draft-ietf-krb-wg-anon-06.txt   draft-ietf-krb-wg-anon-07.txt 
NETWORK WORKING GROUP L. Zhu NETWORK WORKING GROUP L. Zhu
Internet-Draft P. Leach Internet-Draft P. Leach
Updates: 4120 (if approved) Microsoft Corporation Updates: 4120 (if approved) Microsoft Corporation
Intended status: Standards Track May 15, 2008 Intended status: Standards Track July 27, 2008
Expires: November 16, 2008 Expires: January 28, 2009
Anonymity Support for Kerberos Anonymity Support for Kerberos
draft-ietf-krb-wg-anon-06 draft-ietf-krb-wg-anon-07
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79. aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
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and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
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The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt. http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on November 16, 2008. This Internet-Draft will expire on January 28, 2009.
Abstract Abstract
This document defines extensions to the Kerberos protocol for the This document defines extensions to the Kerberos protocol for the
Kerberos client to authenticate the Kerberos Key Distribution Center Kerberos client to authenticate the Kerberos Key Distribution Center
and the Kerberos server, without revealing the client's identity. It (KDC) and the Kerberos server, without revealing the client's
updates RFC 4120. These extensions can be used to secure identity to the server or to the KDC. It updates RFC 4120. These
communication between the anonymous client and the server. extensions can be used to secure communication between the anonymous
client and the server.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Protocol Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4. Protocol Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. GSS-API Implementation Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5. GSS-API Implementation Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
9. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 9. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 11 Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 12
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
In certain situations, the Kerberos [RFC4120] client may wish to In certain situations, the Kerberos [RFC4120] client may wish to
authenticate a server and/or protect communications without revealing authenticate a server and/or protect communications without revealing
its own identity. For example, consider an application which its own identity. For example, consider an application which
provides read access to a research database, and which permits provides read access to a research database, and which permits
queries by arbitrary requestors. A client of such a service might queries by arbitrary requestors. A client of such a service might
wish to authenticate the service, to establish trust in the wish to authenticate the service, to establish trust in the
information received from it, but might not wish to disclose its information received from it, but might not wish to disclose its
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2. Conventions Used in This Document 2. Conventions Used in This Document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
3. Definitions 3. Definitions
The anonymous Kerberos realm name is defined as a well-known realm The anonymous Kerberos realm name is defined as a well-known realm
name based on [KRBNAM]. The value is the literal "WELLKNOWN: name based on [KRBNAM]. The value is the literal "WELLKNOWN:
ANONYMOUS". An anonymous Kerberos realm name MUST NOT be present in ANONYMOUS".
the transited field of a ticket. However, as specified in Section 4,
the true name of the realm that issued the anonymous ticket MAY be
present in the transited field of a ticket.
The anonymous Kerberos principal name is defined as a well-known The anonymous Kerberos principal name is defined as a well-known
Kerberos principal name based on [KRBNAM]. The value of the name- Kerberos principal name based on [KRBNAM]. The value of the name-
type field is KRB_NT_WELLKNOWN [KRBNAM], and the value of the name- type field is KRB_NT_WELLKNOWN [KRBNAM], and the value of the name-
string field is a sequence of two KerberosString components: string field is a sequence of two KerberosString components:
"WELLKNOWN", "ANONYMOUS". "WELLKNOWN", "ANONYMOUS".
Note that in this specification, the anonymous principal name and
realm are only applicable to the client in Kerberos messages, the
server MUST NOT be anonymous in any Kerberos message.
The anonymous ticket flag is defined as bit 14 (with the first bit The anonymous ticket flag is defined as bit 14 (with the first bit
being bit 0) in the TicketFlags: being bit 0) in the TicketFlags:
TicketFlags ::= KerberosFlags TicketFlags ::= KerberosFlags
-- anonymous(14) -- anonymous(14)
-- TicketFlags and KerberosFlags are defined in [RFC4120] -- TicketFlags and KerberosFlags are defined in [RFC4120]
This is a new ticket flag that is used to indicate a ticket is an
anonymous one.
