draft-ietf-kitten-sasl-oauth-14.txt   draft-ietf-kitten-sasl-oauth-15.txt 
KITTEN W. Mills KITTEN W. Mills
Internet-Draft Yahoo! Inc. Internet-Draft Skype
Intended status: Standards Track T. Showalter Intended status: Standards Track T. Showalter
Expires: September 7, 2014 Expires: January 23, 2015
H. Tschofenig H. Tschofenig
ARM Ltd. ARM Ltd.
March 6, 2014 July 22, 2014
A set of SASL Mechanisms for OAuth A set of SASL Mechanisms for OAuth
draft-ietf-kitten-sasl-oauth-14.txt draft-ietf-kitten-sasl-oauth-15.txt
Abstract Abstract
OAuth enables a third-party application to obtain limited access to a OAuth enables a third-party application to obtain limited access to a
protected resource, either on behalf of a resource owner by protected resource, either on behalf of a resource owner by
orchestrating an approval interaction, or by allowing the third-party orchestrating an approval interaction, or by allowing the third-party
application to obtain access on its own behalf. application to obtain access on its own behalf.
This document defines how an application client uses credentials This document defines how an application client uses credentials
obtained via OAuth over the Simple Authentication and Security Layer obtained via OAuth over the Simple Authentication and Security Layer
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on September 7, 2014. This Internet-Draft will expire on January 23, 2015.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. OAuth SASL Mechanism Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3. OAuth SASL Mechanism Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1. Initial Client Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.1. Initial Client Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1.1. Reserved Key/Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.1.1. Reserved Key/Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.2. Server's Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.2. Server's Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.2.1. OAuth Identifiers in the SASL Context . . . . . . . . 8 3.2.1. OAuth Identifiers in the SASL Context . . . . . . . . 8
3.2.2. Server Response to Failed Authentication . . . . . . 9 3.2.2. Server Response to Failed Authentication . . . . . . 9
3.2.3. Completing an Error Message Sequence . . . . . . . . 9 3.2.3. Completing an Error Message Sequence . . . . . . . . 9
3.3. OAuth Access Token Types using Keyed Message Digests . . 9 3.3. OAuth Access Token Types using Keyed Message Digests . . 9
4. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 4. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.1. Successful Bearer Token Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4.1. Successful Bearer Token Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.2. Failed Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4.2. Successful OAuth 1.0a Token Exchange . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.3. SMTP Example of a Failed Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . 12 4.3. Failed Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4.4. SMTP Example of a Failed Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . 13
6. Internationalization Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 6. Internationalization Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7.1. SASL Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 7.1. SASL Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Appendix A. Acknowlegements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Appendix B. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Appendix A. Acknowlegements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Appendix B. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
OAuth 1.0a [RFC5849] and OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] are protocol frameworks OAuth 1.0a [RFC5849] and OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] are protocol frameworks
that enable a third-party application to obtain limited access to a that enable a third-party application to obtain limited access to a
protected resource, either on behalf of a resource owner by protected resource, either on behalf of a resource owner by
orchestrating an approval interaction, or by allowing the third-party orchestrating an approval interaction, or by allowing the third-party
application to obtain access on its own behalf. application to obtain access on its own behalf.
The core OAuth 2.0 specification [RFC6749] specifies the interaction The core OAuth 2.0 specification [RFC6749] specifies the interaction
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When OAuth is integrated into SASL the high-level steps are as When OAuth is integrated into SASL the high-level steps are as
follows: follows:
(A) The client requests authorization from the resource owner. (A) The client requests authorization from the resource owner.
The authorization request can be made directly to the resource The authorization request can be made directly to the resource
owner (as shown), or preferably indirectly via the authorization owner (as shown), or preferably indirectly via the authorization
server as an intermediary. server as an intermediary.
(B) The client receives an authorization grant which is a (B) The client receives an authorization grant which is a
credential representing the resource owner's authorization, credential representing the resource owner's authorization,
expressed using one of four grant types defined in this expressed using one of the grant types defined in [RFC6749] or
specification or using an extension grant type. The authorization [RFC5849] or using an extension grant type. The authorization
grant type depends on the method used by the client to request grant type depends on the method used by the client to request
authorization and the types supported by the authorization server. authorization and the types supported by the authorization server.
(C) The client requests an access token by authenticating with the (C) The client requests an access token by authenticating with the
authorization server and presenting the authorization grant. authorization server and presenting the authorization grant.
