Network Working Group                                        K. Wierenga
Internet-Draft                                       Cisco Systems, Inc.
Intended status: Standards Track                                 E. Lear
Expires: April 25, August 29, 2011                              Cisco Systems GmbH
                                                            S. Josefsson
                                                                  SJD AB
                                                        October 22, 2010
                                                       February 25, 2011

                 A SASL and GSS-API Mechanism for SAML
                   draft-ietf-kitten-sasl-saml-01.txt
                   draft-ietf-kitten-sasl-saml-02.txt

Abstract

   Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) has found its usage on the
   Internet for Web Single Sign-On.  Simple Authentication and Security
   Layer (SASL) and the Generic Security Service Application Program
   Interface (GSS-API) are application frameworks to generalize
   authentication.  This memo specifies a SASL mechanism and a GSS-API
   mechanism for SAML 2.0 that allows the integration of existing SAML
   Identity Providers with applications using SASL and GSS-API.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 25, August 29, 2011.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2010 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   3.  Applicability for non-HTTP Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   4.  SAML SASL Mechanism Specification  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     4.1.  Advertisement  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     4.2.  Initiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     4.3.  Server Redirect  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     4.4.  Client Empty Response and other  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     4.5.  Outcome and parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   5.  SAML GSS-API Mechanism Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     5.1.  GSS-API Principal Name Types for SAML  . . . . . . . . . . 11
   6.  Channel Binding  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   7.  Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     7.1.  XMPP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     7.2.  IMAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
   8.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
     8.1.  Man in the middle and Tunneling Attacks  . . . . . . . . . 20
     8.2.  Binding SAML subject identifiers to Authorization
           Identities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
     8.3.  User Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
     8.4.  Collusion between RPs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
   9.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
   10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
     10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
     10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
   Appendix A.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
   Appendix B.  Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

1.  Introduction

   Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) 2.0
   [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os] is a modular specification that provides
   various means for a user to be identified to a relying party (RP)
   through the exchange of (typically signed) assertions issued by an
   identity provider (IdP).  It includes a number of protocols, protocol
   bindings [OASIS.saml-bindings-2.0-os], and interoperability profiles
   [OASIS.saml-profiles-2.0-os] designed for different use cases.

   Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) [RFC4422] is a
   generalized mechanism for identifying and authenticating a user and
   for optionally negotiating a security layer for subsequent protocol
   interactions.  SASL is used by application protocols like IMAP
   [RFC3501] and XMPP [RFC3920].  The effect is to make modular
   authentication, so that newer authentication mechanisms can be added
   as needed.  This memo specifies just such a mechanism.

   The Generic Security Service Application Program Interface (GSS-API)
   [RFC2743] provides a framework for applications to support multiple
   authentication mechanisms through a unified programming interface.
   This document defines a pure SASL mechanism for SAML, but it conforms
   to the new bridge between SASL and the GSS-API called GS2 [RFC5801].
   This means that this document defines both a SASL mechanism and a
   GSS-API mechanism.  We want to point out that the GSS-API interface
   is optional for SASL implementers, and the GSS-API considerations can
   be avoided in environments that uses SASL directly without GSS-API.

   As currently envisioned, this mechanism is to allow the interworking
   between SASL and SAML in order to assert identity and other
   attributes to relying parties.  As such, while servers (as relying
   parties) will advertise SASL mechanisms (including SAML), clients
   will select the SAML SASL mechanism as their SASL mechanism of
   choice.

   The SAML mechanism described in this memo aims to re-use the
   available SAML deployment to a maximum extent and therefore does not
   establish a separate authentication, integrity and confidentiality
   mechanism.  The mechanisms assumes a security layer, such as
   Transport Layer Security (TLS), to protect against some attacks.

   Figure 1 describes the interworking between SAML and SASL: this
   document requires enhancements to the Relying Party and to the Client
   (as the two SASL communication end points) but no changes to the SAML
   Identity Provider are necessary.  To accomplish this goal some
   indirect messaging is tunneled within SASL, and some use of external
   methods is made.

                                       +-----------+
                                       |           |
                                      >|  Relying  |
                                     / |  Party    |
                                   //  |           |
                                 //    +-----------+
                      SAML/    //            ^
                      HTTPs  //           +--|--+
                           //             | S|  |
                          /             S | A|  |
                        //              A | M|  |
                      //                S | L|  |
                    //                  L |  |  |
                  //                      |  |  |
                </                        +--|--+
         +------------+                      v
         |            |                 +----------+
         |  SAML      |     HTTPs       |          |
         |  Identity  |<--------------->|  Client  |
         |  Provider  |                 |          |
         +------------+                 +----------+

                    Figure 1: Interworking Architecture

2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

   The reader is assumed to be familiar with the terms used in the SAML
   2.0 specification.

