--- 1/draft-ietf-kitten-cammac-03.txt 2015-11-01 10:15:06.756127233 -0800 +++ 2/draft-ietf-kitten-cammac-04.txt 2015-11-01 10:15:06.780127816 -0800 @@ -1,20 +1,19 @@ -Internet Engineering Task Force S. Sorce, Ed. +Internet Engineering Task Force S. Sorce Internet-Draft Red Hat -Updates: 4120 (if approved) T. Yu, Ed. -Intended status: Standards Track T. Hardjono, Ed. -Expires: December 27, 2015 MIT Kerberos Consortium - June 25, 2015 +Updates: 4120 (if approved) T. Yu +Intended status: Standards Track MIT +Expires: May 4, 2016 November 1, 2015 Kerberos Authorization Data Container Authenticated by Multiple MACs - draft-ietf-kitten-cammac-03 + draft-ietf-kitten-cammac-04 Abstract This document specifies a Kerberos Authorization Data container that supersedes AD-KDC-ISSUED. It allows for multiple Message Authentication Codes (MACs) or signatures to authenticate the contained Authorization Data elements. The multiple MACs are needed to mitigate shortcomings in the existing AD-KDC-ISSUED container. This document updates RFC 4120. @@ -26,21 +25,21 @@ Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." - This Internet-Draft will expire on December 27, 2015. + This Internet-Draft will expire on May 4, 2016. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents @@ -381,21 +380,22 @@ communicate attributes related to the client. If an application requires an authenticated binding between the service principal name and the CAMMAC or ticket contents, the KDC MUST include in the CAMMAC some authorization data element that names the service principal. 9. Acknowledgements Shawn Emery, Sam Hartman, Greg Hudson, Ben Kaduk, Barry Leiba, Meral Shirazipour, Zhanna Tsitkov, Qin Wu, and Kai Zheng provided helpful technical and editorial feedback on earlier versions of this - document. + document. Thomas Hardjono helped with the initial editing to split + this document from a predecessor document that had a wider scope. 10. References 10.1. Normative References [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. [RFC3961] Raeburn, K., "Encryption and Checksum Specifications for Kerberos 5", RFC 3961, February 2005. @@ -417,23 +417,18 @@ 10.2. Informative References [MS-SFU] Microsoft, "[MS-SFU]: Kerberos Protocol Extensions: Service for User and Constrained Delegation Protocol", January 2013, . Authors' Addresses - Simo Sorce (editor) + Simo Sorce Red Hat Email: ssorce@redhat.com - Tom Yu (editor) - MIT Kerberos Consortium + Tom Yu + MIT Email: tlyu@mit.edu - - Thomas Hardjono (editor) - MIT Kerberos Consortium - - Email: hardjono@mit.edu