draft-ietf-jose-json-web-signature-41.txt   rfc7515.txt 
JOSE Working Group M. Jones Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) M. Jones
Internet-Draft Microsoft Request for Comments: 7515 Microsoft
Intended status: Standards Track J. Bradley Category: Standards Track J. Bradley
Expires: July 20, 2015 Ping Identity ISSN: 2070-1721 Ping Identity
N. Sakimura N. Sakimura
NRI NRI
January 16, 2015 May 2015
JSON Web Signature (JWS) JSON Web Signature (JWS)
draft-ietf-jose-json-web-signature-41
Abstract Abstract
JSON Web Signature (JWS) represents content secured with digital JSON Web Signature (JWS) represents content secured with digital
signatures or Message Authentication Codes (MACs) using JavaScript signatures or Message Authentication Codes (MACs) using JSON-based
Object Notation (JSON) based data structures. Cryptographic data structures. Cryptographic algorithms and identifiers for use
algorithms and identifiers for use with this specification are with this specification are described in the separate JSON Web
described in the separate JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) specification and Algorithms (JWA) specification and an IANA registry defined by that
an IANA registry defined by that specification. Related encryption specification. Related encryption capabilities are described in the
capabilities are described in the separate JSON Web Encryption (JWE) separate JSON Web Encryption (JWE) specification.
specification.
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the Status of This Memo
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering This is an Internet Standards Track document.
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference received public review and has been approved for publication by the
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.
This Internet-Draft will expire on July 20, 2015. Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1. Introduction ....................................................4
1.1. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.1. Notational Conventions .....................................4
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2. Terminology .....................................................5
3. JSON Web Signature (JWS) Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3. JSON Web Signature (JWS) Overview ...............................7
3.1. JWS Compact Serialization Overview . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.1. JWS Compact Serialization Overview .........................7
3.2. JWS JSON Serialization Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.2. JWS JSON Serialization Overview ............................8
3.3. Example JWS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.3. Example JWS ................................................8
4. JOSE Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 4. JOSE Header .....................................................9
4.1. Registered Header Parameter Names . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4.1. Registered Header Parameter Names .........................10
4.1.1. "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . . 11 4.1.1. "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter .................10
4.1.2. "jku" (JWK Set URL) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . 11 4.1.2. "jku" (JWK Set URL) Header Parameter ...............10
4.1.3. "jwk" (JSON Web Key) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . 11 4.1.3. "jwk" (JSON Web Key) Header Parameter ..............11
4.1.4. "kid" (Key ID) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4.1.4. "kid" (Key ID) Header Parameter ....................11
4.1.5. "x5u" (X.509 URL) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . . 12 4.1.5. "x5u" (X.509 URL) Header Parameter .................11
4.1.6. "x5c" (X.509 Certificate Chain) Header Parameter . . . 12 4.1.6. "x5c" (X.509 Certificate Chain) Header Parameter ...11
4.1.7. "x5t" (X.509 Certificate SHA-1 Thumbprint) Header 4.1.7. "x5t" (X.509 Certificate SHA-1 Thumbprint)
Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Header Parameter ...................................12
4.1.8. "x5t#S256" (X.509 Certificate SHA-256 Thumbprint) 4.1.8. "x5t#S256" (X.509 Certificate SHA-256
Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Thumbprint) Header Parameter .......................12
4.1.9. "typ" (Type) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4.1.9. "typ" (Type) Header Parameter ......................12
4.1.10. "cty" (Content Type) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . 14 4.1.10. "cty" (Content Type) Header Parameter .............13
4.1.11. "crit" (Critical) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . . 14 4.1.11. "crit" (Critical) Header Parameter ................14
4.2. Public Header Parameter Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4.2. Public Header Parameter Names .............................14
4.3. Private Header Parameter Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4.3. Private Header Parameter Names ............................14
5. Producing and Consuming JWSs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 5. Producing and Consuming JWSs ...................................15
5.1. Message Signature or MAC Computation . . . . . . . . . . 15 5.1. Message Signature or MAC Computation ......................15
5.2. Message Signature or MAC Validation . . . . . . . . . . . 16 5.2. Message Signature or MAC Validation .......................16
5.3. String Comparison Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 5.3. String Comparison Rules ...................................17
6. Key Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 6. Key Identification .............................................18
7. Serializations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 7. Serializations .................................................19
7.1. JWS Compact Serialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 7.1. JWS Compact Serialization .................................19
7.2. JWS JSON Serialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 7.2. JWS JSON Serialization ....................................19
7.2.1. General JWS JSON Serialization Syntax . . . . . . . . 20 7.2.1. General JWS JSON Serialization Syntax ..............20
7.2.2. Flattened JWS JSON Serialization Syntax . . . . . . . 22 7.2.2. Flattened JWS JSON Serialization Syntax ............21
8. TLS Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 8. TLS Requirements ...............................................22
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 9. IANA Considerations ............................................22
9.1. JSON Web Signature and Encryption Header Parameters 9.1. JSON Web Signature and Encryption Header
Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Parameters Registry .......................................23
9.1.1. Registration Template ..............................23
9.1.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 9.1.2. Initial Registry Contents ..........................24
9.1.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 9.2. Media Type Registration ...................................26
9.2. Media Type Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 9.2.1. Registry Contents ..................................26
9.2.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 10. Security Considerations .......................................27
10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 10.1. Key Entropy and Random Values ............................27
10.1. Key Entropy and Random Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 10.2. Key Protection ...........................................28
10.2. Key Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 10.3. Key Origin Authentication ................................28
10.3. Key Origin Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 10.4. Cryptographic Agility ....................................28
10.4. Cryptographic Agility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 10.5. Differences between Digital Signatures and MACs ..........28
10.5. Differences between Digital Signatures and MACs . . . . . 29 10.6. Algorithm Validation .....................................29
10.6. Algorithm Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 10.7. Algorithm Protection .....................................29
10.7. Algorithm Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 10.8. Chosen Plaintext Attacks .................................30
10.8. Chosen Plaintext Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 10.9. Timing Attacks ...........................................30
10.9. Timing Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 10.10. Replay Protection .......................................30
10.10. Replay Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 10.11. SHA-1 Certificate Thumbprints ...........................30
10.11. SHA-1 Certificate Thumbprints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 10.12. JSON Security Considerations ............................31
10.12. JSON Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 10.13. Unicode Comparison Security Considerations ..............31
10.13. Unicode Comparison Security Considerations . . . . . . . 32 11. References ....................................................32
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 11.1. Normative References .....................................32
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 11.2. Informative References ...................................34
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Appendix A. JWS Examples .........................................36
Appendix A. JWS Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 A.1. Example JWS Using HMAC SHA-256 ............................36
A.1. Example JWS using HMAC SHA-256 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 A.1.1. Encoding ..............................................36
A.1.1. Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 A.1.2. Validating ............................................38
A.1.2. Validating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 A.2. Example JWS Using RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 SHA-256 ...............38
A.2. Example JWS using RSASSA-PKCS-v1_5 SHA-256 . . . . . . . 39 A.2.1. Encoding ..............................................38
A.2.1. Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 A.2.2. Validating ............................................42
A.2.2. Validating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 A.3. Example JWS Using ECDSA P-256 SHA-256 .....................42
A.3. Example JWS using ECDSA P-256 SHA-256 . . . . . . . . . . 42 A.3.1. Encoding ..............................................42
A.3.1. Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 A.3.2. Validating ............................................44
A.3.2. Validating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 A.4. Example JWS Using ECDSA P-521 SHA-512 .....................45
A.4. Example JWS using ECDSA P-521 SHA-512 . . . . . . . . . . 44 A.4.1. Encoding ..............................................45
A.4.1. Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 A.4.2. Validating ............................................47
A.4.2. Validating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 A.5. Example Unsecured JWS .....................................47
A.5. Example Unsecured JWS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 A.6. Example JWS Using General JWS JSON Serialization ..........48
A.6. Example JWS using General JWS JSON Serialization . . . . 47 A.6.1. JWS Per-Signature Protected Headers ...................48
A.6.1. JWS Per-Signature Protected Headers . . . . . . . . . 48 A.6.2. JWS Per-Signature Unprotected Headers .................49
A.6.2. JWS Per-Signature Unprotected Headers . . . . . . . . 48 A.6.3. Complete JOSE Header Values ...........................49
A.6.3. Complete JOSE Header Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 A.6.4. Complete JWS JSON Serialization Representation ........50
A.6.4. Complete JWS JSON Serialization Representation . . . . 49 A.7. Example JWS Using Flattened JWS JSON Serialization ........51
A.7. Example JWS using Flattened JWS JSON Serialization . . . 49 Appendix B. "x5c" (X.509 Certificate Chain) Example ..............52
Appendix B. "x5c" (X.509 Certificate Chain) Example . . . . . . . 50 Appendix C. Notes on Implementing base64url Encoding without
Appendix C. Notes on implementing base64url encoding without Padding ..............................................54
padding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 Appendix D. Notes on Key Selection ...............................55
Appendix D. Notes on Key Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 Appendix E. Negative Test Case for "crit" Header Parameter .......57
Appendix E. Negative Test Case for "crit" Header Parameter . . . 54 Appendix F. Detached Content .....................................57
Appendix F. Detached Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Acknowledgements ..................................................58
Appendix G. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Authors' Addresses ................................................58
Appendix H. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
JSON Web Signature (JWS) represents content secured with digital JSON Web Signature (JWS) represents content secured with digital
signatures or Message Authentication Codes (MACs) using JavaScript signatures or Message Authentication Codes (MACs) using JSON-based
Object Notation (JSON) [RFC7159] based data structures. The JWS [RFC7159] data structures. The JWS cryptographic mechanisms provide
cryptographic mechanisms provide integrity protection for an integrity protection for an arbitrary sequence of octets. See
arbitrary sequence of octets. See Section 10.5 for a discussion on Section 10.5 for a discussion on the differences between digital
the differences between Digital Signatures and MACs. signatures and MACs.
Two closely related serializations for JWSs are defined. The JWS Two closely related serializations for JWSs are defined. The JWS
Compact Serialization is a compact, URL-safe representation intended Compact Serialization is a compact, URL-safe representation intended
for space constrained environments such as HTTP Authorization headers for space-constrained environments such as HTTP Authorization headers
and URI query parameters. The JWS JSON Serialization represents JWSs and URI query parameters. The JWS JSON Serialization represents JWSs
as JSON objects and enables multiple signatures and/or MACs to be as JSON objects and enables multiple signatures and/or MACs to be
applied to the same content. Both share the same cryptographic applied to the same content. Both share the same cryptographic
underpinnings. underpinnings.
Cryptographic algorithms and identifiers for use with this Cryptographic algorithms and identifiers for use with this
specification are described in the separate JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) specification are described in the separate JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)
[JWA] specification and an IANA registry defined by that [JWA] specification and an IANA registry defined by that
specification. Related encryption capabilities are described in the specification. Related encryption capabilities are described in the
separate JSON Web Encryption (JWE) [JWE] specification. separate JSON Web Encryption (JWE) [JWE] specification.
Names defined by this specification are short because a core goal is Names defined by this specification are short because a core goal is
for the resulting representations to be compact. for the resulting representations to be compact.
1.1. Notational Conventions 1.1. Notational Conventions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in Key "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels [RFC2119]. If "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels" [RFC2119].
these words are used without being spelled in uppercase then they are The interpretation should only be applied when the terms appear in
to be interpreted with their normal natural language meanings. all capital letters.
BASE64URL(OCTETS) denotes the base64url encoding of OCTETS, per BASE64URL(OCTETS) denotes the base64url encoding of OCTETS, per
Section 2. Section 2.
UTF8(STRING) denotes the octets of the UTF-8 [RFC3629] representation UTF8(STRING) denotes the octets of the UTF-8 [RFC3629] representation
of STRING, where STRING is a sequence of zero or more Unicode of STRING, where STRING is a sequence of zero or more Unicode
[UNICODE] characters. [UNICODE] characters.
ASCII(STRING) denotes the octets of the ASCII [RFC20] representation ASCII(STRING) denotes the octets of the ASCII [RFC20] representation
of STRING, where STRING is a sequence of zero or more ASCII of STRING, where STRING is a sequence of zero or more ASCII
skipping to change at page 6, line 14 skipping to change at page 5, line 24
2. Terminology 2. Terminology
These terms are defined by this specification: These terms are defined by this specification:
JSON Web Signature (JWS) JSON Web Signature (JWS)
A data structure representing a digitally signed or MACed message. A data structure representing a digitally signed or MACed message.
JOSE Header JOSE Header
JSON object containing the parameters describing the cryptographic JSON object containing the parameters describing the cryptographic
operations and parameters employed. The JOSE Header is comprised operations and parameters employed. The JOSE (JSON Object Signing
of a set of Header Parameters. and Encryption) Header is comprised of a set of Header Parameters.
JWS Payload JWS Payload
The sequence of octets to be secured -- a.k.a., the message. The The sequence of octets to be secured -- a.k.a. the message. The
payload can contain an arbitrary sequence of octets. payload can contain an arbitrary sequence of octets.
JWS Signature JWS Signature
Digital signature or MAC over the JWS Protected Header and the JWS Digital signature or MAC over the JWS Protected Header and the JWS
Payload. Payload.
Header Parameter Header Parameter
A name/value pair that is member of the JOSE Header. A name/value pair that is member of the JOSE Header.
JWS Protected Header JWS Protected Header
skipping to change at page 6, line 44 skipping to change at page 6, line 9
JWS Unprotected Header JWS Unprotected Header
JSON object that contains the Header Parameters that are not JSON object that contains the Header Parameters that are not
integrity protected. This can only be present when using the JWS integrity protected. This can only be present when using the JWS
JSON Serialization. JSON Serialization.
Base64url Encoding Base64url Encoding
Base64 encoding using the URL- and filename-safe character set Base64 encoding using the URL- and filename-safe character set
defined in Section 5 of RFC 4648 [RFC4648], with all trailing '=' defined in Section 5 of RFC 4648 [RFC4648], with all trailing '='
characters omitted (as permitted by Section 3.2) and without the characters omitted (as permitted by Section 3.2) and without the
inclusion of any line breaks, white space, or other additional inclusion of any line breaks, whitespace, or other additional
characters. Note that the base64url encoding of the empty octet characters. Note that the base64url encoding of the empty octet
sequence is the empty string. (See Appendix C for notes on sequence is the empty string. (See Appendix C for notes on
implementing base64url encoding without padding.) implementing base64url encoding without padding.)
JWS Signing Input JWS Signing Input
The input to the digital signature or MAC computation. Its value The input to the digital signature or MAC computation. Its value
is ASCII(BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header)) || '.' || is ASCII(BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header)) || '.' ||
BASE64URL(JWS Payload)). BASE64URL(JWS Payload)).
JWS Compact Serialization JWS Compact Serialization
skipping to change at page 7, line 37 skipping to change at page 7, line 5
precautions to ensure they are in control of the portion of the precautions to ensure they are in control of the portion of the
namespace they use to define the name. namespace they use to define the name.
StringOrURI StringOrURI
A JSON string value, with the additional requirement that while A JSON string value, with the additional requirement that while
arbitrary string values MAY be used, any value containing a ":" arbitrary string values MAY be used, any value containing a ":"
character MUST be a URI [RFC3986]. StringOrURI values are character MUST be a URI [RFC3986]. StringOrURI values are
compared as case-sensitive strings with no transformations or compared as case-sensitive strings with no transformations or
canonicalizations applied. canonicalizations applied.
These terms defined by the JSON Web Encryption (JWE) [JWE] The terms "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)", "JWE Compact Serialization",
specification are incorporated into this specification: "JSON Web and "JWE JSON Serialization" are defined by the JWE specification
Encryption (JWE)", "JWE Compact Serialization", and "JWE JSON [JWE].
Serialization".
These terms defined by the Internet Security Glossary, Version 2 The terms "Digital Signature" and "Message Authentication Code (MAC)"
[RFC4949] are incorporated into this specification: "Digital are defined by the "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2" [RFC4949].
Signature" and "Message Authentication Code (MAC)".
3. JSON Web Signature (JWS) Overview 3. JSON Web Signature (JWS) Overview
JWS represents digitally signed or MACed content using JSON data JWS represents digitally signed or MACed content using JSON data
structures and base64url encoding. These JSON data structures MAY structures and base64url encoding. These JSON data structures MAY
contain white space and/or line breaks before or after any JSON contain whitespace and/or line breaks before or after any JSON values
values or structural characters, in accordance with Section 2 of RFC or structural characters, in accordance with Section 2 of RFC 7159
7159 [RFC7159]. A JWS represents these logical values (each of which [RFC7159]. A JWS represents these logical values (each of which is
is defined in Section 2): defined in Section 2):
o JOSE Header o JOSE Header
o JWS Payload o JWS Payload
o JWS Signature o JWS Signature
For a JWS, the JOSE Header members are the union of the members of For a JWS, the JOSE Header members are the union of the members of
these values (each of which is defined in Section 2): these values (each of which is defined in Section 2):
o JWS Protected Header o JWS Protected Header
o JWS Unprotected Header o JWS Unprotected Header
skipping to change at page 9, line 5 skipping to change at page 8, line 16
In the JWS JSON Serialization, one or both of the JWS Protected In the JWS JSON Serialization, one or both of the JWS Protected
Header and JWS Unprotected Header MUST be present. In this case, the Header and JWS Unprotected Header MUST be present. In this case, the
members of the JOSE Header are the union of the members of the JWS members of the JOSE Header are the union of the members of the JWS
Protected Header and the JWS Unprotected Header values that are Protected Header and the JWS Unprotected Header values that are
present. present.
In the JWS JSON Serialization, a JWS is represented as a JSON object In the JWS JSON Serialization, a JWS is represented as a JSON object
containing some or all of these four members: containing some or all of these four members:
"protected", with the value BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header)) o "protected", with the value BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header))
"header", with the value JWS Unprotected Header o "header", with the value JWS Unprotected Header
"payload", with the value BASE64URL(JWS Payload) o "payload", with the value BASE64URL(JWS Payload)
"signature", with the value BASE64URL(JWS Signature) o "signature", with the value BASE64URL(JWS Signature)
The three base64url encoded result strings and the JWS Unprotected The three base64url-encoded result strings and the JWS Unprotected
Header value are represented as members within a JSON object. The Header value are represented as members within a JSON object. The
inclusion of some of these values is OPTIONAL. The JWS JSON inclusion of some of these values is OPTIONAL. The JWS JSON
Serialization can also represent multiple signature and/or MAC Serialization can also represent multiple signature and/or MAC
values, rather than just one. See Section 7.2 for more information values, rather than just one. See Section 7.2 for more information
about the JWS JSON Serialization. about the JWS JSON Serialization.
3.3. Example JWS 3.3. Example JWS
This section provides an example of a JWS. Its computation is This section provides an example of a JWS. Its computation is
described in more detail in Appendix A.1, including specifying the described in more detail in Appendix A.1, including specifying the
exact octet sequences representing the JSON values used and the key exact octet sequences representing the JSON values used and the key
value used. value used.
The following example JWS Protected Header declares that the encoded The following example JWS Protected Header declares that the encoded
object is a JSON Web Token (JWT) [JWT] and the JWS Protected Header object is a JSON Web Token [JWT] and the JWS Protected Header and the
and the JWS Payload are secured using the HMAC SHA-256 [RFC2104, SHS] JWS Payload are secured using the HMAC SHA-256 [RFC2104] [SHS]
algorithm: algorithm:
{"typ":"JWT", {"typ":"JWT",
"alg":"HS256"} "alg":"HS256"}
Encoding this JWS Protected Header as BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Encoding this JWS Protected Header as BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected
Header)) gives this value: Header)) gives this value:
eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLA0KICJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9 eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLA0KICJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9
The UTF-8 representation of following JSON object is used as the JWS The UTF-8 representation of the following JSON object is used as the
Payload. (Note that the payload can be any content, and need not be JWS Payload. (Note that the payload can be any content and need not
a representation of a JSON object.) be a representation of a JSON object.)
