--- 1/draft-ietf-kink-reqmt-02.txt	2006-02-05 00:06:34.000000000 +0100
+++ 2/draft-ietf-kink-reqmt-03.txt	2006-02-05 00:06:34.000000000 +0100
@@ -1,17 +1,18 @@
-INTERNET-DRAFT      KINK Requirements     Michael Thomas
-                                          Cisco Systems
-                                          March 1, 2001
 
-                Kerberized Internet Negotiation of Keys
+INTERNET-DRAFT    Requirements for Kerberized     Michael Thomas
+                  Internet Negotiation of Keys    Cisco Systems
+                                                  April 30, 2001
 
-                      draft-ietf-kink-reqmt-02.txt
+        Requirements for Kerberized Internet Negotiation of Keys
+
+                      draft-ietf-kink-reqmt-03.txt
 
 Status of this Memo
 
    This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
    all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.  Internet-Drafts are working
    documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas,
    and its working groups.  Note that other groups may also distribute
    working documents as Internet-Drafts.
 
    Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
@@ -160,20 +161,30 @@
 -    The protocol must be capable of rekeying without the assistance of
      the KDC if the Kerberos session ticket is still valid
 
 -    The protocol must make an effort to mitigate third party Denial of
      Service attacks (aka Zombies attacks)
 
 -    The protocol must be able to be used for more than IPsec keying
 
 -    The protocol must support both IPv4 and IPv6
 
+Security Considerations
+
+     These requirements lay out input to define a protocol which allows
+     the keying of IPsec security associations using Kerberos as the key
+     distribution mechanism. As such, the security associations that
+     will be created by the new protocol will inherit the union of IPsec
+     and Kerberos's existing security weaknesses. There is no require-
+     ment to address those weaknesses unless in combination they produce
+     a new weakness which is not inherent in other keying protocols.
+
 Acknowledgments
 
    The original KINK Kabal was:
 
    Michael Thomas (Cisco)
    David McGrew (Cisco)
    Jan Vilhuber (Cisco)
    Jonathan Trostle (Cisco)
    Matt Hur (Cybersafe)
    Mike Froh (Cybersafe)