draft-ietf-kitten-sasl-oauth-11.txt		draft-ietf-kitten-sasl-oauth-12.txt
	KITTEN W. Mills		KITTEN W. Mills
	Internet-Draft Yahoo! Inc.		Internet-Draft Yahoo! Inc.
	Intended status: Standards Track T. Showalter		Intended status: Standards Track T. Showalter
	Expires: April 20, 2014		Expires: June 18, 2014
	H. Tschofenig		H. Tschofenig
	Nokia Solutions and Networks		Nokia Solutions and Networks
	October 17, 2013		December 15, 2013
	A set of SASL Mechanisms for OAuth		A set of SASL Mechanisms for OAuth
	draft-ietf-kitten-sasl-oauth-11.txt		draft-ietf-kitten-sasl-oauth-12.txt
	Abstract		Abstract
	OAuth enables a third-party application to obtain limited access to a		OAuth enables a third-party application to obtain limited access to a
	protected resource, either on behalf of a resource owner by		protected resource, either on behalf of a resource owner by
	orchestrating an approval interaction, or by allowing the third-party		orchestrating an approval interaction, or by allowing the third-party
	application to obtain access on its own behalf.		application to obtain access on its own behalf.
	This document defines how an application client uses credentials		This document defines how an application client uses credentials
	obtained via OAuth over the Simple Authentication and Security Layer		obtained via OAuth over the Simple Authentication and Security Layer
	skipping to change at page 2, line 4		skipping to change at page 2, line 4
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on April 20, 2014.		This Internet-Draft will expire on June 18, 2014.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect		carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
	to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must		to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
	include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of		include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
	the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as		the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
	described in the Simplified BSD License.		described in the Simplified BSD License.
	Table of Contents		Table of Contents
	1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
	2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	3. OAuth SASL Mechanism Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		3. OAuth SASL Mechanism Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	3.1. Initial Client Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		3.1. Initial Client Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	3.1.1. Reserved Key/Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		3.1.1. Reserved Key/Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	3.2. Server's Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		3.2. Server's Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	3.2.1. OAuth Identifiers in the SASL Context . . . . . . . . 8		3.2.1. OAuth Identifiers in the SASL Context . . . . . . . . 8
	3.2.2. Server Response to Failed Authentication . . . . . . 9		3.2.2. Server Response to Failed Authentication . . . . . . 8
	3.2.3. Completing an Error Message Sequence . . . . . . . . 9		3.2.3. Completing an Error Message Sequence . . . . . . . . 9
	3.3. OAuth Access Token Types using Keyed Message Digests . . 9		3.3. OAuth Access Token Types using Keyed Message Digests . . 9
	3.4. Channel Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		4. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	4. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	4.1. Successful Bearer Token Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . 11		4.1. Successful Bearer Token Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	4.2. OAuth 1.0a Authorization with Channel Binding . . . . . . 12		4.2. Failed Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	4.3. Failed Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		4.3. SMTP Example of a Failed Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . 12
	4.4. Failed Channel Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	4.5. SMTP Example of a Failed Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . 14		6. Internationalization Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
	5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15		7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
	6. Internationalization Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16		7.1. SASL Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
	7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17		8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
	7.1. SASL Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17		8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
	8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18		8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
	8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18		Appendix A. Acknowlegements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
	8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19		Appendix B. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
	Appendix A. Acknowlegements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19		Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
	Appendix B. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	OAuth 1.0a [RFC5849] and OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] are protocol frameworks		OAuth 1.0a [RFC5849] and OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] are protocol frameworks
	that enable a third-party application to obtain limited access to a		that enable a third-party application to obtain limited access to a
	protected resource, either on behalf of a resource owner by		protected resource, either on behalf of a resource owner by
	orchestrating an approval interaction, or by allowing the third-party		orchestrating an approval interaction, or by allowing the third-party
	application to obtain access on its own behalf.		application to obtain access on its own behalf.
	The core OAuth 2.0 specification [RFC6749] specifies the interaction		The core OAuth 2.0 specification [RFC6749] specifies the interaction
	skipping to change at page 6, line 6		skipping to change at page 6, line 18
	Note that the IMAP SASL specification requires base64 encoding, see		Note that the IMAP SASL specification requires base64 encoding, see
	Section 4 of [RFC4648], not this memo.		Section 4 of [RFC4648], not this memo.
	3. OAuth SASL Mechanism Specifications		3. OAuth SASL Mechanism Specifications
	SASL is used as an authentication framework in a variety of		SASL is used as an authentication framework in a variety of
	application layer protocols. This document defines the following		application layer protocols. This document defines the following
	SASL mechanisms for usage with OAuth:		SASL mechanisms for usage with OAuth:
	OAUTHBEARER: OAuth 2.0 bearer tokens, as described in [RFC6750].		OAUTHBEARER: OAuth 2.0 bearer tokens, as described in [RFC6750].
