 81, [101, 121, 74, 48, 101, 88, 65, 105, 79, 105, 74, 75, 86, 49, 81,
105, 76, 65, 48, 75, 73, 67, 74, 104, 98, 71, 99, 105, 79, 105, 74, 105, 76, 65, 48, 75, 73, 67, 74, 104, 98, 71, 99, 105, 79, 105, 74,
73, 85, 122, 73, 49, 78, 105, 74, 57, 46, 101, 121, 74, 112, 99, 51, 73, 85, 122, 73, 49, 78, 105, 74, 57, 46, 101, 121, 74, 112, 99, 51,
77, 105, 79, 105, 74, 113, 98, 50, 85, 105, 76, 65, 48, 75, 73, 67, 77, 105, 79, 105, 74, 113, 98, 50, 85, 105, 76, 65, 48, 75, 73, 67,
74, 108, 101, 72, 65, 105, 79, 106, 69, 122, 77, 68, 65, 52, 77, 84, 74, 108, 101, 72, 65, 105, 79, 106, 69, 122, 77, 68, 65, 52, 77, 84,
107, 122, 79, 68, 65, 115, 68, 81, 111, 103, 73, 109, 104, 48, 100, 107, 122, 79, 68, 65, 115, 68, 81, 111, 103, 73, 109, 104, 48, 100,
72, 65, 54, 76, 121, 57, 108, 101, 71, 70, 116, 99, 71, 120, 108, 76, 72, 65, 54, 76, 121, 57, 108, 101, 71, 70, 116, 99, 71, 120, 108, 76,
109, 78, 118, 98, 83, 57, 112, 99, 49, 57, 121, 98, 50, 57, 48, 73, 109, 78, 118, 98, 83, 57, 112, 99, 49, 57, 121, 98, 50, 57, 48, 73,
106, 112, 48, 99, 110, 86, 108, 102, 81] 106, 112, 48, 99, 110, 86, 108, 102, 81]
HMACs are generated using keys. This example uses the key HMACs are generated using keys. This example uses the key
represented by the following byte array: represented by the following octet sequence:
[3, 35, 53, 75, 43, 15, 165, 188, 131, 126, 6, 101, 119, 123, 166, [3, 35, 53, 75, 43, 15, 165, 188, 131, 126, 6, 101, 119, 123, 166,
143, 90, 179, 40, 230, 240, 84, 201, 40, 169, 15, 132, 178, 210, 80, 143, 90, 179, 40, 230, 240, 84, 201, 40, 169, 15, 132, 178, 210, 80,
46, 191, 211, 251, 90, 146, 210, 6, 71, 239, 150, 138, 180, 195, 119, 46, 191, 211, 251, 90, 146, 210, 6, 71, 239, 150, 138, 180, 195, 119,
98, 61, 34, 61, 46, 33, 114, 5, 46, 79, 8, 192, 205, 154, 245, 103, 98, 61, 34, 61, 46, 33, 114, 5, 46, 79, 8, 192, 205, 154, 245, 103,
208, 128, 163] 208, 128, 163]
Running the HMAC SHA-256 algorithm on the bytes of the ASCII Running the HMAC SHA-256 algorithm on the octets of the ASCII
representation of the JWS Secured Input with this key yields the representation of the JWS Signing Input with this key yields the
following byte array: following octet sequence:
[116, 24, 223, 180, 151, 153, 224, 37, 79, 250, 96, 125, 216, 173, [116, 24, 223, 180, 151, 153, 224, 37, 79, 250, 96, 125, 216, 173,
187, 186, 22, 212, 37, 77, 105, 214, 191, 240, 91, 88, 5, 88, 83, 187, 186, 22, 212, 37, 77, 105, 214, 191, 240, 91, 88, 5, 88, 83,
132, 141, 121] 132, 141, 121]
Base64url encoding the above HMAC output yields the Encoded JWS Base64url encoding the above HMAC output yields the Encoded JWS
Signature value: Signature value:
dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk
Concatenating these values in the order Header.Payload.Signature with
period ('.') characters between the parts yields this complete JWS
representation using the JWS Compact Serialization (with line breaks
for display purposes only):
eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLA0KICJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9
.
eyJpc3MiOiJqb2UiLA0KICJleHAiOjEzMDA4MTkzODAsDQogImh0dHA6Ly9leGFt
cGxlLmNvbS9pc19yb290Ijp0cnVlfQ
.
dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk
A.1.2. Decoding A.1.2. Decoding
Decoding the JWS requires base64url decoding the Encoded JWS Header, Decoding the JWS requires base64url decoding the Encoded JWS Header,
Encoded JWS Payload, and Encoded JWS Signature to produce the JWS Encoded JWS Payload, and Encoded JWS Signature to produce the JWS
Header, JWS Payload, and JWS Signature byte arrays. The byte array Header, JWS Payload, and JWS Signature octet sequences. The octet
containing the UTF-8 representation of the JWS Header is decoded into sequence containing the UTF-8 representation of the JWS Header is
the JWS Header string. decoded into the JWS Header string.
A.1.3. Validating A.1.3. Validating
Next we validate the decoded results. Since the "alg" parameter in Next we validate the decoded results. Since the "alg" parameter in
the header is "HS256", we validate the HMAC SHA-256 value contained the header is "HS256", we validate the HMAC SHA-256 value contained
in the JWS Signature. If any of the validation steps fail, the JWS in the JWS Signature. If any of the validation steps fail, the JWS
MUST be rejected. MUST be rejected.
First, we validate that the JWS Header string is legal JSON. First, we validate that the JWS Header string is legal JSON.
To validate the HMAC value, we repeat the previous process of using To validate the HMAC value, we repeat the previous process of using
the correct key and the ASCII representation of the JWS Secured Input the correct key and the ASCII representation of the JWS Signing Input
as input to the HMAC SHA-256 function and then taking the output and as input to the HMAC SHA-256 function and then taking the output and
determining if it matches the JWS Signature. If it matches exactly, determining if it matches the JWS Signature. If it matches exactly,
the HMAC has been validated. the HMAC has been validated.
