draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-02.txt   draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-03.txt 
LAMPS WG P. Kampanakis LAMPS WG P. Kampanakis
Internet-Draft Cisco Systems Internet-Draft Cisco Systems
Intended status: Standards Track Q. Dang Intended status: Standards Track Q. Dang
Expires: December 31, 2018 NIST Expires: April 22, 2019 NIST
June 29, 2018 October 19, 2018
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Additional Algorithm Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Additional Algorithm
Identifiers for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA using SHAKEs as Hash Functions Identifiers for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA using SHAKEs as Hash Functions
draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-02 draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-03
Abstract Abstract
Digital signatures are used to sign messages, X.509 certificates and Digital signatures are used to sign messages, X.509 certificates and
CRLs (Certificate Revocation Lists). This document describes the CRLs (Certificate Revocation Lists). This document describes the
conventions for using the SHAKE family of hash functions in the conventions for using the SHAKE family of hash functions in the
Internet X.509 as one-way hash functions with the RSA Probabilistic Internet X.509 as one-way hash functions with the RSA Probabilistic
Signature Scheme and ECDSA signature algorithms. The conventions for Signature Scheme and ECDSA signature algorithms. The conventions for
the associated subject public keys are also described. the associated subject public keys are also described.
skipping to change at page 1, line 37 skipping to change at page 1, line 37
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on December 31, 2018. This Internet-Draft will expire on April 22, 2019.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Use in PKIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4. Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.1. Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5. Use in PKIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.1.1. RSASSA-PSS Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5.1. Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.1.2. ECDSA Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5.1.1. RSASSA-PSS Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.2. Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5.1.2. Deterministic ECDSA Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2.1. RSASSA-PSS Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5.2. Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2.2. ECDSA Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5.2.1. RSASSA-PSS Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5.2.2. ECDSA Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Appendix A. ASN.1 module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Appendix A. ASN.1 module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1. Change Log 1. Change Log
[ EDNOTE: Remove this section before publication. ] [ EDNOTE: Remove this section before publication. ]
o draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-03:
* Updates based on suggestions and clarifications by Jim.
* Added ASN.1.
o draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-02: o draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-02:
* Significant reorganization of the sections to simplify the * Significant reorganization of the sections to simplify the
introduction, the new OIDs and their use in PKIX. introduction, the new OIDs and their use in PKIX.
* Added new OIDs for RSASSA-PSS that hardcode hash, salt and MFG, * Added new OIDs for RSASSA-PSS that hardcode hash, salt and MGF,
according the WG consensus. according the WG consensus.
* Updated Public Key section to use the new RSASSA-PSS OIDs and * Updated Public Key section to use the new RSASSA-PSS OIDs and
clarify the algorithm identifier usage. clarify the algorithm identifier usage.
* Removed the no longer used SHAKE OIDs from section 3.1. * Removed the no longer used SHAKE OIDs from section 3.1.
* Consolidated subsection for message digest algorithms. * Consolidated subsection for message digest algorithms.
* Text fixes. * Text fixes.
skipping to change at page 3, line 29 skipping to change at page 3, line 35
* Initial version * Initial version
2. Introduction 2. Introduction
This document describes several cryptographic algorithm identifiers This document describes several cryptographic algorithm identifiers
for several cryptographic algorithms which use variable length output for several cryptographic algorithms which use variable length output
SHAKE functions introduced in [SHA3] which can be used with the SHAKE functions introduced in [SHA3] which can be used with the
Internet X.509 Certificate and CRL profile [RFC5280]. Internet X.509 Certificate and CRL profile [RFC5280].
The SHA-3 family of one-way hash functions is specified in [SHA3]. The SHA-3 family of one-way hash functions is specified in [SHA3].
