draft-ietf-kitten-gssapi-naming-exts-04.txt   draft-ietf-kitten-gssapi-naming-exts-05.txt 
KITTEN WORKING GROUP N. Williams KITTEN WORKING GROUP N. Williams
Internet-Draft Sun Internet-Draft Sun
Intended status: Standards Track L. Johansson Intended status: Standards Track L. Johansson
Expires: September 9, 2009 Stockholm university Expires: January 31, 2010 SUNET
March 8, 2009 July 30, 2009
GSS-API Naming Extensions GSS-API Naming Extensions
draft-ietf-kitten-gssapi-naming-exts-04.txt draft-ietf-kitten-gssapi-naming-exts-05.txt
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
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This Internet-Draft will expire on September 9, 2009. This Internet-Draft will expire on January 31, 2010.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents in effect on the date of Provisions Relating to IETF Documents in effect on the date of
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Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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The Generic Security Services API (GSS-API) provides a simple naming The Generic Security Services API (GSS-API) provides a simple naming
architecture that supports name-based authorization. This document architecture that supports name-based authorization. This document
introduces new APIs that extend the GSS-API naming model to support introduces new APIs that extend the GSS-API naming model to support
name attribute transfer between GSS-API peers. name attribute transfer between GSS-API peers.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Conventions used in this document . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Conventions used in this document . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Name Attribute Sources and Criticality . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. Name Attribute Authenticity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Name Attributes/Values as ACL Subjects . . . . . . . . . . 4 4. Name Attributes/Values as ACL Subjects . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Mapping Mechanism Facilities to Name Attributes . . . . . 4 5. Attribute Name Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5.1. Kerberos V and SPKM Authorization-Data . . . . . . . . . . 5 6. Mapping Mechanism Facilities to Name Attributes . . . . . 5
5.2. PKIX Certificate Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 6.1. Kerberos V and SPKM Authorization-Data . . . . . . . . . . 5
5.2.1. PKIX EKUs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 6.2. PKIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5.2.2. PKIX Certificate Alternative Names . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 6.2.1. Standard PKIX Certificate Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5.2.3. Other PKIX Certificate Extensions and Attributes . . . . . 6 6.2.2. Other PKIX Certificate Extensions and Attributes . . . . . 6
5.2.4. SAML attribute assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 6.3. SAML attribute assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. GSS_Display_name_ext() . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 7. API . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6.1. C-Bindings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 7.1. GSS_Display_name_ext() . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7. GSS_Inquire_name() . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 7.1.1. C-Bindings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7.1. C-Bindings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 7.2. GSS_Inquire_name() . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8. GSS_Get_name_attribute() . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 7.2.1. C-Bindings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8.1. C-Bindings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 7.3. GSS_Get_name_attribute() . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
9. GSS_Set_name_attribute() . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 7.3.1. C-Bindings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9.1. C-Bindings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 7.4. GSS_Set_name_attribute() . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
10. GSS_Delete_name_attribute() . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 7.4.1. C-Bindings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
10.1. C-Bindings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 7.5. GSS_Delete_name_attribute() . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
11. GSS_Export_name_composite() . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 7.5.1. C-Bindings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
11.1. C-Bindings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 7.6. GSS_Export_name_composite() . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
12. GSS_Map_name_to_any() . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 7.6.1. C-Bindings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
12.1. C-Bindings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 7.7. GSS_Map_name_to_any() . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
13. GSS_Release_any_name_mapping() . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 7.7.1. C-Bindings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
13.1. C-Bindings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 7.8. GSS_Release_any_name_mapping() . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
14. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 7.8.1. C-Bindings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
15. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
16. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 10. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1. Conventions used in this document 1. Conventions used in this document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2. Introduction 2. Introduction
As described in [I-D.GSS-NAMING] the GSS-API's naming architecture As described in [I-D.GSS-NAMING] the GSS-API's naming architecture
suffers from certain limitations. This document proposes concrete suffers from certain limitations. This document proposes concrete
GSS-API extensions as outlined in [I-D.GSS-NAMING]. GSS-API extensions as outlined in [I-D.GSS-NAMING].
A number of extensions to the GSS-API [RFC2743] and its C Bindings A number of extensions to the GSS-API [RFC2743] and its C Bindings
[RFC2744] are described herein with the goal of making authorization [RFC2744] are described herein. The goal is to make information
information, and other information that can be modeled as "name modeled as "name attributes" available to applications. Such
attributes" available as such to applications. For example, Kerberos information MAY for instance be used by applications to make
V authorization data elements, both, in their raw forms as well as authorization-decisions. For example, Kerberos V authorization data
mapped to more useful value types, can be made available to GSS-API elements, both, in their raw forms as well as mapped to more useful
applications through these interfaces. value types, can be made available to GSS-API applications through
these interfaces.