(D) The authorization server authenticates the client and (D) The authorization server authenticates the client and
validates the authorization grant, and if valid issues an access validates the authorization grant, and if valid issues an access
token. token.
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1. Client sends an invalid initial client response. 1. Client sends an invalid initial client response.
2. Server responds with an error message. 2. Server responds with an error message.
3. Client sends a dummy client response. 3. Client sends a dummy client response.
4. Server fails the authentication. 4. Server fails the authentication.
3.1. Initial Client Response 3.1. Initial Client Response
Client responses are a key/value pair sequence. The initial client Client responses are a GS2 [RFC5801] header followed by a key/value
response includes a gs2-header as defined in GS2 [RFC5801] which is pair sequence, or may be empty. The gs2-header is defined here for
defined here as a stub for compatibility with GS2 if a GS2 mechanism compatibility with GS2 if a GS2 mechanism is formally defined, but
is formally defined, but this document does not define one. These this document does not define one. These key/value pairs carry the
key/value pairs carry the equivalent values from an HTTP context in equivalent values from an HTTP context in order to be able to
order to be able to complete an OAuth style HTTP authorization. complete an OAuth style HTTP authorization. Unknown key/value pairs
Unknown key/value pairs MUST be ignored by the server. The ABNF MUST be ignored by the server. The ABNF [RFC5234] syntax is:
[RFC5234] syntax is:
kvsep = %x01 kvsep = %x01
key = 1*(ALPHA / ",") key = 1*(ALPHA / ",")
value = *(VCHAR / SP / HTAB / CR / LF ) value = *(VCHAR / SP / HTAB / CR / LF )
kvpair = key "=" value kvsep kvpair = key "=" value kvsep
gs2-header = ALPHA "," value ;;gs2-header = See RFC 5801
client_resp = gs2-header kvsep 0*kvpair kvsep client_resp = (gs2-header kvsep 0*kvpair kvsep) / kvsep
The GS2 The GS2 header MAY include the user name associated with the resource
being accessed, the "authzid". It is worth noting that application
protocols are allowed to require an authzid, as are specific server
implementations.
The following key/value pairs are defined in the client response: The following key/value pairs are defined in the client response:
auth (REQUIRED): The payload of the HTTP Authorization header for auth (REQUIRED): The payload of the HTTP Authorization header for
an equivalent HTTP OAuth authorization. an equivalent HTTP OAuth authorization.
user (REQUIRED): Contains the user name being authenticated. The
server MAY use this as a routing or database lookup hint. The
server MUST NOT use this as authoritative, the user name MUST
be asserted by the OAuth credential.
host: Contains the host name to which the client connected. host: Contains the host name to which the client connected.
port: Contains the port number represented as a decimal positive port: Contains the port number represented as a decimal positive
integer string without leading zeros to which the client integer string without leading zeros to which the client
connected. connected.
qs: The HTTP query string. This is reserved for future use, the qs: The HTTP query string. This is reserved for future use, the
client SHOUD NOT send it, and has the default value of "". client SHOUD NOT send it, and has the default value of "".
For OAuth token types that use keyed message digests the client MUST For OAuth token types that use keyed message digests the client MUST
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status (REQUIRED): The authorization error code. Valid error status (REQUIRED): The authorization error code. Valid error
codes are defined in the IANA "OAuth Extensions Error Registry" codes are defined in the IANA "OAuth Extensions Error Registry"
specified in the OAuth 2 core specification. specified in the OAuth 2 core specification.
scope (OPTIONAL): An OAuth scope which is valid to access the scope (OPTIONAL): An OAuth scope which is valid to access the
service. This may be empty which implies that unscoped tokens service. This may be empty which implies that unscoped tokens
are required, or a scope value. If a scope is specified then a are required, or a scope value. If a scope is specified then a
single scope is preferred, use of a space separated list of single scope is preferred, use of a space separated list of
scopes is NOT RECOMMENDED. scopes is NOT RECOMMENDED.
oauth-configuration (OPTIONAL): The URL for for a document
following the OpenID Provider Configuration Information schema
as described in OpenID Connect Discovery [OpenID.Discovery]
section 3 that is appropriate for the user. This document MUST
have all OAuth related data elements populated. The server MAY
return different URLs for users in different domains and the
client SHOULD NOT cache a single returned value and assume it
applies for all users/domains that the server suports.