3.  Applicability for non-HTTP Use Cases

   While SAML itself is merely a markup language, its common use case
   these days is with HTTP.  What follows is a typical flow:

   1.  The browser requests a resource of a Relying Party (RP) (via an
       HTTP request).

   2.  The RP sends an HTTP redirect as described in Section 10.3 of
       [RFC2616] to the browser to the Identity Provider (IdP) or an IdP
       discovery service with an authentication request that contains
       the name of resource being requested, some sort of a cookie and a
       return URL,

   3.  The user authenticates to the IdP and perhaps authorizes the
       authentication to the service provider.

   4.  In its authentication response, the IdP redirects the browser
       back to the RP with an authentication assertion (stating that the
       IdP vouches that the subject has successfully authenticated),
       optionally along with some additional attributes.

   5.  RP now has sufficient identity information to approve access to
       the resource or not, and acts accordingly.  The authentication is
       concluded.

   When considering this flow in the context of SASL, we note that while
   the RP and the client both must change their code to implement this
   SASL mechanism, the IdP must remain untouched.  The RP already has
   some sort of session (probably a TCP connection) established with the
   client.  However, it may be necessary to redirect a SASL client to
   another application or handler.  This will be discussed below.  The
   steps are shown from below:

   1.  The Relying Party or SASL server advertises support for the SASL
       SAML20 mechanism to the client

   2.  The client initiates a SASL authentication with SAML20 and sends
       an IdP identity
       a domain

   3.  The Relying Party transmits an authentication request encoded
       using a Universal Resource Identifier (URI) as described in RFC
       3986 [RFC3986] and a redirect to the IdP corresponding to the
       domain

   4.  The SASL client now sends an empty response, as authentication
       continues via the normal SAML flow.

   5.  At this point the SASL client MUST construct a URL containing the
       content received in the previous message from the RP.  This URL
       is transmitted to the IdP either by the SASL client application
       or an appropriate handler, such as a browser.

   6.  Next the client authenticates to the IdP.  The manner in which
       the end user is authenticated to the IdP and any policies
       surrounding such authentication is out of scope for SAML and
       hence for this draft.  This step happens out of band from SASL.

   7.  The IdP will convey information about the success or failure of
       the authentication back to the the RP in the form of an
       Authentication Statement or failure, using a indirect response
       via the client browser or the handler.  This step happens out of
       band from SASL.

   8.  The SASL Server sends an appropriate SASL response to the client,
       along with an optional list of attributes

   Please note: What is described here is the case in which the client
   has not previously authenticated.  If the client can handle SAML
   internally it is possible that the client already holds a valid SAML
   authentication token so that the user does not need to be involved in
   the process anymore, but that would still be external to SASL.

   With all of this in mind, the flow appears as follows:

            SASL Serv.       Client          IdP
               |>-----(1)----->|              | Advertisement
               |               |              |
               |<-----(2)-----<|              | Initiation
               |               |              |
               |>-----(3)----->|              | Authentication Request
               |               |              |
               |<-----(4)-----<|              | Empty Response
               |               |              |
               |               |< - - - - - ->| Client<>IDP
               |               |              | Authentication
               |               |              |
               |<- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -| Authentication Statement
               |               |              |
               |>-----(6)----->|              | SASL completion with
               |               |              | status
               |               |              |

          ----- = SASL
          - - - = HTTP or HTTPs (external to SASL)

                       Figure 2: Authentication flow

4.  SAML SASL Mechanism Specification

   Based on the previous figure, the following operations are performed
   with the SAML SASL mechanism.

   The mechanism is "client first" as discussed in section 3 of
   [RFC4422] which means that the initial server challenge will be empty
   if the protocol does not support an initial client response.

4.1.  Advertisement

   To advertise that a server supports SAML 2.0, during application
   session initiation, it displays the name "SAML20" in the list of
   supported SASL mechanisms.

4.2.  Initiation

   A client initiates a "SAML20" authentication with SASL by sending the
   GS2 header followed by the authentication identifier.  The GS2 header
   carries the optional authorization identity.

        initial-response = gs2-header Idp-Identifier
        IdP-Identifier = Identifier ; IdP identifier
        Identifier = URI domain ; domain name with corresponding IdP URI

   The "gs2-header" is specified in [RFC5801], and it is used as
   follows.  The "gs2-nonstd-flag" MUST NOT be present.  Regarding the
   channel binding "gs2-cb-flag" field, see Section 5.  The "gs2-
   authzid" carries the optional authorization identity.  URI  Domain name is
   specified in [RFC3986]. [RFC1035].