A.2. JWS using RSA SHA-256 A.2. Example JWS using RSA SHA-256
A.2.1. Encoding A.2.1. Encoding
The JWS Header in this example is different from the previous example The JWS Header in this example is different from the previous example
in two ways: First, because a different algorithm is being used, the in two ways: First, because a different algorithm is being used, the
"alg" value is different. Second, for illustration purposes only, "alg" value is different. Second, for illustration purposes only,
the optional "typ" parameter is not used. (This difference is not the optional "typ" parameter is not used. (This difference is not
related to the algorithm employed.) The JWS Header used is: related to the algorithm employed.) The JWS Header used is:
{"alg":"RS256"} {"alg":"RS256"}
The following byte array contains the UTF-8 representation of the JWS The following octet sequence contains the UTF-8 representation of the
Header: JWS Header:
[123, 34, 97, 108, 103, 34, 58, 34, 82, 83, 50, 53, 54, 34, 125] [123, 34, 97, 108, 103, 34, 58, 34, 82, 83, 50, 53, 54, 34, 125]
Base64url encoding these bytes yields this Encoded JWS Header value: Base64url encoding these octets yields this Encoded JWS Header value:
eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9 eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9
The JWS Payload used in this example, which follows, is the same as The JWS Payload used in this example, which follows, is the same as
in the previous example. Since the Encoded JWS Payload will in the previous example. Since the Encoded JWS Payload will
therefore be the same, its computation is not repeated here. therefore be the same, its computation is not repeated here.
{"iss":"joe", {"iss":"joe",
"exp":1300819380, "exp":1300819380,
"http://example.com/is_root":true} "http://example.com/is_root":true}
Concatenating the Encoded JWS Header, a period ('.') character, and Concatenating the Encoded JWS Header, a period ('.') character, and
the Encoded JWS Payload yields this JWS Secured Input value (with the Encoded JWS Payload yields this JWS Signing Input value (with
line breaks for display purposes only): line breaks for display purposes only):
eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9 eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9
. .
eyJpc3MiOiJqb2UiLA0KICJleHAiOjEzMDA4MTkzODAsDQogImh0dHA6Ly9leGFt eyJpc3MiOiJqb2UiLA0KICJleHAiOjEzMDA4MTkzODAsDQogImh0dHA6Ly9leGFt
cGxlLmNvbS9pc19yb290Ijp0cnVlfQ cGxlLmNvbS9pc19yb290Ijp0cnVlfQ
The ASCII representation of the JWS Secured Input is the following The ASCII representation of the JWS Signing Input is the following
byte array: octet sequence:
[101, 121, 74, 104, 98, 71, 99, 105, 79, 105, 74, 83, 85, 122, 73, [101, 121, 74, 104, 98, 71, 99, 105, 79, 105, 74, 83, 85, 122, 73,
49, 78, 105, 74, 57, 46, 101, 121, 74, 112, 99, 51, 77, 105, 79, 105, 49, 78, 105, 74, 57, 46, 101, 121, 74, 112, 99, 51, 77, 105, 79, 105,
74, 113, 98, 50, 85, 105, 76, 65, 48, 75, 73, 67, 74, 108, 101, 72, 74, 113, 98, 50, 85, 105, 76, 65, 48, 75, 73, 67, 74, 108, 101, 72,
65, 105, 79, 106, 69, 122, 77, 68, 65, 52, 77, 84, 107, 122, 79, 68, 65, 105, 79, 106, 69, 122, 77, 68, 65, 52, 77, 84, 107, 122, 79, 68,
65, 115, 68, 81, 111, 103, 73, 109, 104, 48, 100, 72, 65, 54, 76, 65, 115, 68, 81, 111, 103, 73, 109, 104, 48, 100, 72, 65, 54, 76,
121, 57, 108, 101, 71, 70, 116, 99, 71, 120, 108, 76, 109, 78, 118, 121, 57, 108, 101, 71, 70, 116, 99, 71, 120, 108, 76, 109, 78, 118,
98, 83, 57, 112, 99, 49, 57, 121, 98, 50, 57, 48, 73, 106, 112, 48, 98, 83, 57, 112, 99, 49, 57, 121, 98, 50, 57, 48, 73, 106, 112, 48,
99, 110, 86, 108, 102, 81] 99, 110, 86, 108, 102, 81]
The RSA key consists of a public part (Modulus, Exponent), and a The RSA key consists of a public part (Modulus, Exponent), and a
Private Exponent. The values of the RSA key used in this example, Private Exponent. The values of the RSA key used in this example,
presented as the byte arrays representing big endian integers are: presented as the octet sequences representing big endian integers
are:
+-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+ +-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+
| Parameter | Value | | Parameter | Value |
| Name | | | Name | |
+-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+ +-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+
| Modulus | [161, 248, 22, 10, 226, 227, 201, 180, 101, 206, 141, | | Modulus | [161, 248, 22, 10, 226, 227, 201, 180, 101, 206, 141, |
| | 45, 101, 98, 99, 54, 43, 146, 125, 190, 41, 225, 240, | | | 45, 101, 98, 99, 54, 43, 146, 125, 190, 41, 225, 240, |
| | 36, 119, 252, 22, 37, 204, 144, 161, 54, 227, 139, | | | 36, 119, 252, 22, 37, 204, 144, 161, 54, 227, 139, |
| | 217, 52, 151, 197, 182, 234, 99, 221, 119, 17, 230, | | | 217, 52, 151, 197, 182, 234, 99, 221, 119, 17, 230, |
| | 124, 116, 41, 249, 86, 176, 251, 138, 143, 8, 154, | | | 124, 116, 41, 249, 86, 176, 251, 138, 143, 8, 154, |
skipping to change at page 26, line 31 skipping to change at page 31, line 31