If the resource server provides a scope then the client MUST always If the resource server provides a scope then the client MUST always
request scoped tokens from the token endpoint. If the resource request scoped tokens from the token endpoint. If the resource
server provides no scope to the client then the client SHOULD presume server provides no scope to the client then the client SHOULD presume
an empty scope (unscoped token) is needed. an empty scope (unscoped token) is needed.
3.2.3. Completing an Error Message Sequence 3.2.3. Completing an Error Message Sequence
Section 3.6 of [RFC4422] explicitly prohibits additional information Section 3.6 of [RFC4422] explicitly prohibits additional information
in an unsuccessful authentication outcome. Therefore, the error in an unsuccessful authentication outcome. Therefore, the error
message is sent in a normal message. The client MUST then send an message is sent in a normal message. The client MUST then send an
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These atoms are defined as extension points so that no changes are These atoms are defined as extension points so that no changes are
needed if there is a revision of SASL which supports more specific needed if there is a revision of SASL which supports more specific
resource authorization, e.g., IMAP access to a specific folder or FTP resource authorization, e.g., IMAP access to a specific folder or FTP
access limited to a specific directory. access limited to a specific directory.
Using the example in the OAuth 1.0a specification as a starting Using the example in the OAuth 1.0a specification as a starting
point, on an IMAP server running on port 143 and given the OAuth 1.0a point, on an IMAP server running on port 143 and given the OAuth 1.0a
style authorization request (with %x01 shown as ^A and line breaks style authorization request (with %x01 shown as ^A and line breaks
added for readability) below: added for readability) below:
n,^A n,a=user@example.com,^A
host=example.com^A host=example.com^A
user=user@example.com^A
port=143^A port=143^A
auth=OAuth realm="Example", auth=OAuth realm="Example",
oauth_consumer_key="9djdj82h48djs9d2", oauth_consumer_key="9djdj82h48djs9d2",
oauth_token="kkk9d7dh3k39sjv7", oauth_token="kkk9d7dh3k39sjv7",
oauth_signature_method="HMAC-SHA1", oauth_signature_method="HMAC-SHA1",
oauth_timestamp="137131201", oauth_timestamp="137131201",
oauth_nonce="7d8f3e4a", oauth_nonce="7d8f3e4a",
oauth_signature="Tm90IGEgcmVhbCBzaWduYXR1cmU%3D"^A^A oauth_signature="Tm90IGEgcmVhbCBzaWduYXR1cmU"^A^A
The signature base string would be constructed per the OAuth 1.0 The signature base string would be constructed per the OAuth 1.0
specification [RFC5849] with the following things noted: specification [RFC5849] with the following things noted:
o The method value is defaulted to POST. o The method value is defaulted to POST.
o The scheme defaults to be "http", and any port number other than o The scheme defaults to be "http", and any port number other than
80 is included. 80 is included.
o The path defaults to "/". o The path defaults to "/".
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Note to implementers: The SASL OAuth method names are case Note to implementers: The SASL OAuth method names are case
insensitive. One example uses "Bearer" but that could as easily be insensitive. One example uses "Bearer" but that could as easily be
"bearer", "BEARER", or "BeArEr". "bearer", "BEARER", or "BeArEr".
4.1. Successful Bearer Token Exchange 4.1. Successful Bearer Token Exchange
This example shows a successful OAuth 2.0 bearer token exchange. This example shows a successful OAuth 2.0 bearer token exchange.
Note that line breaks are inserted for readability and the underlying Note that line breaks are inserted for readability and the underlying
TLS establishment is not shown either. TLS establishment is not shown either.