{"iss":"joe", {"iss":"joe",
"exp":1300819380, "exp":1300819380,
"http://example.com/is_root":true} "http://example.com/is_root":true}
Encoding this JWS Payload as BASE64URL(JWS Payload) gives this value Encoding this JWS Payload as BASE64URL(JWS Payload) gives this value
(with line breaks for display purposes only): (with line breaks for display purposes only):
eyJpc3MiOiJqb2UiLA0KICJleHAiOjEzMDA4MTkzODAsDQogImh0dHA6Ly9leGFt eyJpc3MiOiJqb2UiLA0KICJleHAiOjEzMDA4MTkzODAsDQogImh0dHA6Ly9leGFt
cGxlLmNvbS9pc19yb290Ijp0cnVlfQ cGxlLmNvbS9pc19yb290Ijp0cnVlfQ
Computing the HMAC of the JWS Signing Input ASCII(BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Computing the HMAC of the JWS Signing Input ASCII(BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS
Protected Header)) || '.' || BASE64URL(JWS Payload)) with the HMAC Protected Header)) || '.' || BASE64URL(JWS Payload)) with the HMAC
SHA-256 algorithm using the key specified in Appendix A.1 and SHA-256 algorithm using the key specified in Appendix A.1 and
base64url encoding the result yields this BASE64URL(JWS Signature) base64url-encoding the result yields this BASE64URL(JWS Signature)
value: value:
dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk
Concatenating these values in the order Header.Payload.Signature with Concatenating these values in the order Header.Payload.Signature with
period ('.') characters between the parts yields this complete JWS period ('.') characters between the parts yields this complete JWS
representation using the JWS Compact Serialization (with line breaks representation using the JWS Compact Serialization (with line breaks
for display purposes only): for display purposes only):
eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLA0KICJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9 eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLA0KICJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9
skipping to change at page 10, line 34 skipping to change at page 9, line 46
4. JOSE Header 4. JOSE Header
For a JWS, the members of the JSON object(s) representing the JOSE For a JWS, the members of the JSON object(s) representing the JOSE
Header describe the digital signature or MAC applied to the JWS Header describe the digital signature or MAC applied to the JWS
Protected Header and the JWS Payload and optionally additional Protected Header and the JWS Payload and optionally additional
properties of the JWS. The Header Parameter names within the JOSE properties of the JWS. The Header Parameter names within the JOSE
Header MUST be unique; JWS parsers MUST either reject JWSs with Header MUST be unique; JWS parsers MUST either reject JWSs with
duplicate Header Parameter names or use a JSON parser that returns duplicate Header Parameter names or use a JSON parser that returns
only the lexically last duplicate member name, as specified in only the lexically last duplicate member name, as specified in
Section 15.12 (The JSON Object) of ECMAScript 5.1 [ECMAScript]. Section 15.12 ("The JSON Object") of ECMAScript 5.1 [ECMAScript].
Implementations are required to understand the specific Header Implementations are required to understand the specific Header
Parameters defined by this specification that are designated as "MUST Parameters defined by this specification that are designated as "MUST
be understood" and process them in the manner defined in this be understood" and process them in the manner defined in this
specification. All other Header Parameters defined by this specification. All other Header Parameters defined by this
specification that are not so designated MUST be ignored when not specification that are not so designated MUST be ignored when not
understood. Unless listed as a critical Header Parameter, per understood. Unless listed as a critical Header Parameter, per
Section 4.1.11, all Header Parameters not defined by this Section 4.1.11, all Header Parameters not defined by this
specification MUST be ignored when not understood. specification MUST be ignored when not understood.
There are three classes of Header Parameter names: Registered Header There are three classes of Header Parameter names: Registered Header
Parameter names, Public Header Parameter names, and Private Header Parameter names, Public Header Parameter names, and Private Header
Parameter names. Parameter names.
4.1. Registered Header Parameter Names 4.1. Registered Header Parameter Names
The following Header Parameter names for use in JWSs are registered The following Header Parameter names for use in JWSs are registered
in the IANA JSON Web Signature and Encryption Header Parameters in the IANA "JSON Web Signature and Encryption Header Parameters"
registry defined in Section 9.1, with meanings as defined below. registry established by Section 9.1, with meanings as defined in the
subsections below.
As indicated by the common registry, JWSs and JWEs share a common As indicated by the common registry, JWSs and JWEs share a common
Header Parameter space; when a parameter is used by both Header Parameter space; when a parameter is used by both
specifications, its usage must be compatible between the specifications, its usage must be compatible between the
specifications. specifications.
4.1.1. "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter 4.1.1. "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter
The "alg" (algorithm) Header Parameter identifies the cryptographic The "alg" (algorithm) Header Parameter identifies the cryptographic
algorithm used to secure the JWS. The JWS Signature value is not algorithm used to secure the JWS. The JWS Signature value is not
valid if the "alg" value does not represent a supported algorithm, or valid if the "alg" value does not represent a supported algorithm or
if there is not a key for use with that algorithm associated with the if there is not a key for use with that algorithm associated with the
party that digitally signed or MACed the content. "alg" values should party that digitally signed or MACed the content. "alg" values
either be registered in the IANA JSON Web Signature and Encryption should either be registered in the IANA "JSON Web Signature and
Algorithms registry defined in [JWA] or be a value that contains a Encryption Algorithms" registry established by [JWA] or be a value
Collision-Resistant Name. The "alg" value is a case-sensitive ASCII that contains a Collision-Resistant Name. The "alg" value is a case-
string containing a StringOrURI value. This Header Parameter MUST be sensitive ASCII string containing a StringOrURI value. This Header
present and MUST be understood and processed by implementations. Parameter MUST be present and MUST be understood and processed by
implementations.
A list of defined "alg" values for this use can be found in the IANA A list of defined "alg" values for this use can be found in the IANA
JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms registry defined in "JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms" registry established
[JWA]; the initial contents of this registry are the values defined by [JWA]; the initial contents of this registry are the values
in Section 3.1 of the JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) [JWA] specification. defined in Section 3.1 of [JWA].
4.1.2. "jku" (JWK Set URL) Header Parameter 4.1.2. "jku" (JWK Set URL) Header Parameter
The "jku" (JWK Set URL) Header Parameter is a URI [RFC3986] that The "jku" (JWK Set URL) Header Parameter is a URI [RFC3986] that
refers to a resource for a set of JSON-encoded public keys, one of refers to a resource for a set of JSON-encoded public keys, one of
which corresponds to the key used to digitally sign the JWS. The which corresponds to the key used to digitally sign the JWS. The
keys MUST be encoded as a JSON Web Key Set (JWK Set) [JWK]. The keys MUST be encoded as a JWK Set [JWK]. The protocol used to
protocol used to acquire the resource MUST provide integrity acquire the resource MUST provide integrity protection; an HTTP GET
protection; an HTTP GET request to retrieve the JWK Set MUST use TLS request to retrieve the JWK Set MUST use Transport Layer Security
[RFC2818, RFC5246]; the identity of the server MUST be validated, as (TLS) [RFC2818] [RFC5246]; and the identity of the server MUST be
per Section 6 of RFC 6125 [RFC6125]. Also, see Section 8 on TLS validated, as per Section 6 of RFC 6125 [RFC6125]. Also, see
requirements. Use of this Header Parameter is OPTIONAL. Section 8 on TLS requirements. Use of this Header Parameter is
OPTIONAL.
4.1.3. "jwk" (JSON Web Key) Header Parameter 4.1.3. "jwk" (JSON Web Key) Header Parameter
The "jwk" (JSON Web Key) Header Parameter is the public key that The "jwk" (JSON Web Key) Header Parameter is the public key that
corresponds to the key used to digitally sign the JWS. This key is corresponds to the key used to digitally sign the JWS. This key is
represented as a JSON Web Key [JWK]. Use of this Header Parameter is represented as a JSON Web Key [JWK]. Use of this Header Parameter is
OPTIONAL. OPTIONAL.
4.1.4. "kid" (Key ID) Header Parameter 4.1.4. "kid" (Key ID) Header Parameter
skipping to change at page 12, line 23 skipping to change at page 11, line 34
When used with a JWK, the "kid" value is used to match a JWK "kid" When used with a JWK, the "kid" value is used to match a JWK "kid"
parameter value. parameter value.
4.1.5. "x5u" (X.509 URL) Header Parameter 4.1.5. "x5u" (X.509 URL) Header Parameter
The "x5u" (X.509 URL) Header Parameter is a URI [RFC3986] that refers The "x5u" (X.509 URL) Header Parameter is a URI [RFC3986] that refers
to a resource for the X.509 public key certificate or certificate to a resource for the X.509 public key certificate or certificate
chain [RFC5280] corresponding to the key used to digitally sign the chain [RFC5280] corresponding to the key used to digitally sign the
JWS. The identified resource MUST provide a representation of the JWS. The identified resource MUST provide a representation of the
certificate or certificate chain that conforms to RFC 5280 [RFC5280] certificate or certificate chain that conforms to RFC 5280 [RFC5280]
in PEM encoded form, with each certificate delimited as specified in in PEM-encoded form, with each certificate delimited as specified in
Section 6.1 of RFC 4945 [RFC4945]. The certificate containing the Section 6.1 of RFC 4945 [RFC4945]. The certificate containing the
public key corresponding to the key used to digitally sign the JWS public key corresponding to the key used to digitally sign the JWS
MUST be the first certificate. This MAY be followed by additional MUST be the first certificate. This MAY be followed by additional
certificates, with each subsequent certificate being the one used to certificates, with each subsequent certificate being the one used to
certify the previous one. The protocol used to acquire the resource certify the previous one. The protocol used to acquire the resource
MUST provide integrity protection; an HTTP GET request to retrieve MUST provide integrity protection; an HTTP GET request to retrieve
the certificate MUST use TLS [RFC2818, RFC5246]; the identity of the the certificate MUST use TLS [RFC2818] [RFC5246]; and the identity of
server MUST be validated, as per Section 6 of RFC 6125 [RFC6125]. the server MUST be validated, as per Section 6 of RFC 6125 [RFC6125].
Also, see Section 8 on TLS requirements. Use of this Header Also, see Section 8 on TLS requirements. Use of this Header
Parameter is OPTIONAL. Parameter is OPTIONAL.
4.1.6. "x5c" (X.509 Certificate Chain) Header Parameter 4.1.6. "x5c" (X.509 Certificate Chain) Header Parameter
The "x5c" (X.509 Certificate Chain) Header Parameter contains the The "x5c" (X.509 certificate chain) Header Parameter contains the
X.509 public key certificate or certificate chain [RFC5280] X.509 public key certificate or certificate chain [RFC5280]
corresponding to the key used to digitally sign the JWS. The corresponding to the key used to digitally sign the JWS. The
certificate or certificate chain is represented as a JSON array of certificate or certificate chain is represented as a JSON array of
certificate value strings. Each string in the array is a base64 certificate value strings. Each string in the array is a
encoded ([RFC4648] Section 4 -- not base64url encoded) DER base64-encoded (Section 4 of [RFC4648] -- not base64url-encoded) DER
[ITU.X690.1994] PKIX certificate value. The certificate containing [ITU.X690.2008] PKIX certificate value. The certificate containing
the public key corresponding to the key used to digitally sign the the public key corresponding to the key used to digitally sign the
JWS MUST be the first certificate. This MAY be followed by JWS MUST be the first certificate. This MAY be followed by
additional certificates, with each subsequent certificate being the additional certificates, with each subsequent certificate being the
one used to certify the previous one. The recipient MUST validate one used to certify the previous one. The recipient MUST validate
the certificate chain according to RFC 5280 [RFC5280] and consider the certificate chain according to RFC 5280 [RFC5280] and consider
the certificate or certificate chain to be invalid if any validation the certificate or certificate chain to be invalid if any validation
failure occurs. Use of this Header Parameter is OPTIONAL. failure occurs. Use of this Header Parameter is OPTIONAL.
See Appendix B for an example "x5c" value. See Appendix B for an example "x5c" value.
4.1.7. "x5t" (X.509 Certificate SHA-1 Thumbprint) Header Parameter 4.1.7. "x5t" (X.509 Certificate SHA-1 Thumbprint) Header Parameter
The "x5t" (X.509 Certificate SHA-1 Thumbprint) Header Parameter is a The "x5t" (X.509 certificate SHA-1 thumbprint) Header Parameter is a
base64url encoded SHA-1 thumbprint (a.k.a. digest) of the DER base64url-encoded SHA-1 thumbprint (a.k.a. digest) of the DER
encoding of the X.509 certificate [RFC5280] corresponding to the key encoding of the X.509 certificate [RFC5280] corresponding to the key
used to digitally sign the JWS. Note that certificate thumbprints used to digitally sign the JWS. Note that certificate thumbprints
are also sometimes known as certificate fingerprints. Use of this are also sometimes known as certificate fingerprints. Use of this
Header Parameter is OPTIONAL. Header Parameter is OPTIONAL.
4.1.8. "x5t#S256" (X.509 Certificate SHA-256 Thumbprint) Header 4.1.8. "x5t#S256" (X.509 Certificate SHA-256 Thumbprint) Header
Parameter Parameter
The "x5t#S256" (X.509 Certificate SHA-256 Thumbprint) Header The "x5t#S256" (X.509 certificate SHA-256 thumbprint) Header
Parameter is a base64url encoded SHA-256 thumbprint (a.k.a. digest) Parameter is a base64url-encoded SHA-256 thumbprint (a.k.a. digest)
of the DER encoding of the X.509 certificate [RFC5280] corresponding of the DER encoding of the X.509 certificate [RFC5280] corresponding
to the key used to digitally sign the JWS. Note that certificate to the key used to digitally sign the JWS. Note that certificate
thumbprints are also sometimes known as certificate fingerprints. thumbprints are also sometimes known as certificate fingerprints.
Use of this Header Parameter is OPTIONAL. Use of this Header Parameter is OPTIONAL.
4.1.9. "typ" (Type) Header Parameter 4.1.9. "typ" (Type) Header Parameter
The "typ" (type) Header Parameter is used by JWS applications to The "typ" (type) Header Parameter is used by JWS applications to
declare the MIME Media Type [IANA.MediaTypes] of this complete JWS. declare the media type [IANA.MediaTypes] of this complete JWS. This
This is intended for use by the application when more than one kind is intended for use by the application when more than one kind of
of object could be present in an application data structure that can object could be present in an application data structure that can
contain a JWS; the application can use this value to disambiguate contain a JWS; the application can use this value to disambiguate
among the different kinds of objects that might be present. It will among the different kinds of objects that might be present. It will
typically not be used by applications when the kind of object is typically not be used by applications when the kind of object is
already known. This parameter is ignored by JWS implementations; any already known. This parameter is ignored by JWS implementations; any
processing of this parameter is performed by the JWS application. processing of this parameter is performed by the JWS application.
Use of this Header Parameter is OPTIONAL. Use of this Header Parameter is OPTIONAL.
Per RFC 2045 [RFC2045], all media type values, subtype values, and Per RFC 2045 [RFC2045], all media type values, subtype values, and
parameter names are case-insensitive. However, parameter values are parameter names are case insensitive. However, parameter values are
case-sensitive unless otherwise specified for the specific parameter. case sensitive unless otherwise specified for the specific parameter.
To keep messages compact in common situations, it is RECOMMENDED that To keep messages compact in common situations, it is RECOMMENDED that
producers omit an "application/" prefix of a media type value in a producers omit an "application/" prefix of a media type value in a
"typ" Header Parameter when no other '/' appears in the media type "typ" Header Parameter when no other '/' appears in the media type
value. A recipient using the media type value MUST treat it as if value. A recipient using the media type value MUST treat it as if
"application/" were prepended to any "typ" value not containing a "application/" were prepended to any "typ" value not containing a
'/'. For instance, a "typ" value of "example" SHOULD be used to '/'. For instance, a "typ" value of "example" SHOULD be used to
represent the "application/example" media type; whereas, the media represent the "application/example" media type, whereas the media
type "application/example;part="1/2"" cannot be shortened to type "application/example;part="1/2"" cannot be shortened to
"example;part="1/2"". "example;part="1/2"".
The "typ" value "JOSE" can be used by applications to indicate that The "typ" value "JOSE" can be used by applications to indicate that
this object is a JWS or JWE using the JWS Compact Serialization or this object is a JWS or JWE using the JWS Compact Serialization or
the JWE Compact Serialization. The "typ" value "JOSE+JSON" can be the JWE Compact Serialization. The "typ" value "JOSE+JSON" can be
used by applications to indicate that this object is a JWS or JWE used by applications to indicate that this object is a JWS or JWE
using the JWS JSON Serialization or the JWE JSON Serialization. using the JWS JSON Serialization or the JWE JSON Serialization.
Other type values can also be used by applications. Other type values can also be used by applications.
4.1.10. "cty" (Content Type) Header Parameter 4.1.10. "cty" (Content Type) Header Parameter
The "cty" (content type) Header Parameter is used by JWS applications The "cty" (content type) Header Parameter is used by JWS applications
to declare the MIME Media Type [IANA.MediaTypes] of the secured to declare the media type [IANA.MediaTypes] of the secured content
content (the payload). This is intended for use by the application (the payload). This is intended for use by the application when more
when more than one kind of object could be present in the JWS than one kind of object could be present in the JWS Payload; the
payload; the application can use this value to disambiguate among the application can use this value to disambiguate among the different
different kinds of objects that might be present. It will typically kinds of objects that might be present. It will typically not be
not be used by applications when the kind of object is already known. used by applications when the kind of object is already known. This
This parameter is ignored by JWS implementations; any processing of parameter is ignored by JWS implementations; any processing of this
this parameter is performed by the JWS application. Use of this parameter is performed by the JWS application. Use of this Header
Header Parameter is OPTIONAL. Parameter is OPTIONAL.
Per RFC 2045 [RFC2045], all media type values, subtype values, and Per RFC 2045 [RFC2045], all media type values, subtype values, and
parameter names are case-insensitive. However, parameter values are parameter names are case insensitive. However, parameter values are
case-sensitive unless otherwise specified for the specific parameter. case sensitive unless otherwise specified for the specific parameter.
To keep messages compact in common situations, it is RECOMMENDED that To keep messages compact in common situations, it is RECOMMENDED that
producers omit an "application/" prefix of a media type value in a producers omit an "application/" prefix of a media type value in a
"cty" Header Parameter when no other '/' appears in the media type "cty" Header Parameter when no other '/' appears in the media type
value. A recipient using the media type value MUST treat it as if value. A recipient using the media type value MUST treat it as if
"application/" were prepended to any "cty" value not containing a "application/" were prepended to any "cty" value not containing a
'/'. For instance, a "cty" value of "example" SHOULD be used to '/'. For instance, a "cty" value of "example" SHOULD be used to
represent the "application/example" media type; whereas, the media represent the "application/example" media type, whereas the media
type "application/example;part="1/2"" cannot be shortened to type "application/example;part="1/2"" cannot be shortened to
"example;part="1/2"". "example;part="1/2"".
4.1.11. "crit" (Critical) Header Parameter 4.1.11. "crit" (Critical) Header Parameter
The "crit" (critical) Header Parameter indicates that extensions to The "crit" (critical) Header Parameter indicates that extensions to
the initial RFC versions of [[ this specification ]] and [JWA] are this specification and/or [JWA] are being used that MUST be
being used that MUST be understood and processed. Its value is an understood and processed. Its value is an array listing the Header
array listing the Header Parameter names present in the JOSE Header Parameter names present in the JOSE Header that use those extensions.
that use those extensions. If any of the listed extension Header If any of the listed extension Header Parameters are not understood
Parameters are not understood and supported by the recipient, then and supported by the recipient, then the JWS is invalid. Producers
the JWS is invalid. Producers MUST NOT include Header Parameter MUST NOT include Header Parameter names defined by this specification
names defined by the initial RFC versions of [[ this specification ]]
or [JWA] for use with JWS, duplicate names, or names that do not or [JWA] for use with JWS, duplicate names, or names that do not
occur as Header Parameter names within the JOSE Header in the "crit" occur as Header Parameter names within the JOSE Header in the "crit"
list. Producers MUST NOT use the empty list "[]" as the "crit" list. Producers MUST NOT use the empty list "[]" as the "crit"
value. Recipients MAY consider the JWS to be invalid if the critical value. Recipients MAY consider the JWS to be invalid if the critical
list contains any Header Parameter names defined by the initial RFC list contains any Header Parameter names defined by this
versions of [[ this specification ]] or [JWA] for use with JWS, or specification or [JWA] for use with JWS or if any other constraints
any other constraints on its use are violated. When used, this on its use are violated. When used, this Header Parameter MUST be
Header Parameter MUST be integrity protected; therefore, it MUST integrity protected; therefore, it MUST occur only within the JWS
occur only within the JWS Protected Header. Use of this Header Protected Header. Use of this Header Parameter is OPTIONAL. This
Parameter is OPTIONAL. This Header Parameter MUST be understood and Header Parameter MUST be understood and processed by implementations.
processed by implementations.
An example use, along with a hypothetical "exp" (expiration-time) An example use, along with a hypothetical "exp" (expiration time)
field is: field is:
{"alg":"ES256", {"alg":"ES256",
"crit":["exp"], "crit":["exp"],
"exp":1363284000 "exp":1363284000
} }
4.2. Public Header Parameter Names 4.2. Public Header Parameter Names
Additional Header Parameter names can be defined by those using JWSs. Additional Header Parameter names can be defined by those using JWSs.