| | 37, 255, 31, 227, 78, 61, 220, 112, 240, 213, 100, | | | 37, 255, 31, 227, 78, 61, 220, 112, 240, 213, 100, |
| | 80, 253, 164, 139, 161, 46, 16, 78, 157, 235, 159, | | | 80, 253, 164, 139, 161, 46, 16, 78, 157, 235, 159, |
| | 184, 24, 129, 225, 196, 189, 242, 93, 146, 71, 244, | | | 184, 24, 129, 225, 196, 189, 242, 93, 146, 71, 244, |
| | 80, 200, 101, 146, 121, 104, 231, 115, 52, 244, 65, | | | 80, 200, 101, 146, 121, 104, 231, 115, 52, 244, 65, |
| | 79, 117, 167, 80, 225, 57, 84, 110, 58, 138, 115, | | | 79, 117, 167, 80, 225, 57, 84, 110, 58, 138, 115, |
| | 157] | | | 157] |
+-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+ +-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+
The RSA private key (Modulus, Private Exponent) is then passed to the The RSA private key (Modulus, Private Exponent) is then passed to the
RSA signing function, which also takes the hash type, SHA-256, and RSA signing function, which also takes the hash type, SHA-256, and
the bytes of the ASCII representation of the JWS Secured Input as the octets of the ASCII representation of the JWS Signing Input as
inputs. The result of the digital signature is a byte array, which inputs. The result of the digital signature is an octet sequence,
represents a big endian integer. In this example, it is: which represents a big endian integer. In this example, it is:
[112, 46, 33, 137, 67, 232, 143, 209, 30, 181, 216, 45, 191, 120, 69, [112, 46, 33, 137, 67, 232, 143, 209, 30, 181, 216, 45, 191, 120, 69,
243, 65, 6, 174, 27, 129, 255, 247, 115, 17, 22, 173, 209, 113, 125, 243, 65, 6, 174, 27, 129, 255, 247, 115, 17, 22, 173, 209, 113, 125,
131, 101, 109, 66, 10, 253, 60, 150, 238, 221, 115, 162, 102, 62, 81, 131, 101, 109, 66, 10, 253, 60, 150, 238, 221, 115, 162, 102, 62, 81,
102, 104, 123, 0, 11, 135, 34, 110, 1, 135, 237, 16, 115, 249, 69, 102, 104, 123, 0, 11, 135, 34, 110, 1, 135, 237, 16, 115, 249, 69,
229, 130, 173, 252, 239, 22, 216, 90, 121, 142, 232, 198, 109, 219, 229, 130, 173, 252, 239, 22, 216, 90, 121, 142, 232, 198, 109, 219,
61, 184, 151, 91, 23, 208, 148, 2, 190, 237, 213, 217, 217, 112, 7, 61, 184, 151, 91, 23, 208, 148, 2, 190, 237, 213, 217, 217, 112, 7,
16, 141, 178, 129, 96, 213, 248, 4, 12, 167, 68, 87, 98, 184, 31, 16, 141, 178, 129, 96, 213, 248, 4, 12, 167, 68, 87, 98, 184, 31,
190, 127, 249, 217, 46, 10, 231, 111, 36, 242, 91, 51, 187, 230, 244, 190, 127, 249, 217, 46, 10, 231, 111, 36, 242, 91, 51, 187, 230, 244,
74, 230, 30, 177, 4, 10, 203, 32, 4, 77, 62, 249, 18, 142, 212, 1, 74, 230, 30, 177, 4, 10, 203, 32, 4, 77, 62, 249, 18, 142, 212, 1,
skipping to change at page 27, line 16 skipping to change at page 32, line 16
Base64url encoding the digital signature produces this value for the Base64url encoding the digital signature produces this value for the
Encoded JWS Signature (with line breaks for display purposes only): Encoded JWS Signature (with line breaks for display purposes only):
cC4hiUPoj9Eetdgtv3hF80EGrhuB__dzERat0XF9g2VtQgr9PJbu3XOiZj5RZmh7 cC4hiUPoj9Eetdgtv3hF80EGrhuB__dzERat0XF9g2VtQgr9PJbu3XOiZj5RZmh7
AAuHIm4Bh-0Qc_lF5YKt_O8W2Fp5jujGbds9uJdbF9CUAr7t1dnZcAcQjbKBYNX4 AAuHIm4Bh-0Qc_lF5YKt_O8W2Fp5jujGbds9uJdbF9CUAr7t1dnZcAcQjbKBYNX4
BAynRFdiuB--f_nZLgrnbyTyWzO75vRK5h6xBArLIARNPvkSjtQBMHlb1L07Qe7K BAynRFdiuB--f_nZLgrnbyTyWzO75vRK5h6xBArLIARNPvkSjtQBMHlb1L07Qe7K
0GarZRmB_eSN9383LcOLn6_dO--xi12jzDwusC-eOkHWEsqtFZESc6BfI7noOPqv 0GarZRmB_eSN9383LcOLn6_dO--xi12jzDwusC-eOkHWEsqtFZESc6BfI7noOPqv
hJ1phCnvWh6IeYI2w9QOYEUipUTI8np6LbgGY9Fs98rqVt5AXLIhWkWywlVmtVrB hJ1phCnvWh6IeYI2w9QOYEUipUTI8np6LbgGY9Fs98rqVt5AXLIhWkWywlVmtVrB
p0igcN_IoypGlUPQGe77Rw p0igcN_IoypGlUPQGe77Rw
Concatenating these values in the order Header.Payload.Signature with
period ('.') characters between the parts yields this complete JWS
representation using the JWS Compact Serialization (with line breaks
for display purposes only):
eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9
.
eyJpc3MiOiJqb2UiLA0KICJleHAiOjEzMDA4MTkzODAsDQogImh0dHA6Ly9leGFt
cGxlLmNvbS9pc19yb290Ijp0cnVlfQ
.
cC4hiUPoj9Eetdgtv3hF80EGrhuB__dzERat0XF9g2VtQgr9PJbu3XOiZj5RZmh7
AAuHIm4Bh-0Qc_lF5YKt_O8W2Fp5jujGbds9uJdbF9CUAr7t1dnZcAcQjbKBYNX4
BAynRFdiuB--f_nZLgrnbyTyWzO75vRK5h6xBArLIARNPvkSjtQBMHlb1L07Qe7K
0GarZRmB_eSN9383LcOLn6_dO--xi12jzDwusC-eOkHWEsqtFZESc6BfI7noOPqv
hJ1phCnvWh6IeYI2w9QOYEUipUTI8np6LbgGY9Fs98rqVt5AXLIhWkWywlVmtVrB
p0igcN_IoypGlUPQGe77Rw
A.2.2. Decoding A.2.2. Decoding
Decoding the JWS requires base64url decoding the Encoded JWS Header, Decoding the JWS requires base64url decoding the Encoded JWS Header,
Encoded JWS Payload, and Encoded JWS Signature to produce the JWS Encoded JWS Payload, and Encoded JWS Signature to produce the JWS
Header, JWS Payload, and JWS Signature byte arrays. The byte array Header, JWS Payload, and JWS Signature octet sequences. The octet
containing the UTF-8 representation of the JWS Header is decoded into sequence containing the UTF-8 representation of the JWS Header is
the JWS Header string. decoded into the JWS Header string.