In the SHA-3 family, two extendable-output functions, called SHAKE128 In the SHA-3 family, two extendable-output functions (SHAKEs):
and SHAKE256 are defined. Four hash functions, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHAKE128 and SHAKE256, are defined. Four other hash function
SHA3-384, and SHA3-512 are also defined but are out of scope for this instances, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, and SHA3-512 are also
document. A SHAKE is a variable length hash function. The output defined but are out of scope for this document. A SHAKE is a
lengths, in bits, of the SHAKE hash functions are defined by the d variable length hash function. The output length, in bits, of a
parameter. The corresponding collision and preimage resistance SHAKE is defined by the d parameter. The corresponding collision and
security levels for SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 are respectively second preimage resistance strengths for SHAKE128 are min(d/2,128)
min(d/2,128) and min(d,128) and min(d/2,256) and min(d,256) bits. and min(d,128) bits respectively. And, the corresponding collision
and second preimage resistance strengths for SHAKE256 are
min(d/2,256) and min(d,256) bits respectively.
SHAKEs can be used as the message digest function (to hash the A SHAKE can be used as the message digest function (to hash the
message to be signed) and as the hash function in the mask generating message to be signed) in RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA and as the hash in the
functions in RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA. In this document, we define four mask generating function in RSASSA-PSS. In Section 4, we define four
new OIDs for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA when SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 are used new OIDs for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA when SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 are
as hash functions. The same algorithm identifiers are used for used. The same algorithm identifiers are used for identifying a
identifying a public key, and identifying a signature. public key, and identifying a signature.
3. Identifiers 3. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
4. Identifiers
The new identifiers for RSASSA-PSS signatures using SHAKEs are below. The new identifiers for RSASSA-PSS signatures using SHAKEs are below.
id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { TBD } id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { TBD }
id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { TBD } id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { TBD }
[ EDNOTE: "TBD" will be specified by NIST later. ] [ EDNOTE: "TBD" will be specified by NIST later. ]
The new algorithm identifiers of ECDSA signatures using SHAKEs are The new algorithm identifiers of ECDSA signatures using SHAKEs are
below. below.
id-ecdsa-with-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-ccitt(2) id-ecdsa-with-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-ccitt(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) algorithms(4) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
id-ecdsa-with-shake(3) TBD } csor(3) algorithms(4) id-ecdsa-with-shake(3)
TBD }
id-ecdsa-with-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-ccitt(2) id-ecdsa-with-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-ccitt(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) algorithms(4) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
id-ecdsa-with-shake(3) TBD } csor(3) algorithms(4) id-ecdsa-with-shake(3)
TBD }
[ EDNOTE: "TBD" will be specified by NIST later. ] [ EDNOTE: "TBD" will be specified by NIST later. ]
The parameters for these four identifiers above MUST be absent. That The parameters for these four identifiers above MUST be absent. That
is, the identifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, the OID. is, the identifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, the OID.
4. Use in PKIX Section 5.1.1 and Section 5.1.2 specify the required output length
for each use of SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 in RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA. In
summary, when hashing messages to be signed, output lengths of
SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 are 256 and 512 bits respectively. When the
SHAKEs are used as mask generation functions, their output lengths
are (n - 264) or (n - 520) bits respectively, where n is a RSA
modulus size in bits.
4.1. Signatures 5. Use in PKIX
5.1. Signatures
Signatures can be placed in a number of different ASN.1 structures. Signatures can be placed in a number of different ASN.1 structures.
The top level structure for an X.509 certificate, to illustrate how The top level structure for an X.509 certificate, to illustrate how
signatures are frequently encoded with an algorithm identifier and a signatures are frequently encoded with an algorithm identifier and a
location for the signature, is location for the signature, is
Certificate ::= SEQUENCE { Certificate ::= SEQUENCE {
tbsCertificate TBSCertificate, tbsCertificate TBSCertificate,
signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
signatureValue BIT STRING } signatureValue BIT STRING }
The identifiers defined in Section 3 can be used as the The identifiers defined in Section 4 can be used as the
AlgorithmIdentifier in the signatureAlgorithm field in the sequence AlgorithmIdentifier in the signatureAlgorithm field in the sequence
Certificate and the signature field in the sequence tbsCertificate in Certificate and the signature field in the sequence tbsCertificate in
X.509 [RFC3280]. X.509 [RFC5280].