However, in order to prevent collisions, any new Header Parameter However, in order to prevent collisions, any new Header Parameter
name should either be registered in the IANA JSON Web Signature and name should either be registered in the IANA "JSON Web Signature and
Encryption Header Parameters registry defined in Section 9.1 or be a Encryption Header Parameters" registry established by Section 9.1 or
Public Name: a value that contains a Collision-Resistant Name. In be a Public Name (a value that contains a Collision-Resistant Name).
each case, the definer of the name or value needs to take reasonable In each case, the definer of the name or value needs to take
precautions to make sure they are in control of the part of the reasonable precautions to make sure they are in control of the part
namespace they use to define the Header Parameter name. of the namespace they use to define the Header Parameter name.
New Header Parameters should be introduced sparingly, as they can New Header Parameters should be introduced sparingly, as they can
result in non-interoperable JWSs. result in non-interoperable JWSs.
4.3. Private Header Parameter Names 4.3. Private Header Parameter Names
A producer and consumer of a JWS may agree to use Header Parameter A producer and consumer of a JWS may agree to use Header Parameter
names that are Private Names: names that are not Registered Header names that are Private Names (names that are not Registered Header
Parameter names Section 4.1 or Public Header Parameter names Parameter names (Section 4.1)) or Public Header Parameter names
Section 4.2. Unlike Public Header Parameter names, Private Header (Section 4.2). Unlike Public Header Parameter names, Private Header
Parameter names are subject to collision and should be used with Parameter names are subject to collision and should be used with
caution. caution.
5. Producing and Consuming JWSs 5. Producing and Consuming JWSs
5.1. Message Signature or MAC Computation 5.1. Message Signature or MAC Computation
To create a JWS, the following steps are performed. The order of the To create a JWS, the following steps are performed. The order of the
steps is not significant in cases where there are no dependencies steps is not significant in cases where there are no dependencies
between the inputs and outputs of the steps. between the inputs and outputs of the steps.
1. Create the content to be used as the JWS Payload. 1. Create the content to be used as the JWS Payload.
2. Compute the encoded payload value BASE64URL(JWS Payload). 2. Compute the encoded payload value BASE64URL(JWS Payload).
3. Create the JSON object(s) containing the desired set of Header 3. Create the JSON object(s) containing the desired set of Header
Parameters, which together comprise the JOSE Header: the JWS Parameters, which together comprise the JOSE Header (the JWS
Protected Header and/or the JWS Unprotected Header. Protected Header and/or the JWS Unprotected Header).
4. Compute the encoded header value BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected 4. Compute the encoded header value BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected
Header)). If the JWS Protected Header is not present (which can Header)). If the JWS Protected Header is not present (which can
only happen when using the JWS JSON Serialization and no only happen when using the JWS JSON Serialization and no
"protected" member is present), let this value be the empty "protected" member is present), let this value be the empty
string. string.
5. Compute the JWS Signature in the manner defined for the 5. Compute the JWS Signature in the manner defined for the
particular algorithm being used over the JWS Signing Input particular algorithm being used over the JWS Signing Input
ASCII(BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header)) || '.' || ASCII(BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header)) || '.' ||
skipping to change at page 16, line 48 skipping to change at page 16, line 16
When validating a JWS, the following steps are performed. The order When validating a JWS, the following steps are performed. The order
of the steps is not significant in cases where there are no of the steps is not significant in cases where there are no
dependencies between the inputs and outputs of the steps. If any of dependencies between the inputs and outputs of the steps. If any of
the listed steps fails, then the signature or MAC cannot be the listed steps fails, then the signature or MAC cannot be
validated. validated.
When there are multiple JWS Signature values, it is an application When there are multiple JWS Signature values, it is an application
decision which of the JWS Signature values must successfully validate decision which of the JWS Signature values must successfully validate
for the JWS to be accepted. In some cases, all must successfully for the JWS to be accepted. In some cases, all must successfully
validate or the JWS will be considered invalid. In other cases, only validate, or the JWS will be considered invalid. In other cases,
a specific JWS Signature value needs to be successfully validated. only a specific JWS Signature value needs to be successfully
However, in all cases, at least one JWS Signature value MUST validated. However, in all cases, at least one JWS Signature value
successfully validate or the JWS MUST be considered invalid. MUST successfully validate, or the JWS MUST be considered invalid.
1. Parse the JWS representation to extract the serialized values 1. Parse the JWS representation to extract the serialized values for
for the components of the JWS. When using the JWS Compact the components of the JWS. When using the JWS Compact
Serialization, these components are the base64url encoded Serialization, these components are the base64url-encoded
representations of the JWS Protected Header, the JWS Payload, representations of the JWS Protected Header, the JWS Payload, and
and the JWS Signature, and when using the JWS JSON the JWS Signature, and when using the JWS JSON Serialization,
Serialization, these components also include the unencoded JWS these components also include the unencoded JWS Unprotected
Unprotected Header value. When using the JWS Compact Header value. When using the JWS Compact Serialization, the JWS
Serialization, the JWS Protected Header, the JWS Payload, and Protected Header, the JWS Payload, and the JWS Signature are
the JWS Signature are represented as base64url encoded values in represented as base64url-encoded values in that order, with each
that order, with each value being separated from the next by a value being separated from the next by a single period ('.')
single period ('.') character, resulting in exactly two character, resulting in exactly two delimiting period characters
delimiting period characters being used. The JWS JSON being used. The JWS JSON Serialization is described in
Serialization is described in Section 7.2. Section 7.2.
2. Base64url decode the encoded representation of the JWS Protected 2. Base64url-decode the encoded representation of the JWS Protected
Header, following the restriction that no line breaks, white Header, following the restriction that no line breaks,
space, or other additional characters have been used. whitespace, or other additional characters have been used.
3. Verify that the resulting octet sequence is a UTF-8 encoded 3. Verify that the resulting octet sequence is a UTF-8-encoded
representation of a completely valid JSON object conforming to representation of a completely valid JSON object conforming to
RFC 7159 [RFC7159]; let the JWS Protected Header be this JSON RFC 7159 [RFC7159]; let the JWS Protected Header be this JSON
object. object.
4. If using the JWS Compact Serialization, let the JOSE Header be 4. If using the JWS Compact Serialization, let the JOSE Header be
the JWS Protected Header. Otherwise, when using the JWS JSON the JWS Protected Header. Otherwise, when using the JWS JSON
Serialization, let the JOSE Header be the union of the members Serialization, let the JOSE Header be the union of the members of
of the corresponding JWS Protected Header and JWS Unprotected the corresponding JWS Protected Header and JWS Unprotected
Header, all of which must be completely valid JSON objects. Header, all of which must be completely valid JSON objects.
During this step, verify that the resulting JOSE Header does not During this step, verify that the resulting JOSE Header does not
contain duplicate Header Parameter names. When using the JWS contain duplicate Header Parameter names. When using the JWS
JSON Serialization, this restriction includes that the same JSON Serialization, this restriction includes that the same
Header Parameter name also MUST NOT occur in distinct JSON Header Parameter name also MUST NOT occur in distinct JSON object
object values that together comprise the JOSE Header. values that together comprise the JOSE Header.
5. Verify that the implementation understands and can process all 5. Verify that the implementation understands and can process all
fields that it is required to support, whether required by this fields that it is required to support, whether required by this
specification, by the algorithm being used, or by the "crit" specification, by the algorithm being used, or by the "crit"
Header Parameter value, and that the values of those parameters Header Parameter value, and that the values of those parameters
are also understood and supported. are also understood and supported.
6. Base64url decode the encoded representation of the JWS Payload, 6. Base64url-decode the encoded representation of the JWS Payload,
following the restriction that no line breaks, white space, or following the restriction that no line breaks, whitespace, or
other additional characters have been used. other additional characters have been used.
7. Base64url decode the encoded representation of the JWS 7. Base64url-decode the encoded representation of the JWS Signature,
Signature, following the restriction that no line breaks, white following the restriction that no line breaks, whitespace, or
space, or other additional characters have been used. other additional characters have been used.
8. Validate the JWS Signature against the JWS Signing Input 8. Validate the JWS Signature against the JWS Signing Input
ASCII(BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header)) || '.' || ASCII(BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header)) || '.' ||
BASE64URL(JWS Payload)) in the manner defined for the algorithm BASE64URL(JWS Payload)) in the manner defined for the algorithm
being used, which MUST be accurately represented by the value of being used, which MUST be accurately represented by the value of
the "alg" (algorithm) Header Parameter, which MUST be present. the "alg" (algorithm) Header Parameter, which MUST be present.
See Section 10.6 for security considerations on algorithm See Section 10.6 for security considerations on algorithm
validation. Record whether the validation succeeded or not. validation. Record whether the validation succeeded or not.
9. If the JWS JSON Serialization is being used, repeat this process 9. If the JWS JSON Serialization is being used, repeat this process
(steps 4-8) for each digital signature or MAC value contained in (steps 4-8) for each digital signature or MAC value contained in
the representation. the representation.
10. If none of the validations in step 9 succeeded, then the JWS 10. If none of the validations in step 9 succeeded, then the JWS MUST
MUST be considered invalid. Otherwise, in the JWS JSON be considered invalid. Otherwise, in the JWS JSON Serialization
Serialization case, return a result to the application case, return a result to the application indicating which of the
indicating which of the validations succeeded and failed. In validations succeeded and failed. In the JWS Compact
the JWS Compact Serialization case, the result can simply Serialization case, the result can simply indicate whether or not
indicate whether or not the JWS was successfully validated. the JWS was successfully validated.
Finally, note that it is an application decision which algorithms may Finally, note that it is an application decision which algorithms may
be used in a given context. Even if a JWS can be successfully be used in a given context. Even if a JWS can be successfully
validated, unless the algorithm(s) used in the JWS are acceptable to validated, unless the algorithm(s) used in the JWS are acceptable to
the application, it SHOULD consider the JWS to be invalid. the application, it SHOULD consider the JWS to be invalid.
5.3. String Comparison Rules 5.3. String Comparison Rules
Processing a JWS inevitably requires comparing known strings to Processing a JWS inevitably requires comparing known strings to
members and values in JSON objects. For example, in checking what members and values in JSON objects. For example, in checking what
skipping to change at page 19, line 8 skipping to change at page 18, line 26
out that a different comparison rule is to be used for that member out that a different comparison rule is to be used for that member
value. Only the "typ" and "cty" member values defined in this value. Only the "typ" and "cty" member values defined in this
specification do not use these comparison rules. specification do not use these comparison rules.
Some applications may include case-insensitive information in a case- Some applications may include case-insensitive information in a case-
sensitive value, such as including a DNS name as part of a "kid" (key sensitive value, such as including a DNS name as part of a "kid" (key
ID) value. In those cases, the application may need to define a ID) value. In those cases, the application may need to define a
convention for the canonical case to use for representing the case- convention for the canonical case to use for representing the case-
insensitive portions, such as lowercasing them, if more than one insensitive portions, such as lowercasing them, if more than one
party might need to produce the same value so that they can be party might need to produce the same value so that they can be
compared. (However if all other parties consume whatever value the compared. (However, if all other parties consume whatever value the
producing party emitted verbatim without attempting to compare it to producing party emitted verbatim without attempting to compare it to
an independently produced value, then the case used by the producer an independently produced value, then the case used by the producer
will not matter.) will not matter.)
Also, see the JSON security considerations in Section 10.12 and the Also, see the JSON security considerations in Section 10.12 and the
Unicode security considerations in Section 10.13. Unicode security considerations in Section 10.13.
6. Key Identification 6. Key Identification
It is necessary for the recipient of a JWS to be able to determine It is necessary for the recipient of a JWS to be able to determine
skipping to change at page 21, line 46 skipping to change at page 21, line 15
of Header Parameters comprises the JOSE Header. The Header Parameter of Header Parameters comprises the JOSE Header. The Header Parameter
names in the two locations MUST be disjoint. names in the two locations MUST be disjoint.
Each JWS Signature value is computed using the parameters of the Each JWS Signature value is computed using the parameters of the
corresponding JOSE Header value in the same manner as for the JWS corresponding JOSE Header value in the same manner as for the JWS
Compact Serialization. This has the desirable property that each JWS Compact Serialization. This has the desirable property that each JWS
Signature value represented in the "signatures" array is identical to Signature value represented in the "signatures" array is identical to
the value that would have been computed for the same parameter in the the value that would have been computed for the same parameter in the
JWS Compact Serialization, provided that the JWS Protected Header JWS Compact Serialization, provided that the JWS Protected Header
value for that signature/MAC computation (which represents the value for that signature/MAC computation (which represents the
integrity protected Header Parameter values) matches that used in the integrity-protected Header Parameter values) matches that used in the
JWS Compact Serialization. JWS Compact Serialization.
In summary, the syntax of a JWS using the general JWS JSON In summary, the syntax of a JWS using the general JWS JSON
Serialization is as follows: Serialization is as follows:
{ {
"payload":"<payload contents>", "payload":"<payload contents>",
"signatures":[ "signatures":[
{"protected":"<integrity-protected header 1 contents>", {"protected":"<integrity-protected header 1 contents>",
"header":<non-integrity-protected header 1 contents>, "header":<non-integrity-protected header 1 contents>,
skipping to change at page 22, line 26 skipping to change at page 21, line 39
"header":<non-integrity-protected header N contents>, "header":<non-integrity-protected header N contents>,
"signature":"<signature N contents>"}] "signature":"<signature N contents>"}]
} }
See Appendix A.6 for an example JWS using the general JWS JSON See Appendix A.6 for an example JWS using the general JWS JSON
Serialization syntax. Serialization syntax.
7.2.2. Flattened JWS JSON Serialization Syntax 7.2.2. Flattened JWS JSON Serialization Syntax
The flattened JWS JSON Serialization syntax is based upon the general The flattened JWS JSON Serialization syntax is based upon the general
syntax, but flattens it, optimizing it for the single digital syntax but flattens it, optimizing it for the single digital
signature/MAC case. It flattens it by removing the "signatures" signature/MAC case. It flattens it by removing the "signatures"
member and instead placing those members defined for use in the member and instead placing those members defined for use in the
"signatures" array (the "protected", "header", and "signature" "signatures" array (the "protected", "header", and "signature"
members) in the top-level JSON object (at the same level as the members) in the top-level JSON object (at the same level as the
"payload" member). "payload" member).
The "signatures" member MUST NOT be present when using this syntax. The "signatures" member MUST NOT be present when using this syntax.
Other than this syntax difference, JWS JSON Serialization objects Other than this syntax difference, JWS JSON Serialization objects
using the flattened syntax are processed identically to those using using the flattened syntax are processed identically to those using
the general syntax. the general syntax.
skipping to change at page 23, line 9 skipping to change at page 22, line 22
"signature":"<signature contents>" "signature":"<signature contents>"
} }
See Appendix A.7 for an example JWS using the flattened JWS JSON See Appendix A.7 for an example JWS using the flattened JWS JSON
Serialization syntax. Serialization syntax.
8. TLS Requirements 8. TLS Requirements
Implementations supporting the "jku" and/or "x5u" Header Parameters Implementations supporting the "jku" and/or "x5u" Header Parameters
MUST support TLS. Which TLS version(s) ought to be implemented will MUST support TLS. Which TLS version(s) ought to be implemented will
vary over time, and depend on the widespread deployment and known vary over time and depend on the widespread deployment and known
security vulnerabilities at the time of implementation. At the time security vulnerabilities at the time of implementation. At the time
of this writing, TLS version 1.2 [RFC5246] is the most recent of this writing, TLS version 1.2 [RFC5246] is the most recent
version. version.
To protect against information disclosure and tampering, To protect against information disclosure and tampering,
confidentiality protection MUST be applied using TLS with a confidentiality protection MUST be applied using TLS with a
ciphersuite that provides confidentiality and integrity protection. ciphersuite that provides confidentiality and integrity protection.
See current publications by the IETF TLS working group, including RFC See current publications by the IETF TLS working group, including RFC
6176 [RFC6176], for guidance on the ciphersuites currently considered 6176 [RFC6176], for guidance on the ciphersuites currently considered
to be appropriate for use. Also, see Recommendations for Secure Use to be appropriate for use. Also, see "Recommendations for Secure Use
of TLS and DTLS [I-D.ietf-uta-tls-bcp] for recommendations on of Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer
improving the security of software and services using TLS. Security (DTLS)" [RFC7525] for recommendations on improving the
security of software and services using TLS.
Whenever TLS is used, the identity of the service provider encoded in Whenever TLS is used, the identity of the service provider encoded in
the TLS server certificate MUST be verified using the procedures the TLS server certificate MUST be verified using the procedures
described in Section 6 of RFC 6125 [RFC6125]. described in Section 6 of RFC 6125 [RFC6125].
9. IANA Considerations 9. IANA Considerations
The following registration procedure is used for all the registries The following registration procedure is used for all the registries
established by this specification. established by this specification.
Values are registered on a Specification Required [RFC5226] basis Values are registered on a Specification Required [RFC5226] basis
after a three-week review period on the jose-reg-review@ietf.org after a three-week review period on the jose-reg-review@ietf.org
mailing list, on the advice of one or more Designated Experts. mailing list, on the advice of one or more Designated Experts.
However, to allow for the allocation of values prior to publication, However, to allow for the allocation of values prior to publication,
the Designated Expert(s) may approve registration once they are the Designated Experts may approve registration once they are
satisfied that such a specification will be published. satisfied that such a specification will be published.
Registration requests must be sent to the jose-reg-review@ietf.org Registration requests sent to the mailing list for review should use
mailing list for review and comment, with an appropriate subject an appropriate subject (e.g., "Request to register header parameter:
(e.g., "Request to register header parameter: example"). example").
Within the review period, the Designated Expert(s) will either Within the review period, the Designated Experts will either approve
approve or deny the registration request, communicating this decision or deny the registration request, communicating this decision to the
to the review list and IANA. Denials should include an explanation review list and IANA. Denials should include an explanation and, if
and, if applicable, suggestions as to how to make the request applicable, suggestions as to how to make the request successful.
successful. Registration requests that are undetermined for a period Registration requests that are undetermined for a period longer than
longer than 21 days can be brought to the IESG's attention (using the 21 days can be brought to the IESG's attention (using the
iesg@ietf.org mailing list) for resolution. iesg@ietf.org mailing list) for resolution.
Criteria that should be applied by the Designated Expert(s) includes Criteria that should be applied by the Designated Experts includes
determining whether the proposed registration duplicates existing determining whether the proposed registration duplicates existing
functionality, determining whether it is likely to be of general functionality, whether it is likely to be of general applicability or
applicability or whether it is useful only for a single application, useful only for a single application, and whether the registration
and whether the registration description is clear. description is clear.
IANA must only accept registry updates from the Designated Expert(s) IANA must only accept registry updates from the Designated Experts
and should direct all requests for registration to the review mailing and should direct all requests for registration to the review mailing
list. list.
It is suggested that multiple Designated Experts be appointed who are It is suggested that multiple Designated Experts be appointed who are
able to represent the perspectives of different applications using able to represent the perspectives of different applications using
this specification, in order to enable broadly-informed review of this specification, in order to enable broadly informed review of
registration decisions. In cases where a registration decision could registration decisions. In cases where a registration decision could
be perceived as creating a conflict of interest for a particular be perceived as creating a conflict of interest for a particular
Expert, that Expert should defer to the judgment of the other Expert, that Expert should defer to the judgment of the other
Expert(s). Experts.
[[ Note to the RFC Editor and IANA: Pearl Liang of ICANN had
requested that the draft supply the following proposed registry
description information. It is to be used for all registries
established by this specification.
o Protocol Category: JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE)
o Registry Location: http://www.iana.org/assignments/jose
o Webpage Title: (same as the protocol category)
o Registry Name: (same as the section title, but excluding the word
"Registry", for example "JSON Web Signature and Encryption Header
Parameters")
]]
9.1. JSON Web Signature and Encryption Header Parameters Registry 9.1. JSON Web Signature and Encryption Header Parameters Registry
This specification establishes the IANA JSON Web Signature and This specification establishes the IANA "JSON Web Signature and
Encryption Header Parameters registry for Header Parameter names. Encryption Header Parameters" registry for Header Parameter names.
The registry records the Header Parameter name and a reference to the The registry records the Header Parameter name and a reference to the
specification that defines it. The same Header Parameter name can be specification that defines it. The same Header Parameter name can be
registered multiple times, provided that the parameter usage is registered multiple times, provided that the parameter usage is
compatible between the specifications. Different registrations of compatible between the specifications. Different registrations of
the same Header Parameter name will typically use different Header the same Header Parameter name will typically use different Header
Parameter Usage Location(s) values. Parameter Usage Locations values.