An anonymous ticket is a ticket that has all of the following An anonymous ticket is a ticket that has all of the following
properties: properties:
o The cname field contains the anonymous Kerberos principal name. o The cname field contains the anonymous Kerberos principal name.
o The crealm field contains the client's realm name, or the name of o The crealm field contains the client's realm name, or the name of
the realm that issued the initial ticket for the client principal the realm that issued the initial ticket for the client principal
(when the anonymous ticket is obtained using anonymous PKINIT from (when the anonymous ticket is obtained using anonymous Public Key
a Kerberos realm other than that of the client as described in Cryptography for Initial Authentication in Kerberos (PKINIT) as
Section 4), or the anonymous realm name. defined in Section 4, or the anonymous realm name.
o The anonymous ticket contains no information that can reveal the o The anonymous ticket contains no information that can reveal the
client's identity. However the ticket may contain the client client's identity. However the ticket may contain the client
realm, intermediate realms on the client's authentication path, realm, intermediate realms on the client's authentication path,
and authorization data that may provide information related to the and authorization data that may provide information related to the
client's identity. For example, an anonymous principal that is client's identity. For example, an anonymous principal that is
identifiable only within a particular group of users can be identifiable only within a particular group of users can be
implemented using authorization data and such authorization data, implemented using authorization data and such authorization data,
if included in the anonymous ticket, shall disclose the client's if included in the anonymous ticket, shall disclose the client's
membership of that group. membership of that group.
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KDCOptions ::= KerberosFlags KDCOptions ::= KerberosFlags
-- anonymous(14) -- anonymous(14)
-- KDCOptions and KerberosFlags are defined in [RFC4120] -- KDCOptions and KerberosFlags are defined in [RFC4120]
As described in Section 4, the anonymous KDC option is set to request As described in Section 4, the anonymous KDC option is set to request
an anonymous ticket. an anonymous ticket.
4. Protocol Description 4. Protocol Description
In order to request an anonymous ticket, the client sets the In order to request an anonymous ticket, the client sets the
anonymous KDC option in an Authentication Exchange (AS) or Ticket anonymous KDC option in an Authentication Service exchange (AS) or
Granting Service (TGS) request. The client can request an anonymous Ticket Granting Service (TGS) exchange. The client can request an
Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) based on a normal TGT. Unless otherwise anonymous Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) based on a normal TGT. Unless
specified, the client can obtain an anonymous ticket with the otherwise specified, the client can obtain an anonymous ticket with
anonymous realm name only by requesting an anonymous ticket in an AS the anonymous realm name only by requesting an anonymous ticket in an
exchange with the client realm set as anonymous in the request. AS exchange with the client realm set as anonymous in the request.
If the client wishes to authenticate to the KDC anonymously, it sets If the client wishes to authenticate to the KDC anonymously, it sets
the client name as anonymous in the AS exchange and provides a the client name as anonymous in the AS exchange and provides a
PA_PK_AS_REQ pre-authentication data [RFC4556] where both the PA_PK_AS_REQ pre-authentication data [RFC4556] where both the
signerInfos field and the certificates field of the SignedData signerInfos field and the certificates field of the SignedData
[RFC3852] of the PA_PK_AS_REQ are empty. Because the anonymous [RFC3852] of the PA_PK_AS_REQ are empty. Because the anonymous
client does not have an associated asymmetric key pair, the client client does not have an associated asymmetric key pair, the client
MUST choose the Diffie-Hellman key agreement method by filling in the MUST choose the Diffie-Hellman key agreement method by filling in the
Diffie-Hellman domain parameters in the clientPublicValue [RFC4556]. Diffie-Hellman domain parameters in the clientPublicValue [RFC4556].
This use of the anonymous client name in conjunction with PKINIT is
referred to as anonymous PKINIT. If anonymous PKINIT is used, the
realm name in the returned anonymous ticket MUST be the anonymous
realm.
If the ticket in the PA-TGS-REQ of the TGS request is anonymous, or If the ticket in the PA-TGS-REQ of the TGS request is anonymous, or
if the client in the AS request is anonymous, the anonymous KDC if the client in the AS request is anonymous, the anonymous KDC
option MUST be set in the request. Otherwise, the KDC MUST return a option MUST be set in the request. Otherwise, the KDC MUST return a
KRB-ERROR message with the code KDC_ERR_BADOPTION. KRB-ERROR message with the code KDC_ERR_BADOPTION.