	RFC 6750 uses Transport Layer Security (TLS) to secure the		RFC 6750 uses Transport Layer Security (TLS) to secure the
	protocol interaction between the client and the resource		protocol interaction between the client and the resource
	server.		server.
	OAUTH10A: OAuth 1.0a MAC tokens (using the HMAC-SHA1 keyed		OAUTH10A: OAuth 1.0a MAC tokens (using the HMAC-SHA1 keyed
	message digest), as described in Section 3.4.2 of [RFC5849].		message digest), as described in Section 3.4.2 of [RFC5849].
	OAUTH10A-PLUS: Adds channel binding [RFC5056] capability to
	OAUTH10A for protection against man-in-the-middle attacks.
	OAUTH10A-PLUS mandates the usage of Transport Layer Security
	(TLS).
	New extensions may be defined to add additional OAuth Access Token		New extensions may be defined to add additional OAuth Access Token
	Types. Such a new SASL OAuth mechanism can be added by simply		Types. Such a new SASL OAuth mechanism can be added by simply
	registering the new name(s) and citing this specification for the		registering the new name(s) and citing this specification for the
	further definition. New channel binding enabled "-PLUS" mechanisms		further definition.
	defined in this way MUST include message integrity protection.
	These mechanisms are client initiated and lock-step, the server		These mechanisms are client initiated and lock-step, the server
	always replying to a client message. In the case where the client		always replying to a client message. In the case where the client
	has and correctly uses a valid token the flow is:		has and correctly uses a valid token the flow is:
	o Client sends a valid and correct initial client response.		o Client sends a valid and correct initial client response.
	o Server responds with a successful authentication.		o Server responds with a successful authentication.
	In the case where authorization fails the server sends an error		In the case where authorization fails the server sends an error
	skipping to change at page 7, line 22		skipping to change at page 7, line 24
	kvsep = %x01		kvsep = %x01
	key = 1*ALPHA		key = 1*ALPHA
	value = *(VCHAR / SP / HTAB / CR / LF )		value = *(VCHAR / SP / HTAB / CR / LF )
	kvpair = key "=" value kvsep		kvpair = key "=" value kvsep
	client_resp = 0*kvpair kvsep		client_resp = 0*kvpair kvsep
	The following key/value pairs are defined in the client response:		The following key/value pairs are defined in the client response:
	auth (REQUIRED): The payload of the HTTP Authorization header for		auth (REQUIRED): The payload of the HTTP Authorization header for
	an equivalent HTTP OAuth authorization.		an equivalent HTTP OAuth authorization.
	host: Contains the host name to which the client connected.		host: Contains the host name to which the client connected.
	port: Contains the port number represented as a decimal positive		port: Contains the port number represented as a decimal positive
	integer string without leading zeros to which the client		integer string without leading zeros to which the client
	connected.		connected.
	qs: The HTTP query string. In non-channel binding mechanisms		qs: The HTTP query string. This is reserved for future use, the
	this is reserved, the client SHOUD NOT send it, and has the		client SHOUD NOT send it, and has the default value of "".
	default value of "". In "-PLUS" variants this carries a
	single key value pair "cbdata" for the channel binding data
	payload formatted as an HTTP query string.
	For OAuth token types that use keyed message digests the client MUST		For OAuth token types that use keyed message digests the client MUST
	send host and port number key/values, and the server MUST fail an		send host and port number key/values, and the server MUST fail an
	authorization request requiring keyed message digests that do not		authorization request requiring keyed message digests that do not
	have host and port values. In OAuth 1.0a for example, the so-called		have host and port values. In OAuth 1.0a for example, the so-called
	"signature base string calculation" includes the reconstructed HTTP		"signature base string calculation" includes the reconstructed HTTP
	URL.		URL.
	3.1.1. Reserved Key/Values		3.1.1. Reserved Key/Values
	In these mechanisms values for path, query string and post body are		In these mechanisms values for path, query string and post body are
	assigned default values. OAuth authorization schemes MAY define		assigned default values. OAuth authorization schemes MAY define
	usage of these in the SASL context and extend this specification.		usage of these in the SASL context and extend this specification.
