draft-ietf-kitten-tls-channel-bindings-for-tls13-11.txt   draft-ietf-kitten-tls-channel-bindings-for-tls13-12.txt 
Transport Layer Security S. Whited Transport Layer Security S. Whited
Internet-Draft 18 October 2021 Internet-Draft 25 October 2021
Updates: 5801, 5802, 5929, 8446 (if approved) Updates: 5801, 5802, 5929, 7677, 8446 (if
approved)
Intended status: Standards Track Intended status: Standards Track
Expires: 21 April 2022 Expires: 28 April 2022
Channel Bindings for TLS 1.3 Channel Bindings for TLS 1.3
draft-ietf-kitten-tls-channel-bindings-for-tls13-11 draft-ietf-kitten-tls-channel-bindings-for-tls13-12
Abstract Abstract
This document defines a channel binding type, tls-exporter, that is This document defines a channel binding type, tls-exporter, that is
compatible with TLS 1.3 in accordance with RFC 5056, On Channel compatible with TLS 1.3 in accordance with RFC 5056, On Channel
Binding. Furthermore it updates the "default" channel binding to the Binding. Furthermore it updates the "default" channel binding to the
new binding for versions of TLS greater than 1.2. This document new binding for versions of TLS greater than 1.2. This document
updates RFC5801, RFC5802, RFC5929, and RFC8446. updates RFC5801, RFC5802, RFC5929, RFC7677, and RFC8446.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 21 April 2022. This Internet-Draft will expire on 28 April 2022.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
skipping to change at page 2, line 12 skipping to change at page 2, line 21
as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Conventions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1.1. Conventions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. The 'tls-exporter' Channel Binding Type . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. The 'tls-exporter' Channel Binding Type . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. TLS 1.3 with SCRAM or GSS-API over SASL . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. TLS 1.3 with SCRAM or GSS-API over SASL . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4.1. Use with Legacy TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4.1. Use with Legacy TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5.1. Registration of Channel Binding Type . . . . . . . . . . 4 5.1. Registration of Channel Binding Type . . . . . . . . . . 4
5.2. Registration of Channel Binding TLS Exporter Label . . . 5 5.2. Registration of Channel Binding TLS Exporter Label . . . 5
6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The "tls-unique" channel binding type defined in [RFC5929] was found The "tls-unique" channel binding type defined in [RFC5929] was found
to be vulnerable to the "triple handshake vulnerability" to be vulnerable to the "triple handshake vulnerability"
[TRIPLE-HANDSHAKE] without the extended master secret extension [TRIPLE-HANDSHAKE] without the extended master secret extension
defined in [RFC7627]. While TLS 1.3 uses a complete transcript hash defined in [RFC7627]. While TLS 1.3 uses a complete transcript hash
akin to the extended master secret procedures, the safety of channel akin to the extended master secret procedures, the safety of channel
bindings with TLS 1.3 was not analyzed as part of the core protocol bindings with TLS 1.3 was not analyzed as part of the core protocol
skipping to change at page 3, line 29 skipping to change at page 3, line 35
Length: 32 bytes. Length: 32 bytes.
This channel binding mechanism is defined only when TLS cipher This channel binding mechanism is defined only when TLS cipher
negotiation results in unique master secrets, which is true of TLS negotiation results in unique master secrets, which is true of TLS
1.3 which always behaves as if it were using the extended master 1.3 which always behaves as if it were using the extended master
secret fix required by previous versions of TLS (see [RFC8446] secret fix required by previous versions of TLS (see [RFC8446]
appendix D). appendix D).