4.3.  Server Redirect

   The SASL Server transmits a URI to the IdP that corresponds to the
   domain the user provided, with a SAML authentication request in the
   form of a SAML assertion as one of the parameters.  Note: The SASL
   server may have a static mapping of domain to corresponding IdP or
   alternatively a DNS-lookup mechanism could be envisioned, but that is
   out-of-scope for this document

        redirect-url = URI

   As before, URI is specified in [RFC3986].

4.4.  Client Empty Response and other

   The SASL client hands the URI it received from the server in the
   previous step to either a browser or other appropriate handler to
   continue authentication externally while sending an empty response to
   the SASL server.  The URI is encoded according to Section 3.4 of the
   SAML bindings 2.0 specification [OASIS.saml-bindings-2.0-os].

        empty-response = ""

4.5.  Outcome and parameters

   The SAML authentication having completed externally, the SASL server
   will transmit the outcome of the authentication exchange as success
   or failure.

5.  SAML GSS-API Mechanism Specification

   This section and its sub-sections and all normative references of it
   not referenced elsewhere in this document are INFORMATIONAL for SASL
   implementors, but they are NORMATIVE for GSS-API implementors.

   The SAML SASL mechanism is actually also a GSS-API mechanism.  The
   messages are the same, but

   a) the GS2 header on the client's first message and channel binding
   data is excluded when SAML is used as a GSS-API mechanism, and

   b) the RFC2743 section 3.1 initial context token header is prefixed
   to the client's first authentication message (context token).

   The GSS-API mechanism OID for SAML is 1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.4.8.

   SAML20 security contexts always have the mutual_state flag
   (GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG) set to TRUE.  SAML does not support credential
   delegation, therefore SAML security contexts alway have the
   deleg_state flag (GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG) set to FALSE.

   The SAML mechanism does not support per-message tokens or
   GSS_Pseudo_random.

   Note that the GSS-API mechanism MUST only be used by the client when
   a secure channel with server authentication (e.g., TLS) is available.

5.1.  GSS-API Principal Name Types for SAML

   SAML supports standard generic name syntaxes for acceptors such as
   GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE (see [RFC2743], Section 4.1).  SAML
   supports only a single name type for initiators: GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME.
   GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME is the default name type for SAML.  The query,
   display, and exported name syntaxes for SAML principal names are all
   the same.  There are no SAML-specific name syntaxes -- applications
   should use generic GSS-API name types such as GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME and
   GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE (see [RFC2743], Section 4).  The exported
   name token does, of course, conform to [RFC2743], Section 3.2.

6.  Channel Binding

   The "gs2-cb-flag" MUST use "n" because channel binding data cannot be
   integrity protected by the SAML negotiation.  FIXME: Transfer channel
   binding in SAML assertion?

7.  Examples

7.1.  XMPP

   Suppose the user has an identity at the SAML IdP saml.example.org and
   a Jabber Identifier (JID) "somenode@example.com", and wishes to
   authenticate his XMPP connection to xmpp.example.com.  The
   authentication on the wire would then look something like the
   following:

   Step 1: Client initiates stream to server:

   <stream:stream xmlns='jabber:client'
   xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams'
   to='example.com' version='1.0'>

   Step 2: Server responds with a stream tag sent to client:

   <stream:stream
   xmlns='jabber:client' xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams'
   id='some_id' from='example.com' version='1.0'>

   Step 3: Server informs client of available authentication mechanisms:

   <stream:features>
    <mechanisms xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'>
     <mechanism>DIGEST-MD5</mechanism>
     <mechanism>PLAIN</mechanism>
     <mechanism>SAML20</mechanism>
    </mechanisms>
   </stream:features>

   Step 4: Client selects an authentication mechanism and provides the
   initial client response: response containing the BASE64 [RFC4648] encoded gs2-
   header and domain:

   <auth xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl' mechanism='SAML20'>
    n,,https://saml.example.org</auth>
   biwsZXhhbXBsZS5vcmc</auth>