Conforming CA implementations MUST specify the algorithms explicitly Conforming CA implementations MUST specify the algorithms explicitly
by using the OIDs specified in Section 3 when encoding RSASSA-PSS and by using the OIDs specified in Section 4 when encoding RSASSA-PSS and
ECDSA with SHAKE signatures, and public keys in certificates and ECDSA with SHAKE signatures in certificates and CRLs. Encoding rules
CRLs. Encoding rules for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA signature values are for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA signature values are specified in [RFC4055]
specified in [RFC4055] and [RFC5480] respectively. and [RFC5480] respectively.
Conforming client implementations that process RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA Conforming client implementations that process RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA
with SHAKE signatures when processing certificates and CRLs MUST with SHAKE signatures when processing certificates and CRLs MUST
recognize the corresponding OIDs. recognize the corresponding OIDs.
4.1.1. RSASSA-PSS Signatures 5.1.1. RSASSA-PSS Signatures
The RSASSA-PSS algorithm is defined in [RFC8017]. When id-RSASSA- The RSASSA-PSS algorithm is defined in [RFC8017]. When id-RSASSA-
PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 specified in Section 3 is PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 specified in Section 4 is
used, the encoding MUST omit the parameters field. That is, the used, the encoding MUST omit the parameters field. That is, the
AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, id-RSASSA- AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, id-RSASSA-
PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256. PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256.
The hash algorithm to hash a message being signed and the hash The hash algorithm to hash a message being signed and the hash
algorithm in the maskGenAlgorithm used in RSASSA-PSS MUST be the algorithm as the mask generation function "MGF(H, emLen - hLen - 1)"
same, SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 respectively. The output-length of the [RFC8017] used in RSASSA-PSS MUST be the same, SHAKE128 or SHAKE256
hash algorithm which hashes the message SHALL be 32 or 64 bytes respectively. The output-length of the hash algorithm which hashes
respectively. the message SHALL be 32 or 64 bytes respectively.
The maskGenAlgorithm is the MGF1 specified in Section B.2.1 of In RSASSA-PSS, a mask generation function takes an octet string of
[RFC8017]. The output length for SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 being used as variable length and a desired output length as input, and outputs an
the hash function in MGF1 is (n - 264)/8 or (n - 520)/8 bytes octet string of the desired length. In RSASSA-PSS with SHAKES, the
respectively, where n is the RSA modulus in bits. For example, when SHAKEs MUST be used natively as the MGF function, instead of the MGF1
RSA modulus n is 2048, the output length of SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 in algorithm that uses the hash function in multiple iterations as
the MGF1 will be 223 or 191 when id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA- specified in Section B.2.1 of [RFC8017]. In other words, the MGF is
PSS-SHAKE256 is used respectively. defined as
SHAKE128(mgfSeed, maskLen)
and
SHAKE256(mgfSeed, maskLen)
respectively for id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 and id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256.
The mgfSeed is the seed from which mask is generated, an octet
string. The maskLen for SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 being used as the MGF
is (n - 264)/8 or (n - 520)/8 bytes respectively, where n is the RSA
modulus in bits. For example, when RSA modulus n is 2048, the output
length of SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 as the MGF will be 223 or 191 when id-
RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 is used respectively.
The RSASSA-PSS saltLength MUST be 32 or 64 bytes respectively. The RSASSA-PSS saltLength MUST be 32 or 64 bytes respectively.
Finally, the trailerField MUST be 1, which represents the trailer Finally, the trailerField MUST be 1, which represents the trailer
field with hexadecimal value 0xBC [RFC8017]. field with hexadecimal value 0xBC [RFC8017].