9.1.1. Registration Template 9.1.1. Registration Template
Header Parameter Name: Header Parameter Name:
The name requested (e.g., "kid"). Because a core goal of this The name requested (e.g., "kid"). Because a core goal of this
specification is for the resulting representations to be compact, specification is for the resulting representations to be compact,
it is RECOMMENDED that the name be short -- not to exceed 8 it is RECOMMENDED that the name be short -- not to exceed 8
characters without a compelling reason to do so. This name is characters without a compelling reason to do so. This name is
case-sensitive. Names may not match other registered names in a case sensitive. Names may not match other registered names in a
case-insensitive manner unless the Designated Expert(s) state that case-insensitive manner unless the Designated Experts state that
there is a compelling reason to allow an exception in this there is a compelling reason to allow an exception.
particular case.
Header Parameter Description: Header Parameter Description:
Brief description of the Header Parameter (e.g., "Key ID"). Brief description of the Header Parameter (e.g., "Key ID").
Header Parameter Usage Location(s): Header Parameter Usage Location(s):
The Header Parameter usage locations, which should be one or more The Header Parameter usage locations, which should be one or more
of the values "JWS" or "JWE". of the values "JWS" or "JWE".
Change Controller: Change Controller:
For Standards Track RFCs, state "IESG". For others, give the name For Standards Track RFCs, list the "IESG". For others, give the
of the responsible party. Other details (e.g., postal address, name of the responsible party. Other details (e.g., postal
email address, home page URI) may also be included. address, email address, home page URI) may also be included.
Specification Document(s): Specification Document(s):
Reference to the document(s) that specify the parameter, Reference to the document or documents that specify the parameter,
preferably including URI(s) that can be used to retrieve copies of preferably including URIs that can be used to retrieve copies of
the document(s). An indication of the relevant sections may also the documents. An indication of the relevant sections may also be
be included but is not required. included but is not required.
9.1.2. Initial Registry Contents 9.1.2. Initial Registry Contents
This specification registers the Header Parameter names defined in This section registers the Header Parameter names defined in
Section 4.1 in this registry. Section 4.1 in this registry.
o Header Parameter Name: "alg" o Header Parameter Name: "alg"
o Header Parameter Description: Algorithm o Header Parameter Description: Algorithm
o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWS o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWS
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.1 of [[ this document ]] o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.1 of RFC 7515
o Header Parameter Name: "jku" o Header Parameter Name: "jku"
o Header Parameter Description: JWK Set URL o Header Parameter Description: JWK Set URL
o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWS o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWS
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.2 of [[ this document ]] o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.2 of RFC 7515
o Header Parameter Name: "jwk" o Header Parameter Name: "jwk"
o Header Parameter Description: JSON Web Key o Header Parameter Description: JSON Web Key
o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWS o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWS
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification document(s): Section 4.1.3 of [[ this document ]] o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.3 of RFC 7515
o Header Parameter Name: "kid" o Header Parameter Name: "kid"
o Header Parameter Description: Key ID o Header Parameter Description: Key ID
o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWS o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWS
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.4 of [[ this document ]] o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.4 of RFC 7515
o Header Parameter Name: "x5u" o Header Parameter Name: "x5u"
o Header Parameter Description: X.509 URL o Header Parameter Description: X.509 URL
o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWS o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWS
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.5 of [[ this document ]] o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.5 of RFC 7515
o Header Parameter Name: "x5c" o Header Parameter Name: "x5c"
o Header Parameter Description: X.509 Certificate Chain o Header Parameter Description: X.509 Certificate Chain
o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWS o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWS
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.6 of [[ this document ]] o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.6 of RFC 7515
o Header Parameter Name: "x5t" o Header Parameter Name: "x5t"
o Header Parameter Description: X.509 Certificate SHA-1 Thumbprint o Header Parameter Description: X.509 Certificate SHA-1 Thumbprint
o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWS o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWS
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.7 of [[ this document ]] o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.7 of RFC 7515
o Header Parameter Name: "x5t#S256" o Header Parameter Name: "x5t#S256"
o Header Parameter Description: X.509 Certificate SHA-256 Thumbprint o Header Parameter Description: X.509 Certificate SHA-256 Thumbprint
o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWS o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWS
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.8 of [[ this document ]] o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.8 of RFC 7515
o Header Parameter Name: "typ" o Header Parameter Name: "typ"
o Header Parameter Description: Type o Header Parameter Description: Type
o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWS o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWS
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.9 of [[ this document ]] o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.9 of RFC 7515
o Header Parameter Name: "cty" o Header Parameter Name: "cty"
o Header Parameter Description: Content Type o Header Parameter Description: Content Type
o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWS o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWS
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.10 of [[ this document ]] o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.10 of RFC 7515
o Header Parameter Name: "crit" o Header Parameter Name: "crit"
o Header Parameter Description: Critical o Header Parameter Description: Critical
o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWS o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWS
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.11 of [[ this document ]] o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1.11 of RFC 7515
9.2. Media Type Registration 9.2. Media Type Registration
9.2.1. Registry Contents 9.2.1. Registry Contents
This specification registers the "application/jose" Media Type This section registers the "application/jose" media type [RFC2046] in
[RFC2046] in the MIME Media Types registry [IANA.MediaTypes] in the the "Media Types" registry [IANA.MediaTypes] in the manner described
manner described in RFC 6838 [RFC6838], which can be used to indicate in RFC 6838 [RFC6838], which can be used to indicate that the content
that the content is a JWS or JWE using the JWS Compact Serialization is a JWS or JWE using the JWS Compact Serialization or the JWE
or the JWE Compact Serialization and the "application/jose+json" Compact Serialization. This section also registers the "application/
Media Type in the MIME Media Types registry, which can be used to jose+json" media type in the "Media Types" registry, which can be
indicate that the content is a JWS or JWE using the JWS JSON used to indicate that the content is a JWS or JWE using the JWS JSON
Serialization or the JWE JSON Serialization. Serialization or the JWE JSON Serialization.
o Type name: application o Type name: application
o Subtype name: jose o Subtype name: jose
o Required parameters: n/a o Required parameters: n/a
o Optional parameters: n/a o Optional parameters: n/a
o Encoding considerations: 8bit; application/jose values are encoded o Encoding considerations: 8bit; application/jose values are encoded
as a series of base64url encoded values (some of which may be the as a series of base64url-encoded values (some of which may be the
empty string) each separated from the next by a single period empty string), each separated from the next by a single period
('.') character. ('.') character.
o Security considerations: See the Security Considerations section o Security considerations: See the Security Considerations section
of [[ this document ]] of RFC 7515.
o Interoperability considerations: n/a o Interoperability considerations: n/a
o Published specification: [[ this document ]] o Published specification: RFC 7515
o Applications that use this media type: OpenID Connect, Mozilla o Applications that use this media type: OpenID Connect, Mozilla
Persona, Salesforce, Google, Android, Windows Azure, Xbox One, Persona, Salesforce, Google, Android, Windows Azure, Xbox One,
Amazon Web Services, and numerous others that use JWTs Amazon Web Services, and numerous others that use JWTs
o Fragment identifier considerations: n/a o Fragment identifier considerations: n/a
o Additional information: Magic number(s): n/a, File extension(s): o Additional information:
n/a, Macintosh file type code(s): n/a
o Person & email address to contact for further information: Michael Magic number(s): n/a
B. Jones, mbj@microsoft.com File extension(s): n/a
Macintosh file type code(s): n/a
o Person & email address to contact for further information:
Michael B. Jones, mbj@microsoft.com
o Intended usage: COMMON o Intended usage: COMMON
o Restrictions on usage: none o Restrictions on usage: none
o Author: Michael B. Jones, mbj@microsoft.com o Author: Michael B. Jones, mbj@microsoft.com
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Provisional registration? No o Provisional registration? No
o Type name: application o Type name: application
o Subtype name: jose+json o Subtype name: jose+json
o Required parameters: n/a o Required parameters: n/a
o Optional parameters: n/a o Optional parameters: n/a
o Encoding considerations: 8bit; application/jose+json values are o Encoding considerations: 8bit; application/jose+json values are
represented as a JSON Object; UTF-8 encoding SHOULD be employed represented as a JSON Object; UTF-8 encoding SHOULD be employed
for the JSON object. for the JSON object.
o Security considerations: See the Security Considerations section o Security considerations: See the Security Considerations section
of [[ this document ]] of RFC 7515
o Interoperability considerations: n/a o Interoperability considerations: n/a
o Published specification: [[ this document ]] o Published specification: RFC 7515
o Applications that use this media type: TBD o Applications that use this media type: Nimbus JOSE + JWT library
o Fragment identifier considerations: n/a o Fragment identifier considerations: n/a
o Additional information: Magic number(s): n/a, File extension(s): o Additional information:
n/a, Macintosh file type code(s): n/a
o Person & email address to contact for further information: Michael Magic number(s): n/a
B. Jones, mbj@microsoft.com File extension(s): n/a
Macintosh file type code(s): n/a
o Person & email address to contact for further information:
Michael B. Jones, mbj@microsoft.com
o Intended usage: COMMON o Intended usage: COMMON
o Restrictions on usage: none o Restrictions on usage: none
o Author: Michael B. Jones, mbj@microsoft.com o Author: Michael B. Jones, mbj@microsoft.com
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Provisional registration? No o Provisional registration? No
10. Security Considerations 10. Security Considerations
All of the security issues that are pertinent to any cryptographic All of the security issues that are pertinent to any cryptographic
application must be addressed by JWS/JWE/JWK agents. Among these application must be addressed by JWS/JWE/JWK agents. Among these
issues are protecting the user's asymmetric private and symmetric issues are protecting the user's asymmetric private and symmetric
secret keys and employing countermeasures to various attacks. secret keys and employing countermeasures to various attacks.
All the security considerations in XML DSIG 2.0 All the security considerations in "XML Signature Syntax and
[W3C.NOTE-xmldsig-core2-20130411], also apply to this specification, Processing Version 2.0" [W3C.NOTE-xmldsig-core2-20130411], also apply
other than those that are XML specific. Likewise, many of the best to this specification, other than those that are XML specific.
practices documented in XML Signature Best Practices Likewise, many of the best practices documented in "XML Signature
[W3C.NOTE-xmldsig-bestpractices-20130411] also apply to this Best Practices" [W3C.NOTE-xmldsig-bestpractices-20130411] also apply
specification, other than those that are XML specific. to this specification, other than those that are XML specific.
10.1. Key Entropy and Random Values 10.1. Key Entropy and Random Values
Keys are only as strong as the amount of entropy used to generate Keys are only as strong as the amount of entropy used to generate
them. A minimum of 128 bits of entropy should be used for all keys, them. A minimum of 128 bits of entropy should be used for all keys,
and depending upon the application context, more may be required. and depending upon the application context, more may be required.
Implementations must randomly generate public/private key pairs, Implementations must randomly generate public/private key pairs, MAC
message authentication (MAC) keys, and padding values. The use of keys, and padding values. The use of inadequate pseudorandom number
inadequate pseudo-random number generators (PRNGs) to generate generators (PRNGs) to generate cryptographic keys can result in
cryptographic keys can result in little or no security. An attacker little or no security. An attacker may find it much easier to
may find it much easier to reproduce the PRNG environment that reproduce the PRNG environment that produced the keys, searching the
produced the keys, searching the resulting small set of resulting small set of possibilities rather than brute-force
possibilities, rather than brute force searching the whole key space. searching the whole key space. The generation of quality random
The generation of quality random numbers is difficult. RFC 4086 numbers is difficult. RFC 4086 [RFC4086] offers important guidance
[RFC4086] offers important guidance in this area. in this area.
10.2. Key Protection 10.2. Key Protection
Implementations must protect the signer's private key. Compromise of Implementations must protect the signer's private key. Compromise of
the signer's private key permits an attacker to masquerade as the the signer's private key permits an attacker to masquerade as the
signer. signer.
Implementations must protect the message authentication (MAC) key. Implementations must protect the MAC key. Compromise of the MAC key
Compromise of the MAC key may result in undetectable modification of may result in undetectable modification of the authenticated content.
the authenticated content.
10.3. Key Origin Authentication 10.3. Key Origin Authentication
The key management technique employed to obtain public keys must The key management technique employed to obtain public keys must
authenticate the origin of the key; otherwise, it is unknown what authenticate the origin of the key; otherwise, it is unknown what
party signed the message. party signed the message.
Likewise, the key management technique employed to distribute MAC Likewise, the key management technique employed to distribute MAC
keys must provide data origin authentication; otherwise, the contents keys must provide data origin authentication; otherwise, the contents
are delivered with integrity from an unknown source. are delivered with integrity from an unknown source.
skipping to change at page 30, line 14 skipping to change at page 29, line 17
generated by one of the parties that knows the symmetric MAC key. generated by one of the parties that knows the symmetric MAC key.
This means that origination can only be determined if a MAC key is This means that origination can only be determined if a MAC key is
known only to two entities and the recipient knows that it did not known only to two entities and the recipient knows that it did not
create the message. MAC validation cannot be used to prove create the message. MAC validation cannot be used to prove
origination to a third party. origination to a third party.
10.6. Algorithm Validation 10.6. Algorithm Validation
The digital signature representations for some algorithms include The digital signature representations for some algorithms include
information about the algorithm used inside the signature value. For information about the algorithm used inside the signature value. For
instance, signatures produced with RSASSA-PKCS-v1_5 [RFC3447] encode instance, signatures produced with RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 [RFC3447] encode
the hash function used and many libraries actually use the hash the hash function used, and many libraries actually use the hash
algorithm specified inside the signature when validating the algorithm specified inside the signature when validating the
signature. When using such libraries, as part of the algorithm signature. When using such libraries, as part of the algorithm
validation performed, implementations MUST ensure that the algorithm validation performed, implementations MUST ensure that the algorithm
information encoded in the signature corresponds to that specified information encoded in the signature corresponds to that specified
with the "alg" Header Parameter. If this is not done, an attacker with the "alg" Header Parameter. If this is not done, an attacker
could claim to have used a strong hash algorithm while actually using could claim to have used a strong hash algorithm while actually using
a weak one represented in the signature value. a weak one represented in the signature value.
10.7. Algorithm Protection 10.7. Algorithm Protection
In some usages of JWS, there is a risk of algorithm substitution In some usages of JWS, there is a risk of algorithm substitution
attacks, in which an attacker can use an existing digital signature attacks, in which an attacker can use an existing digital signature
value with a different signature algorithm to make it appear that a value with a different signature algorithm to make it appear that a
signer has signed something that it has not. These attacks have been signer has signed something that it has not. These attacks have been
discussed in detail in the context of CMS [RFC6211]. This risk discussed in detail in the context of Cryptographic Message Syntax
arises when all of the following are true: (CMS) [RFC6211]. This risk arises when all of the following are
true:
o Verifiers of a signature support multiple algorithms. o Verifiers of a signature support multiple algorithms.
o Given an existing signature, an attacker can find another payload o Given an existing signature, an attacker can find another payload
that produces the same signature value with a different algorithm. that produces the same signature value with a different algorithm.
o The payload crafted by the attacker is valid in the application o The payload crafted by the attacker is valid in the application
context. context.
There are several ways for an application to mitigate algorithm There are several ways for an application to mitigate algorithm
substitution attacks: substitution attacks:
o Use only digital signature algorithms that are not vulnerable to o Use only digital signature algorithms that are not vulnerable to
substitution attacks. Substitution attacks are only feasible if substitution attacks. Substitution attacks are only feasible if
an attacker can compute pre-images for a hash function accepted by an attacker can compute pre-images for a hash function accepted by
the recipient. All JWA-defined signature algorithms use SHA-2 the recipient. All JWA-defined signature algorithms use SHA-2
hashes, for which there are no known pre-image attacks, as of the hashes, for which there are no known pre-image attacks, as of the
time of this writing. time of this writing.
o Require that the "alg" Header Parameter be carried in the o Require that the "alg" Header Parameter be carried in the JWS
protected header. (This is always the case when using the JWS Protected Header. (This is always the case when using the JWS
Compact Serialization and is the approach taken by CMS [RFC6211].) Compact Serialization and is the approach taken by CMS [RFC6211].)
o Include a field containing the algorithm in the application o Include a field containing the algorithm in the application
payload, and require that it be matched with the "alg" Header payload, and require that it be matched with the "alg" Header
Parameter during verification. (This is the approach taken by Parameter during verification. (This is the approach taken by
PKIX [RFC5280].) PKIX [RFC5280].)
10.8. Chosen Plaintext Attacks 10.8. Chosen Plaintext Attacks
Creators of JWSs should not allow third parties to insert arbitrary Creators of JWSs should not allow third parties to insert arbitrary
skipping to change at page 31, line 32 skipping to change at page 30, line 35
When cryptographic algorithms are implemented in such a way that When cryptographic algorithms are implemented in such a way that
successful operations take a different amount of time than successful operations take a different amount of time than
unsuccessful operations, attackers may be able to use the time unsuccessful operations, attackers may be able to use the time
difference to obtain information about the keys employed. Therefore, difference to obtain information about the keys employed. Therefore,
such timing differences must be avoided. such timing differences must be avoided.
10.10. Replay Protection 10.10. Replay Protection
While not directly in scope for this specification, note that While not directly in scope for this specification, note that
applications using JWS (or JWE) objects can thwart replay attacks by applications using JWS (or JWE) objects can thwart replay attacks by
including a unique message identifier as integrity protected content including a unique message identifier as integrity-protected content
in the JWS (or JWE) message and having the recipient verify that the in the JWS (or JWE) message and having the recipient verify that the
message has not been previously received or acted upon. message has not been previously received or acted upon.
10.11. SHA-1 Certificate Thumbprints 10.11. SHA-1 Certificate Thumbprints
A SHA-1 hash is used when computing "x5t" (X.509 Certificate SHA-1 A SHA-1 hash is used when computing "x5t" (X.509 certificate SHA-1
Thumbprint) values, for compatibility reasons. Should an effective thumbprint) values, for compatibility reasons. Should an effective
means of producing SHA-1 hash collisions be developed, and should an means of producing SHA-1 hash collisions be developed and should an
attacker wish to interfere with the use of a known certificate on a attacker wish to interfere with the use of a known certificate on a
given system, this could be accomplished by creating another given system, this could be accomplished by creating another
certificate whose SHA-1 hash value is the same and adding it to the certificate whose SHA-1 hash value is the same and adding it to the
certificate store used by the intended victim. A prerequisite to certificate store used by the intended victim. A prerequisite to
this attack succeeding is the attacker having write access to the this attack succeeding is the attacker having write access to the
intended victim's certificate store. intended victim's certificate store.
Alternatively, the "x5t#S256" (X.509 Certificate SHA-256 Thumbprint) Alternatively, the "x5t#S256" (X.509 certificate SHA-256 thumbprint)
Header Parameter could be used instead of "x5t". However, at the Header Parameter could be used instead of "x5t". However, at the
time of this writing, no development platform is known to support time of this writing, no development platform is known to support
SHA-256 certificate thumbprints. SHA-256 certificate thumbprints.
10.12. JSON Security Considerations 10.12. JSON Security Considerations
Strict JSON [RFC7159] validation is a security requirement. If Strict JSON [RFC7159] validation is a security requirement. If
malformed JSON is received, then the intent of the producer is malformed JSON is received, then the intent of the producer is
impossible to reliably discern. Ambiguous and potentially impossible to reliably discern. Ambiguous and potentially
exploitable situations could arise if the JSON parser used does not exploitable situations could arise if the JSON parser used does not
reject malformed JSON syntax. In particular, any JSON inputs not reject malformed JSON syntax. In particular, any JSON inputs not
conforming to the JSON-text syntax defined in RFC 7159 input MUST be conforming to the JSON-text syntax defined in RFC 7159 MUST be
rejected in their entirety by JSON parsers. rejected in their entirety by JSON parsers.
Section 4 of the JSON Data Interchange Format specification [RFC7159] Section 4 of "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data Interchange
states "The names within an object SHOULD be unique", whereas this Format" [RFC7159] states, "The names within an object SHOULD be
specification states that "Header Parameter names within this object unique", whereas this specification states that
MUST be unique; JWS parsers MUST either reject JWSs with duplicate
Header Parameter names or use a JSON parser that returns only the The Header Parameter names within the JOSE Header MUST be unique;
lexically last duplicate member name, as specified in Section 15.12 JWS parsers MUST either reject JWSs with duplicate Header
(The JSON Object) of ECMAScript 5.1 [ECMAScript]". Thus, this Parameter names or use a JSON parser that returns only the
specification requires that the Section 4 "SHOULD" be treated as a lexically last duplicate member name, as specified in
"MUST" by producers and that it be either treated as a "MUST" or in Section 15.12 ("The JSON Object") of ECMAScript 5.1 [ECMAScript].
the manner specified in ECMAScript 5.1 by consumers. Ambiguous and
potentially exploitable situations could arise if the JSON parser Thus, this specification requires that the "SHOULD" in Section 4 of
used does not enforce the uniqueness of member names or returns an [RFC7159] be treated as a "MUST" by producers and that it be either
unpredictable value for duplicate member names. treated as a "MUST" or treated in the manner specified in ECMAScript
5.1 by consumers. Ambiguous and potentially exploitable situations
could arise if the JSON parser used does not enforce the uniqueness
of member names or returns an unpredictable value for duplicate
member names.