The model is that GSS names have attributes. The attributes of a The model is that GSS names have attributes. The attributes of a
name may be authenticated by the credential whence the name comes, or name may be authenticated (eg an X509 attribute certificate or signed
may have been set locally on a GSS name for the purpose of SAML attribute assertion), or may have been set on a GSS name for the
"asserting" the attribute during credential acquisition or security purpose of locally "asserting" the attribute during credential
context exchange. Name attributes' values are network acquisition or security context exchange. Name attributes' values
representations thereof (e.g., the actual value octets of the are network representations thereof (e.g., the actual value octets of
contents of an X.509 certificate extension, for example) and are the contents of an X.509 certificate extension, for example) and are
intended to be useful for constructing portable access control intended to be useful for constructing portable access control
facilities. Applications may often require language- or platform- facilities. Applications may often require language- or platform-
specific data types, rather than network representations of name specific data types, rather than network representations of name
attributes, so a function is provided to obtain objects of such types attributes, so a function is provided to obtain objects of such types
associated with names and name attributes. associated with names and name attributes.
3. Name Attribute Sources and Criticality 3. Name Attribute Authenticity
A given GSS name object's name attributes may be authenticated,
mapped and/or critical. These flags are explained below.
An attribute is 'authenticated' iff there is a secure association An attribute is 'authenticated' iff there is a secure association
between the attribute (and its values) and the trusted source of the between the attribute (and its values) and the trusted source of the
peer credential. Examples of authenticated attributes are (any part peer credential. Examples of authenticated attributes are (any part
of) the signed portion of an X.509 certificate or AD-KDCIssued of) the signed portion of an X.509 certificate or AD-KDCIssued
authorization-data elements in Kerberos V Tickets. Note that the authorization-data elements in Kerberos V Tickets provided of course
fact that an attribute is authenticated does not imply anything about that the authenticity of the respective security associations (eg
the semantics of the attribute nor that the trusted credential source signatures) have been verified.
authorized any one semantic of the attribute. Such interpretations
MAY be the result of applying local policy to the attribute.
That a given name's given attribute is 'mapped' means that it was
obtained through some mapping mechanism applied to another attribute
of the name that was not, itself, mapped. For example, such
attributes as platform-specific internal identifiers may sometimes be
mapped from other name attributes.
Name attributes may be "critical," meaning that applications that do
not understand them MUST reject security contexts where the peer has
such unknown, critical attributes.
[NOTE(leifj): The criticality flag seems to have limited Note that the fact that an attribute is authenticated does not imply
applicability in practice. As written the security context should anything about the semantics of the attribute nor that the trusted
not be established unless all critically marked naming attributes are credential source authorized any one semantic of the attribute. Such
supported and understood. But what happens if the peer doesn't interpretations MAY be the result of applying local policy to the
understand naming extensions at all. It seems more reasonable to attribute.
state that name attribute extensions MUST only be used to as a basis
for authorization decisions.]
[NOTE(leifj): The mapped flag also seems to have limited An un-authentciated attribute is called _asserted_ in what
applicability in practice - interpretation of the attribute will be follows.This is not to be confused with other uses of the word
entierly up to the peer anyway which will need to know much more asserted or assertion eg "SAML attribute assertion", the attributes
about the attribute than the fact than its value is derived.] of which may be authenticated in the sense of this document if the
SAML attribute assertion was signed by a key trusted by the peer.
4. Name Attributes/Values as ACL Subjects 4. Name Attributes/Values as ACL Subjects
Some name attributes (e.g., numeric user or group identifiers) may be Some name attributes (e.g., numeric user or group identifiers) may be
useful as subjects of access control list (ACL) entries, some may not useful as subjects of access control list (ACL) entries, some may not
(e.g., time of day login restrictions). The (e.g., time of day login restrictions). The
GSS_Inquire_name_attribute() function indicates this. GSS_Inquire_name_attribute() function indicates this.
To facilitate the development of portable applications that make use To facilitate the development of portable applications that make use
of name attributes to construct and evaluate portable ACLs the GSS- of name attributes to construct and evaluate portable ACLs the GSS-
API makes name attribute values available in canonical network API makes name attribute values available in canonical network
encodings thereof. encodings thereof.
To facilitate the development of platform- or language-specific To facilitate the development of platform- or language-specific
applications that need access to native types of representations of applications that need access to native types of representations of
name attributes an optional facility is provided, name attributes an optional facility is provided,
GSS_Map_name_to_any(). GSS_Map_name_to_any().