4.1.2. ECDSA Signatures 5.1.2. Deterministic ECDSA Signatures
The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is defined in The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is defined in
[X9.62]. When the id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE128 or id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE256 [X9.62]. When the id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE128 or id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE256
(specified in Section 3) algorithm identifier appears, the respective (specified in Section 4) algorithm identifier appears, the respective
SHAKE function (SHAKE128 or SHAKE256) is used as the hash. The SHAKE function (SHAKE128 or SHAKE256) is used as the hash. The
encoding MUST omit the parameters field. That is, the encoding MUST omit the parameters field. That is, the
AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, the OID id- AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, the OID id-
ecdsa-with-SHAKE128 or id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE256. ecdsa-with-SHAKE128 or id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE256.
For simplicity and compliance with the ECDSA standard specification, For simplicity and compliance with the ECDSA standard specification,
the output size of the hash function must be explicitly determined. the output size of the hash function must be explicitly determined.
The output size, d, for SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 used in ECDSA MUST be The output size, d, for SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 used in ECDSA MUST be
256 or 512 bits respectively. 256 or 512 bits respectively.
Conforming CA implementations that generate ECDSA with SHAKE Conforming CA implementations that generate ECDSA with SHAKE
signatures in certificates or CRLs MUST generate such signatures in signatures in certificates or CRLs MUST generate such signatures with
accordance with all the requirements specified in Sections 7.2 and a deterministicly generated, non-random k in accordance with all the
7.3 of [X9.62] or with all the requirements specified in requirements specified in [RFC6979]. They MAY also generate such
Section 4.1.3 of [SEC1]. They MAY also generate such signatures in signatures in accordance with all other recommendations in [X9.62] or
accordance with all the recommendations in [X9.62] or [SEC1] if they [SEC1] if they have a stated policy that requires conformance to
have a stated policy that requires conformance to these standards. these standards. These standards may have not specified SHAKE128 and
These standards may have not specified SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 as hash SHAKE256 as hash algorithm options. However, SHAKE128 and SHAKE256
algorithm options. However, SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 with output length with output length being 32 and 64 octets respectively are
being 32 and 64 octets respectively are subtitutions for 256 and subtitutions for 256 and 512-bit output hash algorithms such as
512-bit output hash algorithms such as SHA256 and SHA512 used in the SHA256 and SHA512 used in the standards.
standards.
4.2. Public Keys In Section 3.2 "Generation of k" of [RFC6979], HMAC is used to derive
the deterministic k. Conforming implementations that generate
deterministic ECDSA with SHAKE signatures in X.509 MUST use KMAC with
SHAKE128 or KMAC with SHAKE256 as specfied in [SP800-185] when
SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 is used as the message hashing algorithm,
respectively. In this situation, KMAC with SHAKE128 and KMAC with
SHAKE256 have 256-bit and 512-bit outputs respectively, and the
optional customization bit string S is an empty string.
5.2. Public Keys
Certificates conforming to [RFC5280] can convey a public key for any Certificates conforming to [RFC5280] can convey a public key for any
public key algorithm. The certificate indicates the algorithm public key algorithm. The certificate indicates the algorithm
through an algorithm identifier. This algorithm identifier is an OID through an algorithm identifier. This algorithm identifier is an OID
and optionally associated parameters. and optionally associated parameters.
In the X.509 certificate, the subjectPublicKeyInfo field has the In the X.509 certificate, the subjectPublicKeyInfo field has the
SubjectPublicKeyInfo type, which has the following ASN.1 syntax: SubjectPublicKeyInfo type, which has the following ASN.1 syntax:
SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE { SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
skipping to change at page 6, line 38 skipping to change at page 7, line 38
The fields in SubjectPublicKeyInfo have the following meanings: The fields in SubjectPublicKeyInfo have the following meanings:
o algorithm is the algorithm identifier and parameters for the o algorithm is the algorithm identifier and parameters for the
public key. public key.
o subjectPublicKey contains the byte stream of the public key. The o subjectPublicKey contains the byte stream of the public key. The
algorithms defined in this document always encode the public key algorithms defined in this document always encode the public key
as an exact multiple of 8-bits. as an exact multiple of 8-bits.