Some JSON parsers might not reject input that contains extra Some JSON parsers might not reject input that contains extra
significant characters after a valid input. For instance, the input significant characters after a valid input. For instance, the input
"{"tag":"value"}ABCD" contains a valid JSON-text object followed by "{"tag":"value"}ABCD" contains a valid JSON-text object followed by
the extra characters "ABCD". Implementations MUST consider JWSs the extra characters "ABCD". Implementations MUST consider JWSs
containing such input to be invalid. containing such input to be invalid.
10.13. Unicode Comparison Security Considerations 10.13. Unicode Comparison Security Considerations
Header Parameter names and algorithm names are Unicode strings. For Header Parameter names and algorithm names are Unicode strings. For
skipping to change at page 33, line 9 skipping to change at page 32, line 18
implementations SHOULD ensure that characters outside the Basic implementations SHOULD ensure that characters outside the Basic
Multilingual Plane are preserved and compared correctly; Multilingual Plane are preserved and compared correctly;
alternatively, if this is not possible due to these characters alternatively, if this is not possible due to these characters
exercising limitations present in the underlying JSON implementation, exercising limitations present in the underlying JSON implementation,
then input containing them MUST be rejected. then input containing them MUST be rejected.
11. References 11. References
11.1. Normative References 11.1. Normative References
[ECMAScript] [ECMAScript] Ecma International, "ECMAScript Language Specification,
Ecma International, "ECMAScript Language Specification, 5.1 Edition", ECMA 262, June 2011,
5.1 Edition", ECMA 262, June 2011. <http://www.ecma-international.org/ecma-262/5.1/
ECMA-262.pdf>.
[IANA.MediaTypes] [IANA.MediaTypes]
Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), "MIME Media IANA, "Media Types",
Types", 2005. <http://www.iana.org/assignments/media-types>.
[ITU.X690.1994] [ITU.X690.2008]
International Telecommunications Union, "Information International Telecommunications Union, "Information
Technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of
Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules
Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)", ITU-T Recommendation (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)", ITU-T
X.690, 1994. Recommendation X.690, 2008.
[JWA] Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", [JWA] Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", RFC 7518,
draft-ietf-jose-json-web-algorithms (work in progress), DOI 10.17487/RFC7518, May 2015,
January 2015. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7518>.
[JWK] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", [JWK] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517,
draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key (work in progress), DOI 10.17487/RFC7517, May 2015,
January 2015. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7517>.
[RFC20] Cerf, V., "ASCII format for Network Interchange", RFC 20, [RFC20] Cerf, V., "ASCII format for Network Interchange",
October 1969. STD 80, RFC 20, DOI 10.17487/RFC0020, October 1969,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc20>.
[RFC2045] Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail [RFC2045] Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail
Extensions (MIME) Part One: Format of Internet Message Extensions (MIME) Part One: Format of Internet Message
Bodies", RFC 2045, November 1996. Bodies", RFC 2045, DOI 10.17487/RFC2045, November 1996,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2045>.
[RFC2046] Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail [RFC2046] Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail
Extensions (MIME) Part Two: Media Types", RFC 2046, Extensions (MIME) Part Two: Media Types", RFC 2046,
November 1996. DOI 10.17487/RFC2046, November 1996,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2046>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, May 2000. [RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2818, May 2000,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2818>.
[RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO [RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, November 2003. 10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, DOI 10.17487/RFC3629, November
2003, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3629>.
[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform [RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66, Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
RFC 3986, January 2005. RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.
[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data [RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
Encodings", RFC 4648, October 2006. Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October
2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.
[RFC4945] Korver, B., "The Internet IP Security PKI Profile of [RFC4945] Korver, B., "The Internet IP Security PKI Profile of
IKEv1/ISAKMP, IKEv2, and PKIX", RFC 4945, August 2007. IKEv1/ISAKMP, IKEv2, and PKIX", RFC 4945,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4945, August 2007,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4945>.
[RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2", [RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2",
RFC 4949, August 2007. FYI 36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4949>.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security [RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008. Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008. List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May
2008, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and [RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity Verification of Domain-Based Application Service
within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 Identity within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using
(PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer X.509 (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport
Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, March 2011. Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, DOI 10.17487/RFC6125,
March 2011, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6125>.
[RFC6176] Turner, S. and T. Polk, "Prohibiting Secure Sockets Layer [RFC6176] Turner, S. and T. Polk, "Prohibiting Secure Sockets
(SSL) Version 2.0", RFC 6176, March 2011. Layer (SSL) Version 2.0", RFC 6176,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6176, March 2011,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6176>.
[RFC7159] Bray, T., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data [RFC7159] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON)
Interchange Format", RFC 7159, March 2014. Data Interchange Format", RFC 7159,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, March 2014,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7159>.
[UNICODE] The Unicode Consortium, "The Unicode Standard", 1991-, [UNICODE] The Unicode Consortium, "The Unicode Standard",
<http://www.unicode.org/versions/latest/>. <http://www.unicode.org/versions/latest/>.
11.2. Informative References 11.2. Informative References
[CanvasApp] [CanvasApp] Facebook, "Canvas Applications",
Facebook, "Canvas Applications", 2010. <http://developers.facebook.com/docs/authentication/
canvas>.
[I-D.ietf-uta-tls-bcp]
Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
"Recommendations for Secure Use of TLS and DTLS",
draft-ietf-uta-tls-bcp-08 (work in progress),
December 2014.
[JSS] Bradley, J. and N. Sakimura (editor), "JSON Simple Sign", [JSS] Bradley, J. and N. Sakimura, Ed., "JSON Simple Sign",
September 2010. September 2010, <http://jsonenc.info/jss/1.0/>.
[JWE] Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)", [JWE] Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption
draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption (work in progress), (JWE)", RFC 7516, DOI 10.17487/RFC7516, May 2015,
January 2015. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7516>.
[JWT] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token [JWT] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token (work in (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
progress), January 2015. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
[MagicSignatures] [MagicSignatures]
Panzer (editor), J., Laurie, B., and D. Balfanz, "Magic Panzer, J., Ed., Laurie, B., and D. Balfanz, "Magic
Signatures", January 2011. Signatures", January 2011,
<http://salmon-protocol.googlecode.com/svn/trunk/
draft-panzer-magicsig-01.html>.
[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed- [RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC:
Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
February 1997. DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2104>.
[RFC3447] Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, "Public-Key Cryptography [RFC3447] Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, "Public-Key Cryptography
Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications
Version 2.1", RFC 3447, February 2003. Version 2.1", RFC 3447, DOI 10.17487/RFC3447, February
2003, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3447>.
[RFC4086] Eastlake, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, "Randomness [RFC4086] Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, June 2005. "Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106,
RFC 4086, DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4086>.
[RFC4122] Leach, P., Mealling, M., and R. Salz, "A Universally [RFC4122] Leach, P., Mealling, M., and R. Salz, "A Universally
Unique IDentifier (UUID) URN Namespace", RFC 4122, Unique IDentifier (UUID) URN Namespace", RFC 4122,
July 2005. DOI 10.17487/RFC4122, July 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4122>.
[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an [RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226, IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
May 2008. DOI 10.17487/RFC5226, May 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5226>.
[RFC6211] Schaad, J., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) Algorithm [RFC6211] Schaad, J., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
Identifier Protection Attribute", RFC 6211, April 2011. Algorithm Identifier Protection Attribute", RFC 6211,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6211, April 2011,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6211>.
[RFC6838] Freed, N., Klensin, J., and T. Hansen, "Media Type [RFC6838] Freed, N., Klensin, J., and T. Hansen, "Media Type
Specifications and Registration Procedures", BCP 13, Specifications and Registration Procedures", BCP 13,
RFC 6838, January 2013. RFC 6838, DOI 10.17487/RFC6838, January 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6838>.
[SHS] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure [RFC7525] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
Hash Standard (SHS)", FIPS PUB 180-4, March 2012. "Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May
2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7525>.
[SHS] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure
Hash Standard (SHS)", FIPS PUB 180-4, March 2012,
<http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-4/
fips-180-4.pdf>.
[W3C.NOTE-xmldsig-bestpractices-20130411] [W3C.NOTE-xmldsig-bestpractices-20130411]
Hirsch, F. and P. Datta, "XML Signature Best Practices", Hirsch, F. and P. Datta, "XML Signature Best Practices",
World Wide Web Consortium Note NOTE-xmldsig-bestpractices- World Wide Web Consortium Note
20130411, April 2013, <http://www.w3.org/TR/2013/ NOTE-xmldsig-bestpractices-20130411, April 2013,
NOTE-xmldsig-bestpractices-20130411/>. <http://www.w3.org/TR/2013/
NOTE-xmldsig-bestpractices-20130411/>.
[W3C.NOTE-xmldsig-core2-20130411] [W3C.NOTE-xmldsig-core2-20130411]
Eastlake, D., Reagle, J., Solo, D., Hirsch, F., Roessler, Eastlake, D., Reagle, J., Solo, D., Hirsch, F.,
T., Yiu, K., Datta, P., and S. Cantor, "XML Signature Roessler, T., Yiu, K., Datta, P., and S. Cantor, "XML
Syntax and Processing Version 2.0", World Wide Web Signature Syntax and Processing Version 2.0", World Wide
Consortium Note NOTE-xmldsig-core2-20130411, April 2013, Web Consortium Note NOTE-xmldsig-core2-20130411, April
<http://www.w3.org/TR/2013/NOTE-xmldsig-core2-20130411/>. 2013,
<http://www.w3.org/TR/2013/NOTE-xmldsig-core2-20130411/>.
Appendix A. JWS Examples Appendix A. JWS Examples
This section provides several examples of JWSs. While the first This section provides several examples of JWSs. While the first
three examples all represent JSON Web Tokens (JWTs) [JWT], the three examples all represent JSON Web Tokens (JWTs) [JWT], the
payload can be any octet sequence, as shown in Appendix A.4. payload can be any octet sequence, as shown in Appendix A.4.
A.1. Example JWS using HMAC SHA-256 A.1. Example JWS Using HMAC SHA-256
A.1.1. Encoding A.1.1. Encoding
The following example JWS Protected Header declares that the data The following example JWS Protected Header declares that the data
structure is a JSON Web Token (JWT) [JWT] and the JWS Signing Input structure is a JWT [JWT] and the JWS Signing Input is secured using
is secured using the HMAC SHA-256 algorithm. the HMAC SHA-256 algorithm.
{"typ":"JWT", {"typ":"JWT",
"alg":"HS256"} "alg":"HS256"}
To remove potential ambiguities in the representation of the JSON To remove potential ambiguities in the representation of the JSON
object above, the actual octet sequence representing UTF8(JWS object above, the actual octet sequence representing UTF8(JWS
Protected Header) used in this example is also included below. (Note Protected Header) used in this example is also included below. (Note
that ambiguities can arise due to differing platform representations that ambiguities can arise due to differing platform representations
of line breaks (CRLF versus LF), differing spacing at the beginning of line breaks (CRLF versus LF), differing spacing at the beginning
and ends of lines, whether the last line has a terminating line break and ends of lines, whether the last line has a terminating line break
skipping to change at page 37, line 4 skipping to change at page 37, line 46
[123, 34, 116, 121, 112, 34, 58, 34, 74, 87, 84, 34, 44, 13, 10, 32, [123, 34, 116, 121, 112, 34, 58, 34, 74, 87, 84, 34, 44, 13, 10, 32,
34, 97, 108, 103, 34, 58, 34, 72, 83, 50, 53, 54, 34, 125] 34, 97, 108, 103, 34, 58, 34, 72, 83, 50, 53, 54, 34, 125]
Encoding this JWS Protected Header as BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Encoding this JWS Protected Header as BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected
Header)) gives this value: Header)) gives this value:
eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLA0KICJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9 eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLA0KICJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9
The JWS Payload used in this example is the octets of the UTF-8 The JWS Payload used in this example is the octets of the UTF-8
representation of the JSON object below. (Note that the payload can representation of the JSON object below. (Note that the payload can
be any base64url encoded octet sequence, and need not be a base64url be any base64url-encoded octet sequence and need not be a base64url-
encoded JSON object.) encoded JSON object.)
{"iss":"joe", {"iss":"joe",
"exp":1300819380, "exp":1300819380,
"http://example.com/is_root":true} "http://example.com/is_root":true}
The following octet sequence, which is the UTF-8 representation used The following octet sequence, which is the UTF-8 representation used
in this example for the JSON object above, is the JWS Payload: in this example for the JSON object above, is the JWS Payload:
[123, 34, 105, 115, 115, 34, 58, 34, 106, 111, 101, 34, 44, 13, 10, [123, 34, 105, 115, 115, 34, 58, 34, 106, 111, 101, 34, 44, 13, 10,
32, 34, 101, 120, 112, 34, 58, 49, 51, 48, 48, 56, 49, 57, 51, 56, 32, 34, 101, 120, 112, 34, 58, 49, 51, 48, 48, 56, 49, 57, 51, 56,
48, 44, 13, 10, 32, 34, 104, 116, 116, 112, 58, 47, 47, 101, 120, 97, 48, 44, 13, 10, 32, 34, 104, 116, 116, 112, 58, 47, 47, 101, 120, 97,
109, 112, 108, 101, 46, 99, 111, 109, 47, 105, 115, 95, 114, 111, 109, 112, 108, 101, 46, 99, 111, 109, 47, 105, 115, 95, 114, 111,
111, 116, 34, 58, 116, 114, 117, 101, 125] 111, 116, 34, 58, 116, 114, 117, 101, 125]
Encoding this JWS Protected Header as BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Encoding this JWS Payload as BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Payload)) gives this
Header)) gives this value (with line breaks for display purposes value (with line breaks for display purposes only):
only):
eyJpc3MiOiJqb2UiLA0KICJleHAiOjEzMDA4MTkzODAsDQogImh0dHA6Ly9leGFt eyJpc3MiOiJqb2UiLA0KICJleHAiOjEzMDA4MTkzODAsDQogImh0dHA6Ly9leGFt
cGxlLmNvbS9pc19yb290Ijp0cnVlfQ cGxlLmNvbS9pc19yb290Ijp0cnVlfQ
Combining these as BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header)) || '.' || Combining these as BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header)) || '.' ||
BASE64URL(JWS Payload) gives this string (with line breaks for BASE64URL(JWS Payload) gives this string (with line breaks for
display purposes only): display purposes only):
eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLA0KICJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9 eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLA0KICJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9
. .
skipping to change at page 39, line 5 skipping to change at page 39, line 43
To validate the HMAC value, we repeat the previous process of using To validate the HMAC value, we repeat the previous process of using
the correct key and the JWS Signing Input (which is the initial the correct key and the JWS Signing Input (which is the initial
substring of the JWS Compact Serialization representation up until substring of the JWS Compact Serialization representation up until
but not including the second period character) as input to the HMAC but not including the second period character) as input to the HMAC
SHA-256 function and then taking the output and determining if it SHA-256 function and then taking the output and determining if it
matches the JWS Signature (which is base64url decoded from the value matches the JWS Signature (which is base64url decoded from the value
encoded in the JWS representation). If it matches exactly, the HMAC encoded in the JWS representation). If it matches exactly, the HMAC
has been validated. has been validated.
A.2. Example JWS using RSASSA-PKCS-v1_5 SHA-256 A.2. Example JWS Using RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 SHA-256
A.2.1. Encoding A.2.1. Encoding
The JWS Protected Header in this example is different from the The JWS Protected Header in this example is different from the
previous example in two ways: First, because a different algorithm is previous example in two ways. First, because a different algorithm
being used, the "alg" value is different. Second, for illustration is being used, the "alg" value is different. Second, for
purposes only, the optional "typ" parameter is not used. (This illustration purposes only, the optional "typ" (type) Header
difference is not related to the algorithm employed.) The JWS Parameter is not used. (This difference is not related to the
Protected Header used is: algorithm employed.) The JWS Protected Header used is:
{"alg":"RS256"} {"alg":"RS256"}
The octets representing UTF8(JWS Protected Header) in this example The octets representing UTF8(JWS Protected Header) in this example
(using JSON array notation) are: (using JSON array notation) are:
[123, 34, 97, 108, 103, 34, 58, 34, 82, 83, 50, 53, 54, 34, 125] [123, 34, 97, 108, 103, 34, 58, 34, 82, 83, 50, 53, 54, 34, 125]
Encoding this JWS Protected Header as BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Encoding this JWS Protected Header as BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected
Header)) gives this value: Header)) gives this value:
skipping to change at page 40, line 46 skipping to change at page 42, line 8
7I9xXDoRwbKgB719rrmI2oKr6N3Do9U0ajaHF-NKJnwgjMd2w9cjz3_-ky 7I9xXDoRwbKgB719rrmI2oKr6N3Do9U0ajaHF-NKJnwgjMd2w9cjz3_-ky
NlxAr2v4IKhGNpmM5iIgOS1VZnOZ68m6_pbLBSp3nssTdlqvd0tIiTHU", NlxAr2v4IKhGNpmM5iIgOS1VZnOZ68m6_pbLBSp3nssTdlqvd0tIiTHU",
"qi":"IYd7DHOhrWvxkwPQsRM2tOgrjbcrfvtQJipd-DlcxyVuuM9sQLdgjVk2o "qi":"IYd7DHOhrWvxkwPQsRM2tOgrjbcrfvtQJipd-DlcxyVuuM9sQLdgjVk2o
y26F0EmpScGLq2MowX7fhd_QJQ3ydy5cY7YIBi87w93IKLEdfnbJtoOPLU y26F0EmpScGLq2MowX7fhd_QJQ3ydy5cY7YIBi87w93IKLEdfnbJtoOPLU
W0ITrJReOgo1cq9SbsxYawBgfp_gh6A5603k2-ZQwVK0JKSHuLFkuQ3U" W0ITrJReOgo1cq9SbsxYawBgfp_gh6A5603k2-ZQwVK0JKSHuLFkuQ3U"
} }
The RSA private key is then passed to the RSA signing function, which The RSA private key is then passed to the RSA signing function, which
also takes the hash type, SHA-256, and the JWS Signing Input as also takes the hash type, SHA-256, and the JWS Signing Input as
inputs. The result of the digital signature is an octet sequence, inputs. The result of the digital signature is an octet sequence,
which represents a big endian integer. In this example, it is: which represents a big-endian integer. In this example, it is:
[112, 46, 33, 137, 67, 232, 143, 209, 30, 181, 216, 45, 191, 120, 69, [112, 46, 33, 137, 67, 232, 143, 209, 30, 181, 216, 45, 191, 120, 69,
243, 65, 6, 174, 27, 129, 255, 247, 115, 17, 22, 173, 209, 113, 125, 243, 65, 6, 174, 27, 129, 255, 247, 115, 17, 22, 173, 209, 113, 125,
131, 101, 109, 66, 10, 253, 60, 150, 238, 221, 115, 162, 102, 62, 81, 131, 101, 109, 66, 10, 253, 60, 150, 238, 221, 115, 162, 102, 62, 81,
102, 104, 123, 0, 11, 135, 34, 110, 1, 135, 237, 16, 115, 249, 69, 102, 104, 123, 0, 11, 135, 34, 110, 1, 135, 237, 16, 115, 249, 69,
229, 130, 173, 252, 239, 22, 216, 90, 121, 142, 232, 198, 109, 219, 229, 130, 173, 252, 239, 22, 216, 90, 121, 142, 232, 198, 109, 219,
61, 184, 151, 91, 23, 208, 148, 2, 190, 237, 213, 217, 217, 112, 7, 61, 184, 151, 91, 23, 208, 148, 2, 190, 237, 213, 217, 217, 112, 7,
16, 141, 178, 129, 96, 213, 248, 4, 12, 167, 68, 87, 98, 184, 31, 16, 141, 178, 129, 96, 213, 248, 4, 12, 167, 68, 87, 98, 184, 31,
190, 127, 249, 217, 46, 10, 231, 111, 36, 242, 91, 51, 187, 230, 244, 190, 127, 249, 217, 46, 10, 231, 111, 36, 242, 91, 51, 187, 230, 244,
74, 230, 30, 177, 4, 10, 203, 32, 4, 77, 62, 249, 18, 142, 212, 1, 74, 230, 30, 177, 4, 10, 203, 32, 4, 77, 62, 249, 18, 142, 212, 1,
skipping to change at page 41, line 49 skipping to change at page 43, line 25
cC4hiUPoj9Eetdgtv3hF80EGrhuB__dzERat0XF9g2VtQgr9PJbu3XOiZj5RZmh7 cC4hiUPoj9Eetdgtv3hF80EGrhuB__dzERat0XF9g2VtQgr9PJbu3XOiZj5RZmh7
AAuHIm4Bh-0Qc_lF5YKt_O8W2Fp5jujGbds9uJdbF9CUAr7t1dnZcAcQjbKBYNX4 AAuHIm4Bh-0Qc_lF5YKt_O8W2Fp5jujGbds9uJdbF9CUAr7t1dnZcAcQjbKBYNX4
BAynRFdiuB--f_nZLgrnbyTyWzO75vRK5h6xBArLIARNPvkSjtQBMHlb1L07Qe7K BAynRFdiuB--f_nZLgrnbyTyWzO75vRK5h6xBArLIARNPvkSjtQBMHlb1L07Qe7K
0GarZRmB_eSN9383LcOLn6_dO--xi12jzDwusC-eOkHWEsqtFZESc6BfI7noOPqv 0GarZRmB_eSN9383LcOLn6_dO--xi12jzDwusC-eOkHWEsqtFZESc6BfI7noOPqv
hJ1phCnvWh6IeYI2w9QOYEUipUTI8np6LbgGY9Fs98rqVt5AXLIhWkWywlVmtVrB hJ1phCnvWh6IeYI2w9QOYEUipUTI8np6LbgGY9Fs98rqVt5AXLIhWkWywlVmtVrB
p0igcN_IoypGlUPQGe77Rw p0igcN_IoypGlUPQGe77Rw
A.2.2. Validating A.2.2. Validating
Since the "alg" Header Parameter is "RS256", we validate the RSASSA- Since the "alg" Header Parameter is "RS256", we validate the RSASSA-
PKCS-v1_5 SHA-256 digital signature contained in the JWS Signature. PKCS1-v1_5 SHA-256 digital signature contained in the JWS Signature.