   The decoded string is: n,,example.org
   Step 5: Server sends a BASE64 [RFC4648] encoded challenge to client in the form
   of an HTTP Redirect to the SAML IdP corresponding to example.org
   (https://saml.example.org) with the SAML Authentication Request as
   specified in the redirection url:

   aHR0cHM6Ly9zYW1sLmV4YW1wbGUub3JnL1NBTUwvQnJvd3Nlcj9TQU1MUmVx
   dWVzdD1QSE5oYld4d09rRjFkR2h1VW1WeGRXVnpkQ0I0Yld4dWN6cHpZVzFz
   Y0QwaWRYSnVPbTloYzJsek9tNWhiV1Z6T25Sak9sTkJUVXc2TWk0d09uQnli
   M1J2WTI5c0lnMEtJQ0FnSUVsRVBTSmZZbVZqTkRJMFptRTFNVEF6TkRJNE9U
   QTVZVE13Wm1ZeFpUTXhNVFk0TXpJM1pqYzVORGMwT1RnMElpQldaWEp6YVc5
   dVBTSXlMakFpRFFvZ0lDQWdTWE56ZFdWSmJuTjBZVzUwUFNJeU1EQTNMVEV5
   TFRFd1ZERXhPak01T2pNMFdpSWdSbTl5WTJWQmRYUm9iajBpWm1Gc2MyVWlE
   UW9nSUNBZ1NYTlFZWE56YVhabFBTSm1ZV3h6WlNJTkNpQWdJQ0JRY205MGIy
   TnZiRUpwYm1ScGJtYzlJblZ5YmpwdllYTnBjenB1WVcxbGN6cDBZenBUUVUx
   TU9qSXVNRHBpYVc1a2FXNW5jenBJVkZSUUxWQlBVMVFpRFFvZ0lDQWdRWE56
   WlhKMGFXOXVRMjl1YzNWdFpYSlRaWEoyYVdObFZWSk1QUTBLSUNBZ0lDQWdJ
   Q0FpYUhSMGNITTZMeTk0YlhCd0xtVjRZVzF3YkdVdVkyOXRMMU5CVFV3dlFY
   TnpaWEowYVc5dVEyOXVjM1Z0WlhKVFpYSjJhV05sSWo0TkNpQThjMkZ0YkRw
   SmMzTjFaWElnZUcxc2JuTTZjMkZ0YkQwaWRYSnVPbTloYzJsek9tNWhiV1Z6
   T25Sak9sTkJUVXc2TWk0d09tRnpjMlZ5ZEdsdmJpSStEUW9nSUNBZ0lHaDBk
   SEJ6T2k4dmVHMXdjQzVsZUdGdGNHeGxMbU52YlEwS0lEd3ZjMkZ0YkRwSmMz
   TjFaWEkrRFFvZ1BITmhiV3h3T2s1aGJXVkpSRkJ2YkdsamVTQjRiV3h1Y3pw
   ellXMXNjRDBpZFhKdU9tOWhjMmx6T201aGJXVnpPblJqT2xOQlRVdzZNaTR3
   T25CeWIzUnZZMjlzSWcwS0lDQWdJQ0JHYjNKdFlYUTlJblZ5YmpwdllYTnBj
   enB1WVcxbGN6cDBZenBUUVUxTU9qSXVNRHB1WVcxbGFXUXRabTl5YldGME9u
   Qmxjbk5wYzNSbGJuUWlEUW9nSUNBZ0lGTlFUbUZ0WlZGMVlXeHBabWxsY2ow
   aWVHMXdjQzVsZUdGdGNHeGxMbU52YlNJZ1FXeHNiM2REY21WaGRHVTlJblJ5
   ZFdVaUlDOCtEUW9nUEhOaGJXeHdPbEpsY1hWbGMzUmxaRUYxZEdodVEyOXVk
   R1Y0ZEEwS0lDQWdJQ0I0Yld4dWN6cHpZVzFzY0QwaWRYSnVPbTloYzJsek9t
   NWhiV1Z6T25Sak9sTkJUVXc2TWk0d09uQnliM1J2WTI5c0lpQU5DaUFnSUNB
   Z0lDQWdRMjl0Y0dGeWFYTnZiajBpWlhoaFkzUWlQZzBLSUNBOGMyRnRiRHBC
   ZFhSb2JrTnZiblJsZUhSRGJHRnpjMUpsWmcwS0lDQWdJQ0FnZUcxc2JuTTZj
   MkZ0YkQwaWRYSnVPbTloYzJsek9tNWhiV1Z6T25Sak9sTkJUVXc2TWk0d09t
   RnpjMlZ5ZEdsdmJpSStEUW9nb0NBZ0lDQjFjbTQ2YjJGemFYTTZibUZ0WlhN
   NmRHTTZVMEZOVERveUxqQTZZV002WTJ4aGMzTmxjenBRWVhOemQyOXlaRkJ5
   YjNSbFkzUmxaRlJ5WVc1emNHOXlkQTBLSUNBOEwzTmhiV3c2UVhWMGFHNURi
   MjUwWlhoMFEyeGhjM05TWldZK0RRb2dQQzl6WVcxc2NEcFNaWEYxWlhOMFpX
   UkJkWFJvYmtOdmJuUmxlSFErSUEwS1BDOXpZVzFzY0RwQmRYUm9ibEpsY1hW
   bGMzUSs=

   The decoded challenge is:

   https://saml.example.org/SAML/Browser?SAMLRequest=PHNhbWxwOk
   F1dGhuUmVxdWVzdCB4bWxuczpzYW1scD0idXJuOm9hc2lzOm5hbWVzOnRjOl
   NBTUw6Mi4wOnByb3RvY29sIg0KICAgIElEPSJfYmVjNDI0ZmE1MTAzNDI4OT
   A5YTMwZmYxZTMxMTY4MzI3Zjc5NDc0OTg0IiBWZXJzaW9uPSIyLjAiDQogIC
   AgSXNzdWVJbnN0YW50PSIyMDA3LTEyLTEwVDExOjM5OjM0WiIgRm9yY2VBdX
   Robj0iZmFsc2UiDQogICAgSXNQYXNzaXZlPSJmYWxzZSINCiAgICBQcm90b2
   NvbEJpbmRpbmc9InVybjpvYXNpczpuYW1lczp0YzpTQU1MOjIuMDpiaW5kaW
   5nczpIVFRQLVBPU1QiDQogICAgQXNzZXJ0aW9uQ29uc3VtZXJTZXJ2aWNlVV
   JMPQ0KICAgICAgICAiaHR0cHM6Ly94bXBwLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tL1NBTUwvQX
   NzZXJ0aW9uQ29uc3VtZXJTZXJ2aWNlIj4NCiA8c2FtbDpJc3N1ZXIgeG1sbn
   M6c2FtbD0idXJuOm9hc2lzOm5hbWVzOnRjOlNBTUw6Mi4wOmFzc2VydGlvbi
   I+DQogICAgIGh0dHBzOi8veG1wcC5leGFtcGxlLmNvbQ0KIDwvc2FtbDpJc3
   N1ZXI+DQogPHNhbWxwOk5hbWVJRFBvbGljeSB4bWxuczpzYW1scD0idXJuOm
   9hc2lzOm5hbWVzOnRjOlNBTUw6Mi4wOnByb3RvY29sIg0KICAgICBGb3JtYX
   Q9InVybjpvYXNpczpuYW1lczp0YzpTQU1MOjIuMDpuYW1laWQtZm9ybWF0On
   BlcnNpc3RlbnQiDQogICAgIFNQTmFtZVF1YWxpZmllcj0ieG1wcC5leGFtcG
   xlLmNvbSIgQWxsb3dDcmVhdGU9InRydWUiIC8+DQogPHNhbWxwOlJlcXVlc3
   RlZEF1dGhuQ29udGV4dA0KICAgICB4bWxuczpzYW1scD0idXJuOm9hc2lzOm
   5hbWVzOnRjOlNBTUw6Mi4wOnByb3RvY29sIiANCiAgICAgICAgQ29tcGFyaX
   Nvbj0iZXhhY3QiPg0KICA8c2FtbDpBdXRobkNvbnRleHRDbGFzc1JlZg0KIC
   AgICAgeG1sbnM6c2FtbD0idXJuOm9hc2lzOm5hbWVzOnRjOlNBTUw6Mi4wOm
   Fzc2VydGlvbiI+DQogICAgICAgICAgIHVybjpvYXNpczpuYW1lczp0YzpTQU
   1MOjIuMDphYzpjbGFzc2VzOlBhc3N3b3JkUHJvdGVjdGVkVHJhbnNwb3J0DQ
   ogIDwvc2FtbDpBdXRobkNvbnRleHRDbGFzc1JlZj4NCiA8L3NhbWxwOlJlcX
   Vlc3RlZEF1dGhuQ29udGV4dD4gDQo8L3NhbWxwOkF1dGhuUmVxdWVzdD4=

   Where the decoded SAMLRequest looks like:

 <samlp:AuthnRequest xmlns:samlp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol"
     ID="_bec424fa5103428909a30ff1e31168327f79474984" Version="2.0"
     IssueInstant="2007-12-10T11:39:34Z" ForceAuthn="false"
     IsPassive="false"
     ProtocolBinding="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:bindings:HTTP-POST"
     AssertionConsumerServiceURL=
         "https://xmpp.example.com/SAML/AssertionConsumerService">
  <saml:Issuer xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion">
      https://xmpp.example.com
  </saml:Issuer>
  <samlp:NameIDPolicy xmlns:samlp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol"
      Format="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:nameid-format:persistent"
      SPNameQualifier="xmpp.example.com" AllowCreate="true" />
  <samlp:RequestedAuthnContext
      xmlns:samlp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol"
         Comparison="exact">
   <saml:AuthnContextClassRef
       xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion">
       urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes:PasswordProtectedTransport
   </saml:AuthnContextClassRef>
  </samlp:RequestedAuthnContext>
 </samlp:AuthnRequest>

   Step 5 (alt): Server returns error to client:

   <failure xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'>
    <incorrect-encoding/>
   </failure>
   </stream:stream>

   Step 6: Client sends a BASE64 encoded empty response to the
   challenge:

   <response xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'>
    =
   </response>

   [ The client now sends the URL to a browser for processing.  The
   browser engages in a normal SAML authentication flow (external to
   SASL), like redirection to the Identity Provider
   (https://saml.example.org), the user logs into
   https://saml.example.org, and agrees to authenticate to
   xmpp.example.com.  A redirect is passed back to the client browser
   who sends the AuthN response to the server, containing the subject-
   identifier as an attribute.  If the AuthN response doesn't contain
   the JID, the server maps the subject-identifier received from the IdP
   to a JID]

   Step 7: Server informs client of successful authentication:

   <success xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'/>

   Step 7 (alt): Server informs client of failed authentication:

   <failure xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'>
    <temporary-auth-failure/>
   </failure>
   </stream:stream>

   Step 8: Client initiates a new stream to server:

   <stream:stream xmlns='jabber:client'
   xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams'
   to='example.com' version='1.0'>

   Step 9: Server responds by sending a stream header to client along
   with any additional features (or an empty features element):

   <stream:stream xmlns='jabber:client'
   xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams'
   id='c2s_345' from='example.com' version='1.0'>
   <stream:features>
    <bind xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-bind'/>
    <session xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-session'/>
   </stream:features>

   Step 10: Client binds a resource:

      <iq type='set' id='bind_1'>
        <bind xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-bind'>
          <resource>someresource</resource>
        </bind>

      </iq>

   Step 11: Server informs client of successful resource binding:

      <iq type='result' id='bind_1'>
        <bind xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-bind'>
          <jid>somenode@example.com/someresource</jid>
        </bind>
      </iq>

   Please note: line breaks were added to the base64 for clarity.

7.2.  IMAP

   The following describes an IMAP exchange.  Lines beginning with 'S:'
   indicate data sent by the server, and lines starting with 'C:'
   indicate data sent by the client.  Long lines are wrapped for
   readability.

   S: * OK IMAP4rev1
   C: . CAPABILITY
   S: * CAPABILITY IMAP4rev1 STARTTLS
   S: . OK CAPABILITY Completed
   C: . STARTTLS
   S: . OK Begin TLS negotiation now
   C: . CAPABILITY
   S: * CAPABILITY IMAP4rev1 AUTH=SAML20
   S: . OK CAPABILITY Completed
   C: . AUTHENTICATE SAML20
   S: +
   C: biwsaHR0cHM6Ly9zYW1sLmV4YW1wbGUub3Jn biwsZXhhbXBsZS5vcmc
   S: + aHR0cHM6Ly9zYW1sLmV4YW1wbGUub3JnL1NBTUwvQnJvd3Nlcj9TQU1MUmVx
   dWVzdD1QSE5oYld4d09rRjFkR2h1VW1WeGRXVnpkQ0I0Yld4dWN6cHpZVzFz
   Y0QwaWRYSnVPbTloYzJsek9tNWhiV1Z6T25Sak9sTkJUVXc2TWk0d09uQnli
   M1J2WTI5c0lnMEtJQ0FnSUVsRVBTSmZZbVZqTkRJMFptRTFNVEF6TkRJNE9U
   QTVZVE13Wm1ZeFpUTXhNVFk0TXpJM1pqYzVORGMwT1RnMElpQldaWEp6YVc5
   dVBTSXlMakFpRFFvZ0lDQWdTWE56ZFdWSmJuTjBZVzUwUFNJeU1EQTNMVEV5
   TFRFd1ZERXhPak01T2pNMFdpSWdSbTl5WTJWQmRYUm9iajBpWm1Gc2MyVWlE
   UW9nSUNBZ1NYTlFZWE56YVhabFBTSm1ZV3h6WlNJTkNpQWdJQ0JRY205MGIy
   TnZiRUpwYm1ScGJtYzlJblZ5YmpwdllYTnBjenB1WVcxbGN6cDBZenBUUVUx
   TU9qSXVNRHBpYVc1a2FXNW5jenBJVkZSUUxWQlBVMVFpRFFvZ0lDQWdRWE56
   WlhKMGFXOXVRMjl1YzNWdFpYSlRaWEoyYVdObFZWSk1QUTBLSUNBZ0lDQWdJ
   Q0FpYUhSMGNITTZMeTk0YlhCd0xtVjRZVzF3YkdVdVkyOXRMMU5CVFV3dlFY
   TnpaWEowYVc5dVEyOXVjM1Z0WlhKVFpYSjJhV05sSWo0TkNpQThjMkZ0YkRw
   SmMzTjFaWElnZUcxc2JuTTZjMkZ0YkQwaWRYSnVPbTloYzJsek9tNWhiV1Z6
   T25Sak9sTkJUVXc2TWk0d09tRnpjMlZ5ZEdsdmJpSStEUW9nSUNBZ0lHaDBk
   SEJ6T2k4dmVHMXdjQzVsZUdGdGNHeGxMbU52YlEwS0lEd3ZjMkZ0YkRwSmMz
   TjFaWEkrRFFvZ1BITmhiV3h3T2s1aGJXVkpSRkJ2YkdsamVTQjRiV3h1Y3pw
   ellXMXNjRDBpZFhKdU9tOWhjMmx6T201aGJXVnpPblJqT2xOQlRVdzZNaTR3
   T25CeWIzUnZZMjlzSWcwS0lDQWdJQ0JHYjNKdFlYUTlJblZ5YmpwdllYTnBj
   enB1WVcxbGN6cDBZenBUUVUxTU9qSXVNRHB1WVcxbGFXUXRabTl5YldGME9u
   Qmxjbk5wYzNSbGJuUWlEUW9nSUNBZ0lGTlFUbUZ0WlZGMVlXeHBabWxsY2ow
   aWVHMXdjQzVsZUdGdGNHeGxMbU52YlNJZ1FXeHNiM2REY21WaGRHVTlJblJ5
   ZFdVaUlDOCtEUW9nUEhOaGJXeHdPbEpsY1hWbGMzUmxaRUYxZEdodVEyOXVk
   R1Y0ZEEwS0lDQWdJQ0I0Yld4dWN6cHpZVzFzY0QwaWRYSnVPbTloYzJsek9t
   NWhiV1Z6T25Sak9sTkJUVXc2TWk0d09uQnliM1J2WTI5c0lpQU5DaUFnSUNB
   Z0lDQWdRMjl0Y0dGeWFYTnZiajBpWlhoaFkzUWlQZzBLSUNBOGMyRnRiRHBC
   ZFhSb2JrTnZiblJsZUhSRGJHRnpjMUpsWmcwS0lDQWdJQ0FnZUcxc2JuTTZj
   MkZ0YkQwaWRYSnVPbTloYzJsek9tNWhiV1Z6T25Sak9sTkJUVXc2TWk0d09t
   RnpjMlZ5ZEdsdmJpSStEUW9nb0NBZ0lDQjFjbTQ2YjJGemFYTTZibUZ0WlhN
   NmRHTTZVMEZOVERveUxqQTZZV002WTJ4aGMzTmxjenBRWVhOemQyOXlaRkJ5
   YjNSbFkzUmxaRlJ5WVc1emNHOXlkQTBLSUNBOEwzTmhiV3c2UVhWMGFHNURi
   MjUwWlhoMFEyeGhjM05TWldZK0RRb2dQQzl6WVcxc2NEcFNaWEYxWlhOMFpX
   UkJkWFJvYmtOdmJuUmxlSFErSUEwS1BDOXpZVzFzY0RwQmRYUm9ibEpsY1hW
   bGMzUSs=
   C:
   S: . OK Success (tls protection)

8.  Security Considerations

   This section will address only security considerations associated
   with the use of SAML with SASL applications.  For considerations
   relating to SAML in general, the reader is referred to the SAML
   specification and to other literature.  Similarly, for general SASL
   Security Considerations, the reader is referred to that
   specification.

8.1.  Man in the middle and Tunneling Attacks

   This mechanism is vulnerable to man in the middle and tunneling
   attacks unless a client always verify the server identity before
   proceeding with authentication.  Typically TLS is used to provide a
   secure channel with server authentication.

8.2.  Binding SAML subject identifiers to Authorization Identities

   As specified in [RFC4422], the server is responsible for binding
   credentials to a specific authorization identity.  It is therefore
   necessary that only specific trusted IdPs be allowed.  This is
   typical part of SAML trust establishment between RP's and IdP.

8.3.  User Privacy

   The IdP is aware of each RP that a user logs into.  There is nothing
   in the protocol to hide this information from the IdP.  It is not a
   requirement to track the visits, but there is nothing that prohibits
   the collection of information.  SASL servers should be aware that
   SAML IdPs will track - to some extent - user access to their
   services.

8.4.  Collusion between RPs

   It is possible for RPs to link data that they have collected on you.
   By using the same identifier to log into every RP, collusion between
   RPs is possible.  In SAML, targeted identity was introduced.
   Targeted identity allows the IdP to transform the identifier the user
   typed in to an opaque identifier.  This way the RP would never see
   the actual user identifier, but a randomly generated identifier.
   This is an option the user has to understand and decide to use if the
   IdP is supporting it.

9.  IANA Considerations

   The IANA is requested to register the following SASL profile:

   SASL mechanism profile: SAML20

   Security Considerations: See this document

   Published Specification: See this document

   For further information: Contact the authors of this document.

   Owner/Change controller: the IETF

   Note: None

10.  References

10.1.  Normative References

   [OASIS.saml-bindings-2.0-os]
              Cantor, S., Hirsch, F., Kemp, J., Philpott, R., and E.
              Maler, "Bindings for the OASIS Security Assertion Markup
              Language (SAML) V2.0", OASIS
              Standard saml-bindings-2.0-os, March 2005.

   [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os]
              Cantor, S., Kemp, J., Philpott, R., and E. Maler,
              "Assertions and Protocol for the OASIS Security Assertion
              Markup Language (SAML) V2.0", OASIS Standard saml-core-
              2.0-os, March 2005.

   [OASIS.saml-profiles-2.0-os]
              Hughes, J., Cantor, S., Hodges, J., Hirsch, F., Mishra,
              P., Philpott, R., and E. Maler, "Profiles for the OASIS
              Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V2.0", OASIS
              Standard OASIS.saml-profiles-2.0-os, March 2005.

   [RFC1035]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
              specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC2616]  Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H.,
              Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext
              Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999.

   [RFC2743]  Linn, J., "Generic Security Service Application Program
              Interface Version 2, Update 1", RFC 2743, January 2000.

   [RFC3986]  Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
              Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
              RFC 3986, January 2005.

   [RFC4422]  Melnikov, A. and K. Zeilenga, "Simple Authentication and
              Security Layer (SASL)", RFC 4422, June 2006.

   [RFC4648]  Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
              Encodings", RFC 4648, October 2006.

   [RFC5801]  Josefsson, S. and N. Williams, "Using Generic Security
              Service Application Program Interface (GSS-API) Mechanisms
              in Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL): The
              GS2 Mechanism Family", RFC 5801, July 2010.

10.2.  Informative References

   [RFC3501]  Crispin, M., "INTERNET MESSAGE ACCESS PROTOCOL - VERSION
              4rev1", RFC 3501, March 2003.

   [RFC3920]  Saint-Andre, P., Ed., "Extensible Messaging and Presence
              Protocol (XMPP): Core", RFC 3920, October 2004.

Appendix A.  Acknowledgments

   The authors would like to thank Scott Cantor, Joe Hildebrand, Josh
   Howlett, Leif Johansson, Diego Lopez, Hank Mauldin, RL 'Bob' Morgan,
   Stefan Plug and Hannes Tschofenig for their review and contributions.

Appendix B.  Changes

   This section to be removed prior to publication.

   o  02 Changed IdP URI to domain per Joe Hildebrand, fixed some typos

   o  00 WG -00 draft.  Updates GSS-API section, some fixes per Scott
      Cantor

   o  01 Added authorization identity, added GSS-API specifics, added
      client supplied IdP

   o  00 Initial Revision.

Authors' Addresses

   Klaas Wierenga
   Cisco Systems, Inc.
   Haarlerbergweg 13-19
   Amsterdam, Noord-Holland  1101 CH
   Netherlands

   Phone: +31 20 357 1752
   Email: klaas@cisco.com

   Eliot Lear
   Cisco Systems GmbH
   Richtistrasse 7
   Wallisellen, ZH  CH-8304
   Switzerland

   Phone: +41 44 878 9200
   Email: lear@cisco.com

   Simon Josefsson
   SJD AB
   Hagagatan 24
   Stockholm  113 47
   SE

   Email: simon@josefsson.org
   URI:   http://josefsson.org/