The conventions for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA public keys algorithm Conforming CA implementations MUST specify the algorithms explicitly
by using the OIDs specified in Section 4 when encoding RSASSA-PSS and
ECDSA with SHAKE public keys in certificates and CRLs. The
conventions for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA public keys algorithm
identifiers are as specified in [RFC3279], [RFC4055] and [RFC5480] , identifiers are as specified in [RFC3279], [RFC4055] and [RFC5480] ,
but we include them below for convenience. but we include them below for convenience.
4.2.1. RSASSA-PSS Public Keys 5.2.1. RSASSA-PSS Public Keys
[RFC3279] defines the following OID for RSA AlgorithmIdentifier in [RFC3279] defines the following OID for RSA AlgorithmIdentifier in
the SubjectPublicKeyInfo with NULL parameters. the SubjectPublicKeyInfo with NULL parameters.
rsaEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 1} rsaEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 1}
Additionally, when the RSA private key owner wishes to limit the use Additionally, when the RSA private key owner wishes to limit the use
of the public key exclusively to RSASSA-PSS, the AlgorithmIdentifiers of the public key exclusively to RSASSA-PSS, the AlgorithmIdentifiers
for RSASSA-PSS defined in Section 3 can be used as the algorithm for RSASSA-PSS defined in Section 4 can be used as the algorithm
field in the SubjectPublicKeyInfo sequence [RFC3280]. The identifier field in the SubjectPublicKeyInfo sequence [RFC5280]. The identifier
parameters, as explained in section Section 3, MUST be absent. parameters, as explained in section Section 4, MUST be absent.
Regardless of what public key algorithm identifier is used, the RSA Regardless of what public key algorithm identifier is used, the RSA
public key, which is composed of a modulus and a public exponent, public key, which is composed of a modulus and a public exponent,
MUST be encoded using the RSAPublicKey type [RFC4055]. The output of MUST be encoded using the RSAPublicKey type [RFC4055]. The output of
this encoding is carried in the certificate subjectPublicKey. this encoding is carried in the certificate subjectPublicKey.
RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE { RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE {
modulus INTEGER, -- n modulus INTEGER, -- n
publicExponent INTEGER -- e publicExponent INTEGER -- e
} }
4.2.2. ECDSA Public Keys 5.2.2. ECDSA Public Keys
For ECDSA, when id-ecdsa-with-shake128 or id-ecdsa-with-shake256 is For ECDSA, the public key identifier defined in [RFC5480] is
used as the AlgorithmIdentifier in the algorithm field of
SubjectPublicKeyInfo, the parameters, as explained in section id-ecPublicKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
Section 3, MUST be absent. iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) keyType(2) 1 }
Additionally, the mandatory EC SubjectPublicKey is defined in Additionally, the mandatory EC SubjectPublicKey is defined in
Section 2.1.1 and its syntax is in Section 2.2 of [RFC5480]. We also Section 2.1.1 and its syntax is in Section 2.2 of [RFC5480]. We also
include them here for convenience: include them here for convenience:
id-ecPublicKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) keyType(2) 1 }
The id-ecPublicKey parameters MUST be present and are defined as The id-ecPublicKey parameters MUST be present and are defined as
ECParameters ::= CHOICE { ECParameters ::= CHOICE {
namedCurve OBJECT IDENTIFIER namedCurve OBJECT IDENTIFIER
-- implicitCurve NULL -- implicitCurve NULL
-- specifiedCurve SpecifiedECDomain -- specifiedCurve SpecifiedECDomain
} }
The ECParameters associated with the ECDSA public key in the signer's The ECParameters associated with the ECDSA public key in the signer's
certificate SHALL apply to the verification of the signature. certificate SHALL apply to the verification of the signature.
