draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-04.txt   draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-05.txt 
LAMPS WG P. Kampanakis LAMPS WG P. Kampanakis
Internet-Draft Cisco Systems Internet-Draft Cisco Systems
Intended status: Standards Track Q. Dang Intended status: Standards Track Q. Dang
Expires: May 29, 2019 NIST Expires: June 2, 2019 NIST
November 25, 2018 November 29, 2018
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Additional Algorithm Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Additional Algorithm
Identifiers for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA using SHAKEs Identifiers for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA using SHAKEs
draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-04 draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-05
Abstract Abstract
Digital signatures are used to sign messages, X.509 certificates and Digital signatures are used to sign messages, X.509 certificates and
CRLs (Certificate Revocation Lists). This document describes the CRLs (Certificate Revocation Lists). This document describes the
conventions for using the SHAKE function family in Internet X.509 conventions for using the SHAKE function family in Internet X.509
certificates and CRLs as one-way hash functions with the RSA certificates and CRLs as one-way hash functions with the RSA
Probabilistic signature and ECDSA signature algorithms. The Probabilistic signature and ECDSA signature algorithms. The
conventions for the associated subject public keys are also conventions for the associated subject public keys are also
described. described.
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on May 29, 2019. This Internet-Draft will expire on June 2, 2019.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4. Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Use in PKIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5. Use in PKIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5.1. Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5.1. Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5.1.1. RSASSA-PSS Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5.1.1. RSASSA-PSS Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.1.2. Deterministic ECDSA Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5.1.2. Deterministic ECDSA Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.2. Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5.2. Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.2.1. RSASSA-PSS Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.2.2. ECDSA Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Appendix A. ASN.1 module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Appendix A. ASN.1 module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1. Change Log 1. Change Log
[ EDNOTE: Remove this section before publication. ] [ EDNOTE: Remove this section before publication. ]
o draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-05:
* Added RFC8174 reference and text.
* Explicitly explained why RSASSA-PSS-params are omitted in
section 5.1.1.
* Simplified Public Keys section by removing redundand info from
RFCs.
o draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-04: o draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-04:
* Removed paragraph suggesting KMAC to be used in generating k in * Removed paragraph suggesting KMAC to be used in generating k in
Deterministric ECDSA. That should be RFC6979-bis. Deterministric ECDSA. That should be RFC6979-bis.
* Removed paragraph from Security Considerations that talks about * Removed paragraph from Security Considerations that talks about
randomness of k because we are using deterministric ECDSA. randomness of k because we are using deterministric ECDSA.
* Various ASN.1 fixes. * Various ASN.1 fixes.
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min(d/2,256) and min(d,256) bits respectively. min(d/2,256) and min(d,256) bits respectively.
A SHAKE can be used as the message digest function (to hash the A SHAKE can be used as the message digest function (to hash the
message to be signed) in RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA and as the hash in the message to be signed) in RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA and as the hash in the
mask generating function in RSASSA-PSS. This specification describes mask generating function in RSASSA-PSS. This specification describes
the identifiers for SHAKEs to be used in X.509 and their meaning. the identifiers for SHAKEs to be used in X.509 and their meaning.
3. Terminology 3. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
4. Identifiers 4. Identifiers
This section defines four new OIDs for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA when This section defines four new OIDs for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA when
SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 are used. The same algorithm identifiers are SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 are used. The same algorithm identifiers are
used for identifying a public key in RSASSA-PSS. used for identifying a public key in RSASSA-PSS.
The new identifiers for RSASSA-PSS signatures using SHAKEs are below. The new identifiers for RSASSA-PSS signatures using SHAKEs are below.
id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { TBD } id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { TBD }
id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { TBD } id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { TBD }
[ EDNOTE: "TBD" will be specified by NIST later. ] [ EDNOTE: "TBD" will be specified by NIST later. ]
The new algorithm identifiers of ECDSA signatures using SHAKEs are The new algorithm identifiers of ECDSA signatures using SHAKEs are
below. below.
id-ecdsa-with-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-ccitt(2) id-ecdsa-with-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
csor(3) algorithms(4) id-ecdsa-with-shake(3) csor(3) algorithms(4) id-ecdsa-with-shake(3)
TBD } TBD }
id-ecdsa-with-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-ccitt(2) id-ecdsa-with-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
csor(3) algorithms(4) id-ecdsa-with-shake(3) csor(3) algorithms(4) id-ecdsa-with-shake(3)
TBD } TBD }
[ EDNOTE: "TBD" will be specified by NIST later. ] [ EDNOTE: "TBD" will be specified by NIST later. ]
The parameters for the four identifiers above MUST be absent. That The parameters for the four identifiers above MUST be absent. That
is, the identifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, the OID. is, the identifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, the OID.