S: * OK IMAP4rev1 Server Ready S: * OK IMAP4rev1 Server Ready
C: t0 CAPABILITY C: t0 CAPABILITY
S: * CAPABILITY IMAP4rev1 AUTH=OAUTHBEARER SASL-IR S: * CAPABILITY IMAP4rev1 AUTH=OAUTHBEARER SASL-IR
S: t0 OK Completed S: t0 OK Completed
C: t1 AUTHENTICATE OAUTHBEARER biwBdXNlcj11c2VyQGV4YW1wbGUuY29tAWhvc3Q9c2Vyd C: t1 AUTHENTICATE OAUTHBEARER bixhPXVzZXJAZXhhbXBsZS5jb20sAWhvc3Q9c2
mVyLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tAXBvcnQ9MTQzAWF1dGg9QmVhcmVyIHZGOWRmdDRxbVRjMk52YjN VydmVyLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tAXBvcnQ9MTQzAWF1dGg9QmVhcmVyIHZGOWRmdDRxb
SbGNrQmhiSFJoZG1semRHRXVZMjl0Q2c9PQEB VRjMk52YjNSbGNrQmhiSFJoZG1semRHRXVZMjl0Q2c9PQEB
S: t1 OK SASL authentication succeeded S: t1 OK SASL authentication succeeded
As required by IMAP [RFC3501], the payloads are base64-encoded. The As required by IMAP [RFC3501], the payloads are base64-encoded. The
decoded initial client response (with %x01 represented as ^A and long decoded initial client response (with %x01 represented as ^A and long
lines wrapped for readability) is: lines wrapped for readability) is:
n,^Auser=user@example.com^Ahost=server.example.com^Aport=143^A n,a=user@example.com,^Ahost=server.example.com^Aport=143^A
auth=Bearer vF9dft4qmTc2Nvb3RlckBhbHRhdmlzdGEuY29tCg==^A^A auth=Bearer vF9dft4qmTc2Nvb3RlckBhbHRhdmlzdGEuY29tCg==^A^A
The same credential used in an SMTP exchange is shown below. Note The same credential used in an SMTP exchange is shown below. Note
that line breaks are inserted for readability, and that the SMTP that line breaks are inserted for readability, and that the SMTP
protocol terminates lines with CR and LF characters (ASCII values protocol terminates lines with CR and LF characters (ASCII values
0x0D and 0x0A), these are not displayed explicitly in the example. 0x0D and 0x0A), these are not displayed explicitly in the example.
[connection begins] [connection begins]
S: 220 mx.example.com ESMTP 12sm2095603fks.9 S: 220 mx.example.com ESMTP 12sm2095603fks.9
C: EHLO sender.example.com C: EHLO sender.example.com
S: 250-mx.example.com at your service,[172.31.135.47] S: 250-mx.example.com at your service,[172.31.135.47]
S: 250-SIZE 35651584 S: 250-SIZE 35651584
S: 250-8BITMIME S: 250-8BITMIME
S: 250-AUTH LOGIN PLAIN OAUTHBEARER S: 250-AUTH LOGIN PLAIN OAUTHBEARER
S: 250-ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES S: 250-ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES
S: 250 PIPELINING S: 250 PIPELINING
C: t1 AUTHENTICATE OAUTHBEARER biwBdXNlcj11c2VyQGV4YW1wbGUuY29tAWhvc C: t1 AUTHENTICATE OAUTHBEARER bixhPXVzZXJAZXhhbXBsZS5jb20sAWhvc3Q9c
3Q9c2VydmVyLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tAXBvcnQ9MTQzAWF1dGg9QmVhcmVyIHZGOWR 2VydmVyLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tAXBvcnQ9MTQzAWF1dGg9QmVhcmVyIHZGOWRmdDR
mdDRxbVRjMk52YjNSbGNrQmhiSFJoZG1semRHRXVZMjl0Q2c9PQEB xbVRjMk52YjNSbGNrQmhiSFJoZG1semRHRXVZMjl0Q2c9PQEB
S: 235 Authentication successful. S: 235 Authentication successful.
[connection continues...] [connection continues...]
4.2. Failed Exchange 4.2. Successful OAuth 1.0a Token Exchange
This example shows a successful OAuth 1.0a token exchange. Note that
line breaks are inserted for readability and the underlying TLS
establishment is not shown. Signature computation is discussed in
Section 3.3.