5. IANA Considerations 6. IANA Considerations
This document uses several new registries [ EDNOTE: Update here. ] [ EDNOTE: Update here only if there are OID allocations by IANA. ]
6. Security Considerations This document has no IANA actions.
7. Security Considerations
The SHAKEs are deterministic functions. Like any other deterministic The SHAKEs are deterministic functions. Like any other deterministic
functions, executing each function with the same input multiple times functions, executing each function with the same input multiple times
will produce the same output. Therefore, users should not expect will produce the same output. Therefore, users should not expect
unrelated outputs (with the same or different output lengths) from unrelated outputs (with the same or different output lengths) from
excuting a SHAKE function with the same input multiple times. excuting a SHAKE function with the same input multiple times.The
shorter one of any 2 outputs produced from a SHAKE with the same
input is a prefix of the longer one. It is a similar situation as
truncating a 512-bit output of SHA-512 by taking its 256 left-most
bits. These 256 left-most bits are a prefix of the 512-bit output.
Implementations must protect the signer's private key. Compromise of Implementations must protect the signer's private key. Compromise of
the signer's private key permits masquerade. the signer's private key permits masquerade.
Implementations must randomly generate one-time values, such as the k Implementations must randomly generate one-time values, such as the k
value when generating a ECDSA signature. In addition, the generation value when generating a ECDSA signature. In addition, the generation
of public/private key pairs relies on random numbers. The use of of public/private key pairs relies on random numbers. The use of
inadequate pseudo-random number generators (PRNGs) to generate such inadequate pseudo-random number generators (PRNGs) to generate such
cryptographic values can result in little or no security. The cryptographic values can result in little or no security. The
generation of quality random numbers is difficult. [RFC4086] offers generation of quality random numbers is difficult. [RFC4086] offers
skipping to change at page 8, line 28 skipping to change at page 9, line 38
Implementers should be aware that cryptographic algorithms may become Implementers should be aware that cryptographic algorithms may become
weaker with time. As new cryptanalysis techniques are developed and weaker with time. As new cryptanalysis techniques are developed and
computing power increases, the work factor or time required to break computing power increases, the work factor or time required to break
a particular cryptographic algorithm may decrease. Therefore, a particular cryptographic algorithm may decrease. Therefore,
cryptographic algorithm implementations should be modular allowing cryptographic algorithm implementations should be modular allowing
new algorithms to be readily inserted. That is, implementers should new algorithms to be readily inserted. That is, implementers should
be prepared to regularly update the set of algorithms in their be prepared to regularly update the set of algorithms in their
implementations. implementations.
7. Acknowledgements 8. Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Sean Turner for his valuable contributions to We would like to thank Sean Turner and Jim Schaad for his valuable
this document. contributions to this document.
8. References 9. References
8.1. Normative References 9.1. Normative References
[RFC3280] Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W., and D. Solo, "Internet [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3280, April 2002, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3280>.
[RFC4055] Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional [RFC4055] Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional
Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in
the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 4055, and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 4055,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4055, June 2005, DOI 10.17487/RFC4055, June 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4055>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4055>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
skipping to change at page 9, line 27 skipping to change at page 10, line 34
"PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2", "PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2",
RFC 8017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8017, November 2016, RFC 8017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8017, November 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8017>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8017>.
[SHA3] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "SHA-3 [SHA3] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "SHA-3
Standard - Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Standard - Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output
Functions FIPS PUB 202", August 2015, Functions FIPS PUB 202", August 2015,
<https://www.nist.gov/publications/sha-3-standard- <https://www.nist.gov/publications/sha-3-standard-
permutation-based-hash-and-extendable-output-functions>. permutation-based-hash-and-extendable-output-functions>.
8.2. Informative References 9.2. Informative References
[RFC3279] Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and [RFC3279] Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and
Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, DOI 10.17487/RFC3279, April (CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, DOI 10.17487/RFC3279, April
2002, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3279>. 2002, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3279>.
[RFC4086] Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, [RFC4086] Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
"Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, "Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005, DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4086>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4086>.
[RFC6979] Pornin, T., "Deterministic Usage of the Digital Signature
Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm (ECDSA)", RFC 6979, DOI 10.17487/RFC6979, August
2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6979>.