A.2.3. Validating A.2.3. Validating
Since the "alg" parameter in the header is "RS256", we validate the Since the "alg" parameter in the header is "RS256", we validate the
RSA SHA-256 digital signature contained in the JWS Signature. If any RSA SHA-256 digital signature contained in the JWS Signature. If any
of the validation steps fail, the JWS MUST be rejected. of the validation steps fail, the JWS MUST be rejected.
First, we validate that the JWS Header string is legal JSON. First, we validate that the JWS Header string is legal JSON.
Validating the JWS Signature is a little different from the previous Validating the JWS Signature is a little different from the previous
example. First, we base64url decode the Encoded JWS Signature to example. First, we base64url decode the Encoded JWS Signature to
produce a digital signature S to check. We then pass (n, e), S and produce a digital signature S to check. We then pass (n, e), S and
the bytes of the ASCII representation of the JWS Secured Input to an the octets of the ASCII representation of the JWS Signing Input to an
RSA signature verifier that has been configured to use the SHA-256 RSA signature verifier that has been configured to use the SHA-256
hash function. hash function.
A.3. JWS using ECDSA P-256 SHA-256 A.3. Example JWS using ECDSA P-256 SHA-256
A.3.1. Encoding A.3.1. Encoding
The JWS Header for this example differs from the previous example The JWS Header for this example differs from the previous example
because a different algorithm is being used. The JWS Header used is: because a different algorithm is being used. The JWS Header used is:
{"alg":"ES256"} {"alg":"ES256"}
The following byte array contains the UTF-8 representation of the JWS The following octet sequence contains the UTF-8 representation of the
Header: JWS Header:
[123, 34, 97, 108, 103, 34, 58, 34, 69, 83, 50, 53, 54, 34, 125] [123, 34, 97, 108, 103, 34, 58, 34, 69, 83, 50, 53, 54, 34, 125]
Base64url encoding these bytes yields this Encoded JWS Header value:
Base64url encoding these octets yields this Encoded JWS Header value:
eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiJ9 eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiJ9
The JWS Payload used in this example, which follows, is the same as The JWS Payload used in this example, which follows, is the same as
in the previous examples. Since the Encoded JWS Payload will in the previous examples. Since the Encoded JWS Payload will
therefore be the same, its computation is not repeated here. therefore be the same, its computation is not repeated here.
{"iss":"joe", {"iss":"joe",
"exp":1300819380, "exp":1300819380,
"http://example.com/is_root":true} "http://example.com/is_root":true}
Concatenating the Encoded JWS Header, a period ('.') character, and Concatenating the Encoded JWS Header, a period ('.') character, and
the Encoded JWS Payload yields this JWS Secured Input value (with the Encoded JWS Payload yields this JWS Signing Input value (with
line breaks for display purposes only): line breaks for display purposes only):
eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiJ9 eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiJ9
. .
eyJpc3MiOiJqb2UiLA0KICJleHAiOjEzMDA4MTkzODAsDQogImh0dHA6Ly9leGFt eyJpc3MiOiJqb2UiLA0KICJleHAiOjEzMDA4MTkzODAsDQogImh0dHA6Ly9leGFt
cGxlLmNvbS9pc19yb290Ijp0cnVlfQ cGxlLmNvbS9pc19yb290Ijp0cnVlfQ
The ASCII representation of the JWS Secured Input is the following The ASCII representation of the JWS Signing Input is the following
byte array: octet sequence:
[101, 121, 74, 104, 98, 71, 99, 105, 79, 105, 74, 70, 85, 122, 73, [101, 121, 74, 104, 98, 71, 99, 105, 79, 105, 74, 70, 85, 122, 73,
49, 78, 105, 74, 57, 46, 101, 121, 74, 112, 99, 51, 77, 105, 79, 105, 49, 78, 105, 74, 57, 46, 101, 121, 74, 112, 99, 51, 77, 105, 79, 105,
74, 113, 98, 50, 85, 105, 76, 65, 48, 75, 73, 67, 74, 108, 101, 72, 74, 113, 98, 50, 85, 105, 76, 65, 48, 75, 73, 67, 74, 108, 101, 72,
65, 105, 79, 106, 69, 122, 77, 68, 65, 52, 77, 84, 107, 122, 79, 68, 65, 105, 79, 106, 69, 122, 77, 68, 65, 52, 77, 84, 107, 122, 79, 68,
65, 115, 68, 81, 111, 103, 73, 109, 104, 48, 100, 72, 65, 54, 76, 65, 115, 68, 81, 111, 103, 73, 109, 104, 48, 100, 72, 65, 54, 76,
121, 57, 108, 101, 71, 70, 116, 99, 71, 120, 108, 76, 109, 78, 118, 121, 57, 108, 101, 71, 70, 116, 99, 71, 120, 108, 76, 109, 78, 118,
98, 83, 57, 112, 99, 49, 57, 121, 98, 50, 57, 48, 73, 106, 112, 48, 98, 83, 57, 112, 99, 49, 57, 121, 98, 50, 57, 48, 73, 106, 112, 48,
99, 110, 86, 108, 102, 81] 99, 110, 86, 108, 102, 81]
The ECDSA key consists of a public part, the EC point (x, y), and a The ECDSA key consists of a public part, the EC point (x, y), and a
private part d. The values of the ECDSA key used in this example, private part d. The values of the ECDSA key used in this example,
presented as the byte arrays representing three 256 bit big endian presented as the octet sequences representing three 256 bit big
integers are: endian integers are:
+-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+ +-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+
| Parameter | Value | | Parameter | Value |
| Name | | | Name | |
+-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+ +-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+