Upon receiving the AS request with a PA_PK_AS_REQ [RFC4556] from the Upon receiving the AS request with a PA_PK_AS_REQ [RFC4556] from the
anonymous client, the KDC processes the request according to Section anonymous client, the KDC processes the request according to Section
3.1.2 of [RFC4120]. The KDC skips the checks for the client's 3.1.2 of [RFC4120]. The KDC skips the checks for the client's
signature and the client's public key (such as the verification of signature and the client's public key (such as the verification of
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[RFC4556]. If all goes well, an anonymous ticket is generated [RFC4556]. If all goes well, an anonymous ticket is generated
according to Section 3.1.3 of [RFC4120] and a PA_PK_AS_REP [RFC4556] according to Section 3.1.3 of [RFC4120] and a PA_PK_AS_REP [RFC4556]
pre-authentication data is included in the KDC reply according to pre-authentication data is included in the KDC reply according to
[RFC4556]. If the KDC does not have an asymmetric key pair, it MAY [RFC4556]. If the KDC does not have an asymmetric key pair, it MAY
reply anonymously or reject the authentication attempt. If the KDC reply anonymously or reject the authentication attempt. If the KDC
replies anonymously, both the signerInfos field and the certificates replies anonymously, both the signerInfos field and the certificates
field of the SignedData [RFC3852] of PA_PK_AS_REP in the reply are field of the SignedData [RFC3852] of PA_PK_AS_REP in the reply are
empty. The server name in the anonymous KDC reply contains the name empty. The server name in the anonymous KDC reply contains the name
of the TGS. of the TGS.
The KDC conforming to this specification MUST indicate the support of A KDC that supports anonymous PKINIT MUST indicate the support of
anonymous PKINIT as described above in this section according to PKINIT according to Section 3.4 of [RFC4556].
Section 3.4 of [RFC4556].
Upon receipt of the KDC reply that contains an anonymous ticket and a Upon receipt of the KDC reply that contains an anonymous ticket and a
PA_PK_AS_REP [RFC4556] pre-authentication data, the client can then PA_PK_AS_REP [RFC4556] pre-authentication data, the client can then
authenticate the KDC based on the KDC's signature in the authenticate the KDC based on the KDC's signature in the
PA_PK_AS_REP. If the KDC's signature is missing in the KDC reply PA_PK_AS_REP. If the KDC's signature is missing in the KDC reply
(the reply is anonymous), the client MUST reject the returned ticket (the reply is anonymous), the client MUST reject the returned ticket
if it cannot authenticate the KDC otherwise. if it cannot authenticate the KDC otherwise.
The client can use the client keys to mutually authenticate with the The client can use the client keys to mutually authenticate with the
KDC, request an anonymous TGT in the AS request. And in that case, KDC, request an anonymous TGT in the AS request. And in that case,
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realm of the anonymous ticket in the reply. The client MUST use the realm of the anonymous ticket in the reply. The client MUST use the
client name and the client realm returned in the KDC-REP in client name and the client realm returned in the KDC-REP in
subsequent message exchanges when using the obtained anonymous subsequent message exchanges when using the obtained anonymous
ticket. ticket.
When propagating authorization data in the ticket or in the enc- When propagating authorization data in the ticket or in the enc-
authorization-data field of the request, the TGS MUST ensure that the authorization-data field of the request, the TGS MUST ensure that the
client confidentiality is not violated in the returned anonymous client confidentiality is not violated in the returned anonymous
ticket. The TGS MUST process the authorization data recursively ticket. The TGS MUST process the authorization data recursively
according to Section 5.2.6 of [RFC4120] beyond the container levels according to Section 5.2.6 of [RFC4120] beyond the container levels
such that all embedded authorization elements are interpreted. such that all embedded authorization elements are interpreted. AS or
Identity-based authorization data SHOULD NOT be present in an TGS SHOULD NOT populate identity-based authorization data into an
anonymous ticket in that it typically reveals the client's identity. anonymous ticket in that such authorization data typically reveals
The specification of a new authorization data type MUST specify the the client's identity. The specification of a new authorization data
processing rules of the authorization data when an anonymous ticket type MUST specify the processing rules of the authorization data when
is returned. If there is no processing rule defined for an an anonymous ticket is returned. If there is no processing rule
authorization data element or the authorization data element is defined for an authorization data element or the authorization data
unknown, the TGS MUST process it when an anonymous ticket is returned element is unknown, the TGS MUST process it when an anonymous ticket
as follows: is returned as follows:
o If the authorization data element may reveal the client's o If the authorization data element may reveal the client's
identity, it MUST be removed unless otherwise specified. identity, it MUST be removed unless otherwise specified.
o If the authorization data element is intended to restrict the use o If the authorization data element is intended to restrict the use
of the ticket or limit the rights otherwise conveyed in the of the ticket or limit the rights otherwise conveyed in the
ticket, it cannot be removed in order to hide the client's ticket, it cannot be removed in order to hide the client's
identity. In this case, the authentication attempt MUST be identity. In this case, the authentication attempt MUST be
rejected, and the KDC MUST return an error message with the code rejected, and the KDC MUST return an error message with the code
KDC_ERR_POLICY. Note this is applicable to both critical and KDC_ERR_POLICY. Note this is applicable to both critical and
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is undesirable to disclose such information about the client's is undesirable to disclose such information about the client's
identity, the AD-INITIAL-VERIFIED-CAS authorization data SHOULD be identity, the AD-INITIAL-VERIFIED-CAS authorization data SHOULD be
removed from an anonymous ticket based on local policy of the TGS. removed from an anonymous ticket based on local policy of the TGS.