5. Mapping Mechanism Facilities to Name Attributes 5. Attribute Name Syntax
[NOTE: This entire section should probably be split into one or more Attribute names are represented as opaque STRING elements in the API
separate Internet-Drafts. It is here in the -00 of this I-D to help described below. These attribute names have syntax and semantics
readers understand how to mechanism-specific name attributes would be that are understood by the application and by the lower-layer
accessed through these GSS-API extensions.] implementations (some of which are described below). In order to
present a consistent namespace to the application and at the same
time impose as few transformation requirements as possible to lower-
layer implementations attribute names SHOULD be URIs.
Kerberos V [I-D.ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications] and the Simple Technologies used in lower-layer protocols may of course use
Public-Key GSS-API Mechanism, SPKM [RFC2025], both support the attribute naming that are not based on URIs. Notably X.509
concept and encoding of containers of "authorization-data" as certificates will use OIDs for most naming purposes. In this case
described in [I-D.ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications]. OIDs MUST be mapped into URIs.
PKIX [RFC3280] supports a number of authorization-data-like features, When mapping entities named by OIDs into this API [RFC3001] MUST be
like Extended Key Usage values (EKUs) and certificate extensions. used. For example if the OID 1.2.3 denotes an Extended Key Usage,
the corresponding GSS-API attribute MUST be represented as
urn:oid:1.2.3.
The authorization data can be accessed through the GSS-API name 6. Mapping Mechanism Facilities to Name Attributes
attributes facility defined herein.
5.1. Kerberos V and SPKM Authorization-Data In this section we describe two important examples of lower-layer
implementations of this API. These examples are not mandatory to
implement and are only provided for reference. The use of [RFC2119]-
terms in this section is limited to those implementations of the GSS-
API naming extensions that choose to implement these lower-layer
technologies.
Kerberos V [RFC4120] and the Simple Public-Key GSS-API Mechanism,
SPKM described in [RFC2025], both support the concept and encoding of
containers of "authorization-data" as described in [RFC4120].
PKIX [RFC5280] supports a number of attribute-like features, like
Extended Key Usage values (EKUs) and certificate extensions.
6.1. Kerberos V and SPKM Authorization-Data
Authorization-data non-container elements asserted in Kerberos V AP- Authorization-data non-container elements asserted in Kerberos V AP-
REQ Authenticators MUST be mapped into *asserted* GSS-API name REQ Authenticators MUST be mapped into *asserted* GSS-API name
attributes; if not contained in AD-IF-RELEVANT then they MUST be attributes.
mapped into *critical* GSS-API name attributes. AD-AND-OR
authorization-data elements MUST be mapped into a single *critical*
attribute, (TBD).
Authorization-data included in Kerberos V Tickets that is not Authorization-data included in Kerberos V Tickets that is not
contained in AD-KDCIssued (with valid signature) MUST be mapped into contained in AD-KDCIssued (with valid signature) MUST be mapped into
*asserted* GSS-API name attributes. Conversely, authorization-data *asserted* GSS-API name attributes. Conversely, authorization-data
elements in Kerberos V Tickets contained by AD-KDCIssued MUST be elements in Kerberos V Tickets contained by AD-KDCIssued MUST be
mapped into *authenticated* GSS-API name attributes mapped into *authenticated* GSS-API name attributes.
As with authorization-data elements in Authenticators, authorization- The URIs for authorization-data elements MUST be the authorization-
data elements in Tickets not contained in AD-IF-RELEVANT are to be data elements 'ad-type' prefixed by the IANA-allocated URN prefix
mapped to *critical* name attributes, and similarly with AD-AND-OR (<TBD>)
(see above).
The OIDs for authorization-data elements are to be the authorization- 6.2. PKIX
data element's 'ad-type' positive integer ID, relative to the base
OID <TBD> Negative values are reserved for local experiments. [NOTE:
what about negative ad-type's? OID arcs are positive integers... ad-
type is an Int32, so clearly something can be done.]
5.2. PKIX Certificate Extensions 6.2.1. Standard PKIX Certificate Extensions
PKI certificate extensions MAY/SHOULD/MUST (see comment above) be PKI certificate extensions MAY/SHOULD/MUST (see comment above) be
represented as *authenticated* GSS-API name attributes with the represented as *authenticated* GSS-API name attributes named using
_same_ OIDs, and if they be marked critical in the certificate then the _same_.
they MUST be mapped as *critical* GSS-API name attributes.
SubjectAltNames and EKUs, specifically, MUST be represented as SubjectAltNames and EKUs, specifically, MUST be represented as
*authenticated* GSS-API name attributes; see below. Certificate *authenticated* GSS-API name attributes; see below. Certificate
extensions MUST be represented as GSS-API name attributes whose OIDs extensions MUST be represented as GSS-API name attributes named using
are the same as the extensions' the OIDs used for the extensions (represented as URNs)
5.2.1. PKIX EKUs
Extended Key Usage extensions, specifically, MUST be mapped as Extended Key Usage extensions, specifically, MUST be mapped as
described above, except that GSS-API name attributes for EKUs MUST described above, except that GSS-API name attributes for EKUs MUST
have NULL values (i.e., zero-length OCTET STRINGs). have NULL values (i.e., zero-length OCTET STRINGs).