	For OAuth Access Token Types that use request keyed message digest		For OAuth Access Token Types that use request keyed message digest
	the default values MUST be used unless explicit values are provided		the default values MUST be used unless explicit values are provided
	in the client response. The following key values are reserved for		in the client response. The following key values are reserved for
	future use:		future use:
	mthd (RESERVED): HTTP method, the default value is "POST".		mthd (RESERVED): HTTP method, the default value is "POST".
	skipping to change at page 8, line 22		skipping to change at page 8, line 26
	post (RESERVED): HTTP post data, the default value is "".		post (RESERVED): HTTP post data, the default value is "".
	3.2. Server's Response		3.2. Server's Response
	The server validates the response per the specification for the OAuth		The server validates the response per the specification for the OAuth
	Access Token Types used. If the OAuth Access Token Type utilizes a		Access Token Types used. If the OAuth Access Token Type utilizes a
	keyed message digest of the request parameters then the client must		keyed message digest of the request parameters then the client must
	provide a client response that satisfies the data requirements for		provide a client response that satisfies the data requirements for
	the scheme in use.		the scheme in use.
	In a "-PLUS" mechanism the server examines the channel binding data,
	extracts the channel binding unique prefix, and extracts the raw
	channel biding data based on the channel binding type used. It then
	computes it's own copy of the channel binding payload and compares
	that to the payload sent by the client in the cbdata key/value.
	Those two must be equal for channel binding to succeed.
	The server responds to a successfully verified client message by		The server responds to a successfully verified client message by
	completing the SASL negotiation. The authenticated identity reported		completing the SASL negotiation. The authenticated identity reported
	by the SASL mechanism is the identity securely established for the		by the SASL mechanism is the identity securely established for the
	client with the OAuth credential. The application, not the SASL		client with the OAuth credential. The application, not the SASL
	mechanism, based on local access policy determines whether the		mechanism, based on local access policy determines whether the
	identity reported by the mechanism is allowed access to the requested		identity reported by the mechanism is allowed access to the requested
	resource. Note that the semantics of the authz-id is specified by		resource. Note that the semantics of the authz-id is specified by
	the SASL framework [RFC4422].		the SASL framework [RFC4422].
	3.2.1. OAuth Identifiers in the SASL Context		3.2.1. OAuth Identifiers in the SASL Context
	skipping to change at page 9, line 6		skipping to change at page 9, line 4
	authorization server. OAuth access tokens may contain information		authorization server. OAuth access tokens may contain information
	about the authentication of the resource owner and about the client		about the authentication of the resource owner and about the client
	and may therefore make this information accessible to the resource		and may therefore make this information accessible to the resource
	server.		server.
	If both identifiers are needed by an application the developer will		If both identifiers are needed by an application the developer will
	need to provide a way to communicate that from the SASL mechanism		need to provide a way to communicate that from the SASL mechanism
	back to the application.		back to the application.
	3.2.2. Server Response to Failed Authentication		3.2.2. Server Response to Failed Authentication
	For a failed authentication the server returns a JSON [RFC4627]		For a failed authentication the server returns a JSON [RFC4627]
	formatted error result, and fails the authentication. The error		formatted error result, and fails the authentication. The error
	result consists of the following values:		result consists of the following values:
	status (REQUIRED): The authorization error code. Valid error		status (REQUIRED): The authorization error code. Valid error
	codes are defined in the IANA [[need registry name]]		codes are defined in the IANA [[need registry name]] registry
	registry specified in the OAuth 2 core specification.		specified in the OAuth 2 core specification.
	scope (OPTIONAL): An OAuth scope which is valid to access the		scope (OPTIONAL): An OAuth scope which is valid to access the
	service. This may be empty which implies that unscoped		service. This may be empty which implies that unscoped tokens
	tokens are required, or a space separated list. Use of a		are required, or a space separated list. Use of a space
	space separated list is NOT RECOMMENDED.		separated list is NOT RECOMMENDED.
	If the resource server provides a scope then the client MUST always		If the resource server provides a scope then the client MUST always
	request scoped tokens from the token endpoint. If the resource		request scoped tokens from the token endpoint. If the resource
	server provides no scope to the client then the client SHOULD presume		server provides no scope to the client then the client SHOULD presume
	an empty scope (unscoped token) is needed.		an empty scope (unscoped token) is needed.
	If channel binding is in use and the channel binding fails the server		If channel binding is in use and the channel binding fails the server
	responds with a status code set to 412 to indicate that the channel		responds with a status code set to 412 to indicate that the channel
	binding precondition failed. If the authentication scheme in use		binding precondition failed. If the authentication scheme in use
	does not include signing the server SHOULD revoke the presented		does not include signing the server SHOULD revoke the presented
	skipping to change at page 10, line 47		skipping to change at page 10, line 44
	o The query string defaults to "".		o The query string defaults to "".