Validating the JWS Signature is a bit different from the previous Validating the JWS Signature is a bit different from the previous
example. We pass the public key (n, e), the JWS Signature (which is example. We pass the public key (n, e), the JWS Signature (which is
base64url decoded from the value encoded in the JWS representation), base64url decoded from the value encoded in the JWS representation),
and the JWS Signing Input (which is the initial substring of the JWS and the JWS Signing Input (which is the initial substring of the JWS
Compact Serialization representation up until but not including the Compact Serialization representation up until but not including the
second period character) to an RSASSA-PKCS-v1_5 signature verifier second period character) to an RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 signature verifier
that has been configured to use the SHA-256 hash function. that has been configured to use the SHA-256 hash function.
A.3. Example JWS using ECDSA P-256 SHA-256 A.3. Example JWS Using ECDSA P-256 SHA-256
A.3.1. Encoding A.3.1. Encoding
The JWS Protected Header for this example differs from the previous The JWS Protected Header for this example differs from the previous
example because a different algorithm is being used. The JWS example because a different algorithm is being used. The JWS
Protected Header used is: Protected Header used is:
{"alg":"ES256"} {"alg":"ES256"}
The octets representing UTF8(JWS Protected Header) in this example The octets representing UTF8(JWS Protected Header) in this example
skipping to change at page 43, line 12 skipping to change at page 44, line 38
[101, 121, 74, 104, 98, 71, 99, 105, 79, 105, 74, 70, 85, 122, 73, [101, 121, 74, 104, 98, 71, 99, 105, 79, 105, 74, 70, 85, 122, 73,
49, 78, 105, 74, 57, 46, 101, 121, 74, 112, 99, 51, 77, 105, 79, 105, 49, 78, 105, 74, 57, 46, 101, 121, 74, 112, 99, 51, 77, 105, 79, 105,
74, 113, 98, 50, 85, 105, 76, 65, 48, 75, 73, 67, 74, 108, 101, 72, 74, 113, 98, 50, 85, 105, 76, 65, 48, 75, 73, 67, 74, 108, 101, 72,
65, 105, 79, 106, 69, 122, 77, 68, 65, 52, 77, 84, 107, 122, 79, 68, 65, 105, 79, 106, 69, 122, 77, 68, 65, 52, 77, 84, 107, 122, 79, 68,
65, 115, 68, 81, 111, 103, 73, 109, 104, 48, 100, 72, 65, 54, 76, 65, 115, 68, 81, 111, 103, 73, 109, 104, 48, 100, 72, 65, 54, 76,
121, 57, 108, 101, 71, 70, 116, 99, 71, 120, 108, 76, 109, 78, 118, 121, 57, 108, 101, 71, 70, 116, 99, 71, 120, 108, 76, 109, 78, 118,
98, 83, 57, 112, 99, 49, 57, 121, 98, 50, 57, 48, 73, 106, 112, 48, 98, 83, 57, 112, 99, 49, 57, 121, 98, 50, 57, 48, 73, 106, 112, 48,
99, 110, 86, 108, 102, 81] 99, 110, 86, 108, 102, 81]
This example uses the elliptic curve key represented in JSON Web Key This example uses the Elliptic Curve key represented in JSON Web Key
[JWK] format below: [JWK] format below:
{"kty":"EC", {"kty":"EC",
"crv":"P-256", "crv":"P-256",
"x":"f83OJ3D2xF1Bg8vub9tLe1gHMzV76e8Tus9uPHvRVEU", "x":"f83OJ3D2xF1Bg8vub9tLe1gHMzV76e8Tus9uPHvRVEU",
"y":"x_FEzRu9m36HLN_tue659LNpXW6pCyStikYjKIWI5a0", "y":"x_FEzRu9m36HLN_tue659LNpXW6pCyStikYjKIWI5a0",
"d":"jpsQnnGQmL-YBIffH1136cspYG6-0iY7X1fCE9-E9LI" "d":"jpsQnnGQmL-YBIffH1136cspYG6-0iY7X1fCE9-E9LI"
} }
The ECDSA private part d is then passed to an ECDSA signing function, The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) private part d
which also takes the curve type, P-256, the hash type, SHA-256, and is then passed to an ECDSA signing function, which also takes the
the JWS Signing Input as inputs. The result of the digital signature curve type, P-256, the hash type, SHA-256, and the JWS Signing Input
is the EC point (R, S), where R and S are unsigned integers. In this as inputs. The result of the digital signature is the Elliptic Curve
(EC) point (R, S), where R and S are unsigned integers. In this
example, the R and S values, given as octet sequences representing example, the R and S values, given as octet sequences representing
big endian integers are: big-endian integers are:
+--------+----------------------------------------------------------+ +--------+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Result | Value | | Result | Value |
| Name | | | Name | |
+--------+----------------------------------------------------------+ +--------+----------------------------------------------------------+
| R | [14, 209, 33, 83, 121, 99, 108, 72, 60, 47, 127, 21, 88, | | R | [14, 209, 33, 83, 121, 99, 108, 72, 60, 47, 127, 21, 88, |
| | 7, 212, 2, 163, 178, 40, 3, 58, 249, 124, 126, 23, 129, | | | 7, 212, 2, 163, 178, 40, 3, 58, 249, 124, 126, 23, 129, |
| | 154, 195, 22, 158, 166, 101] | | | 154, 195, 22, 158, 166, 101] |
| S | [197, 10, 7, 211, 140, 60, 112, 229, 216, 241, 45, 175, | | S | [197, 10, 7, 211, 140, 60, 112, 229, 216, 241, 45, 175, |
| | 8, 74, 84, 128, 166, 101, 144, 197, 242, 147, 80, 154, | | | 8, 74, 84, 128, 166, 101, 144, 197, 242, 147, 80, 154, |
| | 143, 63, 127, 138, 131, 163, 84, 213] | | | 143, 63, 127, 138, 131, 163, 84, 213] |
+--------+----------------------------------------------------------+ +--------+----------------------------------------------------------+
The JWS Signature is the value R || S. Encoding the signature as The JWS Signature is the value R || S. Encoding the signature as
BASE64URL(JWS Signature) produces this value (with line breaks for BASE64URL(JWS Signature) produces this value (with line breaks for
display purposes only): display purposes only):
DtEhU3ljbEg8L38VWAfUAqOyKAM6-Xx-F4GawxaepmXFCgfTjDxw5djxLa8ISlSA DtEhU3ljbEg8L38VWAfUAqOyKAM6-Xx-F4GawxaepmXFCgfTjDxw5djxLa8ISlSA
pmWQxfKTUJqPP3-Kg6NU1Q pmWQxfKTUJqPP3-Kg6NU1Q
Concatenating these values in the order Header.Payload.Signature with Concatenating these values in the order Header.Payload.Signature with
period ('.') characters between the parts yields this complete JWS period ('.') characters between the parts yields this complete JWS
representation using the JWS Compact Serialization (with line breaks representation using the JWS Compact Serialization (with line breaks
for display purposes only): for display purposes only):
skipping to change at page 44, line 22 skipping to change at page 45, line 49
A.3.2. Validating A.3.2. Validating
Since the "alg" Header Parameter is "ES256", we validate the ECDSA Since the "alg" Header Parameter is "ES256", we validate the ECDSA
P-256 SHA-256 digital signature contained in the JWS Signature. P-256 SHA-256 digital signature contained in the JWS Signature.
Validating the JWS Signature is a bit different from the previous Validating the JWS Signature is a bit different from the previous
examples. We need to split the 64 member octet sequence of the JWS examples. We need to split the 64 member octet sequence of the JWS
Signature (which is base64url decoded from the value encoded in the Signature (which is base64url decoded from the value encoded in the
JWS representation) into two 32 octet sequences, the first JWS representation) into two 32 octet sequences, the first
representing R and the second S. We then pass the public key (x, y), representing R and the second S. We then pass the public key (x, y),
the signature (R, S), and the JWS Signing Input (which is the initial the signature (R, S), and the JWS Signing Input (which is the initial
substring of the JWS Compact Serialization representation up until substring of the JWS Compact Serialization representation up until
but not including the second period character) to an ECDSA signature but not including the second period character) to an ECDSA signature
verifier that has been configured to use the P-256 curve with the verifier that has been configured to use the P-256 curve with the
SHA-256 hash function. SHA-256 hash function.
A.4. Example JWS using ECDSA P-521 SHA-512 A.4. Example JWS Using ECDSA P-521 SHA-512
A.4.1. Encoding A.4.1. Encoding
The JWS Protected Header for this example differs from the previous The JWS Protected Header for this example differs from the previous
example because different ECDSA curves and hash functions are used. example because different ECDSA curves and hash functions are used.
The JWS Protected Header used is: The JWS Protected Header used is:
{"alg":"ES512"} {"alg":"ES512"}
The octets representing UTF8(JWS Protected Header) in this example The octets representing UTF8(JWS Protected Header) in this example
(using JSON array notation) are: (using JSON array notation) are:
[123, 34, 97, 108, 103, 34, 58, 34, 69, 83, 53, 49, 50, 34, 125] [123, 34, 97, 108, 103, 34, 58, 34, 69, 83, 53, 49, 50, 34, 125]
Encoding this JWS Protected Header as BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Encoding this JWS Protected Header as BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected
Header)) gives this value: Header)) gives this value:
eyJhbGciOiJFUzUxMiJ9 eyJhbGciOiJFUzUxMiJ9
The JWS Payload used in this example, is the ASCII string "Payload". The JWS Payload used in this example is the ASCII string "Payload".
The representation of this string is the octet sequence: The representation of this string is the following octet sequence:
[80, 97, 121, 108, 111, 97, 100] [80, 97, 121, 108, 111, 97, 100]
Encoding this JWS Payload as BASE64URL(JWS Payload) gives this value: Encoding this JWS Payload as BASE64URL(JWS Payload) gives this value:
UGF5bG9hZA UGF5bG9hZA
Combining these as BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header)) || '.' || Combining these as BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header)) || '.' ||
BASE64URL(JWS Payload) gives this string: BASE64URL(JWS Payload) gives this string:
eyJhbGciOiJFUzUxMiJ9.UGF5bG9hZA eyJhbGciOiJFUzUxMiJ9.UGF5bG9hZA
The resulting JWS Signing Input value, which is the ASCII The resulting JWS Signing Input value, which is the ASCII
skipping to change at page 45, line 18 skipping to change at page 47, line 4
Combining these as BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header)) || '.' || Combining these as BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header)) || '.' ||
BASE64URL(JWS Payload) gives this string: BASE64URL(JWS Payload) gives this string:
eyJhbGciOiJFUzUxMiJ9.UGF5bG9hZA eyJhbGciOiJFUzUxMiJ9.UGF5bG9hZA
The resulting JWS Signing Input value, which is the ASCII The resulting JWS Signing Input value, which is the ASCII
representation of above string, is the following octet sequence: representation of above string, is the following octet sequence:
[101, 121, 74, 104, 98, 71, 99, 105, 79, 105, 74, 70, 85, 122, 85, [101, 121, 74, 104, 98, 71, 99, 105, 79, 105, 74, 70, 85, 122, 85,
120, 77, 105, 74, 57, 46, 85, 71, 70, 53, 98, 71, 57, 104, 90, 65] 120, 77, 105, 74, 57, 46, 85, 71, 70, 53, 98, 71, 57, 104, 90, 65]
This example uses the Elliptic Curve key represented in JSON Web Key
This example uses the elliptic curve key represented in JSON Web Key
[JWK] format below (with line breaks within values for display [JWK] format below (with line breaks within values for display
purposes only): purposes only):
{"kty":"EC", {"kty":"EC",
"crv":"P-521", "crv":"P-521",
"x":"AekpBQ8ST8a8VcfVOTNl353vSrDCLLJXmPk06wTjxrrjcBpXp5EOnYG_ "x":"AekpBQ8ST8a8VcfVOTNl353vSrDCLLJXmPk06wTjxrrjcBpXp5EOnYG_
NjFZ6OvLFV1jSfS9tsz4qUxcWceqwQGk", NjFZ6OvLFV1jSfS9tsz4qUxcWceqwQGk",
"y":"ADSmRA43Z1DSNx_RvcLI87cdL07l6jQyyBXMoxVg_l2Th-x3S1WDhjDl "y":"ADSmRA43Z1DSNx_RvcLI87cdL07l6jQyyBXMoxVg_l2Th-x3S1WDhjDl
y79ajL4Kkd0AZMaZmh9ubmf63e3kyMj2", y79ajL4Kkd0AZMaZmh9ubmf63e3kyMj2",
"d":"AY5pb7A0UFiB3RELSD64fTLOSV_jazdF7fLYyuTw8lOfRhWg6Y6rUrPA "d":"AY5pb7A0UFiB3RELSD64fTLOSV_jazdF7fLYyuTw8lOfRhWg6Y6rUrPA
xerEzgdRhajnu0ferB0d53vM9mE15j2C" xerEzgdRhajnu0ferB0d53vM9mE15j2C"
} }
The ECDSA private part d is then passed to an ECDSA signing function, The ECDSA private part d is then passed to an ECDSA signing function,
which also takes the curve type, P-521, the hash type, SHA-512, and which also takes the curve type, P-521, the hash type, SHA-512, and
the JWS Signing Input as inputs. The result of the digital signature the JWS Signing Input as inputs. The result of the digital signature
is the EC point (R, S), where R and S are unsigned integers. In this is the EC point (R, S), where R and S are unsigned integers. In this
example, the R and S values, given as octet sequences representing example, the R and S values, given as octet sequences representing
big endian integers are: big-endian integers are:
+--------+----------------------------------------------------------+ +--------+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Result | Value | | Result | Value |
| Name | | | Name | |
+--------+----------------------------------------------------------+ +--------+----------------------------------------------------------+
| R | [1, 220, 12, 129, 231, 171, 194, 209, 232, 135, 233, | | R | [1, 220, 12, 129, 231, 171, 194, 209, 232, 135, 233, |
| | 117, 247, 105, 122, 210, 26, 125, 192, 1, 217, 21, 82, | | | 117, 247, 105, 122, 210, 26, 125, 192, 1, 217, 21, 82, |
| | 91, 45, 240, 255, 83, 19, 34, 239, 71, 48, 157, 147, | | | 91, 45, 240, 255, 83, 19, 34, 239, 71, 48, 157, 147, |
| | 152, 105, 18, 53, 108, 163, 214, 68, 231, 62, 153, 150, | | | 152, 105, 18, 53, 108, 163, 214, 68, 231, 62, 153, 150, |
| | 106, 194, 164, 246, 72, 143, 138, 24, 50, 129, 223, 133, | | | 106, 194, 164, 246, 72, 143, 138, 24, 50, 129, 223, 133, |
| | 206, 209, 172, 63, 237, 119, 109] | | | 206, 209, 172, 63, 237, 119, 109] |
| S | [0, 111, 6, 105, 44, 5, 41, 208, 128, 61, 152, 40, 92, | | S | [0, 111, 6, 105, 44, 5, 41, 208, 128, 61, 152, 40, 92, |
| | 61, 152, 4, 150, 66, 60, 69, 247, 196, 170, 81, 193, | | | 61, 152, 4, 150, 66, 60, 69, 247, 196, 170, 81, 193, |
| | 199, 78, 59, 194, 169, 16, 124, 9, 143, 42, 142, 131, | | | 199, 78, 59, 194, 169, 16, 124, 9, 143, 42, 142, 131, |
| | 48, 206, 238, 34, 175, 83, 203, 220, 159, 3, 107, 155, | | | 48, 206, 238, 34, 175, 83, 203, 220, 159, 3, 107, 155, |
| | 22, 27, 73, 111, 68, 68, 21, 238, 144, 229, 232, 148, | | | 22, 27, 73, 111, 68, 68, 21, 238, 144, 229, 232, 148, |
| | 188, 222, 59, 242, 103] | | | 188, 222, 59, 242, 103] |
+--------+----------------------------------------------------------+ +--------+----------------------------------------------------------+
The JWS Signature is the value R || S. Encoding the signature as The JWS Signature is the value R || S. Encoding the signature as
BASE64URL(JWS Signature) produces this value (with line breaks for BASE64URL(JWS Signature) produces this value (with line breaks for
display purposes only): display purposes only):
AdwMgeerwtHoh-l192l60hp9wAHZFVJbLfD_UxMi70cwnZOYaRI1bKPWROc-mZZq AdwMgeerwtHoh-l192l60hp9wAHZFVJbLfD_UxMi70cwnZOYaRI1bKPWROc-mZZq
wqT2SI-KGDKB34XO0aw_7XdtAG8GaSwFKdCAPZgoXD2YBJZCPEX3xKpRwcdOO8Kp wqT2SI-KGDKB34XO0aw_7XdtAG8GaSwFKdCAPZgoXD2YBJZCPEX3xKpRwcdOO8Kp
EHwJjyqOgzDO7iKvU8vcnwNrmxYbSW9ERBXukOXolLzeO_Jn EHwJjyqOgzDO7iKvU8vcnwNrmxYbSW9ERBXukOXolLzeO_Jn
Concatenating these values in the order Header.Payload.Signature with Concatenating these values in the order Header.Payload.Signature with
period ('.') characters between the parts yields this complete JWS period ('.') characters between the parts yields this complete JWS
representation using the JWS Compact Serialization (with line breaks representation using the JWS Compact Serialization (with line breaks
skipping to change at page 46, line 39 skipping to change at page 48, line 24
AdwMgeerwtHoh-l192l60hp9wAHZFVJbLfD_UxMi70cwnZOYaRI1bKPWROc-mZZq AdwMgeerwtHoh-l192l60hp9wAHZFVJbLfD_UxMi70cwnZOYaRI1bKPWROc-mZZq
wqT2SI-KGDKB34XO0aw_7XdtAG8GaSwFKdCAPZgoXD2YBJZCPEX3xKpRwcdOO8Kp wqT2SI-KGDKB34XO0aw_7XdtAG8GaSwFKdCAPZgoXD2YBJZCPEX3xKpRwcdOO8Kp
EHwJjyqOgzDO7iKvU8vcnwNrmxYbSW9ERBXukOXolLzeO_Jn EHwJjyqOgzDO7iKvU8vcnwNrmxYbSW9ERBXukOXolLzeO_Jn
A.4.2. Validating A.4.2. Validating
Since the "alg" Header Parameter is "ES512", we validate the ECDSA Since the "alg" Header Parameter is "ES512", we validate the ECDSA
P-521 SHA-512 digital signature contained in the JWS Signature. P-521 SHA-512 digital signature contained in the JWS Signature.