PKI certificate key usages (KUs, but not EKUs), MUST NOT be PKI certificate key usages (KUs, but not EKUs), MUST NOT be
represented as GSS-API name attributes. represented as GSS-API name attributes.
5.2.2. PKIX Certificate Alternative Names PKI certificate subjectAltNames MUST be mapped as *authenticated*.
PKI certificate subjectAltNames MUST be mapped as *authenticated*,
*non-critical* GSS-API name attributes.
PKI certificate extensions MUST be represented as *authenticated*
GSS-API name attributes with the _same_ OIDs, and if they be marked
critical in the certificate then they MUST be mapped as *critical*
GSS-API name attributes.
Extended Key Usage extensions, specifically, MUST be mapped as
described above, except that GSS-API name attributes for EKUs MUST
have NULL values (i.e., zero-length OCTET STRINGs).
5.2.3. Other PKIX Certificate Extensions and Attributes 6.2.2. Other PKIX Certificate Extensions and Attributes
Any X.509 certificate extension not covered above SHOULD be Any X.509 certificate extension not covered above SHOULD be
represented as GSS-AOI name attributes with the OID of the X.509 represented as GSS-AOI name attributes with the OID of the X.509
extension and with OCTET STRING values containing the encoded value extension and with OCTET STRING values containing the encoded value
of the extension. of the extension.
5.2.4. SAML attribute assertions 6.3. SAML attribute assertions
Attributes contained in SAML attribute assertions are mapped to GSS- Attributes contained in SAML attribute assertions are mapped to GSS-
API name attributes with OIDs derived from the SAML attributes: API name attributes with the same URIs as used in the SAML attribute
names (subject to representing OIDs to URIs).
If the SAML attribute is an OID the same OID is used. SAML attributes found in SAML attribute assertions MUST NOT be mapped
as authenticated unless the SAML attribute assertion was signed by a
key trusted by the peer or otherwise protected from unauthorized
modification.
If the SAML attribute is a URN or a URI then the name MUST be 7. API
mapped to a corresponding OID by means of an IANA registry.
6. GSS_Display_name_ext() 7.1. GSS_Display_name_ext()
Inputs: Inputs:
o name NAME, o name NAME,
o display_as_name_type OBJECT IDENTIFIER o display_as_name_type OBJECT IDENTIFIER
Outputs: Outputs:
o major_status INTEGER, o major_status INTEGER,
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displayed using the syntax of the given name type. displayed using the syntax of the given name type.
o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates a general error. o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates a general error.
This function displays a given name using the given name syntax, if This function displays a given name using the given name syntax, if
possible. This operation may require mapping MNs to generic name possible. This operation may require mapping MNs to generic name
syntaxes or generic name syntaxes to mechanism-specific name syntaxes or generic name syntaxes to mechanism-specific name
syntaxes; such mappings may not always be feasible and MAY be inexact syntaxes; such mappings may not always be feasible and MAY be inexact
or lossy, therefore this function may fail. or lossy, therefore this function may fail.
6.1. C-Bindings 7.1.1. C-Bindings
OM_uint32 GSS_Display_name_ext( OM_uint32 GSS_Display_name_ext(
OM_uint32 *minor_status, OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_name_t name, gss_name_t name,
gss_OID display_as_name_type, gss_OID display_as_name_type,
gss_buffer_t display_name gss_buffer_t display_name
); );
7. GSS_Inquire_name() 7.2. GSS_Inquire_name()
Inputs: Inputs:
o name NAME o name NAME
Outputs: Outputs:
o major_status INTEGER, o major_status INTEGER,
o minor_status INTEGER, o minor_status INTEGER,
o name_is_MN BOOLEAN, o name_is_MN BOOLEAN,
o mn_mech OBJECT IDENTIFIER, o mn_mech OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
o asserted_attrs SET OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER, o asserted_attrs SET OF STRING,
o authenticated_attrs SET OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
o critical_attrs SET OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER, o authenticated_attrs SET OF STRING,
o all_attrs SET OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER, o all_attrs SET OF STRING,
Return major_status codes: Return major_status codes:
o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates no error. o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates no error.
o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates a general error. o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates a general error.
This function outputs the sets of attributes of a name, that are This function outputs the sets (represented as a NULL terminated
authenticated, asserted or critical. It also indicates if a given array of gss_buffer_t) of attributes of a name, that are
NAME is an MN or not and, if it is, what mechanism it's an MN of. authenticated or asserted. It also indicates if a given NAME is an
MN or not and, if it is, what mechanism it's an MN of.