S: * OK IMAP4rev1 Server Ready
C: t0 CAPABILITY
S: * CAPABILITY IMAP4rev1 AUTH=OAUTHBEARER OAUTH10A SASL-IR
S: t0 OK Completed
C: t1 AUTHENTICATE OAUTH10A bixhPXVzZXJAZXhhbXBsZS5jb20sAWhvc3Q9ZXhhb
XBsZS5jb20BcG9ydD0xNDMBYXV0aD1PQXV0aCByZWFsbT0iRXhhbXBsZSIsb2F1
dGhfY29uc3VtZXJfa2V5PSI5ZGpkajgyaDQ4ZGpzOWQyIixvYXV0aF90b2tlbj0
ia2trOWQ3ZGgzazM5c2p2NyIsb2F1dGhfc2lnbmF0dXJlX21ldGhvZD0iSE1BQy
1TSEExIixvYXV0aF90aW1lc3RhbXA9IjEzNzEzMTIwMSIsb2F1dGhfbm9uY2U9I
jdkOGYzZTRhIixvYXV0aF9zaWduYXR1cmU9IlRtOTBJR0VnY21WaGJDQnphV2R1
WVhSMWNtVSUzRCIBAQ==
S: t1 OK SASL authentication succeeded
As required by IMAP [RFC3501], the payloads are base64-encoded. The
decoded initial client response (with %x01 represented as ^A and
lines wrapped for readability) is:
n,a=user@example.com,^A
host=example.com^A
port=143^A
auth=OAuth realm="Example",
oauth_consumer_key="9djdj82h48djs9d2",
oauth_token="kkk9d7dh3k39sjv7",
oauth_signature_method="HMAC-SHA1",
oauth_timestamp="137131201",
oauth_nonce="7d8f3e4a",
oauth_signature="SSdtIGEgbGl0dGxlIHRlYSBwb3Qu"^A^A
4.3. Failed Exchange
This example shows a failed exchange because of the empty This example shows a failed exchange because of the empty
Authorization header, which is how a client can query for the needed Authorization header, which is how a client can query for the needed
scope. Note that line breaks are inserted for readability. scope. Note that line breaks are inserted for readability.
S: * CAPABILITY IMAP4rev1 AUTH=OAUTHBEARER SASL-IR IMAP4rev1 Server S: * CAPABILITY IMAP4rev1 AUTH=OAUTHBEARER SASL-IR IMAP4rev1 Server
Ready Ready
S: t0 OK Completed S: t0 OK Completed
C: t1 AUTHENTICATE OAUTHBEARER biwBdXNlcj11c2VyQGV4YW1wbGUuY29tAWhvc3Q9c2Vyd C: t1 AUTHENTICATE OAUTHBEARER bixhPXVzZXJAZXhhbXBsZS5jb20sAW
mVyLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tAXBvcnQ9MTQzAWF1dGg9AWNiZGF0YT0BAQ== hvc3Q9c2VydmVyLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tAXBvcnQ9MTQzAWF1dGg9AQE=
S: + ewoic3RhdHVzIjoiNDAxIgoic2NvcGUiOiJleGFtcGxlX3Njb3BlIgp9 S: + eyJzdGF0dXMiOiI0MDEiLCJzY29wZSI6ImV4YW1wbGVfc2NvcGUiLCJv
C: + AQ== cGVuaWQtY29uZmlndXJhdGlvbiI6Imh0dHBzOi8vZXhhbXBsZS5jb20v
S: t1 NO SASL authentication failed LndlbGwta25vd24vb3BlbmlkLWNvbmZpZ3VyYXRpb24ifQ==
C: + AQ==
S: t1 NO SASL authentication failed
The decoded initial client response is: The decoded initial client response is:
n,^Auser=user@example.com^Ahost=server.example.com^A n,a=user@example.com,^Ahost=server.example.com^A
port=143^Aauth=^A^A port=143^Aauth=^A^A
The decoded server error response is: The decoded server error response is:
{ {
"status":"401", "status":"401",
"scope":"example_scope" "scope":"example_scope",
} "openid-configuration":"https://example.com/.well-known/openid-configuration"
}
The client responds with the required dummy response. The client responds with the required dummy response.
4.3. SMTP Example of a Failed Negotiation 4.4. SMTP Example of a Failed Negotiation
This example shows an authorization failure in an SMTP exchange. This example shows an authorization failure in an SMTP exchange.
Note that line breaks are inserted for readability, and that the SMTP Note that line breaks are inserted for readability, and that the SMTP
protocol terminates lines with CR and LF characters (ASCII values protocol terminates lines with CR and LF characters (ASCII values
0x0D and 0x0A), these are not displayed explicitly in the example. 0x0D and 0x0A), these are not displayed explicitly in the example.