| x | [127, 205, 206, 39, 112, 246, 196, 93, 65, 131, 203, | | x | [127, 205, 206, 39, 112, 246, 196, 93, 65, 131, 203, |
| | 238, 111, 219, 75, 123, 88, 7, 51, 53, 123, 233, 239, | | | 238, 111, 219, 75, 123, 88, 7, 51, 53, 123, 233, 239, |
| | 19, 186, 207, 110, 60, 123, 209, 84, 69] | | | 19, 186, 207, 110, 60, 123, 209, 84, 69] |
| y | [199, 241, 68, 205, 27, 189, 155, 126, 135, 44, 223, | | y | [199, 241, 68, 205, 27, 189, 155, 126, 135, 44, 223, |
| | 237, 185, 238, 185, 244, 179, 105, 93, 110, 169, 11, | | | 237, 185, 238, 185, 244, 179, 105, 93, 110, 169, 11, |
| | 36, 173, 138, 70, 35, 40, 133, 136, 229, 173] | | | 36, 173, 138, 70, 35, 40, 133, 136, 229, 173] |
| d | [142, 155, 16, 158, 113, 144, 152, 191, 152, 4, 135, | | d | [142, 155, 16, 158, 113, 144, 152, 191, 152, 4, 135, |
| | 223, 31, 93, 119, 233, 203, 41, 96, 110, 190, 210, | | | 223, 31, 93, 119, 233, 203, 41, 96, 110, 190, 210, |
| | 38, 59, 95, 87, 194, 19, 223, 132, 244, 178] | | | 38, 59, 95, 87, 194, 19, 223, 132, 244, 178] |
+-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+ +-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+
The ECDSA private part d is then passed to an ECDSA signing function, The ECDSA private part d is then passed to an ECDSA signing function,
which also takes the curve type, P-256, the hash type, SHA-256, and which also takes the curve type, P-256, the hash type, SHA-256, and
the bytes of the ASCII representation of the JWS Secured Input as the octets of the ASCII representation of the JWS Signing Input as
inputs. The result of the digital signature is the EC point (R, S), inputs. The result of the digital signature is the EC point (R, S),
where R and S are unsigned integers. In this example, the R and S where R and S are unsigned integers. In this example, the R and S
values, given as byte arrays representing big endian integers are: values, given as octet sequences representing big endian integers
are:
+--------+----------------------------------------------------------+ +--------+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Result | Value | | Result | Value |
| Name | | | Name | |
+--------+----------------------------------------------------------+ +--------+----------------------------------------------------------+
| R | [14, 209, 33, 83, 121, 99, 108, 72, 60, 47, 127, 21, 88, | | R | [14, 209, 33, 83, 121, 99, 108, 72, 60, 47, 127, 21, 88, |
| | 7, 212, 2, 163, 178, 40, 3, 58, 249, 124, 126, 23, 129, | | | 7, 212, 2, 163, 178, 40, 3, 58, 249, 124, 126, 23, 129, |
| | 154, 195, 22, 158, 166, 101] | | | 154, 195, 22, 158, 166, 101] |
| S | [197, 10, 7, 211, 140, 60, 112, 229, 216, 241, 45, 175, | | S | [197, 10, 7, 211, 140, 60, 112, 229, 216, 241, 45, 175, |
| | 8, 74, 84, 128, 166, 101, 144, 197, 242, 147, 80, 154, | | | 8, 74, 84, 128, 166, 101, 144, 197, 242, 147, 80, 154, |
| | 143, 63, 127, 138, 131, 163, 84, 213] | | | 143, 63, 127, 138, 131, 163, 84, 213] |
+--------+----------------------------------------------------------+ +--------+----------------------------------------------------------+
Concatenating the S array to the end of the R array and base64url Concatenating the S array to the end of the R array and base64url
encoding the result produces this value for the Encoded JWS Signature encoding the result produces this value for the Encoded JWS Signature
(with line breaks for display purposes only): (with line breaks for display purposes only):
DtEhU3ljbEg8L38VWAfUAqOyKAM6-Xx-F4GawxaepmXFCgfTjDxw5djxLa8ISlSA DtEhU3ljbEg8L38VWAfUAqOyKAM6-Xx-F4GawxaepmXFCgfTjDxw5djxLa8ISlSA
pmWQxfKTUJqPP3-Kg6NU1Q pmWQxfKTUJqPP3-Kg6NU1Q
Concatenating these values in the order Header.Payload.Signature with
period ('.') characters between the parts yields this complete JWS
representation using the JWS Compact Serialization (with line breaks
for display purposes only):
eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiJ9
.
eyJpc3MiOiJqb2UiLA0KICJleHAiOjEzMDA4MTkzODAsDQogImh0dHA6Ly9leGFt
cGxlLmNvbS9pc19yb290Ijp0cnVlfQ
.
DtEhU3ljbEg8L38VWAfUAqOyKAM6-Xx-F4GawxaepmXFCgfTjDxw5djxLa8ISlSA
pmWQxfKTUJqPP3-Kg6NU1Q
A.3.2. Decoding A.3.2. Decoding
Decoding the JWS requires base64url decoding the Encoded JWS Header, Decoding the JWS requires base64url decoding the Encoded JWS Header,
Encoded JWS Payload, and Encoded JWS Signature to produce the JWS Encoded JWS Payload, and Encoded JWS Signature to produce the JWS
Header, JWS Payload, and JWS Signature byte arrays. The byte array Header, JWS Payload, and JWS Signature octet sequences. The octet
containing the UTF-8 representation of the JWS Header is decoded into sequence containing the UTF-8 representation of the JWS Header is
the JWS Header string. decoded into the JWS Header string.
A.3.3. Validating A.3.3. Validating
Since the "alg" parameter in the header is "ES256", we validate the Since the "alg" parameter in the header is "ES256", we validate the
ECDSA P-256 SHA-256 digital signature contained in the JWS Signature. ECDSA P-256 SHA-256 digital signature contained in the JWS Signature.
If any of the validation steps fail, the JWS MUST be rejected. If any of the validation steps fail, the JWS MUST be rejected.
First, we validate that the JWS Header string is legal JSON. First, we validate that the JWS Header string is legal JSON.
Validating the JWS Signature is a little different from the first Validating the JWS Signature is a little different from the first
example. First, we base64url decode the Encoded JWS Signature as in example. First, we base64url decode the Encoded JWS Signature as in
the previous examples but we then need to split the 64 member byte the previous examples but we then need to split the 64 member octet
array that must result into two 32 byte arrays, the first R and the sequence that must result into two 32 octet sequences, the first R
second S. We then pass (x, y), (R, S) and the bytes of the ASCII and the second S. We then pass (x, y), (R, S) and the octets of the
representation of the JWS Secured Input to an ECDSA signature ASCII representation of the JWS Signing Input to an ECDSA signature
verifier that has been configured to use the P-256 curve with the verifier that has been configured to use the P-256 curve with the
SHA-256 hash function. SHA-256 hash function.
As explained in Section 3.4 of the JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) [JWA] As explained in Section 3.4 of the JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) [JWA]
specification, the use of the K value in ECDSA means that we cannot specification, the use of the K value in ECDSA means that we cannot
validate the correctness of the digital signature in the same way we validate the correctness of the digital signature in the same way we
validated the correctness of the HMAC. Instead, implementations MUST validated the correctness of the HMAC. Instead, implementations MUST
use an ECDSA validator to validate the digital signature. use an ECDSA validator to validate the digital signature.
A.4. JWS using ECDSA P-521 SHA-512 A.4. Example JWS using ECDSA P-521 SHA-512
A.4.1. Encoding A.4.1. Encoding
The JWS Header for this example differs from the previous example The JWS Header for this example differs from the previous example
because a different ECDSA curve and hash function are used. The JWS because a different ECDSA curve and hash function are used. The JWS
Header used is: Header used is:
{"alg":"ES512"} {"alg":"ES512"}
The following byte array contains the UTF-8 representation of the JWS The following octet sequence contains the UTF-8 representation of the
Header: JWS Header:
[123, 34, 97, 108, 103, 34, 58, 34, 69, 83, 53, 49, 50, 34, 125] [123, 34, 97, 108, 103, 34, 58, 34, 69, 83, 53, 49, 50, 34, 125]
Base64url encoding these bytes yields this Encoded JWS Header value: Base64url encoding these octets yields this Encoded JWS Header value:
eyJhbGciOiJFUzUxMiJ9 eyJhbGciOiJFUzUxMiJ9
The JWS Payload used in this example, is the ASCII string "Payload". The JWS Payload used in this example, is the ASCII string "Payload".
The representation of this string is the byte array: The representation of this string is the octet sequence:
[80, 97, 121, 108, 111, 97, 100] [80, 97, 121, 108, 111, 97, 100]
Base64url encoding these bytes yields the Encoded JWS Payload value: Base64url encoding these octets yields the Encoded JWS Payload value:
UGF5bG9hZA UGF5bG9hZA
Concatenating the Encoded JWS Header, a period ('.') character, and Concatenating the Encoded JWS Header, a period ('.') character, and
the Encoded JWS Payload yields this JWS Secured Input value: the Encoded JWS Payload yields this JWS Signing Input value:
eyJhbGciOiJFUzUxMiJ9.UGF5bG9hZA eyJhbGciOiJFUzUxMiJ9.UGF5bG9hZA
The ASCII representation of the JWS Secured Input is the following The ASCII representation of the JWS Signing Input is the following
byte array: octet sequence:
[101, 121, 74, 104, 98, 71, 99, 105, 79, 105, 74, 70, 85, 122, 85, [101, 121, 74, 104, 98, 71, 99, 105, 79, 105, 74, 70, 85, 122, 85,
120, 77, 105, 74, 57, 46, 85, 71, 70, 53, 98, 71, 57, 104, 90, 65] 120, 77, 105, 74, 57, 46, 85, 71, 70, 53, 98, 71, 57, 104, 90, 65]
The ECDSA key consists of a public part, the EC point (x, y), and a The ECDSA key consists of a public part, the EC point (x, y), and a
private part d. The values of the ECDSA key used in this example, private part d. The values of the ECDSA key used in this example,
presented as the byte arrays representing three 521 bit big endian presented as the octet sequences representing three 521 bit big
integers are: endian integers are:
+-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+ +-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+
| Parameter | Value | | Parameter | Value |
| Name | | | Name | |
+-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+ +-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+
| x | [1, 233, 41, 5, 15, 18, 79, 198, 188, 85, 199, 213, | | x | [1, 233, 41, 5, 15, 18, 79, 198, 188, 85, 199, 213, |
| | 57, 51, 101, 223, 157, 239, 74, 176, 194, 44, 178, | | | 57, 51, 101, 223, 157, 239, 74, 176, 194, 44, 178, |
| | 87, 152, 249, 52, 235, 4, 227, 198, 186, 227, 112, | | | 87, 152, 249, 52, 235, 4, 227, 198, 186, 227, 112, |
| | 26, 87, 167, 145, 14, 157, 129, 191, 54, 49, 89, 232, | | | 26, 87, 167, 145, 14, 157, 129, 191, 54, 49, 89, 232, |
| | 235, 203, 21, 93, 99, 73, 244, 189, 182, 204, 248, | | | 235, 203, 21, 93, 99, 73, 244, 189, 182, 204, 248, |
skipping to change at page 31, line 40 skipping to change at page 37, line 31
| d | [1, 142, 105, 111, 176, 52, 80, 88, 129, 221, 17, 11, | | d | [1, 142, 105, 111, 176, 52, 80, 88, 129, 221, 17, 11, |
| | 72, 62, 184, 125, 50, 206, 73, 95, 227, 107, 55, 69, | | | 72, 62, 184, 125, 50, 206, 73, 95, 227, 107, 55, 69, |
| | 237, 242, 216, 202, 228, 240, 242, 83, 159, 70, 21, | | | 237, 242, 216, 202, 228, 240, 242, 83, 159, 70, 21, |
| | 160, 233, 142, 171, 82, 179, 192, 197, 234, 196, 206, | | | 160, 233, 142, 171, 82, 179, 192, 197, 234, 196, 206, |
| | 7, 81, 133, 168, 231, 187, 71, 222, 172, 29, 29, 231, | | | 7, 81, 133, 168, 231, 187, 71, 222, 172, 29, 29, 231, |
| | 123, 204, 246, 97, 53, 230, 61, 130] | | | 123, 204, 246, 97, 53, 230, 61, 130] |
+-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+ +-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+
The ECDSA private part d is then passed to an ECDSA signing function, The ECDSA private part d is then passed to an ECDSA signing function,
which also takes the curve type, P-521, the hash type, SHA-512, and which also takes the curve type, P-521, the hash type, SHA-512, and
the bytes of the ASCII representation of the JWS Secured Input as the octets of the ASCII representation of the JWS Signing Input as
inputs. The result of the digital signature is the EC point (R, S), inputs. The result of the digital signature is the EC point (R, S),
where R and S are unsigned integers. In this example, the R and S where R and S are unsigned integers. In this example, the R and S
values, given as byte arrays representing big endian integers are: values, given as octet sequences representing big endian integers
are:
+--------+----------------------------------------------------------+ +--------+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Result | Value | | Result | Value |
| Name | | | Name | |
+--------+----------------------------------------------------------+ +--------+----------------------------------------------------------+
| R | [1, 220, 12, 129, 231, 171, 194, 209, 232, 135, 233, | | R | [1, 220, 12, 129, 231, 171, 194, 209, 232, 135, 233, |
| | 117, 247, 105, 122, 210, 26, 125, 192, 1, 217, 21, 82, | | | 117, 247, 105, 122, 210, 26, 125, 192, 1, 217, 21, 82, |
| | 91, 45, 240, 255, 83, 19, 34, 239, 71, 48, 157, 147, | | | 91, 45, 240, 255, 83, 19, 34, 239, 71, 48, 157, 147, |
| | 152, 105, 18, 53, 108, 163, 214, 68, 231, 62, 153, 150, | | | 152, 105, 18, 53, 108, 163, 214, 68, 231, 62, 153, 150, |
| | 106, 194, 164, 246, 72, 143, 138, 24, 50, 129, 223, 133, | | | 106, 194, 164, 246, 72, 143, 138, 24, 50, 129, 223, 133, |
skipping to change at page 32, line 31 skipping to change at page 38, line 20
+--------+----------------------------------------------------------+ +--------+----------------------------------------------------------+
Concatenating the S array to the end of the R array and base64url Concatenating the S array to the end of the R array and base64url
encoding the result produces this value for the Encoded JWS Signature encoding the result produces this value for the Encoded JWS Signature
(with line breaks for display purposes only): (with line breaks for display purposes only):
AdwMgeerwtHoh-l192l60hp9wAHZFVJbLfD_UxMi70cwnZOYaRI1bKPWROc-mZZq AdwMgeerwtHoh-l192l60hp9wAHZFVJbLfD_UxMi70cwnZOYaRI1bKPWROc-mZZq
wqT2SI-KGDKB34XO0aw_7XdtAG8GaSwFKdCAPZgoXD2YBJZCPEX3xKpRwcdOO8Kp wqT2SI-KGDKB34XO0aw_7XdtAG8GaSwFKdCAPZgoXD2YBJZCPEX3xKpRwcdOO8Kp
EHwJjyqOgzDO7iKvU8vcnwNrmxYbSW9ERBXukOXolLzeO_Jn EHwJjyqOgzDO7iKvU8vcnwNrmxYbSW9ERBXukOXolLzeO_Jn
Concatenating these values in the order Header.Payload.Signature with
period ('.') characters between the parts yields this complete JWS
representation using the JWS Compact Serialization (with line breaks
for display purposes only):
eyJhbGciOiJFUzUxMiJ9
.
eyJpc3MiOiJqb2UiLA0KICJleHAiOjEzMDA4MTkzODAsDQogImh0dHA6Ly9leGFt
cGxlLmNvbS9pc19yb290Ijp0cnVlfQ
.
AdwMgeerwtHoh-l192l60hp9wAHZFVJbLfD_UxMi70cwnZOYaRI1bKPWROc-mZZq
wqT2SI-KGDKB34XO0aw_7XdtAG8GaSwFKdCAPZgoXD2YBJZCPEX3xKpRwcdOO8Kp
EHwJjyqOgzDO7iKvU8vcnwNrmxYbSW9ERBXukOXolLzeO_Jn
A.4.2. Decoding A.4.2. Decoding
Decoding the JWS requires base64url decoding the Encoded JWS Header, Decoding the JWS requires base64url decoding the Encoded JWS Header,
Encoded JWS Payload, and Encoded JWS Signature to produce the JWS Encoded JWS Payload, and Encoded JWS Signature to produce the JWS
Header, JWS Payload, and JWS Signature byte arrays. The byte array Header, JWS Payload, and JWS Signature octet sequences. The octet
containing the UTF-8 representation of the JWS Header is decoded into sequence containing the UTF-8 representation of the JWS Header is
the JWS Header string. decoded into the JWS Header string.
A.4.3. Validating A.4.3. Validating
Since the "alg" parameter in the header is "ES512", we validate the Since the "alg" parameter in the header is "ES512", we validate the
ECDSA P-521 SHA-512 digital signature contained in the JWS Signature. ECDSA P-521 SHA-512 digital signature contained in the JWS Signature.
If any of the validation steps fail, the JWS MUST be rejected. If any of the validation steps fail, the JWS MUST be rejected.
First, we validate that the JWS Header string is legal JSON. First, we validate that the JWS Header string is legal JSON.
Validating the JWS Signature is similar to the previous example. Validating the JWS Signature is similar to the previous example.
First, we base64url decode the Encoded JWS Signature as in the First, we base64url decode the Encoded JWS Signature as in the
previous examples but we then need to split the 132 member byte array previous examples but we then need to split the 132 member octet
that must result into two 66 byte arrays, the first R and the second sequence that must result into two 66 octet sequences, the first R
S. We then pass (x, y), (R, S) and the bytes of the ASCII and the second S. We then pass (x, y), (R, S) and the octets of the
representation of the JWS Secured Input to an ECDSA signature ASCII representation of the JWS Signing Input to an ECDSA signature
verifier that has been configured to use the P-521 curve with the verifier that has been configured to use the P-521 curve with the
SHA-512 hash function. SHA-512 hash function.