[SEC1] Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group, "SEC 1: [SEC1] Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group, "SEC 1:
Elliptic Curve Cryptography", May 2009, Elliptic Curve Cryptography", May 2009,
<http://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf>. <http://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf>.
[SP800-185]
National Institute of Standards and Technology, "SHA-3
Derived Functions: cSHAKE, KMAC, TupleHash and
ParallelHash. NIST SP 800-185", December 2016,
<http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/
NIST.SP.800-185.pdf>.
[SP800-90A] [SP800-90A]
National Institute of Standards and Technology, National Institute of Standards and Technology,
"Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using "Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using
Deterministic Random Bit Generators. NIST SP 800-90A", Deterministic Random Bit Generators. NIST SP 800-90A",
June 2015, June 2015,
<http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/ <http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/
NIST.SP.800-90Ar1.pdf>. NIST.SP.800-90Ar1.pdf>.
[X9.62] American National Standard for Financial Services (ANSI), [X9.62] American National Standard for Financial Services (ANSI),
"X9.62-2005 Public Key Cryptography for the Financial "X9.62-2005 Public Key Cryptography for the Financial
Services Industry: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Services Industry: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Standard (ECDSA)", November 2005. Standard (ECDSA)", November 2005.
Appendix A. ASN.1 module Appendix A. ASN.1 module
[ EDNOTE: More here. ] This appendix includes the ASN.1 modules for SHAKEs in X.509. This
module does not come from any existing RFC.
PKIXAlgsForSHAKE-2018 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-pkix1-shake-2018(TBD) }
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
-- EXPORTS ALL;
IMPORTS
-- FROM [RFC5912]
PUBLIC-KEY, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, DIGEST-ALGORITHM, MAC-ALGORITHM,
SMIME-CAPS
FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58) }
-- FROM [RFC5912]
id-RSASSA-PSS, RSAPublicKey, rsaEncryption, id-ecPublicKey,
ECPoint, ECDSA-Sig-Value
FROM PKIXAlgs-2009 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-pkix1-algorithms2008-02(56) }
--
-- One-Way Hash Functions
-- SHAKE128
mda-shake128 DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-shake128 -- with output length 32 bytes.
}
id-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4)
hashAlgs(2) 11 }
-- SHAKE-256
mda-shake256 DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-shake256 -- with output length 64 bytes.
}
id-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4)
hashAlgs(2) 12 }
--
-- Public Key (pk-) Algorithms
--
PublicKeys PUBLIC-KEY ::= {
...,
pk-rsaSSA-PSS-SHAKE128 |
pk-rsaSSA-PSS-SHAKE256 |
pk-ec,
...
}
-- From [RFC5912] - Here so it compiles.
pk-rsa PUBLIC-KEY ::= {
IDENTIFIER rsaEncryption
KEY RSAPublicKey
PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE absent
-- Private key format not in this module --
CERT-KEY-USAGE {digitalSignature, nonRepudiation,
keyEncipherment, dataEncipherment, keyCertSign, cRLSign}
}
-- The hashAlgorithm is mda-shake128
-- The maskGenAlgorithm is mda-shake128
-- Mask Gen Algorithm is SHAKE128 with output length
-- (n - 264)/8, where n is the RSA modulus in bits.
-- the saltLength is 32
-- the trailerField is 1
pk-rsaSSA-PSS-SHAKE128 PUBLIC-KEY ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128
KEY RSAPublicKey
PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE absent
-- Private key format not in this module --
CERT-KEY-USAGE { nonRepudiation, digitalSignature,
keyCertSign, cRLSign }
}
-- The hashAlgorithm is mda-shake256
-- The maskGenAlgorithm is mda-shake256
-- Mask Gen Algorithm is SHAKE256 with output length
-- (n - 520)/8, where n is the RSA modulus in bits.