	In this example the signature base string with line breaks added for		In this example the signature base string with line breaks added for
	readability would be:		readability would be:
	POST&http%3A%2F%2Fexample.com:143%2F&oauth_consumer_key%3D9djdj82h4		POST&http%3A%2F%2Fexample.com:143%2F&oauth_consumer_key%3D9djdj82h4
	8djs9d2%26oauth_nonce%3D7d8f3e4a%26oauth_signature_method%3DHMAC-SH		8djs9d2%26oauth_nonce%3D7d8f3e4a%26oauth_signature_method%3DHMAC-SH
	A1%26oauth_timestamp%3D137131201%26oauth_token%3Dkkk9d7dh3k39sjv7		A1%26oauth_timestamp%3D137131201%26oauth_token%3Dkkk9d7dh3k39sjv7
	3.4. Channel Binding
	The channel binding data is carried in the "qs" (query string) key
	value pair formatted as a standard HTTP query parameter with the name
	"cbdata". Channel binding requires that the channel binding data be
	integrity protected end-to-end in order to protect against man-in-
	the-middle attacks. All SASL OAuth mechanisms with a "-PLUS" postfix
	MUST provide integrity protection. It should be noted that while the
	OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token mandates TLS it does not create keying
	material at the application layer and is not suitable for use with
	channel bindings.
	The channel binding data is computed by the client based on it's
	choice of preferred channel binding type. As specified in [RFC5056],
	the channel binding information MUST start with the channel binding
	unique prefix, followed by a colon (ASCII 0x3A), followed by a base64
	encoded channel binding payload. The channel binding payload is the
	raw data from the channel binding type. For example, if the client
	is using tls-unique for channel binding then the raw channel binding
	data is the TLS finished message as specified in Section 3.1 of
	[RFC5929].
	4. Examples		4. Examples
	These examples illustrate exchanges between an IMAP and SMTP clients		These examples illustrate exchanges between an IMAP and SMTP clients
	and servers.		and servers.
	Note to implementers: The SASL OAuth method names are case		Note to implementers: The SASL OAuth method names are case
	insensitive. One example uses "Bearer" but that could as easily be		insensitive. One example uses "Bearer" but that could as easily be
	"bearer", "BEARER", or "BeArEr".		"bearer", "BEARER", or "BeArEr".
	4.1. Successful Bearer Token Exchange		4.1. Successful Bearer Token Exchange
	skipping to change at page 12, line 28		skipping to change at page 11, line 47
	S: 250-8BITMIME		S: 250-8BITMIME
	S: 250-AUTH LOGIN PLAIN OAUTHBEARER		S: 250-AUTH LOGIN PLAIN OAUTHBEARER
	S: 250-ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES		S: 250-ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES
	S: 250 PIPELINING		S: 250 PIPELINING
	C: t1 AUTHENTICATE OAUTHBEARER bixhPXVzZXJAZXhhbXBsZS5jb20BaG9zdD1zZX		C: t1 AUTHENTICATE OAUTHBEARER bixhPXVzZXJAZXhhbXBsZS5jb20BaG9zdD1zZX
	J2ZXIuZXhhbXBsZS5jb20BcG9ydD0xNDMBYXV0aD1CZWFyZXIgdkY5ZGZ0NHFtV		J2ZXIuZXhhbXBsZS5jb20BcG9ydD0xNDMBYXV0aD1CZWFyZXIgdkY5ZGZ0NHFtV
	GMyTnZiM1JsY2tCaGJIUmhkbWx6ZEdFdVkyOXRDZz09AQE=		GMyTnZiM1JsY2tCaGJIUmhkbWx6ZEdFdVkyOXRDZz09AQE=
	S: 235 Authentication successful.		S: 235 Authentication successful.
	[connection continues...]		[connection continues...]
	4.2. OAuth 1.0a Authorization with Channel Binding		4.2. Failed Exchange
	This example shows channel binding in the context of an OAuth 1.0a
	request using a keyed message digest. Note that line breaks are
	inserted for readability.