7.1. C-Bindings 7.2.1. C-Bindings
OM_uint32 gss_inquire_name( OM_uint32 gss_inquire_name(
OM_uint32 *minor_status, OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_name_t name, gss_name_t name,
int name_is_MN, int name_is_MN,
gss_OID *MN_mech, gss_OID *MN_mech,
gss_OID_set *authenticated, gss_buffer_t *authenticated,
gss_OID_set *asserted, gss_buffer_t *asserted,
gss_OID_set *critical, gss_buffer_t *all_attrs
gss_OID_set *all_attrs
); );
8. GSS_Get_name_attribute() 7.3. GSS_Get_name_attribute()
Inputs: Inputs:
o name NAME, o name NAME,
o attr OBJECT IDENTIFIER o attr STRING
Outputs: Outputs:
o major_status INTEGER, o major_status INTEGER,
o minor_status INTEGER, o minor_status INTEGER,
o authenticated BOOLEAN, -- TRUE iff authenticated by the trusted o authenticated BOOLEAN, -- TRUE iff authenticated by the trusted
peer credential source. peer credential source.
o negative BOOLEAN, o complete BOOLEAN -- TRUE iff this represents a complete set of
values for the name.
o mapped BOOLEAN,
o critical BOOLEAN,
o values SET OF OCTET STRING, o values SET OF OCTET STRING,
o display_values SET OF STRING o display_values SET OF STRING
Return major_status codes: Return major_status codes:
o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates no error. o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates no error.
o GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE indicates that the given attribute OID is not o GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE indicates that the given attribute OID is not
known or set. known or set.
o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates a general error. o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates a general error.
This function outputs the value(s) associated with a given GSS name This function outputs the value(s) associated with a given GSS name
object for a given name attribute. object for a given name attribute.
The complete flag denotes that (if TRUE) the set of values represents
a complete set of values for this name. The peer being an
authoritative source of information for this attribute is a
sufficient condition for the complete flag to be set by the peer.
In the federated case when several peers may hold some of the
attributes about a name this flag may be highly dangerous and SHOULD
NOT be used.
NOTE: This function relies on the GSS-API notion of "SET OF" allowing NOTE: This function relies on the GSS-API notion of "SET OF" allowing
for order preservation; this has been discussed on the KITTEN WG for order preservation; this has been discussed on the KITTEN WG
mailing list and the consensus seems to be that, indeed, that was mailing list and the consensus seems to be that, indeed, that was
always the intention. It should be noted however that the order always the intention. It should be noted however that the order
presented does not always reflect an underlying order of the presented does not always reflect an underlying order of the
mechanism specific source of the attribute values. mechanism specific source of the attribute values.
8.1. C-Bindings 7.3.1. C-Bindings
The C-bindings of GSS_Get_name_attribute() requires one function call The C-bindings of GSS_Get_name_attribute() requires one function call
per-attribute value, for multi-valued name attributes. This is done per-attribute value, for multi-valued name attributes. This is done
by using a single gss_buffer_t for each value and an input/output by using a single gss_buffer_t for each value and an input/output
integer parameter to distinguish initial and subsequent calls and to integer parameter to distinguish initial and subsequent calls and to
indicate when all values have been obtained. indicate when all values have been obtained.
The 'more' input/output parameter should point to an integer variable The 'more' input/output parameter should point to an integer variable
whose value, on first call to gss_name_attribute_get() MUST be -1, whose value, on first call to gss_name_attribute_get() MUST be -1,
and whose value upon function call return will be non-zero to and whose value upon function call return will be non-zero to
indicate that additional values remain, or zero to indicate that no indicate that additional values remain, or zero to indicate that no
values remain. The caller should not modify this parameter after the values remain. The caller should not modify this parameter after the
initial call. initial call.
OM_uint32 gss_get_name_attribute( OM_uint32 gss_get_name_attribute(
OM_uint32 *minor_status, OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_name_t name, gss_name_t name,
gss_OID attr, gss_buffer_t attr,
int *authenticated, int *authenticated,
int *negative, int *complete,
int *mapped,
int *critical,
gss_buffer_t value, gss_buffer_t value,
gss_buffer_t display_value, gss_buffer_t display_value,
int *more int *more
); );
9. GSS_Set_name_attribute() 7.4. GSS_Set_name_attribute()
Inputs: Inputs:
o name NAME, o name NAME,
o critical BOOLEAN, o complete BOOLEAN, -- TRUE iff this represents a complete set of
values for the name.
o negative BOOLEAN,
o attr OBJECT IDENTIFIER, o attr STRING,
o values SET OF OCTET STRING o values SET OF OCTET STRING
Outputs: Outputs:
o major_status INTEGER, o major_status INTEGER,
o minor_status INTEGER o minor_status INTEGER
Return major_status codes: Return major_status codes:
o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates no error. o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates no error.
o GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE indicates that the given attribute OID is not o GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE indicates that the given attribute OID is not
known or could not be set. known or could not be set.
o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates a general error. o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates a general error.