-- the saltLength is 64
-- the trailerField is 1
pk-rsaSSA-PSS-SHAKE256 PUBLIC-KEY ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256
KEY RSAPublicKey
PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE absent
-- Private key format not in this module --
CERT-KEY-USAGE { nonRepudiation, digitalSignature,
keyCertSign, cRLSign }
}
pk-ec PUBLIC-KEY ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-ecPublicKey
KEY ECPoint
PARAMS TYPE ECParameters ARE required
-- Private key format not in this module --
CERT-KEY-USAGE { digitalSignature, nonRepudiation, keyAgreement,
keyCertSign, cRLSign }
}
ECParameters ::= CHOICE {
namedCurve CURVE.&id({NamedCurve})
-- implicitCurve NULL
-- implicitCurve MUST NOT be used in PKIX
-- specifiedCurve SpecifiedCurve
-- specifiedCurve MUST NOT be used in PKIX
-- Details for specifiedCurve can be found in [X9.62]
-- Any future additions to this CHOICE should be coordinated
-- with ANSI X.9.
}
--
-- Signature Algorithms (sa-)
--
SignatureAlgs SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
...,
-- This expands SignatureAlgorithms from [RFC5912]
sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE128 |
sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE256 |
sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE128 |
sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE256
}
--
-- SMIME Capabilities (sa-)
--
SMimeCaps SMIME-CAPS ::= {
...,
-- The expands SMimeCaps from [RFC5912]
sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE128.&smimeCaps |
sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE256.&smimeCaps |
sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE128.&smimeCaps |
sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE256.&smimeCaps
}
-- RSASSA-PSS with SHAKE128
sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE128 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128
PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE absent
-- The hashAlgorithm is mda-shake128
-- The maskGenAlgorithm is mda-shake128
-- Mask Gen Algorithm is SHAKE128 with output length
-- (n - 264)/8, where n is the RSA modulus in bits.
-- the saltLength is 32
-- the trailerField is 1
HASHES {mda-shake128} -- omitting mda-shake128-params
PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-rsa | pk-rsaSSA-PSS-SHAKE128 }
SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 }
}
id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { TBD }
-- RSASSA-PSS with SHAKE256
sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE256 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256
PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE absent
-- The hashAlgorithm is mda-shake256
-- The maskGenAlgorithm is mda-shake256
-- Mask Gen Algorithm is SHAKE256 with output length
-- (n - 520)/8, where n is the RSA modulus in bits.
-- the saltLength is 64
-- the trailerField is 1
HASHES {mda-shake256} -- omitting mda-shake256-params
PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-rsa | pk-rsaSSA-PSS-SHAKE256 }
SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 }
}
id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { TBD }
-- Determinstic ECDSA with SHAKE128
-- Generating k by using KMAC with SHAKE128 as the hash
-- [SP800-185] instead of HMAC with output length 256-bits
-- that is equal to or slightly less than the elliptic
-- curve group order. S is set to an empty string.
sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE128 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-ecdsa-with-shake128
VALUE ECDSA-Sig-Value
PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE absent
HASHES { mda-shake128 }
PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-ec }
SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-ecdsa-with-shake128 }
}
id-ecdsa-with-shake128 ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4)
sigAlgs(3) TBD }
-- Determinstic ECDSA with SHAKE256
-- Generating k by using KMAC with SHAKE256 as the hash
-- [SP800-185] instead of HMAC with output length 512-bits
-- truncated to equal to or slightly less than the elliptic
-- curve group order. S is set to an empty string.
sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE256 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-ecdsa-with-shake256
VALUE ECDSA-Sig-Value
PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE absent
HASHES { mda-shake256 }
PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-ec }
SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-ecdsa-with-shake256 }
}
id-ecdsa-with-shake256 ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4)
sigAlgs(3) TBD }
END
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Panos Kampanakis Panos Kampanakis
Cisco Systems Cisco Systems
Email: pkampana@cisco.com Email: pkampana@cisco.com
Quynh Dang Quynh Dang
NIST NIST
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