[connection begins] [connection begins]
S: 220 mx.example.com ESMTP 12sm2095603fks.9 S: 220 mx.example.com ESMTP 12sm2095603fks.9
C: EHLO sender.example.com C: EHLO sender.example.com
S: 250-mx.example.com at your service,[172.31.135.47] S: 250-mx.example.com at your service,[172.31.135.47]
S: 250-SIZE 35651584 S: 250-SIZE 35651584
S: 250-8BITMIME S: 250-8BITMIME
S: 250-AUTH LOGIN PLAIN OAUTHBEARER S: 250-AUTH LOGIN PLAIN OAUTHBEARER
S: 250-ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES S: 250-ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES
S: 250 PIPELINING S: 250 PIPELINING
C: AUTH OAUTHBEARER biwBdXNlcj1zb21ldXNlckBleGFtcGxlLmNvbQFhdXRoPUJlYXJl C: AUTH OAUTHBEARER bix1c2VyPXNvbWV1c2VyQGV4YW1wbGUuY29tLAFhdXRoPUJlYXJl
ciB2RjlkZnQ0cW1UYzJOdmIzUmxja0JoZEhSaGRtbHpkR0V1WTI5dENnPT0BAQ== ciB2RjlkZnQ0cW1UYzJOdmIzUmxja0JoZEhSaGRtbHpkR0V1WTI5dENnPT0BAQ==
S: 334 eyJzdGF0dXMiOiI0MDEiLCJzY2hlbWVzIjoiYmVhcmVyIG1hYyIsInNjb3BlIjoia S: 334 eyJzdGF0dXMiOiI0MDEiLCJzY2hlbWVzIjoiYmVhcmVyIG1hYyIsInNjb3BlIjoia
HR0cHM6Ly9tYWlsLmdvb2dsZS5jb20vIn0K HR0cHM6Ly9tYWlsLmdvb2dsZS5jb20vIn0K
C: AQ== C: AQ==
S: 535-5.7.1 Username and Password not accepted. Learn more at S: 535-5.7.1 Username and Password not accepted. Learn more at
S: 535 5.7.1 http://support.example.com/mail/oauth S: 535 5.7.1 http://support.example.com/mail/oauth
[connection continues...] [connection continues...]
The server returned an error message in the 334 SASL message, the The server returned an error message in the 334 SASL message, the
client responds with the required dummy response, and the server client responds with the required dummy response, and the server
finalizes the negotiation. finalizes the negotiation.
5. Security Considerations 5. Security Considerations
OAuth 1.0a and OAuth 2 allows for a variety of deployment scenarios, OAuth 1.0a and OAuth 2 allows for a variety of deployment scenarios,
and the security properties of these profiles vary. As shown in and the security properties of these profiles vary. As shown in
Figure 1 this specification is aimed to be integrated into a larger Figure 1 this specification is aimed to be integrated into a larger
OAuth deployment. Application developers therefore need to OAuth deployment. Application developers therefore need to
skipping to change at page 14, line 19 skipping to change at page 15, line 40
problem with this mechanism per se. Resource servers may problem with this mechanism per se. Resource servers may
unilaterally disconnect clients in accordance with the application unilaterally disconnect clients in accordance with the application
protocol. protocol.
Access tokens have a lifetime. Access tokens have a lifetime.
Reducing the lifetime of an access token provides security Reducing the lifetime of an access token provides security
benefits and OAuth 2.0 introduces refresh tokens to obtain new benefits and OAuth 2.0 introduces refresh tokens to obtain new
access token on the fly without any need for a human interaction. access token on the fly without any need for a human interaction.
Additionally, a previously obtained access token may be revoked or Additionally, a previously obtained access token may be revoked or
rendered invalid at any time by the authorization server. The rendered invalid at any time. The client may request a new access
client may request a new access token for each connection to a token for each connection to a resource server, but it SHOULD
resource server, but it should cache and re-use valid credentials. cache and re-use valid credentials.
6. Internationalization Considerations 6. Internationalization Considerations
The identifer asserted by the OAuth authorization server about the The identifer asserted by the OAuth authorization server about the
resource owner inside the access token may be displayed to a human. resource owner inside the access token may be displayed to a human.
For example, when SASL is used in the context of IMAP the resource For example, when SASL is used in the context of IMAP the resource
server may assert the resource owner's email address to the IMAP server may assert the resource owner's email address to the IMAP
server for usage in an email-based application. The identifier may server for usage in an email-based application. The identifier may
therefore contain internationalized characters and an application therefore contain internationalized characters and an application
needs to ensure that the mapping between the identifier provided by needs to ensure that the mapping between the identifier provided by
skipping to change at page 15, line 28 skipping to change at page 16, line 49
For further information: Contact the authors of this document. For further information: Contact the authors of this document.