The TGS encodes the name of the previous realm into the transited The TGS encodes the name of the previous realm into the transited
field according to Section 3.3.3.2 of [RFC4120]. Based on local field according to Section 3.3.3.2 of [RFC4120]. Based on local
policy, the TGS MAY omit the previous realm if the cross realm TGT is policy, the TGS MAY omit the previous realm if the cross realm TGT is
an anonymous one to hide the authentication path of the client. The an anonymous one to hide the authentication path of the client. The
unordered set of realms in the transited field, if present, can unordered set of realms in the transited field, if present, can
reveal which realm may potentially be the realm of the client or the reveal which realm may potentially be the realm of the client or the
realm that issued the anonymous TGT. realm that issued the anonymous TGT. The anonymous Kerberos realm
name MUST NOT be present in the transited field of a ticket. The
true name of the realm that issued the anonymous ticket MAY be
present in the transited field of a ticket.
If the client is anonymous and the KDC does not have a key to encrypt If the client is anonymous and the KDC does not have a key to encrypt
the reply (this can happen when, for example, the KDC does not the reply (this can happen when, for example, the KDC does not
support PKINIT [RFC4556]), the KDC MUST return an error message with support PKINIT [RFC4556]), the KDC MUST return an error message with
the code KDC_ERR_NULL_KEY [RFC4120]. the code KDC_ERR_NULL_KEY [RFC4120].
If a client requires anonymous communication then the client MUST If a client requires anonymous communication then the client MUST
check to make sure that the ticket in the reply is actually anonymous check to make sure that the ticket in the reply is actually anonymous
by checking the presence of the anonymous ticket flag in the flags by checking the presence of the anonymous ticket flag in the flags
field of the EncKDCRepPart. This is because KDCs ignore unknown KDC field of the EncKDCRepPart. This is because KDCs ignore unknown KDC
options. A KDC that does not understand the anonymous KDC option options. A KDC that does not understand the anonymous KDC option
will not return an error, but will instead return a normal ticket. will not return an error, but will instead return a normal ticket.
The subsequent client and server communications then proceed as The subsequent client and server communications then proceed as
described in [RFC4120]. described in [RFC4120].
Note that the anonymous principal name and realm are only applicable
to the client in Kerberos messages, the server cannot be anonymous in
any Kerberos message per this specification.
A server accepting an anonymous service ticket may assume that A server accepting an anonymous service ticket may assume that
subsequent requests using the same ticket originate from the same subsequent requests using the same ticket originate from the same
client. Requests with different tickets are likely to originate from client. Requests with different tickets are likely to originate from
different clients. different clients.
5. GSS-API Implementation Notes 5. GSS-API Implementation Notes
At the GSS-API [RFC2743] level, the use of an anonymous principal by At the GSS-API [RFC2743] level, the use of an anonymous principal by
the initiator/client requires the initiator/client to assert the the initiator/client requires the initiator/client to assert the
"anonymous" flag when calling GSS_Init_Sec_Context(). "anonymous" flag when calling GSS_Init_Sec_Context().
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for the acceptor/server when performing an authorization decision for the acceptor/server when performing an authorization decision
based on the initiator name that is returned from the acceptor side based on the initiator name that is returned from the acceptor side
upon the successful security context establishment. upon the successful security context establishment.
A GSS-API initiator MUST carefully check the resulting context A GSS-API initiator MUST carefully check the resulting context
attributes from the initial call to GSS_Init_Sec_Context() when attributes from the initial call to GSS_Init_Sec_Context() when
requesting anonymity, because (as in the GSS-API tradition and for requesting anonymity, because (as in the GSS-API tradition and for
backwards compatibility) anonymity is just another optional context backwards compatibility) anonymity is just another optional context
attribute. It could be that the mechanism doesn't recognize the attribute. It could be that the mechanism doesn't recognize the
attribute at all or that anonymity is not available for some other attribute at all or that anonymity is not available for some other
reasons -- and in that case the initiator must NOT send the initial reasons -- and in that case the initiator MUST NOT send the initial
security context token to the acceptor, because it will likely reveal security context token to the acceptor, because it will likely reveal
the initiators identity to the acceptor, something that can rarely be the initiators identity to the acceptor, something that can rarely be
"un-done". "un-done".
GSS-API defines the name_type GSS_C_NT_ANONYMOUS [RFC2743] to GSS-API defines the name_type GSS_C_NT_ANONYMOUS [RFC2743] to
represent the anonymous identity. In addition, Section 2.1.1 of represent the anonymous identity. In addition, Section 2.1.1 of
[RFC1964] defines the single string representation of a Kerberos [RFC1964] defines the single string representation of a Kerberos
principal name with the name_type GSS_KRB5_NT_PRINCIPAL_NAME. For principal name with the name_type GSS_KRB5_NT_PRINCIPAL_NAME. For
the anonymous principals, the name component within the exportable the anonymous principals, the name component within the exportable
name as defined in Section 2.1.3 of [RFC1964] MUST signify the realm name as defined in Section 2.1.3 of [RFC1964] MUST signify the realm
name according to Section 2.1.1 of [RFC1964]. Note that in this name according to Section 2.1.1 of [RFC1964]. Note that in this
specification only the client/initiator can be anonymous. specification only the client/initiator can be anonymous.
Portable initiators are RECOMMENDED to use default credentials Portable initiators are RECOMMENDED to use default credentials
whenever possible, and request anonymity only through the input whenever possible, and request anonymity only through the input
anon_req_flag [RFC2743] to GSS_Init_Sec_Context(). anon_req_flag [RFC2743] to GSS_Init_Sec_Context().
6. Security Considerations 6. Security Considerations
Since KDCs ignore unknown options, a client requiring anonymous Since KDCs ignore unknown options, a client requiring anonymous
communication needs to make sure that the ticket is actually communication needs to make sure that the returned ticket is actually
anonymous. This is because a KDC that that does not understand the anonymous. This is because a KDC that that does not understand the
anonymous option would not return an anonymous ticket. anonymous option would not return an anonymous ticket.
By using the mechanism defined in this specification, the client does By using the mechanism defined in this specification, the client does
not reveal its identity to the server but its identity may be not reveal its identity to the server but its identity may be
revealed to the KDC of the server principal (when the server revealed to the KDC of the server principal (when the server
principal is in a different realm than that of the client), and any principal is in a different realm than that of the client), and any
KDC on the cross-realm authentication path. The Kerberos client MUST KDC on the cross-realm authentication path. The Kerberos client MUST
verify the ticket being used is indeed anonymous before communicating verify the ticket being used is indeed anonymous before communicating
with the server, otherwise the client's identity may be revealed with the server, otherwise the client's identity may be revealed
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Ken Raeburn reviewed the document and provided suggestions for Ken Raeburn reviewed the document and provided suggestions for
improvements. improvements.
Martin Rex wrote the text for GSS-API considerations. Martin Rex wrote the text for GSS-API considerations.
Nicolas Williams reviewed the GSS-API considerations section and Nicolas Williams reviewed the GSS-API considerations section and
suggested ideas for improvements. suggested ideas for improvements.
Sam Hartman and Nicolas Williams were great champions of this work. Sam Hartman and Nicolas Williams were great champions of this work.
Miguel Garcia and Phillip Hallam-Baker reviewed the document and
provided helpful suggestions.
In addition, the following individuals made significant In addition, the following individuals made significant
contributions: Jeffrey Altman, Tom Yu, Chaskiel M Grundman, Love contributions: Jeffrey Altman, Tom Yu, Chaskiel M Grundman, Love
Hornquist Astrand, Jeffrey Hutzelman, and Olga Kornievskaia. Hornquist Astrand, Jeffrey Hutzelman, and Olga Kornievskaia.
8. IANA Considerations 8. IANA Considerations
Section 3 defines the anonymous Kerberos name and the anonymous This document defines a new 'anonymous' Kerberos well-known name and
Kerberos realm based on [KRBNAM]. The IANA registry for [KRBNAM] a new 'anonymous' Kerberos well-known realm based on [KRBNAM]. IANA
need to be updated to add references to this document. is requested to add these two values to the Kerberos naming
registries that are created in [KRBNAM].
9. Normative References 9. Normative References
[KRBNAM] Zhu, L., "Additonal Kerberos Naming Contraints", [KRBNAM] Zhu, L., "Additonal Kerberos Naming Contraints",
draft-ietf-krb-wg-naming, work in progress. draft-ietf-krb-wg-naming, work in progress.
[RFC1964] Linn, J., "The Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API Mechanism", [RFC1964] Linn, J., "The Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API Mechanism",
RFC 1964, June 1996. RFC 1964, June 1996.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
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