3. TLS 1.3 with SCRAM or GSS-API over SASL 3. TLS 1.3 with SCRAM or GSS-API over SASL
SCRAM [RFC5802] and GSS-API over SASL [RFC5801] define "tls-unique" SCRAM ([RFC5802], and [RFC7677]) and GSS-API over SASL [RFC5801]
as the default channel binding to use over TLS. As "tls-unique" is define "tls-unique" as the default channel binding to use over TLS.
not defined for TLS 1.3 (and greater), this document updates As "tls-unique" is not defined for TLS 1.3 (and greater), this
[RFC5801] and [RFC5802] to use "tls-exporter" as the default channel document updates [RFC5801], [RFC5802], and [RFC7677] to use "tls-
binding over TLS 1.3 (and greater). exporter" as the default channel binding over TLS 1.3 (and greater).
Note that this document does not change the default channel binding
for SCRAM mechanisms over TLS 1.2 [RFC5246], which is still "tls-
unique".
4. Security Considerations 4. Security Considerations
The channel binding type defined in this document is constructed so The channel binding type defined in this document is constructed so
that disclosure of the channel binding data does not leak secret that disclosure of the channel binding data does not leak secret
information about the TLS channel and does not affect the security of information about the TLS channel and does not affect the security of
the TLS channel. the TLS channel.
The Security Considerations sections of [RFC5056], [RFC5705], and The Security Considerations sections of [RFC5056], [RFC5705], and
[RFC8446] apply to this document. [RFC8446] apply to this document.
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Subject: Registration of channel binding tls-exporter Subject: Registration of channel binding tls-exporter
Channel binding unique prefix: tls-exporter Channel binding unique prefix: tls-exporter
Channel binding type: unique Channel binding type: unique
Channel type: TLS [RFC8446] Channel type: TLS [RFC8446]
Published specification: draft-ietf-kitten-tls-channel-bindings-for- Published specification: draft-ietf-kitten-tls-channel-bindings-for-
tls13-11 tls13-12
Channel binding is secret: no Channel binding is secret: no
Description: The EKM value obtained from the current TLS connection. Description: The EKM value obtained from the current TLS connection.
Intended usage: COMMON Intended usage: COMMON
Person and email address to contact for further information: Sam Person and email address to contact for further information: Sam
Whited <sam@samwhited.com>. Whited <sam@samwhited.com>.
skipping to change at page 5, line 35 skipping to change at page 5, line 41
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC5056] Williams, N., "On the Use of Channel Bindings to Secure [RFC5056] Williams, N., "On the Use of Channel Bindings to Secure
Channels", RFC 5056, DOI 10.17487/RFC5056, November 2007, Channels", RFC 5056, DOI 10.17487/RFC5056, November 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5056>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5056>.
[RFC5705] Rescorla, E., "Keying Material Exporters for Transport [RFC5705] Rescorla, E., "Keying Material Exporters for Transport
Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 5705, DOI 10.17487/RFC5705, Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 5705, DOI 10.17487/RFC5705,
March 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5705>. March 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5705>.
[RFC7677] Hansen, T., "SCRAM-SHA-256 and SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS Simple
Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) Mechanisms",
RFC 7677, DOI 10.17487/RFC7677, November 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7677>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol [RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018, Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
6.2. Informative References 6.2. Informative References
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.
[RFC5801] Josefsson, S. and N. Williams, "Using Generic Security [RFC5801] Josefsson, S. and N. Williams, "Using Generic Security
Service Application Program Interface (GSS-API) Mechanisms Service Application Program Interface (GSS-API) Mechanisms
in Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL): The in Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL): The
GS2 Mechanism Family", RFC 5801, DOI 10.17487/RFC5801, GS2 Mechanism Family", RFC 5801, DOI 10.17487/RFC5801,
July 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5801>. July 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5801>.
[RFC5802] Newman, C., Menon-Sen, A., Melnikov, A., and N. Williams, [RFC5802] Newman, C., Menon-Sen, A., Melnikov, A., and N. Williams,
"Salted Challenge Response Authentication Mechanism "Salted Challenge Response Authentication Mechanism
(SCRAM) SASL and GSS-API Mechanisms", RFC 5802, (SCRAM) SASL and GSS-API Mechanisms", RFC 5802,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5802, July 2010, DOI 10.17487/RFC5802, July 2010,
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