Owner/Change controller: the IETF Owner/Change controller: the IETF
Note: None Note: None
8. References 8. References
8.1. Normative References 8.1. Normative References
[OpenID.Discovery]
Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., and E. Jay, "OpenID
Connect Discovery 1.0", July 2011.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3174] Eastlake, D. and P. Jones, "US Secure Hash Algorithm 1 [RFC3174] Eastlake, D. and P. Jones, "US Secure Hash Algorithm 1
(SHA1)", RFC 3174, September 2001. (SHA1)", RFC 3174, September 2001.
[RFC4422] Melnikov, A. and K. Zeilenga, "Simple Authentication and [RFC4422] Melnikov, A. and K. Zeilenga, "Simple Authentication and
Security Layer (SASL)", RFC 4422, June 2006. Security Layer (SASL)", RFC 4422, June 2006.
[RFC4627] Crockford, D., "The application/json Media Type for [RFC4627] Crockford, D., "The application/json Media Type for
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[RFC6749] Hardt, D., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", RFC [RFC6749] Hardt, D., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", RFC
6749, October 2012. 6749, October 2012.
[RFC6750] Jones, M. and D. Hardt, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization [RFC6750] Jones, M. and D. Hardt, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization
Framework: Bearer Token Usage", RFC 6750, October 2012. Framework: Bearer Token Usage", RFC 6750, October 2012.
8.2. Informative References 8.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-oauth-json-web-token] [I-D.ietf-oauth-json-web-token]
Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token-18 (work in (JWT)", draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token-25 (work in
progress), March 2014. progress), July 2014.
[I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-http-mac] [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-http-mac]
Richer, J., Mills, W., Tschofenig, H., and P. Hunt, "OAuth Richer, J., Mills, W., Tschofenig, H., and P. Hunt, "OAuth
2.0 Message Authentication Code (MAC) Tokens", draft-ietf- 2.0 Message Authentication Code (MAC) Tokens", draft-ietf-
oauth-v2-http-mac-05 (work in progress), January 2014. oauth-v2-http-mac-05 (work in progress), January 2014.
[RFC2616] Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H., [RFC2616] Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H.,
Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext
Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999. Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999.
skipping to change at page 17, line 20 skipping to change at page 18, line 40
Williams, and Matt Miller. Williams, and Matt Miller.
This document was produced under the chairmanship of Alexey Melnikov, This document was produced under the chairmanship of Alexey Melnikov,
Tom Yu, Shawn Emery, Josh Howlett, Sam Hartman. The supervising area Tom Yu, Shawn Emery, Josh Howlett, Sam Hartman. The supervising area
director was Stephen Farrell. director was Stephen Farrell.
Appendix B. Document History Appendix B. Document History
[[ to be removed by RFC editor before publication as an RFC ]] [[ to be removed by RFC editor before publication as an RFC ]]
-14 -15
o Last call feedack on the GS2 stuff being ripped out completely.
o Removed the "user" parameter and put stuff back into the
gs2-header. Call out that the authzid goes in the gs2-header with
some prose about when it might be required. Very comparable to
-10.
o Added an OAuth 1.0A example explicitly.
-14
o Last call feedack on RFC citations needed, small editorial. o Last call feedack on RFC citations needed, small editorial.
o Added the "user" parameter back, which was pulled when we started o Added the "user" parameter back, which was pulled when we started
down the GS2 path. Same language as -03. down the GS2 path. Same language as -03.
o Defined a stub GS2 header to make sure that when the GS2 bride is o Defined a stub GS2 header to make sure that when the GS2 bride is
defined for this that nothing will break when it actually starts defined for this that nothing will break when it actually starts
to get populated. to get populated.
-13 -13
skipping to change at page 19, line 45 skipping to change at page 21, line 28
-00 -00
o Renamed draft into proper IETF naming format now that it's o Renamed draft into proper IETF naming format now that it's
adopted. adopted.
o Minor fixes. o Minor fixes.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
William Mills William Mills
Yahoo! Inc. Skype
Email: wmills_92105@yahoo.com Email: wmills_92105@yahoo.com
Tim Showalter Tim Showalter
Email: tjs@psaux.com Email: tjs@psaux.com
Hannes Tschofenig Hannes Tschofenig
ARM Ltd. ARM Ltd.
110 Fulbourn Rd 110 Fulbourn Rd
Cambridge CB1 9NJ Cambridge CB1 9NJ
Great Britain Great Britain
Email: Hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net Email: Hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net
URI: http://www.tschofenig.priv.at URI: http://www.tschofenig.priv.at
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