Section 5.1.1 and Section 5.1.2 specify the required output length Section 5.1.1 and Section 5.1.2 specify the required output length
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corresponding OIDs. Encoding rules for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA corresponding OIDs. Encoding rules for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA
signature values are specified in [RFC4055] and [RFC5480] signature values are specified in [RFC4055] and [RFC5480]
respectively. respectively.
5.1.1. RSASSA-PSS Signatures 5.1.1. RSASSA-PSS Signatures
The RSASSA-PSS algorithm is defined in [RFC8017]. When id-RSASSA- The RSASSA-PSS algorithm is defined in [RFC8017]. When id-RSASSA-
PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 specified in Section 4 is PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 specified in Section 4 is
used, the encoding MUST omit the parameters field. That is, the used, the encoding MUST omit the parameters field. That is, the
AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, id-RSASSA- AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, id-RSASSA-
PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256. PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256. [RFC4055] defines RSASSA-
PSS-params that are used to define the algorithms and inputs to the
algorithm. This specification does not use parameters because the
hash and mask generating algorithsm and trailer and salt are embedded
in the OID definition.
The hash algorithm to hash a message being signed and the hash The hash algorithm to hash a message being signed and the hash
algorithm as the mask generation function used in RSASSA-PSS MUST be algorithm as the mask generation function used in RSASSA-PSS MUST be
the same, SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 respectively. The output-length of the same, SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 respectively. The output-length of
the hash algorithm which hashes the message SHALL be 32 or 64 bytes the hash algorithm which hashes the message SHALL be 32 or 64 bytes
respectively. respectively.
The mask generation function takes an octet string of variable length The mask generation function takes an octet string of variable length
and a desired output length as input, and outputs an octet string of and a desired output length as input, and outputs an octet string of
the desired length. In RSASSA-PSS with SHAKES, the SHAKEs MUST be the desired length. In RSASSA-PSS with SHAKES, the SHAKEs MUST be
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[SEC1] if they have a stated policy that requires conformance to [SEC1] if they have a stated policy that requires conformance to
these standards. These standards may have not specified SHAKE128 and these standards. These standards may have not specified SHAKE128 and
SHAKE256 as hash algorithm options. However, SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 SHAKE256 as hash algorithm options. However, SHAKE128 and SHAKE256
with output length being 32 and 64 octets respectively are with output length being 32 and 64 octets respectively are
subtitutions for 256 and 512-bit output hash algorithms such as subtitutions for 256 and 512-bit output hash algorithms such as
SHA256 and SHA512 used in the standards. SHA256 and SHA512 used in the standards.
5.2. Public Keys 5.2. Public Keys
Certificates conforming to [RFC5280] can convey a public key for any Certificates conforming to [RFC5280] can convey a public key for any
public key algorithm. The certificate indicates the algorithm public key algorithm. The certificate indicates the public key
through an algorithm identifier. This algorithm identifier is an OID algorithm through an algorithm identifier. This algorithm identifier
and optionally associated parameters. is an OID and optionally associated parameters.
In the X.509 certificate, the subjectPublicKeyInfo field has the
SubjectPublicKeyInfo type, which has the following ASN.1 syntax:
SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
subjectPublicKey BIT STRING
}
The fields in SubjectPublicKeyInfo have the following meanings:
o algorithm is the algorithm identifier and parameters for the
public key.
o subjectPublicKey contains the byte stream of the public key. The
algorithms defined in this document always encode the public key
as an exact multiple of 8-bits.
Conforming CA implementations MUST specify the algorithms explicitly
by using the OIDs specified in Section 4 when encoding RSASSA-PSS or
ECDSA with SHAKE public keys in certificates and CRLs. Conforming
client implementations that process RSASSA-PSS or ECDSA with SHAKE
public key when processing certificates and CRLs MUST recognize the
corresponding OIDs. The conventions for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA public
keys algorithm identifiers are as specified in [RFC3279], [RFC4055]
and [RFC5480] , but we include them below for convenience.