Validating this JWS Signature is very similar to the previous Validating this JWS Signature is very similar to the previous
example. We need to split the 132 member octet sequence of the JWS example. We need to split the 132-member octet sequence of the JWS
Signature into two 66 octet sequences, the first representing R and Signature into two 66-octet sequences, the first representing R and
the second S. We then pass the public key (x, y), the signature (R, the second S. We then pass the public key (x, y), the signature (R,
S), and the JWS Signing Input to an ECDSA signature verifier that has S), and the JWS Signing Input to an ECDSA signature verifier that has
been configured to use the P-521 curve with the SHA-512 hash been configured to use the P-521 curve with the SHA-512 hash
function. function.
A.5. Example Unsecured JWS A.5. Example Unsecured JWS
The following example JWS Protected Header declares that the encoded The following example JWS Protected Header declares that the encoded
object is an Unsecured JWS: object is an Unsecured JWS:
{"alg":"none"} {"alg":"none"}
skipping to change at page 47, line 32 skipping to change at page 49, line 16
period ('.') characters between the parts yields this complete JWS period ('.') characters between the parts yields this complete JWS
representation using the JWS Compact Serialization (with line breaks representation using the JWS Compact Serialization (with line breaks
for display purposes only): for display purposes only):
eyJhbGciOiJub25lIn0 eyJhbGciOiJub25lIn0
. .
eyJpc3MiOiJqb2UiLA0KICJleHAiOjEzMDA4MTkzODAsDQogImh0dHA6Ly9leGFt eyJpc3MiOiJqb2UiLA0KICJleHAiOjEzMDA4MTkzODAsDQogImh0dHA6Ly9leGFt
cGxlLmNvbS9pc19yb290Ijp0cnVlfQ cGxlLmNvbS9pc19yb290Ijp0cnVlfQ
. .
A.6. Example JWS using General JWS JSON Serialization A.6. Example JWS Using General JWS JSON Serialization
This section contains an example using the general JWS JSON This section contains an example using the general JWS JSON
Serialization syntax. This example demonstrates the capability for Serialization syntax. This example demonstrates the capability for
conveying multiple digital signatures and/or MACs for the same conveying multiple digital signatures and/or MACs for the same
payload. payload.
The JWS Payload used in this example is the same as that used in the The JWS Payload used in this example is the same as that used in the
examples in Appendix A.2 and Appendix A.3 (with line breaks for examples in Appendix A.2 and Appendix A.3 (with line breaks for
display purposes only): display purposes only):
eyJpc3MiOiJqb2UiLA0KICJleHAiOjEzMDA4MTkzODAsDQogImh0dHA6Ly9leGFt eyJpc3MiOiJqb2UiLA0KICJleHAiOjEzMDA4MTkzODAsDQogImh0dHA6Ly9leGFt
cGxlLmNvbS9pc19yb290Ijp0cnVlfQ cGxlLmNvbS9pc19yb290Ijp0cnVlfQ
Two digital signatures are used in this example: the first using Two digital signatures are used in this example: the first using
RSASSA-PKCS-v1_5 SHA-256 and the second using ECDSA P-256 SHA-256. RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 SHA-256 and the second using ECDSA P-256 SHA-256.
For the first, the JWS Protected Header and key are the same as in For the first, the JWS Protected Header and key are the same as in
Appendix A.2, resulting in the same JWS Signature value; therefore, Appendix A.2, resulting in the same JWS Signature value; therefore,
its computation is not repeated here. For the second, the JWS its computation is not repeated here. For the second, the JWS
Protected Header and key are the same as in Appendix A.3, resulting Protected Header and key are the same as in Appendix A.3, resulting
in the same JWS Signature value; therefore, its computation is not in the same JWS Signature value; therefore, its computation is not
repeated here. repeated here.
A.6.1. JWS Per-Signature Protected Headers A.6.1. JWS Per-Signature Protected Headers
The JWS Protected Header value used for the first signature is: The JWS Protected Header value used for the first signature is:
skipping to change at page 48, line 29 skipping to change at page 50, line 13
{"alg":"ES256"} {"alg":"ES256"}
Encoding this JWS Protected Header as BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Encoding this JWS Protected Header as BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected
Header)) gives this value: Header)) gives this value:
eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiJ9 eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiJ9
A.6.2. JWS Per-Signature Unprotected Headers A.6.2. JWS Per-Signature Unprotected Headers
Key ID values are supplied for both keys using per-signature Header Key ID values are supplied for both keys using per-signature Header
Parameters. The two values used to represent these Key IDs are: Parameters. The two JWS Unprotected Header values used to represent
these key IDs are:
{"kid":"2010-12-29"} {"kid":"2010-12-29"}
and and
{"kid":"e9bc097a-ce51-4036-9562-d2ade882db0d"} {"kid":"e9bc097a-ce51-4036-9562-d2ade882db0d"}
A.6.3. Complete JOSE Header Values A.6.3. Complete JOSE Header Values
Combining the protected and unprotected header values supplied, the Combining the JWS Protected Header and JWS Unprotected Header values
JOSE Header values used for the first and second signatures supplied, the JOSE Header values used for the first and second
respectively are: signatures, respectively, are:
{"alg":"RS256", {"alg":"RS256",
"kid":"2010-12-29"} "kid":"2010-12-29"}
and and
{"alg":"ES256", {"alg":"ES256",
"kid":"e9bc097a-ce51-4036-9562-d2ade882db0d"} "kid":"e9bc097a-ce51-4036-9562-d2ade882db0d"}
A.6.4. Complete JWS JSON Serialization Representation A.6.4. Complete JWS JSON Serialization Representation
skipping to change at page 49, line 33 skipping to change at page 52, line 5
c6BfI7noOPqvhJ1phCnvWh6IeYI2w9QOYEUipUTI8np6LbgGY9Fs98rqVt5AX c6BfI7noOPqvhJ1phCnvWh6IeYI2w9QOYEUipUTI8np6LbgGY9Fs98rqVt5AX
LIhWkWywlVmtVrBp0igcN_IoypGlUPQGe77Rw"}, LIhWkWywlVmtVrBp0igcN_IoypGlUPQGe77Rw"},
{"protected":"eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiJ9", {"protected":"eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiJ9",
"header": "header":
{"kid":"e9bc097a-ce51-4036-9562-d2ade882db0d"}, {"kid":"e9bc097a-ce51-4036-9562-d2ade882db0d"},
"signature": "signature":
"DtEhU3ljbEg8L38VWAfUAqOyKAM6-Xx-F4GawxaepmXFCgfTjDxw5djxLa8IS "DtEhU3ljbEg8L38VWAfUAqOyKAM6-Xx-F4GawxaepmXFCgfTjDxw5djxLa8IS
lSApmWQxfKTUJqPP3-Kg6NU1Q"}] lSApmWQxfKTUJqPP3-Kg6NU1Q"}]
} }
A.7. Example JWS using Flattened JWS JSON Serialization A.7. Example JWS Using Flattened JWS JSON Serialization
This section contains an example using the flattened JWS JSON This section contains an example using the flattened JWS JSON
Serialization syntax. This example demonstrates the capability for Serialization syntax. This example demonstrates the capability for
conveying a single digital signature or MAC in a flattened JSON conveying a single digital signature or MAC in a flattened JSON
structure. structure.
The values in this example are the same as those in the second The values in this example are the same as those in the second
signature of the previous example in Appendix A.6. signature of the previous example in Appendix A.6.
The complete JWS JSON Serialization for these values is as follows The complete JWS JSON Serialization for these values is as follows
skipping to change at page 50, line 20 skipping to change at page 53, line 8
"header": "header":
{"kid":"e9bc097a-ce51-4036-9562-d2ade882db0d"}, {"kid":"e9bc097a-ce51-4036-9562-d2ade882db0d"},
"signature": "signature":
"DtEhU3ljbEg8L38VWAfUAqOyKAM6-Xx-F4GawxaepmXFCgfTjDxw5djxLa8IS "DtEhU3ljbEg8L38VWAfUAqOyKAM6-Xx-F4GawxaepmXFCgfTjDxw5djxLa8IS
lSApmWQxfKTUJqPP3-Kg6NU1Q" lSApmWQxfKTUJqPP3-Kg6NU1Q"
} }
Appendix B. "x5c" (X.509 Certificate Chain) Example Appendix B. "x5c" (X.509 Certificate Chain) Example
The JSON array below is an example of a certificate chain that could The JSON array below is an example of a certificate chain that could
be used as the value of an "x5c" (X.509 Certificate Chain) Header be used as the value of an "x5c" (X.509 certificate chain) Header
Parameter, per Section 4.1.6 (with line breaks within values for Parameter, per Section 4.1.6 (with line breaks within values for
display purposes only): display purposes only):
["MIIE3jCCA8agAwIBAgICAwEwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQAwYzELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVM ["MIIE3jCCA8agAwIBAgICAwEwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQAwYzELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVM
xITAfBgNVBAoTGFRoZSBHbyBEYWRkeSBHcm91cCwgSW5jLjExMC8GA1UECxMoR2 xITAfBgNVBAoTGFRoZSBHbyBEYWRkeSBHcm91cCwgSW5jLjExMC8GA1UECxMoR2
8gRGFkZHkgQ2xhc3MgMiBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0aW9uIEF1dGhvcml0eTAeFw0wNjExM 8gRGFkZHkgQ2xhc3MgMiBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0aW9uIEF1dGhvcml0eTAeFw0wNjExM
TYwMTU0MzdaFw0yNjExMTYwMTU0MzdaMIHKMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzEQMA4GA1UE TYwMTU0MzdaFw0yNjExMTYwMTU0MzdaMIHKMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzEQMA4GA1UE
CBMHQXJpem9uYTETMBEGA1UEBxMKU2NvdHRzZGFsZTEaMBgGA1UEChMRR29EYWR CBMHQXJpem9uYTETMBEGA1UEBxMKU2NvdHRzZGFsZTEaMBgGA1UEChMRR29EYWR
keS5jb20sIEluYy4xMzAxBgNVBAsTKmh0dHA6Ly9jZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZXMuZ29kYW keS5jb20sIEluYy4xMzAxBgNVBAsTKmh0dHA6Ly9jZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZXMuZ29kYW
RkeS5jb20vcmVwb3NpdG9yeTEwMC4GA1UEAxMnR28gRGFkZHkgU2VjdXJlIENlc RkeS5jb20vcmVwb3NpdG9yeTEwMC4GA1UEAxMnR28gRGFkZHkgU2VjdXJlIENlc
skipping to change at page 52, line 5 skipping to change at page 55, line 5
XJ0IENsYXNzIDIgUG9saWN5IFZhbGlkYXRpb24gQXV0aG9yaXR5MSEwHwYDVQQD XJ0IENsYXNzIDIgUG9saWN5IFZhbGlkYXRpb24gQXV0aG9yaXR5MSEwHwYDVQQD
ExhodHRwOi8vd3d3LnZhbGljZXJ0LmNvbS8xIDAeBgkqhkiG9w0BCQEWEWluZm9 ExhodHRwOi8vd3d3LnZhbGljZXJ0LmNvbS8xIDAeBgkqhkiG9w0BCQEWEWluZm9
AdmFsaWNlcnQuY29tMIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDOOnHK5a AdmFsaWNlcnQuY29tMIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDOOnHK5a
vIWZJV16vYdA757tn2VUdZZUcOBVXc65g2PFxTXdMwzzjsvUGJ7SVCCSRrCl6zf vIWZJV16vYdA757tn2VUdZZUcOBVXc65g2PFxTXdMwzzjsvUGJ7SVCCSRrCl6zf
N1SLUzm1NZ9WlmpZdRJEy0kTRxQb7XBhVQ7/nHk01xC+YDgkRoKWzk2Z/M/VXwb N1SLUzm1NZ9WlmpZdRJEy0kTRxQb7XBhVQ7/nHk01xC+YDgkRoKWzk2Z/M/VXwb
P7RfZHM047QSv4dk+NoS/zcnwbNDu+97bi5p9wIDAQABMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQU P7RfZHM047QSv4dk+NoS/zcnwbNDu+97bi5p9wIDAQABMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQU
AA4GBADt/UG9vUJSZSWI4OB9L+KXIPqeCgfYrx+jFzug6EILLGACOTb2oWH+heQ AA4GBADt/UG9vUJSZSWI4OB9L+KXIPqeCgfYrx+jFzug6EILLGACOTb2oWH+heQ
C1u+mNr0HZDzTuIYEZoDJJKPTEjlbVUjP9UNV+mWwD5MlM/Mtsq2azSiGM5bUMM C1u+mNr0HZDzTuIYEZoDJJKPTEjlbVUjP9UNV+mWwD5MlM/Mtsq2azSiGM5bUMM
j4QssxsodyamEwCW/POuZ6lcg5Ktz885hZo+L7tdEy8W9ViH0Pd"] j4QssxsodyamEwCW/POuZ6lcg5Ktz885hZo+L7tdEy8W9ViH0Pd"]
Appendix C. Notes on implementing base64url encoding without padding Appendix C. Notes on Implementing base64url Encoding without Padding
This appendix describes how to implement base64url encoding and This appendix describes how to implement base64url encoding and
decoding functions without padding based upon standard base64 decoding functions without padding based upon standard base64
encoding and decoding functions that do use padding. encoding and decoding functions that do use padding.
To be concrete, example C# code implementing these functions is shown To be concrete, example C# code implementing these functions is shown
below. Similar code could be used in other languages. below. Similar code could be used in other languages.
static string base64urlencode(byte [] arg) static string base64urlencode(byte [] arg)
{ {
skipping to change at page 52, line 40 skipping to change at page 55, line 40
case 0: break; // No pad chars in this case case 0: break; // No pad chars in this case
case 2: s += "=="; break; // Two pad chars case 2: s += "=="; break; // Two pad chars
case 3: s += "="; break; // One pad char case 3: s += "="; break; // One pad char
default: throw new System.Exception( default: throw new System.Exception(
"Illegal base64url string!"); "Illegal base64url string!");
} }
return Convert.FromBase64String(s); // Standard base64 decoder return Convert.FromBase64String(s); // Standard base64 decoder
} }
As per the example code above, the number of '=' padding characters As per the example code above, the number of '=' padding characters
that needs to be added to the end of a base64url encoded string that needs to be added to the end of a base64url-encoded string
without padding to turn it into one with padding is a deterministic without padding to turn it into one with padding is a deterministic
function of the length of the encoded string. Specifically, if the function of the length of the encoded string. Specifically, if the
length mod 4 is 0, no padding is added; if the length mod 4 is 2, two length mod 4 is 0, no padding is added; if the length mod 4 is 2, two
'=' padding characters are added; if the length mod 4 is 3, one '=' '=' padding characters are added; if the length mod 4 is 3, one '='
padding character is added; if the length mod 4 is 1, the input is padding character is added; if the length mod 4 is 1, the input is
malformed. malformed.
An example correspondence between unencoded and encoded values An example correspondence between unencoded and encoded values
follows. The octet sequence below encodes into the string below, follows. The octet sequence below encodes into the string below,
which when decoded, reproduces the octet sequence. which when decoded, reproduces the octet sequence.
skipping to change at page 52, line 51 skipping to change at page 56, line 8
without padding to turn it into one with padding is a deterministic without padding to turn it into one with padding is a deterministic
function of the length of the encoded string. Specifically, if the function of the length of the encoded string. Specifically, if the
length mod 4 is 0, no padding is added; if the length mod 4 is 2, two length mod 4 is 0, no padding is added; if the length mod 4 is 2, two
'=' padding characters are added; if the length mod 4 is 3, one '=' '=' padding characters are added; if the length mod 4 is 3, one '='
padding character is added; if the length mod 4 is 1, the input is padding character is added; if the length mod 4 is 1, the input is
malformed. malformed.
An example correspondence between unencoded and encoded values An example correspondence between unencoded and encoded values
follows. The octet sequence below encodes into the string below, follows. The octet sequence below encodes into the string below,
which when decoded, reproduces the octet sequence. which when decoded, reproduces the octet sequence.
3 236 255 224 193 3 236 255 224 193
A-z_4ME A-z_4ME
Appendix D. Notes on Key Selection Appendix D. Notes on Key Selection
This appendix describes a set of possible algorithms for selecting This appendix describes a set of possible algorithms for selecting
the key to be used to validate the digital signature or MAC of a JWS the key to be used to validate the digital signature or MAC of a JWS
or for selecting the key to be used to decrypt a JWE. This guidance or for selecting the key to be used to decrypt a JWE. This guidance
describes a family of possible algorithms, rather than a single describes a family of possible algorithms rather than a single
algorithm, because in different contexts, not all the sources of keys algorithm, because in different contexts, not all the sources of keys
will be used, they can be tried in different orders, and sometimes will be used, they can be tried in different orders, and sometimes
not all the collected keys will be tried; hence, different algorithms not all the collected keys will be tried; hence, different algorithms
will be used in different application contexts. will be used in different application contexts.
The steps below are described for illustration purposes only; The steps below are described for illustration purposes only;
specific applications can and are likely to use different algorithms specific applications can and are likely to use different algorithms
or perform some of the steps in different orders. Specific or perform some of the steps in different orders. Specific
applications will frequently have a much simpler method of applications will frequently have a much simpler method of
determining the keys to use, as there may be one or two key selection determining the keys to use, as there may be one or two key selection
skipping to change at page 53, line 40 skipping to change at page 56, line 47
may include: may include:
* Keys supplied by the application protocol being used. * Keys supplied by the application protocol being used.
* Keys referenced by the "jku" (JWK Set URL) Header Parameter. * Keys referenced by the "jku" (JWK Set URL) Header Parameter.
* The key provided by the "jwk" (JSON Web Key) Header Parameter. * The key provided by the "jwk" (JSON Web Key) Header Parameter.
* The key referenced by the "x5u" (X.509 URL) Header Parameter. * The key referenced by the "x5u" (X.509 URL) Header Parameter.
* The key provided by the "x5c" (X.509 Certificate Chain) Header * The key provided by the "x5c" (X.509 certificate chain) Header
Parameter. Parameter.
* Other applicable keys available to the application. * Other applicable keys available to the application.
The order for collecting and trying keys from different key The order for collecting and trying keys from different key
sources is typically application dependent. For example, sources is typically application dependent. For example,
frequently all keys from a one set of locations, such as local frequently, all keys from a one set of locations, such as local
caches, will be tried before collecting and trying keys from caches, will be tried before collecting and trying keys from
other locations. other locations.
2. Filter the set of collected keys. For instance, some 2. Filter the set of collected keys. For instance, some
applications will use only keys referenced by "kid" (key ID) or applications will use only keys referenced by "kid" (key ID) or
"x5t" (X.509 certificate SHA-1 thumbprint) parameters. If the "x5t" (X.509 certificate SHA-1 thumbprint) parameters. If the
application uses the "alg" (algorithm), "use" (public key use), application uses the JWK "alg" (algorithm), "use" (public key
or "key_ops" (key operations) parameters, keys with keys with use), or "key_ops" (key operations) parameters, keys with
inappropriate values of those parameters would be excluded. inappropriate values of those parameters would be excluded.
Additionally, keys might be filtered to include or exclude keys Additionally, keys might be filtered to include or exclude keys
with certain other member values in an application specific with certain other member values in an application-specific
manner. For some applications, no filtering will be applied. manner. For some applications, no filtering will be applied.
3. Order the set of collected keys. For instance, keys referenced 3. Order the set of collected keys. For instance, keys referenced
by "kid" (Key ID) or "x5t" (X.509 Certificate SHA-1 Thumbprint) by "kid" (key ID) or "x5t" (X.509 certificate SHA-1 thumbprint)
parameters might be tried before keys with neither of these parameters might be tried before keys with neither of these
values. Likewise, keys with certain member values might be values. Likewise, keys with certain member values might be
ordered before keys with other member values. For some ordered before keys with other member values. For some
applications, no ordering will be applied. applications, no ordering will be applied.
4. Make trust decisions about the keys. Signatures made with keys 4. Make trust decisions about the keys. Signatures made with keys
not meeting the application's trust criteria would not be not meeting the application's trust criteria would not be
accepted. Such criteria might include, but is not limited to the accepted. Such criteria might include, but is not limited to,
source of the key, whether the TLS certificate validates for keys the source of the key, whether the TLS certificate validates for
retrieved from URLs, whether a key in an X.509 certificate is keys retrieved from URLs, whether a key in an X.509 certificate
backed by a valid certificate chain, and other information known is backed by a valid certificate chain, and other information
by the application. known by the application.
5. Attempt signature or MAC validation for a JWS or decryption of a 5. Attempt signature or MAC validation for a JWS or decryption of a
JWE with some or all of the collected and possibly filtered JWE with some or all of the collected and possibly filtered and/
and/or ordered keys. A limit on the number of keys to be tried or ordered keys. A limit on the number of keys to be tried might
might be applied. This process will normally terminate following be applied. This process will normally terminate following a
a successful validation or decryption. successful validation or decryption.