As explained in Section 3.4 of the JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) [JWA] As explained in Section 3.4 of the JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) [JWA]
specification, the use of the K value in ECDSA means that we cannot specification, the use of the K value in ECDSA means that we cannot
validate the correctness of the digital signature in the same way we validate the correctness of the digital signature in the same way we
validated the correctness of the HMAC. Instead, implementations MUST validated the correctness of the HMAC. Instead, implementations MUST
use an ECDSA validator to validate the digital signature. use an ECDSA validator to validate the digital signature.
A.5. Example Plaintext JWS A.5. Example Plaintext JWS
The following example JWS Header declares that the encoded object is The following example JWS Header declares that the encoded object is
a Plaintext JWS: a Plaintext JWS:
{"alg":"none"} {"alg":"none"}
Base64url encoding the bytes of the UTF-8 representation of the JWS Base64url encoding the octets of the UTF-8 representation of the JWS
Header yields this Encoded JWS Header: Header yields this Encoded JWS Header:
eyJhbGciOiJub25lIn0 eyJhbGciOiJub25lIn0
The JWS Payload used in this example, which follows, is the same as The JWS Payload used in this example, which follows, is the same as
in the previous examples. Since the Encoded JWS Payload will in the previous examples. Since the Encoded JWS Payload will
therefore be the same, its computation is not repeated here. therefore be the same, its computation is not repeated here.
{"iss":"joe", {"iss":"joe",
"exp":1300819380, "exp":1300819380,
skipping to change at page 36, line 40 skipping to change at page 42, line 40
As per the example code above, the number of '=' padding characters As per the example code above, the number of '=' padding characters
that needs to be added to the end of a base64url encoded string that needs to be added to the end of a base64url encoded string
without padding to turn it into one with padding is a deterministic without padding to turn it into one with padding is a deterministic
function of the length of the encoded string. Specifically, if the function of the length of the encoded string. Specifically, if the
length mod 4 is 0, no padding is added; if the length mod 4 is 2, two length mod 4 is 0, no padding is added; if the length mod 4 is 2, two
'=' padding characters are added; if the length mod 4 is 3, one '=' '=' padding characters are added; if the length mod 4 is 3, one '='
padding character is added; if the length mod 4 is 1, the input is padding character is added; if the length mod 4 is 1, the input is
malformed. malformed.
An example correspondence between unencoded and encoded values An example correspondence between unencoded and encoded values
follows. The byte sequence below encodes into the string below, follows. The octet sequence below encodes into the string below,
which when decoded, reproduces the byte sequence. which when decoded, reproduces the octet sequence.
3 236 255 224 193 3 236 255 224 193
A-z_4ME A-z_4ME
Appendix D. Acknowledgements Appendix D. Acknowledgements
Solutions for signing JSON content were previously explored by Magic Solutions for signing JSON content were previously explored by Magic
Signatures [MagicSignatures], JSON Simple Sign [JSS], and Canvas Signatures [MagicSignatures], JSON Simple Sign [JSS], and Canvas
Applications [CanvasApp], all of which influenced this draft. Applications [CanvasApp], all of which influenced this draft.
Thanks to Axel Nennker for his early implementation and feedback on Thanks to Axel Nennker for his early implementation and feedback on
skipping to change at page 37, line 21 skipping to change at page 43, line 21
Dirk Balfanz, Richard Barnes, Brian Campbell, Breno de Medeiros, Dick Dirk Balfanz, Richard Barnes, Brian Campbell, Breno de Medeiros, Dick
Hardt, Joe Hildebrand, Jeff Hodges, Edmund Jay, Yaron Y. Goland, Ben Hardt, Joe Hildebrand, Jeff Hodges, Edmund Jay, Yaron Y. Goland, Ben
Laurie, James Manger, Tony Nadalin, Axel Nennker, John Panzer, Laurie, James Manger, Tony Nadalin, Axel Nennker, John Panzer,
Emmanuel Raviart, Eric Rescorla, Jim Schaad, Paul Tarjan, Hannes Emmanuel Raviart, Eric Rescorla, Jim Schaad, Paul Tarjan, Hannes
Tschofenig, and Sean Turner. Tschofenig, and Sean Turner.
Jim Schaad and Karen O'Donoghue chaired the JOSE working group and Jim Schaad and Karen O'Donoghue chaired the JOSE working group and
Sean Turner and Stephen Farrell served as Security area directors Sean Turner and Stephen Farrell served as Security area directors
during the creation of this specification. during the creation of this specification.
Appendix E. Open Issues Appendix E. Document History
[[ to be removed by the RFC editor before publication as an RFC ]] [[ to be removed by the RFC editor before publication as an RFC ]]
The following items remain to be considered or done in this draft: -09
o Should all header fields continue to be required to be understood o Added JWS JSON Serialization, as specified by
by implementations using them or should a means of declaring that draft-jones-jose-jws-json-serialization-04.
specific header fields may be safely ignored if not understood
should be defined?
Appendix F. Document History o Registered "application/jws-js" MIME type and "JWS-JS" typ header
parameter value.
[[ to be removed by the RFC editor before publication as an RFC ]] o Defined that the default action for header parameters that are not
understood is to ignore them unless specifically designated as
"MUST be understood" or included in the new "crit" (critical)
header parameter list. This addressed issue #6.
-08 o Changed term "JWS Secured Input" to "JWS Signing Input".
o Changed from using the term "byte" to "octet" when referring to 8
bit values.
o Changed member name from "recipients" to "signatures" in the JWS
JSON Serialization.
o Added complete values using the JWS Compact Serialization for all
examples.
-08
o Applied editorial improvements suggested by Jeff Hodges and Hannes o Applied editorial improvements suggested by Jeff Hodges and Hannes
Tschofenig. Many of these simplified the terminology used. Tschofenig. Many of these simplified the terminology used.
o Clarified statements of the form "This header parameter is o Clarified statements of the form "This header parameter is
OPTIONAL" to "Use of this header parameter is OPTIONAL". OPTIONAL" to "Use of this header parameter is OPTIONAL".
o Added a Header Parameter Usage Location(s) field to the IANA JSON o Added a Header Parameter Usage Location(s) field to the IANA JSON
Web Signature and Encryption Header Parameters registry. Web Signature and Encryption Header Parameters registry.
o Added seriesInfo information to Internet Draft references. o Added seriesInfo information to Internet Draft references.
 End of changes. 138 change blocks. 
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