5.2.1. RSASSA-PSS Public Keys
[RFC3279] defines the following OID for RSA AlgorithmIdentifier in
the SubjectPublicKeyInfo with NULL parameters.
rsaEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 1}
Additionally, when the RSA private key owner wishes to limit the use
of the public key exclusively to RSASSA-PSS, the AlgorithmIdentifiers
for RSASSA-PSS defined in Section 4 can be used as the algorithm
field in the SubjectPublicKeyInfo sequence [RFC5280]. The identifier
parameters, as explained in section Section 4, MUST be absent.
Regardless of what public key algorithm identifier is used, the RSA
public key, which is composed of a modulus and a public exponent,
MUST be encoded using the RSAPublicKey type [RFC4055]. The output of
this encoding is carried in the certificate subjectPublicKey.
RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE {
modulus INTEGER, -- n
publicExponent INTEGER -- e
}
5.2.2. ECDSA Public Keys
For ECDSA, the public key identifier defined in [RFC5480] is
id-ecPublicKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) keyType(2) 1 }
Additionally, the mandatory EC SubjectPublicKey is defined in
Section 2.1.1 and its syntax is in Section 2.2 of [RFC5480]. We also
include them here for convenience:
The id-ecPublicKey parameters MUST be absent or present and are
defined as
ECParameters ::= CHOICE { Conforming CA implementations MUST specify the X.509 public key
namedCurve OBJECT IDENTIFIER algorithm explicitly by using the OIDs specified in Section 4 when
-- implicitCurve NULL encoding RSASSA-PSS or ECDSA with SHAKE public keys in certificates
-- specifiedCurve SpecifiedECDomain and CRLs. Conforming client implementations that process RSASSA-PSS
} or ECDSA with SHAKE public key when processing certificates and CRLs
MUST recognize the corresponding OIDs. The conventions and encoding
for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA public keys algorithm identifiers are as
specified in Section 2.3 of [RFC3279], Section 3.1 of [RFC4055] and
Section 2.1 of [RFC5480].
The ECParameters associated with the ECDSA public key in the signer's When the RSA private key owner wishes to limit the use of the public
certificate SHALL apply to the verification of the signature. key exclusively to RSASSA-PSS, the AlgorithmIdentifiers for RSASSA-
PSS defined in Section 4 can be used as the algorithm field in the
SubjectPublicKeyInfo sequence [RFC5280]. The identifier parameters,
as explained in section Section 4, MUST be absent. The RSASSA-PSS
algorithm functions and output lengths are the same as defined in
Section 5.1.1.
6. IANA Considerations 6. IANA Considerations
[ EDNOTE: Update here only if there are OID allocations by IANA. ] [ EDNOTE: Update here only if there are OID allocations by IANA. ]
This document has no IANA actions. This document has no IANA actions.
7. Security Considerations 7. Security Considerations
The SHAKEs are deterministic functions. Like any other deterministic The SHAKEs are deterministic functions. Like any other deterministic
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[RFC6979] Pornin, T., "Deterministic Usage of the Digital Signature [RFC6979] Pornin, T., "Deterministic Usage of the Digital Signature
Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm (ECDSA)", RFC 6979, DOI 10.17487/RFC6979, August Algorithm (ECDSA)", RFC 6979, DOI 10.17487/RFC6979, August
2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6979>. 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6979>.
[RFC8017] Moriarty, K., Ed., Kaliski, B., Jonsson, J., and A. Rusch, [RFC8017] Moriarty, K., Ed., Kaliski, B., Jonsson, J., and A. Rusch,
"PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2", "PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2",
RFC 8017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8017, November 2016, RFC 8017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8017, November 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8017>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8017>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[SHA3] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "SHA-3 [SHA3] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "SHA-3
Standard - Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Standard - Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output
Functions FIPS PUB 202", August 2015, Functions FIPS PUB 202", August 2015,
<https://www.nist.gov/publications/sha-3-standard- <https://www.nist.gov/publications/sha-3-standard-
permutation-based-hash-and-extendable-output-functions>. permutation-based-hash-and-extendable-output-functions>.
9.2. Informative References 9.2. Informative References
[RFC3279] Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and [RFC3279] Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and
Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key
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