The complete flag denotes that (if TRUE) the set of values represents
a complete set of values for this name. The peer being an
authoritative source of information for this attribute is a
sufficient condition for the complete flag to be set by the peer.
In the federated case when several peers may hold some of the
attributes about a name this flag may be highly dangerous and SHOULD
NOT be used.
NOTE: This function relies on the GSS-API notion of "SET OF" allowing NOTE: This function relies on the GSS-API notion of "SET OF" allowing
for order preservation; this has been discussed on the KITTEN WG for order preservation; this has been discussed on the KITTEN WG
mailing list and the consensus seems to be that, indeed, that was mailing list and the consensus seems to be that, indeed, that was
always the intention. It should be noted that underlying mechanisms always the intention. It should be noted that underlying mechanisms
may not respect the given order. may not respect the given order.
9.1. C-Bindings 7.4.1. C-Bindings
The C-bindings of GSS_Set_name_attribute() requires one function call The C-bindings of GSS_Set_name_attribute() requires one function call
per-attribute value, for multi-valued name attributes -- each call per-attribute value, for multi-valued name attributes -- each call
adds one value. To replace an attribute's every value delete the adds one value. To replace an attribute's every value delete the
attribute's values first with GSS_Delete_name_attribute(). attribute's values first with GSS_Delete_name_attribute().
OM_uint32 gss_set_name_attribute( OM_uint32 gss_set_name_attribute(
OM_uint32 *minor_status, OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_name_t name, gss_name_t name,
int critical, int complete,
int negative, gss_buffer_t attr,
gss_OID attr,
gss_buffer_t value gss_buffer_t value
); );
10. GSS_Delete_name_attribute() 7.5. GSS_Delete_name_attribute()
Inputs: Inputs:
o name NAME, o name NAME,
o attr OBJECT IDENTIFIER, o attr STRING,
Outputs: Outputs:
o major_status INTEGER, o major_status INTEGER,
o minor_status INTEGER o minor_status INTEGER
Return major_status codes: Return major_status codes:
o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates no error. o GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates no error.
skipping to change at page 12, line 13 skipping to change at page 11, line 46
known. known.
o GSS_S_UNAUTHORIZED indicates that a forbidden delete operation was o GSS_S_UNAUTHORIZED indicates that a forbidden delete operation was
attempted eg deleting a negative attribute. attempted eg deleting a negative attribute.
o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates a general error. o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates a general error.
Deletion of negative authenticated attributes from NAME objects MUST Deletion of negative authenticated attributes from NAME objects MUST
NOT be allowed and must result in a GSS_S_UNAUTHORIZED. NOT be allowed and must result in a GSS_S_UNAUTHORIZED.
10.1. C-Bindings 7.5.1. C-Bindings
OM_uint32 gss_delete_name_attribute( OM_uint32 gss_delete_name_attribute(
OM_uint32 *minor_status, OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_name_t name, gss_name_t name,
gss_OID attr gss_buffer_t attr
); );
11. GSS_Export_name_composite() 7.6. GSS_Export_name_composite()
Inputs: Inputs:
o name NAME o name NAME
Outputs: Outputs:
o major_status INTEGER, o major_status INTEGER,
o minor_status INTEGER, o minor_status INTEGER,
skipping to change at page 13, line 5 skipping to change at page 12, line 38
This function outputs a token which can be imported with This function outputs a token which can be imported with
GSS_Import_name(), using GSS_C_NT_COMPOSITE_EXPORT as the name type GSS_Import_name(), using GSS_C_NT_COMPOSITE_EXPORT as the name type
and which preserves any name attribute information associated with and which preserves any name attribute information associated with
the input name (which GSS_Export_name() may well not). The token the input name (which GSS_Export_name() may well not). The token
format is no specified here as this facility is intended for inter- format is no specified here as this facility is intended for inter-
process communication only; however, all such tokens MUST start with process communication only; however, all such tokens MUST start with
a two-octet token ID, hex 04 02, in network byte order. a two-octet token ID, hex 04 02, in network byte order.
The OID for GSS_C_NT_COMPOSITE_EXPORT is <TBD>. The OID for GSS_C_NT_COMPOSITE_EXPORT is <TBD>.
11.1. C-Bindings 7.6.1. C-Bindings
OM_uint32 gss_export_name_composite( OM_uint32 gss_export_name_composite(
OM_uint32 *minor_status, OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_name_t name, gss_name_t name,
gss_buffer_t exp_composite_name gss_buffer_t exp_composite_name
); );
12. GSS_Map_name_to_any() 7.7. GSS_Map_name_to_any()
Inputs: Inputs:
o name NAME, o name NAME,
o authenticated BOOLEAN, -- if TRUE only authenticated attributes o authenticated BOOLEAN, -- if TRUE only authenticated attributes
will be included will be included
o type_id OBJECT IDENTIFIER o type_id STRING
Outputs: Outputs:
o major_status INTEGER, o major_status INTEGER,
o minor_status INTEGER, o minor_status INTEGER,
o output ANY DEFINED BY type_id o output ANY DEFINED BY type_id
Return major_status codes: Return major_status codes:
skipping to change at page 13, line 48 skipping to change at page 13, line 36
information. information.
o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates a general error. The minor status code o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates a general error. The minor status code
may provide additional information. may provide additional information.
Whereas name attribute's values are encoded in some network Whereas name attribute's values are encoded in some network
representation applications often require native, language- and/or representation applications often require native, language- and/or
platform-specific data types. This function provides access to such platform-specific data types. This function provides access to such
types. types.
12.1. C-Bindings 7.7.1. C-Bindings
typedef struct gss_any *gss_any_t; typedef struct gss_any *gss_any_t;
OM_uint32 gss_map_name_to_any( OM_uint32 gss_map_name_to_any(
OM_uint32 *minor_status, OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_name_t name, gss_name_t name,
int authenticated, int authenticated,
gss_OID type_id, gss_buffer_t type_id, // why isn't this 'name'?
gss_any_t output gss_any_t output
); );
Note the new C bindings type, gss_any_t. We define it as a pointer Note the new C bindings type, gss_any_t. We define it as a pointer
to an incompletely declared struct. to an incompletely declared struct.
13. GSS_Release_any_name_mapping() 7.8. GSS_Release_any_name_mapping()
Inputs: Inputs:
o name NAME, o name NAME,
o type_id OBJECT IDENTIFIER, o type_id STRING,
o input ANY DEFINED BY type_id o input ANY DEFINED BY type_id
Outputs: Outputs:
o major_status INTEGER, o major_status INTEGER,
o minor_status INTEGER, o minor_status INTEGER,
Return major_status codes: Return major_status codes:
skipping to change at page 14, line 48 skipping to change at page 14, line 34
information. information.
o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates a general error. The minor status code o GSS_S_FAILURE indicates a general error. The minor status code
may provide additional information. may provide additional information.
This function releases, if possible, the objects of language- and/or This function releases, if possible, the objects of language- and/or
platform-specific types output by GSS_Map_name_to_any(). If such platform-specific types output by GSS_Map_name_to_any(). If such
types have native release functions applications MAY use either those types have native release functions applications MAY use either those
or this function to release the given object. or this function to release the given object.
13.1. C-Bindings 7.8.1. C-Bindings
typedef struct gss_any *gss_any_t; typedef struct gss_any *gss_any_t;
OM_uint32 gss_release_any_name_mapping( OM_uint32 gss_release_any_name_mapping(
OM_uint32 *minor_status, OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_name_t name, gss_name_t name,
gss_OID type_id, gss_buffer_t type_id,
gss_any_t *input gss_any_t *input
); );
14. IANA Considerations 8. IANA Considerations
This document creates a namespace of GSS-API name attributes. This document creates a namespace of GSS-API name attributes.
Attributes are named by OID, so no single authority might be needed Attributes are named by URIs, so no single authority is technically
for allocation, however, in the interest of providing the community needed for allocation. However future deployment experience may
with an authority for name attribute OID allocation and a way to find indicate the need for an IANA registry for URIs used to reference
the existing set of name attributes, the IANA should establish both, names specified by IETF standards. It is expected that this will be
a single OID off of which name attributes could be allocated, and a a registry of URNs but this document provides no further guidance on
registry of known GSS name attributes. this registry.
GSS-API name attribute registry entries should contain all the
information that GSS_Inquire_name_attribute() may return about the
given name attributes and their OIDs:
o a name attribute OID (this is a unique key)
o a name attribute symbolic name, starting with "GSS_C_NA_" (this is
a unique key)
o a brief description, in English
o whether the attribute is useful as the subject of access control
list entries
o whether the attribute is useful as an indicator of trust
o an optional normative reference to documentation for the given
name attribute
The allocation and registration policy should be first come, first
served. Registry entries' OIDs need not be based on the base OID
given above.
15. Security Considerations 9. Security Considerations
This document extends the GSS-API naming model to include support for This document extends the GSS-API naming model to include support for
name attributes. The intention is that name attributes are to be name attributes. The intention is that name attributes are to be
used as a basis for (among other things) authorization decisions or used as a basis for (among other things) authorization decisions or
application personalization for applications relying on GSS-API application personalization for applications relying on GSS-API
security contexts. security contexts.
The security of the application may be critically dependent on the The security of the application may be critically dependent on the
security of the attributes. This document classifies attributes as security of the attributes. This document classifies attributes as
asserted or authenticated. Only authenticated attributes MUST be asserted or authenticated. Only authenticated attributes MUST be
skipping to change at page 16, line 34 skipping to change at page 15, line 44
included in signed SAML attribute assertions lor by other means included in signed SAML attribute assertions lor by other means
authenticated by the underlying mechanism. authenticated by the underlying mechanism.
When the underlying security mechanism does not provide a permanent When the underlying security mechanism does not provide a permanent
unique identity (eg anonymous kerberos) the GSS-API naming extensions unique identity (eg anonymous kerberos) the GSS-API naming extensions
may be used to provide a replacement permanent unique identity may be used to provide a replacement permanent unique identity
attribute which in this case may be unique for each relying party. attribute which in this case may be unique for each relying party.
This is analogous to the Liberty Alliance targetedID attribute and This is analogous to the Liberty Alliance targetedID attribute and
has similar security implications. has similar security implications.
16. Normative References 10. Normative References
[I-D.GSS-NAMING] [I-D.GSS-NAMING]
Hartman, S., "Desired Enhancements to GSSAPI Naming", Hartman, S., "Desired Enhancements to GSSAPI Naming",
draft-ietf-kitten-gss-naming-01.txt (work in progress), draft-ietf-kitten-gss-naming-01.txt (work in progress),
February 2005. February 2005.
[I-D.ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications]
Neuman, C., "The Kerberos Network Authentication Service
(V5)", draft-ietf-krb-wg-kerberos-clarifications-07 (work
in progress), September 2004.
[RFC0854] Postel, J. and J. Reynolds, "Telnet Protocol
Specification", STD 8, RFC 854, May 1983.
[RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.
[RFC2025] Adams, C., "The Simple Public-Key GSS-API Mechanism [RFC2025] Adams, C., "The Simple Public-Key GSS-API Mechanism
(SPKM)", RFC 2025, October 1996. (SPKM)", RFC 2025, October 1996.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2203] Eisler, M., Chiu, A., and L. Ling, "RPCSEC_GSS Protocol
Specification", RFC 2203, September 1997.
[RFC2478] Baize, E. and D. Pinkas, "The Simple and Protected GSS-API
Negotiation Mechanism", RFC 2478, December 1998.
[RFC2623] Eisler, M., "NFS Version 2 and Version 3 Security Issues
and the NFS Protocol's Use of RPCSEC_GSS and Kerberos V5",
RFC 2623, June 1999.
[RFC2743] Linn, J., "Generic Security Service Application Program [RFC2743] Linn, J., "Generic Security Service Application Program
Interface Version 2, Update 1", RFC 2743, January 2000. Interface Version 2, Update 1", RFC 2743, January 2000.
[RFC2744] Wray, J., "Generic Security Service API Version 2 : [RFC2744] Wray, J., "Generic Security Service API Version 2 :
C-bindings", RFC 2744, January 2000. C-bindings", RFC 2744, January 2000.
[RFC3008] Wellington, B., "Domain Name System Security (DNSSEC) [RFC3001] Mealling, M., "A URN Namespace of Object Identifiers",
Signing Authority", RFC 3008, November 2000. RFC 3001, November 2000.
[RFC3280] Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W., and D. Solo, "Internet [RFC4120] Neuman, C., Yu, T., Hartman, S., and K. Raeburn, "The
X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5)", RFC 4120,
Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280, July 2005.
April 2002.
[RFC3530] Shepler, S., Callaghan, B., Robinson, D., Thurlow, R., [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Beame, C., Eisler, M., and D. Noveck, "Network File System Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
(NFS) version 4 Protocol", RFC 3530, April 2003. Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Nicolas Williams Nicolas Williams
Sun Microsystems Sun Microsystems
5300 Riata Trace Ct 5300 Riata Trace Ct
Austin, TX 78727 Austin, TX 78727
US US
Email: Nicolas.Williams@sun.com Email: Nicolas.Williams@sun.com
Leif Johansson Leif Johansson
Stockholm university Swedish University Network
Avdelningen foer IT och Media Thulegatan 11
Stockholm SE-106 91 Stockholm
Sweden
Email: leifj@it.su.se Email: leifj@sunet.se
URI: http://people.su.se/~leifj/ URI: http://www.sunet.se
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