	S: * OK [CAPABILITY IMAP4rev1 AUTH=OAUTH10A-PLUS SASL-IR]
	IMAP4rev1 Server Ready
	C: t1 AUTHENTICATE OAUTH10A-PLUS cD10bHMtdW5pcXVlLGE9dXNlckBleGFtcGxlL
	mNvbQFob3N0PXNlcnZlci5leGFtcGxlLmNvbQFwb3J0PTE0MwFhdXRoPU9BdXRoI
	HJlYWxtPSJFeGFtcGxlIixvYXV0aF9jb25zdW1lcl9rZXk9IjlkamRqODJoNDhka
	nM5ZDIiLG9hdXRoX3Rva2VuPSJra2s5ZDdkaDNrMzlzanY3IixvYXV0aF9zaWduY
	XR1cmVfbWV0aG9kPSJITUFDLVNIQTEiLG9hdXRoX3RpbWVzdGFtcD0iMTM3MTMxM
	jAxIixvYXV0aF9ub25jZT0iN2Q4ZjNlNGEiLG9hdXRoX3NpZ25hdHVyZT0iU1Nkd
	ElHRWdiR2wwZEd4bElIUmxZU0J3YjNRdSIBcXM9Y2JkYXRhPXRscy11bmlxdWU6U
	0c5M0lHSnBaeUJwY3lCaElGUk1VeUJtYVc1aGJDQnRaWE56WVdkbFB3bz0BAQ==
	S: t1 OK SASL authentication succeeded
	As required by IMAP [RFC3501], the payloads are base64-encoded. The
	decoded initial client response (with %x01 represented as ^A and
	lines wrapped for readability) is:
	p=tls-unique,a=user@example.com^A
	host=server.example.com^A
	port=143^A
	auth=OAuth realm="Example",
	oauth_consumer_key="9djdj82h48djs9d2",
	oauth_token="kkk9d7dh3k39sjv7",
	oauth_signature_method="HMAC-SHA1",
	oauth_timestamp="137131201",
	oauth_nonce="7d8f3e4a",
	oauth_signature="SSdtIGEgbGl0dGxlIHRlYSBwb3Qu"^A
	qs=cbdata=tls-unique:SG93IGJpZyBpcyBhIFRMUyBmaW5hbCBtZXNzYWdlPwo=^A^A
	In this example the signature base string with line breaks added for
	readability would be:
	POST&http%3A%2F%2Fserver.example.com:143%2F&cbdata=tls-unique:SG93I
	GJpZyBpcyBhIFRMUyBmaW5hbCBtZXNzYWdlPwo=%26oauth_consumer_key%3D9djd
	j82h48djs9d2%26oauth_nonce%3D7d8f3e4a%26oauth_signature_method%3DHM
	AC-SHA1%26oauth_timestamp%3D137131201%26oauth_token%3Dkkk9d7dh3k39s
	jv7
	4.3. Failed Exchange
	This example shows a failed exchange because of the empty		This example shows a failed exchange because of the empty
	Authorization header, which is how a client can query for the needed		Authorization header, which is how a client can query for the needed
	scope. Note that line breaks are inserted for readability.		scope. Note that line breaks are inserted for readability.
	S: * CAPABILITY IMAP4rev1 AUTH=OAUTHBEARER SASL-IR IMAP4rev1 Server		S: * CAPABILITY IMAP4rev1 AUTH=OAUTHBEARER SASL-IR IMAP4rev1 Server
	Ready		Ready
	S: t0 OK Completed		S: t0 OK Completed
	C: t1 AUTHENTICATE OAUTHBEARER cD10bHMtdW5pcXVlLGE9dXNlckBleGFtcG		C: t1 AUTHENTICATE OAUTHBEARER cD10bHMtdW5pcXVlLGE9dXNlckBleGFtcG
	xlLmNvbQFob3N0PXNlcnZlci5leGFtcGxlLmNvbQFwb3J0PTE0MwFhdXRoP		xlLmNvbQFob3N0PXNlcnZlci5leGFtcGxlLmNvbQFwb3J0PTE0MwFhdXRoP
	skipping to change at page 14, line 12		skipping to change at page 12, line 29
	The decoded server error response is:		The decoded server error response is:
	{		{
	"status":"401",		"status":"401",
	"scope":"example_scope"		"scope":"example_scope"
	}		}
	The client responds with the required dummy response.		The client responds with the required dummy response.
	4.4. Failed Channel Binding		4.3. SMTP Example of a Failed Negotiation
	This example shows a channel binding failure in an empty request.
	The channel binding information is empty. Note that line breaks are
	inserted for readability.
	S: * CAPABILITY IMAP4rev1 AUTH=OAUTH10A-PLUS SASL-IR IMAP4rev1 Server
	Ready
	S: t0 OK Completed
	C: t1 AUTHENTICATE OAUTH10A-PLUS cCxhPXVzZXJAZXhhbXBsZS5jb20BaG9z
	dD1zZXJ2ZXIuZXhhbXBsZS5jb20BcG9ydD0xNDMBYXV0aD0BY2JkYXRhPQEB
	S: + ewoic3RhdHVzIjoiNDEyIiwKInNjb3BlIjoiZXhhbXBsZV9zY29wZSIKfQ==
	C: + AQ==
	S: t1 NO SASL authentication failed
	The decoded initial client response is:
	p=tls-unique,a=user@example.com,^Ahost=server.example.com^A
	port=143^Aauth=^Acbdata=^A^A
	The decoded server response is:
	{
	"status":"412",
	"scope":"example_scope"
	}
	The client responds with the required dummy response.