Note that it is reasonable for some applications to perform signature Note that it is reasonable for some applications to perform signature
or MAC validation prior to making a trust decision about a key, since or MAC validation prior to making a trust decision about a key, since
keys for which the validation fails need no trust decision. keys for which the validation fails need no trust decision.
Appendix E. Negative Test Case for "crit" Header Parameter Appendix E. Negative Test Case for "crit" Header Parameter
Conforming implementations must reject input containing critical Conforming implementations must reject input containing critical
extensions that are not understood or cannot be processed. The extensions that are not understood or cannot be processed. The
following JWS must be rejected by all implementations, because it following JWS must be rejected by all implementations, because it
uses an extension Header Parameter name uses an extension Header Parameter name "http://example.invalid/
"http://example.invalid/UNDEFINED" that they do not understand. Any UNDEFINED" that they do not understand. Any other similar input, in
other similar input, in which the use of the value which the use of the value "http://example.invalid/UNDEFINED" is
"http://example.invalid/UNDEFINED" is substituted for any other substituted for any other Header Parameter name not understood by the
Header Parameter name not understood by the implementation, must also implementation, must also be rejected.
be rejected.
The JWS Protected Header value for this JWS is: The JWS Protected Header value for this JWS is:
{"alg":"none", {"alg":"none",
"crit":["http://example.invalid/UNDEFINED"], "crit":["http://example.invalid/UNDEFINED"],
"http://example.invalid/UNDEFINED":true "http://example.invalid/UNDEFINED":true
} }
The complete JWS that must be rejected is as follows (with line The complete JWS that must be rejected is as follows (with line
breaks for display purposes only): breaks for display purposes only):
eyJhbGciOiJub25lIiwNCiAiY3JpdCI6WyJodHRwOi8vZXhhbXBsZS5jb20vVU5ERU eyJhbGciOiJub25lIiwNCiAiY3JpdCI6WyJodHRwOi8vZXhhbXBsZS5jb20vVU5ERU
ZJTkVEIl0sDQogImh0dHA6Ly9leGFtcGxlLmNvbS9VTkRFRklORUQiOnRydWUNCn0. ZJTkVEIl0sDQogImh0dHA6Ly9leGFtcGxlLmNvbS9VTkRFRklORUQiOnRydWUNCn0.
RkFJTA. RkFJTA.
Appendix F. Detached Content Appendix F. Detached Content
In some contexts, it is useful integrity protect content that is not In some contexts, it is useful to integrity-protect content that is
itself contained in a JWS. One way to do this is create a JWS in the not itself contained in a JWS. One way to do this is to create a JWS
normal fashion using a representation of the content as the payload, in the normal fashion using a representation of the content as the
but then delete the payload representation from the JWS, and send payload but then delete the payload representation from the JWS and
this modified object to the recipient, rather than the JWS. When send this modified object to the recipient rather than the JWS. When
using the JWS Compact Serialization, the deletion is accomplished by using the JWS Compact Serialization, the deletion is accomplished by
replacing the second field (which contains BASE64URL(JWS Payload)) replacing the second field (which contains BASE64URL(JWS Payload))
value with the empty string; when using the JWS JSON Serialization, value with the empty string; when using the JWS JSON Serialization,
the deletion is accomplished by deleting the "payload" member. This the deletion is accomplished by deleting the "payload" member. This
method assumes that the recipient can reconstruct the exact payload method assumes that the recipient can reconstruct the exact payload
used in the JWS. To use the modified object, the recipient used in the JWS. To use the modified object, the recipient
reconstructs the JWS by re-inserting the payload representation into reconstructs the JWS by re-inserting the payload representation into
the modified object, and uses the resulting JWS in the usual manner. the modified object and uses the resulting JWS in the usual manner.
Note that this method needs no support from JWS libraries, as Note that this method needs no support from JWS libraries, as
applications can use this method by modifying the inputs and outputs applications can use this method by modifying the inputs and outputs
of standard JWS libraries. of standard JWS libraries.
Appendix G. Acknowledgements Acknowledgements
Solutions for signing JSON content were previously explored by Magic Solutions for signing JSON content were previously explored by Magic
Signatures [MagicSignatures], JSON Simple Sign [JSS], and Canvas Signatures [MagicSignatures], JSON Simple Sign [JSS], and Canvas
Applications [CanvasApp], all of which influenced this draft. Applications [CanvasApp], all of which influenced this document.
Thanks to Axel Nennker for his early implementation and feedback on Thanks to Axel Nennker for his early implementation and feedback on
the JWS and JWE specifications. the JWS and JWE specifications.
This specification is the work of the JOSE Working Group, which This specification is the work of the JOSE working group, which
includes dozens of active and dedicated participants. In particular, includes dozens of active and dedicated participants. In particular,
the following individuals contributed ideas, feedback, and wording the following individuals contributed ideas, feedback, and wording
that influenced this specification: that influenced this specification:
Dirk Balfanz, Richard Barnes, Brian Campbell, Alissa Cooper, Breno de Dirk Balfanz, Richard Barnes, Brian Campbell, Alissa Cooper, Breno de
Medeiros, Stephen Farrell, Dick Hardt, Joe Hildebrand, Jeff Hodges, Medeiros, Stephen Farrell, Yaron Y. Goland, Dick Hardt, Joe
Russ Housley, Edmund Jay, Tero Kivinen, Yaron Y. Goland, Ben Laurie, Hildebrand, Jeff Hodges, Russ Housley, Edmund Jay, Tero Kivinen, Ben
Ted Lemon, James Manger, Matt Miller, Kathleen Moriarty, Tony Laurie, Ted Lemon, James Manger, Matt Miller, Kathleen Moriarty, Tony
Nadalin, Hideki Nara, Axel Nennker, John Panzer, Ray Polk, Emmanuel Nadalin, Hideki Nara, Axel Nennker, John Panzer, Ray Polk, Emmanuel
Raviart, Eric Rescorla, Pete Resnick, Jim Schaad, Paul Tarjan, Hannes Raviart, Eric Rescorla, Pete Resnick, Jim Schaad, Paul Tarjan, Hannes
Tschofenig, and Sean Turner. Tschofenig, and Sean Turner.
Jim Schaad and Karen O'Donoghue chaired the JOSE working group and Jim Schaad and Karen O'Donoghue chaired the JOSE working group and
Sean Turner, Stephen Farrell, and Kathleen Moriarty served as Sean Turner, Stephen Farrell, and Kathleen Moriarty served as
Security area directors during the creation of this specification. Security Area Directors during the creation of this specification.
Appendix H. Document History
[[ to be removed by the RFC Editor before publication as an RFC ]]
-41
o Changed more instances of "reject" to "consider to be invalid".
o Simplified the wording of a Message Signature or MAC Computation
step.
-40
o Clarified the definitions of UTF8(STRING) and ASCII(STRING).
o Stated that line breaks are for display purposes only in places
where this disclaimer was needed and missing.
-39
o Updated the reference to draft-ietf-uta-tls-bcp.
-38
o Replaced uses of the phrases "JWS object" and "JWE object" with
"JWS" and "JWE".
o Added member names to the JWS JSON Serialization Overview.
o Applied other minor editorial improvements.
-37
o Updated the TLS requirements language to only require
implementations to support TLS when they support features using
TLS.
o Updated the language about integrity protecting Header Parameters
when used in a trust decision.
o Restricted algorithm names to using only ASCII characters.
o When describing actions taken as a result of validation failures,
changed statements about rejecting the JWS to statements about
considering the JWS to be invalid.
o Added the CRT parameter values to example RSA private key
representations.
o Updated the example IANA registration request subject line.
-36
o Defined a flattened JWS JSON Serialization syntax, which is
optimized for the single digital signature or MAC case.
o Clarified where white space and line breaks may occur in JSON
objects by referencing Section 2 of RFC 7159.
o Specified that registration reviews occur on the
jose-reg-review@ietf.org mailing list.
-35
o Addressed AppsDir reviews by Ray Polk.
o Used real values for examples in the IANA Registration Template.
-34
o Addressed IESG review comments by Alissa Cooper, Pete Resnick,
Richard Barnes, Ted Lemon, and Stephen Farrell.
o Addressed Gen-ART review comments by Russ Housley.
o Referenced RFC 4945 for PEM certificate delimiter syntax.
-33
o Noted that certificate thumbprints are also sometimes known as
certificate fingerprints.
o Added an informative reference to draft-ietf-uta-tls-bcp for
recommendations on improving the security of software and services
using TLS.
o Changed the registration review period to three weeks.
o Acknowledged additional contributors.
-32
o Addressed Gen-ART review comments by Russ Housley.
o Addressed secdir review comments by Tero Kivinen, Stephen Kent,
and Scott Kelly.
o Replaced the term Plaintext JWS with Unsecured JWS.
-31
o Reworded the language about JWS implementations ignoring the "typ"
and "cty" parameters, explicitly saying that their processing is
performed by JWS applications.
o Added additional guidance on ciphersuites currently considered to
be appropriate for use, including a reference to a recent update
by the TLS working group.
-30
o Added subsection headings within the Overview section for the two
serializations.
o Added references and cleaned up the reference syntax in a few
places.
o Applied minor wording changes to the Security Considerations
section and made other local editorial improvements.
-29
o Replaced the terms JWS Header, JWE Header, and JWT Header with a
single JOSE Header term defined in the JWS specification. This
also enabled a single Header Parameter definition to be used and
reduced other areas of duplication between specifications.
-28
o Revised the introduction to the Security Considerations section.
Also introduced additional subsection headings for security
considerations items and also moved a security consideration item
here from the JWA draft.
o Added text about when applications typically would and would not
use "typ" and "cty" header parameters.
-27
o Added the "x5t#S256" (X.509 Certificate SHA-256 Thumbprint) header
parameter.
o Stated that any JSON inputs not conforming to the JSON-text syntax
defined in RFC 7159 input MUST be rejected in their entirety.
o Simplified the TLS requirements.
-26
o Referenced Section 6 of RFC 6125 for TLS server certificate
identity validation.
o Described potential sources of ambiguity in representing the JSON
objects used in the examples. The octets of the actual UTF-8
representations of the JSON objects used in the examples are
included to remove these ambiguities.
o Added a small amount of additional explanatory text to the
signature validation examples to aid implementers.
o Noted that octet sequences are depicted using JSON array notation.
o Updated references, including to W3C specifications.
-25
o No changes were made, other than to the version number and date.
-24
o Updated the JSON reference to RFC 7159.
-23
o Clarified that the base64url encoding includes no line breaks,
white space, or other additional characters.
-22
o Corrected RFC 2119 terminology usage.
o Replaced references to draft-ietf-json-rfc4627bis with RFC 7158.
-21
o Applied review comments to the appendix "Notes on Key Selection",
addressing issue #93.
o Changed some references from being normative to informative,
addressing issue #90.
o Applied review comments to the JSON Serialization section,
addressing issue #121.
-20
o Made terminology definitions more consistent, addressing issue
#165.
o Restructured the JSON Serialization section to call out the
parameters used in hanging lists, addressing issue #121.
o Described key filtering and refined other aspects of the text in
the appendix "Notes on Key Selection", addressing issue #93.
o Replaced references to RFC 4627 with draft-ietf-json-rfc4627bis,
addressing issue #90.
-19
o Added the appendix "Notes on Validation Key Selection", addressing
issue #93.
o Reordered the key selection parameters.
-18
o Updated the mandatory-to-implement (MTI) language to say that
applications using this specification need to specify what
serialization and serialization features are used for that
application, addressing issue #119.
o Changes to address editorial and minor issues #25, #89, #97, #110,
#114, #115, #116, #117, #120, and #184.
o Added and used Header Parameter Description registry field.
-17
o Refined the "typ" and "cty" definitions to always be MIME Media
Types, with the omission of "application/" prefixes recommended
for brevity, addressing issue #50.
o Updated the mandatory-to-implement (MTI) language to say that
general-purpose implementations must implement the single
signature/MAC value case for both serializations whereas special-
purpose implementations can implement just one serialization if
that meets the needs of the use cases the implementation is
designed for, addressing issue #119.
o Explicitly named all the logical components of a JWS and defined
the processing rules and serializations in terms of those
components, addressing issues #60, #61, and #62.
o Replaced verbose repetitive phases such as "base64url encode the
octets of the UTF-8 representation of X" with mathematical
notation such as "BASE64URL(UTF8(X))".
o Terms used in multiple documents are now defined in one place and
incorporated by reference. Some lightly used or obvious terms
were also removed. This addresses issue #58.
-16
o Changes to address editorial and minor issues #50, #98, #99, #102,
#104, #106, #107, #111, and #112.
-15
o Clarified that it is an application decision which signatures,
MACs, or plaintext values must successfully validate for the JWS
to be accepted, addressing issue #35.
o Corrected editorial error in "ES512" example.
o Changes to address editorial and minor issues #34, #96, #100,
#101, #104, #105, and #106.
-14
o Stated that the "signature" parameter is to be omitted in the JWS
JSON Serialization when its value would be empty (which is only
the case for a Plaintext JWS).
-13
o Made all header parameter values be per-signature/MAC, addressing
issue #24.
-12
o Clarified that the "typ" and "cty" header parameters are used in
an application-specific manner and have no effect upon the JWS
processing.
o Replaced the MIME types "application/jws+json" and
"application/jws" with "application/jose+json" and
"application/jose".
o Stated that recipients MUST either reject JWSs with duplicate
Header Parameter Names or use a JSON parser that returns only the
lexically last duplicate member name.
o Added a Serializations section with parallel treatment of the JWS
Compact Serialization and the JWS JSON Serialization and also
moved the former Implementation Considerations content there.
-11
o Added Key Identification section.
o For the JWS JSON Serialization, enable header parameter values to
be specified in any of three parameters: the "protected" member
that is integrity protected and shared among all recipients, the
"unprotected" member that is not integrity protected and shared
among all recipients, and the "header" member that is not
integrity protected and specific to a particular recipient. (This
does not affect the JWS Compact Serialization, in which all header
parameter values are in a single integrity protected JWE Header
value.)
o Removed suggested compact serialization for multiple digital
signatures and/or MACs.
o Changed the MIME type name "application/jws-js" to
"application/jws+json", addressing issue #22.
o Tightened the description of the "crit" (critical) header
parameter.
o Added a negative test case for the "crit" header parameter
-10
o Added an appendix suggesting a possible compact serialization for
JWSs with multiple digital signatures and/or MACs.
-09
o Added JWS JSON Serialization, as specified by
draft-jones-jose-jws-json-serialization-04.
o Registered "application/jws-js" MIME type and "JWS-JS" typ header
parameter value.
o Defined that the default action for header parameters that are not
understood is to ignore them unless specifically designated as
"MUST be understood" or included in the new "crit" (critical)
header parameter list. This addressed issue #6.
o Changed term "JWS Secured Input" to "JWS Signing Input".
o Changed from using the term "byte" to "octet" when referring to 8
bit values.
o Changed member name from "recipients" to "signatures" in the JWS
JSON Serialization.
o Added complete values using the JWS Compact Serialization for all
examples.
-08
o Applied editorial improvements suggested by Jeff Hodges and Hannes
Tschofenig. Many of these simplified the terminology used.
o Clarified statements of the form "This header parameter is
OPTIONAL" to "Use of this header parameter is OPTIONAL".
o Added a Header Parameter Usage Location(s) field to the IANA JSON
Web Signature and Encryption Header Parameters registry.
o Added seriesInfo information to Internet Draft references.
-07
o Updated references.
-06
o Changed "x5c" (X.509 Certificate Chain) representation from being
a single string to being an array of strings, each containing a
single base64 encoded DER certificate value, representing elements
of the certificate chain.
o Applied changes made by the RFC Editor to RFC 6749's registry
language to this specification.
-05
o Added statement that "StringOrURI values are compared as case-
sensitive strings with no transformations or canonicalizations
applied".
o Indented artwork elements to better distinguish them from the body
text.
-04
o Completed JSON Security Considerations section, including
considerations about rejecting input with duplicate member names.
o Completed security considerations on the use of a SHA-1 hash when
computing "x5t" (x.509 certificate thumbprint) values.
o Refer to the registries as the primary sources of defined values
and then secondarily reference the sections defining the initial
contents of the registries.
o Normatively reference XML DSIG 2.0 for its security
considerations.
o Added this language to Registration Templates: "This name is case
sensitive. Names that match other registered names in a case
insensitive manner SHOULD NOT be accepted."
o Reference draft-jones-jose-jws-json-serialization instead of
draft-jones-json-web-signature-json-serialization.
o Described additional open issues.
o Applied editorial suggestions.
-03
o Added the "cty" (content type) header parameter for declaring type
information about the secured content, as opposed to the "typ"
(type) header parameter, which declares type information about
this object.
o Added "Collision Resistant Namespace" to the terminology section.
o Reference ITU.X690.1994 for DER encoding.
o Added an example JWS using ECDSA P-521 SHA-512. This has
particular illustrative value because of the use of the 521 bit
integers in the key and signature values. This is also an example
in which the payload is not a base64url encoded JSON object.
o Added an example "x5c" value.
o No longer say "the UTF-8 representation of the JWS Secured Input
(which is the same as the ASCII representation)". Just call it
"the ASCII representation of the JWS Secured Input".
o Added Registration Template sections for defined registries.
o Added Registry Contents sections to populate registry values.
o Changed name of the JSON Web Signature and Encryption "typ" Values
registry to be the JSON Web Signature and Encryption Type Values
registry, since it is used for more than just values of the "typ"
parameter.
o Moved registries JSON Web Signature and Encryption Header
Parameters and JSON Web Signature and Encryption Type Values to
the JWS specification.
o Numerous editorial improvements.
-02
o Clarified that it is an error when a "kid" value is included and
no matching key is found.
o Removed assumption that "kid" (key ID) can only refer to an
asymmetric key.
o Clarified that JWSs with duplicate Header Parameter Names MUST be
rejected.
o Clarified the relationship between "typ" header parameter values
and MIME types.
o Registered application/jws MIME type and "JWS" typ header
parameter value.
o Simplified JWK terminology to get replace the "JWK Key Object" and
"JWK Container Object" terms with simply "JSON Web Key (JWK)" and
"JSON Web Key Set (JWK Set)" and to eliminate potential confusion
between single keys and sets of keys. As part of this change, the
Header Parameter Name for a public key value was changed from
"jpk" (JSON Public Key) to "jwk" (JSON Web Key).
o Added suggestion on defining additional header parameters such as
"x5t#S256" in the future for certificate thumbprints using hash
algorithms other than SHA-1.
o Specify RFC 2818 server identity validation, rather than RFC 6125
(paralleling the same decision in the OAuth specs).
o Generalized language to refer to Message Authentication Codes
(MACs) rather than Hash-based Message Authentication Codes (HMACs)
unless in a context specific to HMAC algorithms.
o Reformatted to give each header parameter its own section heading.
-01
o Moved definition of Plaintext JWSs (using "alg":"none") here from
the JWT specification since this functionality is likely to be
useful in more contexts that just for JWTs.
o Added "jpk" and "x5c" header parameters for including JWK public
keys and X.509 certificate chains directly in the header.
o Clarified that this specification is defining the JWS Compact
Serialization. Referenced the new JWS-JS spec, which defines the
JWS JSON Serialization.
o Added text "New header parameters should be introduced sparingly
since an implementation that does not understand a parameter MUST
reject the JWS".
o Clarified that the order of the creation and validation steps is
not significant in cases where there are no dependencies between
the inputs and outputs of the steps.
o Changed "no canonicalization is performed" to "no canonicalization
need be performed".
o Corrected the Magic Signatures reference.
o Made other editorial improvements suggested by JOSE working group
participants.
-00
o Created the initial IETF draft based upon
draft-jones-json-web-signature-04 with no normative changes.
o Changed terminology to no longer call both digital signatures and
HMACs "signatures".
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Michael B. Jones Michael B. Jones
Microsoft Microsoft
Email: mbj@microsoft.com EMail: mbj@microsoft.com
URI: http://self-issued.info/ URI: http://self-issued.info/
John Bradley John Bradley
Ping Identity Ping Identity
Email: ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com EMail: ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com
URI: http://www.thread-safe.com/ URI: http://www.thread-safe.com/
Nat Sakimura Nat Sakimura
Nomura Research Institute Nomura Research Institute
Email: n-sakimura@nri.co.jp EMail: n-sakimura@nri.co.jp
URI: http://nat.sakimura.org/ URI: http://nat.sakimura.org/
 End of changes. 193 change blocks. 
1128 lines changed or deleted 632 lines changed or added

This html diff was produced by rfcdiff 1.42. The latest version is available from http://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcdiff/