--- 1/draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-11.txt 2019-06-30 21:13:11.488554843 -0700
+++ 2/draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-12.txt 2019-06-30 21:13:11.600557684 -0700
@@ -1,47 +1,46 @@
LAMPS WG P. Kampanakis
Internet-Draft Cisco Systems
Updates: 3279 (if approved) Q. Dang
Intended status: Standards Track NIST
-Expires: December 11, 2019 June 9, 2019
+Expires: January 1, 2020 June 30, 2019
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Additional Algorithm
Identifiers for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA using SHAKEs
- draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-11
+ draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-12
Abstract
Digital signatures are used to sign messages, X.509 certificates and
- CRLs (Certificate Revocation Lists). This document describes the
- conventions for using the SHAKE function family in Internet X.509
- certificates and CRLs as one-way hash functions with the RSA
- Probabilistic signature and ECDSA signature algorithms. The
- conventions for the associated subject public keys are also
- described.
+ CRLs. This document updates [RFC3279] and describes the conventions
+ for using the SHAKE function family in Internet X.509 certificates
+ and CRLs as one-way hash functions with the RSA Probabilistic
+ signature and ECDSA signature algorithms. The conventions for the
+ associated subject public keys are also described.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
- This Internet-Draft will expire on December 11, 2019.
+ This Internet-Draft will expire on January 1, 2020.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
@@ -53,35 +52,40 @@
Table of Contents
1. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Use in PKIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.1. Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.1.1. RSASSA-PSS Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
- 5.1.2. ECDSA Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
+ 5.1.2. ECDSA Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.2. Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
- 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
+ 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Appendix A. ASN.1 module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1. Change Log
[ EDNOTE: Remove this section before publication. ]
+ o draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-12:
+
+ * Nits identified by Roman, Eric V. Ben K., Barry L. in ballot
+ position review.
+
o draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-11:
* Nits identified by Roman in AD Review.
o draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-10:
* Updated IANA considerations section to request for OID
assignments.
o draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-09:
@@ -166,42 +170,41 @@
* Added Public key algorithm OIDs.
* Populated Introduction and IANA sections.
o draft-ietf-lamps-pkix-shake-00:
* Initial version
2. Introduction
- This document describes cryptographic algorithm identifiers for
- several cryptographic algorithms which use variable length output
- SHAKE functions introduced in [SHA3] which can be used with the
- Internet X.509 Certificate and CRL profile [RFC5280].
+ This document defines cryptographic algorithm identifiers for several
+ cryptographic algorithms that use variable length output SHAKE
+ functions introduced in [SHA3] which can be used with the Internet
+ X.509 Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) profile
+ [RFC5280].
In the SHA-3 family, two extendable-output functions (SHAKEs),
SHAKE128 and SHAKE256, are defined. Four other hash function
- instances, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, and SHA3-512 are also
+ instances, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, and SHA3-512, are also
defined but are out of scope for this document. A SHAKE is a
variable length hash function defined as SHAKE(M, d) where the output
- is a d-bits long digest of message M. The corresponding collision
- and second preimage resistance strengths for SHAKE128 are
- min(d/2,128) and min(d,128) bits respectively (Appendix A.1 [SHA3]).
- And, the corresponding collision and second preimage resistance
- strengths for SHAKE256 are min(d/2,256) and min(d,256) bits
+ is a d-bits-long digest of message M. The corresponding collision
+ and second-preimage-resistance strengths for SHAKE128 are
+ min(d/2,128) and min(d,128) bits, respectively (Appendix A.1 [SHA3]).
+ And the corresponding collision and second-preimage-resistance
+ strengths for SHAKE256 are min(d/2,256) and min(d,256) bits,
respectively.
A SHAKE can be used as the message digest function (to hash the
message to be signed) in RSASSA-PSS [RFC8017] and ECDSA [X9.62] and
as the hash in the mask generation function (MGF) in RSASSA-PSS.
- This specification describes the identifiers for SHAKEs to be used in
- X.509 and their meaning.
3. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
4. Identifiers
@@ -236,52 +239,52 @@
TBD4 }
The parameters for the four identifiers above MUST be absent. That
is, the identifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, the OID.
Section 5.1.1 and Section 5.1.2 specify the required output length
for each use of SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 in RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA. In
summary, when hashing messages to be signed, output lengths of
SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 are 256 and 512 bits respectively. When the
SHAKEs are used as mask generation functions RSASSA-PSS, their output
- length is (n - 264) or (n - 520) bits respectively, where n is the
- RSA modulus size in bits.
+ length is (8*ceil((n-1)/8) - 264) or (8*ceil((n-1)/8) - 520) bits,
+ respectively, where n is the RSA modulus size in bits.
5. Use in PKIX
5.1. Signatures
Signatures are used in a number of different ASN.1 structures. As
- shown in the ASN.1 representation from [RFC5280] below, an X.509
- certificate a signature is encoded with an algorithm identifier in
+ shown in the ASN.1 representation from [RFC5280] below, in an X.509
+ certificate, a signature is encoded with an algorithm identifier in
the signatureAlgorithm attribute and a signatureValue attribute that
contains the actual signature.
Certificate ::= SEQUENCE {
tbsCertificate TBSCertificate,
signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
signatureValue BIT STRING }
The identifiers defined in Section 4 can be used as the
AlgorithmIdentifier in the signatureAlgorithm field in the sequence
- Certificate and the signature field in the sequence tbsCertificate in
+ Certificate and the signature field in the sequence TBSCertificate in
X.509 [RFC5280]. The parameters of these signature algorithms are
absent as explained in Section 4.
Conforming CA implementations MUST specify the algorithms explicitly
by using the OIDs specified in Section 4 when encoding RSASSA-PSS or
ECDSA with SHAKE signatures in certificates and CRLs. Conforming
- client implementations that process RSASSA-PSS or ECDSA with SHAKE
- signatures when processing certificates and CRLs MUST recognize the
- corresponding OIDs. Encoding rules for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA
- signature values are specified in [RFC4055] and [RFC5480]
- respectively.
+ client implementations that process certificates and CRLs using
+ RSASSA-PSS or ECDSA with SHAKE MUST recognize the corresponding OIDs.
+
+ Encoding rules for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA signature values are
+ specified in [RFC4055] and [RFC5480], respectively.
When using RSASSA-PSS or ECDSA with SHAKEs, the RSA modulus and ECDSA
curve order SHOULD be chosen in line with the SHAKE output length.
In the context of this document SHAKE128 OIDs are RECOMMENDED for
2048 or 3072-bit RSA modulus or curves with group order of 256-bits.
SHAKE256 OIDs are RECOMMENDED for 4096-bit RSA modulus and higher or
curves with group order of 384-bits and higher.
5.1.1. RSASSA-PSS Signatures
@@ -289,84 +292,86 @@
PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 specified in Section 4 is
used, the encoding MUST omit the parameters field. That is, the
AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, id-RSASSA-
PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256. [RFC4055] defines RSASSA-
PSS-params that are used to define the algorithms and inputs to the
algorithm. This specification does not use parameters because the
hash, mask generation algorithm, trailer and salt are embedded in the
OID definition.
The hash algorithm to hash a message being signed and the hash
- algorithm as the mask generation function used in RSASSA-PSS MUST be
- the same, SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 respectively. The output-length of
- the hash algorithm which hashes the message SHALL be 32 or 64 bytes
- respectively.
+ algorithm used as the mask generation function in RSASSA-PSS MUST be
+ the same: both SHAKE128 or both SHAKE256. The output length of the
+ hash algorithm which hashes the message SHALL be 32 (for SHAKE128) or
+ 64 bytes (for SHAKE256).
The mask generation function takes an octet string of variable length
and a desired output length as input, and outputs an octet string of
the desired length. In RSASSA-PSS with SHAKEs, the SHAKEs MUST be
used natively as the MGF function, instead of the MGF1 algorithm that
uses the hash function in multiple iterations as specified in
Section B.2.1 of [RFC8017]. In other words, the MGF is defined as
the SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 output of the mgfSeed for id-RSASSA-PSS-
- SHAKE128 and id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 respectively. The mgfSeed is the
- seed from which mask is generated, an octet string [RFC8017]. As
+ SHAKE128 and id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256, respectively. The mgfSeed is
+ the seed from which mask is generated, an octet string [RFC8017]. As
explained in Step 9 of section 9.1.1 of [RFC8017], the output length
of the MGF is emLen - hLen - 1 bytes. emLen is the maximum message
length ceil((n-1)/8), where n is the RSA modulus in bits. hLen is 32
- and 64-bytes for id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 and id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256
+ and 64-bytes for id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 and id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256,
respectively. Thus when SHAKE is used as the MGF, the SHAKE output
- length maskLen is (n - 264) or (n - 520) bits respectively. For
- example, when RSA modulus n is 2048, the output length of SHAKE128 or
- SHAKE256 as the MGF will be 1784 or 1528-bits when id-RSASSA-PSS-
- SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 is used respectively.
+ length maskLen is (8*emLen - 264) or (8*emLen - 520) bits,
+ respectively. For example, when RSA modulus n is 2048, the output
+ length of SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 as the MGF will be 1784 or 1528-bits
+ when id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 or id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 is used,
+ respectively.
- The RSASSA-PSS saltLength MUST be 32 or 64 bytes respectively.
- Finally, the trailerField MUST be 1, which represents the trailer
- field with hexadecimal value 0xBC [RFC8017].
+ The RSASSA-PSS saltLength MUST be 32 bytes for id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128
+ or 64 bytes for id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256. Finally, the trailerField
+ MUST be 1, which represents the trailer field with hexadecimal value
+ 0xBC [RFC8017].
5.1.2. ECDSA Signatures
The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is defined in
[X9.62]. When the id-ecdsa-with-shake128 or id-ecdsa-with-shake256
(specified in Section 4) algorithm identifier appears, the respective
SHAKE function (SHAKE128 or SHAKE256) is used as the hash. The
encoding MUST omit the parameters field. That is, the
AlgorithmIdentifier SHALL be a SEQUENCE of one component, the OID id-
ecdsa-with-shake128 or id-ecdsa-with-shake256.
For simplicity and compliance with the ECDSA standard specification,
the output length of the hash function must be explicitly determined.
The output length, d, for SHAKE128 or SHAKE256 used in ECDSA MUST be
- 256 or 512 bits respectively.
+ 256 or 512 bits, respectively.
- It is RECOMMENDED that conforming CA implementations that generate
- ECDSA with SHAKE signatures in certificates or CRLs generate such
- signatures with a deterministically generated, non-random k in
- accordance with all the requirements specified in [RFC6979]. They
- MAY also generate such signatures in accordance with all other
- recommendations in [X9.62] or [SEC1] if they have a stated policy
- that requires conformance to these standards. These standards have
- not specified SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 as hash algorithm options.
- However, SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 with output length being 32 and 64
- octets respectively can be used instead of 256 and 512-bit output
- hash algorithms such as SHA256 and SHA512 used in the standards.
+ Conforming CA implementations that generate ECDSA with SHAKE
+ signatures in certificates or CRLs SHOULD generate such signatures
+ with a deterministically generated, non-random k in accordance with
+ all the requirements specified in [RFC6979]. They MAY also generate
+ such signatures in accordance with all other recommendations in
+ [X9.62] or [SEC1] if they have a stated policy that requires
+ conformance to those standards. Those standards have not specified
+ SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 as hash algorithm options. However, SHAKE128
+ and SHAKE256 with output length being 32 and 64 octets, respectively,
+ can be used instead of 256 and 512-bit output hash algorithms such as
+ SHA256 and SHA512.
5.2. Public Keys
Certificates conforming to [RFC5280] can convey a public key for any
public key algorithm. The certificate indicates the public key
algorithm through an algorithm identifier. This algorithm identifier
is an OID and optionally associated parameters. The conventions and
encoding for RSASSA-PSS and ECDSA public keys algorithm identifiers
- are as specified in Section 2.3 of [RFC3279], Section 3.1 of
- [RFC4055] and Section 2.1 of [RFC5480].
+ are as specified in Section 2.3.1 and 2.3.5 of [RFC3279], Section 3.1
+ of [RFC4055] and Section 2.1 of [RFC5480].
Traditionally, the rsaEncryption object identifier is used to
identify RSA public keys. The rsaEncryption object identifier
continues to identify the subject public key when the RSA private key
owner does not wish to limit the use of the public key exclusively to
RSASSA-PSS with SHAKEs. When the RSA private key owner wishes to
limit the use of the public key exclusively to RSASSA-PSS with
SHAKEs, the AlgorithmIdentifiers for RSASSA-PSS defined in Section 4
SHOULD be used as the algorithm field in the SubjectPublicKeyInfo
sequence [RFC5280]. Conforming client implementations that process
@@ -601,38 +606,38 @@
PublicKeys PUBLIC-KEY ::= {
-- This expands PublicKeys from [RFC5912]
pk-rsaSSA-PSS-SHAKE128 |
pk-rsaSSA-PSS-SHAKE256,
...
}
-- The hashAlgorithm is mda-shake128
-- The maskGenAlgorithm is id-shake128
-- Mask Gen Algorithm is SHAKE128 with output length
- -- (n - 264) bits, where n is the RSA modulus in bits.
- -- the saltLength is 32
- -- the trailerField is 1
+ -- (8*ceil((n-1)/8) - 264) bits, where n is the RSA
+ -- modulus in bits.
+ -- The saltLength is 32. The trailerField is 1.
pk-rsaSSA-PSS-SHAKE128 PUBLIC-KEY ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128
KEY RSAPublicKey
PARAMS ARE absent
-- Private key format not in this module --
CERT-KEY-USAGE { nonRepudiation, digitalSignature,
keyCertSign, cRLSign }
}
-- The hashAlgorithm is mda-shake256
-- The maskGenAlgorithm is id-shake256
-- Mask Gen Algorithm is SHAKE256 with output length
- -- (n - 520)-bits, where n is the RSA modulus in bits.
- -- the saltLength is 64
- -- the trailerField is 1
+ -- (8*ceil((n-1)/8) - 520)-bits, where n is the RSA
+ -- modulus in bits.
+ -- The saltLength is 64. The trailerField is 1.
pk-rsaSSA-PSS-SHAKE256 PUBLIC-KEY ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256
KEY RSAPublicKey
PARAMS ARE absent
-- Private key format not in this module --
CERT-KEY-USAGE { nonRepudiation, digitalSignature,
keyCertSign, cRLSign }
}
--
@@ -659,66 +664,66 @@
...
}
-- RSASSA-PSS with SHAKE128
sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE128 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128
PARAMS ARE absent
-- The hashAlgorithm is mda-shake128
-- The maskGenAlgorithm is id-shake128
-- Mask Gen Algorithm is SHAKE128 with output length
- -- (n - 264) bits, where n is the RSA modulus in bits.
- -- the saltLength is 32
- -- the trailerField is 1
+ -- (8*ceil((n-1)/8) - 264) bits, where n is the RSA
+ -- modulus in bits.
+ -- The saltLength is 32. The trailerField is 1
HASHES { mda-shake128 }
PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-rsa | pk-rsaSSA-PSS-SHAKE128 }
SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 }
}
id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)
TBD1 }
-- RSASSA-PSS with SHAKE256
sa-rsassapssWithSHAKE256 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256
PARAMS ARE absent
-- The hashAlgorithm is mda-shake256
-- The maskGenAlgorithm is id-shake256
-- Mask Gen Algorithm is SHAKE256 with output length
- -- (n - 520)-bits, where n is the RSA modulus in bits.
- -- the saltLength is 64
- -- the trailerField is 1
+ -- (8*ceil((n-1)/8) - 520)-bits, where n is the
+ -- RSA modulus in bits.
+ -- The saltLength is 64. The trailerField is 1.
HASHES { mda-shake256 }
PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-rsa | pk-rsaSSA-PSS-SHAKE256 }
SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 }
}
id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)
TBD2 }
- -- Deterministic ECDSA with SHAKE128
+ -- ECDSA with SHAKE128
sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE128 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-ecdsa-with-shake128
VALUE ECDSA-Sig-Value
PARAMS ARE absent
HASHES { mda-shake128 }
PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-ec }
SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-ecdsa-with-shake128 }
}
id-ecdsa-with-shake128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) algorithms(6)
TBD3 }
- -- Deterministic ECDSA with SHAKE256
+ -- ECDSA with SHAKE256
sa-ecdsaWithSHAKE256 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-ecdsa-with-shake256
VALUE ECDSA-Sig-Value
PARAMS ARE absent
HASHES { mda-shake256 }
PUBLIC-KEYS { pk-ec }
SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-ecdsa-with-shake256 }
}
id-ecdsa-with-shake256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)