	4.5. SMTP Example of a Failed Negotiation
	This example shows an authorization failure in an SMTP exchange.		This example shows an authorization failure in an SMTP exchange.
	Note that line breaks are inserted for readability, and that the SMTP		Note that line breaks are inserted for readability, and that the SMTP
	protocol terminates lines with CR and LF characters (ASCII values		protocol terminates lines with CR and LF characters (ASCII values
	0x0D and 0x0A), these are not displayed explicitly in the example.		0x0D and 0x0A), these are not displayed explicitly in the example.
	[connection begins]		[connection begins]
	S: 220 mx.example.com ESMTP 12sm2095603fks.9		S: 220 mx.example.com ESMTP 12sm2095603fks.9
	C: EHLO sender.example.com		C: EHLO sender.example.com
	S: 250-mx.example.com at your service,[172.31.135.47]		S: 250-mx.example.com at your service,[172.31.135.47]
	S: 250-SIZE 35651584		S: 250-SIZE 35651584
	S: 250-8BITMIME		S: 250-8BITMIME
	S: 250-AUTH LOGIN PLAIN OAUTHBEARER		S: 250-AUTH LOGIN PLAIN OAUTHBEARER
	S: 250-ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES		S: 250-ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES
	S: 250 PIPELINING		S: 250 PIPELINING
	C: AUTH OAUTHBEARER bixhPT1zb21ldXNlckBleGFtcGxlLmNvbQFhdXRoPUJlYXJlciB2		C: AUTH OAUTHBEARER bixhPT1zb21ldXNlckBleGFtcGxlLmNvbQFhdXRoPUJlYXJlciB2
	RjlkZnQ0cW1UYzJOdmIzUmxja0JoZEhSaGRtbHpkR0V1WTI5dENnPT0BAQ==		RjlkZnQ0cW1UYzJOdmIzUmxja0JoZEhSaGRtbHpkR0V1WTI5dENnPT0BAQ==
	S: 334 eyJzdGF0dXMiOiI0MDEiLCJzY2hlbWVzIjoiYmVhcmVyIG1hYyIsInNjb3BlIjoia		S: 334 eyJzdGF0dXMiOiI0MDEiLCJzY2hlbWVzIjoiYmVhcmVyIG1hYyIsInNjb3BlIjoia
	HR0cHM6Ly9tYWlsLmdvb2dsZS5jb20vIn0K		HR0cHM6Ly9tYWlsLmdvb2dsZS5jb20vIn0K
	C: AQ==		C: AQ==
	S: 535-5.7.1 Username and Password not accepted. Learn more at		S: 535-5.7.1 Username and Password not accepted. Learn more at
	S: 535 5.7.1 http://support.example.com/mail/oauth		S: 535 5.7.1 http://support.example.com/mail/oauth
	[connection continues...]		[connection continues...]
	The server returned an error message in the 334 SASL message, the		The server returned an error message in the 334 SASL message, the
	client responds with the required dummy response, and the server		client responds with the required dummy response, and the server
	finalizes the negotiation.		finalizes the negotiation.
	5. Security Considerations		5. Security Considerations
	OAuth 1.0a and OAuth 2 allows for a variety of deployment scenarios,		OAuth 1.0a and OAuth 2 allows for a variety of deployment scenarios,
	and the security properties of these profiles vary. As shown in		and the security properties of these profiles vary. As shown in
	Figure 1 this specification is aimed to be integrated into a larger		Figure 1 this specification is aimed to be integrated into a larger
	OAuth deployment. Application developers therefore need to		OAuth deployment. Application developers therefore need to
	skipping to change at page 16, line 4		skipping to change at page 13, line 33
	OAUTHBEARER: This mechanism borrows from OAuth 2.0 bearer tokens		OAUTHBEARER: This mechanism borrows from OAuth 2.0 bearer tokens
	[RFC6750]. It relies on the application using TLS to protect the		[RFC6750]. It relies on the application using TLS to protect the
	OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token exchange; without TLS usage at the		OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token exchange; without TLS usage at the
	application layer this method is completely insecure.		application layer this method is completely insecure.
	Consequently, TLS MUST be provided by the application when		Consequently, TLS MUST be provided by the application when
	choosing this authentication mechanism.		choosing this authentication mechanism.
	OAUTH10A: This mechanism re-uses OAuth 1.0a MAC tokens (using the		OAUTH10A: This mechanism re-uses OAuth 1.0a MAC tokens (using the
	HMAC-SHA1 keyed message digest), as described in Section 3.4.2 of		HMAC-SHA1 keyed message digest), as described in Section 3.4.2 of
	[RFC5849]. To compute the keyed message digest in the same way		[RFC5849]. To compute the keyed message digest in the same way
	was in RFC 5839 this specification conveys additional parameters		was in RFC 5839 this specification conveys additional parameters
	between the client and the server. This SASL mechanism only		between the client and the server. This SASL mechanism only
	supports client authentication. If server-side authentication is		supports client authentication. If server-side authentication is
	desireable then it must be provided by the application underneath		desireable then it must be provided by the application underneath
	the SASL layer. The use of TLS is strongly RECOMMENDED.		the SASL layer. The use of TLS is strongly RECOMMENDED.
	OAUTH10A-PLUS: This mechanism adds the channel binding [RFC5056]
	capability to OAUTH10A for protection against man-in-the-middle
	attacks. OAUTH10A-PLUS mandates the usage of Transport Layer
	Security (TLS) at the application layer.
	Additionally, the following aspects are worth pointing out:		Additionally, the following aspects are worth pointing out:
	An access token is not equivalent to the user's long term password.		An access token is not equivalent to the user's long term password.
	Care has to be taken when these OAuth credentials are used for		Care has to be taken when these OAuth credentials are used for
	actions like changing passwords (as it is possible with some		actions like changing passwords (as it is possible with some
	protocols, e.g., XMPP). The resource server should ensure that		protocols, e.g., XMPP). The resource server should ensure that
	actions taken in the authenticated channel are appropriate to the		actions taken in the authenticated channel are appropriate to the
	strength of the presented credential.		strength of the presented credential.
	skipping to change at page 17, line 48		skipping to change at page 15, line 24
	Security Considerations: See this document		Security Considerations: See this document
	Published Specification: See this document		Published Specification: See this document
	For further information: Contact the authors of this document.		For further information: Contact the authors of this document.
	Owner/Change controller: the IETF		Owner/Change controller: the IETF
	Note: None		Note: None
	The IANA is requested to register the following SASL profile:
	SASL mechanism profile: OAUTH10A-PLUS
	Security Considerations: See this document
	Published Specification: See this document
	For further information: Contact the authors of this document.
	Owner/Change controller: the IETF
	Note: None
	8. References		8. References
	8.1. Normative References		8.1. Normative References
	[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate		[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
	Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.		Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
	[RFC3174] Eastlake, D. and P. Jones, "US Secure Hash Algorithm 1		[RFC3174] Eastlake, D. and P. Jones, "US Secure Hash Algorithm 1
	(SHA1)", RFC 3174, September 2001.		(SHA1)", RFC 3174, September 2001.
	skipping to change at page 18, line 45		skipping to change at page 16, line 8
	[RFC5234] Crocker, D. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax		[RFC5234] Crocker, D. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
	Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234, January 2008.		Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234, January 2008.
	[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security		[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
	(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.		(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.
	[RFC5849] Hammer-Lahav, E., "The OAuth 1.0 Protocol", RFC 5849,		[RFC5849] Hammer-Lahav, E., "The OAuth 1.0 Protocol", RFC 5849,
	April 2010.		April 2010.
	[RFC5929] Altman, J., Williams, N., and L. Zhu, "Channel Bindings
	for TLS", RFC 5929, July 2010.
	[RFC6749] Hardt, D., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", RFC		[RFC6749] Hardt, D., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", RFC
	6749, October 2012.		6749, October 2012.
	[RFC6750] Jones, M. and D. Hardt, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization		[RFC6750] Jones, M. and D. Hardt, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization
	Framework: Bearer Token Usage", RFC 6750, October 2012.		Framework: Bearer Token Usage", RFC 6750, October 2012.
	8.2. Informative References		8.2. Informative References
	[I-D.ietf-oauth-json-web-token]		[I-D.ietf-oauth-json-web-token]
	Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token		Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
	(JWT)", draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token-12 (work in		(JWT)", draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token-13 (work in
	progress), October 2013.		progress), November 2013.
	[I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-http-mac]		[I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-http-mac]
	Richer, J., Mills, W., Tschofenig, H., and P. Hunt, "OAuth		Richer, J., Mills, W., Tschofenig, H., and P. Hunt, "OAuth
	2.0 Message Authentication Code (MAC) Tokens", draft-ietf-		2.0 Message Authentication Code (MAC) Tokens", draft-ietf-
	oauth-v2-http-mac-04 (work in progress), July 2013.		oauth-v2-http-mac-04 (work in progress), July 2013.
	[RFC3501] Crispin, M., "INTERNET MESSAGE ACCESS PROTOCOL - VERSION		[RFC3501] Crispin, M., "INTERNET MESSAGE ACCESS PROTOCOL - VERSION
	4rev1", RFC 3501, March 2003.		4rev1", RFC 3501, March 2003.
	[RFC5321] Klensin, J., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", RFC 5321,		[RFC5321] Klensin, J., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", RFC 5321,
	skipping to change at page 19, line 47		skipping to change at page 17, line 4
	Lodderstadt, Ryan Troll, Alexey Melnikov, Jeffrey Hutzelman, and Nico		Lodderstadt, Ryan Troll, Alexey Melnikov, Jeffrey Hutzelman, and Nico
	Williams.		Williams.
	This document was produced under the chairmanship of Alexey Melnikov,		This document was produced under the chairmanship of Alexey Melnikov,
	Tom Yu, Shawn Emery, Josh Howlett, Sam Hartman. The supervising area		Tom Yu, Shawn Emery, Josh Howlett, Sam Hartman. The supervising area
	directors was Stephen Farrell.		directors was Stephen Farrell.
	Appendix B. Document History		Appendix B. Document History
	[[ to be removed by RFC editor before publication as an RFC ]]		[[ to be removed by RFC editor before publication as an RFC ]]
	-12		-12
	o Removed GSS-API components from the specification.		o Removed -PLUS components from the specification.
	-11		-11
			o Removed GSS-API components from the specification.
	o Updated security consideration section.		o Updated security consideration section.
	-10		-10
	o Clarifications throughout the document in response to the feedback		o Clarifications throughout the document in response to the feedback
	from Jeffrey Hutzelman.		from Jeffrey Hutzelman.
	-09		-09
	o Incorporated review by Alexey and Hannes.		o Incorporated review by Alexey and Hannes.
	skipping to change at page 20, line 31		skipping to change at page 17, line 39
	-08		-08
	o Fixed the channel binding examples for p=$cbtype		o Fixed the channel binding examples for p=$cbtype
	o More tuning of the authcid language and edited and renamed 3.2.1.		o More tuning of the authcid language and edited and renamed 3.2.1.
	-07		-07
	o Struck the MUST langiage from authzid.		o Struck the MUST langiage from authzid.
			o
	-06		-06
	o Removed the user field. Fixed the examples again.		o Removed the user field. Fixed the examples again.
	o Added canonicalization language.		o Added canonicalization language.
			o
	-05		-05
	o Fixed the GS2 header language again.		o Fixed the GS2 header language again.
	o Separated out different OAuth schemes into different SASL		o Separated out different OAuth schemes into different SASL
	mechanisms. Took out the scheme in the error return. Tuned up		mechanisms. Took out the scheme in the error return. Tuned up
	the IANA registrations.		the IANA registrations.
	o Added the user field back into the SASL message.		o Added the user field back into the SASL message.
	o Fixed the examples (again).		o Fixed the examples (again).
			o
	-04		-04
	o Changed user field to be carried in the gs2-header, and made gs2		o Changed user field to be carried in the gs2-header, and made gs2
	header explicit in all cases.		header explicit in all cases.
	o Converted MAC examples to OAuth 1.0a. Moved MAC to an informative		o Converted MAC examples to OAuth 1.0a. Moved MAC to an informative
	reference.		reference.
	o Changed to sending an empty client response (single control-A) as		o Changed to sending an empty client response (single control-A) as
	the second message of a failed sequence.		the second message of a failed sequence.
	o Fixed channel binding prose to refer to the normative specs and		o Fixed channel binding prose to refer to the normative specs and
	skipping to change at page 22, line 10		skipping to change at page 19, line 17
	o Renamed draft into proper IETF naming format now that it's		o Renamed draft into proper IETF naming format now that it's
	adopted.		adopted.
	o Minor fixes.		o Minor fixes.
	Authors' Addresses		Authors' Addresses
	William Mills		William Mills
	Yahoo! Inc.		Yahoo! Inc.
	Email: wmills@yahoo-inc.com		Email: wmills_92105@yahoo.com
	Tim Showalter		Tim Showalter
	Email: tjs@psaux.com		Email: tjs@psaux.com
	Hannes Tschofenig		Hannes Tschofenig
	Nokia Solutions and Networks		Nokia Solutions and Networks
	Linnoitustie 6		Linnoitustie 6
	Espoo 02600		Espoo 02600
	Finland		Finland
End of changes. 38 change blocks.
	199 lines changed or deleted		70 lines changed or added
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